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Bolshevik leadership Correspondence. 1912-1927
Collection of documents 1996.
Compiled by: A.V.Kvashonkin, L.P.Kosheleva, L.A.Rogovaya, O.V.Khlevnyuk.
No. 167
A. M. Nazaretyan - G. K. Ordzhonikidze.
January 24, 1923
Dear Sergo!
1. I am sending you and Comrade Vardzieli the protocols missing from you to [omi]siya Dzerzhinsky 1 .
2. The Central Committee of the Communist Party suggested that Kartvelishvili go to the disposal of the Central Committee of the RCP.
3. Koba sent your cipher to Smilge (about the sale of gasoline to the Turks), and the latter delayed. We tease [with] the answer 2 .
4. Budu and Seryozha, with the permission of the PB, are studying the materials of the Dzerzhinsky commission, and Koba is joking. They feel the futility of this work, but apparently want to be armed just in case. Budu, by the way, spoke to me about the possible impact of damage to relations on the situation of his family. He asks to save everything for them until the device. I assured him that personal and political relations cannot be the reason for this, and in vain he presents all dissidents as such vengeful and that I know examples of the opposite. Tomorrow their question will be finally resolved in Polit. Bureau 3 .
Today I received your code. What's up with poor Beso? I'm glad everything is going smoothly for you. I'll be here trying to convince Koba that the people of today are unreliable and will also (!) change. Koba will go on vacation soon. Maybe then, after his vacation, he will let me go too.
6. Nothing has changed with Ilyich yet.
7. Our political situation is fine so far. The Germans won't take a step without us. Our authority there has risen high. Also in the Arab countries of Arabia. The French are now clinging to us (they are afraid we will interfere with the Ruhr operation) 4 . The British played an amazing trick with the Turks. They pressed them with the Dardanelles so that they themselves yielded to each other as much as possible, and now the British are building a channel in the narrowest isthmus of the Gallipoli peninsula and creating straits that are exclusively in their dominion, while the Dardanelles are losing all significance (look at the map) 5 .
Well, I signed up. Greetings from all friends and comrades. Hi Zina. Greetings to Mamiya and other comrades. Ask Shalva not to shoot yourself, because he is the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Georgia. They say he was afraid to shoot himself.
I kiss you hard.
Your Amayak.
24/1 23
RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 1/S. D. 13. L. 12-13. Autograph.
Notes:
1 See note 1 to document No. 166.
On February 1, 1923, the Politburo agreed with Ordzhonikidze's proposal to supply aviation and motor gasoline to the Angora government (RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 332. L. 1).
On January 25, 1923, the Politburo approved the change in the composition of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia and the leaders of the Soviet institutions of the republic, "as caused by the situation in the Caucasus and the course of the struggle in the Georgian Party." The decision of the Organizing Bureau of December 21, 1922 was approved to send Tsintsadze, Mdivani, Kavtaradze and Makharadze to work outside Georgia. “This change,” the decision said, “in no sense deprives the trust in the eyes of the Central Committee of those comrades who have retired from responsible posts in Georgia” (Ibid. D. 331. L. 1).
4 We are talking about the entry of French troops into the Ruhr region of Germany, carried out on January 11, 1923.
5 See note 4 to document No. 166.
No. 168
A. M. Nazaretyan — G. K. Ordzhonikidze
January 28, 1923
Dear Sergo!
28/1 23
Tov. Graskin, in addition to this letter, will give you two more packets: one with an extract of the decision [of the PB on the affairs of the commission of Comrade Dzerzhinsky 1 and the decision of the Secretariat regarding the ciphers printed in the Sots[ialist] Bulletin (Lenin, Kamenev, Bukharin and the decisions of the Central Committee of Georgia) on Georgian affairs; the other, with a letter from the Central Committee to the regional and provincial committees concerning Comrade Lenin 's article in Pravda . Soso himself wanted to write to you, but being very busy at the moment in connection with the latest events in Europe, he asked me to write about these matters.
1. He draws your attention to the fact that the most energetic measures must be taken to ensure that the apparatus of the OKA and the Zakkraykom, like the apparatus of the Central Committee of Georgia, do not become an instrument of information for the Mensheviks and their organ, the Socialist Vestnik. The fact is that the cipher messages printed in the Sotsialisticheskiy Vestnik could only get to them from the apparatus of the Central Committee of Georgia, since only those cipher messages that were addressed to the Central Committee of the KKE fell into their hands. All those that were sent only to you or to the Zakkraykom directly or through the Regional Military Council of the OKA did not make it into the Socialist Bulletin, although they were more odious in content than those published. We received the Socialist Vestnik just in time for the meeting and for the discussion of the question of the Dzerzhinsky commission. In the forwarder to the Socialist Herald, we warned Soso that that only telegrams addressed to the Central Committee of the KKE were printed. This made a stunning impression on the PB, and especially on Buda and Seryozha, who were summoned to the meeting. I would later scold us, accusing us of pointing out in advance to the apparatus of the Central Committee of Georgia without checking. He told Kobe that Zhordania in Genoa had codes and reports from the OKA about Svaneti and the location of our units there. This explains why Koba asks you to pay special attention to this.
2. Extracts of the latest decisions, as well as a letter to the provincial committees, are sent only to you, since until the apparatuses of the Central Committee of the KKE and the Zakkraykom are cleared and reorganized, Soso asked not to send, but to bring them to their attention through you.
3. I will tear and metal, of course, but it was all in vain. Now he is asking to Carlsbad for stomach treatment. He is very worried about his family. Asks before the device in a new location to save everything for her. Seryozha will probably go to Kovno as a plenipotentiary. He doesn't mind. Karakhan proposed his candidacy to Litvinov. Chicherin is now requested. Will be decided soon.
4. The old man is the same. Gets sick. At times he is very good, he even works - he will not be calmed down in any way. Here is the article I wrote.
5. Mogilevsky is here. He also talked about things there. Tomorrow, probably, will be at Koba's. Rusanov was here from Tashkent. I was sick. He wrote me a request to help him get out of there. People were not allowed there, and it is very difficult for him.
6. Have you received the correspondence between Trotsky and Stalin about Gosplan and STO? 3
7. You learn about the most important political moments lately
from another closed letter, which we will send soon.
8. Alyosha filed a protest with the NKF against the decision of the STO to include in the budget for [19]23 appropriations for the Hydraulic Station in Tiflis. Motivates with the richness of the mountains. Tiflis, which can be built with local funds. Sokolnikov sent the question to the Politburo. Soso will know about it the day after tomorrow. I don’t know yet how he will react and whether he will include it in the agenda. But what is outrageous is that the issue has been resolved, and for some reason Svanidze is disrupting it 4 .
9. There is much more I would like to write. I'm in a hurry. I'll write in the next few days. Well, I kiss you hard. Greetings to Zina and all comrades.
Your Amayak.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 1/S. D. 13. L. 14-15. Autograph.
