Bolshevik Leaders correspondence

Bolshevik leadership Correspondence. 1912-1927
Collection of documents 1996.
Compiled by: A.V.Kvashonkin, L.P.Kosheleva, L.A.Rogovaya, O.V.Khlevnyuk.

No. 173

G. L. Pyatakov to I. V. Stalin

November 1, 1923

T. Stalin 1 .

Dear comrade St[alin]! I am replying to your note and sharing some of my observations with you. From the text you will see why he delayed his letter so much.

1. Pro domo sua

The PB sent me with my full consent 2 . I have never refused and will never refuse any assignment that gives me the opportunity to apply my forces as a revolutionary. I will not hide - I had a very hard time here. The hopes that were pinned on me, to a large extent (it is difficult for me to admit this, but in order to dispel another illusion, I consider myself obliged to express this too), will not come true. Of course, I will be useful in outlining the general line, but as regards the concrete, everyday work in which Andrei[she] and I 3should take part, then here is my firmness, determination, clarity in the work, etc. definitely don't show up. The fact is that - as I now clearly see - the main prerequisite for these properties is necessarily: 1) complete knowledge of all concrete life, such knowledge that gives intuitive decisions before rational analysis and 2) knowledge of people, which allows you to translate political decisions into certain organizational and technical measures. Unfortunately, I do not have this prerequisite. As a result, at first I felt like a fish thrown ashore. Of course, since I am not completely deprived of the head apparatus, I gradually get used to the specific situation, but still even now (and three weeks have already passed) I feel quite helpless. Every time the question is "who will do it?" I have to wait for what others will say and take offers on faith - this is very painful. On the other hand, the language also binds me. Of course, I can talk, explain myself, etc., but when it comes to wordings, resolutions, political documents, etc., I myself can’t offer - I don’t speak the language so well.

However, I think that I still bring some benefit here. Not relying only on myself, I consulted with Andrei and he, too, was of the opinion that I was needed here. So we both think that I should be left here. I wrote about my difficulties so that you would not scold me in the future for having done little.

2. Household.

I was very well aware and I am aware that my departure will cause a whole series of negative phenomena in the apparatus. But I, for my part, took the following measures: 1) informed through Dzerzhinsky that, in my opinion , A.D.Ts. 5 should be appointed instead of A.I. e. with release from other work) 6 . 2) I wrote a note to you and A.D.Ts., in which I recommend that you talk to Yulip from time to time, who will truthfully inform you about what is happening there. 3) He asked Yulip to keep you and A.D.Ts. informed of all the affairs. What else could I do?

Then I move on to the local business.

Three main facts inspire me with the strongest anxiety:

1) Party.

2) Armament.

3) The working class.

1. Party.

a) The intra-Party crisis has acquired an unheard-of acuteness. This should be clear to you without much explanation. The Central Committee gave the slogan "to act," then (quite correctly) pulled back. Hamburg performed 7. For a whole week the Central Committee was in the net (moving from Dresden, lack of organization of the illegal apparatus, etc.). As a result, the opposition is furiously attacking the Central Committee. It got to the point that on October 31 the Berliners convened, without the knowledge of the Central Committee, a party conference not only of Berlin-Brandenburg, but also of Hamburg, Mecklenburg, Thuringia, etc., i.e., they actually convened a conference for a split. We banned this conference, but the very attempt to convene is characteristic. The opposition demands Brandler's resignation. 2 Berlin districts passed a resolution expelling Br[andler] from the Party. It got to the point that Comrade Shklovsky writes to us that Br[andler] should be removed from the Central Committee, because he is a dead man. A whole bunch of such facts could be cited. All of them testify to the deepest inner-party crisis.

The Party Council is meeting tomorrow, and I foresee that something scandalous will be played out at it.

