Bolshevik Leaders correspondence

Bolshevik leadership Correspondence. 1912-1927
Collection of documents 1996.
Compiled by: A.V.Kvashonkin, L.P.Kosheleva, L.A.Rogovaya, O.V.Khlevnyuk.

No. 154

Telegram to G. K. Ordzhonikidze to I. V. Stalin

May 12, 1922

Moscow Central Committee of the RCP, comrade. Stalin 1 .

Tashkent 12/V-22

Cipher

The situation [in] Bukhara can be characterized by an almost general uprising. [In] Eastern Bukhara, according to local data, it acquires an organized character under the leadership of Enver. The helplessness, lack of authority of the current government, its complete lack of efficiency and the looting of our units deprived of supplies and uniforms contributed to the expansion of the uprising. To save the situation, the immediate elimination of Enver is necessary, which is being prepared. The campaign [to] Eastern Bukhara will take place [in] incredibly difficult conditions (extremely rugged terrain, tropical malaria, lack of transport and apartments, ignorance of the terrain, the flight of the population from the area of occupation, the example of the city of Karshi). The general belief is that Enver will evade a decisive battle and run away. According to the command for the Bukhara operation, the available forces are not enough - two rifle brigades and two cavalry brigades, the shortage of cavalry is over 50%. Kakurin demands another rifle brigade, which the front, for lack of reserves, cannot give, regiments without a convoy. Parts of the first cavalry brigade are laid out, the Red Army soldiers demand to be removed from the front. The rifle brigade that had just arrived from Moscow and the 10th cavalry regiment were raw material, without a single horse and wagon.

Second. With the most favorable outcome of the operation against Enver, the Bukhara issue remains unresolved unless the following measures are carried out as soon as possible. First. Immediate reorganization of power by creating a national democratic government.

Provide Bukhara with the opportunity to sell goods abroad through our ports, with the exception of those consumed by Russia. Without this measure, complete economic collapse and the final departure from us of those commercial and industrial groups that are vitally interested in maintaining the closest ties with Russia are inevitable.

Third. Dissolution of the Communist Party and Komsomol. The composition of the party and the Komsomol, according to the statement of the secretary of the Central Executive Committee and a number of responsible comrades, is overwhelmingly worthless. This measure should be carried out by means of re-registration, leaving in the Party a small group of the most reliable comrades (now there are 14,000 people in the Party). Assign to this group the main task of propaganda, agitation and education. Left communists, consisting mainly of former emir officials and Persians, who have their own separate illegal organization and are objectively and obviously counterrevolutionary, are declared outside the party, leaving individual private comrades in it.

Fourth. For the actual leadership of the government of Bukhara, it is necessary to have a completely separate plenipotentiary. Tov. Kozhevnikov is not suitable for this purpose.

Fifth. The main core of the government will be made up of groups headed by [with] Feizulla Khodjaev.

Sixth. The maintenance of the army, with the exception of food, which is supplied by the Accounting Government, is to be taken over by allocating one million gold rubles for this. Not to require the Bukhara government to use our Alpari signs and strive [to] maintain the exchange rate of the Bukhara ruble.

Seventh. The declaration of martial law [in] Bukhara is inexpedient, because it is practically impossible.

Eighth. To carry out all of the above, temporarily send Comrade Bukhara. Eliav, who enjoys great confidence among the people of Bukhara. Tov. Sokolov and Peters to withdraw. More about Turkestan. I'm going to leave on the fourteenth. On arrival [in] Bukhara, where we will meet Feyzulla 2 , whom, [when] he was [in] Bukhara, we did not manage to see, he was [at] a junction 3 .

RTSHIDNI; F. 85. Op. 23. D. 46. L. 1-6. Autograph.

Notes:

1 On the letterhead: "RSFSR Member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Separate Caucasian Army."

2 F. Khodzhaev.

3 In a telegram addressed to Ordzhonikidze dated May 13, 1922, Stalin wrote: “I received the cipher, you do not report anything about a change in the composition of the Turkburo and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Turkfront. Provide additional information, if any, have accumulated during this time [...] ”(RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 2327. L. 1).

