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Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931–19361934
In 1934, Stalin did not receive visitors in the Kremlin office from July 30 to October 31. Such a long vacation this time could be justified by the relative improvement in the situation in the country.
1934 was the quietest of the thirteen years of Soviet history that began with the "Great Leap Forward" and ended with the German attack. It was in 1934 that some of the fruits of the tortuous industrialization struggle of the previous five years appeared.
Stalin to Kaganovich October 1, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 86. L. 2–4. Autograph.
Kaganovich.
First. It would be necessary to publish about our donation to the Japanese of money to help the victims of the typhoon.
Second. After hitting Chelyabinsk, the main task is to hit Western Siberia. First of all, it is necessary to hit Eikhe and Gryadinsky in Pravda. It would not hurt you to go to Novosibirsk for a week, taking Yagoda or Agranov with you. If Western Siberia fails in grain procurements, it will be a failure.
Third. I don't have Friedrichson's report, but I do have Eliava's note with the order nomenclature attached. The nomenclature is inappropriate. Sergo says that we can produce two-thirds of the goods under this nomenclature ourselves in sufficient quantities. Therefore, an agreement with the Germans with such a nomenclature will be bondage, since we will be forced to pay for goods we do not need. It is better to postpone the issue for a few more days, and then we will discuss it together.
Stalin.
No. 82 1/X-34 y. 1
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1 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day it was sent in code from Gagra at 0:00. 20 minutes. (Ibid. L. 1).Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin October 2, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 86. L. 6–7. Script. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 51. L. 3–4. Typewritten text with Kaganovich's correction. Signatures are autographs.
Encryption.
From Moscow 2/X - 34 at 3 o'clock. 30 minutes. In. No. 93.
Gagra. Tov. Stalin.
We are planning to send a note to Hirota in response to his note of September 4 regarding the arrests at the CER - We believe that now sending such a note can no longer harm the negotiations on the CER - It is inappropriate to leave Hirota's note completely unanswered, since this note contains serious accusations against employees of the Chinese Eastern Railway, as well as against our prominent figures and the press for allegedly irresponsible and provocative speeches against Japan. Finally, the sending of our note will pave the way for us to put forward, by the end of the negotiations, a demand for the release of those arrested before or at least simultaneously with the signing of the agreement. The draft note is five pages long, due to the need to refute all of Hirota's claims.
We summarize the content:
The first paragraph cites the official numerical data of the CER, which completely refutes Hirota's main accusation that in recent months there have been many wrecks of Japanese military trains organized by Soviet employees, and that the victims of the wrecks were predominantly Japanese, and Soviet citizens rarely suffered.
Since Hirota's note gives the impression that the Soviet side is to blame for the attacks on the CER, the second paragraph contains an indication of all possible measures taken by the Soviet side in the CER board. This is opposed to the behavior of the Manchu authorities.
In view of Hirota's statement that the Ministry of War did not issue the communique against which we protested, the third paragraph is a quotation from the bulletin of the semi-official Japanese News Agency transmitting the communique of this ministry.
In the fourth paragraph, the accusations of anti-Japanese speeches by our leaders and the press are rejected and the aggressive and militant statements against the USSR by Japanese newspapers and prominent figures are opposed to this.
The fifth paragraph states that "having fully joined the accusations that were put forward to justify the illegal actions of the Japanese-Manchu authorities, the Japanese government sanctioned these actions and actually encouraged further arbitrariness of the local authorities of Manchuria." As a result, the number of arrests increased greatly, and, as it turned out after the presentation of the first note, those arrested were beaten and tortured.
The concluding part reads: “Considering, in view of the foregoing, the responsibility of the Japanese government for the above actions of the Japanese-Manchu authorities on the CER, the Soviet government instructed me to declare to you, Mr. Minister, a repeated protest against the ongoing arrests and torture of Soviet citizens in Manchuria and inform you that it expects the Japanese government to take measures for the immediate release of all innocently arrested Soviet employees on the CER.