Andrey and I are taking all measures at our disposal to strengthen the Central Committee without surgical measures. As a matter of fact, a number of "Lefts" should be thrown out of the Party, but this cannot be done now. By the way, these are not leftists at all, but opportunist talkers with leftist phrases. Facts: 1) At a conference of the Berliners with Andrei[ey] and with me, they brought forward the accusation of the Central Committee that it paid too much attention to the technical preparation of the [armed] in [the uprising]. Ruth said bluntly: “It is necessary to prepare for [an armed] insurrection not technically, but politically.” 2) The Berliners rebelled in every possible way against the protest strike. 3) The Berliners treat the issues of armament as secondary issues. 4) At the moment, they are not serious about the [armed] in [rebellion], preferring squabbles within the Party. That is my impression.

In a word, the position within the Party is extremely difficult.

This is aggravated by the fact that the Central Committee is weak, has really made a lot of mistakes, and by the fact that the Party's illegal apparatus is acting extremely badly.

II. Armament. Suffice it to say that we have: 11,000 rifles! 2000 revolvers and 1 1/2 hundreds of machine gun pistols. This is the most important task.

III. The working class is by no means so unanimously active and does not at all follow the CP entirely. Suffice it to say, in cases where the S[social]-d[emocrats] are against it, significant sections of the working class do not come forward. Let's see how today's strike will go, against which the S[social]-d[emocrats] and A.D.G.V. have spoken out .

Of course, the craving for us is enormous. This is visible throughout. But this process has not yet reached the point where we can say: we are leading the working class. Therefore, we see as the main task a frenzied struggle for the working class, a complete break with the social democrats, frenzied persecution of the social democrats, etc. Many facts show that that within the social [social]-d[emocracy] there is a strong decomposition.

I think that 1) the exit of a large number of social [social]-d[emocrats] - workers from the Party and the transition to us and 2) a split in the social [social]-d[emocratic] p[arty] is inevitable. A few curious illustrative facts: five organizations of social [social]-d[emocrats] (Leipzig, Berlin, etc.) demanded the expulsion of Ebert from the Party; in which speeches against the Central Committee aroused stormy approval. Wurm said: we do not agree with the communists, but remember that the actions on the right are directed against you, and the actions on the left are for you; at this point, the report notes: "Brausender Beifall", i.e. "stormy approval." I don't have time to give you a number of similar facts. It is clear to me that the more furiously we attack the Social-Democrats, the sooner this process will proceed.

What do I want to say with this letter?

Here's what: we are sending you the general situation today with the next report (Andrei is writing it now). I consider myself obliged to add that our army has not yet been assembled to deliver a decisive blow . It's sad, but true. According to the general situation, I would now go into battle. The condition of the army forces me to take a different position: the preparation of an armed uprising, the preparation is not only technical (and technical as opposed to pseudo-lefts), but also political: party rallying, rallying the worker class, disorganization of the social [democratic] and disorganization of the Reichswehr.

Unfortunately, I did not have time to write about the latter. I will say briefly: the greatest delusion is that nothing can be done with the Reichswehr. Can be done. There are already concrete facts of small riots, we have connections, and so on. It is only necessary to strengthen this work many times over.

Well, I shake hands. Don't get angry at the long silence. I did not want to give you only rumors, and for this I had to get more comfortable with the situation.

This letter, although addressed to you, of course, can be sent to all members of the PB, with the exception of paragraphs 1 and 2, which are only for you.

Arvid 10 .

Berlin, 1.XI.1923

PS I am very worried about our intra-Party situation in the USSR. If you have mercy, write at least briefly what you thought up there and what you did. Did you call the meeting that we asked you to do? What was on it? I don't know anything for sure, and this torments me in the strongest way. Just for God's sake don't start a fight - otherwise everything will be lost 11 . If you fight, we will quit working here (this is not a threat, but a conclusion from the fact that under such conditions our work here is meaningless). Please write to me.

I also ask L. D. [Trotsky] about this

A[rvid].

