To Stalin

To Stalin Top Secret Summaries Of The most important testimonies Of Those arrested 1937‐ 1938

A summary of the most important testimonies of those arrested by the GUGB NKVD of the USSR for March 7, 1938

Archive: AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 406. L. 1‐9.

March 9, 1938

SECRETARY of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade STALIN

I am sending you a summary of the most important testimonies of those arrested by the GUGB NKVD of the USSR for March 7, 1938.

Peopleʹs Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Peopleʹs Commissar for

State Security (EZHOV)

Top secret

For the 3rd DEPARTMENT

1. REZAEV Kamran Amirovich, employee of the Iranian section of the

Comintern. Interrogated: SHAPKIN.

He showed that in 1930 in Iran he was recruited into an espionageprovocative organization that existed inside the KPI, which, on the instructions of the police, carried out espionage work on the territory of the USSR and carried out provocative work in the Iranian Communist Party.

In 1932 Rezayev was transferred to the territory of the USSR by the Iranian police for espionage and provocative activities. Students of KUTV [1] KHAKIMOV and DEKHKAN were recruited into the spyprovocative organization REZAEV.

Since 1935, REZAEV established contact with the British and Iranian intelligence officer of the Iranian embassy attaché KAZIM ZADE and gave him espionage information about the activities of the Comintern.

2. Latif ZADE Luft, an Iranian political refugee, to arrest the listener

Academy Narkompischeproma. Interrogated: ADARCHUK.

He testified that in 1928 he was recruited by the former secretary of the Iranian section of the Comintern SULTAN ZADE (arrested) into an espionage‐provocative organization created from former leaders of the Iranian Communist Party and Iranian political emigrants.

In the same year, SULTAN ZADE sent him to Iran for provocative work, inviting him to contact REZAEV, at that time the secretary of the Central Committee of the KPI (arrested).

LATIF ZADEH in Iran established contact with the deputy head of the Mashhad police ALIYEV, betrayed the Kazvin communist organization, and then returned to the USSR.

From 1931 until the moment of his arrest, LATIF ZADEH carried out espionage work, being directly connected with the secretary of the Iranian embassy ASHTARI and the attaché of the embassy KAZIM ZADE.

On the instructions of KAZIM ZADE, he left for Tajikistan, where he got a job as the director of Tajiktorg.

In Tajikistan, he was active in espionage work.

For the 5th DEPARTMENT

1. Pogrebnoy, former deputy commander of

the KhVO troops. Interrogated: BRENER.

He additionally testified that, on the instructions of Sokolov, he, together with members of the Ukrainian nationalist organization, the former commander of the 23rd Infantry Division KUNITSKY (arrested), the commander of the 23rd division (after the arrest of KUNITSKY) PAVLOV and the former beginning. under the command of the 41st section of the division, VOLKOV (arrested) worked out a plan of preparation for the uprising in the Kharkiv region, Poltava region, Dubenshina and Kremechug region.

According to the plan worked out, KUNITSKY, BUBLICHENKO, PAVLOV and VOLKOV carried out recruiting work among the commanding and commanding staff of the military units under their jurisdiction, created insurgent cells among the reserve commanders and commanders in the regions attached to their units through members of the organization from among the regional military commissars and leaders of the special aviation organizations.

Further, Pogrebnoy showed that according to the plan of the uprising, the city of Kharkov should be captured by the forces of the insurgent units of the 23rd division, located in the city itself, under the leadership

of DUBOVO and SOKOLOV.

KUNITSKY and PAVLOV, with the forces of the 68th Infantry Regiment, were to occupy the railway line in the direction of Kursk in order to delay units that could be sent from the RSFSR to suppress the uprising.

Volkov with the insurgent units of the 41st division was entrusted with the capture of Kryvyi Rih.

Pogrebnoy, at the direction of Sokolov, was supposed to lead the leadership of units of 23, 25 and 41 rifle divisions and ensure the capture of G. Poltava, Kremenchuk, Kryvyi Rih and Dubna.