Please let us know your opinion 1 . HP 118, 119 , 120.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
________________________
1 On the same day in cipher from Sochi at 13:00. 46 min. Stalin agreed (Ibid. D. 86. L. 5). The note was published in the newspapers on 10 October. For details of the exchange of notes on the arrest of Soviet employees of the CER, see: DVP. T. XVII. pp. 566–568, 624–628.Kaganovich to Stalin October 3, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 86. L. 11. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. P. D. 51. L. 5–7. Autograph.
Encryption.
From Moscow 3/X - 34 at 1 o'clock. 25 min. In. No. 94.
Gagra. Tov. Stalin.
1) Japan's donation was published today 1 .
2) In Pravda tomorrow there will be about Western Siberia, about Eikh and Gryadinsky, although they almost doubled the drafts in this five-day period. We prepared 14 million poods against 7.2 million poods in the last five-day period 2 .
Despite this, we still consider your proposal for a trip to Siberia to be absolutely correct. On the 4th or 5th Yagoda and I will leave for Siberia. I think that it would be advisable to stop either now or on the way back in Chelyabinsk.
Please let me know your opinion. HP 121.
Kaganovich.
________________________
1 October 1-2, newspapers published a report that the Soviet Red Cross and Red Crescent Society had allocated 100,000 yen to help victims of the typhoon in Japan.2 After the publication in Pravda, R.I. Eikhe sent a telegram to Stalin on October 6: “The West Siberian party organization, under particularly difficult conditions, is fighting for the sale of the harvest, for the fulfillment of a 50% larger (including grain purchase) grain procurement plan than last year. If last year we could start harvesting at the end of July - beginning of August, this year, due to the state of the grain, we started harvesting only at the beginning of September. Without this delay, we would not have had a high harvest, since the push will give significantly more pounds per hectare than the first shoots. We are harvesting in rainy weather, and we must keep in mind that harvesting one hectare this year requires more work than it was when harvesting two, sometimes even three hectares last year (the harvest is larger, often fallen bread, which can be harvested even with a jacket only possible on one side). Under these conditions, in fact, only in September, the first five-day period of October, we prepared as much as was prepared last year for August and September, and in the first five-day period of October we reached grain delivery rates that Siberia had never known before (I do not refer to the last five-day period of September, because how belated information from previous five-day meetings was included there). We are working this year no worse, but much better than in previous years, and you, comrade. Stalin, I assure you that we will ensure the fulfillment of the grain procurement and grain purchase plan. There is only one grave threat to the fulfillment of the work plan—that is to force the districts to export grain at such a rate that the grain will remain unbundled. I have just returned from the Kalachinsky district, where the harvest per hectare is 16–18 centners. 85% of the grain lies in windrows, but instead of stacking, the vast majority of the tax is occupied in the export of grain. If we continue like this, then the grain will perish, and then it will be very difficult to take the amount of bread prescribed by the plan. Without taking these conditions into account, Pravda has been continuously slandering us for a month now, making completely unfounded accusations. Me, comrade. Stalin, nothing is needed, and if my beating can help the cause, I am ready for anything, but such continuous pouring on the organization creates confusion and hopelessness in the cadres. A disheveled regional committee in this situation cannot be a leader. Excuse me, comrade. Stalin, for a long telegram, but he could not do otherwise. Eihe." (Ibid. L. 16).
Stalin to Kaganovich October 3, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 86. L. 11. Autograph.
Kaganovich.
Your 121. I agree. Why don't you criticize the lagging regions of Ukraine in Pravda? Why such a privilege for Ukraine?
Stalin.
No. 84
3/X.34 1
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1 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 14:00. 56 min. (Ibid. L. 10).Kaganovich to Stalin October 3 [1934]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 742. L. 115–123. Autograph.
3/X
Hello, Dear Comrade Stalin!
1. We summoned representatives of the International Association of Revolutionary Writers. Now they will prepare a draft resolution of their presidium, in which they will have to admit that they have elements of Rappovism and that they have thus slowed down the attraction of wider circles of writers who stand on the stand against fascism, the war and for the defense of the Soviet Union. And from a conversation with them it is clear how timely your proposal is.
Their resolution should expressly state the liquidation of the MORP .
