Bolshevik Leaders correspondence

Bolshevik leadership Correspondence. 1912-1927
Collection of documents 1996.
Compiled by: A.V.Kvashonkin, L.P.Kosheleva, L.A.Rogovaya, O.V.Khlevnyuk.

No. 196

S. M. Kirov — G. K. Ordzhonikidze

January 10, 1926

10/1 1926

Dear Sergo!

As expected, the reception here was not particularly hospitable. Especially because we immediately went to large factories and began to overturn the teams. They even broke through the stronghold of Sarkis, took Elektrosila (900 members of the p[arty]). In a week, I think, we will finish all the big teams. In terms of the number of Party members, we still have a definite majority. Collectives issue resolutions on the re-election of district committees, and in some places they demand that the Gubkom be re-elected. It is clear that the governors and district committees are climbing the wall, they want us to disperse them, but we think that this would violate the basic rules of democracy. In general, the situation is hot, you have to work very hard, and even more - tear your throat. Let's see what will happen next, but for now I'm going to the mint, to a team meeting. Hello to all friends.

Yours S. Kirov 1 .

RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 25. D. 118. L. 1. Autograph.

Notes:

1 On the letterhead: "Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party (large)".

No. 197

Telegram of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to G. K. Ordzhonikidze

January 13, 1926

Filed from Moscow 13/1-26

Received and deciphered on 14/1-26.

TIFLIS, ZAKKRAIKOM OF THE CPSU(b), Comrade ORDZHONIDZE.

Decrypt immediately.

Three documents are being sent to you: I) a resolution of the Politburo, 2) Comrade Kamenev's proposal, 3) Comrade Zinoviev's proposal. Please vote immediately and report your opinion to the Central Committee. No. 169/S.

SECRETARY OF THE CC STALIN.

Continuation of No. 1 to No. 169/s.

Politburo Resolution 1 .

The Politburo [at] a meeting on January 11, 1926 decided to put the following decision to a vote by poll of all members of the Central Committee:

“a) Abolish the special position of the Chairman[chairman] of the SRT, recognizing that the Chairman[chairman] of the Council of People's Commissars is at the same time the Chairman[s] of the SRT.

b) Deputy comrade. Rykov on the Council of People's Commissars ... appoint comrade Rudzutak, Tsyurupa and Kuibyshev, leaving comrade. Rudzutak and Kuibyshev [in] their positions as people's commissars.

c) Appoint Comrade. Kamenev People's Commissar of Trade, releasing Comrade from this post. Tsyurupu.

d) Appoint acting NKFin Comrade. Bryukhanov, releasing comrade. Sokolnikov from the duties of the NKFin and appointing him Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commission.

e) Deputy Comrade. Bryukhanov on NKFin to appoint comrade. Sheinman, with his appointment at the same time as the director of the State Bank, [with] his release from the duties of Deputy People's Commissariat of Trade and with the release of Comrade. Tumanov from the duties of director of the State Bank.

e) Instruct comrade. Kamenev to submit for the approval of the Politburo the candidacy of his deputy for the NKVTORG, discussing the possibility of using comrade for this purpose. Frumkin.

g) To replenish the Politburo commission for central institutions with deputies of comrade. Rykov, appointing the chairman of this commission comrade. Rykov. Instruct the commission to submit to the Politburo their views on the composition of the STO within 2 weeks. The question, in general, is to vote by telegraph poll of all members of the Central Committee, leaving the members and candidates of the Politburo to submit their proposals against the decision of the Politburo to the members of the Central Committee within 24 hours. To be continued.

Continuation of No. 2 to No. 169/S.

The main motives that prompted the Politburo to take this decision are the following:

1) the need to achieve greater unity in the work of the Council of People's Commissars and the SRT. This unity can be achieved by introducing the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Comrade. Rykov to the STO and the merger of the positions of the Chairman [Chairman] of the Council of People's Commissars and the STO.

2) The discussion that took place at the congress, of course, should not lead to the fact that the group of party members that stood in opposition to the majority of the congress was deprived of the opportunity to participate in responsible Soviet work, but, at the same time, the situation created at the congress forces the use of abilities and experience in Soviet work comrade. Kamenev and comrade. Sokolnikov in other posts. Tov. Kamenev, in all his previous work at the SRT, became familiar with all the questions of the market and foreign trade, and with the dangers that threaten the state economy from the market. As the chairman of the STO commission on grain export, he actually led the procurement and export campaign. Acquaintance with this was reflected in all the speeches of Comrade. Kamenev. The Politburo considers it expedient to use the experience and knowledge of comrade. Kamenev [on] a more responsible area of economic work for the present - the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Trade. At the same time, comrade. Kamenev, of course, must be given every possible assistance in compiling such a collegium that would help him cope with the organizational and operational tasks of the People's Commissariat of Trade.

3) Tov. Sokolnikov, who led the Narkomfin for several years, gained great experience and showed considerable ability in planning the entire economy as a whole and linking its individual parts. These abilities Comrade. Sokolnikov will be fully used in the State Planning Commission, the importance and role of which should increase in the period our economy is going through. The State Planning Commission is faced with the most important financial plans, so that in this special area, the experience of comrade. Sokolnikov will be used by the party.

4) The complexity and diversity of the work of the SNK and STO determine the need to increase the number of deputies of the Chairman [of the] SNK. Therefore, in addition to Comrade. Tsyurupa, who was Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars up to the present time, the Politburo decided to appoint comrades Rudzutak and Kuibyshev as Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.

The appointment of new deputies of the Chairman [Chairman] of the Council of People's Commissars, as well as the appointment of comrade. Sheinman as director of the State Bank and deputy chairman of the Narkomfin did not raise any serious objections during the discussion in the Politburo.

Please immediately communicate your opinion by telegraph.

Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

To be continued.

Continuation of No. 3 to No. 169/s.

2) Offer Comrade. Kamenev: “My appointment as the People's Commissariat of Trade is absolutely inexpedient. I do not have any personal data to successfully cope with the operational, organizational and administrative tasks facing the NKVtorg. The apparatus of the People's Commissariat is in complete disintegration. Krasin is leaving for England today, Sheinman has been appointed to the State Bank. I absolutely do not know the matter, and with the departure of the indicated comrades from the People's Commissariat, I have no one to even learn from and borrow experience from. The economic situation of the republic is such that the correct and confident management of foreign and domestic trade operations is of decisive importance. My appointment under these conditions provides neither one nor the other. It therefore does not correspond to the interests of the state, nor to the correct use of my forces and my experience, which belongs to another field. This appointment does not in any way follow from the events at the Party Congress. In any state post that corresponds to my strength and experience, I have always pursued and will always pursue not any personal line, but only the line of the Party and the Central Committee, but I must insistently point out to my comrades that the proposal for the People's Commissariat of Trade, to lead with success and benefit for the party, the Union, I have no hope, is not in any accordance with the true interests of the party and the state. L. KAMENEV.

The end follows.

Continuation of No. 4 to No. 169/sh.

3) Offer Comrade. Zinoviev:

"I. In view of the fact that the post of chairman of the SRT was abolished and Comrade was appointed the actual chairman of the SRT. Rykov, I propose Comrade. Kamenev to leave as deputy comrade. Rykov according to SRT.

2. Tov. Sokolnikov to leave in the post of Narkomfin. Motives:

a) both of these comrades have shown that they are working in this area with enormous benefit to the cause, b) In view of the economic difficulties that have now arisen, it would be especially dangerous to change horses on the move, c) such organizational conclusions do not follow from a collision at a congress that could threaten major economic bodies a serious weakening. G. ZINOVEV. No. 169 / C 1 .

End.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 3262. L. 1-5. Typewritten text.

Notes:

1 . On the third sheet of the telegram, in the upper part, there is an autograph of Ordzhonikidze: "I do not mind."

No. 198

S. M. Kirov — G. K. Ordzhonikidze

January 16 [1926]

16/1

Dear Sergo!

