On Stalin

To Stalin Top Secret Summaries Of The most important testimonies Of Those arrested 1937‐ 1938

A summary of the most important testimonies of those arrested by the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR for January 10, 1938

Archive: AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 404. L. 66‐85

Moscow [1]

Sov. secretly

For the 3rd DEPARTMENT

1. Raushan V.G., teacher of the Iranian language of the Military Academy named after Frunze, arrived from Iran under the guise of a political emigrant. Interrogated: DZIVOV, RYASNOY.

He showed that in 1925 he was recruited by the Iranian political police and through an agent of this police ‐ a former member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Iran Shirinov, was sent for espionage and provocative work in the USSR. In 1926, with the help of the Iranian section of the ECCI, RAUSHAN was enrolled in the students of the Communist University of the Working People of the East, passed on to the Iranian political police detailed information about the students from Iran.

RAUSHAN reveals that at the Communist University of Workers of the East, a number of Iranian political police agents worked among Iranian students, led by a trusted police agent, student COMRAN (to be tested).

As RAUSHAN shows, in 1930, after graduating from the Communist University of the Working People of the East, he was asked by the former head of the Iranian Communist Party SULTAN‐ZADA

(currently working in the State Planning Commission) to stay at work in the Iranian section of the ECCI, and SULTAN‐ZADA said that he knew about RAUSHANʹs belonging to the agents of the Iranian secret police, on whose instructions he himself ‐ SULTAN‐ZADE ‐ works.

In the process of further provocative work, together with SULTANZADE RAUSHAN, he learned from him about the existence of a provocative group in the Iranian Communist Party, which was tasked with the complete collapse of the Iranian Communist Party. RAUSHAN shows that in addition to him and SULTAN‐ZADE, the provocative group consisted of: the former secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Iran RIZAL SHARGI, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Iran KHESOBI and others, in the amount of 14 people (to be checked).

As RAUSHAN shows, based on the data of this provocative group, the Iranian political police in 1931 and 1933. in two steps, according to a previously drawn up plan, she defeated the Iranian Communist Party.

In 1931, RAUSHAN, on the instructions of SULTAN‐ZADE and RIZAL SHARGI, got a job at the Military Academy. Frunze contacted the Iranian embassy in Moscow and conducted espionage work until the day of his arrest.

2. TUYMETOV Y. G., Secretary of the USSR Plenipotentiary Mission in Yemen (Arabia). Interrogated by: AGIKYAN, VASKOV, SHAPKIN.

He testified that in 1927 in the city of Jeda he was involved in espionage work in favor of England by a large English intelligence officer FILBI, an adviser to the king of IBN‐SAUDA.

TUYMETOV shows that, on the instructions of FILBI, he gave him secret materials about the negotiations between the government of the USSR and the government of Gejas and gave information about the situation in the national republics of the Soviet Union and about the anti‐Soviet Tatar organizations existing in the USSR.

In 1931, when TUIMETOV left for the USSR, FILBI suggested that he contact a British intelligence representative in Ashgabat, who would establish contact with him on behalf of FILBI.

In 1932, when TUYMETOV was working in Ashgabat as an authorized NKID, an agent of British intelligence, a member of the All‐Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a Turkmen, whose last name TUYMETOV did not name during the investigation, came to him and tried to establish reconnaissance contact with him on behalf of FILBI. TUYMETOV declares that the specified agent of British intelligence seemed suspicious to him and he refused to contact him, saying that he knew nothing.

Later, in 1933, in Moscow, TUYMETOV established contact with the former USSR plenipotentiary in Gejas KHAKIMOV (arrested), at whose suggestion he entered the pan‐Turkist terrorist and insurgent organization.

TUYMETOV reveals that Khakimov tied him for further anti‐Soviet work with the former secretary of the Council of Nationalities TAJIEV, on whose proposal TUYMETOV was again sent to work in Gejas to establish communication between the terrorist rebel organization and the British and Turkish intelligence services. TUYMETOV shows that, according to a preliminary agreement with Khakimov, upon his arrival in Yemen in 1934, he contacted not only the British intelligence officer FILBI, but also the Turkish envoy in Gejas, before whom TAJIEV instructed to raise the issue of providing real assistance to the insurgent organization.

TUYMETOV shows that the task of these negotiations was primarily to resolve the issue of supplying the insurgent organization with weapons.