At the same time, projects are being prepared for a speech by the Soviet delegation, French and American, with a proposal to liquidate the MORP and convene an international conference of writers. Before that, apparently, it would be necessary to convene a meeting, preferably in Paris, where such writers as Ehrenburg writes would be present. At such a conference it would be possible to set up an Organizing Committee to convene a conference or congress of writers who stand on the positions of the struggle against fascism, the war and for the defense of the USSR. All these are projects nowhere formalized, which, as soon as they are ready, will be sent to you or will wait in Moscow until a joint discussion with you 1 .
2. Yesterday, a meeting of operators was held at the NKPS, where they discussed the issues of preparing for winter, though not quite prepared, but useful. I visited them, briefly pointed out to them that we are especially concerned about the following questions:
1) Why the number of crashes has increased.
2) Why the demurrage of wagons does not decrease - 6.03 days out of 9.05 turnover.
3) Why routing is badly carried out.
4) A number of specific points from the decisions of the Central Committee on stations that are not being implemented.
He warned them that for the past six months the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars had been softly approaching them, helping them, and now, if they were poorly prepared for the winter, we would beat them.
The meeting went off in a businesslike manner. Andreev performed well. Now they are preparing practical proposals, which I thought to pass through the transport commission - or directly from the NKPS.
3. We have already approved the chairmen] of the Central Committee of the Unions , 2 there was a special commission of Comrade Zhdanov.
On the 1st, all the new chairmen of 150 people gathered at the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, half of them from the seats. We went to them, me and Comrade Zhdanov. Some of the old chairmen spoke unimportantly about their tasks. I had to dwell in detail on the meaning and significance of this reorganization, develop the instructions you repeatedly gave that they should be closer to life, closer to production, to the needs of the workers, gave them a number of practical advice on how to work.
4. The last five days gave 64 mil. 101 t[ys] against 55 mil. 849 t[thous. in the last fifth five days. In total, in September 412 million [million] 200 thousand [thousand] p[uds] against 391 million [million] 600 thousand [thousand] in September last year.
Increased procurement of Western Siberia, Stalingrad, Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk. In Ukraine, a decrease of 1 million. Kharkov completed the plan. Dnepropetrovsk gave me a raise, although at the same time Khataevich sent a note, which you probably have. On the whole, the Ukraine has 92.6 [%] of the whole plan; they have about 20 million poods left to prepare.
We'll hit them in the papers tomorrow. Today, in accordance with your telegram, I scolded Pravda why they bypassed Ukraine 3 . In terms of grain purchases, we have 18 mil. pood[s]. The Moscow Region has already purchased 3 million poods. Now things are already getting tighter, but we will try to finish in October. I am taking 15 Moscow heads of political departments and secretaries to Siberia. 30 people have already been sent to Chelyabinsk.
As I telegraphed to you, I will call on Chelyabinsk. Yagoda will not go, because Comrade Prokofiev is in Siberia, and he, Comrade Yagoda, has a lot of business here, according to him .
Hello. Yours L. Kaganovich.
___________________
On June 21–25, 1935, an international congress of writers in defense of culture was held in Paris, which was attended by 230 writers from 35 countries, including a large Soviet delegation. At the congress it was decided to establish the International Association of Writers. The MORP was dissolved in December 1935.
On September 25, 1934, the PB approved the chairmen of the Central Committee of the newly organized trade unions (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 953. L. 71–81).
On October 3-4, 1934, Pravda published an editorial "Ukraine must speed up the delivery of grain," which stated that Ukraine, having received a not very tense plan, was delaying the delivery of grain to the state.
On October 2, 1934, the PB decided to send Kaganovich and Yagoda to Western Siberia from October 4–5, 1934 to strengthen grain procurements (Ibid. L. 24). On October 3, the PB canceled this decision regarding Yagoda due to the fact that his deputy G.B. Prokofiev was already in Western Siberia with a group of workers (Ibid. L. 25). On October 4, the PB instructed Kaganovich to call on the Chelyabinsk region on grain procurement matters (Ibid. L. 26).Kaganovich to Stalin October 5, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 86. L. 14. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 51. L. 10. Typewritten text with corrections by Kaganovich.
Encryption.
From Moscow 5/X - 34 at 4 o'clock. 36 min. In. No. 97.
Gagra. Tov. Stalin.