No. 155

Telegram of I. V. Stalin to G. K. Ordzhonikidze

May 14 [1922]

Tashkent, tov. Ordzhonikidze.

14/V

All codes received. I will be able to convey the answer of the Central Committee only tomorrow, today it is not possible to convene the Central Committee. For the time being I am giving my personal opinion about Bukhara. Eliava is wrong, since the war has begun, the occupation is inevitable, the sooner the better, the question can only be about certain forms of occupation 1. It is clear that simultaneously with the occupation, a long-term political campaign is needed to move away from the line of concessions to national, religious, and the return of redeemed lands. The corresponding order was given by the Central Committee three months ago to both the Bukharans and the Turkestans. Mukhetdinov is dangerous, he is the main culprit of the Afghan orientation. A national-democratic government without representatives of the average peasant dekhkans is either nonsense or the restoration of the emir. I advise you not to judge the Bukhara affairs without Khodjaev, the Turkestans have not shown objectivity towards the Bukhara people until now. It would be good to call [in] Tashkent Khodjaev and others, talk to them in detail and then tell us your conclusion 2. You are right about left communism in Bukhara and Turkestan. By recalling Safarov, we had in mind to weaken the left-wing communists who are carrying out violent stratification, it is clear that they must be finished off. The Bukhara left should be dispersed, but Mukhetdin, whose supporters are agents of Enver, should also be driven out.

I fully support the dissolution of the Bukhara Communist Party. As for Sokolov and Peters, you should not listen to the Turkestans, try to check it yourself and give your own conclusion. There is no need to bring Khodjaev into the Turkfront, Rakhimbaev is enough. [In] the issue of court verdicts, Krylenko is right, Turkestans demand more rights for themselves than Ukrainians and other independent republics, which is unbearable, there is no need to spoil the Turkestan communists, they did not deserve it, the last two years have shown that all of them taken together are lower than Ryskulov, against whose return I do not mind. Baranov needs ... the whims of Atabaev, Tyurakulov and others are tired of everyone. It is dangerous to consider Gusev's information as satisfactory. Gusev trails behind the politically undeveloped local elements, check everything yourself through cross-questions and give your opinion. No doubt, that the Central Committee will determine the composition only with your and Eliava's consent. We'll have to stay in Tashkent for two extra days, don't scold us for that.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP Stalin.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 2329. L. 1-2. Handwritten text.

Notes:

1 We are talking about the beginning of large-scale actions of the troops of the Turkestan Front against the Basmachi movement on the territory of the BNSR.