The indications are primary.

3. PAVIL OS, former head of Foreign. department ʺGlavzolotoʺ, before his arrest worked in the department of scientific and technical publications of the Peopleʹs Commissariat for

Tyazhprom. Interrogated: MESHIK.

He showed that in 1932 he was involved in espionage work by A.P. SEREBROVSKY.

PAVIL reveals that Serebrovsky has been involved in espionage work with the director of the American concern ʺStandard‐

Oilʺ [2] POWELL for a number of years .

As PAVIL shows, he personally attended one of the meetings between

Serebrovsky and Powell, at which the latter instructed Serebrovsky to carry out sabotage work in the gold industry in the direction of all possible reduction of exploration work.

PAVIL also reveals that he was used by SEREBROVSKY to transmit espionage information to the Intelligence Service agent, the secretary of the British Embassy in Moscow, McLain.

The indications are primary.

For the 5th DEPARTMENT

1. BELOV I.P., b. commander of the BVO. Interrogated: YAMNITSKY.

He confessed that he joined the Communist Party in 1919 in Tashkent on the instructions of the Central Committee of the Left SRs of Turkestan for subversive anti‐Soviet work.

In the same 1919, he took part in the preparation of the Left SR revolt in Tashkent, led by OSIPOV, but then he maneuvered, seeing the unreality of the speech.

In 1927, BELOV establishes contact with b. SR EFIMOV ‐ head of the Artillery Directorate of the NKO, and develops work to create a military SR organization in the Red Army.

The leading group of the military Socialist‐Revolutionary organization included: BELOV, EFIMOV, VELIKANOV, who commanded ZabVO recently, GRYAZNOV, who was in command of SAVO recently, and CHERNEVSKY [3] ‐ b. early inform. department of the PUR of the Red

Army, a former member of the Central Committee of the Left SRs of Turkestan. Since 1928, this leading group of the SR counterrevolutionary organization in the Red Army launched organizational work and created SR organizations in a number of military districts (in Transbaikalia ‐ GRYAZNOV, in SAVO ‐ VELIKANOV, etc.).

In addition to these persons, the composition of the military SR organization included:

1. * KOPYLOVSKY * [4] ‐ the commander of the university corps of the North Caucasus Military District, associated with the Ukrainian Social Revolutionaries ‐ Borotbists, through whom the Social Revolutionary organization contacted the Ukrainian nationalist underground.

2. * KOTOV * [5] ‐ Head of the Lipetsk Aviation School.

3. CHERNEVSKY ‐ b. head of the information department of the PUR.

4. * ZAPOROZHETS * [6] ‐ b. deputy. early UNKVD for Leningrad Region, who headed the Socialist‐Revolutionary organization in Leningrad.

5. * IVANOV Boris * [7] ‐ div. intendant, head of construction of the Moscow‐Minsk highway.

6. * DEGTYAREV * [8] ‐ b. Head agitprop PUR RKKA, who recently worked in transport.

7. * POKUS * [9] ‐ recently worked in OKDVA.

8. * VINOKUROV * [10] ‐ b. early org. PUR, and now the

beginning. Political Department of the Amur Flotilla.

9. * DANENBERG * [11] ‐ division commander in the Moscow Military

District.

10. * SHESTAKOV * [12] ‐ early. PUOKRA ZABVO.

The military Socialist‐Revolutionary organization, headed by BELOV, was connected with the civilian Socialist‐Revolutionary organization through * Paskutsky * [13] ‐ b. deputy. Peopleʹs Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR, with which BELOV was directly connected. In addition, contact was maintained with the civil SR underground through * KULUZAEV * [14] , who carried out the SR work in Tashkent; * KACHINSKY * [15] ‐ deputy. prev. State Planning Committee of the Ukrainian SSR, and TERLETSKY, who recently worked in Voronezh.

Through * Paskutsky * [16], the leadership of the military SocialistRevolutionary organization was associated with the head of the TKP

(Labor Peasant Party) in Prague MASLOV.

Through GRYAZNOV, the military Socialist‐Revolutionary

organization maintained direct contact with the head of the TCH of Manchuria (Harbin) * AGAPOV * [17] .

The military Socialist‐Revolutionary organization, in its task of preparing an armed uprising and seizing power in the country, was blocked with a military‐fascist conspiracy in the army and the Trotskyist underground.

