Bolshevik Leaders correspondence

Bolshevik leadership Correspondence. 1912-1927
Collection of documents 1996.
Compiled by: A.V.Kvashonkin, L.P.Kosheleva, L.A.Rogovaya, O.V.Khlevnyuk.

No. 189

F. E. Dzerzhinsky - L. 3. Mehlis

[not earlier than May 1, 1925]

Tov. MEHLIS

(For the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b)).

Tov. KRYLENKO demands a reduction in the rights of the OGPU, the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and an expansion of the rights of the Prosecutor's Office . Why? Because the OGPU, allegedly, in fact, expanded its rights, accepting for its consideration all kinds of cases that were not under its jurisdiction, and, then, because the OGPU, as a rule, does not refer cases to court; further, because the repressions in the OGPU are too severe (this can be seen from a comparison of the number of executions carried out by the decisions of the OGPU and the courts of the RSFSR), moreover, cases are considered too superficially, there are too many cases in one session; moreover, the camp has essentially turned into imprisonment, and in exile people are left to the mercy of fate, both the old and the young.

In other words, com. Krylenko raises a purely political question - first of all, about the fight against counter-revolution, monarchists, terrorists and all kinds of White Guard groups and exclusively through the courts, moreover, repression, obviously, should be lowered. Such a question at the present time could only be raised by the Prosecutor's Office, as a body and in essence of its functions of protecting the rule of law, and in fact devoid of understanding of the political situation. For her and for comrade. Krylenko, as its main representative, there is only an article on the crime of certain persons, and there is no fight against counter-revolution and prevention of the growth of political parties, terrorist groups, etc. The simplest thing would be to abolish capital punishment and lower the penalties in our code. This would be obligatory both for the courts and for the OGPU. But tov. Krylenko himself does not propose this in his new draft, which means that the whole thing comes down to curtailing the rights of the OGPU. Meanwhile, we believe that it is politically completely unacceptable to establish the growth of terrorist and monarchist groups in the Union through a series of lawsuits. Experience has shown that the more terror is shouted about, the more it becomes popular. Monarchist processes, on the other hand, would only give wings to the activities of the monarchists abroad and give them the opportunity to receive serious assistance, both financial and otherwise, from all the headquarters and intelligence agencies of the capitalist states. Finally, in view of the fact that the OGPU is a federal, centralized body, it is, of course, easier for us to vary our methods of combating counter-revolution and espionage, including repression, than the 8 People's Commissariat of Justice. By the way, when determining the measure of punishment, we have to argue with the prosecutor's office, not only because we propose more severe measures, and they are milder, but mainly because for us camp, exile, etc. are means of demoralizing the enemy, and not punishment , and quite often, for our operational reasons, it is necessary to give more lenient punishment to formally more serious criminals; Courts, of course, cannot do this.

As for the other considerations Comrade. Krylenko, then, first of all, one has to be surprised at his illiteracy in matters relating to the OGPU. It would seem that having a dozen prosecutors sitting on our cases in the OGPU itself, not to mention the huge staff watching them from the building of the People's Commissariat of Justice, one could know the matter somewhat better. In fact, there is no expansion of our rights, on the contrary, there is an extremely moderate use of the rights granted to us. The question is, what are the prosecutors sitting with us doing, how do they allow illegal actions. They don't even have to fight against illegal actions, since according to the well-known decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR on bugs, marathons and other socially dangerous elements, the OGPU could carry out systematic mass expulsions of these gentlemen. In fact, we carried out one mass expulsion of NEPmen and others - in February [19]24 and did not repeat it, leaving this struggle to the Criminal Investigation Department. The second mass expulsion of pickpockets was undertaken last summer on orders from above, when members of the 5th Congress of the Comintern were robbed. Both of these expulsions produced about 4 1/2 thousand people. At present, dozens of cases on the return of Nepmen have to be reviewed at almost every meeting. These cases are prepared by a Special Subcommittee with the participation of the Prosecutor's Office, which initiates a review. The Special Meeting only approves. The same procedure applies to the expulsion of recidivists who have at least two convictions, four drives, etc. Locally they do not have the right to expel such an element, there they are interrogated by special Civil Defense Commissions, also with the participation of the prosecutor's office, which sees every expelled criminal; In Moscow, these cases are reviewed by a Special Subcommittee with the participation of the Prosecutor's Office. The Special Meeting already approves the conclusion of this Commission. It is these lists that give those astronomical figures with which Comrade operates. Krylenko. But the OGPU would willingly refuse to expel recidivists, because this clutters up its local Gubot departments, which have to deal with living criminals, and not with paper.