2. DUBOVOY, former commander of the Kharkov military district. Interrogated by YAMNITSKY and KAZAKEVICH.

In addition, he testified that one of the leaders of the ʺPOVʺ in Ukraine, Kvyatek, a former deputy commander of the troops of the Kharkov Military District (arrested), associated with him, was in turn associated with espionage and insurgent work with BRZHEZOVSKY (convicted), the former deputy head of the Special Department of the NKVD Ukrainian SSR and BEGAILO ‐ the former second secretary of the Vinnitsa Regional Committee of the CP (b) U.

Of the leaders of the Ukrainian nationalist organization, ZATONSKY was associated with the Poles (arrested). He used his trips to Poland to establish personal contact with the Polish minister SVENTOSLAVSKI.

In addition, ZATONSKY, on behalf of the nationalist center, maintained contact with the Poles (for espionage and insurgency) through the Polish consul in Kiev KARSHO‐SELETSKY.

Through KOPULOVSKY (arrested), the ʺmilitary headquartersʺ of Ukrainian nationalists communicated with the Ukrainian nationalist organization in the militia, headed by the head of the Kiev regional police department, RYABOTENKO, who had his own personnel in the militia and, in particular, at the militia school.

RYABOTENKO was also a member of the ʺKGB conspiracyʺ, being associated with the former head of the URCM BACHINSKY.

RYABOTENKO and his people were to supply the insurgent units with weapons.

The military headquarters expected to receive weapons from the military through the military enlistment offices, through the corps training centers (where there were weapons, up to artillery) from the military enrollments of universities, from the training centers of Osoaviakhim.

Insurgent headquarters in districts and oblasts were responsible for accounting for and ensuring access to weapons, as well as military training for members of insurgent groups.

3. KOVALEV, former commander of the 48th division, brigade commander. Interrogated by PETUSHKOV and LUKIN.

He additionally testified that in 1929, being the commander of the 2nd Nerchinsk regiment at the Razdolnaya station (DVK), he was recruited to work in Japanese intelligence by the commander of the 1st Pacific Division, the Japanese agent NIKITIN (currently the commander of the

11th rifle corps in the mountains . Smolensk ‐ not arrested). Before KOVALEV was recruited into the Japanese intelligence service, NIKITIN told KOVALEV that he was a member of the organization of the right, and became close to Kovalev on the anti‐Soviet platform of the right. NIKITIN then, in 1929‐30, told KOVALEV that the rightwingers were gathering forces and preparing to seize power and were counting on armed assistance from the Japanese in the East and the French in a bloc with the limitrophic states in the West. NIKITIN spoke of the need for territorial concessions to the Japanese for their help. NIKITIN suggested to KOVALEV to render assistance to the Japanese as allies in the interests of the right, saying that he was already working in Japanese intelligence.

NIKITIN connected KOVALEV with a Japanese intelligence agent, platoon commander of the 2nd Nerchinsk regiment, commanded by KOVALEV, EVTROPOV (to be established).

EVTROPOV before serving in the regiment worked as a pom. an accountant at the Chinese Eastern Railroad and, according to the existing agreement between the Soviet government and the government of Manchuria, upon reaching draft age, he arrived in the USSR to do military service and ended up in the regiment to KOVALEV.

Not understanding what value, he represents to Japanese intelligence as a regiment commander, when NIKITIN himself is a division commander working in this intelligence, KOVALEV asked NIKITIN to explain this. NIKITIN pointed out to KOVALEV that Japanese intelligence is also interested in connection with KOVALEV, since a situation may arise when it would be more convenient for KOVALEV to personally transfer certain materials to Japanese intelligence.

KOVALEV was associated with a Japanese intelligence agent, the commander of his regiment, EVTROPOV, before leaving for Moscow in 1930, and gave him secret materials about the regimentʹs mobilization readiness, etc.

On the instructions of NIKITIN, KOVALEV processed and involved in organizing the right‐wing assistant to the commander of the 2nd Nerchinsk regiment KUTUZOV and the military prosecutor of the 1st Pacific division ERKIS (both were not arrested).

At the same time in 1929‐30. NIKITIN called KOVALEVA as ʺhis ownʺ, right‐wingers, the former commander of the 19th rifle corps KHAKHANYAN (arrested) and early podiv 1 Pacific Division SKOBORTSOV (not arrested).

