To Stalin

To Stalin Top Secret Summaries Of The most important testimonies Of Those arrested 1937‐ 1938

A summary of the most important testimonies of those arrested by the GUGB NKVD of the USSR for March 26, 1938

Archive: AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 406. L. 122‐133

March 31, 1938

SECRETARY of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade STALIN

I am sending you a summary of the most important testimonies of those arrested by the GUGB NKVD of the USSR for March 26, 1938.

Peopleʹs Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR General Commissar for State Security (EZHOV)

Top secret

For the 5th DEPARTMENT

1. SIMONOV, former vred head of the AMU RKKA and secretary of the Central Bureau of Party organizations of the NCO. Interrogated by: Meshcheryakov, Ivanov.

In addition, he testified that at the end of 1935, the former deputy head of the RKKA PU, OSEPYAN, put him in touch with Andrei Vasilyevich Khrulyov, who was then a member of the Central Party Bureau of the NPO (not arrested), for joint anti‐Soviet activities in the NPO party organization.

Simonov and Khrulev, on the instructions of OSEPYAN, as participants in a military conspiracy, retained the right‐Trotskyist cadres in the party organization of the NGO and in the army. This task was carried out by OSEPYANA Khrulev during the check of party documents in the Artillery Directorate of the Red Army.

Simonov, in accordance with Osepyanʹs instructions, retained the following Trotskyists in the NPO party organization: in the Engineering Department of the NPO MAKSIMOV, DUBOV and GUREVICH (all arrested), in the management of the State Military Publishing House of the NPO PODSOTSKY, the former deputy head of the department

(arrested), and others.

OSEPYAN also connected SIMONOV with the then member of the Central Party Bureau of the NKO LENSKY, the secretary of the party bureau of the Office of the Red Army Naval Forces MIROSHKIN, the former head of the Agitprop Department of the PU RKKA BERLIN (all arrested) and with the former chairman of the revision commission of the party bureau of the NKO head of the Tbilisi Joint Military School.

OSEPYAN then informed M.E. SIMONOV that M.I. ZAPOROZHCHENKO. recruited into the conspiracy by him personally.

2. HAKHANYAN GD, b. member of the Military Council of OKDVA, corps commander. Interrogated: MALYSHEV.

KHAKHANYAN additionally showed that some firing points of the fortified areas of OKDVA for sabotage purposes were planted in the lowlands at the foot of the mountains, due to which they have a limited firing sector. The slopes of the opposite hills are not shelled, and therefore the firing points on these slopes can be bypassed and blocked by the Japanese. The quality of the built firing points (especially in the Blagoveshchensk and Barabash fortified areas) is low, the concrete does not meet the standards, and the resistance against enemy artillery fire is underestimated.

As a rule, in all fortified areas, communication routes to the firing points located on the slopes facing the enemy are not arranged, so communication of firing points with their rear under enemy fire is impossible.

In all fortified areas, firing points are not provided with communications.

In February 1937, the participants in the conspiracy ‐ the commandant of the Blagoveshchensk fortified region KRUGLOV and the commandant of the Blagoveshchensk border detachment KLINOVSKY (both arrested) ‐ were given the opportunity to the Japanese to penetrate one of the firing points in the northern section of the Blagoveshchensk fortified area, for which they were removed at the time agreed with the Japanese. patrols of border guards and a machinegun company of the fortified area. The Japanese, having penetrated the firing point, examined and removed the plan, went back. The fact of the penetration of the Japanese became known to the Peopleʹs Commissar of Defense, in connection with which HAHANYAN went to the site to investigate, but covered up this issue, being aware of the agreement of the conspirators with the Japanese.

3. MINCHUK AI , Commissar of the Chemical Administration of the

Red Army. Interrogated: KONSTANTINOV.

In addition, he testified that in May 1936, from the head of the militaryfascist conspiracy GAMARNIK, he received instructions on anti‐Soviet work due to the fact that he was sent to the Chemical Directorate of the Red Army as an assistant to the head of the administrative department.

GAMARNIK warned MINCHUK that this appointment was taking on a special role in connection with the failure of the head of the Chemical Directorate of the Red Army, a participant in the FISHMAN conspiracy (arrested). GAMARNIK suggested that MINCHUK carefully conspire, not get involved with FISHMAN and not decipher oneself in front of him, but, disguising himself with the activity and exposure of FISHMAN, lead the group of early. composition and, thus gaining confidence, take over the leadership of sabotage activities in Chemical Management.