BELOV was connected through URITSKY with YAKIR and UBOREVICH ‐ members of the center of the conspiracy, and also directly communicated with the leadership of the right: BUKHARIN and in Leningrad ‐ CHUDOV and KODATSKY.

The members of the military‐Socialist‐Revolutionary organization were simultaneously part of the military‐fascist conspiracy, often without revealing their Socialist‐Revolutionary face, and in a number of cases played a leading role in the conspiracy.

So, GRYAZNOV headed his conspiratorial organization in Transbaikalia, VELIKANOV ‐ in Central Asia, EFIMOV ‐ was in the leadership of the military‐fascist conspiracy in the Red Army.

The leadership of the military Socialist‐Revolutionary organization set itself the task of using a bloc with a military conspiracy and a Trotskyist organization to come to power in order to then crush their allies, seizing power in the country into their own hands.

To this end, the military SR organization set one of the most important tasks to preserve, concentrate and advance the SR cadres ‐ members of the organization ‐ in the Red Army, to ensure its influence and seize the leading sectors in the anti‐Soviet underground. At the same time, the military‐Socialist‐Revolutionary organization set itself its largest task, relying on the peasant strata, lower commanders and reserve commanders, to organize its wide underground organization.

2. KHRIPIN , b. Air Force Commander. Interrogated: USHAKOV.

** In addition, he testified that in Moscow he contacted the German military attaché GARTMAN and systematically transmitted spy information about the Red Army Air Force to him. For example, he gave him data on the development of aviation in the second five‐year plan, on the construction of new high‐speed aircraft, on the transfer of aviation units to the DCK, on the development of Air Force schools and logistics, on the air defense of Moscow and Leningrad, on the state of combat training of the Air Force, etc. ** [18]

GARTMAN gave Khripin a directive to reach agreement with

Czechoslovakia on the basing on its territory of the air forces of the Red Army intended to participate in the war with Germany. Tukhachevsky gave him the same directive, and KHRIPIN tried to put it into practice through negotiations with the Czechs. According to the testimony of Khripin, this installation pursued the goal that the Germans had the opportunity to suppress the Soviet air forces in Czechoslovakia with an unexpected raid.

Khripin reveals that he received 20,000 rubles from GARTMAN for his espionage and subversive work.

3. TROYANKER, b. member of the Military Council. Interrogated by: LISTENGURT, MALYSHEV, BEBER‐KARKLE.

TROYANKER, who had previously testified about his participation in the army group of the right, led by BULIN, and in the military‐political center of the anti‐Soviet military conspiracy, additionally testified:

1) PROKOFIEV was recruited into the organization of the right in 1929 by BULIN ‐ b. pom. commander for political affairs of the 3rd rifle corps.

2) GAMARNIK, who was the head of the military‐political center of the conspiracy, was directly associated with TROTSKY, from whom he received directives on the deployment of anti‐Soviet activities in the Red Army.

3) After his appointment as a member of the Military Council of the LVO TROYANKER, he received an order from BULIN to lead the

leadership of the conspiracy in the MVO.

4) TROYANKER contacted the former head of the Political Department of the Moscow Military District Veklichyev and the deputy. early PUOKRA ISAENKO (both arrested), who named TROYANKERU a number of participants in the conspiracy in the MVO troops. TROYANKER contacted some of them and gave them instructions to carry out subversive work.

4. BAZHANOV, early. scientific testing institute of the Red Army. Interrogated by VUL and GORBULIN.

He additionally showed that, being the head of the school of naval pilots in Yeisk, from 1932 to 1935 he was a member of the Trotskyist underground organization operating in the North Caucasus.

On the instructions of one of its leaders, GOGOBERIDZE (arrested) BAZHANOV, together with the school commissar CHERNY‐LIFSHITS (brother of the shot LIFSHITS) [19] launched an active sabotage activity in the school, which was expressed in the deliberate release from the school of inferior military pilots and navigators, creating conditions that increase accident rate, accompanied by human casualties; the discontent of the command and cadets of the school was artificially aroused. To create all sorts of excesses and dissatisfaction with BAZHANOV and LIFSHITS, b. officers and White Guards (CHERNYLIFSHITS arrested).