2 Arriving on behalf of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) with an inspection, Ordzhonikidze settled in Tashkent - the seat of the Turkburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), the Turkcommission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Turkestan Front. His conclusions about the situation in the region were based mainly on conversations with the leadership of these bodies. From the point of view of the Bukhara leaders, the situation looked somewhat different. On April 5, 1922, Khodzhaev, who returned from Moscow, sent a letter to Karakhan, a copy of which the latter sent to Stalin. “[...] I will try to briefly describe to you the reasons for the recent events in Bukhara itself,” Khodjaev reported. - [...] The internal Basmachi movement is clearly supported from the outside. In the Bukhara and Kermeninsky vilayats, the Basmachi were led by emir officials and Afghans. An internal commissure and a common connection between the Basmachi of the Bukhara vilayat and the Samarkand region was noticed. There is no doubt that the leading center of the Basmachi movement now and, in particular, in the near future will be Eastern Bukhara. Basmachi in the Bukhara, Kermeninsky vilayats was not only the result of the laxity and weakness of our apparatuses in recent times, but a direct result of the long preparation and organization of our enemies [...] As for the measures taken after my arrival in Bukhara in relation to all of the above, I consider it my duty to note the following: [...] I have convened an Extraordinary Congress of all tribal leaders and authoritative persons, as well as the clergy friendly to the Soviet government in the city of Karshah, where we invited from the vilayats of Shakhrizyab, Shirabad and Karshi. G. Karshi, as more calm and revolutionary, will be the base of our revolutionary actions against the Basmachi. The theses of the congress are being discussed in the Central Committee of the Party. An emergency conference of dekhkans was also convened. Up to 1,500 people gathered from the Bukhara vilayat alone. Many vital questions were raised. As a result of the conference, an emergency troika was created to investigate and pursue the remnants of the robbers in Eastern Bukhara and to restore the apparatus of Soviet power. The same emergency trio was instructed to grant amnesty, grant benefits, and so on. Several large rallies were convened, where each time up to 4,000 people from the urban and rural population participated [...] Unfortunately, it must be noted here that the population [...] is very dissatisfied with the actions of the Special Departments in the border zone [...] What As for the East Bukhara question, then, according to the information I have, the situation is as follows: Enver Pasha with his people is in Dushanbe. We have received information about the arrival there of several Afghans and representatives of the former Emir of Bukhara, as well as the fact that there was a meeting between them, in which the Ferghana Basmachi also took part. It is now confirmed that the armed forces consist of three or four thousand people, and the rest - up to twelve thousand - from a simple crowd in different places. According to our agents, there are four gangs numbering about 16,000 people, and the most important of them are led by Enver Pasha, numbering up to 4,000 people. Ibrahim Bek, a former official of the Emir, also in 4000 people, etc. It can be said with certainty that Afghanistan, in part, has managed to some extent to unite all the previously ruined forces and supplies the Basmachi with weapons. Enver is declared commander-in-chief of the Basmachi troops. They sent a delegation to Afghanistan and, it seems, they were received there. Afghanistan's attitude towards the role of the former Emir of Bukhara is good. This is proved by the letters of the former Emir captured by us to the leaders of various tribes of Eastern Bukhara and reveals the essence of the Enver movement in Eastern Bukhara [...] Now I will only note what has been done and what needs to be done from the political and military side. In my opinion, this will not be difficult to do and without any damage, namely I). According to the economic agreement between Bukhara and Soviet Russia, all products of foreign trade should mainly go to Soviet Russia according to the planned export-import plan, and part of the goods specifically Bukhara and free from the above plan are also sold through Russian Foreign Trade in other markets, i.e., everything in generally through Vneshtorg and no other ways. In the course of a year and a half, trading with Vneshtorg, we came to the conclusion that cotton, astrakhan fur, carpets, leather, silk, wool are disappearing, and the licorice root is rotting. The Vneshtorg of the RSFSR from time to time takes the necessary goods from us and in return for them covers only 50%. The state, monopolizing all the products mentioned above for bartering with Foreign Trade, cannot buy them, because it has neither goods nor sufficient money. Consequently, the farmer does not have the opportunity to sell and purchase, in exchange for his products of labor, the manufactures and agricultural items necessary for his everyday life. In view of the monopoly established on all the above-mentioned goods, their prices are incredibly low, and manufactured goods are several times more expensive, for example: astrakhan fur, cotton against manufacture, or at least sugar. The skin of astrakhan before the revolution was worth 8-10 rubles in gold, and now it costs 500,000 rubles in Soviet paper banknotes, this is at the rate of 2 roubles] 50 k[opecks], cotton cost 11 roubles], and now at the same rate 34-36 kop[eks], i.e. three times more expensive. Thus, dekhkans and pastoralists, having been freed from emir taxes, now live much worse. Such phenomena cannot continue, and therefore it will be necessary to create some changes in the field of our commodity relations, from which, in my deep conviction, there will be no harm to anyone, except for benefit, not to mention the position of the dehkans and the fact that the economic soil of -under the feet of our enemies (who used this to their advantage) will be knocked out. My thoughts on this matter are attached here. Moving on to what follows, one should come to the conclusion that it is impossible to put an end to the Basmachi by military measures alone, but it is required: I.