Notes:
1 See note 1 to document No. 166.
On January 25, 1923, Pravda published Lenin's article "How do we reorganize the Rabkrin (Proposals to the XII Party Congress)", which outlined measures to prevent a split in the Central Committee. The issue of publishing this article was the subject of controversy in the leadership of the party. The final decision on publication was made at a meeting of the Politburo on 24 January. However, at the same time, the members of the Politburo and the Orgburo decided to turn to the party organizations with a special letter, in which they reported in a strictly secret order that Lenin, due to illness, was practically out of business, and, accordingly, his fears about a split in the Central Committee were nothing more than the fruit of his " general considerations” (News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 11. P. 179-192).
3 We are talking about the controversy between Stalin and Trotsky over the reorganization of the management of the national economy and personnel changes in the government apparatus (Trotsky Archive. The Communist Opposition in the USSR, 1923-1927: In 4 vols. M., 1990. Vol. 1. P. 9 -nineteen).
On February 1, 1923, the Politburo considered Svanidze's protest against the STO's decision of January 16 on the release of 1 million gold rubles by the Council of People's Commissars of the Transcaucasian Republic as a loan for the construction of a hydroelectric power station in Tiflis. The issue was postponed, but the implementation of the SRT decision was suspended until Ordzhonikidze arrived (RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 332. L. 4).
No. 169
S. K. Minin to K. E. Voroshilov, I. V. Stalin, G. K. Ordzhonikidze
April 20, 1923
20/IV-1923
Klim. Stalin. Sergo.
I am surprised why you do not pay the necessary attention to Frunze's illness. True, the Central Committee last year decided that F[runze] should be treated and provided funds. But this is not enough. You need to follow the implementation. His disease is severe (stomach ulcer) and can be fatal. Doctors recommend four months of serious treatment. Next year it will be 6 months, etc. And then we will, when M[ikhail] V[asilyevich] is out of action, say that this is how he worked, forgetting a serious illness and so on .
As I see, F[runze] is not at all going to be treated properly: there will be maneuvers and so on .
It is necessary to force them to be treated in a comradely and party way, as, it seems, Comrade Lenin did with many.
S. Minin 2 .
RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 24. D. 175. L. 1. Autograph.
Notes:
1 At the end of October 1925, Frunze was operated on and died as a result of this operation. This gave rise to numerous assumptions about Stalin's involvement in the death of Frunze (Medvedev R.A. On Stalin and Stalinism. M., 1990. S. 129-136).
2 On the form: “Secretary of the North-Western Regional Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (Bol.) Petrograd Smolny room. eight."
No. 170
K. E. Voroshilov — G. K. Ordzhonikidze
May 22, 1923
22/V-23
Hello, dear Sergo!
Just returned from a detour of the region together with Kalinin. We traveled with him to Dagestan, Grozny, Chechnya, the Sunzha district, Vladikavkaz, Nalchik. Without me, K[alinin] was in Kislovodsk, where a large delegation of Karachays came to see him. Thus, all our national[ional] re[publics] and auto[nomous] regions were visited by the supreme representative of the power of the Soviet Union.
There are many benefits from the trip. I am personally quite satisfied. Kalinin is a good guy and an indispensable person for us. In order to appreciate him, you need to travel with him through the villages and listen to his conversations with the peasants; here he is in all his peculiar beauty and, I will say frankly, strength.
You won't find another like it in our party. It is not given to many to present our theory and practice to the peasants, as K[alinin] does. He has great experience in this field.
He knows the peasants better than the best peasant experts.
In short, the old man is well done, I considered him a bit of a nerd, but now I ardently repent and pray to Allah to forgive my involuntary sins. I suggested to K[alini]nu to go to Tiflis with you, but he intelligibly explained to me that he could not do such things without the permission of the Central Committee. From Vladikavkaz we traveled along the V[military]-G[ruzin] Kobi road, even further, and I really wanted to wave to you in Tiflis for a day, but the old man was stubborn like a demon, and I had to return back.
19 / V in the Labinsk Cavalry celebrated the 4th anniversary of the 4th Cavalry Division. Three divisions were brought together - 4, Chongar [th] and 14. From the Special [th] b[igada] and the 2nd Cavalry [division] there were representatives of 120 people each. The celebration was a success. Divisions look lovely. The military training is quite satisfactory. At the horse competitions, the guys showed themselves to be real daring and well done. I’m already sorry that I agreed to the transfer of the cavalry army from the North Caucasus Military District, everything will be lost, dispersed and spread. On the occasion of the holiday, T. Trotsky sent a long letter addressed to Budyonny, in which he dwells in detail on recent international events, etc., and expressed regret that he could not personally attend the celebrations. Yesterday K[alinin] was with us in Rostov. The audience greeted enthusiastically. Today I left for Moscow.
How are you doing? How are your dodgers? Are you going to the upcoming Plenum? Greetings to Zinaida Gavrilovna and son. Write a couple of words *. Your Voroshilov 1 .
RTSHIDNI; F. 85. Op. 24. D. 150. L. 1-2. Autograph.
Notes:
1 On the letterhead: “RSFSR. Commander of the North Caucasian Military District.
No. 171
F. E. Dzerzhinsky to I. V. Stalin
August 3 [1923]
Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), Comrade Stalin.
Today, 3/VІІІ, at the meeting of the SRT, I had a major clash with the chairman, Comrade Rykov.
The STO, with my objections, was accepted for hearing the question, introduced not by a member of the STO and not by the head of the department, but by a member of the collegium (headed by members of the STO, comrades Rykov and Pyatakov), comrade Chubarov, about the debt of the NKPS to Donbass, Kuzbass and Cherembass. I objected, because this issue was not included in the agenda, and I was not notified before the meeting that it would be included in the agenda, and therefore I was not acquainted with this proposal. When considering the issue of Donbass, the proposal was accepted with my amendments, guaranteeing the NKPS the opportunity to pay the debt 1. When considering the debt of the Siberian roads to Kuzbass, I asked to consider the issue of the debt to the Siberian roads of Chelyabkopey. Since neither the Siberian roads nor the NKPS are able to cover their debts without paying our debts - and that therefore it is useless to adopt a resolution on the payment of debts, which we do not deny. We do not want, but we cannot pay. My request - unlike Chubarov's - was not accepted, and the STO decided to oblige the NKPS to pay 305,342 commodity rubles within 7 [th] days. My statement that I could not pay was not taken into account, and no one (RKI - Central Control Commission - Gosplan) was instructed to check my statement. With its resolution, the STO discredits me both as a member of the STO and the Council of People's Commissars (strangers were present in the meeting room), and as a member of the Central Committee. T. Krzhizhanovsky even considered it necessary to state2 .