Since the end of 1934, being transferred to the Research Institute of the

Red Army Air Force, BAZHANOV was actively involved in the antiSoviet subversive work of the conspirators b. early Air Force headquarters LAVROVA and head of the logistics department BAZENKOVA.

On Lavrovʹs instructions and on his own initiative, BAZHANOV delayed testing of prototype aircraft, aircraft armaments, instruments and other types of military equipment of the Air Force; disrupted extremely important work on the combat employment of aviation at high altitudes; disorganized all scientific research work by secondary topics at the expense of the most important and urgent.

The institute was artificially littered with socially alien, inferior pilots and navigators, insufficiently qualified to conduct tests, which in practice led to the fact that a number of defects on the tested objects were not eliminated.

Tried to introduce the Polish fire extinguisher ʺSalveʺ in the Air Force with a sabotage purpose (during the action, it released poisonous gases).

5. DEDULIN, b. squadron commander of the Air Force Research Institute. Interrogated: VUL.

He additionally testified that in 1928, while at the Lipetsk school, he was recruited by the German intelligence officer BOLIE, who worked at the German aviation school in Lipetsk as an adjutant of the school (BOLIE is currently in Germany).

With BOLIE DEDULIN was connected until 1931 ‐ before leaving for the Far East. DEDYULIN transferred data on aviation to German intelligence, having received 2000 rubles at various times. During the recruitment, BOLIE promised to promote DEDULIN in the service and transfer him to the Lipetsk air squadron as a commander, which was done.

In 1931, DEDULIN was unexpectedly seconded to the Far East, where he served until 1933, and then returned to Moscow at the Air Force Research Institute.

In the spring of 1936 to DEDULIN at the station. Chkalovskaya, disguised as a hunter, an unknown person appeared from BOLIE, who demanded from him information about the objects of aircraft weapons, tests of which were carried out by the Research Institute, about LUKAC machine guns and aerial bombs with a delayed fuse and chemical weapons.

When DEDULIN reported this information to an unknown person, he accidentally made a mistake in the rate of fire of the ShKAS machine gun, the unknown person corrected him and advised not to mislead him. Having warned DEDYULIN to prepare him information about the tests of the research instituteʹs facilities, he got into a nearby car and drove off to Moscow.

After 4 months, an unknown person called DEDULIN and agreed on the day and place of the meeting. DEDULIN verbally informed the unknown person on a number of issues of the research institute, including about the personnel. An unknown person offered to prepare a report on the work of the research institute for the whole of 1936, but he no longer came for this information.

DEDYULIN suspects the pilot FEGERVARI (not arrested) of espionage activities, who studied with DEDULIN at the Lipetsk school and who brought DEDULIN to BOLIE.

6. NEMIROV AC ., B. instructor of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army in Mongolia. Interrogated: YAMNITSKY, PAVLOVSKY.

In addition, he testified that, while carrying out the assignments of TAIROV and TARKHANOV on espionage work in favor of Japan, NEMIROV gave Tarkhanov information for the development of relations with agents of the Intelligence Agency (appearances, codes, passwords), as a result, residents of NAMSARAY, DAMDIN were sent to Manchukuo and Inner Mongolia , agent DELGIR and radio operators HAPRI and BALIRTU remained there, there was no connection with them and their fate is not known. The Mongolian intelligence radio network NEMIROV, on the instructions of TAIROV, destroyed.

They were tasked with bringing the radio network to such a state that, in case of military operations with the Japanese, it would be impossible for the center to receive operational reports from Mongolia.

New, more advanced radio devices were not imported to Mongolia, but operated on old devices, which often deteriorated, and communication with some points was interrupted for 10‐15 days. The call signs of these radios were known to the Japanese from NEMIROV.

The central radio worked for a long time with border points on the same wavelength and call signs known to the Japanese, which made it easier for the latter to take direction finding and eavesdrop on our work. In addition, telegrams were transmitted in numbers known to the Japanese.

7. SCHMIDEN, b. student of the Institute of Foreign

Languages. Interrogated: PETERS.

He additionally showed that on the instructions of the German citizen FRIEDRICH (arrested), by whom he was involved in espionage activities in 1934, at the beginning of 1936 he involved in the preparation of a terrorist attack on Comrade STALIN and EZHOV, a group of young people from their former schoolmates, now students: Aleksandra MEBERT, Pavel KASHUTIN, Nikolai SUKHUTIN, Mikhail ASTAFIEV and Roman SMIRNOV (not arrested). [twenty]

SCHMIDEN attracted these persons to the preparation of the terrorist attack as a result of their prolonged treatment in the fascist spirit, using their anti‐Soviet sentiments and anger in connection with the arrest of their parents.

