Stalin Kaganovich aug 1936

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 Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931–1936

1936 January August
For the industrial development of the country, 1936 was the most successful of all the 1930s. With the exception of coal and oil, all branches of industry progressed rapidly. According to official data, the production of heavy industry increased by 30%. Arms production, according to modern estimates, has increased by at least 60%. This pace contrasted sharply with 1935, when the military industry lagged behind the rest of the industry due to the difficulties of transition to new technologies. Almost as high as in heavy industry was the increase in the production of consumer goods - by 27%. It was a year of rising living standards for a considerable part of the urban population.

 

Kaganovich to Stalin January 15, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 17. Op. 163. D. 1091. L. 59. Original. Typescript.
Sent 9-00 15.1.1936

Entered the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for interpretation on January 15, 1936, 15–55.

In. No. 37/sh.

Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Tov. Stalin 1 .

1) Was on the Omsk road. Now I am on Tomskaya, in Kuzbass. The state of affairs on the Omsk road is extremely difficult; things are also bad on the Tomsk road. According to Omsk, I think that Ulanov should be removed. Now I am preparing a proposal for a candidate for the post of head of the road. I am preparing an order for Omskaya, as well as for Tomskaya with specific measures to raise roads, which I will inform you later.

2) Having familiarized myself with the situation on the Eastern Road, I think that the situation is extremely difficult, especially with the advancement of trains. Starting from the Omsk road, a tape of slow train progress stretches. In addition to the general ugly work of the road, and especially the operation, which we are now spurring on, a major brake is the poor state of repair of steam locomotives.

I ask for your consent to the following activities:

1) Of the equipped repair trains available to the NKPS according to the mobilization plan, send 4 repair trains from the central roads to Vostochnaya at the disposal of Comrade Kaganovich to help repair locomotives and wagons.

2) In view of the shortage of warm clothes, allow, in addition to those released, to give the NKPS 10 thousand sheepskin coats and 10 thousand pairs of felt boots from the Barnaul sheepskin coat factory.

Kaganovich 2 .

_______________________

1 The telegram was sent in cipher from the village of Usyat to the Tomsk Railway. On the encryption marks about the vote: “For. I.St[alin]. V. Molotov. K.Voroshilov. M. Kalinin. Zhdanov. V.Chybar” and the record of the Secretary of the PB about voting “for” Andreev and Mikoyan.

2 On the same day, the PB considered Kaganovich's telegram and approved the measures he proposed (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 974. L. 48).


Kaganovich to Stalin January 20, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 17. Op. 163. D. 1092. L. 2. Original. Typescript.
Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Tov. Stalin.

After a detour of the Tomsk road, especially the Kuzbass, a meeting of the workers of the Tomsk was held with a call from the field. The meeting showed that despite the presence of about 100 abandoned trains going mainly to the East, the systematic underload of coal, the road can be taken out of a difficult situation in a short time. I am developing all the necessary measures for this, which I will submit tomorrow for your approval, now I am sending you the draft order for the Omsk road, and I ask:

1) approve the order on the Omsk road,

2) remove comrade Ulanov from the post of head of the road,

3) to appoint the head of the Omsk road comrade. Fufryansky (the current deputy of Comrade Kuritsyn, one of the old workers who are reorganizing to work in a new way),

4) to send to the Omsk and South Ural roads comrade. Zimin. Kaganovich 1 .

20.1.36

___________________

On January 21, 1936, the PB considered the issue of the work of the Omsk railway and agreed with all the proposals of Kaganovich (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 974. L. 57). Order of the NKPS "On the work of the Omsk Railway" see: Ibid. Op. 163. D. 1092. L. 3–6.

On the encryption marks about the vote: “For. I. Stalin. V. Molotov. K.Voroshilov. A. Mikoyan. M. Kalinin. V. Chubar. Andreev.


Kaganovich to Stalin January 23, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 17. Op. 163. D. 1092. L. 23. Original. Typescript.
Departed from Krasnoyarsk on 14–14 23/1.1936.

Entered the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for interpretation on December 23, 1936, 18–35.

In. No. 63/sh.

Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Tov. Stalin.

After a thorough acquaintance with the state of affairs on the Tomsk road, he outlined a number of practical measures to improve the operation of the road, which is now in an extremely difficult situation. I indicated the measures orally, and for the main ones I developed a draft order, which gives an assessment of the condition of the road, the reasons for the poor performance, and outlines practical measures to correct the situation. The draft order will deal in detail with a number of issues, both organizational and technical, in view of the fact that the Tomsk road has lagged behind other roads in restructuring, the order will also touch upon a number of practical issues that are of vital importance for other roads in the network.

It turned out that in the administration of the road there was a group of counter-revolutionary and sabotage elements, former Kolchakites, who disrupted measures to improve the road. The draft order plans to remove them from work and hand them over to the investigating authorities.

I ask the Central Committee: 1) to approve the draft order. Including the removal of the head of the Novo-Kuznetsk operational department, Karpov, and the approval of the head of this department, Andreev, an employee of the NKPS (a very good employee);

2) Command deputy. NKPS Kishkina to Orenburgskaya and Turksib to ensure the advancement of an empty man stuck on Turksib and heading through Turksib to Tomskaya to Kuzbass;

3) Permission to publish in the press orders on the Omsk and Tomsk roads. Kaganovich 1 .

____________________

1 According to the text of the encryption, there is Stalin's resolution in red pencil: “To Molotov. Accept all proposals of Comrade Kaganovich on the Omsk and Tomsk roads, and publish his orders not in the all-Union press, but only in the Omsk and West Siberian press. I. Stalin. On January 24, 1936, the PB approved this proposal (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 974. L. 60).


Kaganovich to Stalin January 26, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 77. Op. 163. D. 1092. L. 70. Original. Typescript.
Departed from Irkutsk on 20–15 26/1.1936.

Received by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for decryption 27/1.1936 10-00.

In. No. 79/sh.

Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Tov. Stalin.

He got acquainted with the work of the Krasnoyarsk hub and the locomotive car repair plant. On the approaches to Chernorechenskaya, at the station itself and in Krasnoyarsk, dozens of trains had accumulated, delayed by moving to the east. Along with the ugly work of the operators, this was caused by the collapse of the locomotive fleet of the Krasnoyarsk depot. Half of all commodity steam locomotives were out of order due to a malfunction. The quality of repairs is ugly, often downright criminal. The depot and the factory are littered with wrecking elements associated with the Japanese and Poles. With the connivance of would-be communists, they started such a repair system that led to a leak (so in the document) of communication, damage to boilers, injectors, pumps. A group of Trotskyists was uncovered at the plant, engaged in sabotage during repairs, persecution of the Stakhanovists, and the decomposition of workers. Party organizers and party organizations of the depot and factory work disgustingly, the party organizations are practically disintegrated, the Stakhanovites are in the pen, the mood of the workers is unimportant. He took prompt measures on the spot to correct the situation, transferred 15 steam locomotives from the NKPS reserve from Irkutsk, instructed the plant to help the depot in repairs, a repair train had already arrived from Moscow. All this will make it possible in the next few days to improve the health of locomotives and expand the traffic jam in Chernorechenskaya and Krasnoyarsk and to move trains from Tomskaya to the east without hindrance.

I ask the Central Committee to adopt the following resolution:

1) To send a major employee of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs from Moscow to the Krasnoyarsk junction and the plant in order to fully reveal the subversive work of espionage and class-hostile elements.

2) In view of the unsuitable work and the great contamination of the party organizations of the Krasnoyarsk hub and plant, conduct a secondary check of party documents with them.

3) To approve the party organizer of the Krasnoyarsk steam locomotive repair plant Khonin A.I., an employee of the regional committee, who previously worked in the political department of the MTS and the secretary of the district committee, relieving Ignatovich of the duties of the party organizer.

4) To approve P.M. Pereverzev as the party organizer of the Krasnoyarsk locomotive depot. an employee of the regional committee, who previously worked in the political sector of the MTS of Western Siberia.

5) Release the head of the Krasnoyarsk locomotive department Tarakanov from work, appointing Sokolov (employee of the Department of the locomotive economy of the NKPS, engineer) as the head of the locomotive department.

L. Kaganovich 1 .

________________________

1 Encrypted notes about the vote: “For. I. Stalin. V. Molotov. K.Voroshilov. S. Ordzhonikidze ”and a note from the PB secretary on the consent of Andreev, Chubar, Kalinin and Mikoyan.

On January 28, 1936, the PB accepted Kaganovich's proposals (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 974. L. 63).


Kaganovich to Stalin July 6 [1936]

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 743. L. 53. Autograph.
6/VII

Hello, dear Comrade Stalin!

1) Leaving 1 , I left 4 notes with a draft resolution of the Central Committee on imports for the NKPS. These issues have not yet been resolved. I assure you, Comrade Stalin, that if you had entrusted me in the past as the head of the transport department of the Central Committee , 2 I would not have shown such ignorance as I have shown now, cruelly cutting down by 5 and 10 times the demands of the NKPS departments. I will not repeat here the arguments set forth in the notes. I ask you to consider and satisfy these modest requests of the NKPS. Explanations could be given by Comrade Livshits .

