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   To Stalin Top Secret Summaries Of The most important testimonies Of Those arrested 1937‐ 1938

A summary of the most important testimonies of those arrested by the GUGB NKVD of the USSR for April 1, 1938

Archive: AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 407. L. 1‐34.

April 3, 1938

SECRETARY of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade STALIN

I am sending you a summary of the most important testimonies of those arrested by the GUGB NKVD of the USSR for April 1, 1938.

Peopleʹs Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Peopleʹs Commissar for State Security (EZHOV)

Top secret

For the 3rd DEPARTMENT

1. BOBINSKY Boris Vladimirovich, Ukrainian White émigré , Petliura, who returned from Czechoslovakia in 1933 and worked in the Peopleʹs Commissariat for Industry, Art. economist. Interrogated: RAPOPORT.

He showed that in 1922, together with the Ukrainian White émigré

SAMARSKY (established), he illegally moved from Poland to Czechoslovakia, where, with the assistance of the Ukrainian Huge Committee, headed by one of the leaders of the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary Party SHAPOVAL, he was admitted to the Podebrady Ukrainian Agricultural Academy, organized by the UPCR for training of Ukrainian White emigre cadres in order to conduct active counterrevolutionary work in the USSR.

In 1922‐1923, BOBINSKY joined the UPSR cell at the Podebrady Academy and for a number of years was associated with the UPSR leaders GRIGORIEV and SHAPOVAL.

On the instructions of the Prague Center of the UPSR, BOBINSKY in Podebrady and Prague led a group of Ukrainian White émigré students who were scheduled to be transferred to the USSR.

This group included those who graduated from the Petliura military school in Poland: BOBINSKY B.V., KORPUN L., MARCHENKO A. (arrested), PETRIK, Gokvoy, VARAVIN, MIKHAILENKO S. and others.

In order to obtain legal opportunities to enter the USSR, this entire group, creating the appearance of a departure from active White emigre circles, under the guise of ʺSovietophilesʺ joined the ʺUnion of Students of USSR Citizens in Czechoslovakiaʺ organized in Prague, which was one of the main channels for promotion to the Soviet Union counterrevolutionary, terrorist, espionage and sabotage personnel.

In the process of preparing for deployment in the USSR, which lasted for several years, BOBINSKY was recruited by Czech intelligence in 1930 and already then received preliminary instructions to conduct espionage work in the USSR.

In addition, BOBINSKY was associated behind the cordon with the terrorist ʺorganization of Ukrainian nationalistsʺ (OUN) and, in particular, with the emissary KONOVALETS OKIS.

The entire above group, as well as active Ukrainian White emigres KULCHYTSKY, POPENKO, NOSIK and others, arrived in the USSR at different times.

BOBINSKY arrived in the USSR in 1933 on assignments from the Prague Center of the UPSR and Czech intelligence to carry out sabotage and sabotage acts in industry, espionage and preparation of terrorist acts against the leaders of the party and the Soviet government.

For this work, BOBINSKY was associated in the USSR with MARCHENKO, GAEV, and others who arrived from Prague, and BOBINSKY and GAEV were to prepare and directly carry out acts of central terror.

The persons mentioned are established.

2. DIZHUR Mark Zakharovich, the son of a merchant of the 1st guild, before the arrest of Ch. engineer of Glavroszhirprom. Interrogated:

LUKHOVITSKY.

He confessed that he was involved in the anti‐Soviet organization of the right, which existed in the system of the Peopleʹs Commissariat for Food Industry, in 1935 by the former beginning. Margarine Industry Department ZORIN (convicted).

On the instructions of ZORINA DIZHUR disrupted the production of margarine by supplying this branch of industry with substandard raw materials.

In the oil industry, DIZHUR carried out a number of subversive acts: at the Slavyansk Hydrogenation Plant, it installed an incorrect technological process, as a result of which the autoclaves went out of order after six months of work. At a number of factories, he organized the business in such a way that the consumption of press felt increased by 200%. This cloth is extremely scarce, and there is a threat of shutdown of factories due to lack of cloth. Deliberately thwarted the reconstruction of the distillation shop at the Kazan plant.

DIZHUR was an agent of the Japanese, German and Polish intelligence services.

DIZHUR was recruited into Japanese intelligence in 1935 by the deputy. manager of Glavroszhirprom VANSHTEIN (arrested). For Japanese intelligence, DIJUR handed over to WANSTEIN the summaries‐reports (not subject to publicity).

DIZHUR was recruited into Polish intelligence by ZORIN, to whom he handed over the same materials as WANSTEIN. For espionage activities DIZHUR received 6,000 rubles.

DIJUR was recruited into German intelligence by early. Office of the margarine industry MARGOLIN (not arrested), to whom he gave information about the technical equipment of the oil industry and workshops working for defense.

DIZHUR named 13 people known to him as members of an anti‐Soviet organization (4 people were arrested): EMELYANOV ‐ early. capital construction NKLP; G.S. MARGOLIN ‐ early. Office of the Margarine Industry; KHANKIN ‐ early. offices of Glavroszhirprom; PARKHOMOVSKY ‐ early. supply of Glavroszhirprom; OLEYNIK ‐ director of a creamery (Odessa); SEVERINOV ‐ Director of the Zhirkombinat (DVK); LAZDZIN ‐ technical director of the Kirovobad creamery; SHTAMM ‐ engineer Giproroszhirmazlo; Malkin ‐ engineer Giprorosfat oil. The last 3 were attracted to the organization by DIJUR.

3.             DEMYANOV Valentin   Borisovich,          former engineer               of            the plant  Stalin. Interrogated: UDALOV.

He pleaded guilty to the fact that while living in Bessarabia, in 1926, as an agent of the Romanian intelligence ALEKSINSKY, he was involved and took part in a fascist youth organization, which set the task of ideological education of youth in the spirit of irreconcilable hostility to communism.

In 1937, with the assistance of ALEKSINSKY, he was recruited by the Romanian intelligence service and sent through France to the USSR with espionage assignments.

In France, DEMYANOV joined the ʺUnion of Homecomingʺ, where he maintained counter‐revolutionary ties with the White Guards ORTINSKY, MUSIN‐PUSHKIN and others. In 1933, ORTINSKY was recruited to take part in the White Guard spy rebel‐terrorist organization ʺRussian General Military Unionʺ (ROVS). ROVS was transferred to the Union with terrorist missions. Before leaving for the USSR in 1934, he was recruited by French intelligence and received a number of espionage assignments.