PSS The scandal in the Central Committee is being played out. Because of this, Andr[ey] is unable to write a report. We are now going with him to a meeting with Br[andler], Ruth [Fischer] and Helm 12 . I read my letter to him, and he fully agreed with it. We ask you to give a copy to Zinoviev and Trotsky.

Ar[view].

RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 2. D. 137. L. 1-5. Typewritten text.

Notes:

1 At the top of the first sheet is Stalin's inscription: "Only to Trotsky, Zinoviev and Bukharin."

2 The decision to send Pyatakov to Germany was made by the Politburo on October 4, 1923 (Source. 1995. No. 5. P. 138).

3 Radek's pseudonym.

4 A. I. Rykov.

5 A. D. Tsyurupa.

6 This, apparently, is about the implementation of economic support for the German revolution. On September 13, 1923, the Politburo considered proposals to send 10 million poods of grain bread to Germany and entrusted the practical implementation of this action to Rudzutak, Rykov and Krasin (Ibid., pp. 128-129).

On October 23-25, 1923, an armed uprising of the communists took place in Hamburg, which was being prepared as part of an all-German uprising. On the eve of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany, the all-German strike was canceled, which was supposed to develop into an armed uprising, but this information accidentally did not reach Hamburg. The uprising in Hamburg was put down.

8 All-German Association of Trade Unions.

9 Stalin tacitly supported the ultra-lefts in the German Communist Party, who considered the decision to cancel the uprising a mistake. Pyatakov defended the correctness of this decision and once again tried to prove it to Stalin in his letter (See: Babichenko L.G. Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), Comintern and events in Germany in 1923. New archival materials / / Modern and recent history. 1994. No. 2. S. 125-157).

10 Pyatakov's pseudonym.

11 . In October 1923, a sharp struggle unfolded in the Politburo between Trotsky and the "troika" - Stalin, Zinoviev, Kamenev.

12 . Probably, we are talking about the Soviet military emissary in Germany, Skoblevsky.

No. 174

B. I. Magidov to I. V. Stalin

November 10 [1923]

Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP.

comrade STALIN.

Dear comrade.

Let it not surprise you that I am writing you a personal, informal letter.

This is explained by the fact that what I will describe below, for a number of reasons, I consider it not entirely appropriate to write officially.

When [I] was in Moscow with a report to the Orgburo (in October) 1 , you were on vacation and therefore did not manage to speak in person.

The general state of the party, the inner-party events that took place in October, perhaps I am not entirely accurate, because officially, as secretary of the Gubernia Committee, I am not informed about the events; facts, materials about the situation and mood of the workers of Donbass, which were cited at the last plenum of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U (October 29-31), encourage me, as a member of the party, to write to you.

First of all, such a situation is absolutely abnormal when the secretaries of the Gubkoms are absolutely unaware of the matter, they are not informed by the Central Committee about the internal state of the party, when, to our great common regret, this is talked about everywhere, gossip about it in non-party circles.

I especially have in mind the last disagreement [in] the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, the statement of Comrade. Trotsky and platform 46. (Neither the statements of Comrade Trotsky, nor platform 46, needless to say, had to be read).

Meanwhile, Soviet and economic workers traveling to Moscow on their departmental business, returning, turn to the secretary of the Gubkom with all sorts of questions for them and, in particular, for the secretary in this case, perplexed questions.

The absence of correct, timely, accurate, if not official, then at least private information, has a very harmful effect on the leadership of Party work.

If only I were in such a position, then it would not be worth writing about, wasting your time and mine.

In such "obscurity and ignorance" is the vast majority of responsible Party workers appointed by the Central Committee of the Party and elected by local organizations to lead Party work.

But all this, dear comrade. Stalin, only a preface.

During the last Plenum of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U, when meeting with many old party members, it turns out that the old party guard is too oppressed.

There is no living party life, party thought is not beating.

The so-called party discipline (applied according to a template) dominates and prevails.

I assure you, comrade. Stalin, that until now the resolutions of the 10th, 11th, and 12th Party Congresses, especially the 10th, on intra-Party workers' democracy, have been poorly carried out and instilled into life.