I'm leaving Chelyabinsk-Novosibirsk today. In view of the fact that in a few days there will be a meeting of the Central Commission for Purge, I ask you to introduce Comrade V. Zhdanova 1 . HP 124.
Kaganovich.
____________________
1 On the same day in cipher from Sochi at 11 a.m. 5 minutes. Stalin agreed (Ibid. D. 86. L. 13). On October 6, 1934, the corresponding decision of the PB was drawn up (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 953. L. 32).Kaganovich, Ryndin, Chernov to Stalin, Molotov, Zhdanov [October 9, 1934]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 86. L. 41. Original. Typescript.
Direct wire note.
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b). T. t. Stalin, Molotov, Zhdanov.
We are handing over to you the resolution of the Chelyabinsk Regional Committee and the Organizing Committee of the Soviets, developed by us and adopted by the Regional Committee. From the resolution itself, one can see the situation with the preparations that demanded such a resolution from us. We ask you to approve this resolution, we also believe that it should be published in local newspapers. We send you a separate item not for printing. We are waiting for your reply.
Kaganovich, Ryndin, Chernov 1 .
_______________________
1 The following is the text of the resolution of the Chelyabinsk Regional Committee of the Party and the Organizing Committee of the Soviets “On the Progress of Grain Procurement in the Chelyabinsk Region” dated October 8, 1934 (Ibid. L. 41–48).
At the end of the decision, in the section “Item not for publication”, a directive was given to the authorized NKVD for the Chelyabinsk region “to speed up the investigation and transfer to court of a number of pending cases of counter-revolutionary groups that organized sabotage of grain procurements, breakdown of machines and plunder of public property”, the prosecutor of the Chelyabinsk region and the chairman of the regional court was asked to “organize without delay in the next few days several trials with the application of capital punishment” (Ibid. L. 48–49).
On October 9, 1934, Stalin agreed (Ibid. L. 41). On October 10, the PB approved this resolution (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 953. L. 41).Kaganovich to Stalin, Molotov, Zhdanov October 9, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 86. L. 23. Original. Typescript.
From Chelyabinsk at 11 o'clock. 45 min. October 9, 1934
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b). T. T. Stalin. Molotov. Zhdanov .
I would consider it possible to grant the right for one month to the troika consisting of Ryndin, Chernov and Shokhin to approve the court verdicts on capital punishment.
Please let me know your opinion 1 .
Kaganovich.
_______________________
1 On the same day, Dvinsky forwarded Kaganovich's telegram to Stalin in Sochi, No. 129 (Ibid., L. 52).Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov, Zhdanov October 9, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 86. L. 52. Autograph.
Your number 129. I don't understand what's the matter. If you can, it would be better to do without the troika, and you can approve the sentence in the usual way. Stalin. No. 89 9/X.34 1
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1 Number and date entered by the secretary. October 10 sent in code from Sochi at 0:00. 10 minutes. (Ibid. L. 50).Kaganovich to Stalin, Molotov, Zhdanov October 10, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 86. L. 55. Original. Typescript.
From Barabinsk at 20:00. 28 min. October 10, 1934
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b). T. T. Stalin. Molotov. Zhdanov .
It is possible to approve the verdict of the courts in the usual manner in Moscow with an accelerated response to Chelyabinsk. By asking for a troika, I had in mind to give these three comrades the rights, as given by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to Comrade Eikhe in Sibkrai, that is, the approval of the sentence of the courts on capital punishment 1 .
Kaganovich 2 .
___________________
1 The usual procedure for issuing sentences to capital punishment provided for their coordination with the commission of the PB on political affairs. However, from time to time this order was violated. In particular, on September 19, 1934, at the suggestion of Molotov, the PB granted the right to the secretary of the West Siberian Regional Committee, Eikhe, to authorize the use of capital punishment in the region during September-October 1934 (See Stalin's Politburo in the 30s. S. 65).
2 Bottom left litter: "Sochi sent."Kaganovich, Zhdanov - Stalin October 21, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 87. L. 39. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 51. L. 50. Text - autographed by Zhdanov with corrections by Kaganovich. Signatures are autographs.
Encryption.
From Moscow 21/X - 34 at 18 o'clock. 57 min. In. No. 134.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
Tov. Bauman asks to be allowed to travel abroad in connection with the serious illness of his wife and the need for her treatment by foreign professors so that comrade. Bauman could heal himself.