Arriving in Moscow, he contacted ORTINSKY, MUSIN‐PUSHKIN and SELIVANOV (convicted) members of the ROVS transferred to the union, prepared acts of central terror and carried out sabotage work at the plant. Stalin and through the agent of the French intelligence SELIVANOV, he transmitted espionage information about the plant to French intelligence.

For the 4th DEPARTMENT

1. KAMENSHTEIN, b. member of the Polish Communist Party, came to the USSR in 1926 as a Polish emigrant, b. member of the CPSU (b), editorial staff of the newspaper ʺFor Communist Educationʺ,

b. member of the Central Committee of the Polish Bund. Interrogated: GRADOV, MILITSYN.

KAMENSHTEIN testified that in 1924 he joined the Communist Party of Poland on the instructions of the Central Committee of the Polish Bund.

In 1926, he was recruited by the Polish intelligence officer SHIBORSKY and sent to the USSR to strengthen the underground Bund organization and espionage work in favor of Poland.

Upon arrival in the USSR, he contacted the leaders of the Bund underground organization WEINSTEIN and FRUMKINA, conveyed to them the instructions of the Central Committee of the Polish Bund and, with their assistance, was appointed as the executive secretary of the OZET central board, through which the Bund underground carried out significant counter‐revolutionary work.

Until 1929, while working in OZET, he carried out sabotage work there, at the same time he regularly informed the Central Committee of the Polish Bund about the work of the Bund underground in the USSR and sent materials for use in anti‐Soviet purposes.

From 1929 to 1935 he worked in Kharkov, where he took an active part in the Bund underground.

KAMENSHTEIN also testified that the illegal Central Committee of the Bund in the USSR included WEINSTEIN, FRUMKINA, RAFES, REGIN, LITVAKOV (all arrested).

2. TEMKIN, b. executive secretary of Komzet, b. Secretary of the Odessa Provincial Committee of the CPSU (b), b. member of the CPSU (b) since 1922. Interrogated by: GORELKIN, NEMLIKHER.

TEMKIN showed that in 1923, together with a group of other leaders of the Odessa organization of the ETUC, he joined the CPSU (b) with double‐dealing goals.

Further, TEMKIN showed that in the USSR there is a Jewish nationalist bloc that unites Bundists and Zionists and seized all the main Jewish public and cultural organizations like OZET, Komzet, Der‐Emes publishing house and others.

This bloc was headed by the leaders of the Central Committee of the Bund WEINSTEIN, FRUMKINA and LITVAKOV (arrested), and also took part in the leadership of the DIMANSHTEIN bloc (arrested).

According to the testimony of TEMKIN, he personally through Komzet systematically carried out extensive sabotage work in the construction of Jewish settlements, in particular in Birobidzhan.

3. DIASAMIDZE V.A., b. student of the Geological Prospecting Institute. Interrogated: SHULYAK.

DIASAMIDZE confessed that he was a member of a counterrevolutionary terrorist group, into which he was recruited by EGANOVA, a student at the Institute of National Economy (EGANOVAʹs husband was arrested by the NKVD).

The group was organized in October 1937 mainly from the relatives of the repressed.

The members of the group systematically organized illegal gatherings at the apartment of Eganova or Kandelaka Arkady. At these gatherings, the members of the group conducted counter‐revolutionary conversations, expressed anger against the CPSU (b) and the Soviet government and terrorist sentiments.

With a view to the practical implementation of terrorist acts, the members of the group got acquainted with the order of protecting the Kremlin, tracked down the cars of government members and took measures to acquire weapons. DIASAMIDZE personally established the route and brand of cars comrade. EZHOVA.

OSIDZE, who was familiar with one of the Kremlin employees (being checked), informed the group about the order of protecting the Kremlin.

               4.      DOSSER ,     b. senior      economist      at      Posyltorg. Interrogated:

VLADZIMIRSKY, COOPER.

DOSSER testified that the terrorist group created by EISMONT included: he ‐ DOSSER, V.N. KHRONIN, V. POPONIN, A. SKOVKO,

R. KRUMOVETS (all arrested).

The group was associated with terrorists TER‐GABRIELYAN and BOGOMOLOV (he was an engineer at Elektrostal, died in 1935).

Plans for a terrorist attack against Comrade STALIN were discussed by the group in 1932‐1933 and 1935.

DOSSER, as a representative of a terrorist group, on behalf of an antiSoviet organization of the right, contacted GLEBOV‐AVILOV in Rostov‐on‐Don, whom he informed about the plans of the Moscow terrorist group, and agreed in 1934‐1935. on the joint execution of a terrorist act against comrade STALIN by organizing the crash of a government train. A member of the BOGOMOLOV group also traveled to communicate with GLEBOV‐AVILOV.

In            1936‐1937. DOSSER         processed            members              of            the          anti‐Soviet organization of the right‐wing SHEIN Mikhail ‐ senior inspector of the Peopleʹs Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR, and KOCHERIANTS Gayk to participate in organizing a terrorist act against Comrade. STALIN.

5.             SHAPOSHNIKOVA        G.F., b. listener of            foreign language courses. Interrogated: ROMANOV.

She confessed that she was a member of a counter‐revolutionary terrorist group among members of the families of the repressed, into which M. CHERNOVA (daughter of the enemy of the people MA CHERNOV) was recruited in 1937.

The group consisted of: CHERNOVA, KOROLEVA ‐ wife of the son of CHERNOV, SILANTYEV ‐ husband of Chernov M.M., student of the Institute of Agricultural Mechanization, OM REIKHEL. ‐ A student of the Moscow Aviation Institute. The organizer of the group was M. M.

CHERNOVA.

The group members were viciously opposed to the leadership of the

CPSU (b) and the government and expressed terrorist views.

For the 5th DEPARTMENT

1. A. I. Egorov Interrogated by NIKOLAEV and YAMNITSKY.

During interrogation on March 30, Egorov testified that the anti‐Soviet organization of the right in the Red Army, headed by him, Egorov, Dybenko and BUDENNY, was formed in 1925, after the death of the Peopleʹs Commissar for Military Affairs FRUNZE and the appointment of a new Peopleʹs Commissar VOROSHILOV.