Meanwhile, the masses, the rank-and-file mass of the Party, including the non-Party masses, have grown up, matured and objectively demand more attention to themselves, yearn to know everything that really exists.

In connection with the latest circular of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party and the Central Control Commission of the Russian Communist Party on excesses (No. 58 of 19/X), the questions about “tops” and “bottoms”, about “specialists”, about high rates, about all kinds of bonuses and bonuses, etc. etc. 2

How can one prevent the possibility (and some think the inevitability) of the reappearance of deviations on the part of the rank and file of Party members.

There is only one way: a correct, strictly sustained, clear-cut communist line, and along with this, we ourselves, the leaders of the masses, should be a little more modest - serve as an example and a model.

But this is not really the case.

Example: members of the Union Central Executive Committee and members of the VUTsIK received a salary of 100 gold rubles in September, and 150 in October.

When an ordinary member of a cell working at a machine tool sees that the secretary of the Gubkom pays 35 gold rubles and a membership fee of 5 gold rubles to the commission for improving the life of the communists, and he sees an ordinary member of the party working at a machine tool, the entire monthly salary earned is maximum 25-30 rubles in gold.

Hence, involuntarily, he begins to think about the “tops” and “bottoms”, about blatant inequality, etc.

When the working mass (quite literate) reads an announcement in the newspapers that for October, approximately, the rate for a party member, from which deductions should not be paid, is 80 gold rubles, then the worker involuntarily begins to talk and expresses dissatisfaction with the "tops".

You obviously know that in September and October there were strikes all the time in the Donbass, and in October almost all Donbass went on strike.

The main reason is the delay in the payment of wages. But not only that: the living conditions of the miners of Donbass are worse than bestial ones.

10,000 workers of Donbass prefer to go down into the mines every day, live in the rocks, in the bowels of the earth, 200, 300, 500 fathoms deep, the miner feels better there than in his "apartment".

You know that in the Mine District (Alexandro-Grushevsky District) all the miners (approximately 30-35 thousand) were on strike for ten days and unanimously refused to take the pay sent to them in the amount of 40% of the following.

The workers of Donbass say: what prevents them from “paying off like a miner with the leaders of Donbass for arrogance and mockery of a miner for five years, for systematic deceit and swindle, for not fulfilling almost a single promise, and there were hundreds of them ...

If they had paid off - rest assured - repeats the miner (perhaps incited by the provocation of the Mensheviks) - yes, you can’t be a traitor in relation to the German revolution.

All this was officially said at the plenum of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U by a member of the Central Committee, a responsible representative of Donbass.

It is not entirely clear to us why we pay the 200,000-strong army of Soviet workers carefully twice a month and systematically do not pay the Donbass.

Isn’t it possible with the same right not to pay so carefully (not in the Soviet way neatly) to our co-workers and to pay the miners of Donbass.

We also do not quite understand another circumstance: as soon as the miners go on strike, spend a week, money appears (and the miners take this circumstance seriously).

And why not approach this issue in the most serious (Leninist) way and bring a couple of responsible and most responsible leaders to public trial, if we are not capable of doing anything else.

What is the result - the Poltava province, entirely rural, is set up very positively towards the Soviet power, carefully fulfills all Soviet duties, the unified agricultural tax for November 5 was made in the amount of 64.8% (20 million pounds in rye units), although "scissors" so far they have no tendency to narrow.

There is no political banditry in the province, there are also no strikes (once the Poltava cab drivers went on strike for 7 days, so this even benefited the Gubkommunkhoz, which transported passengers from the station with its means of transportation and thereby struggled with excesses).

So in the rural Poltava region we are seeing a Soviet paradise, and in the proletarian Donbass they are already on strike according to plan and quite systematically.

There is something to ponder, comrade. Stalin.

We, the local workers, unfortunately, get the impression and even the conviction that in the leading central Party, Soviet and economic circles, if they think about these questions, they do not take decisive, cardinal measures.