For almost two weeks now, I have been working in my new and very difficult role. The situation is as follows: Vyborgsky district, Petrogradsky, Gorodskoy, Volodarsky are all with us. There are a few small factories left. M[oskovsko]-Narva[y] - mostly ours. Putilov - not yet. Here everything has to be taken from the battle. And what fights! Yesterday we were at the Triangle, a team of 2200 people. The fight was incredible. The nature of the meeting is such as I have not only not seen since the October days, but I have not even imagined that there could be such a meeting of Party members. At times, in some parts of the meeting, it came to a real massacre! I speak without exaggeration. In a word, I got into the situation. In other areas, the fracture is large. One of these days it will be possible in three districts to carry out re-elections of the bureaus of district committees and to elect our organizers. In a word, who loves scandals, please come here. Meetings are being withdrawn. We've been talking for two weeks, and everything is the same. Every day at the meeting, my head is spinning. Write what is good for you. Bored without you. I send warm greetings to all.

Kiss.

Yours S. Kirov 1 .

RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 25. D. 118. L. 2-3. Autograph.

Notes:

1 On the letterhead: "Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party (large)".

No. 199

F. E. Dzerzhinsky - V. V. Kuibyshev

February 1, 1926

To the Chairman] TsKK comrade Kuibyshev

Copy.

T. Milyutin informed me that he had filed a complaint with the Central Control Commission against my attack on him in the Council of People's Commissars [of the] canteen. I told Comrade M[ilyutin] approximately the following: “I must tell you that I consider your actions to be wrong, disorganizing and caused not at your initiative, but at someone else’s orders.” For the first two statements (actions) incorrect and dis[organizational]), I had and still have enough data, of course, enough for me, if for the so-called. M[ilyutin], otherwise he would not have acted in the way he did*. As for the third one (on [another's] order), it was caused by my suspicions[s] in connection with various accusations[s] against the Supreme Council of National Economy, but, of course, it was not substantiated in any way[by them] provable d[anna]mi. This attack was made by me on the basis of suspicions only.

In order to avoid unnecessary [...] 1 , I am ready to take back this last part of my words (at someone else's orders) and take it back, and I will not mind if the Central Control Commission punishes me for these words, since they were said by me. As for my accusations that I consider Comrade M[ilyutin's] actions to be “irregular and dis[organizing]” — I can’t take this back, because I consider them to be such for many reasons and I can prove it not on suspicion but on facts.

1/II-26

F.D. 2

RTSKHIDNI. F. 76. Op. 2. D. 31. L. 1. Autograph.

Notes:

1 Unclear.

2 On the letterhead: “USSR. Chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy.

No. 200

Telegram of I. V. Stalin to G. K. Ordzhonikidze

February 1, 1926

Filed from Moscow on 1/II-26.

Received and deciphered 1/II [1926]

TIFLIS, ZAKKRAIKOM VKP(b),

comrade ORJONIKIDZE.

Got everything. We'll talk about Kirov after he arrives at the Plenum of the Central Committee in March 1 . Things are going well for us. I think I'll go on a short vacation in two weeks, I'm very tired.

I. STALIN

RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 2756. L. 1. Typewritten text.

Notes:

1 We are talking about the return of Kirov from Leningrad to Baku to his former post of secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party (See document No. 205).

No. 201

F. E. Dzerzhinsky - V. V. Kuibyshev

February 5, 1926

Tov. Kuibyshev.

At the same time, the protocol of the meeting of the Presid[ium] of the Supreme Economic Council with the Transcaucasians 1. It was on the issue of paragraph 7 of the Protocol. The wording of the decision was given by Pyatakov, who strongly objected to the adoption of a final decision without verification. The Transcaucasians declared that they were allocating, I think, 500,000 rubles for this purpose “out of their own funds,” demanding from us, I think, 400,000 rubles. They did not say where they got "their" funds from, and we could not ask them and suspect that they would turn to the SNKom for these funds. I must add that Comrade Pyatakov was at that meeting very cruel and stingy with promises to the Transcaucasians and their other demands, and that I was much more liberal and gentle. Aleksey Ivanovich made a mistake in this case both in address (by naming Pyatakov) and in substance. Then, we must remember how Comrade Pyatakov's statement was written: he did it immediately at a meeting of the Politburo after Comrade Pyatakov's speech. Rykov and after he was not given the floor to make a statement. He did not write for a squabble, because he did not leave a copy of his application, but he wrote it right away, showing me what he wrote, asking for my advice on whether to submit this application. I said that it should be introduced, since I considered Comrade Rykov's statement a misunderstanding that should be dispelled. I am sure that the phrase about the investigation meant finding out the truth, and not squabble and litigation2 .

5/II 26

F. Dzerzhinsky 3 .

RTSKHIDNI. F. 79. On. 1. D. 431. L. 3. Autograph.

Notes:

1 Not preserved in the file.

2 We are talking about a conflict at a meeting of the Politburo, the essence of which, due to the fact that the transcripts of the meetings were not kept, could not be clarified. Perhaps this clash happened the day before, at a meeting of the Politburo on February 4th. It was attended by Rykov, and Dzerzhinsky, and Pyatakov. Rykov, as follows from the protocol, spoke on questions of foreign exchange intervention and on the export-import and foreign exchange plan for the second quarter. (RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 545. L. 3-4).

3 On the letterhead: “USSR. Chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy.

No. 202

K. E. Voroshilov — G. K. Ordzhonikidze

February 6, 1926

February 6, 1926

Dear Sergo!

Thanks for your letter. Delayed the answer due to the damned hustle, which is literally intoxicating. The trouble is with our brother, the proletarian, for whole days you rush about to the point of insanity, but it seems that things stand still and ... in a filthy place ...

In Leningrad, we really did a great job. The success is complete, but not unexpected. From the day of our arrival and detailed acquaintance with the situation, we saw that the opposition, fortunately for us, was slipping on the surface. The lower ranks of the party were not aware of the ongoing process of withdrawal of the Leningrad [organization] (gradually) from the party. The bosses thought that we would begin our reports with the assets, where we were prepared for both due meeting and certain failure. When we moved through the plants and factories, the busilers were completely at a loss. After that, the "leaders" could not get into the "tone", and we thrashed, giving neither rest nor time. There were many great episodes. During the 16 days spent in L[eningra]de, I literally rejuvenated, I had to go through so many moments reminiscent of [the events of 1904], [190]5-[190]7.

Now everything is calm with us and only occasionally, as after a big storm, a fresh sound of wind will sweep through, but it will immediately subside.

A little bit of our Felix is "hammered" by the "arrogant" chairman. There was a discussion about this in a close circle. F[elix] complained and asked for rest . The soil is severe difficulties with currency, imports, etc. I think everything will be settled, although I really don’t like the symptoms. I personally spoke with Kob[oy], the results are insignificant. There is nothing special about Voenved. Our estimate is already ugly shredded. Lashev [ich] was ill for more than a week, and now he is doing something somehow.

Our (military) affairs are worse than we imagine. It will be necessary to take on something big, but it’s hard to say what exactly, we’ll wait and find out.

At the next Plenum , 2 fights are not expected, as if, but in general, during this year, I think one cannot do without fights. Kirych works well in St. Petersburg, but his soul is in oil and, of course, he would spit 30 [degree] frost in the face with pleasure and rush to his “fragrant” and alluring Baku.

To friends - Eliava, Amayak, Orakhelashvili, Lavrentiy and others - hello.

I shake your hand, your Voroshilov 3 .

RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 25. D. 93. L. 3-6. Autograph.