               Then        BUDENNY       and        EGOROV        decided        to       contact

TUKHACHEVSKYʹs group, which included: DYBENKO, FEDKO, TRIANDOFILOV, EFIMOV, URITSKY ‐ for a joint speech against the appointment of            Voroshilov. EGOROV     shows   that        when VOROSHILOV was appointed BUDENNY, in conversation with him, spoke with extreme spite, to the extent that he spoke of his readiness to kill VOROSHILOV in order to prevent him from joining the post of the Peopleʹs Commissariat for Military Affairs.

At that time, a joint demonstration against Comrade VOROSHILOVEGOROV, BUDENNY, TUKHACHEVSKY and his group had already taken place.

In 1926 DYBENKO moved from the Tukhachevsky group to the Egorov and           BUDENNY         group. In              the period 1926‐28. the           anti‐Soviet organization of the right is finally formed under the leadership of Egorov, BUDENNY and DYBENKO.

This organization set itself the task of seizing leading posts in the central apparatus of the Red Army, in the military districts and preparing the conditions for an anti‐Soviet coup in the interests of the policy of the right and the restoration of capitalism in the USSR.

In 1930, BUDENNY got in touch with one of the leaders of the right ‐ TOMSKY and kept in touch with him.

In the same year, on behalf of DYBENKO and BUDENNY, Egorov contacts the center of the Right through RYKOV.

This connection took place at a meeting between Egorov and Rykov in

Sochi. In the conversation, RYKOV told Egorov that the center of the Rights            is             associated            with       this organization       (TOMSKY,

BUDENNY). Throughout the entire period, this organization maintains contact with the center of the right‐wing RYKOV and BUDENNY.

At the end of 1933, at the direction of RYKOV, the leadership of the antiSoviet organization of the right entered into contact with the anti‐Soviet military conspiracy through Tukhachevsky.

While in Leningrad in the spring of 1934, TUKHACHEVSKY and EGOROV agreed on joint actions of a military conspiracy and organization of the Rights, on an anti‐Soviet action plan and sabotage measures in the operational work of the General Staff to prepare the defeat of the Red Army.

In            1935       BUDENNY         and        EGOROV             had        conversations     with Tukhachevsky in his office (NPO) about the joint work of the conspiracy and organization of the right in the army.

After a while Egorov had a meeting with TUKHACHEVSKY. They discussed a plan to seize power in peacetime, a plan for an anti‐Soviet coup and the defeat of the Red Army in wartime.

In May 1936 Egorov had a conversation with TUKHACHEVSKY about joint actions.

EGOROV names a number of participants in the anti‐Soviet organization of the right in the army: LEVANDOVSKY ‐ commander of the troops of Primorye; KASHIRINA ‐ command of the North Caucasus     Military                District; VELIKANOVA ‐              SAVO commander; GRIBOVA ‐ command of the North Caucasus Military District; EFREMOVA ‐ ZABVO commander (not arrested); former cavalry soldiers SERDICH, TOCHENOVA, FEDORENKO, ZOTOVA, KHATSKELEVICH, KOSOGOV, TYULENEVA.

Egorov shows that in 1930, while studying at the German military academy, he established an espionage connection with the chief of the General Staff of the German Reichswehr, General ADAM.

Being in the same year with the German Military Academy on maneuvers in Stuttgardt, I had a meeting with General Hammerstein. At the meeting, Egorov told Hammerstein and ADAM about the anti‐Soviet organization of the right in the army. It was agreed that the German Reichswehr would support the Egorov, DYBENKO and BUDENNY groups in case of an anti‐Soviet coup.

EGOROV informed General Hammerstein about the groupings in the leadership of the Red Army, the state of the Red Army, and the internal situation in the USSR.

Egorov knew about DYBENKO and LEVANDOVSKYʹs connections with German intelligence.

Egorovʹs connection with the German General Staff was carried out throughout the years through the military attachés of the German embassy KESTRING, HARTMAN and captain SPALKE (head of the Russian department of German intelligence).

To the Germans Egorovs were transferred in 1931 ‐ the composition of the BVO troops (peacetime), in 1932 ‐ the operational deployment of units of the Ukrainian district, in 1933 ‐ the composition of the Moscow Military District (peacetime), in 1935 ‐ the staff of the assault air brigade. The operational materials of the General Staff of the Red Army and information outlining the sabotage defeatist work both in terms of operational plans and in the direction of preparing the Red Army for war (equipping and equipping fortified areas, organizational and staff issues of the rear, etc.) were delivered.

Egorov testified that in 1933 he established contact with the Polish General Staff through the Polish ambassador to the USSR LUKASEVICH.

Through LUKASEVICH it was agreed with the Polish General Staff to provide assistance to the anti‐Soviet organization of the right in the Red Army.

In 1934, in Warsaw, Egorov had a meeting with the chief of the Polish

General Staff, General STAKHEVICH.

With him, he discussed issues of military contact between the antiSoviet organization of the right in the Red Army and the Polish General Staff.

EGOROV informed General STAKHEVICH about the readiness of the Red Army for war in the western theater, about fortified areas, about the timing of the mobilization readiness of the Red Army.

2.             PRAMNEK ,       b. secretary         of            the          Donetsk                regional committee. Interrogated: NIKOLAEV, USHAKOV.

PRAMNEK additionally showed:

1.                   In 1935, with the help of the conspirator DYBETS PRAMNEK, he contacted the director of the automobile plant DYAKONOV and worked out and carried out sabotage measures together with him. DYAKONOV named PRAMNEKU a number of his close people involved in sabotage work: SLUTSKY ‐ the head of production, HELLER ‐ the head of the wheel shop, GIOSIN ‐ the head of the mechanical building shop, DANILOV ‐ headed the technical department.

In addition, PRAMNEK knew that the secretary of the party committee of the forge of the plant, VORONIN, was anti‐Soviet.

2.                   PRAMNEK for a number of years conducted anti‐Soviet conversations with NI PAKHOMOV. (Peopleʹs Commissar) both in Gorky and in Moscow at the apartment of PAKHOMOV.

3.                   Having learned from OSTROVSKY that GENYAVSKY (oblvnutorg) was a conspirator, PRAMNEK conducted anti‐Soviet conversations in his presence and gave him sabotage attitudes aimed at disrupting trade.

4.                   OGURTSOV KM (now the secretary of the Chelyabinsk Regional Committee), was a close person with PRAMNEK, knew and shared the anti‐Soviet views of PRAMNEK.