2) I read the testimony of the scoundrels Dreitzer and Pikel. Although it was clear before, they reveal with all the details the true gangster face of the murderers and provocateurs - Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev and Smirnov. Now it is absolutely clear that the main inspirer of this gang is this corrupt bitch Trotsky. It's time to declare him "outlaw", and shoot the rest of the scoundrels sitting with us.

Goodbye. Greetings to you, your L. Kaganovich.

Kislovodsk.

6/VII.

___________________

1 Kaganovich was on vacation from June 15 to August 1 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 978. L. 51).

2 The Transport Department of the Central Committee was formed by decision of the 17th Congress of the CPSU(b). On March 10, 1934, Kaganovich was appointed its head (Ibid. D. 941. L. 14).

On July 16, 1936, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decided to purchase equipment and wires for the NKPS (GARF. F. R-5446. Op. 1. D. 487. L. 109, 111, 113).


Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze to Stalin August 16, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 8. Original. Ticker-tape.
From Moscow. Telegram HP 11889.

Commissar of State Security 2nd rank comrade. Pauker.

Tov. Stalin.

The French chargé d'affaires Paillard applied to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs with a request to take back our amendments to the introductory part of the declaration of the French plenipotentiary on non-intervention in Spanish affairs. Krestinsky proposes to give the following answer to the French: “We would be ready to discuss the question of withdrawing our amendment if the French government could notify us that all the other invited states accept the text of the declaration proposed by the French government without any amendments. Since, as we know, this is not the case, we believe that at the present moment we have no reason to reconsider our attitude towards the introductory part of the French project. We believe that the answer should be worded differently, namely: “At the moment, the Council of Ministers sees no reason to withdraw its amendments, especially since we are not sure whether

Please let us know your opinion 1 .

L. Kaganovich. S. Ordzhonikidze.

Transmitted August 16, 1936 19 hours. 56 min.

____________________

1 In early August 1936, the French government proposed to a number of countries, including the USSR, to conclude an agreement on non-intervention in Spanish affairs. The Soviet government agreed, but proposed to amend the introductory part of the declaration of non-intervention. After Stalin's telegram, on August 23, Litvinov signed a note on the adoption of the declaration (DVP. Vol. XIX. S. 292-293, 397-398, 402-403).


Stalin - Voroshilov, Kaganovich August 16, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 2–3. Autograph.
Moscow. CC ON. Voroshilov, Kaganovich.

After seriously considering, I came to the conclusion that Uborevich should not be given the title of commander of the USSR aviation. It would be blatant and inappropriate. You can limit yourself to the title of chief of the aviation forces of the USSR, by analogy with the Morflot, where Orlov is the chief of the sea, and the commanders of the corresponding naval forces sit or could sit on the seas. Stalin 1 .

_____________________

1 Further, the secretary's note: "Encrypted 16/VIII - 36, 22-10". On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 23:00. 25 min. (Ibid. L. 1).


Stalin to Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze August 16, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558 Op. 11. D. 93. L. 6. Autograph; F. 81. Op. 3. D. 101. L. 78. Typewritten copy.
No. 2.

Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze.

I propose to give Paillard the following answer: “The USSR agrees to discuss Franzpr’s proposal on our amendments, but before doing this, the joint would like to know how things stand with the amendments of Italy, Germany and other states, whether they were adopted or withdrawn, and if adopted, then by whom accepted only by France or other countries. If Payart answers with ignorance or unsatisfactory, proceed through our attorney in Paris. If it turns out that all the other countries' amendments have been withdrawn and our amendments are the only brake, we will have to accept the French proposal and withdraw our amendments .

Stalin 2 .

_____________________________

1 On August 17, 1936, this text of Stalin's answer was formalized as a decision of the PB (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 20. L. 50). See note 1 to document no. 739.

2 The document bears the secretary's mark: “Submitted on 16/VIII. 23–40” and the names of the sender and receiver of the telegram are indicated (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 6v). There is also a telegraphic text in the file (Ibid. L. 4).


Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze to Stalin August 17, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 11. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.

From Moscow 17/VHI - 36 at 17:00. 46 min. In. No. 1.

Sochi. Tov. Stalin.

For the fastest development of metal radio tubes, radio receivers, television receivers and other equipment, under the contract of technical assistance of Radio Corporation, it is necessary to purchase equipment and materials in America for 2 million 900 thousand dollars.

The application for equipment and materials was carefully reviewed by Ordzhonikidze. We ask for your consent 1 .

HP 1.

Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze.

_________________

1 Stalin replied the same day in a cipher from Sochi at 11 p.m. 45 min.: “As far as I remember, this issue has already been decided” (Ibid.).


Kaganovich, Chubar, Ordzhonikidze to Stalin August 17, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 14. Original. Typescript. Signatures are autographs.
Telegram number 11925 from Moscow.

Tov. Stalin.

KhTZ and STZ in the 4th quarter, by decision of the Central Committee, should be stopped in order to prepare the transition from January 1937 to the production of caterpillar tractors. Reconstruction of factories is late by one quarter. NKTP offers:

1) In the fourth quarter, give the factories a program to produce 11,000 tractors, 13,000 engines and 1,000 tractors, in addition to the annual plan;

2) in the first quarter, plants should not stop and produce wheeled tractors for spring sowing;

3) to stop both plants in the second quarter and prepare them from July for the transition to the production of caterpillar tractors, ensuring the production of 30,000 caterpillar tractors in six months.

We ask for your consent 1 .

Kaganovich. V. Chubar. Ordzhonikidze.

17/8–36 years 19 hours. 25 min.

___________________

1 On the telegraph text, Stalin made a note of his consent (Ibid. L. 13). The corresponding decision of the PB was issued on August 19, 1936 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 980. L. 48).


Yezhov, Kaganovich - Stalin August 17, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 21. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 55. L. 37. Typewritten text with corrections by Kaganovich.
Encryption.

From Moscow 17/VIII - 36 at 21 o'clock. 52 min. In. No. 2.

Sochi. Tov. Stalin.

Press coverage of the trial of the counter-revolutionary Trotskyist-Zinoviev terrorist group was outlined as follows:

1) Pravda and Izvestia publish daily reports on the trial in the amount of one page. Other newspapers print reports of the trial up to half a page. The indictment and the prosecutor's speech are printed in full. All reports are sent through TASS, which has the necessary apparatus for this. In addition, newspapers publish articles and responses during the process (resolutions, etc.). All material goes to print with the visa of comrades Stetsky, Tal, Mekhlis, Vyshinsky and Agranov. General supervision to assign to comrade. Yezhov.

2) Of the representatives of the press, the following are allowed to the process: a) Editors of the largest central newspapers, correspondents of Pravda and Izvestia; b) Employees of the ECCI and correspondents for servicing foreign communist press workers; c) Correspondents of the foreign bourgeois press.

Some embassies are requested. We consider it possible to issue tickets only for ambassadors - personally. We ask for your consent 1 . HP 2.

Ezhov, Kaganovich.

_____________________

1 The encryption about Stalin's consent was sent from Sochi on August 18 at 18:00. 42 min. (Ibid. D. 93. L. 20).


Kaganovich to Stalin August 17 [1936]

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 743. L. 54–55. Autograph.
17/VIII

Hello, Dear Comrade Stalin!

1) Tov. Litvinov sent a draft letter to the League of Nations. I am sending it to you, we will not make any decisions until your reply.

2) Golubenko, Loginov and Mrachkovsky gave very serious testimonies about Pyatakov, the protocols have been sent to you. They all show that he was the head of the Ukrainian terrorist center. They also point to Livshits as a participant. We believe that it is hardly possible to publish Pyatakov's article now, and in general, what should be done with him? Sergo agreed with him (before obtaining evidence) that Pyatakov would go to the Urals now, and then it would be possible to agree on the DVK. We ask you to tell us your opinion, both about the article and in general, how to deal with it? 1

3) Today we talked with comrades Vyshinsky and Ulrich and established:

1) the hearing of the case to begin on the 19th at 12 noon with the calculation of the end of the court on the 22nd day; 2) conduct the interrogation in the following order: 1) Mrachkovsky, 2) Evdokimov, 3) Dreitzer, 4) Reingold, 5) Bakaev, 6) Pikel, 7) Kamenev, 8) Zinoviev, 9) Smirnov, 10) Olberg, 11) Berman-Yurin, 12) Goltsman, 13) N. Lurie, 14) M. Lurie, 15) Ter-Vaganyan, 16) Fritz David.

2) The role of the Gestapo is fully revealed.

3) If the accused will name Pyatakov and others, do not interfere. If you have instructions on these points, please let us know 2 .

Hello to you. Yours L. Kaganovich 3 .

PS Comrade Yezhov writes to you about the news.

______________________

1 On September 10-11, 1936, Pyatakov was expelled from the Central Committee by a poll of members of the Central Committee. On September 12, Pyatakov, who was at that time on a business trip in the Urals, was arrested (Rehabilitation. Political processes of the 30-50s. M., 1991. P. 219).

2 We are talking about the preparation of an open trial in the case of the so-called "anti-Soviet united Trotskyist-Zinoviev center", known as the first big Moscow trial, which took place on August 19-24, 1936.