2. Take measures to ensure that the army is fed (we must do this) and that the army is dressed (this must be done by the Turkfront). 3. Instead of sending a lot of infantry, you need to send, although few, but cavalry and 4. [With] the implementation of the above measures, that is, when the army is fed and clothed, robberies will recede into the realm of tradition.

Further, it is necessary to clear the center of various elements alien to the revolution and suspected of assisting the Basmachi movement. Finally, in order for the power, which is waging a struggle in such a difficult time, to rely on the broadest strata of the population (here it must be noted that relying on the poor peasant does not give anything) and that the middle peasant must be the backbone of the Soviet power, and it must be more and more attracted to power and satisfy its economic demands. In Bukhara, and now in particular, it is necessary that [would] the authority of the Government [...] be strengthened and not be dropped by anyone in this case. In view of the enormous responsibility that falls on me before the revolution and before the People, I want to frankly state my opinion about the power that exists in our country: You know that the Government is composed of equal groups, i.e. right, middle and left. I'm sure, that the essence of each grouping is also not unknown to you, because here everything depends on the struggle that takes place inside us for the implementation of this or that measure, where everything depends on the influence of this or that group on the broad masses. It is necessary that Moscow, represented by the Full[full] Representation of the RSFSR in the BNSR, stop focusing on individual groups, since flirting with one group or another brings a sharp dissonance to the work of the Government and undoubtedly drops its authority. By the way, at the moment I am taking decisive measures to isolate the Republic from [both] the so-called left-wing and extreme right-wing elements, who, under the guise of various missions, are sent by me to various cities of the Russian Republic. At this extraordinary moment in the history of the Buhrepublic, when a decisive, direct and firm policy is needed, The measure I have taken is dictated by life itself, and it would be desirable for Moscow to support the emergency measures I have taken with its authority. In order to strengthen the consciousness of the independence of the masses and the complete liberation of Bukhara, it is necessary that the Russian Government widely demonstrate its relations in Bukhara, declaring publicly its complete independence and the inviolability of its sovereign rights, because in the hands of our opponents this is a powerful weapon, and here, of course, , all sorts of little things begin like the actions of the Special Departments, the intervention of Russian consulates in the field, etc., etc. While we stop here, I will later report in detail on what will be done [...] ”(RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 2280. L. 1, 4-8). so that Moscow will support the emergency measures I have taken with its authority. In order to strengthen the consciousness of the independence of the masses and the complete liberation of Bukhara, it is necessary that the Russian Government widely demonstrate its relations in Bukhara, declaring publicly its complete independence and the inviolability of its sovereign rights, because in the hands of our opponents this is a powerful weapon, and here, of course, , all sorts of little things begin like the actions of the Special Departments, the intervention of Russian consulates in the field, etc., etc. While we stop here, I will later report in detail on what will be done [...] ”(RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 2280. L. 1, 4-8). so that Moscow will support the emergency measures I have taken with its authority. In order to strengthen the consciousness of the independence of the masses and the complete liberation of Bukhara, it is necessary that the Russian Government widely demonstrate its relations in Bukhara, declaring publicly its complete independence and the inviolability of its sovereign rights, because in the hands of our opponents this is a powerful weapon, and here, of course, , all sorts of little things begin like the actions of the Special Departments, the intervention of Russian consulates in the field, etc., etc. While we stop here, I will later report in detail on what will be done [...] ”(RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 2280. L. 1, 4-8).

No. 156

G. K. Ordzhonikidze to I. V. Stalin

May 18, 1922

Moscow. Central Committee of the RCP, comrade. Stalin.