5.                   Burov A. N. (Chairman of the Gorky Regional Executive Committee) is an anti‐Soviet person, conducted anti‐Soviet conversations with

PRAMNEK and carried out his sabotage attitudes.

6.                   Having learned from BOBKOV that LEGKONRAVOV (the former head of the Kirov Regional Executive Committee) is anti‐Soviet, PRAMNEK conducted anti‐Soviet conversations with him.

7.                   In 1934 PRAMNEK established personal contact with Rykov on conspiracy matters and received instructions from him on anti‐Soviet work.

8.                   Leaving for work in Donbass, PRAMNEK received from V.I. MEZHLAUK. and BAUMAN, instructions to contact SARKISOV, who will acquaint him with the work of the conspirators, among them: KHOLOHOLENKO ‐ 2nd secretary of the Donetsk regional committee (arrested), KOZLOVA ‐ head. prom. department of the regional committee (arrested), STEEL ‐ head. coal department of the regional committee.

SARKISOV pointed out to PRAMNEK the most difficult places in coal mining in order to carry out sabotage work. PRAMNEK in Donbass postponed, thwarted the exposure and arrests of the conspiracy participants.

9.                   STRAUSOV, who moved from the Gorky organization to the Donbass, is now the secretary of the Horlivka City Party Committee, is an anti‐Soviet person. PRAMNEK conducted anti‐Soviet conversations with him.

10.                PRAMNEK processed for the purpose of recruiting into the conspiracy the devoted PINDYURA (2nd secretary of the Donetsk regional committee) and conducted anti‐Soviet conversations with him. PINYURA followed all the instructions of PRAMNEK.

3. DYBENKO P.E., b. Commander of the Leningrad Military District. Interrogated: YAMNITSKY, KAZAKEVICH.

Additionally, he showed that since 1924‐25. he contacted Egorov and BUDENNY on the basis of a joint struggle with the leadership of the Red Army.

By 1929‐30. this group is formed as the leading nucleus of the military organization of the right and through BUBNOV establishes contact with the leadership of the anti‐Soviet organization of the right. Each of the group members (EGOROV, DYBENKO, BUDENNY) starts recruiting commanders.

In 1930‐31, when Egorov and Dybenko were studying at the German military academy, on behalf of the center of the right, they established contact with the German general staff. At the same time, DYBENKO was recruited by the German intelligence officer SHPALKE and kept in touch with General Hammersteinʹs aide‐de‐camp HOFMESTER.

Egorov was associated with General ADAM and GAMMERSHTEIN.

After HITLER came to power, DYBENKO and EGOROV, on the instructions of the German General Staff and the center of the Right, strengthened their c. work, recruitment and sabotage aimed at preparing the defeat of the Red Army in the war.

The question of the direction of K.‐R. work was permitted at a meeting of the leadership of the military organization of the right (EGOROV, DYBENKO, BUDENNY), which took place during the convocation of the Military Council in 1933 (at the apartment of BUDENNY). At this meeting, the issue was discussed with 3 versions of the plan for an antiSoviet coup: an armed uprising, a ʺpalace coupʺ, a performance during the war and the defeat of the Red Army. It was decided to prepare mainly for performance during the war. To undermine the combat training and mobilization readiness of the Red Army and defense enterprises, DYBENKO carried out the following: in agreement with the leader of the right in the Urals KABAKOV, 50‐60% of highly qualified workers were withdrawn under the plan to mobilize the workforce in the Urals, which was supposed to disrupt the work of factories. The mobilized engineers and technicians were not certified by specialty. The seizure of horse stock, harnesses, tractors and vehicles according to plans approved by A.I. Egorov, it was planned in the amount of up to 60%, which was supposed to disrupt the work of enterprises and agriculture. The dispatch of vehicles was delayed by 34 days, which was supposed to affect the disruption of the rapid deployment of troops. The destructive work in the motor‐technical units of PrivO was carried out by the head of the ABT troops of the MORGUNOV district, recruited into the conspiracy by DYBENKO (not arrested).

Territorial divisions in PrivO, according to DYBENKOʹs instructions, were saturated with an anti‐Soviet element from the kulaks, the Cossacks, associated with the whites, and in another way of sabotaging change‐men to disrupt the mobilization, it was planned (at the time of mobilization) to detain the conscripts for 2‐3 days. In order to carry out espionage assignments of the German intelligence service, DYBENKO informed the Germans about the state of the SAVO and PrivO, about the armaments, strength, deployment, operational and mobilization plans. Egorov also carried out espionage work, as he informed DYBENKO about it.

The main sabotage defeatist measures carried out by Egorov were reduced to disrupting high‐quality construction and deployment of fortified areas, disrupting the armyʹs mobility, disrupting the plans of the headquarters, transport, logistic organizations, informing the Germans about the plans of the Red Army. During the war, the members of the organization, on the instructions of Egorov, had to open a front in the ʺwindowʺ area in the fortified areas of Ukraine.

The members of the military organization of the Right coordinated their sabotage work with the leadership of the civil organization of the Right. DYBENKO was personally associated with RYKOV, KABAKOV in the Urals, KRINITSKY on the Volga and Fayzulla KHODZHAEV in Central Asia.

DYBENKO named a number of members of the military organization of the right‐wingers in SAVO, PrivO and LVO, including those personally recruited by him:

According to SAVO:

1)                   MALYSHEV ‐ the former head of the Central Asian school named after Lenin, now the chief of staff of SAVO, a former officer of the general staff (not arrested).

2)                   PETROV Ivan Efimovich ‐ former. ensign, concealed his officer rank, head of the Central Asian School named after Lenin (not arrested).

3)                   Sokolov Alexander Mikhailovich, a former assistant to the military commanders for the material support of the SAVO, transferred in 1934 or 1935. material support assistant North. Caucasian Military District (not arrested).

4)                   SOKOLOV ‐ Prosecutor of the Central Asian Military District (not arrested).

5)                   TIMERMAN ‐ head of military communications SAVO, transferred in 1935, beginning. VOSO PrivO and in 1936 he was appointed commander of the railway. regiment in PrivO Syzran (not arrested).

6)                   POCHTER ‐ head of the intelligence department, arrived at SAVO from the 3rd cavalry corps, recently studied at the Academy of the General Staff (arrested).

7)                   ZHILTSOV Alexander ‐ deputy. head of PUOKR, later assistant. commander of the BVO near Uborevich, now the head of the Food Directorate of the Red Army (not arrested).