4. MIKHAILOV S.G. , pom. early Department of the Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army, brigade commander. Interrogated: LUKIN, LUSCHINSKY.

In addition, he showed about the sabotage and terrorist activities of the Socialist‐Revolutionary organization, which he created in Leningrad from the commanders of the Red Army, in most of the teachers of the Artillery Academy.

MIKHAILOV in the past participated in terrorist activities: in 1918 he organized an attempt on the life of the former Peopleʹs Commissar of Agriculture SEREDA in Ryazan, who was wounded. MIKHAILOV, having received a directive from a member of the foreign center of the party of Right Socialist Revolutionaries BUNAKOV on organizing terrorist acts against the leaders of the party and government through a former student of the Academy of the General Staff of the RKKA ZHANKOL (arrested), who was traveling to France, began to create a terrorist group. The group was supposed to commit a terrorist act against comrade. Zhdanova. This terrorist group included members of the organization ‐ the servicemen of the Art academy.

The murder plan of Comrade Zhdanov was developed in several versions, and it was provided for the possibility of committing a terrorist act in Leningrad during the parade, during maneuvers in which Comrade. Zhdanov, and, finally, in the first days of mobilization in the event of a declaration of war.

5. KEREVITZ F.F. , b. worker of the RKKA Intelligence Agency, Latvian. Interrogated: YUKHIMOVICH, RUBANOV.

Gave initial testimony that he has been an agent of Latvian intelligence since 1920, having been recruited in Riga by an intelligence officer of the OSIS.

After being recruited in 1920, Latvian intelligence transferred KEREVITSA to the USSR with the task of infiltrating the Red Army. Upon his arrival in the USSR, KEREVITS entered the Frunze Military Academy of the Red Army named after Frunze and, having contacted an employee of the Latvian embassy ZAMLE, transmitted spy materials about the personnel of students, the educational process, about the units of the Moscow garrison, their weapons, about training for Latvian intelligence. command staff, etc. From 1929 to 1930 KEREVITZ worked through the intelligence department in Paris and Berlin, being recommended for this job by Tyltin (arrested).

In Paris, KEREVITZ contacted the White emigration. Deciphered as an employee of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army and gave out our agents, who were subsequently arrested. In addition, KEREVITZ testified that TYLTYN was associated with French intelligence and used him to transfer espionage materials to French intelligence.

6. MISHIN, b. head of the financial department of an NGO.

Interrogated: PROKOFIEV.

MISHIN, who had previously confessed to espionage in favor of the French and to organizing a terrorist attack on Comrade. VOROSHILOV gave additional evidence about the preparation of this terrorist act. The French intelligence resident Grobin (arrested) in 1935, when he received another spy material from MISHIN, told him that there was an antiSoviet military conspiracy in the Red Army. The leadership of this conspiracy ‐ GAMARNIK, TUKHACHEVSKY, UBOREVICH and others, is in contact with the leaders of the right‐Trotskyist bloc ‐ BUKHARIN, RYKOV and PYATAKOV. The conspirators and the

Trotskyist bloc are preparing terrorist acts against the leaders of the party and government.

In November 1935, in the premises of the financial department of the NPO in the room of KLYAVIN (arrested) GROBIN, receiving regular spy materials from KLYAVIN and MISHIN, instructed them to prepare the murder of Comrade VOROSHILOV and invited them to establish surveillance at the building of the NPO in order to find out when the Peopleʹs Commissar of Defense arrives at service and leaves the service.

From December 1935 to early 1937 MISHIN monitored the arrival and departure of comrade VOROSHILOV several times.

MISHIN informed KLYAVIN of the results of monitoring the arrivals and departures of the Peopleʹs Commissar.

Mishin knew that observation of the arrival and departure of the Peopleʹs Commissar of Defense was conducted not only by him alone, but also by others, as KLYAVIN had told him about. For his espionage work, MISHIN was received from Grobin at the end of 1932 for transmitting information about the size of the Red Army in wartime ‐ 600 rubles, in 1933 for information ‐ a list of expenses for 1 month of the war ‐ 500 rubles and from KLYAVIN in 1934, 1935 and in 1937 ‐ 3.550 rubles ‐ for the transfer of espionage materials (the number of the Red Army in 1935, the number of students in the Red Army universities and the new staff of the Red Army academies).