In such a situation of struggle, complete disregard and distrust of me on the part of the chairman and members of the SRT, I am not able to work directly due to my physical properties - these properties are known to you. I am not fit to be a statesman, and therefore my request is to remove me from the Narkomputevstvo, from the service station and the Council of People's Commissars, either by leaving me in the NKPS as a member of the collegium, or, if this is impossible, completely remove me from there, instructing me to deal entirely with the GPU.
There are other reasons for this request. I am not able to find the right way to solve the question of wages and I am afraid that I will not be able to cope with this task. I am deeply convinced that our party, and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions in the first place, are in practice pursuing an incorrect, insufficiently active policy in this matter. What we are doing is breaking the unity of the working class, is giving everything to the elements, whoever manages to get as much from his "employers" himself. This element has already penetrated into our transport system and threatens to shatter all calculations and shatter the unity of the transport proletariat. The river began - with the support of the Gubkoms and Gubprofsovets - up to the support of the announcement of a strike.
From the river it goes to the railroads. With the help of pressure on our business executives from not only professional, but also party organizations, they are forced to conclude local collective agreements, according to which, based on the estimate of the STO, we cannot pay. Fermentation starts. The Politburo approves the principle of managing heavy industry, but we do not receive funds for this, because the growth rate of the metalworkers is stronger than ours. The same NKFin (Vladimirov), which cuts down our estimates by coefficients in the arbitration court, agrees to pay with chervonets - metalworkers, whose pay is much higher than transport workers. What is my position on this issue? In the SRT, in the P / Bureau, ask and prove what follows, that is, what needs to be equalized, give us more, that is, give others less. Only in this way can we equalize our poverty.
To tell the masses that we (NKPS) are in short supply, that we cannot live off the reparations of the muzhik, that the source of our increase in wages is the fight against mismanagement in our transport, which is still terribly much, and we are waging with it, with this mismanagement , fierce fight. I dare say that in no department there is such a pace of struggle and success as we have, and that we did not sow panic before the Central Committee even when the Saratov Provincial Committee blessed the strike, and when all sorts of leaflets were distributed, and when the water workers launched a frenzied campaign .
I thought that the wage policy should be directed by the party through the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the STO (finances) - systematically, according to the program of the Twelfth Congress, according to the correct distribution of the meager funds of the Republic, consistent with the unity of the proletariat.
It is the business of the business executive and the trade union in transport to give the maximum to the state and to fight against bureaucratic perversions in this matter, up to and including a strike, but the main distribution of funds is the business of the highest organs of the party and the state.
But I got into a dead end with my line and was the reason why the pace of raising the salary of a transport worker is so slow and hard that it can result in serious complications.
My arguments, for example, in SRT, 27/VII, when Comrade Kamenev presided, were a crying voice, although they were irrefutable. The NKPS was credited with 3,400,000 commod[ary] rubles [lei] as a net income from state river shipping companies (when calculating the gross consumption of 7,900,000 t[ovar] rubles [lei]), although I argued, not out of a desire to deceive, that in a real mood waterway workers (workers on strike with our administration headed by Ishchenko) I will not be able to get this money (Proof later followed - the threat supported by the Gubernia Committee of the strike of workers on the waterway, to whom the state shipping companies, with the support of the workers, did not give out money, since they themselves needed it).
At the same service station - in addition to this - they reduced our subsidy against the cut down estimate by Tsyurupa and the cut down by Pyatakov by 3 million 3 .
And so we - the NKPS - are cut completely, on every occasion.
But after all, with my weak voice - not reaching the goal - the voice of another must rise. But then there will be cracks in our Soviet building.
And I, as the head of transport, got into a dead end. And because of this, I myself personally turn into some kind of hysteria who “fries” about his “horse” - transport and excites grins and receives not only a refusal, but also, even at official meetings, reprimands.
I must either get support or leave.
3/VІІІ
F. Dzerzhinsky.
PS Only by taking control of the elements of the movement to increase wages, it will be possible to avoid political cracks and achieve maximum results while spending a minimum of funds. Now the alignment is on the strongest. It is necessary to hold back the growth of the wages of the strongest and, gradually, according to a plan that is feasible and recognized by all cells of the Party (primarily in the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, in the Central Committee of the unions, in the Gubernia Trade Union Councils and in the Gubernia Committees), to raise the wages of those who lag behind .
RTSKHIDNI. F. 76. Op. 2. D. 103. L. 103 - 113. Autograph.
Notes:
1 The resolution of the STO of the USSR on the issue of settlements of the NKPS for fuel with the Donbass provided for both the obligations of the NKPS to cover its debts and the payment of debts of state bodies to the NKPS itself (GARF. F. R-5674. On. 1. D. 1. L. 92) .
2 On the issue of the debt of the NKPS to the Kuznetsk and Cheremkhovo coal basins, the STO decided: “a) To propose the NKPS to pay Kuzbasstrest and Cherembasstrest its debt for the supply of planned fuel in the amount of 305,342 commodity rubles [l] within 7 days. b) Offer Comrade. Dzerzhinsky to submit the issue of debts of the People's Commissariat of Commissariat of Commissariat from the side of state bodies in the prescribed manner” (Ibid., L. 93).
3 At the STO meeting on July 27, 1923, the budget plan for August 1923 was considered (Ibid. L. 79-80).
4 On the letterhead: "People's Commissar of Communications." On the first page of the letter, at the top, in red pencil, Dzerzhinsky's note: "not sent."
No. 172
F. E. Dzerzhinsky to I. V. Stalin
October 22, 1923
Copy.
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE CC RCP(b) comrade. STALIN.
One of the important factors inflating the prices of manufactured goods are malicious speculators, who have chosen as their profession to inflate prices (especially currency) and entangle trusts and co-operatives and their workers with their machinations. Especially, Moscow - the location of the main trusts, Tsentrosoyuz and Banks - attracts them with itself 1 . People come here from all over the USSR. They take over the markets, the black market. Their method of action is bribery and corruption. If you ask what they live for, they won't be able to tell you, but they live with full chic. For them, with the housing shortage in Moscow, there is always plenty of the most luxurious apartments. These are parasites, corrupters, leeches, malicious speculators - they corrupt, gradually and imperceptibly drawing in our business executives.
And when all the wrath of the Party falls upon the depraved members of the Party, these gentlemen continue to look for new victims.
My proposal is to allow the Commission on Expulsions to expand its rights of expulsion in relation to these malicious speculators - taking into consideration cases regarding these elements according to my reports, that is, the Chairman of the OGPU F. DZERZHINSKY.
I am sure that within a month we will heal Moscow of these elements and that this will undoubtedly affect the entire economic life .
22/X-23
F. DZERZHINSKY.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 76. Op. 3. D. 231. L. 2. Certified typewritten copy.