We believe that we can allow him a vacation for a month and a half. We ask for your consent 1 . HP 171. Kaganovich, Zhdanov.
______________________
1 Stalin agreed on October 22 at 1 pm. 17 min. cipher from Sochi (Ibid. D. 87. L. 38). On the same day, the corresponding decision of the PB was drawn up (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 953. L. 61).Stalin to Kaganovich October 22, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 100. L. 83–87. Autograph.
T[ovari] to Kaganovich.
The grain procurement plan , apparently, will be fulfilled in the USSR . But it would be foolish to rest on this. In order to cope with all economic needs, we still need to fulfill the plan for the purchase of grain. As can be seen from the materials, the plan for the purchase of bread by regions was drawn up with defects (it is clearly small for Ukraine, the former Central Chernobyl region, the Moscow and Gorky regions, Bashkiria, the Chelyabinsk region, and the Western region). These defects must be corrected now. It is necessary that the plan energizes and pushes people forward, and does not drag behind events, behind the course of grain purchases ...
We need to have in the hands of the state 1 billion 400-500 mil. poods of grain in order to abolish at the end of this year the grain rationing system , which was recently still necessary and useful, but has now become a fetter on the national economy. It is necessary to abolish the rationing system for bread (perhaps also for cereals and pasta) and the associated "commodification" of industrial crops and some livestock products (wool, leather, etc.). By reducing the commercial price and raising the ration price, we will set an average price for baked bread and flour, stabilize on it and vary it according to the belts. This will make it necessary to raise wages, raise the price of cotton, linen, wool, leather, tobacco, and so on.
This reform, which I consider a most serious reform, must be prepared now in order to carry it out in full from January 1935.
But in order to carry out this reform, it is necessary to have an adequate supply of grain .
That is why we must not rest content with successes in procurement , but we must still carry out the plan for the purchase of grain in full.
Consult with members of the PB, read this letter to them and, if they agree, start preparing the case. We'll talk about the details of the case upon arrival in Moscow 1 .
Hey! I. Stalin.
22/X 34
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1 On the first page of the letter there is a resolution: “To the members of P.B. we propose to meet today at 5 o'clock. L. Kaganovich ”and the signatures of Zhdanov, Molotov, Kuibyshev, Kalinin, Andreev on familiarization.Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin October 23, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 87. L. 42. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 51. L. 51. Autograph of Kaganovich.
Encryption.
From Moscow 23 / X - 34 at 0 o'clock. 39 min. In. No. 135.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
In view of the extremely poor progress of cotton procurement, we are planning to send comrade to Central Asia. Kuibyshev. Please provide your opinion. HP 172. Kaganovich, Molotov.
_____________________________
1 On the same day in cipher from Sochi at 14:00. 5 minutes. Stalin agreed (Ibid. D. 87. L. 41). On October 23, 1934, the PB made a decision: “In view of the poor progress of cotton procurement, to send comrade to Central Asia. Kuibyshev V. (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 953. L. 1).Kaganovich to Stalin October 23 [1934]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 742. L. 124–131. Autograph.
23/X1) I am very grateful to you for sending me to the Chelyabinsk Region and the West Siberian Territory. I again plunged into the issues of agriculture and really applied my experience in grain procurement. I must tell you that both in the Chelyabinsk region and in the West Siberian Territory, the matter is not only in the inability to practically and timely organize procurements, but also in the wrong political approach to procurements. Our workers, including those from the krais and oblasts, did not see any resistance to the procurements and approached the procurements in a “economical” way, as they themselves now admit. That is why they allowed the opposition of blanks to stacking. And in the place below, in fact, all the tax was switched to stacking, and then only formally, because in reality the labor discipline is bad and the horses are generally poorly used in a significant part. The harvest is brilliant, but if we hadn’t pressed on the grain procurements, they would not have harvested the harvest and the harvests would have been torn off.