From 1936 to January 1937, this group of persons under the leadership of SCHMIDEN systematically monitored the Kremlin, in particular the Borovitsky Gate and the 1st entrance of the NKVD building from the side of the metro station, in order to identify the cars of Comrades. STALIN and EZHOV, to then outline a plan and start acquiring funds for the attack. The terrorist group initially decided to attack the policeman, take the revolver from him and use it for the attack. Then it was decided to make the bomb ourselves, stuffing it with small ball bearings.

In view of the ineffectiveness of observation, both the first and second versions of the plan were not implemented by the terrorist group.

8. SEMENOV, b. Lecturer at the Air Force Academy. Interrogated: VOLOSOV.

He additionally showed that for espionage activities in favor of Poland he was recruited not in 1921, as he had shown earlier, but in 1922 by the

Polish military attaché, Colonel WALIKOVSKI.

In 1925, after the departure of VALIKOVSKY from the USSR,

SEMENOV was connected by espionage activities with the staff of the

Polish military attaché EMISSARSKY. Communication with EMISSARSKY, as SEMENOV shows, ceased at the end of 1926 due to the departure of the latter from the USSR.

SEMENOV shows that in 1935 (and not in 1932, as he had shown earlier) he was recruited for espionage work in favor of Poland by pom. early the training department of the Air Force Academy KOSTUSEV, whom he supplied with espionage materials until the summer of 1937 (arrested).

In addition, SEMENOV shows that in 1934 he was recruited by MEZHENINOV (arrested) to work for Germany and supplied the latter with spy materials until 1937 inclusive. In addition to MEZHENINOV, SEMENOV had a connection with German intelligence through b. the teacher of the Air Force Academy GRIGORIEV (established), who was recruited in 1935.

SEMENOV supplied representatives of the Polish and German intelligence services with materials characterizing the degree of training of the Air Force commanders and the tactics of the Red Army aviation.

In addition, SEMENOV gave characteristics of the commanding staff for their recruitment by the above intelligence services.

9. TYLTYN, worker of the RKKA RU. Interrogated: IVANOV.

He additionally showed that after leaving America b. employee of the RU RKKA WOLF (since 1927), he completely accepted from WOLF (not arrested) connections with German intelligence and all espionage materials for German intelligence at the beginning sent through the sailors GLUXMAN and REPKE, using Katie GUSFELDT (former agent RU RKKA in America). Subsequently, TYLTYN sent espionage materials to German intelligence through BERZIN Jan (arrested).

TYLTYN sent the Germans the drawings obtained by the agents of the RU RKKA for the combat equipment of American warships, cruisers, battleships, aircraft engines, etc. These materials were of great importance for Germany in the period after the Treaty of Versailles to restore its navy.

In addition, TYLTYN testified that the apartment of a dentist in New York, Dr. ROSENBLIT (arrested), was a place of secret meetings with Trotskyists and Loveronites, and Dr. ROSENBLIT himself was the organizer of these meetings. Meetings took place with LOVERON, James KENAN, MENDELSON Nathan, and others.

10. LUNEV, b. early post office of the UMS RKKA. Interrogated: PETROV.

In addition, he showed about his subversive activities in the field of radio equipment of the naval forces, calculated on the inaction of the radio service in a war.

As a result of this subversive activity, the installation of a radio station in Polyarny (Northern Fleet) from 1935 to the present has not been completed. Likewise, the base radio station in Baku (the Caspian military flotilla) has not been commissioned. Despite the large appropriations, due to the fault of the UMS conspirators, including LUNEV, the timely construction of radio equipment storage warehouses at the Pacific Fleet was disrupted.

Due to LUNEVʹs fault, the construction of radio stations for the destroyer leaders was delayed, which led to a delay in the installation of the main transmitters on the leaders Minsk, Ordzhonikidze and

Tbilisi.

11. BERZINA AP, employee of the RU RKKA. Interrogated: PAVLOVSKY.

At a confrontation with PERKON E.K. BERZINA A.P. She fully confirmed the testimony of PERKON that she, being anti‐Soviet, in 1936 gave PERKON consent to participate in the fascist‐espionage Latvian organization and she was entrusted with the task of conducting antiSoviet nationalist propaganda among her relatives and acquaintances of Latvians.