Notes:
1 . On March 28, 1923, Dzerzhinsky wrote to Yagoda about this: “On the basis of the commodity hunger, the NEP, especially in Moscow, took on the character of undisguised speculation, enrichment and arrogance that is conspicuous to everyone. This spirit of speculation has already spread to both state and [to] co-operative institutions and is drawing in an increasing number of people, including communists. This must be put to an end. I ask you to draw up a report on this subject to the Central Committee of our Party (including data on smuggling from Comrade Katsnelson), pointing out how these phenomena affect the workers, whose wages not only cannot be increased now, but are also being reduced due to the fall ruble exchange rate. At the same time, it is necessary to develop a number of measures and proposals, namely:
1. Eviction from large cities with families and districts (accurately developed plan with a list of cities and regions, with the application of a geographic map). 2. Confiscation of property and eviction from apartments. 3. Link with families to remote areas and camps - their colonization of deserted areas. Develop a plan and identify these areas. 4. Establishment and development of the law against speculation. 5. Order to the courts, etc., etc. " (RTSKHIDNI. F. 76. Op. 3. D. 231. L. 3).
2 In November 1923, the Politburo accepted Dzerzhinsky's proposals. From the end of November, a campaign began to expel from Moscow, and then from other large cities, speculators, keepers of brothels, smugglers and other "socially dangerous elements." The operation was carried out in several stages. In mid-December, the last third stage began - repressions against currency traders. In March 1924, at the suggestion of People's Commissar of Finance Sokolnikov, the Politburo instructed the OGPU to stop repressions against persons associated with the currency exchange, since these operations interfered with the Narkomfin's foreign exchange operations on the free market (Goland Yu. Currency regulation during the NEP period. M., 1993 pp. 11-12).
No. 173
G. L. Pyatakov to I. V. Stalin
November 1, 1923
T. Stalin 1 .
Dear comrade St[alin]! I am replying to your note and sharing some of my observations with you. From the text you will see why he delayed his letter so much.
1. Pro domo sua
The PB sent me with my full consent 2 . I have never refused and will never refuse any assignment that gives me the opportunity to apply my forces as a revolutionary. I will not hide - I had a very hard time here. The hopes that were pinned on me, to a large extent (it is difficult for me to admit this, but in order to dispel another illusion, I consider myself obliged to express this too), will not come true. Of course, I will be useful in outlining the general line, but as regards the concrete, everyday work in which Andrei[she] and I 3should take part, then here is my firmness, determination, clarity in the work, etc. definitely don't show up. The fact is that - as I now clearly see - the main prerequisite for these properties is necessarily: 1) complete knowledge of all concrete life, such knowledge that gives intuitive decisions before rational analysis and 2) knowledge of people, which allows you to translate political decisions into certain organizational and technical measures. Unfortunately, I do not have this prerequisite. As a result, at first I felt like a fish thrown ashore. Of course, since I am not completely deprived of the head apparatus, I gradually get used to the specific situation, but still even now (and three weeks have already passed) I feel quite helpless. Every time the question is "who will do it?" I have to wait for what others will say and take offers on faith - this is very painful. On the other hand, the language also binds me. Of course, I can talk, explain myself, etc., but when it comes to wordings, resolutions, political documents, etc., I myself can’t offer - I don’t speak the language so well.
However, I think that I still bring some benefit here. Not relying only on myself, I consulted with Andrei and he, too, was of the opinion that I was needed here. So we both think that I should be left here. I wrote about my difficulties so that you would not scold me in the future for having done little.
2. Household.
I was very well aware and I am aware that my departure will cause a whole series of negative phenomena in the apparatus. But I, for my part, took the following measures: 1) informed through Dzerzhinsky that, in my opinion , A.D.Ts. 5 should be appointed instead of A.I. e. with release from other work) 6 . 2) I wrote a note to you and A.D.Ts., in which I recommend that you talk to Yulip from time to time, who will truthfully inform you about what is happening there. 3) He asked Yulip to keep you and A.D.Ts. informed of all the affairs. What else could I do?
Then I move on to the local business.
Three main facts inspire me with the strongest anxiety:
1) Party.
2) Armament.
3) The working class.
1. Party.
a) The intra-Party crisis has acquired an unheard-of acuteness. This should be clear to you without much explanation. The Central Committee gave the slogan "to act," then (quite correctly) pulled back. Hamburg performed 7. For a whole week the Central Committee was in the net (moving from Dresden, lack of organization of the illegal apparatus, etc.). As a result, the opposition is furiously attacking the Central Committee. It got to the point that on October 31 the Berliners convened, without the knowledge of the Central Committee, a party conference not only of Berlin-Brandenburg, but also of Hamburg, Mecklenburg, Thuringia, etc., i.e., they actually convened a conference for a split. We banned this conference, but the very attempt to convene is characteristic. The opposition demands Brandler's resignation. 2 Berlin districts passed a resolution expelling Br[andler] from the Party. It got to the point that Comrade Shklovsky writes to us that Br[andler] should be removed from the Central Committee, because he is a dead man. A whole bunch of such facts could be cited. All of them testify to the deepest inner-party crisis.
The Party Council is meeting tomorrow, and I foresee that something scandalous will be played out at it.
Andrey and I are taking all measures at our disposal to strengthen the Central Committee without surgical measures. As a matter of fact, a number of "Lefts" should be thrown out of the Party, but this cannot be done now. By the way, these are not leftists at all, but opportunist talkers with leftist phrases. Facts: 1) At a conference of the Berliners with Andrei[ey] and with me, they brought forward the accusation of the Central Committee that it paid too much attention to the technical preparation of the [armed] in [the uprising]. Ruth said bluntly: “It is necessary to prepare for [an armed] insurrection not technically, but politically.” 2) The Berliners rebelled in every possible way against the protest strike. 3) The Berliners treat the issues of armament as secondary issues. 4) At the moment, they are not serious about the [armed] in [rebellion], preferring squabbles within the Party. That is my impression.
In a word, the position within the Party is extremely difficult.
This is aggravated by the fact that the Central Committee is weak, has really made a lot of mistakes, and by the fact that the Party's illegal apparatus is acting extremely badly.
II. Armament. Suffice it to say that we have: 11,000 rifles! 2000 revolvers and 1 1/2 hundreds of machine gun pistols. This is the most important task.
III. The working class is by no means so unanimously active and does not at all follow the CP entirely. Suffice it to say, in cases where the S[social]-d[emocrats] are against it, significant sections of the working class do not come forward. Let's see how today's strike will go, against which the S[social]-d[emocrats] and A.D.G.V. have spoken out .
Of course, the craving for us is enormous. This is visible throughout. But this process has not yet reached the point where we can say: we are leading the working class. Therefore, we see as the main task a frenzied struggle for the working class, a complete break with the social democrats, frenzied persecution of the social democrats, etc. Many facts show that that within the social [social]-d[emocracy] there is a strong decomposition.