Everyone is waiting for something, everyone is hoping that maybe the Bolshevik curve will take them out.

Try hard, comrade. Stalin, instruct reliable comrades to be in the midst of not only the workers, but, most importantly, the masses of the Party, but let these comrades not show that they are from the center.

Let them talk frankly with the rank and file about our shortcomings and shortcomings, and they will hear a lot, more than they should, of bitter communist truths.

I had a chance to talk with a responsible party worker of a large industrial center, and he, with great party pain, was forced to admit that sometimes he was overcome by doubt, overcome by pessimism, and involuntarily a mood was created that we were falling into some kind of dead end.

The Party organizations in the localities do not have sufficient firm confidence that the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, in connection with the latest circular on excesses (by the way, very long-awaited and quite satisfactory), will lead a decisive and cardinal struggle against hundreds and thousands of unacceptable acts and outrages perpetrated by Party members.

How can one explain that despite a number of recent circulars from the Central Committee of our Party about a resolute struggle against all kinds of banquets, offerings, about the termination of the issuance of bonuses, etc., remnants of bourgeois-petty-bourgeois traditions, only a few days ago Narkomfin sent to his subordinates in the form of a gold watch award. (Head of the Gubfin Department and his assistant, of course, to the communists).

Everyone knows this and emphasizes the duality and contradiction of our practice, for we ourselves issue circulars about taking away precious items from the Communists.

In general, circulars (about the same content as the fight against excesses) are still used to be viewed most of all as a political act (we have developed too much politicking and politicking), a non-committal center, and vice versa - very obliging periphery.

Meanwhile, the main burden in the fight against excesses, of course, will have to be overcome in the center (Moscow, Petrograd, Kharkov, and other metropolitan areas).

After the Twelfth Party Congress it was perfectly clear to us that the absence of Ilyich imposed on us an enormous collective responsibility.

We perfectly understood that there was no one to replace Ilyich personally.

But, unfortunately, we were not sufficiently and to a certain extent certain that an ideological and militant unity would be created in the Central Committee.

That is why we have attached and continue to attach actual importance to the question of the maximum unity of Party members.

First of all, it is necessary to seriously and for a long time raise the question of the indispensable practical implementation of inner-Party workers' democracy.

The mass of the party, the middle peasants of the party, has grown noticeably, matured, stands firmly on the Bolshevik positions and urgently demands confidence in itself from the leaders of the mass of the party, including from the members of the Central Committee.

What is needed is correct, timely, well in advance, undisguised information about everything that is being done in the Central Committee. It is possible less often, and only in the most exceptional cases, to resort to measures of an administrative nature and perhaps less often to resort to the use of administrative diligence.

It is necessary to avoid cases of cancellation by one person (no matter what high post and rank he occupies) of the decision of an elected body.

It is very useful that members of the Central Committee often travel to places and, especially, the presence of the latter at party conferences and plenums of the Gubernia Committee.

It is necessary to carry out firmly and resolutely (again in the Leninist way) the practical measures outlined in the circular on excesses.

It is necessary to categorically forbid all heads of departments to bring any precious gifts (Acceptable gift, in our opinion, is a good book that is already being used locally).

Tov. Stalin, if I decided to take your time, it is only because I am deeply convinced that, with the courage inherent in us Bolsheviks (we, Lenin's disciples), if we only delve deeper into the interests of the working class and the peasantry, we will create within ourselves atmosphere of mutual trust - we will certainly succeed this time as well in getting out of a very difficult situation with honor.

It goes without saying that there can be no question of any pessimism.

The sixth anniversary of October has shown what enormous strength and hope we can draw from the working class and the peasantry, and what selfless confidence the Communist Party enjoys among the working masses.

Waiting for your answer with communist greetings.

Secretary of the Poltava Provincial Committee: B. Magidov.

Poltava

November 10th. G.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 2565. L. 2-7. Typewritten text. The signature is an autograph.