3 On the first sheet in the upper left corner of the litter: "My arch[iv].St[alin]".


Kaganovich, Chubar to Stalin August 18, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 25. Original. Typescript.
Telegram.

From Moscow 18/VIII - 36

Sochi. Tov. Stalin.

1) In connection with the poor condition of grain in a number of districts of the Moscow Region, the Moscow Regional Committee asks for assistance to collective farms affected by the drought by providing discounts on grain deliveries, payment in kind and repayment of a loan of 9.5 million poods of grain, including in the order of discounts from state deliveries 7.5 million poods, a reduction in the repayment of loans by 400,000 poods, and a reduction in the plan for payment in kind by 1.6 million poods. We plan a reduction by 6,800,000 poods, including a reduction in the plan for grain deliveries by 5,000,000 poods, a reduction in the repayment of loans by 400,000 poods, and a reduction in the plan for payment in kind by 1,400,000 poods. The Moscow region has 43 districts with low yields. If our proposal is accepted, the Moscow region will have to hand over 26,160,000 poods in the peasant sector without a garnet. Last year, the region delivered 34,743,000 poods.

2) The Chelyabinsk Regional Committee asks to reduce the plan for grain delivery by 13 million 774 thousand poods, including reducing the plan for grain deliveries by 3 million poods, reducing the amount of payment in kind by 6.5 million poods, completely writing off the debt of collective farms for payment in kind last year in the amount of 2 million 274 thousand poods and to postpone the return of semprodsudy by 2 million poods.

We plan to reduce his plan by 5,810,000 poods, including 3,000,000 poods for grain deliveries, 1.5 million poods for payment in kind, defer the collection of 1,50,000 poods of arrears in 1935 payment in kind, and postpone it to 1937. debt of collective farms on loans in the amount of 260 thousand pounds. The Chelyabinsk region has 28 districts with a harvest below 4 centners. The Central Committee of the Chelyabinsk region has already been given a discount this year by reducing loans by 8 million poods. If our proposal is accepted, the Chelyabinsk region will have to hand over 31,905,000 poods in the peasant sector without a garnet. Last year, the region handed over 38 million 698 thousand pounds.

Please provide your opinion.

Kaganovich, Chubar.

18/8–36 years

1 hour. 30 minutes.


Stalin to Kaganovich, Chubar August 18, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 24. Autograph.
Kaganovich. Chubar .

It is possible to give Muscovites a discount of 8 million poods in all respects, and up to 8.5 million poods to Chelyabinsk residents .

Stalin.

No. 3

18/VIII.36 1

___________________

1 Number and date entered by the secretary. Sent on the same day in code from Sochi at 13:00. 43 min. (Ibid. L. 23).


Kaganovich to Stalin August 18, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 19. Original. Typescript.
Comrade Stalin.

In view of bad weather and the risks involved in carrying out a significant part of the planned program, the aviation festival had to be postponed to August 24th. Kaganovich.

18/8–36 years

13 o'clock 50 min.


Stalin to Kaganovich, Chubar August 18, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 29–30. Autograph.
Cipher.

Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU. Kaganovich, Chubar.

I consider it necessary to immediately sell oil to the Spaniards on the most favorable terms for them, if necessary, at a discount in price. If the Spaniards need bread and food in general, they need to sell all this on preferential terms. Tell us how much oil we have already delivered to the Spaniards. Oblige Vneshtorg to act quickly and accurately.

Stalin.

#4

18/VIII.36 1

______________________

1 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 14:00. 42 min. (Ibid. L. 28).


Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze, Chubar - Stalin August 18, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 55. L. 38. Text - Chubar's autograph. Signatures - autographs; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 31. Certified typewritten copy.
Cipher.

Top secret.

Copy .

Tov. Stalin.

Comrade's message was heard. Sud'in on the progress of oil sales to the Spaniards. It was established that on August 18, 6,000 tons of fuel oil were sold, and another tanker was called in to load oil.

According to your telegram, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade was instructed to immediately sell oil to the Spaniards at a reduced price in the required quantity on the most favorable terms. As for bread and food, instructions were given to find out their needs as a matter of urgency. After clarification, we will inform you additionally. No. 1132/sh.

Kaganovich. Ordzhonikidze. Chubar.

18.VIII.36


Stalin to Kaganovich, Yezhov August 19, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 35. Autograph.
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Kaganovich. Yezhov .

I read a letter from Radek addressed to me concerning his position in connection with the Trotskyist trial. Although the letter is not very convincing, I still propose that for the time being the question of Radek's arrest be dropped and that he be allowed to publish in Izvestiya an article signed against Trotsky under his own name. The article will have to be previewed.

Stalin.

#5

19/VIII. 36 year 1

_____________________

1 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 15:00. 56 min. (Ibid. L. 34).


Kaganovich, Yezhov - Stalin August 19, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 32–33. Script. Typescript. Signatures are autographs.
Comrade Stalin 1 .

We send the first information [about] the process.

1. The court opened [at] 12 noon with a formal questioning of the accused about the service of the indictment.

When asked by the chairman of the court whether the defendants were familiar with the materials of the prosecution and the indictment, they all answered in the affirmative. There are no statements about this.

2. To the question of the chairman of the court whether the defendants had any challenges to the composition of the court, all the defendants replied that there were no challenges.

3. When asked by the defendants whether there were any statements, Zinoviev and Kamenev replied.

Zinoviev and Kamenev filed the following applications:

a) Zinoviev declared that he fully confirmed Bakaev's testimony that the latter reported to Zinoviev about the preparation of a terrorist act against Kirov and, in particular, about the direct executor Nikolaev. In addition, additionally, Zinoviev reported that on the day of Kirov's assassination, Mandelstam, a member of the Leningrad center, went personally to Zinoviev for a report. Mandelstam reported to Zinoviev all the circumstances of Kirov's murder .

b) Kamenev asks to interrogate the witness Yakovlev, only after he, Kamenev, has been questioned.

4. The indictment was read out. After the indictment was read out, all the defendants were asked whether they pleaded guilty, and they all answered: “Yes, we do.”

Three made reservations:

a) Smirnov said:

was a part of the united center;

knew that the center was organized for terrorist purposes; personally received a directive from Trotsky on the transition to terror. However, he personally did not take part in the preparation of terrorist acts.

b) Holtzman declared that he pleaded guilty. He confirmed the receipt of a written directive from Trotsky on the transition to terror and that this directive was handed over to the center and, in particular, to Smirnov. At the same time, he stipulates that he did not personally participate in the preparation of terrorist acts.

c) Ter-Vaganyan pleaded guilty only within the limits of his testimony (he was a member of a terrorist center, etc., according to his testimony in the protocol).

5. The recognition of all the defendants in their guilt made a stunning impression on foreign correspondents.

6. After the break, the interrogation of Mrachkovsky began. Keep calm. All testimonies were verified and corrected. Completely ruined Smirnov. Smirnov is forced, under pressure from the testimony and the prosecutor, to basically confirm the testimony of Mrachkovsky. It's even good that he's a little fronted. Thanks to this, I got into a stupid position. All the defendants attack Smirnov.

7. We will inform you about the further course of the process in the evening.

Kaganovich. Yezhov 3 .

_______________________

1 A telegraph tape is pasted on the first sheet: “Transmitted on August 19, 1936, 19:00. 15 minutes. Trans[ala] Zakharova was received by Afonin.

2 Point a) on the left margin is crossed out in red pencil.

3 The telegram has a note in the upper margin: “send through comrade Volovich. 12008".


Stalin to Kaganovich August 19, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 37–38. Autograph.
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU. Kaganovich.

Got a letter. Litvinov's draft of the League of Nations is acceptable. I am making one correction: not four-fifths, but three-fourths shall be considered as a qualified majority of the members of the League of Nations .

As regards Pyatakov and Radek, I have already spoken to you by telephone. I agree about the process.

Stalin.

#6

19/VIII.36 2

_____________________________

1 See Document No. 745. On August 22, 1936, Litvinov sent a letter to the Secretary General of the League of Nations with proposals on measures to promote the application of the principles of the Statute of the League of Nations in the field of collective security and sanctions against aggressor states. The decision on the existence of conditions for the imposition of sanctions in the letter was proposed to be considered adopted if at least three-fourths of the members of the Council of the League of Nations present at the meeting voted for it (DVP. Vol. XIX. S. 399-401).

2 Number and date entered by the secretary. Sent on August 20 in code from Sochi at 0 o'clock. 15 minutes. (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. I. D. 93. L. 36).


Kaganovich to Stalin August 20, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 40. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 55. L. 39. Original. Typescript. Signature - autograph; F. 81. Op. 3. D. 101. L. 104. Typewritten copy.
Encryption.

From Moscow 20/VIII - 36 at 14:00. 45 min. In. No. 4.

Sochi. Tov. Stalin.

The Afghan ambassador told the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs that the Afghan Minister of War Shah Mahmud Khan, the uncle of the Afghan king, wants to come to the USSR on an official visit and asks if he will be given an appropriate official reception. The People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs believes that it is necessary to answer positively so that Shah Mahmud is received by Comrade upon arrival. Voroshilov.

We think that we can agree with this. Please let me know your opinion 1 . HP 4.

Kaganovich.