8)                   SHAPKIN ‐ divisional commander of the 7th cavalry, former white, went over to the side of the Reds when taking Novorossiysk, was from SAVO in 1934 or 1935. transferred to the divisional commander to the Far East.

9)                   GROSBERG ‐ German, former officer, former chief of staff in the Uzbek division, in 1935 he was appointed commander of the 11th cavalry in PrivO, in 1936 he was transferred to the BVO (arrested) together with the division.

10)               GLAVATSKY – deputy, early Podiva 6 Uzbek, recruited in 1932, in 1935 transferred to the PUOKR PrivO, the son of a priest.

11)               TOMASHEVICH ‐ former divisional commander of the 2nd mountain rifle division, later the corps commander of the university in Moscow (died).

DYBENKO also named 31 other members of the right‐wing organization in SAVO.

Of the participants in the military organization of the Right in the Volga Military District, DYBENKO named the following persons recruited by him personally:

1)     EFREMOV Mikhail Grigorievich ‐ division commander, corps commander, now the commander of the Trans‐Baikal Military

District. Recruited in 1934.

2)     VARFOLOMEEV ‐ Chief of Staff of PrivO. Recruited in 1935

(arrested).

3)     SHIFRAN ‐ head of the financial department of PrivO. Recruited in 1934 (arrested).

4)     CHEKIN ‐ chief of engineers. Recruited in 1935.

5)     BELOV ‐ chief of artillery, recruited in 1936 (not arrested).

6)     MORGUNOV ‐ chief of the armored forces of the PrivO. Recruited in 1935. Now the head of armored courses in Leningrad (not arrested).

7)     MIKUTSKY ‐ material support assistant. Recruited in 1935 (not arrested).

8)     BARANOV ‐ commander of the 53rd division. Recruited in 1936 (not arrested).

9)     Balkin ‐ former divisional commander 53, (arrested).

10) GOLIKOV ‐ division commander 61, now a member of the military council of the BVO. Recruited in 1935 (not arrested).

11) Khlebnikov, divisional commander 31 in Stalingrad. Recruited in 1935 (arrested).

In addition to these persons, DYBENKO knew from EFREMOV and others recruited by him about a number of members of the organization of the Right (named 35 people), including:

1)  MURGIN ‐ Commissar of the Saratov Armored School. I knew from

BLUASHVILIʹs words.

2)  PLAU ‐ commissar of the 12th rifle corps. I knew from the words of BLUASHVILI and KABANOV (arrested).

3)  KAMNEV ‐ Commissar of the 82nd division. I knew from the words of KABAKOV (not arrested).

4)  POVERINOV ‐ instructor of PUOKR. Knew from BLUASHVILIʹs words (not arrested).

5)  PAVLOV ‐ instructor of PUOKR, former commissar of the regiment. I knew from BLUASHVILIʹs words (arrested).

According to LVO DYBENKO, he named among the members of the military organization the rightists transferred from PrivO:

1) NIKOLAEVA ‐ Chief of Staff of the 19th Rifle Division (not arrested). 2) DRANESHNIKOVA ‐ Commissioner of the 70th SD (not arrested).

DYBENKO testified that, through Egorov, with K.‐R. organization of the right in the Red Army were connected ‐ KASHIRIN (the former commander of the North Caucasus Military District ‐ arrested), CHEDIKIN (former head of the combat training department of the Red Army ‐ arrested).

BUDENNY carried out recruiting work and had a group of horsemen.

4. ZONBERG J.F., b. inspector for military work at an NGO, corps commander. Interrogated: YAKUNIN.

ZONBERG, a member of the Latvian fascist organization, additionally testified that he was recruited into this organization not in 1932, as he had shown earlier, but in 1926 by MESIS (arrested) while working with him in the Ukrainian military district.

Working at that time in Odessa as the commander of the 6th corps, ZONBERG created a Latvian nationalist organization there, headed it and directed its anti‐Soviet activities.

This organization included: he ‐ ZONBERG, KABAJIEPC ‐ the former pompolite of the 6th page of the corps, ZVAYZGNE ‐ secretary of the divisional party commission of the 51st Perekop division, EMBERG ‐ former. commissar of the Odessa artillery school (all arrested), and others that we are installing.

The organization under the leadership of ZONBERGA carried out recruitment and nationalist work among Latvians living in Odessa.

The cover for the anti‐Soviet activities of the organization, as ZONBERG shows, was a Latvian club in Odessa. In 1928, SONBERG established contact with a member of the Ukrainian nationalist organization in Odessa GREBENNIK (arrested).

GREBENNIK told ZONBERG about the presence of a nationalist organization in Ukraine, about the tasks of this organization, about the leadership of the organization, which includes VLASENKO, the former deputy chairman of the VUTSIK (with whom he, GREBENNIK, maintained direct contact).

From 1927 to 1930, ZONBERG handed over to the Latvian intelligence a number of espionage materials about the armament, condition and mobilization plans of the Red Army troops of the Ukrainian Military District.

From 1930 to the day of his arrest, ZONBERG was connected by espionage activities with BERZIN Jan (arrested), acted on his instructions and transmitted through him to the Latvian intelligence service spy materials about the mobilization resources of the command and political personnel of the military units of the Ukrainian and Belarusian military districts.

5.                   ARNOLDOV     M.O. B. director                of            Derulyuft. Interrogated: ROGACHEV, EDLIN.

He testified that in Berlin in 1935 the director of Derulyuft (of the German side) FERTE offered him to receive the money allegedly owed to him from the German side. ARNOLDOV received 2050 marks. He spent this money at the same time in Berlin. On the next trip, the new director of ISSEL offered to cover the ʺdebtʺ owed from him in 2,050 marks, threatening otherwise to bring this to the attention of the Soviet side. ARNOLDOV began to ask him not to do this, as it threatens him with a court, expulsion from the party, etc. Then ISSEL said to him: ʺWe can pay         you        upkeep if             you really     observe                 our         German

interests.ʺ ARNOLDOV agreed. After that, ISSEL gave him the task to provide information on the state of the aircraft and engine fleet of the Civil Air Fleet, the state of air lines, airfields and the availability of a human reserve. ARNOLDOV fulfilled this task. After that, he received the task to report information about the newly built ZIG 1 aircraft and a number of others.