Notes:

1 We are talking about the conflict between Dzerzhinsky and the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Rykov. In the Dzerzhinsky fund, an extensive letter from Dzerzhinsky addressed to Stalin dated December 3, 1925, marked Dzerzhinsky "did not send." Dzerzhinsky wrote about the numerous problems of managing the economy and asked for his resignation: “In connection with the situation created for industry and the Supreme Council of National Economy, I must ask the Central Committee for my resignation, since in the current situation I am not able to successfully manage industry. We have neither a correct plan, nor a single plan for the entire Soviet economy, nor a single operational leadership in the economic field, nor a single link between different branches. On this basis, we are advancing with rapid steps towards partial crises, which, as they grow further and further, will widen and may turn into a most serious crisis if the necessary measures are not taken by the Party as soon as possible. I personally, not being a politician and not being able to raise issues in a timely manner so that they are considered and resolved by the party in a timely manner (I raised more than once, and more than once, but almost always they surrendered for elaboration, coordination, etc., and as a result questions and are still being worked out), I become an obstacle in the position of chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of National Economy for the quick and timely resolution of issues, and therefore there is nothing left for me but to ask for resignation, and I am sure that if Vladimir Ilyich were alive, he would satisfy my request [...]” (“Communist”, 1989, no. 9, pp. 82-84). Most likely, at the meeting, which Voroshilov writes about, it was about the problems that Dzerzhinsky raised in his unsent letter to Stalin.

2 The next plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks took place on April 6-9, 1926 and was devoted to economic issues.

3 On the letterhead: "People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR."

No. 203

V. V. Kuibyshev to F. E. Dzerzhinsky

February 1, 1926

T. Dzerzhinsky

Felix! First of all, I want to correct one formal explanation, about which I let you [know] by telephone, about the meeting arranged by Comrade Milyutin. I told you that he convened this meeting with my consent, fulfilling my instructions to clarify the plan for the expansion of industry. I denied in the conversation the existence of a commission on this issue. There really is no commission on this question, but I forgot that there is a commission of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission on the general economic situation, set up by the presidium of the Central Control Commission to work out the whole question for the plenum of the Central Committee.. This commission distributed the work among the members: Stetsky - imports, Yakovlev - exports, Zangvilt - money circulation and currency, V. Larin - trade and grain procurements, Chutskaev - budget, Milyutin and Goltsman - industry. When Comrade Milyutin gave me the composition of the meeting for my signature, I thought that it was only about fulfilling my instructions and forgot that our commission (under my chairmanship) gave Milyutin the same task. Thus, Comrade Milyutin convened this meeting as a member of the commission of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission in order to clarify the questions entrusted to him by the commission, but I did not inform you exactly.

But this is not so important: and on the condition that Comrade Milyutin carried out the instructions of the Central Control Commission, he should not, under the circumstances that have arisen, draw conclusions in the presence of your subordinates, he should have limited himself to clarifying the issue, and report his presumptive conclusions to the commission, which should (under my direction) work through the entire question of the economic situation, linking all the separate parts of the general problem. But, admitting Comrade Milyutin's mistake, I can by no means agree with the harsh assessment that you gave to his behavior in a conversation with me, and then in a conversation with him personally.

In terms of content, his conclusions and all his behavior on the commission were not in the nature of deliberate nitpicking, and most importantly, all the circumstances indicate that your accusation of him that he was carrying out someone else's order, it seems to me, has not been confirmed.

And if so, then all your conclusions are wrong. Tov. Milyutin filed an application with the Central Control Commission to arraign you for insult. How to end this story? She's useless. This is not the way to solve your problem. And all the data for the fact that he decides for the common good.

V. Kuibyshev.

1/II

RTSKHIDNI. F. 76. Op. 2. D. 31. L. 2. Autograph.

Notes:

1 See note 2 to document No. 202.

No. 204

CM Kirov — G. K. Ordzhonikidze

February 13 [1926]

Dear Sergo!

I received your letter. Thank you for not forgetting, I think it will continue to be the same. Yesterday we finished the conference, and thus ended our initial work against the opposition. Today there was a plenum of the Gubkom, they elected a secretariat, a bureau, etc. Things are going well in this respect. It is bad and very bad that a new fight is unfolding on the basis of incredible parochialism. T. Lobov was taken to Moscow 1 , here it causes huge opposition and a fight. In a word, that disunity from the Central Committee, which you know about, turned out to be much deeper. All this must be disentangled. It turns out that I suffered the most. Ear work. Haven't had a chance to get a good night's sleep yet. In general, of course, now it is somewhat easier. Such things, brother. Bukharin enjoyed great success at conferences here, and my Countryman 2 had very little success.. The conferences went well overall. The discussion is fed up, if you wake me up at night, I will tell you very smoothly about the construction of socialism, the NEP, and so on. One of these days I will write in more detail, but now I can’t. Hello to all friends. Hi Zina. I kiss you. S. Kirov 3 .

RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 25. D. 119. L. 1-2. Autograph.

Notes:

On January 21, 1926, the Politburo accepted Dzerzhinsky's proposal to appoint Lobov chairman of the Supreme Economic Council of the RSFSR. This decision was subject to registration within a month (RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 541. L. 5).

2 K. E. Voroshilov.

3 On the letterhead: "The Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party (Bolyn.)".

No. 205

S. M. Kirov — G. K. Ordzhonikidze

March 17 [1926]

17/III.

Dear Sergo!

There hasn't been anything from you for a long time. What's the matter? Is ill? You telegraphed from Sukhum that you were feeling well. Although such telegrams cannot be trusted, of course.

I, brother, was lying down for a week because of the flu. Stupid disease, the temperature reached 40.6. Even now, he didn't wake up properly. This is a very fashionable disease here. A week ago I was in Moscow for one day. I found Stalin in bed, he also had the flu. Everything is fine in Moscow. Although soon you yourself will come and check. Stalin spoke about Baku on the basis, obviously, of your reports, asking whom to send there. I said that so far no one, after the end of our contract, the issue will be resolved by itself 1 . He chuckles, says, and Sergo must definitely be taken from the Transcaucasian slum, which, in his opinion, gives nothing to the mind or heart, but damnably shakes a person 2 . I agreed with him that it is really difficult to work in the Caucasus.

We talked a lot about our economy and finances. It expresses a lot of interesting, but rather sad. According to Soso, things are definitely improving and, in his opinion, will undoubtedly improve. Of course, you will have to tinker. Well, this is not the first time for us.

What do you have?

See you soon in Moscow.

Hello to all friends.

Yours S. Kirov.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 25. D. 120. L. 1-2. Autograph.

Notes:

1 We are talking about the appointment of a new secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan to replace Kirov, who was transferred to work in Leningrad. It follows from the letter that initially Kirov (supported by Ordzhonikidze) agreed to move to Leningrad for a certain period, after which he was going to return to Transcaucasia.

2 See Document No. 218.

No. 206

L. P. Serebryakov to I. V. Stalin

March 27, 1926

T. Stalin!

I spoke with several comrades about the desire you expressed on behalf of several members of the Politburo to explain yourself about the situation in the Party and create conditions for more friendly work under the leadership of the Central Committee. This proposal met, of course, with the full sympathy of the few comrades with whom I spoke. But all of them at that time posed the question that [and] I posed to you. If the Central Committee wants to eliminate superfluous and unnecessary hindrances to the work of those who took part in the opposition [19]23, then how can one explain that just in recent weeks the persecution against the former opposition [19]23 has intensified so much, especially in the Moscow organization, and everyone sees that this campaign is being carried out from above, from the Moscow Committee, without any reasons or pretexts, and no one can believe that this is being done without the knowledge of the secretariat of the Central Committee. You spoke several times about the Party's wariness, but this wariness is being created from above, baseless suspicions are being sown from above, and the atmosphere in the Party is deteriorating. All the comrades ask: if the Central Committee wants to facilitate coordinated work, why is it that a campaign that has not been provoked by anything is being aggravated just at this time? Since you want to speak frankly, I considered myself obliged before the congress to tell you frankly my greatest misgivings about the real causes of anxiety and wariness in the Party. I spoke with Trotsky, Pyatakov and Radek. They expressed their full readiness to continue the conversation that Bukharin and you had with Comrade Trotsky and you with me, with the aim of bringing this conversation to positive practical results. It is best to agree on the time and place with Comrade Pyatakov.