Notes:

1 The report of the secretary of the Poltava provincial committee of the CP(b) U Magidov was considered by the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) on October 8, 1923 (RTsKhIDNI. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 486. L. 1).

2 Circular of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission on "Struggle against excesses and against the criminal use of official position by party members" (Ibid. D. 561. L. 56-56v.).

No. 175

N. N. Krestinsky to I. V. Stalin, F. E. Dzerzhinsky, M. A. Trilisser, V. R. Menzhinsky

November 13, 1923

Tov. Stalin.

Copies of comrades Dzerzhinsky, Trilisser and Menzhinsky.

Dear Comrade!

I received a telegram from you on November 9th stating that MYASNIKOV should not be issued a visa until he submits a written application and considers this application in the Central Committee 1. On the 11th, a telegram arrived from Comrade Trilisser with a proposal to cancel Myasnikov's visa or to report exactly the day of his departure. On the 9th I telegraphed you that Myasnikov's visa had already been issued on November 3rd. Upon receipt of Comrade Trilisser's telegram, I tried to find out whether Myasnikov had already left. I found out that the visa had been issued to him on the 3rd, that he had received the passport with the visa from us on the 5th, that he had said goodbye to a number of familiar comrades at the same time, and that it was not known when he left or whether he left. This is the actual situation. If I establish that he has not left yet, I will try to find him and cancel the visa. If he has already left, then it is easier for you to find out at the border point when he passed. In addition, he was going to go straight to Moscow to an apartment with his family.

I turn now to the merits of the matter. In early September, I received from Comrade. Dzerzhinsky a letter with a request to persuade Myasnikov to return 2 and with an official decision of the GPU to cancel his expulsion. By the way, this was the only official message about Myasnikov, because I did not receive any message about his deportation.

I summoned Myasnikov to me, informed him of the possibility of returning. My message met with his own initiative, he decided to go, then raised the question of not being arrested, then said that he was going to open a campaign here against the Central Committee and, to some extent, against the Comintern, then he came and said that he was ready to go, not demanding no guarantees, leaving the Sovpra and the Central Committee themselves in Russia to decide whether he should be arrested or not. Such a decision by Myasnikov was entirely in favor of the comrade transferred to me. Dzerzhinsky decision of the Central Committee. I ordered that a visa be issued to him and contacted the Trade Representation about sending Myasnikov to Moscow. After all this has been done, when the apparatus of the Trade Representation is aware of his official secondment to Moscow, and he has his passport with a visa in his hands, it is extremely inconvenient to suddenly change the previous decision. Decision, which at one time was reported to Myasnikov as a decision taken on the own initiative of the Soviet authorities. In this case, there is nothing more to be done. If Myasnikov has not left, I will suspend his trip. If I left, I can't stop. But I would very much like to ask you in the future not to put the Plenipotentiary in such an uncomfortable position that it can be used both against the Plenipotentiary and against the Soviet in the most diverse press organs.

I do not understand the reasons for changing the original decision. Comrade Dzerzhinsky's letter was obviously written after Kuznetsov was arrested and the work of Working Group 3 was revealedand, in particular, Myasnikov in Russia and abroad. Obviously, the Central Committee then decided that Myasnikov could cause more trouble and harm abroad than in Russia. I think the same is true now. Now Myasnikov is leaving for Russia under the impression of a new aggravation of the proletarian struggle on an international scale, which began, first of all, in Germany. Under this impression, he will change direction or ease the tension of his struggle in Russia. If he stays here, then with the onset of a certain period of calm, he can return to his former mood and start sharp performances here on an international scale. Not to mention the fact that with the current crisis in the German Party, especially in the Berlin organization, and with Myasnikov’s connection with the left Berliners, his stay here is certainly more harmful than in Moscow4 .

With comradely greetings, N. Krestinsky.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 76. Op. 3. D. 162. L. 15-16. Typewritten text. The signature is an autograph.