4. GOREV , former military attaché in Spain, brigade commander. Interrogated: LEBEDEV, YAKUNIN.

He additionally showed that by the beginning of November 1936 two defeatist groups had formed in Spain: one of the commanding and commanding personnel of the Spaniards, led by CABALLERO; the second of the Soviet workers in Spain, headed by ROSENBERG, the plenipotentiary of the USSR in Spain, and BERZIN.

These two defeatist groups, according to the developed plan, carried out treacherous work aimed at the defeat of the Spanish Republic.

In connection with the approach of the rebels to Madrid and the current difficult situation of the Spanish Republican Army, ROSENBERG and BERZIN, influencing the Spanish government and individual members of the Central Committee of the Spanish Communist Party, proposed their plan for the surrender of Madrid by the rebels without a fight and withdrawing the Republican army across the Jarama River. They proved the hopelessness of the defense of Madrid and therefore the need to surrender it to the fascist command, ostensibly in order to preserve the republican army and ʺsubsequent maneuverʺ.

Insisting before the Republican government and the Central Committee of the Spanish Communist Party on the implementation of this plan, the defeatist group headed by ROSENBERG and BERZIN strove (as GOREV shows) to surrender Madrid and defeat the Spanish revolution.

ROSENBERG and BERZIN, in their telegrams to Moscow about the situation and the situation at the front near Madrid, misinformed the Soviet government in order to prepare the Moscow leadership in advance for the fall of Madrid and obtain a directive to withdraw the Russians from Spain.

The defeatist groups CABALLERO and ROSENBERG‐BERZIN carried out subversive work:

a) disrupted the supply of ammunition to the front near Madrid, for which General ASSENSIO, a member of the CABALLERO defeatist group, was used;

b) obtained from the commander of the central front, General POSAS, the order to withdraw troops for the defense of Madrid in the direction of the mountains. Taranxi.

On the basis of this order, the 1st Brigade of the Republican Army abandoned the Cerro Rojo hill, which is the key to all approaches to Madrid, allowing the rebels to take advantageous positions near

Madrid.

c) the rear service was destroyed.

d) panic is created.

e) at the decisive moment, ROSENBERG, BERZIN and a number of other Soviet workers were evacuated from Madrid, and this evacuation was in the nature of flight and undermined the authority of the Soviet representatives in Spain.

5. Kokadeev AN , Head of the Communications Department of the Red Army. Interrogated: LUSCHINSKY.

He additionally testified that in 1936 he had recruited into a conspiracy the assistant to the head of the 3rd department of the Communications Directorate RUBINSTEIN Ya.M. and V.I. MELNIKOV ‐ military engineer (both are not arrested).

RUBINSTEIN pursued a policy of disrupting the plan of orders for radio equipment for the Red Army, picked up unusable sets for radio stations and spare parts for them, and slowed down the work on the manufacture of new types of tank radio stations by the military industry.

MELNIKOV carried out similar sabotage on serial orders in the field of radio equipment for aviation.

6. Bergolts AI, former teacher of the Academy of the General Staff. Interrogated: KRIVOSHEEV, LADATKO.

BERGOLTS additionally testified that he knew from OZOL, the former deputy head of the Moscow Military Districtʹs Political Directorate (arrested), that the leading troika of the Latvian fascist organization in the Moscow Military District was in contact with the leaders of the Latvian organization in Kharkov, personally with the former assistant commander of the LATSON district troops (arrested) and others.

In August 1936, ALKSNIS told Bergolts that he was directing subversive activities in the KVO through the chief of the KVO Air Force Corps Commander INGAUNIS (arrested) and at the DCK through LAPIN (convicted). ALKSNIS attached great importance to wrecking work. LAPIN in 1936 organized the crash of the heavy squadron aircraft flying to the DCK, for which LAPIN was removed from his post. In exchange for LAPIN, ALKSNIS secured an appointment to the OKDVA INGAUNIS from the Kiev Military District as an active participant in the Latvian organization, which continued the sabotage started by LAPIN.

Head of the Secretariat of the NKVD of the USSR, senior major of state security (SHAPIRO)

[1] Communist University of the Workers of the East.