Since January 1937, BERZINA has been participating in a terrorist group that was preparing terrorist attacks on Comrades. STALIN, MOLOTOV, EZHOV and VOROSHILOV.

BERZINA helped PERKON to conduct preparations for committing a terrorist attack on comrade STALIN. BERZINA personally and jointly with PERKON conducted surveillance on Arbat Square and Arbat Street along the route of exit and movements of government vehicles from the Borovitsky Gate of the Kremlin.

For the 6th DEPARTMENT

1. POGREBINSKY, b. the beginning of the special defense construction of the NKPS in Khabarovsk. Previously, he was the secretary of the NKPS party committee. Interrogated: POTASHOV.

POGREBINSKY confessed to belonging to the anti‐Soviet Trotskyist organization in transport and terrorist activities.

POGREBINSKY testified that he joined the Rights in 1929, working as a secretary of the VKP (b) cell at the Moscow plant ʺSVARZʺ. During this period, in the Sokolniki district committee of the CPSU (b), there was a group of the rightists, headed by GIBER, b. the secretary of the Sokolniki district committee, and YAGODA, who was then a member of the bureau of this district committee.

POGREBINSKY was a member of this group and later for a number of years was associated with the right, in particular, was close to GIBER, POLONSKY (former secretary of the MK), MIRONOV (from the OGPU).

In 1935, at the suggestion of ZIMIN, POGREBINSKY was elected secretary of the NKPS party committee. Soon after, he was recruited by ROSSOV, one of the leaders of the Pravotrotskyist organization in transport (arrested).

Subsequently, POGREBINSKY contacted LIVSHITS and, on his instructions, took part in the terrorist activities of the Trotskyist center in the NKPS. He was directly involved in the preparation of the following terrorist acts.

In the winter of 1935, together with GAISTER and BRODSKY (both arrested), he became a member of the terrorist group preparing the assassination of Comrade LM Kaganovich. during his trip along the roads of Siberia and the East.

In 1936, on the instructions of LIVSHITS and BILIK, POGREBINSKY again joined the terrorist group that was preparing a terrorist attack on comrade STALIN, as well as on other leaders of the party and government during the reception of railway workers in the Kremlin.

The members of this terrorist group (GENTSIS, PAKULIN, ROSSOV, BYKHOVSKY, KOMPANIETS), according to their plan, were to infiltrate the reception of the railway workers in the Kremlin and there, at the sign of LIVSHITS, simultaneously shoot at the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All‐Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

In February 1937 POGREBINSKY accepted BILIKʹs assignment to personally murder comrade KAGANOVICH.

POGREBINSKY testified that, on the instructions of the anti‐Soviet organization, he had carried out a great deal of sabotage and sabotage work in transport. In 1936, POGREBINSKY, who was sent to the East Siberian road to open stations and move empty to Kuzbass, contacted the former head of this road KROKHMAL (arrested) and together with him ruined the road even more.

At the beginning of 1937 POGREBINSKY was sent to the Voroshilovskaya road to move empty goods for oil products and coal. On the instructions of BILIK, he contacted the former head of this road DASHKO (arrested) and together with him thwarted this task, brought the road to a disastrous state. In addition, POGREBINSKY carried out a lot of sabotage work on the South Road.

After being appointed head of the special construction of the NKPS in Khabarovsk, he received the task of BILIK for sabotage, in particular, to prepare the explosion of a strategic railway tunnel under construction near Amur.

2. BAKUTIS, b. head of the traffic service group of the Moscow ring road. Previously worked at the NKPS in the center. Department of Statistics and Cartography, Lithuanian. Interrogated: BUBIS.

BAKUTIS confessed to espionage work in favor of Japan and Latvia. He showed that in 1921 in Moscow he was recruited for espionage work in favor of Latvia by BILKIN, a representative of the Latvian railway. roads, who came to the USSR to conclude a railway convention.