With communist greetings Serebryakov.

March 27, 1926

RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 1/S. D. 171. L. 1. Uncertified typewritten copy.

Notes:

one. After the break with Zinoviev and Kamenev, Stalin began maneuvers to prevent a possible bloc between Zinoviev and Kamenev and Trotsky. Stalin made certain hints about cooperation to Trotsky personally and through Serebryakov. Trotsky, apparently, really counted on a change in his position. On April 2, 1926, he wrote to Serebryakov: “I understood the matter in such a way that a private conversation was aimed at eliminating accusations and insinuations about the stone in the bosom and creating conditions for more friendly work, of course, on the basis of the decisions of the Fourteenth Congress. True, it seemed to me somewhat strange that Stalin, with whom we work together in the Politburo, turns in such a roundabout way after we had a conversation with him on the same topics. But I thought it would be absurd for formal organizational reasons to refuse to talk,

No. 207

F. E. Dzerzhinsky to I. V. Stalin

March 28, 1926

T. Stalin

In the struggle for a regime of economy, for the accumulation and saving of the necessary funds for the fulfillment of the grandiose tasks facing industry and the entire national economy of the USSR, we run into an obstacle that is insurmountable for us (VSNKh), which paralyzes our efforts. Everywhere, almost without exception, in the localities, gubernia committees, district committees, ukoms and the Soviet authorities consider the funds of our economic agencies as a source for covering various expenses that have nothing to do with the work of this economic agency, and which, even under existing laws, they have no right to cover. Local authorities demand "voluntary" contributions for the maintenance of cells, schools, homeless children, newspapers, publications, grain funds, etc. without end. These demands are very often made by the chairmen of the executive committees, the secretaries of party organizations, sometimes even members of the Central Committee of our party. And usually our business executives are willing to meet halfway. This provides a friendly attitude towards them and a cover for their mistakes and independence from the center and the law. One front is created against the center. At the same time, local authorities themselves reveal themselves in front of business executives and must turn a blind eye to their excesses, which flourish everywhere and everywhere. In order to really be able to carry out a regime of economy, it is necessary, first of all, to eradicate this evil - illegal requisitions at the request or with the sanctions of local authorities. Therefore, my request to you is to write a directive letter on behalf of the Central Committee specially on this occasion with your signature, print it in Pravda and instruct the editors of Pravda to pay attention to this phenomenon in a number of articles and correspondence from the localities.

28/II 26

F. Dzerzhinsky.

RTSHIDNI; F. 76. Op. 2. D. 325. L. 25. Autograph.

Notes:

On April 25, 1926, the Appeal of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was adopted to all party organizations, control commissions of the party, to all party members working in economic, cooperative, trade, banking and other institutions, on the struggle for a regime of economy. In the Appeal published in the newspapers, in particular, it was said about the inadmissibility of “direct or indirect material extortions of party organizations from economic agencies; the party organization must fit entirely into its budget, must itself be a model of the greatest economy, for only under this condition can it be the leader of the struggle for a regime of economy ”(CPSU in resolutions ... T. 4. P. 22).

No. 208

F. E. Dzerzhinsky — A. I. Rykov

April 5, 1926

5/IV-26

I value Pyatakov very much, but in view of his conspiracy with Kamenev, I am ready to give him up if they give me a deputy for Promplan. Would you agree to give Smilga away?

[Dzerzhinsky]

But not with the replacement of Pyatakov?

[Rykov]

No. Pyatakov will have to be given work not in the economic field.

[Dzerzhinsky]

I don't think there is anything to be done right now.

There will be fewer major disagreements with Pyatakov in the economy.

They (Pyatakov-Trotsky) make an attempt to lead Kamenev-Zinoviev in the struggle "for power". This he will do to a much greater extent if he is freed from loading.

[Rykov]

RTSKHIDNI. F. 76. Op. 2. D. 168. L. 11. Autographs.

No. 209

G. E. Zinoviev, L. B. Kamenev - Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks

April 16, 1926

Copy .

To the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

Tov. Rykov proposed that the members and candidates of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission be sent a letter from Vladimir Ilyich against Kamenev and Zinoviev, written almost nine years ago at the height of our differences . Everyone understands that the distribution of this letter in a hundred (or more) copies right now may have the sole purpose of carrying out the well-known "theory of compromise". Such use of this document is clearly contrary to the real will of Vladimir Ilyich.

It is known that Vladimir Ilyich wrote (see Lenin, vol. XVII, p. 373), returning to the October (1917) disagreements, the following:

“Just before the October Revolution in Russia and shortly after it, a number of excellent communists in Russia made a mistake, which we now reluctantly recall. Why reluctantly? Because, without special need, it is wrong to recall such errors that have been completely corrected. During the period I have indicated, they showed hesitation in the direction of the fear that the Bolsheviks would isolate themselves too much, take too risky an uprising, and be too uncompromising to a certain section of the “Mensheviks” and “Socialist-Revolutionaries”. The conflict reached such a point that the named comrades defiantly resigned from all responsible posts of party and Soviet work, to the greatest joy of the enemies of the Soviet revolution. Matters have reached the point of extremely fierce polemics in the press on the part of the Central Committee of our Party against those who have resigned. And in a few weeks, in a few months at the most,

From these words of V[ladimir] I[lyich] it is quite clear that to use his letter, written 9 years ago, to try to discredit Zinoviev and Kamenev, means to act contrary to the will of Lenin. The October mistake by Kamenev and Zinoviev was recognized by themselves and, according to V[ladimir] I[lyich], they "completely corrected it." Our Party, on the initiative of Lenin, appointed Zinoviev as early as November 1917 to the post of chairman of the Leningrad Soviet, and then chairman of the Comintern. He remained a member of the Politburo all the time without a break. Kamenev, as soon as he returned from the Finnish arrest - to the post of chairman of the Moscow Soviet, member of the Politburo, deputy Vl[adimir] Ilyich] as chairman of the STO.

The proposal to send V[ladimir] I[lyich's] letter was submitted to the Politburo by Comrade Rykov. In view of this, we consider ourselves entitled to recall the following facts. At the April (1917) party conference Comrade Rykov was farther away from Lenin than any of the Bolsheviks. From April to October, comrade Rykov remained furthest from the position of comrade Lenin. In October 1917 Comrade Rykov made the same mistake as we did . Tov. Rykov was not elected to the Central Committee at the April (1917) conference and, at Lenin's insistence, was not elected to the Central Committee until the IX Congress (1920). Comrade Rykov is now taking the initiative to use, as an instrument of inner-Party struggle, Lenin's letter, to which Vladimir Ilyich himself never returned.

1) There are letters from Lenin on the national question in which Comrade Stalin's policy is sharply criticized . These letters are devoted to deeply fundamental questions. V[ladimir] I[lyich] never took these letters back. On the contrary, it is known that until the very end of his life he was greatly disturbed by this very question. They were read by the delegations of the 13th Congress, but they were not handed over, and a number of members of the Central Committee of the current composition do not know them in their original form.

2) There is a so-called "testament" of V[ladimir] I[lyich] 5 in which he directly proposes to the party to remove comrade Stalin from the post of general secretary, since V[ladimir] I[lyich] fears that Stalin is capable of abusing the enormous power concentrated in the hands of the general secretary. The essence of this letter, the testament, is as follows: remove Comrade Stalin from the post of general secretary and work together with everyone, including Trotsky, despite the fact that all of you have made mistakes and have weaknesses. This most important letter was only read by the delegations of the Thirteenth Congress and was not handed over.

And this testament was written not in 1917, but in 1923, not in the midst of an acute, albeit short-lived conflict, but in a situation when Vladimir] I[lyich] was giving his last advice to the party. V[ladimir] I[lyich] never took back the proposal to remove Stalin from the post of General Secretary, on the contrary, all this indicates that V[ladimir] I[lyich] did not put this proposal into practice only because he could no longer be neither at the twelfth nor at the thirteenth congresses. This testamentary letter was also mentioned in the debate at the Politburo, to which Comrade Rykov refers in his proposal.