As for the political cases considered simultaneously in the Special Conference, long before the hearing and even before the arrest, almost each of the objects of consideration is well known to each member of the Collegium participating in the meeting, and to the prosecutor, without first reviewing which there is not a single case for the hearing. not set. And with such an acquaintance, to consider 30-50 cases is not surprising.

Then, it is absolutely not true that we refer very few cases to the courts, quite the contrary: in [19]24, 8074 people passed through the Collegium of the OGPU and Special Meetings, 1557 people were transferred to the court in the center, if we take the entire territory of the Union - 42,394 people were transferred to the court, 19,576 people remained in the hands of the OGPU, and this does not mean at all that all these 19 thousand people will be considered administratively.

As for the small number of cases against the order of administration and crimes against the person, these inevitably arise in the general mass of OGPU cases, and in the process of investigation they either develop into cases under investigation by the OGPU, or, in compliance with the deadlines established by law, are transferred to the Prosecutor's Office. If there are a small number of cases, the qualifications of which may raise doubts, then these cases usually concern either our secret employees or bandits. During the hearing of cases, the Prosecutor's Office insists, for example, that in this case a simple murder was committed by a bandit and puts a corresponding article that is not under our jurisdiction. But since we have already examined this case, the prosecutor's office itself, if you like, commits illegality and, in order to avoid further red tape, agrees to our sentencing, instead of taking the case to court, where, with the existing red tape, the defendant will have to wait for the case to be heard a little not a year, at least not less than six months.

About VMN. The OGPU is an organ of the Union, and it is impossible to compare our figures with the figures of all the courts, even in the RSFSR, for this means comparing the whole with its part. The first will always be greater than the last. Ukraine, Belarus, etc. are not taken into account.

Of the 650 people sentenced to VMN for 1924:

334 -”- counterfeiters.

89 -”- bandits.

77 -” espionage, mainly, our spies are doppelgangers.

37 -” to [counter] r [revolutionaries].

Out of 245 people for 1925:

126 -” - counterfeiters.

54 -”- bandits.

17 -”- espionage.

28 -”- to [counter] r [revolutionaries].

It must be taken into account that these are the most, so to speak, “cream” from all over the Union, since local authorities do not have the right to extrajudicial verdict. Here, mainly counterfeiters - more than 50% or k[counter]r[evolution] and espionage, which cannot be heard in court.

Link question. The position of the exiles is indeed very difficult. Financial assistance to them is beggarly, but as long as the state does not have the means to increase subsidies for exiles, then all sorts of moments about this are completely fruitless. It should also be added that, according to the petition of the Sibburo, it was carried out in the Soviet order that Moscow cannot determine this or that place in Siberia, and this right is granted to the Plenipotentiary Representative for Siberia. The events in Yakutia and the mood of the peasantry in Siberia make it impossible to establish a different order.

The demand that the Central Executive Committee of the USSR establish one or another order pleasing Pom. To the Prosecutor of the RSFSR in exercising his rights is an interference with the prerogatives of the Central Executive Committee.

Comrade's statement is absolutely false. Krylenko that, as a rule, a petition for extrajudicial consideration of cases is sent to the CEC without the knowledge of the prosecutor's office. The question of whether or not to enter the CEC with a request for an extrajudicial verdict is heard in the Collegium or in a Special Conference in the presence of the prosecutor and then submitted to the CEC with or without his protest. The number of protests was negligible and should be better known to Comrade Krylenko himself.

Comrade Krylenko's practical proposals are objected to by the OGPU in the strongest terms. The current political situation is not at all such as to deprive us of the right to consider cases of terrorists, monarchists, White Guard groups, in a word, to reduce our rights in the fight against counter-revolution. For the same reasons, we would consider it wrong to reduce imprisonment to one year in the camps on the basis of sentences of the OGPU, only the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, spies, etc., would benefit from this. in our opinion, it would give a sharp negative result, since the guardians of the law would have to be made participants in undercover developments, which do not stop even during the conduct of business. One of the two, or the OGPU would acquire a few extra workers with a Chekist approach, but not experienced, not verified by us and independent of us, chatter, development failures would greatly increase, or, taking part in our work, the Prosecutor's Office would retain its formal approach, then this would make the work impossible. In any case, revolutionary legitimacy would not have won. We already have experience with the Economic Directorate and the Transport Department, where the Prosecutor's Office is not constrained by any exceptions from the codes in our favor, as in political cases. All cases, as a rule, are referred to the court, with the exception of counterfeiters, formally it is unlikely that the OGPU has won much, since it is precisely in these departments that all those cases arise under various articles that offend comrade. Krylenko as the guardian of the rule of law. As a weapon in the fight against economic, official, etc. crimes, these Departments have lost to some extent the Chekist resilience and have weakened a little for shock work, since cases go to court, lie there, wait for their turn and are put to a hearing when the entire economic situation has changed. We consider this a very serious shortcoming, but if political matters are resolved, as a rule, at the moment of a changed political situation, then this will threaten the very existence of the Union.2 .