I think that 1) the exit of a large number of social [social]-d[emocrats] - workers from the Party and the transition to us and 2) a split in the social [social]-d[emocratic] p[arty] is inevitable. A few curious illustrative facts: five organizations of social [social]-d[emocrats] (Leipzig, Berlin, etc.) demanded the expulsion of Ebert from the Party; in which speeches against the Central Committee aroused stormy approval. Wurm said: we do not agree with the communists, but remember that the actions on the right are directed against you, and the actions on the left are for you; at this point, the report notes: "Brausender Beifall", i.e. "stormy approval." I don't have time to give you a number of similar facts. It is clear to me that the more furiously we attack the Social-Democrats, the sooner this process will proceed.
What do I want to say with this letter?
Here's what: we are sending you the general situation today with the next report (Andrei is writing it now). I consider myself obliged to add that our army has not yet been assembled to deliver a decisive blow . It's sad, but true. According to the general situation, I would now go into battle. The condition of the army forces me to take a different position: the preparation of an armed uprising, the preparation is not only technical (and technical as opposed to pseudo-lefts), but also political: party rallying, rallying the worker class, disorganization of the social [democratic] and disorganization of the Reichswehr.
Unfortunately, I did not have time to write about the latter. I will say briefly: the greatest delusion is that nothing can be done with the Reichswehr. Can be done. There are already concrete facts of small riots, we have connections, and so on. It is only necessary to strengthen this work many times over.
Well, I shake hands. Don't get angry at the long silence. I did not want to give you only rumors, and for this I had to get more comfortable with the situation.
This letter, although addressed to you, of course, can be sent to all members of the PB, with the exception of paragraphs 1 and 2, which are only for you.
Arvid 10 .
Berlin, 1.XI.1923
PS I am very worried about our intra-Party situation in the USSR. If you have mercy, write at least briefly what you thought up there and what you did. Did you call the meeting that we asked you to do? What was on it? I don't know anything for sure, and this torments me in the strongest way. Just for God's sake don't start a fight - otherwise everything will be lost 11 . If you fight, we will quit working here (this is not a threat, but a conclusion from the fact that under such conditions our work here is meaningless). Please write to me.
I also ask L. D. [Trotsky] about this
A[rvid].
PSS The scandal in the Central Committee is being played out. Because of this, Andr[ey] is unable to write a report. We are now going with him to a meeting with Br[andler], Ruth [Fischer] and Helm 12 . I read my letter to him, and he fully agreed with it. We ask you to give a copy to Zinoviev and Trotsky.
Ar[view].
RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 2. D. 137. L. 1-5. Typewritten text.
Notes:
1 At the top of the first sheet is Stalin's inscription: "Only to Trotsky, Zinoviev and Bukharin."
2 The decision to send Pyatakov to Germany was made by the Politburo on October 4, 1923 (Source. 1995. No. 5. P. 138).
3 Radek's pseudonym.
4 A. I. Rykov.
5 A. D. Tsyurupa.
6 This, apparently, is about the implementation of economic support for the German revolution. On September 13, 1923, the Politburo considered proposals to send 10 million poods of grain bread to Germany and entrusted the practical implementation of this action to Rudzutak, Rykov and Krasin (Ibid., pp. 128-129).
On October 23-25, 1923, an armed uprising of the communists took place in Hamburg, which was being prepared as part of an all-German uprising. On the eve of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany, the all-German strike was canceled, which was supposed to develop into an armed uprising, but this information accidentally did not reach Hamburg. The uprising in Hamburg was put down.
8 All-German Association of Trade Unions.
9 Stalin tacitly supported the ultra-lefts in the German Communist Party, who considered the decision to cancel the uprising a mistake. Pyatakov defended the correctness of this decision and once again tried to prove it to Stalin in his letter (See: Babichenko L.G. Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), Comintern and events in Germany in 1923. New archival materials / / Modern and recent history. 1994. No. 2. S. 125-157).
10 Pyatakov's pseudonym.
11 . In October 1923, a sharp struggle unfolded in the Politburo between Trotsky and the "troika" - Stalin, Zinoviev, Kamenev.
12 . Probably, we are talking about the Soviet military emissary in Germany, Skoblevsky.
No. 174
B. I. Magidov to I. V. Stalin
November 10 [1923]
Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP.
comrade STALIN.
Dear comrade.
Let it not surprise you that I am writing you a personal, informal letter.
This is explained by the fact that what I will describe below, for a number of reasons, I consider it not entirely appropriate to write officially.
When [I] was in Moscow with a report to the Orgburo (in October) 1 , you were on vacation and therefore did not manage to speak in person.
The general state of the party, the inner-party events that took place in October, perhaps I am not entirely accurate, because officially, as secretary of the Gubernia Committee, I am not informed about the events; facts, materials about the situation and mood of the workers of Donbass, which were cited at the last plenum of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U (October 29-31), encourage me, as a member of the party, to write to you.
First of all, such a situation is absolutely abnormal when the secretaries of the Gubkoms are absolutely unaware of the matter, they are not informed by the Central Committee about the internal state of the party, when, to our great common regret, this is talked about everywhere, gossip about it in non-party circles.
I especially have in mind the last disagreement [in] the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, the statement of Comrade. Trotsky and platform 46. (Neither the statements of Comrade Trotsky, nor platform 46, needless to say, had to be read).
Meanwhile, Soviet and economic workers traveling to Moscow on their departmental business, returning, turn to the secretary of the Gubkom with all sorts of questions for them and, in particular, for the secretary in this case, perplexed questions.
The absence of correct, timely, accurate, if not official, then at least private information, has a very harmful effect on the leadership of Party work.
If only I were in such a position, then it would not be worth writing about, wasting your time and mine.
In such "obscurity and ignorance" is the vast majority of responsible Party workers appointed by the Central Committee of the Party and elected by local organizations to lead Party work.
But all this, dear comrade. Stalin, only a preface.
During the last Plenum of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U, when meeting with many old party members, it turns out that the old party guard is too oppressed.
There is no living party life, party thought is not beating.
The so-called party discipline (applied according to a template) dominates and prevails.
I assure you, comrade. Stalin, that until now the resolutions of the 10th, 11th, and 12th Party Congresses, especially the 10th, on intra-Party workers' democracy, have been poorly carried out and instilled into life.
Meanwhile, the masses, the rank-and-file mass of the Party, including the non-Party masses, have grown up, matured and objectively demand more attention to themselves, yearn to know everything that really exists.
In connection with the latest circular of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party and the Central Control Commission of the Russian Communist Party on excesses (No. 58 of 19/X), the questions about “tops” and “bottoms”, about “specialists”, about high rates, about all kinds of bonuses and bonuses, etc. etc. 2
How can one prevent the possibility (and some think the inevitability) of the reappearance of deviations on the part of the rank and file of Party members.
There is only one way: a correct, strictly sustained, clear-cut communist line, and along with this, we ourselves, the leaders of the masses, should be a little more modest - serve as an example and a model.
But this is not really the case.
Example: members of the Union Central Executive Committee and members of the VUTsIK received a salary of 100 gold rubles in September, and 150 in October.