We consider it generally wrong and contrary to Lenin's policy to use Lenin's letters for those purposes for which they were clearly not intended. But if the majority of the Politburo took this path, then it would be absolutely necessary to send out not only the letter of V[ladimir] I[lyich] dated 1917, but also the above-mentioned documents with an exact indication of the time of their writing 6 .

G. ZINOVEV. L. KAMENEV.

April 14, 1926.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 71. D. 83. L. 1-3. Typewritten copy.

Notes:

1 This refers to Lenin’s letter to the Central Committee of the RSDLP(b) dated October 19 (November 1), 1917, in which he accused Zinoviev and Kamenev of strike-breaking and demanded that they be expelled from the party for their speeches against an armed uprising (Lenin V.I. PSS, vol. 34, pp. 423-427). On April 15, 1926, the Politburo decided to send this letter to the members of the Central Committee, obliging them to return the document to the Secretariat of the Central Committee after reading it, without making a copy of it (RTsKhIDNI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 556. L. 7-8 ).

2 Lenin V.I. PSS. T. 41. S. 417.

3 In early November 1917, Rykov filed an application for resignation from the Central Committee and resigned as People's Commissar for Internal Affairs in protest against the decision of the Bolshevik Central Committee, which rejected the idea of creating a government of representatives of all Soviet parties.

4 Lenin V. I. PSS. T. 45. S. 356-362.

5 "Letter to the Congress" (Ibid., pp. 343-348).

6 The final clash between the Stalinist group and the new opposition over the Leninist documents took place at the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission in July 1926.

No. 210

F. E. Dzerzhinsky — G. G. Yagoda

May 4, 1926

Comrade Yagoda.

S. secret.

G. G.

Tomorrow I am already ending my vacation and going to Kharkov and other places for a month. I ask you to keep me informed of the most important affairs in you and in the country. I am disturbed by the plans of Guchkov. We need to deploy our networks in such a way as to capture his agents and frustrate his plans. If this fails, then it may even be necessary to sacrifice someone. Of course, it is better to do without it, but Guchkov is such a strong personality that he can carry his plan through to the end.

Further, the question of "speculation" and the fight against it are of great importance now. Is anything being done to define and implement, where appropriate, the very concept of "speculation". We cannot do without the use of a private trader, but this is possible only in the fight against speculation, i.e., in determining the permitted and prohibited trade. What have you done along this line?

In connection with this, it is necessary to deal with the cleansing of Moscow from the parasitic and speculative element (primarily the city of Moscow). I instructed Pauker to collect material on the distribution of the population of Moscow according to this criterion. So far I haven't received anything from him. Wouldn’t it be worthwhile in our OGPU to create a colonization department or some kind of cell for this purpose and get a special fund for this, at least from the confiscated funds and your construction residues. It is necessary to populate the sparsely populated areas with the parasitic element (with families and all their belongings) in our cities according to a plan specially worked out and approved by the Council of People's Commissars. We must at all costs free our cities from hundreds of thousands of parasitic speculative elements. The work of Ekonupr must follow this path, but this is possible only after the preparation and approval of a large plan, after it has been determined what a parasite speculator is, as opposed to an honest and permitted private trader. This question must be coordinated with the Moscow Soviet] and its Komvnutorg and MSPO, as well as with the Supreme Council of National Economy - in the absence of Mantsev and Quiring. We are being eaten by these parasites. Hence there are no goods for the peasants, hence the rise in prices and the fall of our chervonets. The OGPU must deal with this question with all its energy.

What do you hear about Vyach[eslav] Rud[ol'fovich]? 1 Have you recovered and what mood.

Hello. Yours F. Dzerzhinsky.

4/V-26 Mukhalatka.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 16. Op. 3. D. 390. L. 3-4. Autograph.

Notes:

1 Menzhinsky.

No. 211

F. E. Dzerzhinsky to A. I. Rykov, V. M. Molotov

June 1, 1926

T. Rykov and Comrade Molotov.

T. Pyatakov, by a resolution appointing him a deputy member of the STO instead of a member, was disorganized 1. He told me that he took it very painfully, that he decided during my stay in Moscow, after my final return from Ukraine (I will have to leave there for 10 -15 days), not to go to the STO at all, etc. It seems to me that it would be expedient to reconsider the decision and include Comrade Pyatakov in the STO as a member. Motives: Undoubtedly, Comrade Pyatakov, as one of our few economists, in practice is an independent value, no matter how many and no matter what deviations he has, both in the past and in the present. In this respect, he is undoubtedly more valuable than I am to SRT. Its slopes are in no way dangerous for SRT. They could be more dangerous for the Supreme Council of National Economy - under his deputy chairman of the Supreme Economic Council - if he led in practice, under the leadership of our industry, your line; but this, fortunately, is not the case. In the Supreme Economic Council, Comrade Pyatakov, in his practical work, is undoubtedly loyal both to the directives of the Party and to the resolutions of the STO and the Council of People's Commissars. T. Pyatakov displays his Trotskyist or independent or bloc bias in his political activity outside of his work in the Supreme Council of National Economy. I know about this not only from the statements of Comrade Pyatakov himself, but also from my own (and other comrades') direct observations.

Further, it is absolutely unthinkable for me alone in our entire state industry to work out all the issues of SRT. In financial matters, I still do not understand enough. I won't be able to manage in the SRT without Pyatakov, who should not replace me, but represent himself.

Finally, my trip to the Ukraine convinced me that, as an organizer (and not a specialist), I should especially often go to places, to factories - to get to know people, to help them organizationally. And it's not my job to sit in the service station. Therefore, I ask, without excluding me from the members of the SRT, to bring before the P / Bureau the question of appointing Comrade Pyatakov a member of the SRT (instead of a deputy member of the SRT ) .

1/VI 26

F. Dzerzhinsky.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 76. On. 2. D. 168. L. 12. Autograph.

Notes:

1 Pyatakov had been a member of the STO of the USSR since the establishment of this body in 1923. In May 1926 he was appointed deputy member of the STO Dzerzhinsky.

2 Dzerzhinsky's proposal was not accepted. After moving to work as deputy chairman of the State Bank of the USSR, Pyatakov in November 1928 was appointed deputy chairman of the State Bank Sheinman in the STO.

No. 212

G. K. Ordzhonikidze to S. M. Kirov

June 22, 1926

Bitch you are a son, my dear Mironych! Shame on you, you still haven’t written a word, or you are waiting for me to be the first to write. Let's say you have every right to do so. The ruler of the city of Peter and Lenin, of course, is not up to the Asians, but still you should not be too “conceited”. Well, well, so be it, I will write first, and you, hopefully, will answer sometime. How are you? How are you? When are you thinking of resting?

We have nothing to do - like soot is white, as our Eterka puts it. Amayak is on vacation, I am in Tiflis. After the Plenum of the Central Committee 1 I will go to Sochi. I hope you will go there too, they say Matsesta helps a lot. Days 13 Soso was with us. The time was not spent very badly, only they harassed him by pestering him to speak. Once it was possible to formally rape him and force him to perform in the railway workshops. There were no less than 6-7 thousand people. They met him superbly. I didn’t manage to drag him to Baku - I was afraid of the performance, but I should have. He remembered Ivanyan here, and as a result, the ZKKK expelled Ivanyan from the party. This Iv[anyan] turned out to be very thick-skinned.

Things are generally going well for us, only in Baku there is considerable discontent on the basis of wages. How are you on this part?

Karaev, Bagirov and Y. Kasymov left for the Crimea, Leon, Mamiya and Lavrenty will go with us. In Baku, except for Bagirov, everyone behaves pretty decently. And they are working. 1 1/2 * ago we had a Legislative Conference, which went very well. The Azerbaijanis really distinguished themselves at the meeting. The village, apparently, will be greatly stirred up. Undoubtedly, compared to last year, we have moved forward. True, Larin decently disgraced us, but there's nothing to be done. Much of what he writes is correct, but it was possible to do without that flashy article 2 , especially since, in general, his breed cannot complain that they were oppressed under Soviet rule. Musabekov sent the article to Pravda, but so far nothing has been seen.