7. WALDEN G.I., b. Head of the Airbrushing Institute GUGVF. Interrogated: SHCHERBAKOV.

WALDEN additionally testified that, being an agent of British intelligence, in 1926, before his departure from Persia to the USSR, he received instructions from the representative of Intelligence Service in Tehran MIRZA KERIM KHAN RESHTI on espionage activities in Moscow: to organize intelligence and monitoring the activities of the eastern sections of the Comintern, mainly the Iranian section (the sectionʹs relations with the Eastern Secretariat, sending workers abroad to recruit agents of British intelligence among them, groupings, the placement of individual workers, their training, materials related to tactics, general political reviews and summary data on the general activities of the section).

Since at that time there was virtually no formalized section of the Iranian Communist Party and British intelligence admitted that the formation of a section could go beyond its sphere of supervision, WALDEN was asked:

1) To restore espionage contact with the British intelligence officer, a former member of the Central Committee of the Iranian Communist Party (who was at one time the secretary of the Central Committee) and removed from the eastern work in 1920 by decision of the Kav. Bureau of the Central Committee of the All‐Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks ‐ SULTAN ZADE by Avetis Sultanovich (arrested) in order to assist him in returning to leadership work in the Iranian Communist Party.

2) To facilitate the unification of representatives of various groups of the Iranian Communist Party who were in exile in the USSR (mainly in Moscow), in order to thereby pave the way for SULTAN ZADEʹS return to leading work in the IKP.

3) Use the contacts transferred to British intelligence with representatives of the Trotskyists and Zinovievites for the above purposes, establishing their direct contact with the leading officials of the Iranian Communist Party (CEC BINOM, FARSOM, etc.).

At the same time, MIRZA KERIM KHAN RESHTI pointed out to WALDEN that, given the situation of SULTAN ZADE, he would have to work under his leadership, SULTAN ZADE.

For the successful fulfillment of the tasks assigned to WALDEN by the British intelligence services, he was invited back in Persia to contact the Trotskyist VARDIN and the British intelligence officer REZAEV, the former secretary of the Central Committee of the Iranian Communist Party (arrested), with whom to discuss a plan of further action. When meeting with VARDIN and REZAEV, it was stipulated that in Moscow it would be necessary:

1) to restore the old Trotskyite‐Zinoviev leadership (SULTAN ZADE) through the Iranian Communist Party;

2) transfer a number of Trotskyists to Moscow to strengthen the ʺyoung workersʺ;

3) through WALDEN, transfer fresh materials to SULTAN ZADE (letters and reviews of the situation in the Middle East in a perverted Trotskyist light, depicting the work of the Soviet government in Persia), which were used by TROTSKY and ZINOVIEV to attack the Central Committee of the All‐Union Communist Party (b), to discredit the policy of the Soviet government in Persia.

Upon arrival in Moscow, WALDEN contacted SULTAN ZADE, as well as with a number of other persons influential among Persian political emigrants, and together with SULTAN ZADE and especially confidants working for British intelligence, at conspiratorial meetings, using connections and personal influence, they agreed to create from ʺTheir peopleʺ delegation, which should make a proposal to nominate SULTAN ZADE in the ECCI as a ʺtemporaryʺ representative of the Iranian Communist Party in Moscow, and from Tehran SHARGI REZAEV, who then headed the Iranian Communist Party, organizes the consent and confirmation of this event (temporarily before the congress) ...

In addition, at the same conspiratorial meetings, it was decided to conduct preparations for the congress of the Iranian Communist Party in such a way that SULTAN ZADE and people close to him would be elected to the leadership of the Iranian Communist Party.

8. TROYANKER B.U., b. member of the Military Council of the Moscow

Military District, corps commissioner. Interrogated: MALYSHEV.

Additionally, he showed that, being an assistant. on the political part of the chief of the Red Army Air Force, in order to delay the development of the Red Army air forces, he disrupted the training of observer pilots: there were few schools for summer flight, and the annual recruitment in them was carried out with a large shortage, as a result of which the Red Army air forces experienced a constant shortage of pilots. observers.

TROYANKER shows that while working in the Air Force, he recruited into a military conspiracy the former political assistant of the Air Force Academy of the Red Army SMOLENSKY (arrested), who, on his instructions, carried out sabotage work aimed at clogging the cadres of students and the permanent staff of the Academy by Trotskyists and other anti‐Soviet element, to the disruption of normal study and training.