BAKUTIS knew Bilkin from working together on the former RigoOryol road in pre‐revolutionary times. Having met with Bilkin at the NKPS, Bakutis asked him to help him in the transition to Latvian citizenship due to the fact that his relatives live in Riga, he has his own house there and is going to move there. Bilkin agreed to assist him, but demanded, as proof of his loyalty to Latvia, to transmit a number of espionage information about the state of railway transport in the USSR. BAKUTIS fulfilled this task and at the same time collected and transmitted to BILKIN information about the state of the locomotive and carriage park on the roads. He received this data from the central statistics department of the NKPS, where he worked at that time.

Subsequently, BAKUTIS for 13 years (until 1934) regularly transferred spy materials to the Latvian intelligence service through BILKIN, who periodically came to Moscow on business about relations with the Latvian railways.

In 1934, BAKUTIS moved to the Moscow ring road, and his connection with BILKIN was interrupted.

In 1935, BAKUTIS was recruited by a Japanese resident of Harbin OVRAMENKO, who worked with him in the traffic management service of the road as an auditor (OVRAMENKO was arrested, confessed).

On the instructions of OVRAMENKO, BAKUTIS handed over to the Japanese intelligence a number of spy materials about the presence and condition of the rolling stock, technical equipment of the road, cargo turnover, passenger traffic and a number of other information that fully covered the condition of the road.

The interrogation of BAKUTIS continues.

3. EROFEEV, early. trust of transport engineering NKPS. Interrogated: NIKOLSKY.

EROFEEV confessed to belonging to the anti‐Soviet Pravotrotskyist organization, disclosed in the trust system. He testified that he was recruited into the organization in 1936 by BAZULIN ‐ the former head of the trust of steam locomotive repair factories of the NKPS (BAZULIN was arrested).

In 1936, EROFEEV headed an anti‐Soviet organization at the MOZHEREZ plant. On the instructions of BAZULIN, he organized a terrorist group from among the members of the organization, preparing the murder of comrade KAGANOVICH. The composition of this tergroup included: CHERRI ‐ ex. chief engineer of the plant, KAZAKEVICH ‐ b. pom. early plant, SAVCHENKO ‐ head of planning department, and RMS ‐ technical director.

In October 1936, EROFEEV organized the arson of the steel shop of the MOZHEREZ plant. For these purposes, he attracted the head of the workshop ZINGALEV to the organization.

Concerning the MOZHEREZ plant and other enterprises that are part of the trust system, EROFEEV named 24 members of the anti‐Soviet organization who carried out a lot of sabotage work on his instructions (at the Kovrovsky and Kirovsky plants of the NKPS and the MOZHEREZ plant).

All identified members of the anti‐Soviet organization are arrested.

Head of the Secretariat of the NKVD of the USSR, Senior Major of State Security (SHAPIRO)

[1] On the first page there is Stalinʹs note: “ T. Shchadenko. Please read the summary of Belovʹs testimony and return the summary of use. Wide publicity is still undesirable. I. St. ʺ.

[2] ʺ‐ʺ ‐ so in the source.

[3] On the left margin there is Stalinʹs mark: ʺWhere is he?ʺ

[4] * ‐ * The surname is circled and an ʺxʺ is put on the left margin. Stalin wrote twice: ʺIt is important.ʺ

[5] * ‐ * The surname is circled and an ʺxʺ is placed on the left margin. Stalin wrote twice: ʺIt is important.ʺ

[6] * ‐ * The surname is circled and an ʺxʺ is placed on the left margin. Stalin wrote twice: ʺIt is important.ʺ

[7] * ‐ * The surname is circled and an ʺxʺ is placed on the left margin. Stalin wrote twice: ʺIt is important.ʺ

[8] * ‐ * The surname is circled and an ʺxʺ is placed on the left margin. Stalin wrote twice: ʺIt is important.ʺ

[9] * ‐ * The surname is circled and an ʺxʺ is placed on the left margin. Stalin wrote twice: ʺIt is important.ʺ

[10] * ‐ * The surname is circled and an ʺxʺ is placed on the left margin. Stalin wrote twice: ʺIt is important.ʺ

[11] * ‐ * The surname is circled and an ʺxʺ is placed on the left margin. Stalin wrote twice: ʺIt is important.ʺ

[12] * ‐ * The surname is circled and an ʺxʺ is placed on the left margin. Stalin wrote twice: ʺIt is important.ʺ

[13] * ‐ * The surname is circled and an ʺxʺ is placed on the left margin. Stalin wrote twice: ʺIt is important.ʺ