When an ordinary member of a cell working at a machine tool sees that the secretary of the Gubkom pays 35 gold rubles and a membership fee of 5 gold rubles to the commission for improving the life of the communists, and he sees an ordinary member of the party working at a machine tool, the entire monthly salary earned is maximum 25-30 rubles in gold.
Hence, involuntarily, he begins to think about the “tops” and “bottoms”, about blatant inequality, etc.
When the working mass (quite literate) reads an announcement in the newspapers that for October, approximately, the rate for a party member, from which deductions should not be paid, is 80 gold rubles, then the worker involuntarily begins to talk and expresses dissatisfaction with the "tops".
You obviously know that in September and October there were strikes all the time in the Donbass, and in October almost all Donbass went on strike.
The main reason is the delay in the payment of wages. But not only that: the living conditions of the miners of Donbass are worse than bestial ones.
10,000 workers of Donbass prefer to go down into the mines every day, live in the rocks, in the bowels of the earth, 200, 300, 500 fathoms deep, the miner feels better there than in his "apartment".
You know that in the Mine District (Alexandro-Grushevsky District) all the miners (approximately 30-35 thousand) were on strike for ten days and unanimously refused to take the pay sent to them in the amount of 40% of the following.
The workers of Donbass say: what prevents them from “paying off like a miner with the leaders of Donbass for arrogance and mockery of a miner for five years, for systematic deceit and swindle, for not fulfilling almost a single promise, and there were hundreds of them ...
If they had paid off - rest assured - repeats the miner (perhaps incited by the provocation of the Mensheviks) - yes, you can’t be a traitor in relation to the German revolution.
All this was officially said at the plenum of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U by a member of the Central Committee, a responsible representative of Donbass.
It is not entirely clear to us why we pay the 200,000-strong army of Soviet workers carefully twice a month and systematically do not pay the Donbass.
Isn’t it possible with the same right not to pay so carefully (not in the Soviet way neatly) to our co-workers and to pay the miners of Donbass.
We also do not quite understand another circumstance: as soon as the miners go on strike, spend a week, money appears (and the miners take this circumstance seriously).
And why not approach this issue in the most serious (Leninist) way and bring a couple of responsible and most responsible leaders to public trial, if we are not capable of doing anything else.
What is the result - the Poltava province, entirely rural, is set up very positively towards the Soviet power, carefully fulfills all Soviet duties, the unified agricultural tax for November 5 was made in the amount of 64.8% (20 million pounds in rye units), although "scissors" so far they have no tendency to narrow.
There is no political banditry in the province, there are also no strikes (once the Poltava cab drivers went on strike for 7 days, so this even benefited the Gubkommunkhoz, which transported passengers from the station with its means of transportation and thereby struggled with excesses).
So in the rural Poltava region we are seeing a Soviet paradise, and in the proletarian Donbass they are already on strike according to plan and quite systematically.
There is something to ponder, comrade. Stalin.
We, the local workers, unfortunately, get the impression and even the conviction that in the leading central Party, Soviet and economic circles, if they think about these questions, they do not take decisive, cardinal measures.
Everyone is waiting for something, everyone is hoping that maybe the Bolshevik curve will take them out.
Try hard, comrade. Stalin, instruct reliable comrades to be in the midst of not only the workers, but, most importantly, the masses of the Party, but let these comrades not show that they are from the center.
Let them talk frankly with the rank and file about our shortcomings and shortcomings, and they will hear a lot, more than they should, of bitter communist truths.
I had a chance to talk with a responsible party worker of a large industrial center, and he, with great party pain, was forced to admit that sometimes he was overcome by doubt, overcome by pessimism, and involuntarily a mood was created that we were falling into some kind of dead end.
The Party organizations in the localities do not have sufficient firm confidence that the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, in connection with the latest circular on excesses (by the way, very long-awaited and quite satisfactory), will lead a decisive and cardinal struggle against hundreds and thousands of unacceptable acts and outrages perpetrated by Party members.
How can one explain that despite a number of recent circulars from the Central Committee of our Party about a resolute struggle against all kinds of banquets, offerings, about the termination of the issuance of bonuses, etc., remnants of bourgeois-petty-bourgeois traditions, only a few days ago Narkomfin sent to his subordinates in the form of a gold watch award. (Head of the Gubfin Department and his assistant, of course, to the communists).
Everyone knows this and emphasizes the duality and contradiction of our practice, for we ourselves issue circulars about taking away precious items from the Communists.
In general, circulars (about the same content as the fight against excesses) are still used to be viewed most of all as a political act (we have developed too much politicking and politicking), a non-committal center, and vice versa - very obliging periphery.
Meanwhile, the main burden in the fight against excesses, of course, will have to be overcome in the center (Moscow, Petrograd, Kharkov, and other metropolitan areas).
After the Twelfth Party Congress it was perfectly clear to us that the absence of Ilyich imposed on us an enormous collective responsibility.
We perfectly understood that there was no one to replace Ilyich personally.
But, unfortunately, we were not sufficiently and to a certain extent certain that an ideological and militant unity would be created in the Central Committee.
That is why we have attached and continue to attach actual importance to the question of the maximum unity of Party members.
First of all, it is necessary to seriously and for a long time raise the question of the indispensable practical implementation of inner-Party workers' democracy.
The mass of the party, the middle peasants of the party, has grown noticeably, matured, stands firmly on the Bolshevik positions and urgently demands confidence in itself from the leaders of the mass of the party, including from the members of the Central Committee.
What is needed is correct, timely, well in advance, undisguised information about everything that is being done in the Central Committee. It is possible less often, and only in the most exceptional cases, to resort to measures of an administrative nature and perhaps less often to resort to the use of administrative diligence.
It is necessary to avoid cases of cancellation by one person (no matter what high post and rank he occupies) of the decision of an elected body.
It is very useful that members of the Central Committee often travel to places and, especially, the presence of the latter at party conferences and plenums of the Gubernia Committee.
It is necessary to carry out firmly and resolutely (again in the Leninist way) the practical measures outlined in the circular on excesses.
It is necessary to categorically forbid all heads of departments to bring any precious gifts (Acceptable gift, in our opinion, is a good book that is already being used locally).
Tov. Stalin, if I decided to take your time, it is only because I am deeply convinced that, with the courage inherent in us Bolsheviks (we, Lenin's disciples), if we only delve deeper into the interests of the working class and the peasantry, we will create within ourselves atmosphere of mutual trust - we will certainly succeed this time as well in getting out of a very difficult situation with honor.
It goes without saying that there can be no question of any pessimism.
The sixth anniversary of October has shown what enormous strength and hope we can draw from the working class and the peasantry, and what selfless confidence the Communist Party enjoys among the working masses.
Waiting for your answer with communist greetings.
Secretary of the Poltava Provincial Committee: B. Magidov.
Poltava
November 10th. G.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 2565. L. 2-7. Typewritten text. The signature is an autograph.