Well, more, perhaps, is not worth it, and that's a lot for you.

Warm fraternal greetings to Maria Lvovna.

Kiss you hard, kiss you hard

Your Sergo

Greetings from Zina to you and M[aria] Lv[ovna]. Hello from Eterka. The plaster has already been removed, and the job was successful. She has grown up to be such a brat.

Jim bows low to you.

Your Sergo 3 .

22/VI 26

RTSHIDNI; F. 80. Op. 10. D. 43. L. 1-5. Autograph.

Notes:

1 The next joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was held on July 14-23, 1926.

On May 20, 1926, Pravda published an article by Y. Larin “On Cuban brides”, which spoke about the facts of discrimination by the authorities of the Azerbaijani city of Cuba of townspeople - Mountain Jews.

3 The letter is written on a letterhead: “RSFSR. MEMBER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL of the Separate Caucasian Army.

No. 213

F. E. Dzerzhinsky - V. V. Kuibyshev

June 23, 1926

Tov. Kuibyshev.

One of our non-Party specialists who visited Paris, who was completely devoted to the Soviet authorities, today shared with me his impressions of our Trade Representative Offices there; he told me that these impressions of his were confirmed by the opinions he heard from the French. We pay huge sums of money in dollars, salaries exceeding all rates and salaries of the French. The states are huge - not corresponding to the work. The French say that these staffs and such salaries can only be explained by the fact that, obviously, this apparatus is engaged in another risky job - propaganda. The workers in the trade mission do not speak French. Transactions are made not directly with the French, but through intermediaries, Russian emigrants - speculators.

They publish unnecessary, expensively paid publications.

I think that since Com. Roisemann is testing our apparatus abroad and it would be worthwhile for him to send these impressions for verification .

23/VI-26.

F. Dzerzhinsky.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 76. Op. 2. D. 416. L. 10. Certified typewritten copy.

Notes:

1 . On June 28, 1926, Kuibyshev's secretary wrote to Dzerzhinsky: “[...] I am reporting for your information the resolution on your note dated 23/VI regarding high salaries and large staffs in our foreign representations: “i.e. Roizeman. I agree with com. Dzerzhinsky. At all costs, achieve the maximum results in reducing staff and reducing salaries” [...]” (RTSKHIDNI. F. 76. Op. 2. D. 416. L. 11). On August 9, 1926, the Secretariat of the Central Control Commission considered the question of the composition of Soviet institutions in France. The essence of the decision is not clear from the protocol (Ibid. F. 613. On. 1. D. 46. L. 169).

No. 214

V. V. Kuibyshev — A. I. Rykov

[later July 3, 1926]

Another possible combination. Felix is now worried about the "control system" 1 . The management system at the present time must be largely subordinated to the interests of industrial development and industrialization. It would be possible to give Felix a part-time RCT. Nowhere is it said that the People's Commissar of the RKI must necessarily be a member of the Central Control Commission. Perhaps Felix could do something about the "madhouse" from this angle.

He has a lot of initiatives and much more than me. When he proposed to appoint him as austerity dictator, it was essentially the same.

The matter with him is so serious (after all, in the last word he directly hinted at suicide), that considerations about my ambition should fade into the background. Yes, and my ambition will not be hurt - otherwise I am somehow arranged and will not only obey any decision, but really willingly and without any resentment I will take up any work.

V. Kuibyshev.

And if he is appointed chairman of the SRT and the experience of two governments is resumed?

[Rykov]

This is out of the question. The system of two governments must be buried forever. Not to mention the fact that neither Felix's nervous system nor his impressionism is suitable for the head of the service station. He has a lot of initiative, but lacks the features of a leader (a system at work, a constant sense of the whole complexity of phenomena and their relationships, an accurate feeling for the consequences of one measure or another, etc.!). In the Supreme Economic Council, the advantages of initiative can still outweigh the disadvantages of Felix as a leader, but this will not work in the SRT.

V. Kuibyshev.

I fear that his nervousness and expansiveness, without some major [step], may lead to disaster.

[Rykov]

RTSKHIDNI. F. 79. On. 1. D. 729. L. 1-2. Autograph.

Notes:

On July 3, 1926, Dzerzhinsky sent a letter to Kuibyshev, in which he outlined his "thoughts and proposals on the management system." Earlier, on June 2, 1926, Dzerzhinsky wrote a letter to Rykov, in which he asked for his resignation from the post of chairman of the Supreme Economic Council (Communist. 1989. No. 9. P. 84, 87-88).

No. 215

M. P. Tomsky - Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks

July 10, 1926

Copy .

TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CC AUCP(b).

Dear comrades!

In view of the fact that a number of symptoms from the field of economic life (first of all, a good harvest, appropriate export opportunities, etc.) indicate a high probability of an improvement in our economic situation, it seems to me quite timely to raise the question of raising wages, and I ask put it at one of the next meetings of the Politburo. It goes without saying that the decision of the Central Committee on this issue presupposes its preliminary study by the bodies of the Supreme Council of National Economy and the State Planning Commission with the indispensable participation of the trade unions. In what branches of production, in what terms, sizes, etc. - all this must be worked out and taken into account, at least approximately, in advance. Undoubtedly, this issue is of the greatest economic and political importance,1 . At the same time, I consider it necessary to take measures against distortions of the "economic regime", which is often observed during the implementation of this regime 2 .

In a personal conversation, Comrade Comrades Molotov and Bukharin fully agreed with me on these issues, I think that they will support this proposal of mine.

M. Tomsky 3 .

July 10, 1926

RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 5281. L. 2. Typewritten copy.

Notes:

1 After a long study of the issue, on September 20, 1926, the Politburo approved the proposal of the Politburo commission on wages to increase wages only for workers employed in production. A list of industries in which wage increases were proposed was approved. This decision was approved by Stalin, who was on vacation. “As for the salary, you seem to be doing well. It is important that the lower strata receive something tangible,” he wrote to Molotov on September 23, 1926. At Stalin’s suggestion, the wage increase on September 30 was also extended to certain groups of oil industry workers (Letters from I. V. Stalin to V. M. Molotov pp. 93, 95).

On August 16, 1926, the Politburo approved a draft circular on the economy regime (RTSKHIDNI, F. 17, Op. 3, D. 581, L. 3). On August 17, the circular "On the successes and shortcomings of the campaign for an austerity regime", addressed to all party and Soviet organizations, signed by Rykov, Stalin, Kuibyshev, was published in the newspapers. The circular dealt, in particular, with the worsening of the financial situation of the workers as a result of the austerity campaign.

3 Under the text of the letter there are notes by Bukharin, Stalin and Molotov: “I join - N. Bukharin. For - V. Molotov. Raise the question at the next meeting of the PB after the Plenum. I. Stalin. V. Molotov 13.VII.

No. 216

J. V. Stalin to G. L. Pyatakov

July 13, 1926

Tov. PYATAKOV.

Your paper dated July 13 has been received. A similar proposal was received by the Secretariat of the Central Committee on July 10, signed by Tomsky, Molotov and Bukharin 1, where the authors of the proposal are asked to raise the issue at the next meeting of the Politburo and resolve it by the time the collective agreements are renegotiated. Considering the issue to be quite overdue, the Secretariat decided to raise it at the next meeting of the PB after the Plenum. The Secretariat does not consider it possible to accept your proposal to raise the issue at this (July) Plenum, in view of the fact that the issue has not yet been prepared by you for raising, the control figures for the industry are not yet ready for you, as you write about this, the opinion of the Supreme Economic Council is still unknown (according to the information it turned out that Comrade Dzerzhinsky did not know anything about your letter), the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions had not yet discussed the issue, and, finally, the agenda of the Plenum had already been finally adopted by the PB, and for some reason you did not demand replenishment of the order of the day of the Plenum at the Monday (July 12) meeting of the PB, although You attended it. I remind you that according to the regulations adopted by the PB, issues should be included in the agenda of the PB three days before the meeting. I believe that this requirement should be attributed to an even greater extent to the procedure for compiling the agenda of the Plenum.