Among other assignments, ARNOLDOV received the following: not to send Soviet pilots on the flight along the Leningrad‐Moscow line under the pretext of the unsatisfactory condition of our materiel, but to send German planes. Subsequently, it turned out that German aircraft, deviating from the route, studied fortifications in the Baltic region and mastered the Moscow‐Berlin air route through the Baltic.

6.                   ARKUS , b. officer of the Intelligence Agency of the Red Army. Interrogated by: KRIVOSHEEV, LADATKO.

ARKUS, who had previously confessed to spying for Japan, additionally testified that in 1929 he was contacted by the Japanese intelligence officer MARKOV ‐ b. Profintern employee (to be established).

ARKUS transferred to MARKOV for the Japanese intelligence a number of classified materials of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army: an assessment of the situation in Manchuria, reviews of the SovietChinese conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway and a number of other data on Japan and China.

In 1935, before ARKUSʹs trip to Shanghai to work as secretary of the

USSR Consulate General, MARKOV informed him that a representative of Japanese intelligence would contact him in Shanghai, on whose instructions he, ARKUS, would continue his espionage work.

In Shanghai, at one of the banquets, ARKUS was contacted by the secretary of the Japanese consulate HASHIGAWA. On instructions from HASHIGAWA, ARKUS gave him materials about the activities of the USSR in the East, characterizing the situation in China and assessing

Japanese policy in China.

Before ARKUSA returned to the USSR, HASHIGAWA gave him a meeting with a Japanese agent, a former intelligence officer, SHINKAREV (arrested, confessed), with whom he established a connection.

7. TROYANKER BU, former member of the Military Council of the Moscow Military District, corps commissar. Interrogated: MALYSHEV.

He additionally testified that in 1929, after BULIN had recruited him into the anti‐Soviet organization of the Rights, he received the task of recruiting, mainly from among the leading political workers of the army, and to prepare such a ground that, at the moment of an open speech by the Right, would give them the opportunity to lead behind itself the army party organizations. In this respect, much attention was paid to the party organization of the Moscow garrison.

TROYANKER indicated a number of chiefs of political divisions and brigades of the Moscow Military District, recruited by him into the organization of the Right. At the time of the open speech of the right, the persons recruited by TROYANKER on the instructions of BULIN openly supported the right and tried to lead the party organization, but were defeated. Having suffered defeat, the right‐wingers, at the direction of BULIN, went deep underground and continued to carry out recruiting and anti‐Soviet work.

TROYANKER in 1930, having been transferred to work in the BVO, organized the performance of the rightists both at party meetings and in the schools of party Komsomol education. During his work in the BVO, he recruited 13 political workers into the organization of the right.

TROYANKER knows that the right wing headed by BULIN, in the interests of the organization, raised the question of abolishing the institution of political instructors of the RKKA. These events, as

TROYANKER shows, were supported by GAMARNIK, TUKHACHEVSKY and a number of district commanders.

TROYANKER, being the head of the Kulprop Department of the Red Army PU, on the instructions of BULIN, introduced the right,

Trotskyists and other anti‐Sovietists into the teaching staff of secondary and higher military educational institutions, delayed their removal from the ranks of the Red Army.

8.             WALDEN           G.I., b. Head       of            the          Airbrushing        Institute GUGVF. Interrogated: SHCHERBAKOV.

WALDEN had previously confessed that he is an agent of the British Intelligence Service. In addition, he testified that in Persia, where he worked as the Soviet consul in Shiraz, in 1926, when he left for Moscow, a representative of British intelligence in Tehran MIRZA KERIM KHAN RESHTI told him that a number of spies had been transferred to the territory of the USSR by British intelligence under the guise of Persian political emigrants who “fled »From Persia to the USSR in connection with the unsuccessful outcome of the so‐called Gilan revolution (1920‐21).

These British spies settled mainly in the Transcaucasus, as well as in Moscow at the KUTV [1] e, the Narimanov Institute and other institutions.

MIRZA KERIM KHAN RESHTI told WALDEN that British intelligence has a number of serious espionage connections in the

Transcaucasus. The leading role in organizing espionage in Baku was played by the Persian ʺrevolutionaryʺ ‐ SERDAR MUKHI (died), who was the brother of MIRZA KERIM KHAN RESHTI, who, using the confidence in him from the leading party and Soviet workers, in particular S. ORDJONIKIDZE and NARIMAN‐ NARIMANOV, carried out espionage and subversive work on assignments of British intelligence.

SERDAR MUKHI passed on to British intelligence a number of secret decisions of party organs in Baku related to the ʺGilan revolutionʺ, and also used his connections to plant in the Persian rebel army and political bodies that worked during the ʺGilan revolutionʺ in Gilan ‐ agents of British intelligence and Trotskyists.

SERDAR MUKHI was associated with BUDU MDIVANI (at that time the chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the Persian Insurgent Army) with a member of the Revolutionary Committee, the English spy EHSANULLA KHAN (allegedly now in Baku in the position of an immigrant, it is being established), with SULTAN ZADE group by Avetis Sultanovich, who was then arrested workers of the Iranian

Communist Party, with a Musavatist, an English spy BAGGI JAFERI (established), as well as with Ali Heydar SHIRVANI, who then worked as the Peopleʹs Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan and subsequently convicted of domestic corruption (established).

With the help of BUDU MDIVANI, SERDAR MUKHI and other British spies, the following were sent to the rebel Persian army: CARGARTELLI was appointed commander‐in‐chief (former army general of Menshevik Georgia, in 1920 was the military representative of the Menshevik government in Baku under the Musavat government, now works in Persia as head of the topographic department in the Ministry of War under RIZA KHAN). The Trotskyist TOMASHEVSKY (died) was appointed head of the political department.

The political department included a Trotskyist, an English spy ABIKH (to be established) and a certain AGAYAN, who was during the British occupation of 1918‐1920. Dashnak consul in Rasht.

An English intelligence agent, Freytag, who later worked in Moscow and had connections with some of the NKID workers who carried out espionage activities, was ʺnominatedʺ as a translator into the special department of the rebel Persian army.

During the ʺGilan revolutionʺ British agents, together with the Trotskyists, in order to disrupt the revolution, spoke at meetings in Persia with ʺleftʺ demands ‐ the abolition of land ownership, the closure of mosques, the abolition of religion, the removal of the veil, the confiscation of goods from the merchants, which led to a departure from the revolutionary movement of some part of the peasantry, artisans and other petty‐bourgeois strata of the population.