Tashkent 18/V 22

I share only with you. [In] Turkestan, we must gradually move to the form of government - people's councils, which were in the North Caucasus. [In] an extremely uninfluential group of our communists will not be able to take political possession of Turkestan. Keeping it only on Red Army bayonets is fraught with huge scandals. Turkestan has the same importance in the East as Azerbaijan, and even more so in India and Turkestan China. The bitterness here against us is damn strong. Basmachism is certainly connected [with] these dissatisfied urban groups, some do not hide this. They do not hide the connections of the Basmachi with Enver. Basmachi songs about the defense of religion, Muslims against Russians caress, probably, the ears of very many 1. In my opinion, it would be necessary to throw out something like a people's congress, having previously carried out this experiment on the scale of individual peoples and regions 2. Allow a few influential non-Party people to the central government, maybe not with a brilliant past, declare an amnesty, etc. In a word, start a “new era of Soviet Turkestan”. Throw a certain amount for the restoration of the cotton economy, etc. As a result of the four-year war, an interesting phenomenon occurred here - instead of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, feudal lords hatched - khans, who have their own armed people, their territory, their subjects. The local communists, on behalf of the Turkic Mission and the TurkCyka, are conducting peace negotiations with these feudal lords as equals. Leaving them inviolable property acquired by robbery, a few dozen armed people, and thus legalizing them. Despite such honorable terms of peace, they still do not agree and fool our heads. On the other hand,

The group standing at the head, although it seems to agree to everything, but unconditionally wants to remain masters of the situation. This is not worth doing. You need to dilute them. With decisive pressure from the Central Committee, they will not particularly kick. The public, if not cunning, seems to understand the state of affairs. Give them a firm, but certainly anti-colonizer (they will dump any colonizer and it will not work). According to all the reviews, Rudzutak can be like that, I consider Eliava very useful, who knows the region and enjoys great confidence. True, he is very malleable, but with Rudzutak and Baranov, this is nothing.

Gusev, as far as I looked, is too physically weak, and business requires energy and mobility. The current composition of the Turkburo has little authority. It might be inconvenient to make a change of predilection so soon, but the matter is hardly tolerated. The Turkburo consisting of Rudzutak, Eliava (he is also the plenipotentiary of Bukhara), Baranov, Legrand, Ryskulov, Tyurakulov, Rakhimbaev, Atabaev and the representative of Bukhara and Khiva - moreover, Bukhara affairs are decided by the plenipotentiary Khodzhaev and before. Rudzutak - will be authoritative *. At first, this is in order not to tease the Bukharians. Khiva can only participate by telegraph. I think it will be possible to work with the strong support of such a composition. Presidium: Rudzutak, Tyurakulov, Eliava, Candidate Ryskulov will replace Eliava. Khodzhaev and Sokolov are already with us. In the evening I will tell about the conversation with them.

That's all that can be transmitted over the wire. Now I ask permission to go home 3 .

RTSHIDNI; F.85. Op. 23. D. 55. L. 1-2. Autograph.

Notes:

1 In a personal letter to Stalin dated May 13, 1922, Ordzhonikidze more clearly expressed his point of view on the need to revise policy in Turkestan: “It is not true that the Basmachism is a gang of robbers, torn off and persecuted by the population. In some cases, they are the defenders of religion and life [...] It is necessary to radically revise our policy in Turkestan, resolutely refusing any kind of communist experiments, which is what the local, sufficiently frightened comrades are beginning to do timidly and unsystematically [. ..]" (RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 23. D. 49. L. 1-13).

2 On this occasion, Stalin, in a reply note to Ordzhonikidze by telegraph dated May 19, 1922, noted: “[...] It would be possible to switch to the system of people's councils only after serious military successes against the Basmachi, in no case before that, [ in] otherwise, Enver’s agents will end up in the people’s councils [...]” (Ibid. F. 558. On. 1. D. 2338. L. 1).

3 We are talking about the new composition of the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) (the new name of the Turkburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) since May 1922). In a reply note by telegraph dated May 19, 1922, Stalin wrote about this: “[...] Is [...] the list of the Central Asian Bureau final. Upon approval of the final composition of the Bureau, which will be announced separately, you can leave for Tiflis [...]” (Ibid.).