SECRETARY OF THE CC I. Stalin.

13.VII.26

RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 5281. L. 1. Typewritten text. The signature is a facsimile.

Notes:

1 See Document No. 215.

No. 217

F. E. Dzerzhinsky - V. V. Kuibyshev

July 13, 1926

13/VII-26

PERSONAL

SECRET. COPY.

Tov. Kuibyshev.

Dear V.V.

I received from Comrade CHUTSKAYEV a copy of his appeal to the P/Bureau in connection with the results of an examination of 14 self-supporting bodies. I think that the methods of our work are such that we waste a lot of energy, time and achieve minimal results - due to incorrect relations between the RCT and other departments. A heap of deadly facts relating to completely different institutions in one report, and embracing completely different times and obtained as a result of a long examination, and not promptly reported to those departments within which the audited institutions are located, cannot give positive results in the sense of elimination and prevention evil. The publication of such collected and concentrated facts brings unheard of despondency, because there is no notification at the same time that this is evil, these facts, when noticed, are immediately eliminated, and the perpetrators suffer such and such a punishment. I understand such publications on the part of the RCT, because I am against any cover-up, but by publishing evil - publishing on behalf of the authorities - without publishing at the same time that the evil has already been eliminated - this is demonstrating one's powerlessness. After all, RKI is a body of power. I understand all sorts of publications and revelations of slaves and villages and economic correspondents - but not of the authorities. This is one. On the other hand, if the RCT, having noticed somewhere evil in someone, immediately informed the head of the department with a demand to eliminate this evil and report on the elimination, then the result would have been completely different. Then the speed of eliminating evil would be achieved. With us, it is done completely differently: the noticed evil is kept secret until the entire extensive examination is completed, until it has passed all hierarchical instances, i.e., it is revealed after 1/2 year at best, after that often, when the evil is already just exhausted.

I have a Revision Department in the VSNKh, which is directly subordinate to me, if the RCT agreed to my proposal, I would instruct Comrade Samsonov, who is at the head of this Department, to specifically organize the elimination of the shortcomings noticed by the RCT, since they are indisputable, under my general leadership.

13/VII-26

F. Dzerzhinsky.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 76. Op. 2. D. 198. L. 12. Certified typewritten copy.

No. 218

V. M. Molotov — G. K. Ordzhonikidze

September 9, 1926

Dear Sergo!

As for the wording of the first decision of the PB on your appointment to the North [Northern] Caucasus, there was obviously a mistake 1 . My fault. We didn't mean to offend you, but it was awkward. I hope you will agree that this completely accidental awkwardness should not be regarded otherwise than as an involuntary thing, to which, in our hustle and bustle, we did not attach any importance at the beginning. Now you already have a second resolution - a response to the protest of the Zakkraykom (which, of course, will go to the same addresses as the first resolution) 2. It seems to me that it eliminates any awkwardness that could arise after the first. We all had and still have the full desire that this case does not leave any residue in you. For my part, I hope that you will not stay in the Northern Caucasus for very long and will move to Moscow in the near future.

Our business is going well. There are difficulties (the Far East — with Zhang 3 ; in the economy — it is difficult to get out of export-import[ing] affairs; the growth of unemployment; in the intra-Party — preparations for an offensive are clearly progress in construction and, especially, in party work. I will not write the details, Stalin is generally aware of the latest affairs.

I wish you get well.

9/IX.

Greetings to 3[inaida] Gavrilovna] and friends.

I shake hands with V. Molotov

RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 25. D. 151. L. 1-3. Autograph.

Notes:

oneOn August 30, 1926, the Politburo accepted the proposal of the North Caucasian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to recall Ordzhonikidze from Transcaucasia and approve him instead of Mikoyan, who was transferred to Moscow, as the first secretary of the North Caucasian Regional Committee (F. 17. Op. 3. D. 584 L. 5). On September 4, Stalin, who was on vacation in the south, wrote to Molotov about this decision: “Sergo was with me the other day. He is furious at the wording of the Central Committee's decision to recall him. The wording of the recall is regarded by him as a punishment, as a snap given by the Central Committee for no reason. The phrase that Sergo is being transferred to Rostov “instead of Mikoyan” is considered by him as a hint that Mikoyan is superior to Sergo, that Sergo is suitable only as Mikoyan’s deputy, etc. Stalin proposed a new wording of the decree, which emphasized that all decisions on the appointment were made in agreement with Ordzhonikidze. “The sooner you do this thing, the better, and the new statement will have to be sent out to everyone who received the old statement. You might say it's all nonsense. Maybe. But I must say that this nonsense can seriously damage the case if it is not corrected. Stalin wrote to Molotov (Stalin's Letters to Molotov, pp. 82-83).

On September 1, 1926, members of the Zakkraykom appealed to Stalin with a request to reconsider the decision of the Central Committee to transfer Ordzhonikidze from Transcaucasia. On September 9, the Politburo rejected this request and confirmed its decision on the new appointment of Ordzhonikidze, but this time using the formulations proposed by Stalin (Ibid., pp. 84-86).

3 We are talking about the conflicts between the USSR and the head of the Mukden group, Zhang Zuolin, over the CER.

No. 219

Parkhomenko — G. K. Ordzhonikidze

December 3, 1926

3/XII 26.

Comrade Sergo!

Driven by the interests of a common cause, I would like to share with you the moods and impressions that your arrival at the RCT has generated, and I think that you will not be offended for this.

After your speech at the meeting, the employees (I had to talk to many) believe that in your person the RFL will receive firm, confident leadership, since the prevailing softness of the leadership also introduced uncertainty about the correctness and expediency of the work being done.

It is not for me, of course, to remind you that in addition to firm leadership, what is needed is a comradely attitude towards others, and not depersonalization of them.

Remember the complaints of the inspectors at the meeting that they are being depersonalized, that they do not know the results of their work; Not least in this was Comrade Peters. At the collegium of the RCT on 2/XII from [his] year, I think that you got excited in vain (that's when a hot heart is bad!) And circumcised Peters and Milyutin, I'm sure that at that moment they remembered Ilyich's characterization of you according to " deviant" case.

It seems that you are terrorizing your fellow workers. How else would you explain yourself that Lebed and Romanovsky, who gave the task of the RCT of the RSFSR on “music” at the time when it was attributed to Chutskaev and Peters in their presence, took water in their mouths and did not tell the truth. Than, if not the fear that you will shout at them.

If you restrain the manifestation of this negative trait of your character, all the rest of the evidence for the fact that you will be a good leader.

Do not understand my letter otherwise than as a desire to help the common cause.

With comradely respect, Parkhomenko.

RTSKHIDNI. F. 85. Op. 1/S. D. 52. L. 1-2. Autograph.

No. 220

N. A. Lakoba — G. K. Ordzhonikidze

December 27, 1926

December 27, 1926

Dear Sergo!

Before undertaking the present letter, I was contemplating whether I should hold on to You or You. I came to the following conclusion: if we take into account the existing relations between us, as well as my “self-confidence” that I will not let Sergo down under any circumstances, I should hold on to you. This is essentially. Where it will be necessary, of course, I will not forget to call you Sergo. But this is already the formal side of things. Such an introduction of mine, you, I know, will meet with a smile and, probably, say: "that's bad." Nevertheless - I still considered this reservation necessary.

And now to business.

I received two letters from you. The first one I received very late. It did not catch me in Sukhum: I was in Tiflis at the plenum of the Central Committee of the KKE. I was informed of the arrival of Comrade Molotov in Tiflis by cipher, and [I] immediately ordered his arrangement. But he was not lucky (to our chagrin) with us. In the Rest House of your name with light at that time, due to the lack of water at the power plant, the situation was not very good. This defect could be quickly corrected by replacing the light bulbs that existed in the House with stronger ones.

