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Bolshevik leadership Correspondence. 1912-1927
Collection of documents 1996.
Compiled by: A.V.Kvashonkin, L.P.Kosheleva, L.A.Rogovaya, O.V.Khlevnyuk.
Section II 1921 - 1927
Published letters for 1921-1927. to a certain extent reflect the situation in the highest echelons of the party and state leadership of the country during the period of approval and the beginning of the curtailment of the NEP, an acute intra-party struggle.
The transition to NEP coincided with a significant redistribution of forces in the Kremlin leadership. Beginning in 1921, Lenin was often ill. In his absence, the party and the state were ruled by a "troika" - L. B. Kamenev, Lenin's deputy in the Council of People's Commissars and the STO, presiding at meetings of the Politburo, I. V. Stalin, who actually headed the apparatus of the Central Committee of the party, and G. E. Zinoviev, who headed the executive committee Comintern. Initially, the "troika" acted cautiously, in agreement with Lenin. However, as the health of the leader worsened, his associates began to seriously prepare for the succession to power. Returning briefly to business in the autumn of 1922, Lenin was confronted with the concentration of "immense power" in Stalin's hands and the special opinion of the "troika" on many issues. Lenin decided to tame his comrades-in-arms.
He chose disagreements on the national question as one of the reasons for the attack. Their essence is known: Stalin proposed the idea of "autonomization of the republics", Lenin advocated a union state. An integral part of this conflict was the so-called "Georgian incident", which was widely publicized and of fundamental importance. It consisted in a sharp confrontation between the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia and the Transcaucasian Regional Committee headed by G. K. Ordzhonikidze. Personal rivalry and ambition clashed over the issue of a Transcaucasian federation. Ordzhonikidze, receiving constant support from Stalin, advocated a federation of the three Transcaucasian republics, the group of P. G. Mdivani insisted on independent entry of Georgia into the USSR, bypassing the Transcaucasian Federation. Passions ran high. Ordzhonikidze, instigated by Stalin, behaved aggressively and in a fit of anger hit one of the Georgian leaders. This gave rise to new proceedings. Lenin demanded that the issue be raised to a fundamental level, that Ordzhonikidze be roughly punished, and he was going to give battle to Stalin for displaying great power. However, the alignment of political forces in the highest echelons of power was already such that the conflict was hushed up.1 .
Letters from A. M. Nazaretyan to G. K. Ordzhonikidze (documents No. 159-160, 162, 164, 166-168) testify to many of the nuances of these events, as well as their perception in Stalin's entourage. In 1922-1923. Nazaretyan headed the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee (Stalin's office) and was well aware of the situation in the party leadership.
As one would expect, soon after Lenin's final retirement from business, friction and disagreements began in the leading "troika". However, sharp clashes with L. D. Trotsky, which broke out in the autumn of 1923, temporarily rallied the "troika". In order to mobilize forces and coordinate the struggle against Trotsky, a majority faction was created. She convened her plenum and formed a leading "seven" at it, consisting of six members of the Politburo (all except Trotsky) and the chairman of the Central Control Commission, Kuibyshev. The "Seven" met regularly throughout 1924-1925. and actually led the party, submitting already agreed decisions to the official meetings of the Politburo (with the participation of Trotsky). Some additional information about the circumstances of the creation of the majority faction is contained in Kalinin's published letter (document No. 183).
However, the majority faction and the "seven" turned out to be a fragile formation. In fact, having removed Trotsky from power, yesterday's allies entered a period of serious political conflicts that ended in the complete collapse of the "seven" and a sharp confrontation between Kamenev and Zinoviev and the majority of the Politburo. This confrontation was painfully perceived even by Stalin's unconditional supporters, who feared that the crisis at the top would develop into a general crisis of the regime (documents No. 187, 193).
The final defeat of the oppositionists, the backbone of which were representatives of the Leningrad party organization led by Zinoviev, took place at the XIV Congress of the CPSU (b). After the congress, the majority in the Politburo carried out a "restore order" campaign. A brigade of members of the Central Committee was sent to Leningrad - A. A. Andreev, K. E. Voroshilov, M. I. Kalinin, S. M. Kirov, V. M. Molotov, G. I. Petrovsky, M. P. Tomsky, V. V. Schmidt. Kirov was appointed the new head of the Leningrad organization. The published letters of Kirov and Voroshilov to Ordzhonikidze (documents No. 196, 198, 202, 204) testify to how the “explanation of the decisions of the XIV Congress” took place in Leningrad.
At the same time, organizational consolidation of the victory over the opposition at the 14th Congress was also carried out in Moscow - major reshuffles were made in the government apparatus. In particular, Kamenev was removed from the post of chairman of the STO of the USSR and appointed to a secondary position of People's Commissar of Trade. Despite the protests of Kamenev and Zinoviev, this decision was approved (see Document No. 197).