_____________________________

1 On the same day, by cipher from Sochi, Stalin answered with his consent at 21:00. 23 min. (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 39).


Kaganovich, Yezhov - Stalin August 20, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 42–46. Script. Typescript. Signatures are autographs.
Sochi. Pauker.

Comrade Stalin 1 .

1. In the morning and evening sessions the following persons were interrogated: Mrachkovsky, Evdokimov, Dreitser, Reingold, Bakaev and Pikel.

2. The most characteristic of their interrogations is the following:

a) Mrachkovsky fully confirmed the entire factual side of his testimony at the preliminary investigation and clarified these testimony. Particularly convincing are the testimonies regarding the role of Trotsky and Smirnov. This is the most important thing in Mrachkovsky's testimony.

b) Evdokimov fully confirmed the testimony at the preliminary investigation and added a number of important details. Most convincing in his testimony are the details of the assassination of Kirov on the direct instructions of Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, him - Yevdokimov and others.

c) Dreyer confirmed all the testimony at the preliminary investigation. He paid particular attention to the roles of Trotsky, Smirnov and Mrachkovsky. He gave detailed testimony about them. He especially attacked Smirnov for the latter's attempt to gloss over his role in organizing terror.

d) Reingold fully confirmed the testimony given at the preliminary investigation and specified it in a number of places. The most characteristic in his testimony is:

a detailed presentation of two options for a plan to seize power (double-dealing, terror, military conspiracy);

a detailed report on the connection with the right and the existence of right-wing terrorist groups (Slepkov, Eismont), which Rykov, Tomsky and Bukharin knew about;

a report about the existence of a reserve center consisting of Radek, Sokolnikov, Serebryakov and Pyatakov;

a message about a plan to destroy the traces of the crime by exterminating both the Chekists who know anything about the crime and their own terrorists;

a report on the theft of public funds for the needs of the organization with the help of Arkus and Tumanov.

e) Bakaev fully confirmed the testimony at the preliminary investigation. He spoke in great detail and convincingly about the assassination of Kirov and the preparations for the assassination of Stalin in Moscow. He especially insisted on the direct involvement of Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Evdokimov in this case. Slightly downplaying his role , he was offended that they had not told him everything before .

f) Pikel fully confirmed the testimony at the preliminary investigation. He mostly repeated Reingold's testimony. He paid special attention to the suicide of Bogdan, stating that in fact they killed Bogdan, that he committed suicide at the insistence of Bakaev. On the eve of Bogdan's suicide, Bakaev stayed with him all night and told him that he must either commit suicide himself in the morning, or they would destroy him themselves. Bogdan chose Bakaev's first proposal.

3. We especially note the behavior of the following defendants during the trial:

a) Smirnov took the line that he, being a member of the Trotskyist-Zinoviev center and knowing about the terrorist attitudes, did not himself participate in the practical activities of the organization, did not participate in the preparation of terrorist acts and did not share the attitudes of Trotsky-Sedov. By cross-examination of all the defendants, Smirnov is immediately repeatedly convicted of lying. Under pressure from the testimonies of other defendants, Smirnov was forced to admit a number of incriminating facts at the evening hearing and became less active 3 .

b) Zinoviev , when interrogating the prosecutor about the correctness of the facts stated by the defendants, recognizes the overwhelming majority of the most important of them. Disputes over trifles, like that exactly those persons or others were present when talking about terror plans, etc. He is more subdued than everyone else.

c) Kamenev , during interrogations of the prosecutor about the correctness of the facts reported by the defendants, the overwhelming majority confirms them. In comparison with Zinoviev, he behaves more defiantly. Tries to draw 4 .

4. Some of the defendants, and in particular Reinhold, spoke in detail about their connection with the Rights, giving the names of Rykov, Tomsky, Bukharin, Uglanov. Reingold, in particular, showed that Rykov, Tomsky, Bukharin knew about the existence of right-wing terrorist groups.

This made a special impression on the Encores. All the inkors in their telegrams specifically dwelled on this, calling it a particularly sensational testimony.

We believe that in our newspapers, when publishing a report on Reinhold's testimony, the names of the Rights should not be crossed out.

5. Many defendants named a reserve center consisting of Radek, Sokolnikov, Pyatakov, Serebryakov, calling them convinced supporters of the Trotskyist-Zinoviev bloc. All the incorres in their telegrams pounced on these testimonies as if they were a sensation, and they are passing them on to their press. We believe that 5 when the report is published in our press, these names should also not be crossed out 6 .

Yezhov. Kaganovich 7 .

_____________________

1 At the end of the telegram, a telegraph tape is pasted: “August 20, 1936, 2 o’clock. 50 min. Trans[ala] Zakharova was received by Afonin.

2 Point "e" on the left margin is crossed out in red pencil.

3 Further, the phrase is crossed out: “on the whole, it must be said that his position is more stupid.”

4 Further, the phrase is crossed out: "pretending to be a leader."

5 The end of the phrase was originally: “it is impossible to hide these testimonies in our press.”

6 Further in the draft letter was paragraph 6, which has not been fully preserved: “At all without

the exclusion of incores was a stunning process. According to Tal, Astakhov and the Chekists, the inkors have no doubts about the guilt of all the defendants and, in particular, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev. The interrogation of Kamenev and Zinoviev makes a special impression on them]....”

7 According to the text of the letter, there is an edit by Kaganovich.


Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze to Stalin August 21, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 48. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 55. L. 40. Text - Kaganovich's autograph. Signatures are autographs.
Encryption.

From Moscow 21/VIII - 36 at 0 o'clock. 10 minutes. In. No. 5.

Sochi. Tov. Stalin.

The Japanese are appointing former comrade Foreign Minister Shigemitsu as their ambassador to us. The People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs believes that there are no grounds for refusing him an agrément. We agree with this. Please let us know your opinion 1 . HP 5.

Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze.

________________________

1 On the same day, Stalin agreed in code from Sochi at 12 noon. 48 min. (Ibid. D. 93. L. 47).


Kaganovich, Chubar to Stalin August 21, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 51. Original. Typescript.
Telegram.

From Moscow 21/VIII - 36 at 23 o'clock. 50 min.

Sochi. Tov. Stalin.

1) In connection with the low harvest in a number of regions of Kazakhstan (Aktobe and West-Kazakh regions), the Kazakh Territory Committee asks to reduce grain supplies by 5 million 650 thousand poods. We plan to place at the disposal of Kazakhstan a fund of discounts on grain deliveries in the amount of 3,575,000 poods, including 1,500,000 poods from the reserve of outstanding obligations and 2,000,000 poods from the plan, with the transfer of discounts to the arrears to be recovered from the harvest of 1937 of the year. If our proposal is accepted, Kazakhstan will have to hand over 39.2 million poods to the peasant sector. Last year, Kazakhstan delivered 41.6 million pounds.

2) The Kirov Territory asks for a deferral of grain deliveries and payment in kind in the amount of 6 million poods and for the release of 500,000 poods of rye seeds as a loan. We plan to place at the disposal of the Kirov Territory a fund of discounts on grain deliveries of collective farms in the amount of 2.5 million poods with transfer to the arrears to be collected from the harvest of 1937, reduce the plan for payment in kind for the work of the MTS in the Kirov Territory by 500 thousand poods, release to the collective farms of the Kirov Territory 300 thousand poods of rye as a seed loan. If our proposal is accepted, the Kirov Territory will have to hand over 27.2 million poods to the peasant sector. Last year, the Kirov Territory delivered 33.5 million pounds.

3) The Gorky Territory Committee asks for a discount on grain deliveries in the amount of 1.5 million pounds. We plan to give him a discount of one million pounds. If our proposal is accepted, the Gorky Territory must hand over 20 million poods to the peasant sector. Last year, the Gorky Territory delivered 21 million pounds.

Please let us know your opinion 1 . HP 12111. Kaganovich, Chubar.

___________________

1 Stalin wrote his answer to the text of the telegram: “I agree about discounts for Kazakhstan, the Kirov and Gorky regions. St.". On August 22, Stalin's reply was sent in code from Sochi at 12 noon. 50 min. (Ibid. L. 50), issued on the same day by decision of the PB.


Kaganovich, Yezhov, Ordzhonikidze to Stalin on August 22, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 55. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 55. L. 41. Original. Typescript. Signatures - Kaganovich's autograph.
Encryption.

From Moscow on 22/VIII-36 at 17:00. 46 min. In. No. 6.

Sochi. Tov. Stalin.

Tomsky shot himself this morning. Left a letter addressed to you, in which he tries to prove his innocence 1 . Yesterday, at a meeting of the OGIZ, in his speech Tomsky acknowledged a number of meetings with Zinoviev and Kamenev, his discontent and his grumblings. We have no doubt that Tomsky, like Lominadze 2 , knowing that it was no longer possible to hide his connection with the Zinoviev-Trotskyist gang, decided to hide his ends in the water by suicide.

We think: 1) Bury in the same place in Bolshevo. 2) To give the following notice in the newspaper tomorrow:

“The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks announces that M.P. Tomsky, a candidate member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having become entangled in his connections with the counter-revolutionary Trotskyist-Zinovievist terrorists, committed suicide on August 22 at his dacha in Bolshevo” 3 .