RTSKHIDNI. F. 76. Op. 3. D. 362. L. 7-11. Typewritten text.

Notes:

oneDzerzhinsky responds to Krylenko's note to the Politburo. The note stated that the OGPU applied too widely the out-of-court procedure for examining the cases of those arrested (through the Special Conference and the “judicial troika”). Contrary to the law, extrajudicial procedure became the rule, and the transfer of cases by the OGPU to the court became an exception. Krylenko accused the OGPU of abusing capital punishment (execution). According to him, out of more than 65 thousand convicted in 1924, the provincial courts of the RSFSR applied capital punishment in 615 cases, while the OGPU - to 650 out of 9362 convicted, and this trend continued in the first months of 1925. Krylenko reported to the Politburo about the terrible conditions in which the people were deported by the OGPU to the remote northern regions. The practice of sending deportees to camps actually turned administrative expulsion into imprisonment. Based on all this, Krylenko asked to "strictly and severely" limit the rights of the OGPU to extrajudicial consideration of cases by the Special Conference only in relation to certain categories of crimes, establishing the right of the Special Conference to subject to administrative expulsion for up to 3 years and imprisonment in camps up to a year. Repressions above this norm, Krylenko believed, could be applied each time with the sanction of the Presidium, and not the Secretariat of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, with the obligatory summons of the prosecutor supervising the OGPU. Krylenko also proposed to expand the rights of the prosecutor's office to monitor the investigation by the GPU bodies (RTsKhIDNI. F. 76. Op. 3. D. 362. L. 1-6). Krylenko asked "strictly and harshly" to limit the rights of the OGPU to extrajudicial consideration of cases by the Special Conference only in relation to certain categories of crimes, establishing the right of the Special Conference to subject administrative expulsion for up to 3 years and imprisonment in camps for up to a year. Repressions above this norm, Krylenko believed, could be applied each time with the sanction of the Presidium, and not the Secretariat of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, with the obligatory summons of the prosecutor supervising the OGPU. Krylenko also proposed to expand the rights of the prosecutor's office to monitor the investigation by the GPU bodies (RTsKhIDNI. F. 76. Op. 3. D. 362. L. 1-6). Krylenko asked "strictly and harshly" to limit the rights of the OGPU to extrajudicial consideration of cases by the Special Conference only in relation to certain categories of crimes, establishing the right of the Special Conference to subject administrative expulsion for up to 3 years and imprisonment in camps for up to a year. Repressions above this norm, Krylenko believed, could be applied each time with the sanction of the Presidium, and not the Secretariat of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, with the obligatory summons of the prosecutor supervising the OGPU. Krylenko also proposed to expand the rights of the prosecutor's office to monitor the investigation by the GPU bodies (RTsKhIDNI. F. 76. Op. 3. D. 362. L. 1-6). considered Krylenko, can be applied every time with the sanction of the Presidium, and not the Secretariat of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, with the obligatory summons of the prosecutor supervising the OGPU. Krylenko also proposed to expand the rights of the prosecutor's office to monitor the investigation by the GPU bodies (RTsKhIDNI. F. 76. Op. 3. D. 362. L. 1-6). considered Krylenko, can be applied every time with the sanction of the Presidium, and not the Secretariat of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, with the obligatory summons of the prosecutor supervising the OGPU. Krylenko also proposed to expand the rights of the prosecutor's office to monitor the investigation by the GPU bodies (RTsKhIDNI. F. 76. Op. 3. D. 362. L. 1-6).

On November 10, 1925, the Politburo decided: to prepare the question of the practice of the work of the OGPU, create a commission consisting of comrades Kuibyshev, Menzhinsky and Krylenko; convocation for comrade Kuibyshev (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 530. L. 7).