British agents carried out a series of betrayals at the front in the revolutionary movement in Persia during this period.

After the death of Serdar Mukhi in Baku, EKHSANULLA KHAN was

the resident of the British intelligence service (to be established).

Spy Ali Gaidar SHIRVANI while studying at the Communist Academy in Moscow in 1926‐28. organized Trotskyists; was associated with SULTAN ZADE, BARDIN, OSTEROV (all arrested), as well as with the writer LAHUTI.

WALDEN, together with SULTAN ZADE, on assignments from British intelligence, placed British spies who settled in Moscow and other cities under the guise of Persian political emigrants to study at the military educational institutions of the Red Army and for other work.

9. Mityaev D.G., b. Deputy Head of the NCO Military Publishing

Department, Regimental Commissar. Interrogated: GRINBERG.

Mityaev had previously confessed that he was a participant in an antiSoviet conspiracy who carried out sabotage in the Military Publishing House of the NCO. In addition, he showed that, on the direct instructions of DUSHAKA (the former deputy head of the Military Publishing House of the NKO, who recruited Mityaev into the conspiracy, was arrested), he directed his subversive work to disorganize the supply of units and universities of the Red Army with textbooks and military literature in order to disrupt the combat, political and technical training of units RKKA.

With a sabotage purpose, he delayed and disrupted the publication of naval literature, the release of which was provided for by the plan approved by the Peopleʹs Commissar of Defense, in particular on issues of steam economy and maintenance of ship mechanisms. As a result, students of naval schools were deprived of the opportunity to study the technology of the modern fleet.

MITYAEV thwarted the publication of the much‐needed literature on artillery and aviation.

Translated literature was deliberately published without comment. No criticism of the anti‐Soviet installations hostile and alien to the Red Army, which were carried out by the military specialists of the fascist countries, was not given. For example, a book by the German general von KUL on the German General Staff was published without comment, despite the fact that it contained clearly anti‐Soviet attitudes.

Massive military‐political literature was delayed by publication under various pretexts, new regulations, instructions, etc. the army and the navy received with great delay.

10. KRAVCHUKOVSKY, head of the trade department of Mosvoentorg, Brigintegdant. Interrogated by PROKOFIEV, ELISAVETSKY.

KRAVCHUKOVSKY previously confessed to participating in the Pravotrotskyist organization in the Tsentrvoentorg system. In addition, he testified that at the beginning of 1935, the former head of the Tsentrvoentorg RYKOV (arrested) established contact with him through the Trotskyist organization.

RYKOV told KRAVCHUKOVSKY that RYKOV learned about his participation in the anti‐Soviet organization from the former commander of the Siberian Military District GAILIT (arrested). After

RYKOV left Moscow in August 1935, KRAVCHUKOVSKY was contacted by BARKHONOV, newly appointed head of Tsentrvoentorg

(arrested).

BARKHONOV KRAVCHUKOVSKY informed that, on behalf of the former chairman of the Tsentrosoyuz ZELENSKY (convicted), he headed the leadership of the Pravotrotsky organization in the Tsentrvoentorg system and that he knew from ZELENSKY that KRAVCHUKOVSKY belonged to the organization.

KRAVCHUKOVSKY and BARKHONOV outlined a plan of sabotage in the Tsentrvoentorg system both in the center and in the localities: recruitment, disruption of supply of manufactured goods to OKDVA, freezing of capital investments, disruption of public catering for command personnel (poor quality of meals, throwing glass, nails, sawdust into food, etc.) ). They planned to carry out the plan of sabotage work in the first days of mobilization.

Kravchukovsky testified that the Trotskyite organization had recruited in Tsentrvoentorg. Members of the organization were assigned to the most important positions by BARKHONOV and KRAVCHUKOVSKY.

KRAVCHUKOVSKY named 51 of the members of the organization known to him in the Tsentrvoentorg system (some of the named members of the organization were arrested, the rest are being identified).

Personally, KRAVCHUKOVSKY recruited 11 people into the organization, among whom he named BERKOV, the head of the military canteens department in the Mongolian Peopleʹs Republic, Brodsky, the head of the special trade department of the Trade Mission in the Mongolian Peopleʹs Republic, YAKOVLEV, the head of the production department of Tsentrvoentorg, and ERMAN, the head of the Belarusian military service (all arrested). KRAVCHUKOVSKY admitted that he is an agent of the Polish intelligence, to which he was recruited by the former deputy. Chief of Voentorg FILIPPOVICH (convicted). KRAVCHUKOVSKY handed over to FILIPPOVICH for the Polish intelligence the deployment of units of the Belarusian Military District and other espionage materials.

11. GRUSHETSKY FF, head of the Red Banner improvement courses, beginning. composition of the Red Army, division commander. Interrogated: YUKHIMOVICH, RUBANOV.

GRUSHETSKY previously confessed to participating in a Polish spy organization. He additionally testified that according to the instructions of one of the leaders of the ʺPOVʺ, the former chief of communications of the RKKA LONGVA (convicted), he, GRUSHETSKY, contacted the member of the ʺPOVʺ, the former commander of the air squadron of the Kharkov Military District ROSHKOVSKY (arrested), from whom from 1928 to 1937 received spy information about the air units of the Kharkov, Kiev, Volga and Ural military districts (about the types and number of aircraft, their armament, carrying capacity, etc.).

On the instructions of GRUSHETSKY ROSHKOVSKII, he created sabotage and espionage groups in the air units: in the Kharkov air brigade of 3 people, of whom he named MIZERA (squadron technician, is installed), in Orenburg in an aviation school of 4 people, he named its participants SEGEDI and LUKOTSKY ( ).

ROSHKOVSKY in 1930 in Orenburg established contacts with the rebel Cossack group.

In Chelyabinsk, ROSHKOVSKY created a Polish spy group, into which the aviation commanders GRUZEL, DASHKEVICH and OZERSKY were recruited (to be established).

ROSHKOVSKY periodically visited GRUSHETSKY in Moscow and conveyed information about the air units and the work of the Polish spy groups he had created. GRUSHETSKY, in addition to his connection with LONGWA, was connected through an espionage line with the Polish consulate in Moscow through the resident of the Polish intelligence service TSIFER (arrested). For a number of years, he passed on information about the chemical courses of the Red Army, about achievements in the chemical service, about chemical machines in service, about new toxic chemicals and others.