Notes:

1 G. I. Myasnikov, an old Bolshevik, one of the leaders of the party organization of Motovilikha (Perm province), was arrested in May 1923 for sharp criticism of the party leadership and exiled to Berlin. In Berlin, he continued to be active and made contact with the "left" in the German Communist Party.

2On September 7, 1923, Dzerzhinsky sent the following letter to the Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Germany, Krestinsky: about the expulsion of Gavril Ivanovich MYASNIKOV abroad. I ask you, if possible, to personally call MYASNIKOV to your place and announce to him that the expulsion has been canceled and that he is allowed to return to the USSR. The expulsion was canceled due to the fact that Myasnikov's stay in Germany is undesirable, as a result of his developed anti-Party and anti-Soviet work and his establishment of contact with the left wing of the German Communist Party. The need for the indispensable return of MYASNIKOV to the USSR was recognized by the leading circles. Request to you: take all measures to ensure that Myasnikov leaves immediately back to Soviet Russia. From a conversation with you, Myasnikov should have the impression that the question of repressions against him has disappeared. Please notify me of the results you have achieved [...]” (RTSKHIDNI, F. 76, Op. 3, D. 162, L. 14).

3 After Myasnikov's arrest and expulsion, the OGPU crushed the "Working Group" - an organization of Myasnikov's supporters. More than 20 people were arrested.

4Myasnikov returned to Moscow in early November 1923. On November 19, Dzerzhinsky addressed the Secretary of the Central Committee, Molotov, with the following letter: “I consider Myasnikov's stay at large to be especially dangerous. Firstly, this is incomprehensible to everyone and is an argument that the Central Committee is afraid of him or feels that it is wrong in relation to the “Workers' Group”, because Myasnikov has absolutely not changed his views and does not hide this. Then, Myasnikov, returning here and not finding what he came here for (negotiations and an agreement with the Central Committee), loses all ground and, being mentally unbalanced, can throw out irreparable things, as Ryazanov said at one time. Therefore, I think that Myasnikov should be arrested. Further decisions need to be made after his arrest. I think that it will be necessary to send him out so that it would be difficult for him to escape [...]” (Ibid. L. 17).

No. 176

I. V. Stalin - B. I. Magidov

November 22, 1923

22/XI-23

Dear comrade. MAGIDOV!

Your letter received. Thank you very much for it. You will see from issue 15 of the closed letter that the questions you raised helped me to formalize certain shortcomings in the practice of our Party. The receipt of your letter coincided with the appointment of the Politburo of the Central Committee of a special commission headed by Comrade Yaroslavsky to check the work of the Donbass 1 . As you can see, at this point you hit the mark. Your complaints about the lack of information from the center are absolutely correct. I hope that the 15th letter of the Central Committee will give you some satisfaction in this respect. The problem is that you can't write about everything. For example, the Central Committee decided not to inform party organizations of the resolutions of the Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission in October of this year regarding certain disagreements within the Politburo 2. These disagreements, in essence, are not great, they have already been resolved by the Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission in the spirit of the position of the majority of the Politburo, the misunderstandings themselves have completely or almost completely disappeared, for we continue to work in unison. Nevertheless, I have no right to send you the text of the corresponding resolution of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission in view of the prohibition on the part of these party authorities. There will be an all-Party conference in January, and we must see you then in Moscow, and I will be able to tell you orally about everything that happened. Thanks again for your letter. Please keep writing. Shake your hand.

I. Stalin.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 2565. L. 1. Typewritten text. The signature is an autograph.

Notes:

On November 10, 1923, the Politburo considered the question of the Donbass and decided to immediately send a commission there, chaired by Yaroslavsky, to examine the economic situation of the workers and the activities of local party, trade union and economic bodies (RTsKhIDNI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 391. L. 6-7).

2 We are talking about the decision “On the question of the internal party situation in connection with the letters of comrade. Trotsky" of the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, which met on October 25-27, 1923 (News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 10. P. 188-189).