Please provide your instructions. HP 7.

Kaganovich, Yezhov, Ordzhonikidze.

_____________________________

1 Tomsky's dying letter, see Rodina. 1996. No. 2. S. 92–93.

2 Secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks V.V. Lominadze was removed from his post in 1930 for participating in the so-called "Syrtsov-Lominadze group" and after some time was appointed secretary of the Magnitogorsk party organization. In January 1935, Lominadze committed suicide after learning that the NKVD had fabricated materials about his participation in a "counter-revolutionary organization."

3 Information about Tomsky's suicide was published in Pravda on 23 August.


Kaganovich, Chubar to Stalin August 22, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 58. Original. Ticker-tape.
Telegram 1 from Moscow . Nr 48.

Sochi. Tov. Stalin .

Today we received the following telegram from the Second International:

"Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. We regret that at a time when the world working class is united in their feelings of solidarity with the Spanish workers in their defense of a democratic republic, a major political process has begun in Moscow. Despite the fact that the defendants in this trial - Zinoviev and his comrades - have always been sworn enemies of the socialist Workers' International and the International Federation of Trade Unions, we cannot refrain from asking that the accused be provided with all judicial guarantees, that they be allowed to have defenders, absolutely independent of the Government, that they should not be sentenced to death and that, in any case, no procedure should be applied without the possibility of appeal. Chairman of the Socialist Workers' International De-Brucker. Secretary Adler. Chairman of the International Federation of Trade Unions Citrine. Secretary Chevenels.

We think that they should not be answered. Please let us know your opinion.

Kaganovich. Chubar.

________________

1 At the bottom of the telegram, a telegraph tape is pasted: “Transmitted on August 22, 1936, 18:00. 15 minutes. Narrated by Zakharova. Received Afonin.


Stalin to Kaganovich August 22, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. P. D. 93. L. 55, 55v. Autograph.
Kaganovich.

Your number 7 agrees.

I also agree not to respond to the Second International. But I think that it is necessary to publish the telegram of the Second International, to say in the press that the Council of People's Commissars does not consider it necessary to answer, since the verdict is a matter of the Supreme Court, and there to ridicule and stigmatize in the press the scoundrels who signed the telegram as defenders of a gang of murderers, agents of the Gestapo - Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, sworn enemies of the working class 1 .

Stalin.

No. 10

22/VIII.36 2

________________

1 A telegram from the leaders of the Second International and the International Federation of Trade Unions was published in Soviet newspapers on 23 August. The publication was given under the heading "Contemptible Defenders of Killers and Gestapo Agents" and was accompanied by rude comments.

2 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day it was sent in code from Sochi (Ibid. L. 54).


Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze, Voroshilov, Chubar, Yezhov - to Stalin on August 22, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 65. Certified typewritten copy; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 55. L. 42. Autograph of Kaganovich. Signatures are autographs.
Copy . Secret .

Cipher .

Tov. Stalin.

At the evening session, after Vyshinsky's speech, all the defendants renounced their defensive speeches. Now the final words of the defendants are being spoken at the trial. The process will end tomorrow.

We send you the text of the verdict in cipher 1 , omitting the formal part - the listing of surnames. Please provide your instructions. No. 1181/sh.

Kaganovich. Ordzhonikidze. Voroshilov. Chubar. Yezhov.

22/VIII - 36

_______________________

1 The text of the verdict is not published.


Stalin to Kaganovich August 23, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. P. D. 93. L. 62–64. Autograph.
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU .

Kaganovich .

First, the draft sentence is essentially correct, but needs stylistic polishing. Secondly, it should be mentioned in the verdict in a separate paragraph that Trotsky and Sedov are subject to trial or are under trial or something else of that kind. This is of great importance for Europe, both for the bourgeoisie and for the workers. It is absolutely impossible to keep silent about Trotsky and Sedov in the verdict, because such silence will be understood in such a way that the prosecutor wants to involve these gentlemen, and the court allegedly does not agree with the prosecutor. Third. It would be necessary to cross out the final words: "the verdict is final and not subject to appeal." These words are superfluous and make a bad impression. An appeal should not be allowed, but it is unwise to write about it in the verdict. Fourth, the titles of Ulrich and the members must be reproduced in full, and as for Ulrich, it must be said that he is the presiding officer not of some unknown institution, but of the military collegium of the Supreme Court.

Stalin.

No. 11

23/VIII

23–10 2

_______________

On August 24, 1936, A.N. Poskrebyshev sent the following telegram to Stalin in Sochi: “To Chechulin. On behalf of Comrade Kaganovich, I convey that the title of Ulrich "army military lawyer" and members of the court "military military lawyer" according to competent persons is not deciphered. Poskrebyshev. 24/8–36 years 21 hours. 40 min." (Ibid. L. 81).

2 Number, date and time entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 17:00. 07 min. (Ibid. L. 61).

Stalin to Kaganovich August 23, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 77–80. Autograph.
Moscow. CC ON.

Kaganovich .

First. The articles by Rakovsky, Radek and Pyatakov turned out to be quite good 1. Judging by the correspondent reports, foreign correspondents are hushing up these articles, which are of great importance. It is necessary to reprint them in newspapers in Norway, Sweden, France, America, at least the communist newspapers. Their significance lies, among other things, in the fact that they deprive our enemies of the possibility of portraying the trial as a staged act and as a factional reprisal of the Central Committee against the Zinoviev-Trotsky faction. Second. It is clear from Reinhold's testimony that Kamenev, through his wife Glebova, sounded out the French ambassador Alfan about the possible attitude of the franchisor to the future "government" of the Trotskyist-Zinoviev bloc. I think that Kamenev also probed the British, German and American ambassadors. This means that Kamenev had to reveal to these foreigners the plans for the conspiracy and murder of the leaders of the GDL. It also means that Kamenev has already revealed these plans to them, for otherwise the foreigners would not have begun to talk to him about the future Zinoviev-Trotskyite "government." This is an attempt by Kamenev and his friends to conclude a direct bloc with the bourgeois governments against the Soviet government. Here lies the secret of the well-known advance obituaries of American correspondents. Obviously, Glebova is well informed in this whole dirty area. It is necessary to bring Glebova to Moscow and subject her to a series of thorough interrogations. She can reveal a lot of interesting things. It is necessary to bring Glebova to Moscow and subject her to a series of thorough interrogations. She can reveal a lot of interesting things. It is necessary to bring Glebova to Moscow and subject her to a series of thorough interrogations. She can reveal a lot of interesting things.

Stalin.

No. 12 and 13

23/VIII.36 2

____________________

1 Articles by the former leaders of the opposition Rakovsky, Radek and Pyatakov sharply condemning Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev and demanding their execution were published in the newspapers on 21 August.

2 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 23:00. 36 min. (Ibid. L. 76).


Yezhov, Kaganovich - Stalin August 24, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 88. Original. Typescript. Signatures are autographs.
Comrade Stalin 1 .

1. Shvernik proposed the organization in the USSR of the National Committee for the Struggle for Peace, consisting of 21 people from representatives of trade unions, youth, Soviet writers, scientists, cooperatives and sports organizations.

The creation of the National Committee is motivated by the fact that such committees for the struggle for peace are created in all countries by order of the International Bureau. On questions of the struggle for peace, the committees communicate directly among themselves, bypassing their governments.

Delegations to the forthcoming peace congress stand out and act on behalf of the national committees.

2. At the same time, Shvernik made proposals to send a delegation of 35 people to the Peace Congress. We consider it necessary to limit the delegation to 15 people: representatives of the trade unions - Shvernik (All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions), Artyukhina, Romanov, Sobol, Voropaev (chairman of the Central Committee of the Unions), Bogdanov, Bystrova, Pyatinos (chairmen of the factory committees), Demchenko (representative of the collective farm), Tolstoy, Sholokhov ( Union of Writers), Komarov, Gubkin (academicians), Varyash (Tsentrosoyuz).

We ask for your instructions.

Yezhov. Kaganovich.

______________________

1 At the bottom of the telegram, a telegraph tape is pasted: “24/8–36 years at 1 o’clock. 10 minutes." and there are marks of the secretary about sending.


Yezhov, Kaganovich - Stalin August 24, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 86. Original. Typescript. Signatures are autographs.
Comrade Stalin 1 .

On August 31, an International Youth Congress is convened in Geneva to fight for peace. Kosarev and Dmitrov propose to send a youth delegation of 10 people headed by Kosarev to participate in the congress and allow him to speak at the congress with a report "The communist point of view on the question of peace." Catholics and fascists are scheduled to be among the speakers at the congress.

We ask for your instructions.

Ezhov, Kaganovich.

___________________

1 At the bottom of the telegram is a telegraph tape: “24/8–36 years 1 hour. 12 min." and there are shipping notes.


Kaganovich, Zhdanov, Yezhov - Stalin August 24, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 83. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 55. L. 54. Handwritten text. Signatures are autographs.
Encryption.

From Moscow 24/VIII - 36 at 1 o'clock. 22 min. In. No. 10.

Sochi. Tov. Stalin.

We are nominating Khavinson as deputy head of TASS.

Please provide your opinion. HP 20.

Kaganovich, Zhdanov, Yezhov.