The victories over the opposition, however, did not remove the contradictions that seized the leading faction itself. The absence (at least explicitly) of political friction in the group of leaders who rallied around Stalin was fully compensated by numerous clashes and conflicts on departmental grounds. The most active participant in these conflicts (by virtue of his positions) was F. E. Dzerzhinsky. He literally bombarded his colleagues with numerous proposal letters and protest statements, some of which are published in the section (documents No. 189, 201, 211, 217). Ultimately, these interdepartmental conflicts reflected the crisis state of the management system as a whole, which became one of the significant reasons for the destruction of the NEP and the subsequent victory of the ultra-left course.
The last block of letters published in the section reflects the events of the intra-party struggle in the autumn of 1927, during the period of the final defeat of the united opposition of L. D. Trotsky, G. E. Zinoviev, L. B. Kamenev and their supporters.
After sharp clashes with the majority in the Politburo in the summer, on September 3, 1927, the leaders of the opposition sent to the Central Committee "The draft platform of the Bolshevik-Leninists (opposition) for the XV Congress of the CPSU (b) (The Crisis of the Party and Ways to Overcome It)". The document was signed by 13 well-known figures of the party - Muralov, Evdokimov, Rakovsky, Pyatakov, Smilga, Zinoviev, Trotsky, Kamenev, Peterson, Bakaev, Solovyov, Lizdin, Avdeev2. The opposition demanded the distribution of the "platform" and the opening of a discussion on it on the eve of the XV Congress of the CPSU (b). By decision of the Politburo, however, the publication of the "platform" was prohibited. The oppositionists began to distribute their documents on their own, organizing their illegal publication.
Around one of the printing houses where opposition publications were printed, the OGPU organized a large-scale provocation. The OGPU brought their agent (who later appeared in all documents as a “former officer of the Wrangel army”) to a certain Shcherbakov (“son of a former manufacturer, non-party”), who worked in a printing house of the opposition. On September 12, this printing house was searched and arrested. Some members of the opposition were also searched. On the basis of falsified materials, the oppositionists were accused of involvement in a "counter-revolutionary organization", which allegedly was preparing a military putsch. On September 22 and 27, on behalf of the Politburo and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, notices were sent to party organizations about the disclosure of the Trotskyist printing house and the organization of "military conspirators." Oppositionists wrote protests3 . The chairman of the OGPU, Menzhinsky, was forced to admit that the "Wrangel officer" was an agent of the OGPU. As can be seen from Stalin's published letter to Ordzhonikidze (Document No. 226), Stalin was also well aware of the true background of the case and therefore did not even mention the "counter-revolutionary organization." However, all this no longer mattered. As noted in a statement by opposition leaders dated October 4, 1927, "the legend of the 'Wrangel officer' is circulating around the country, poisoning the minds of a million party members and tens of millions of non-party people" 4 .
In connection with the printing house case, a group of active oppositionists was expelled from the party. "Organization of an illegal anti-Party printing press for the destruction of the Party" - this was one of the main accusations on the basis of which the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, held on October 21-23, 1927, removed Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Central Committee 5 . The oppositionists continued to resist, tried to appeal to the party and working masses, convened meetings, spoke at various kinds of meetings, etc. But at the end of 1927 they were finally crushed and expelled from the party.
One of the main actors in these events could be G. K. Ordzhonikidze, who served as chairman of the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. However, due to the deterioration of his health, in August-November 1927 he was abroad for treatment. The letters included in the volume about the internal party struggle are addressed to Ordzhonikidze and reflect mainly the official point of view on these events .
The defeat of the opposition and the establishment of the absolute power of the Stalinist group gave rise to new contradictions, which soon resulted in deeper and more destructive crises. As the final documents of the publication show, this threat was fully realized not only by the former oppositionists, but also by representatives of the winning faction. However, they preferred to speak about their fears (which was also a consequence of the suppression of oppositions) in an undertone, half-hints, and only among themselves.
Notes:
1 For more details about these events, see: Zhuravlev V.V., Nenarokov A.P. New facts and documents from the history of the formation of the USSR / / Historians argue. 13 conversations. M., 1989. S. 191-227; A failed anniversary. Why the USSR did not celebrate its 70th anniversary. M., 1992.
2 Trotsky archive. Communist opposition in the USSR. 1923-1927. M., 1990. T. 4. S. 109-174.
3 Ibid. pp. 189-201.
4 Ibid. S. 200.
5 CPSU in resolutions ... T. 4. S. 249-250.
6 See also Stalin's letter to Ordzhonikidze dated October 15, 1927, and letters from Stalin's wife N. S. Alliluyeva dated August-November 1927 addressed to Ordzhonikidze's wife Zinaida Gavrilovna (she was abroad with him) - Free Thought. 1993. No. 5. P. 74-80 (publication by Zh. Adibekova and S. Ivanova).
Section II 1921 - 1927