Notes:
1 The report of the secretary of the Poltava provincial committee of the CP(b) U Magidov was considered by the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) on October 8, 1923 (RTsKhIDNI. F. 17. Op. 112. D. 486. L. 1).
2 Circular of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission on "Struggle against excesses and against the criminal use of official position by party members" (Ibid. D. 561. L. 56-56v.).
No. 175
N. N. Krestinsky to I. V. Stalin, F. E. Dzerzhinsky, M. A. Trilisser, V. R. Menzhinsky
November 13, 1923
Tov. Stalin.
Copies of comrades Dzerzhinsky, Trilisser and Menzhinsky.
Dear Comrade!
I received a telegram from you on November 9th stating that MYASNIKOV should not be issued a visa until he submits a written application and considers this application in the Central Committee 1. On the 11th, a telegram arrived from Comrade Trilisser with a proposal to cancel Myasnikov's visa or to report exactly the day of his departure. On the 9th I telegraphed you that Myasnikov's visa had already been issued on November 3rd. Upon receipt of Comrade Trilisser's telegram, I tried to find out whether Myasnikov had already left. I found out that the visa had been issued to him on the 3rd, that he had received the passport with the visa from us on the 5th, that he had said goodbye to a number of familiar comrades at the same time, and that it was not known when he left or whether he left. This is the actual situation. If I establish that he has not left yet, I will try to find him and cancel the visa. If he has already left, then it is easier for you to find out at the border point when he passed. In addition, he was going to go straight to Moscow to an apartment with his family.
I turn now to the merits of the matter. In early September, I received from Comrade. Dzerzhinsky a letter with a request to persuade Myasnikov to return 2 and with an official decision of the GPU to cancel his expulsion. By the way, this was the only official message about Myasnikov, because I did not receive any message about his deportation.
I summoned Myasnikov to me, informed him of the possibility of returning. My message met with his own initiative, he decided to go, then raised the question of not being arrested, then said that he was going to open a campaign here against the Central Committee and, to some extent, against the Comintern, then he came and said that he was ready to go, not demanding no guarantees, leaving the Sovpra and the Central Committee themselves in Russia to decide whether he should be arrested or not. Such a decision by Myasnikov was entirely in favor of the comrade transferred to me. Dzerzhinsky decision of the Central Committee. I ordered that a visa be issued to him and contacted the Trade Representation about sending Myasnikov to Moscow. After all this has been done, when the apparatus of the Trade Representation is aware of his official secondment to Moscow, and he has his passport with a visa in his hands, it is extremely inconvenient to suddenly change the previous decision. Decision, which at one time was reported to Myasnikov as a decision taken on the own initiative of the Soviet authorities. In this case, there is nothing more to be done. If Myasnikov has not left, I will suspend his trip. If I left, I can't stop. But I would very much like to ask you in the future not to put the Plenipotentiary in such an uncomfortable position that it can be used both against the Plenipotentiary and against the Soviet in the most diverse press organs.
I do not understand the reasons for changing the original decision. Comrade Dzerzhinsky's letter was obviously written after Kuznetsov was arrested and the work of Working Group 3 was revealedand, in particular, Myasnikov in Russia and abroad. Obviously, the Central Committee then decided that Myasnikov could cause more trouble and harm abroad than in Russia. I think the same is true now. Now Myasnikov is leaving for Russia under the impression of a new aggravation of the proletarian struggle on an international scale, which began, first of all, in Germany. Under this impression, he will change direction or ease the tension of his struggle in Russia. If he stays here, then with the onset of a certain period of calm, he can return to his former mood and start sharp performances here on an international scale. Not to mention the fact that with the current crisis in the German Party, especially in the Berlin organization, and with Myasnikov’s connection with the left Berliners, his stay here is certainly more harmful than in Moscow4 .
With comradely greetings, N. Krestinsky.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 76. Op. 3. D. 162. L. 15-16. Typewritten text. The signature is an autograph.
Notes:
1 G. I. Myasnikov, an old Bolshevik, one of the leaders of the party organization of Motovilikha (Perm province), was arrested in May 1923 for sharp criticism of the party leadership and exiled to Berlin. In Berlin, he continued to be active and made contact with the "left" in the German Communist Party.
2On September 7, 1923, Dzerzhinsky sent the following letter to the Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Germany, Krestinsky: about the expulsion of Gavril Ivanovich MYASNIKOV abroad. I ask you, if possible, to personally call MYASNIKOV to your place and announce to him that the expulsion has been canceled and that he is allowed to return to the USSR. The expulsion was canceled due to the fact that Myasnikov's stay in Germany is undesirable, as a result of his developed anti-Party and anti-Soviet work and his establishment of contact with the left wing of the German Communist Party. The need for the indispensable return of MYASNIKOV to the USSR was recognized by the leading circles. Request to you: take all measures to ensure that Myasnikov leaves immediately back to Soviet Russia. From a conversation with you, Myasnikov should have the impression that the question of repressions against him has disappeared. Please notify me of the results you have achieved [...]” (RTSKHIDNI, F. 76, Op. 3, D. 162, L. 14).
3 After Myasnikov's arrest and expulsion, the OGPU crushed the "Working Group" - an organization of Myasnikov's supporters. More than 20 people were arrested.
4Myasnikov returned to Moscow in early November 1923. On November 19, Dzerzhinsky addressed the Secretary of the Central Committee, Molotov, with the following letter: “I consider Myasnikov's stay at large to be especially dangerous. Firstly, this is incomprehensible to everyone and is an argument that the Central Committee is afraid of him or feels that it is wrong in relation to the “Workers' Group”, because Myasnikov has absolutely not changed his views and does not hide this. Then, Myasnikov, returning here and not finding what he came here for (negotiations and an agreement with the Central Committee), loses all ground and, being mentally unbalanced, can throw out irreparable things, as Ryazanov said at one time. Therefore, I think that Myasnikov should be arrested. Further decisions need to be made after his arrest. I think that it will be necessary to send him out so that it would be difficult for him to escape [...]” (Ibid. L. 17).
No. 176
I. V. Stalin - B. I. Magidov
November 22, 1923
22/XI-23
Dear comrade. MAGIDOV!
Your letter received. Thank you very much for it. You will see from issue 15 of the closed letter that the questions you raised helped me to formalize certain shortcomings in the practice of our Party. The receipt of your letter coincided with the appointment of the Politburo of the Central Committee of a special commission headed by Comrade Yaroslavsky to check the work of the Donbass 1 . As you can see, at this point you hit the mark. Your complaints about the lack of information from the center are absolutely correct. I hope that the 15th letter of the Central Committee will give you some satisfaction in this respect. The problem is that you can't write about everything. For example, the Central Committee decided not to inform party organizations of the resolutions of the Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission in October of this year regarding certain disagreements within the Politburo 2. These disagreements, in essence, are not great, they have already been resolved by the Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission in the spirit of the position of the majority of the Politburo, the misunderstandings themselves have completely or almost completely disappeared, for we continue to work in unison. Nevertheless, I have no right to send you the text of the corresponding resolution of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission in view of the prohibition on the part of these party authorities. There will be an all-Party conference in January, and we must see you then in Moscow, and I will be able to tell you orally about everything that happened. Thanks again for your letter. Please keep writing. Shake your hand.