Stalin to Kaganovich August 24, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 83. Autograph.
Moscow. CC ON. Kaganovich.

TASS is a big deal, but it is littered with every petty-bourgeois creature. As a substitute, we need to give a person who is bigger, speaks languages, is able to clean out all the abomination from TASS and is organically connected with Pravda. Maybe Mikhailov from Pravda would fit? We should give a man like Mikhailov plus two or three Khavinsons.

You can send five or six people to the international youth congress around the world, no more than 1 .

Shvernikov's proposal for a national committee can be accepted.

8 2 people can be sent to the peace congress .

Stalin.

No. 14

24/VIII.36 3

_____________________

1 The decision of the PB on this issue was drawn up on August 26, 1936 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 980. L. 68).

On August 26, 1936, the PB accepted Shvernik's proposal to organize a national (USSR) Committee for the Struggle for Peace, consisting of 21 people. Shvernik was approved as the Chairman of the Committee. The same decision approved the delegation to the International Peace Congress: Shvernik N.M., Artyukhina AB, Sobol N.L., Smolyansky G.B.; Tolstoy A., Sholokhov M., Gubkin I.M., Varyash E.I. (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 980. L. 69).

4 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 12 noon. 35 min. (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 820).


Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze, Voroshilov, Yezhov - to Stalin on August 24, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 90. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 55. L. 55. Text - Kaganovich's autograph. Signatures are autographs.
Encryption.

From Moscow 24/VIII - 36 at 20:00. 48 min. In. No. 11.

Sochi. Tov. Stalin.

The presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Union received petitions for pardon from all those sentenced, with the exception of Holtsman. The Presidium will meet today at 9 pm. The Politburo proposed to reject the motions and to carry out the sentence tonight. Tomorrow we will publish in the newspapers about the rejection of the petition of the convicts and the execution of the sentence 1 . HP 21.

Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze, Voroshilov, Yezhov.

_______________________

1 Stalin agreed on the same day in a cipher from Sochi at 11 p.m. 30 minutes. (Ibid. D. 93. L. 89).


Kaganovich to Stalin August 24, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558 Op. 11. D. 93. L. 93. Original. Typescript.
Telegram.

From Moscow 24/VIII - 36 at 21 o'clock. 05 min.

Sochi. Tov. Stalin.

During this year, 12,000 people were fired from the aviation industry as part of a purge, and 13,500 people are being drafted into the army. Ordzhonikidze asked to release the aviation industry from this year's draft in its entirety. Voroshilov agrees to the release of 5 thousand. In view of the fact that the recruitment of workers in the aviation industry is carried out in a special manner and the departure of 13,500 will greatly complicate the work of factories, I consider it possible to exempt 8-10 thousand people from conscription.

Please let me know your opinion 1 . HP 12225.

Kaganovich 2 .

____________________

1 Based on the text of the telegram, Stalin’s resolution: “10,000 people in the aviation industry can be released from conscription” (Ibid.). On August 25, the PB decided to release 10,000 workers, engineers, technicians and employees of factories and organizations of the NKTP aviation industry in 1936 from the draft (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 980. L. 65).

2 The draft of the telegram, the autograph of Ordzhonikidze, has been preserved in the file (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 94).


Kaganovich to Stalin August 26, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 95. Original. Typescript
Telegram.

Sochi. Tov. Stalin.

Sergey Sergeevich Kamenev died today 1 . We think:

1) Print the following notice:

"The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks announces with regret the death of the former commander-in-chief during the civil war, a member of the party, one of the main builders of the armed forces of the Soviet state, Sergei Sergeevich Kamenev."

2) Create a commission composed of comrades Unshlikht (chairman), Tukhachevsky, Osepyan, Feldman, Usov, Edeiman.

3) The place of burial has not been decided yet, but there is a proposal to bury him near the Kremlin wall.

Please let me know your opinion 2 .

Kaganovich.

26/VIII-36

_________________

1 S.S. Kamenev died on 25 August.

2 On the same day, Stalin agreed (Ibid.). The PB decision was drawn up on August 25, 1936 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 980. L. 67).


Kaganovich to Stalin August 26, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 98. Original. Typescript; F. 81. Op. 3. D. 101. L. 102. Typewritten copy.
Telegram.

(via NKVD)

From Moscow 26/VIII - 36 at 14:00. 17 min.

Sochi. Tov. Stalin.

There are a number of our engineers in America, permanent representatives of our industry.

Troyanovsky, supported by Litvinov, asks that these engineers make up a delegation to the Energy Congress without reports. They think that by doing so we will avoid the impression of a boycott on our side of Congress.

We consider it possible to agree. Please let us know your opinion 1 .

Kaganovich.

________________________

1 On the same day, Stalin agreed (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11 D. 93. L. 98). On August 26, 1936, the PB allowed the NKTP "to make up, from engineers who are in America as permanent representatives of our industry, a delegation to the energy congress in America without making presentations" (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 980. L .69).


Kaganovich to Stalin August 27, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 110–111. Script. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 55. L. 56–58. Typewritten text with Kaganovich's correction.
Encryption.

From Moscow 27/VIII - 36 at 4 o'clock. 30 minutes. In. No. 12.

Sochi. Tov. Stalin 1 .

I am handing over to you a draft appeal to the Norwegian government. Please give me instructions.

Kaganovich.

“On behalf of my 2 government, I have the honor to state the following: on December 1, 1934, the secretary of the regional committee 3 of the Communist Party 4 , a member of the presidium of the Central Executive Committee of Soviets 4 S. Kirov was killed in Leningrad. The judicial investigation found that the murder was committed by a member of a terrorist organization that set itself the task of terrorist acts against members of the Soviet government and other leaders. This was recognized at trial 5 by Kirov's murderer himself, as well as by his accomplices. An additional investigation, as well as a trial that took place in Moscow on August 19–23 , August 6 , 7, it was further established that the aforementioned terrorist organization was created on the initiative of L. Trotsky, now living in Norway, who gave detailed instructions to his accomplices in the USSR to kill Stalin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze and other members of the government and local organizations 8 . Trotsky sent 9 special agents from abroad for this purpose. All the facts stated were confirmed in an open trial 10 by all Trotsky's accomplices and agents involved in the judicial investigation.

Thus, it can be considered established that L. Trotsky, who lives in Norway, is the organizer and leader, and the inspirer of 11 terrorist actions aimed at killing members of the Soviet government and the leaders of the Soviet people.

Bringing the above to the attention of the Norwegian government, the Soviet government believes that further asylum for L. Trotsky, the organizer of terrorist actions, could damage the friendly relations existing between the USSR and Norway and would be contrary to modern concepts of the norms of international relations. On this occasion, it may be recalled that, in connection with the assassination of the Yugoslav King Alexander and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Barthou, the attitude of governments towards the preparation of terrorist actions on their territory against members of other governments was the subject of discussion in the Council of the League of Nations on December 10, 1934, when the obligation of the members of the League to help each other in the fight against terrorism was stated, and it was even considered desirable to conclude an international convention for this purpose.12 expects that the Norwegian government will not fail to take appropriate measures to deprive Trotsky of his further right of asylum on Norwegian territory . Nr 22, 23.

_______________________________

1 In the upper left corner, Stalin wrote: "The draft was drawn up sloppily" and made numerous notes on the text.

2 Stalin corrected "mine" to "Soviet".

3 Stalin corrected "secretary of the regional committee" to "member of the Central Committee".

4 Stalin inserted "USSR".

5 Stalin inserted "at the end of 1934".

6 The word "this" Stalin crossed out.

7 Further, Stalin inserted "1936".

Stalin replaced 8 "local organizations" with "leading persons".

9 Stalin inserted "in the USSR".

10 Stalin inserted "in August 1936".

11 Stalin crossed out "and an inspirer."

12 Stalin crossed out "firmly".

13 On the draft of the appeal there is a note: “For. M. Kalinin ”(Ibid. D. 55. L. 57).


Kaganovich, Chubar to Stalin August 27, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 102. Original. Typescript.
Telegram.

(via NKVD)

From Moscow on 27/VIII-36 at 14:00. 30 minutes.

Sochi. Tov. Stalin.

1) The Kursk Regional Committee asks to reduce the plan for grain deliveries by 3 million poods and the plan for payment in kind by 6 million poods. We propose to satisfy his request in full on grain deliveries, and on payment in kind to reduce the plan by 3 million poods. If our proposal is accepted, the Kursk region will have to deliver 45,300,000 poods to the peasant sector against the 55,000,000 poods delivered from the 1935 harvest.

2) The North Caucasian Territory Committee asks for a seed loan of 1,760,000 poods and, in addition, a food and fodder loan of 300,000 poods. In the regions of Stavropol, the harvest this year is reduced. We propose to give him a seed loan of 1,385,000 poods, and to refuse food and fodder loans. Now, when grain is still being harvested, it would be wrong to release food and fodder loans.

Please let us know your opinion 1 . HP 1.

Kaganovich, Chubar.