12.                FEDOROV, Controller of the CPC Naval Group. Interrogated: ENDAKOV.

He testified that, while working in the CPC, on the basis of common anti‐Soviet views with the former head of the CPC military group BEREZIN (arrested) and sharp anger towards the leadership of the party and the Soviet government, in 1934, BEREZIN was recruited into a terrorist group by BEREZIN.

Berezin, according to Fedorovʹs testimony, organized a terrorist group. At the suggestion of BEREZIN, FYODOROV agreed to participate in the preparation of a terrorist act against Comrade Ezhov.

FYODOROV, on the instructions of BEREZIN, contacted the participant, Ph.D. organization in the Civil Air Fleet system VOYTOV, deputy head of the Scientific Research Institute of the Civil Air Fleet (arrested), together with whom he carried out subversive work in the direction of motor building for the civil air fleet, in order to disrupt the development of the most acceptable engines for the Civil Air Fleet and the scientific development of operational issues related to the supply of motors in the Civil Air Fleet

13.                LUKIN MM, pom. early Department of Sanitary Administration of the Red Army. Interrogated: SHCHERBAKOV.

He gave initial testimony that in 1931 he was involved in anti‐Soviet activities by his relative N.I. BUKHARIN. (arrested).

During his work in the Sanitary Directorate of the Red Army, LUKIN was recruited into a military‐fascist conspiracy by the former head of the Sanitary Directorate of the Red Army, BARANOV (convicted) and his deputy REINER (arrested). For sabotage activities in the field of sanitary services LUKIN was associated with BARANOV, REINER and pom. early Office ZARAYSKY (not arrested).

The sabotage in the Sanitary Directorate of the Red Army was carried out mainly through the damage of sanitary equipment, incomplete supplies and blanks, disruption of personnel training for wartime, the laying of incomplete and unverified property in an emergency reserve, etc.

14.                CHERENOVICH, former teacher of the Academy. Frunze, Major. Interrogated: CHEKHOV, TAKE.

CHERENOVICH, who had previously confessed to Polish espionage, additionally testified that until 1934, in espionage activities, he was associated with the former commissar of the Kiev Military Engineering School KHOROSHILOV (arrested), to whom he transferred various espionage materials about the Red Army and fortified areas through the former. pom. the chief of engineers of the UVO ‐ the Polish agent BARBYSHEV (not arrested).

In 1934, the Polish intelligence officer P.O.KOLOSOV, the head of the department, contacted CHERENOVICH for espionage activities. RU RKKA (not arrested), with whom he subsequently carried out

espionage contacts until the day of his arrest.

For the 6th DEPARTMENT

1. YAKOVLEV, b. early Central Supply Department of the NKPS. Interrogated: BENENSON.

YAKOVLEV confessed to belonging to the anti‐Soviet Pravotrotskyist organization in the railway transport, to which he was recruited in 1935 by MAMENDOS.

He testified that on the instructions of BILIK and LEVCHENKO (formerly deputy of the Peopleʹs Commissariat of Railways, arrested) he had created an anti‐Soviet Pravotrotskyist organization in the system of material supply of railway transport and until the day of his arrest was the head of this organization.

YAKOVLEV testified about the subversive work carried out by him, as a result of which the material supply of the railway transport was disorganized and the state suffered huge losses.

Subversive work was aimed at mortifying large capital investments by sending incomplete equipment to roads, factories and construction sites. Diesel and locomotives were sent without generators, machine tools and pumps without motors. All this equipment was deadened and lay for a long time without use. So, for example, on January 1, 1938, as a result of YAKOVLEVʹs sabotage activities, 750 new machine tools, many boilers, compressors, cranes and others were lying on the transport. equipment. At the construction sites of the Transsignalsvyazstroy trust, 50 million rubles worth of materials, equipment, cables and apparatus were deliberately overstocked.

Yakovlev showed that he deliberately overestimated the requests to the planning authorities in order to worsen the situation with the satisfaction of materials from other sectors of the national economy and overstocking with unnecessary equipment and materials.

So, YAKOVLEV ordered 5,800 kilometers of interlocking cable for 1938, while the actual need for it was determined by 1,500 kilometers, 40,000 pieces of auto‐interlocking transformers were ordered with an actual need of 13,000 pieces, etc.

In order to hide his criminal activities from the control and planning authorities, YAKOVLEV, together with his accomplices, deliberately confused the accounting of the state of stocks of materials and equipment on the railway transport.

YAKOVLEV named 13 members of the Pravotrotskyist organization, including 10 employees of the NCC, of whom 6 were arrested. The arrest of the rest is being prepared.

2. IVANOVSKY, early. transport group ʺRostekstilsnabʺ, Peopleʹs Commissariat of Industry, arrested on the testimony of VISTA, former. doctor Lechsanupra. Interrogated by: SOLNTSEV.

IVANOVSKY admitted that since 1924 he has been a Polish spy. He was recruited in Samara by the resident of the Polish intelligence service ZAVADSKY, the former chief physician of the District Military Hospital of the Volga Military District.

He showed that, on the instructions of ZAVADSKY, he created an espionage sabotage group in the state farm of the Buzuluk region, where he worked at that time, recruiting SOLDATENKO, formerly. chairman of the executive committee, Asyat KARNAHBAEVA, Art. a state farm patrolman, and a number of other state farm workers.

This group carried out destructive work in the state farm and surrounding villages, for which Karnakhbaev got in touch with the local kulaks and the mullah. (SOLDATENKO and KARNAKHBAYEV are installed).

All subsequent years IVANOVSKY was connected by espionage work with ZAVADSKY and VIST, a resident of the Polish intelligence, who worked in the Transanupra NKPS as a doctor for mobilization work (arrested).

IVANOVSKY gave ZAVADSKY and VIST spy materials about the number of recruits, aero clubs and military circles, the system of nonmilitary training of cavalrymen and pilots of Osoaviakhim, as well as the number of military uniforms manufactured by the Moskovshvey

Trust.

IVANOVSKY named the Polish spies known to him in the Volga

Military District: MUSEUS, ex. pom. commander of PrivO, and KADOM, ex. chief of staff of this district.

IVANOVSKY personally recruited Voenveda workers MENDIRITSKY

(arrested) and KORMILITSBIN (to be established) for espionage work.

Head of the Secretariat of the NKVD of the USSR, Senior Major of State Security (SHAPIRO)

 

[1] Communist University of the Workers of the East.