Someone (damn it!) from the vacationers assured Molotov that nothing would come of the light before a month - and he left for Gagra.

In Athos, too, there was a curiosity. T. Bargandzhia, who learned about Molotov's desire to stay in Athos, was scared, confused. Obviously, Bargandzhia was not ready to meet Molotov. It turned out that the Af[onian] Rest House was not ready for reception, and that it seemed that some troubles would be required especially for Molotov. Molotov drove off to Gagra, to the House of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. I found the Sukhumi comrades and Barganjiy (on arrival) completely bewildered and dejected. We quarreled a little among ourselves about this failure. He took the necessary measures to correct it. I went to Gagra to see Molotov. I asked him to go to Sukhum or Athos, but he expressed a wish to stay in Gagra, arguing that there were 7-10 days left until the end of his vacation, and that it was not advisable to move in this short time, etc. I had no choice but to to agree with this position, holding “revenge” in his soul, to lure Comrade Molotov for hunting or to Sukhum for at least 1-2 days and “spoil” the bridge along the way. If the ongoing Abkha[Az] party conference or some other unforeseen circumstance does not interfere, then I will fulfill my “revenge”. In this way I will be able to somewhat make up for our failure, and also to prove to Comrade Molotov that his excessive modesty is not always good. The second (letter) about Comrade Alliluyev I received without delay. I arranged it in the Rest House of your name. - I was very, very happy with these letters: 1) because you have time to remember me, and even write; 2) because I feel very good from your word, you encourage me in my work and 3) because your letters give me a happy opportunity, in turn, without prior hesitation, to write to you.

About our (Abkhazian) affairs.

In short, the state of affairs in Abkhazia in all areas of party[i] and soviet] work must, on the whole, be recognized as satisfactory. 1. Now we have finished county party conferences. Today, 27/XII, the Abkhaz [Az] party conference opens. Unlike past times, at this conference, in addition to our achievements (there are), we note with satisfaction the fact that there is no squabble, national squabble in our organization. Following your directives, we have achieved the creation of normal working conditions in our organization. Mistakes (involuntary), of course, can happen, but if earlier, in the hope that Sergo would settle things, Sergo would correct them, Sergo would answer for us all, etc., we made quite a few of these involuntary mistakes, but now we are trying to make them. as less as possible. 2. The attitude towards us on the part of the Central Committee of the KKE is the most attentive and good. I sincerely declare that Mamiya, Shalva, Lavrenty Kartvelishvili, Misha Kakhiani, Levan Gogoberidze treat us in a comradely, warm way. I hope that we will justify their attitude towards us.

About tobacco.

Judging by the decision of the college of the CNT of the USSR, the prices for tobacco harvest [19]25-[19]26 must be recognized as unacceptable, risky both for industry and [and] for planters in terms of their consequences, which will be revealed next year. The NCT of the USSR accepted last year's cut prices "as having justified themselves sufficiently" and which, with last year's assortment, gave an average of 26 rubles per pood of corded samsun. And this year, the assortment of tobacco for natural reasons (rain, a small number of sunny days) turned out to be significantly lower than last [th] year, and according to the formula of the USSR NKT (last year's sort prices), the planter will receive 26 rubles instead of last year's ] on average, only 23 rubles 25 kopecks. on average per pood of corded samsun. Tobacco processing for a peasant cost 28 rubles per pood (materials of the Georgian NKT SSR).

The Central Committee of the KKE, taking into account the interests of industry and exports, reduced this price to 26 rubles, but with this year's assortment. The price adopted by the Central Committee, in deciphering, means: last year's average price is 26 rubles, but with this year's assortment, that is, this price gives such sorted prices that will be 11.91% higher than last year's. At this price, we have already concluded an agreement with Gruztabtrest for 11,000 poods and with Zakgostorg for 25 rubles per pood of corded cord, with this year's assortment for 150,000 poods. As a compromise, we can agree to the prices at which we have concluded an agreement with Zakgostorg.

Special considerations: 1. The average yield per tithe remains the same this year as it was last year.

2. The cost of processing one pood of tobacco to the planter cost 28 rubles.

3. This year's assortment in terms of meteorological conditions is lower than last year's.

4. The NCTorg of the USSR, in comparison with the previous year, raises prices in the Kuban and Maikop, and this circumstance could not but raise the question of the ratio of prices between Abkhazian and Kuban tobaccos.

5. The NKTorg of the USSR, correcting its last year's mistake in the Kuban (it is doing very well), may make a mistake with regard to Abkhazia this year, so that it may be corrected next year. But such a "deal" can cost both the planter and the industry dearly.

How much did we earn from last year's tobacco?

According to your directive, since last year, we withheld prices in favor of the union of tobacco growers (cooperative accumulation) 1 ruble per pood, which gave over 500,000 ruble. This measure turned out to be quite expedient and not burdensome for the planter, since the assortment of last year's tobacco actually turned out to be somewhat higher than the accepted NKT and, consequently, the planter received on average per pood more than the accepted price of 26 rubles. As for the total profit from the tobacco operation, I will inform you in Moscow, since it has not been accurately calculated at the moment. Roughly, you can take at least one million rubles.

About Tkvarcheli coal.

In accordance with the views you expressed, during your stay in Athos last summer, I took all possible measures to transfer the Tkvarcheli case to practical ground, that is, in the sense of switching to the exploitation of the already surveyed areas (10 square [adratic] versts).

Without cluttering now with listing all our measures in this regard, as well as enumerating the decisions of the Georgian [] and Transcaucasian [] centers, I consider it necessary to send you a letter from Yushkin from Tiflis on this issue, which will allow you to form an opinion on the nature and pace of movement of this case about our centers.

About the Black Sea railway.

Speaking of Tkvarchely, it is impossible not to touch on the current state of affairs on the Black Sea railway. This road is very bad today. For 1926-[192]7, instead of 5 million [ions] rubles, only 2 million [ions] rubles are assigned, depending on this, solid bridge work on the Zugdida-Ochamchira-Kodar section is stopped. 6 1/2 million [ions] r[ubles] would be sufficient to have a road from Zugdidi to Ochamchira in 6 months, which would be very important for Tkvarcheli. Without this condition, by the end (according to the unanimous opinion in Tiflis) [19]28, it is impossible to build a road [from] Ochamchira [to] the Tkvarcheli mines. The Chernomor[skaya] road (according to our information) is in danger of stopping work on it because of the constraint in means, negativity of views, etc. Rykov and Rudzutak and because of the decision to transfer the maximum funds from the NKPS budget to the Semirechinsko-Turkestan-Siberian road. The fate of the Chernomor[skaya] railway should, as it were, be decided at a meeting scheduled for January at the NKPS. Under these circumstances, of course, we are temporarily refusing to work on the northern side, where part of the work between Pilenkovo and Bzyb presents great difficulties, and we insist on concentrating funds on the Zugdidi-Ochamchira-Sukhum section.

These are the questions about which I thought it necessary to inform you. In reserve, for a date with you, I will leave questions about which you can say in your words: "business endures."

And finally, about private matters.

Everyone at home is alive and well. The warmest greetings from me to Saria and Rauf to Zina and Eterke. "Beloved" Maiba looks better "in every sense." He was very happy when I told him that you remember him. Greetings from George Sturua and all the Abkhaz comrades.

The wounded dog has completely recovered after the lesson taught to her, she no longer rushes after the game.

Amayak is staying in Athos, Comrade Kartvelishvili is also expected to come here to rest. As you can see, I'm on a roll: I write and write. Enough of me. I kiss you firmly, firmly, always devoted to you, your N. Lakoba.

PS I think I'll be in Moscow on January 10-12 1 .

RTSKHIDNI. F.85. Op. 1/S. D. 11. L. 17-20. Autograph.

Notes:

1 On the letterhead: “SSR Abkhazia. Council of People's Commissars.