_____________________________

1 On the same day, Stalin agreed in code from Sochi at 23:00. 10 minutes. (Ibid. L. 101). On August 28, 1936, the PB decided to allocate 1,385 thousand poods of wheat for winter sowing to the collective farms of the North Caucasus Territory in the form of a seed loan with a return from the 1937 harvest, with an accrual of 10 poods for every 100 poods of the released loan. The request for the release of fodder and food loans was rejected (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 980. L. 71).


Kaganovich, Yezhov - Stalin August 27, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 105. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 55. L. 59. Typewritten text with Kaganovich's notes. Signatures are autographs.
Encryption.

From Moscow on 27/VIII-36 at 18:00. 56 min. In. No. 13.

Sochi. Tov. Stalin.

In accordance with your instructions, we made the following decision: 1) Appoint Mikhailov as First Deputy to TASS, releasing him from work at Pravda. 2) Second Deputy Khavinson, releasing him from work in the Leningrad Regional Committee. 3) Release Soltz and Menkes from work at TASS.

It was planned to give Pravda for permanent work Rubinstein from the Party Control, freeing him from work in the Party Control, and Gusev from the Soviet Control, freeing him from work in the Soviet Control.

Please let us know your opinion 1 . No. 24.

Kaganovich, Yezhov.

_____________________________

1 On the same day, Stalin agreed in code from Sochi at 23:00. 10 minutes. (Ibid. D. 93. L. 101). On August 28, 1936, the PB decision was drawn up (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 980. L. 72).


Kaganovich to Stalin August 27, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 115. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 55. L. 60. Autograph of Kaganovich.
Encryption.

From Moscow 27/VIII - 36 at 21 o'clock. 52 min. In. No. 14.

Sochi. Tov. Stalin.

Sedov now lives in Paris, so Litvinov proposes to instruct Girshfeld to declare to Delbos in a less official form, but in the same form as to the Norwegians, about depriving Sedov of the right to asylum, but without publishing it in the press.

Please let me know your opinion 1 . HP 25.

Kaganovich.

______________________

1 Stalin agreed on the same day by cipher from Sochi at 24:00. 00 min (Ibid. D. 93. L. 114).


Stalin to Kaganovich August 27, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 108–109. Autographs of Stalin and Chechulin.
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU. Kaganovich .

I think that we can agree with Litvinov on the transfer of our note to the Norwegian government in oral form, and not in writing, with the aim, however, that this should be reported in the press 1 .

I think that the same note should be sent orally to the German government about Sedov, the son of Trotsky.

Simultaneously with sending the note to the Norwegian government, it is necessary to attack the top of the Norwegian workers' party. This elite, apparently, is privy to all the secrets of Trotsky, which is why they strongly defend Trotsky in their newspaper. This Norwegian bastard should be thrown in the face of an open accusation of supporting Trotsky's criminal-terrorist plans.

Stalin 2 .

______________________

On August 27, 1936, the PB decided to hand over to the Norwegian government a note depriving Trotsky of asylum orally so that a press release would be given (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 20. L. 60 ). Under pressure from the Soviet leadership, the Norwegian government first decided to intern Trotsky, and then at the end of 1936 sent him to Mexico.

2 The text in italics was written by Chechulin, at the bottom of the document there is his note “Written under the dictation of comrade. Stalin. 27/VIII. 36. On the same day it was transmitted by telephone from Sochi (Ibid. F. 81. Op. 3. D. 101. L. 79).


Stalin to Kaganovich August 28, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 118. Autograph.
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU. Kaganovich .

It would be necessary to translate into European languages ​​the report on the trial in the form in which it was published in Pravda and Izvestia. The indictment will have to be included, the speech of the prosecutor also, the last words of the accused are mandatory. It is necessary to publish not from Partizdat or Pravda, but from the People's Commissariat of Justice of the USSR. This must be done as soon as possible and widely disseminated abroad.

Stalin.

#20

28/VIII.36 1

_______________

1 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 14:00. 15 minutes. (Ibid. L. 117). On August 28, 1936, the PB issued a decision at the suggestion of Stalin (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 980. L. 72). The trial materials were published in European languages. See, for example: Report of Court Proceedings. The Case of TrotskyiteZinovievite Terrorist Center heard before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR. Moscow. August 19–24, 1936. Moscow, 1936. Subsequently, the materials of the two subsequent “big” Moscow trials, January 1937 and March 1938, were also published.


Kaganovich, Chubar to Stalin August 28, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 94. L. 56–57. Script. Typescript.
Telegram.

From Moscow 28/VIII - 36 at 22 o'clock. 45 min.

Sochi. Tov. Stalin.

Komzag submitted for our approval a plan for the procurement of flax and hemp under contract in the amount of: flax 332.3 thousand tons, hemp 55.6 thousand tons. Last year, 313.1 thousand tons of flax and 59.1 thousand tons of hemp were harvested under contract. For flax, it is proposed to plan harvesting more than the actual harvesting of last year by 19.2 thousand tons, or 6%, and for hemp less by 3.5 thousand tons. The harvest of flax and especially hemp this year is worse than last year. For flax, the yield is especially low in the Kirov Territory, for hemp in the Kuibyshev Territory, the share of which, even with a reduced plan, is 15% of the entire harvest of hemp in the Union.

It is proposed to establish the terms of procurement somewhat reduced compared to those in force last year for the main flax and hemp-growing regions: for flax on January 1 instead of February 1, for hemp on April 1 instead of July 1. Experience has shown that the hemp and flax remaining for the spring is poorly processed and to a small extent surrenders to the state.

For certain main flax areas, the plan for flax procurement is proposed in the following sizes: Kalinin region 70 thousand tons, Yaroslavl 30.2 thousand tons. Both of these regions rent from one hectare of 2 centners 5 kilograms of flax in terms of fiber. Western 58 thousand tons with delivery from one hectare of one centner and 75 kilograms. Last year, the Western Region delivered 52,000 tons. Leningrad region 33 thousand tons with delivery from one hectare one centner 61 kilograms. Last year, the Leningrad region delivered 31,000 tons. Belarus 40.5 thousand tons with delivery from one hectare one centner 65 kilograms. Last year, Belarus delivered 38.2 thousand tons, the Kirov Territory 21.7 thousand tons, with delivery of one centner per hectare. Last year, the Kirov region delivered 27,000 tons. For 1936, the Kirov Territory had to give a smaller task due to a lower harvest. Moscow Region 9,000 tons with delivery from one hectare one centner 40 kilograms. Last year, the Moscow region delivered 7.8 thousand tons. Northern Territory 16 thousand tons with delivery from one hectare one centner 70 kilograms. Last year, the Northern Territory delivered 14.9 thousand tons.

Please let us know your opinion 1 . HP 2.

Kaganovich, Chubar.

_____________________

1 Stalin agreed on September 6 in a cipher from Sochi at 3 p.m. 47 min. (Ibid. L. 55). The PB decision was drawn up on September 7, 1936 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 981. L. 16, 122, 123).


Stalin to Kaganovich August 28, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 120–123. Autograph.
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU. Kaganovich.

Copy of Ordzhonikidze.

I am against Sergo's order plan for the remainder of the English loan. I insist that three-quarters of the remaining credit be spent on the needs of naval shipbuilding, on turbines or parts of turbines for destroyers, cruisers, battleships, on samples of large naval artillery or even entire batteries, on equipment for the Arkhangelsk plant. Talk about the fact that the project of the Arkhangelsk plant is not ready and this makes it impossible to give orders - there is an empty reply. We have large shipyards in Nikolaev and Leningrad, by which we can determine what orders need to be given for the Arkhangelsk plant. Please keep me posted on the resolution of this issue and do not make concessions to fans of the unsubscribe method.

Stalin.

#21

28/VIII.36 1

___________________

1 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 23:00. 45 min. (Ibid. L. 119).


Stalin to Kaganovich August 29, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 124–125. Autograph.
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU. Kaganovich.

Why is it only Pravda that criticizes the leadership of the Norwegian Labor Party, while Izvestia is silent? Why didn't Izvestia criticize the appeal of Sitrin and others to the Council of People's Commissars? Why did Izvestia turn out to be neutral? Oblige Izvestia to attack both the top of the Norwegian Labor Party and Sitrin. Tell us what Litvinov did to expel Trotsky from Norway and Sedov from France? Why is there no press release?

Stalin.

No. 22.

29/VIII.36 1

____________________

1 Number and date entered by the secretary. There is a postscript to the letter by Chechulin: “This telegram from Comrade. Stalin did not send, because in Izvestia, a note with criticism was discovered by him.


Kaganovich, Yezhov - Stalin August 29, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. P. D. 93. L. 135–136. Script. Typescript; F. 81. Op. 3. D. 101. L. 97–99. Typewritten copy.
Telegram.

From Moscow 29/VIII - 36 at 22 o'clock. 40 min.

Sochi. Tov. Stalin.

1) In accordance with your instructions, we have drawn up the following draft directive:

“To all secretaries of regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties. Due to the fact that recently in a number of party organizations there have been facts of dismissal and expulsion from the party without the knowledge and consent of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of responsible employees appointed by the decision of the Central Committee and in particular directors of enterprises, the Central Committee explains that such actions of local party organizations are wrong. The Central Committee obliges the regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties to stop this practice and in all cases when local party organizations have material that casts doubt on the possibility of leaving an employee appointed by the decision of the Central Committee in the party, transfer these materials to the Central Committee of the CPSU (b).

Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks" 1 .

2) In addition, in connection with the publication in today's issue of Izvestia of an incorrect note about the director Comrade. Tabakov, under the heading "Exposed Enemy", we outlined the following solution:

“About the note “The Exposed Enemy” (“Izvestia” dated 29. VIII. 1936) . The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks establishes the incorrectness of the accusation by the party organization of the Satka plant "Magnezit" of the Chelyabinsk region of the director of the plant comrade. Tabakov in complicity and patronage of the executed Trotskyite terrorist Dreitzer.

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decides:

1). Cancel the decision of the party organization of the Satka plant "Magnezit" to expel comrade. Tabakov from the party.

2). Specify the editor of the newspaper "Chelyabinsk worker" comrade. Syrkin that he did wrong by publishing the decision of the factory party organization on comrade. Tabakov without verifying the correctness of the charges against him.

3). To recognize as correct the removal by the editors of Izvestia from the work of the Chelyabinsk correspondent of the newspaper comrade. Dubinsky for reporting to them in Izvestia without checking the data on comrade. Tabakov, taken from the local newspaper.

four). Propose to the editors of Izvestia, together with the publication of a notice of this decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on this issue, to give an editorial note indicating the error I will print "in Izvestia of the indicated note."

Please let us know your opinion 2 . HP 3.

Kaganovich, Yezhov.

______________________

1 The directive was sent to the localities on August 31, 1936 (AP RF. F. 3. Op. 22. D. 150. L. 129).

2 Stalin agreed on 30 August. On August 31, 1936, the PB approved this resolution (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 980. L. 79). The next day it was published in the newspapers.


Yezhov, Kaganovich - Stalin August 29, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 127–129. Script. Typescript.
Telegram.

From Moscow 29/VTII - 36 at 23:00. 25 min.

Sochi. Tov. Stalin.

Ukrainians came, with whom they discussed questions about the Dnepropetrovsk Regional Committee. The draft resolution proposed by the Central Committee of the CP(b)U was not accepted by the Politburo. In accordance with your instructions, we have outlined the following draft resolution:

“1) Consider that the Dnepropetrovsk Regional Committee, after the instructions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, recognized and corrected the mistakes it made, expressed in an incorrect, diligent attitude towards some former Trotskyists (Lenzner, Krasny, etc.), who turned out to be double-dealing counter-revolutionaries.

2) Agree with the proposal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine and the Dnepropetrovsk regional committee on the release of comrade. Leibenzon from the duties of secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk city committee of the CP (b) U, as he did not provide leadership of the party organization.

3) Recognize that the decision of the Kryvyi Rih City Committee on the exclusion from the party of the director of the Kryvyi Rih Iron and Steel Works Comrade. Vesnik Ya.I. allegedly for direct assistance to the counter-revolutionary work of the Trotskyists, is unfounded and is a gross mistake. Decree of the Krivoy Rog City Committee on comrade. cancel Vesnik.

4) Release Comrade. Levitin from the work of the secretary of the Krivoy Rog city committee, as not providing the party leadership of the Krivoy Rog party organization.

5) Oblige the Dnepropetrovsk regional committee to take measures to stop the completely unacceptable. and unreasonable harassment Comrade. E.E. Vesnik (wife of comrade Vesnik) at the Krivoy Rog plant.

6) Approve the decision of the Bureau of the Commission of Party Control on the restoration in the ranks of the CPSU (b) comrade. Ildrim, as completely wrongly expelled by the Krivoy Rog city committee of the CP(b)U.

7) For what Comrade personally showed. Gavrilov (Chairman of the Dnepropetrovsk Oblast Executive Committee) blunted the Bolshevik vigilance to reprimand him. Recall tov. Gavrilov at the disposal of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b).

8) Offer goods. Khataevich to explain to the Krivoy Rog party organization the mistakes of the Krivoy Rog city committee of the CP(b)U.

9) About the Kharkov regional committee. Demchenko, knowing about Kovalev's past Trotskyist mistakes, unfairly used a closed letter from the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks1, spread rumors in the party organization that Kovalev allegedly concealed the fact that he was a Trotskyist, and then put the issue for discussion by the Regional Committee Bureau. The bureau of the regional committee at the beginning decided to release Kovalev from the work of the secretary of the regional committee for the Trotskyist mistakes, allegedly hidden by him from the members of the bureau of the regional committee. Then this decision was not recorded. Instead, the following decision was made: “Given the exchange of views on the Bureau of the Regional Committee of the CP(b)U, ask the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Ukraine to release comrade. Kovalev from the work of the second secretary of the Kharkov regional committee of the CP (b) U. Adopted unanimously, with one abstention (comrade Demchenko). Before making a decision, Demchenko called Kosior and asked for permission to make such a decision. Kosior forbade and suggested Demchenko to transfer this issue to the discussion of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U. Despite Kosior's instructions, Demchenko nevertheless made a decision.

The question was discussed in the presence of comrades Kosior, Postyshev and Demchenko. Demchenko could in no way justify his dishonest attitude towards the implementation of the Central Committee's resolution. In connection with the current situation, one has to choose between two decisions: either to completely condemn and reject the proposal of the Bureau of the Kharkiv Regional Committee and once again force Demchenko to work with Kovalev, or to firmly point Demchenko to his unscrupulous attitude towards the decisions of the Central Committee and, in view of the established relationship between Demchenko and Kovalev, withdraw the latter at the disposal of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b).

As a result of the exchange of opinions, the following draft resolution was outlined:

1) Recognize that the Bureau of the Kharkov Regional Committee violated the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of July 4, 1936, in which the Central Committee saw no grounds for releasing Comrade Second Secretary of the Kharkov Regional Committee from duties. Kovaleva 2 . It should be noted that the decision of the Bureau of the Regional Committee is all the more wrong because, on behalf of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, comrade. Kosior SV. specially explained to the members of the bureau of the Kharkov regional committee about the need to ensure the coherence of the first secretary comrade. Demchenko with the second secretary comrade. Kovalev.

2) Specify item. Demchenko on the unacceptable attitude on his part to the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in which personally and primarily comrade. Demchenko, as the first secretary, undertook to work together and ensure friendly work with Kovalev. Note that tov. Demchenko took advantage of the completely unfounded accusation of Comrade. Kovalev in concealing his Trotskyist waverings in 1923 and contrary to the instructions of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U and Kosior personally, he carried through the bureau of the regional committee a resolution on the release of comrade. Kovalev from the duties of the second secretary of the regional committee.

3) In view of the impossibility, through the fault of Demchenko, in the future, the joint work of comrade. Demchenko and tov. Kovalev, recall the latter to the disposal of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, prejudging the question of his use in party work in another area.

4) Offer goods. Kosior SV. to explain the present resolution of the Central Committee to the Plenum of the Kharkiv Regional Committee. A candidate for the post of second secretary of the Kharkov regional committee should be outlined in the coming days.

Please let us know your opinion. HP 4.

Ezhov, Kaganovich.

__________________

1 This refers to the closed letter of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks “On the terrorist activities of the Trotskyist-Zinoviev counter-revolutionary bloc” dated July 29, 1936 (Rehabilitation, pp. 196–210).

On June 4, 1936, the PB made a decision by poll: “Since the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks sees no reason to release Comrade Kovalev from the duties of second secretary of the Kharkov regional committee, invite comrades Demchenko (first secretary) and Kovalev (second secretary) to work together and ensure friendly work ”(RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 978. L. 34).


Stalin to Kaganovich, Yezhov August 30, 1936

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 134. Autograph.
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU.

Kaganovich. Yezhov .

Your number three agrees.

At the expense of Dnepropetrovsk, too. As for Demchenko, he is a very good business executive in agriculture, but apparently weak in the field of directly party work. It would be good to appoint him Chernov's first deputy, instead of Muratov , 1 and for Kharkov to appoint another, a new first secretary, more experienced in party work. Kovalev can be named second secretary, say, in Ivanovo 2 .

Stalin.

#22

30/8–36 3

____________________

1 Stalin's proposal to appoint Demchenko as First Deputy People's Commissar for Agriculture of the USSR was formalized by the decision of the PB on September 1, 1936 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 980. L. 3).

On September 1, 1936, the PB considered the decision of the Kharkov Regional Committee of the CP(b)U and adopted the following resolution: “1. Recognize that the Bureau of the Kharkov Regional Committee of the CP(b)U acted erroneously in deciding to release Comrade Kovalev from the duties of the Second Secretary of the Regional Committee, despite the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of June 4, 1936, in which the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks indicated on the lack of grounds for the release of Kovalev from work in the Kharkov regional committee and ordered comrade Demchenko and Kovalev to work together. 2. Consider that Comrade Demchenko is the main blame for the failure of the directive of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of June 4, 1936, and in view of this, release Comrade Demchenko from the duties of the first secretary of the Kharkov Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (b)U. 3. Release Comrade Kovalev from the duties of the second secretary of the Kharkov regional committee of the CP (b) U and recommend him as the second secretary of the Ivanovo regional committee of the CPSU (b) ”(Ibid.).

3 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 16:00. 52 min. (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 93. L. 126).