I. Stalin.
RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 2565. L. 1. Typewritten text. The signature is an autograph.
Notes:
On November 10, 1923, the Politburo considered the question of the Donbass and decided to immediately send a commission there, chaired by Yaroslavsky, to examine the economic situation of the workers and the activities of local party, trade union and economic bodies (RTsKhIDNI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 391. L. 6-7).
2 We are talking about the decision “On the question of the internal party situation in connection with the letters of comrade. Trotsky" of the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, which met on October 25-27, 1923 (News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 10. P. 188-189).
No. 177
G. L. Pyatakov, K. B. Radek, V. N. Yakovleva, I. N. Stukov, V. M. Smirnov, M. N. Pokrovsky, S. N. Sheverdin, E. A. Preobrazhensky, V. M. Maksimovsky - Eastpart, Central Committee of the RCP (b), Central Control Commission, editorial board of Pravda
December 20, 1923
ISTPART.
Copy: CC.
Copy: CCC.
Copy: Editorial Pravda.
Dear comrades.
With the light hand of comrade. BUKHARIN, the legend is spreading in the party about the negotiations between the Left Communists and the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in 1918 regarding the overthrow and arrest of Comrade. LENIN and the election of a new Council of People's Commissars. Tov. Zinoviev, in his speech on December 11, states the matter as follows:
"Tov. BUKHARIN told a meeting of the Krasno-Presnensky district the other day something that should become known to the entire Party, for this is a fact of gigantic historical significance. Having described the period of our internal struggle in connection with the Brest peace, comrade. Bukharin reports that at that time the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries ... made an official proposal to them, to the faction of "Left" Communists, nothing more and nothing less than to arrest the Council of People's Commissars with Comrade. LENIN at the head. And in the circles of the "left" communists, the question of the new composition of the Council of People's Commissars was seriously discussed, and they meant to appoint comrade as chairman. PYATAKOV. This, comrades, is not an anecdote; the factional struggle within our Party has been carried to the point where the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, those enraged petty bourgeois, could, with a certain hope of success, turn to a part of our party with such proposals ... Our comrades, "left" communists, as Comrade says. Bukharin, rejected the proposal of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries indignantly. However, the “Left” Communists did not tell their Central Committee about this at that time, and the Party learns about this important fact only now, six years later” (see Pravda, No. 286 of December 16, 23).
Comrade STALIN, in his article in Pravda, No. 285 of 15/XII, writes:
“It is known, for example, that the Left Communists, who then constituted a separate faction, reached such bitterness that they seriously talked about replacing the then existing Council of People's Commissars with a new Council of People's Commissars from new people who were part of the Left Communists' faction. Some of the current oppositionists, comrades PREOBRAZHENSKY, PYATAKOV, STUKOV, and others, were part of the Left Communist faction.”
In view of the fact that the matter is portrayed in a completely different way from what it really was, in the interests of restoring historical truth and in order to counteract the distortion of the history of our party, we, former active members of the Left Communist faction, consider ourselves obliged to describe those two completely insignificant incidents who could submit Comrade. Bukharin, and after him to comrades Zinoviev and Stalin, the idea of allegedly taking place negotiations on the overthrow of the Council of People's Commissars and the arrest of comrade. Lenin.
A faction of leftist communists did exist. This faction fought for a change in the party's policy both on external issues (the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk) and on internal issues (especially on issues of economic policy). On the question of the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, as is well known, at one time the situation in the Central Committee of the Party was such that the opponents of the Peace of Brest-Litovsk had a majority in the Central Committee. Tov. LENIN declared at a meeting of the Central Committee that if the Central Committee decides against the conclusion of the Brest Peace, he will resign his duties as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and a member of the Central Committee. When it came to a decisive vote, some of the opponents of the Brest Peace abstained from voting and, as a result, the supporters of the Brest Peace held a decision in the Central Committee - to sign the Brest Peace. The struggle of factions in the party continued even after the decision of the Central Committee,
During a meeting of the Central Executive Committee, which took place in the Tauride Palace, when LENIN was making a report on Brest, the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Kamkov approached Pyatakov and Bukharin during Lenin's speech. During the conversation, which not only did not have the character of any official negotiations, but did not even have the character of a preliminary business-like, mutually groping conversation, Kamkov, by the way, half-jokingly said:
“Well, what will you do if you get a majority in the party. After all, Lenin will leave, and then you and I will have to form a new Council of People's Commissars. I think that we will then elect Comrade Sov. Pyatakov.
Of course, this is not a shorthand record of Kamkov's words, but they have been restored to the extent that it is generally possible to restore other people's words from memory, to which the participants in the conversation did not attach any serious significance even at the moment of the conversation. The “proposal” of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries was not only not rejected with indignation, but it was not rejected at all, since it was not discussed, because there was no proposal from the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries to the Left Communists.
This is the first case. In this case, there was no mention of any arrest or overthrow of the Council of People's Commissars, even by the Left SRs.
Later, after the conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, when Pyatakov, Bubnov and Kosior left for Ukraine, a second incident took place, which also had absolutely no significance. Tov. Radek went to the then People's Commissariat of Honor, the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Proshyan, to send over the radio some resolution of the Left Communists. Proshyan, laughing, said Comrade. Radek: “You are all writing resolutions. It would not be easier to arrest Lenin for a day, declare war on the Germans, and after that again unanimously elect Comrade. Lenin as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. Proshyan then said that, of course, Lenin, as a revolutionary, being forced to defend himself against the advancing Germans, scolding us and you (you leftist communists) in every possible way, nevertheless, would lead a defensive war better than anyone else. Again, this "proposal" not only was not rejected by the left communists, but it was also not discussed as a completely anecdotal and ludicrous fantasy by Proshyan. It is curious to note that back in 1918, before the uprising of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, when, after the death of Comrade Proshyan. Lenin wrote an obituary about the latter, comrade. Radek told Comrade about this incident. Lenin, and the latter laughed about such a "plan".
It should be noted that both of these cases were still unknown to many of the undersigned, although almost all of them were members of the bureau of the Left Communist faction and all were active members of the faction. This is the best evidence of the significance that these "facts" had.
20/XII 23 Former left communists:
G. Pyatakov
K. Radek
V. Yakovleva
Shevardin
In. Stukov
V. Smirnov
M. Pokrovsky
E. Preobrazhensky
V. Maksimovsky
RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 71. D. 76. L. 1-2. Typewritten text. Signatures are autographs.