For the 6th DEPARTMENT

1. PAINTING, b. Art. Researcher of the Scientific Research Institute of the Peopleʹs Commissariat for Railways, Socialist‐Revolutionary since 1905. Interrogated: GREENER.

ZHIVOPISTSEV gave additional testimony about the espionage activities of the Socialist‐Revolutionary organization in the NKPS, as well as about the members of this organization recruited by him personally.

ZHIVOPISTSEV showed that in the period 1931‐36. he was personally recruited into the Socialist‐Revolutionary organization PREOBRAZHENSKY ‐ Art. traffic control engineer NKPS, ILYINSKY ‐ Art. Planning Department Engineer, KAP ‐ Art. cargo management engineer, LAPKIN ‐ ex. Scientific Secretary of the Transport Commission of the Academy of Sciences, GUSEV ‐ Art. Researcher of the Scientific Research Institute of Railway Transport, POLUYAN Oleg ‐ Art. researcher of the same institute, son of Verkhsud POLUYAN, convicted by the Military Collegium ‐ former. a member of the NKPS Collegium, POPOV ‐ economist of the planning department of the Northern Road, and GOLUBEV ‐ Art. Engineer of the Financial

Department of the NKPS (LAPKIN, GUSEV, POLUYAN and GOLUBEV arrested, the rest are being prepared).

ZHIVOPISTSEV testified that the members of the Socialist

Revolutionary organization, along with sabotage, carried out espionage work, communicating with foreign intelligence services when attending railway conferences, in particular in Germany, Poland and Latvia. This espionage work contacted members of the Pravotrotskyist organization in the NKPS ‐ SINEV and KIRSANOV.

According to the testimony of ZHIVOPISTSEV, PREOBRAZHENSKY in 1933‐1935. on the instructions of POSTNIKOV (former deputy of the Peopleʹs Commissariat of Railways, convicted), he gave the German and Polish intelligence services spy information about the mobilization plans of the Union railways, their capacity and data on the profiles of railways.

2. POLUYAN, researcher , scientific research. in‐that railway transport. Interrogated by: GREENER, ZHITKOV.

POLUYAN confessed that at the end of 1936 he was involved in the Socialist‐Revolutionary terrorist organization ZHIVOPISTSEV, a former senior researcher at NIIZhT (arrested). During the recruitment, PAISISTSI named him as members of the organization LAPKIN and GUSEV, former senior research workers of the institute (arrested).

POLUYAN testified that on the instructions of ZHIVOPISTSEV, he was engaged in subversive work, disrupting the implementation of thematic plans, in particular for the passenger group. He personally developed a wrecking project for new freight and passenger cars, delayed the construction of car‐washing machines for passenger technical stations and thwarted the development of the issue of reserves in passenger traffic.

POLUYAN also testified that PAISISTSEV had initiated him into the organizationʹs terrorist plans.

3. KROL, b. Senior Engineer of the Central Planning Department of NKPS. Interrogated: MARKOVSKY.

KROL confessed that he was a member of the anti‐Soviet

Pravotrotskyist organization in railway transport. KROL testified that he was recruited into an anti‐Soviet organization in 1936 by KASATKIN ‐ formerly. early Department of Capital Construction of the Central Directorate of the NKPS Traffic Service (arrested).

On the instructions of KASATKIN, he carried out sabotage in the planned work of the NKPS, in particular, assisted KASATKIN in carrying out, through the planning department, wrecking projects and capital construction plans that were drawn up by KASATKIN.

The capital construction plan for the traffic service for 1937 was drawn up by KROL and KASATKIN with an underestimation of the actual cost of work by 20‐25%, as a result of which, to bring the volume of work in accordance with the appropriations, all plans on the roads were revised, and this led to exclusion from the plan works and conservation of development of stations on Kirovskaya, Moscow‐Kievskaya, Orenburgskaya and other roads.

KROLʹs sabotage in planning capital construction led to the fact that in the first 7 months of 1937 the actual fulfillment of the plan barely reached 6‐7 percent.

KROL named the members of the organization known to him ‐

KRASNOLUTSKY ‐ Art. Engineer of the Capital Construction Department of the Central Directorate of the Traffic Service,

KRASOZOV ‐ Deputy. early central planning department, and TEUMINA ‐ early. the planning department (the first two were arrested, the arrest of the latter is being prepared).

Head of the Secretariat of the NKVD of the USSR, Senior Major of State Security (SHAPIRO)