Secretaries of district committees and chiefs | political departments for the most part approach the preparations like hard-workers and do not see, for example, that under the guise of partisans, kulaks, White Guards, are sitting on collective farms. There is no political work among collective farmers, no explanations. Orally, I will set out to you in detail all the facts and considerations, both about the lessons of the mistakes of grain procurements, and about some questions of agriculture. On the spot in Siberia and the Chelyabinsk region, of course, it was necessary to attack the opportunists and blind leaders with all their harshness. The results do not seem to be bad, Siberia will be finished by the 1st, at the latest by the 5th of November, and Chelyabinsk by the 25th of October.
2) In Moscow, we are working intensively to clear a number of streets from metro construction superstructures, at the same time we are leveling a number of streets, and we are demolishing the Kitaigorod wall from the Central Committee to the Metropol. Leveling and widening the street. We move a little Ivan the printer in the same place, but we raise it higher to the place of the former church that stood behind the Kitaigorod wall. We are breaking down the house opposite the National, about which you gave your instructions. In front of the Manege, thus, a new square is formed. They expanded Arbatskaya Square, removed, as you pointed out, a piece of the boulevard up to the Gogol monument, opening it to Arbatskaya Square. As for the metro, things are going well. The tunnel is almost finished, there is a small piece left, where we pass with a shield in the area of the Neglinka River, where at every step quicksands impede the movement of the shield.
Now we have begun work on the stations. In a number of places we will use not marble, but something like artificial marble, cheap concrete slabs, but well and beautifully made. Escalators, moving stairs will be, part of it is already ready. With wagons it is difficult, they do not master this car well, it is much more complicated than usual, but I think that we will be able to achieve 40 wagons, and this will not be bad at first. Electric substations will be ready on time. In general, very hard work is required now. You have to keep people from hobbies and arrogance. For example, they launched a trial section of 21/2 kilometers in order to train personnel, and a pandemonium begins, some are ready to pretend that the subway is almost ready, while newspapermen are ready to inflate any report without understanding the essence of the matter. At the moment, such complacency is especially harmful. Nevertheless, by February, thanks to your help and care, we will have a subway.
3) I did not want to burden you, but in view of the importance I am sending you a draft of slogans and asking you to telegraph your opinion.
I really wanted to visit you for a day or two upon my arrival from Siberia, but I did not dare.
Hearty greetings to you. Your L. Kaganovich.
____________________
1 The slogans for the 17th anniversary of the October Revolution with Stalin's amendment were approved by the PB on October 31, 1934 (RGASPI. F. 17. On. 163. D. 1044. L. 72–80).Kaganovich to Stalin October 25, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 87. L. 45. Original. Typescript.
Series "G".
Telegram.
From Moscow 25/X - 34 at 18 o'clock. 40 min.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
We are planning to rename Sukharevskaya Square to Kolkhoznaya Square and to build for the holidays the honor board of the Moscow collective farms, about which I spoke to you. We will build on the impassable part of the square, without any damage to traffic.
Please let me know your opinion 1 . Kaganovich.
_________________
1 On the same day from Sochi at 9 p.m. 55 min. Stalin replied in code: “In view of the complexity of the issue, I abstain” (Ibid. L. 44).Kaganovich to Stalin October 26, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 87. L. 46. Certified typewritten copy; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 51. L. 55. Typewritten text. The signature is an autograph.
Strictly secret .
Copy.
Cipher.
Sochi. T. Stalin.
I received the letter and instructed Kleiner to prepare proposals for increasing the plan for grain purchases. Today we will discuss at a meeting of PB members. We will send you the draft resolution today. No. 2860/sh.
Kaganovich.
26.X.34Kaganovich to Stalin October 26, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. P. D. 87. L. 47. Original. Typescript.
Telephone message.
From Moscow 26 / X - 34 at 11 o'clock.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
I am compelled to ask for your opinion again on the issue of the honor roll. We want to start building now and finish by the October anniversary. If the place of construction is in doubt - Sukharevskaya Square, then it can be built on Samotechnaya Square, not far from the house of the Red Army, or on Smolenskaya Square along the line of Arbatskaya Street.
I kindly ask you to share your opinion 1 .
Kaganovich.
________________________
1 Stalin agreed (Ibid.).Kaganovich, Molotov, Zhdanov to Stalin October 27, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 87. L. 48. Typewritten copy.
Sochi. Chechulin.
We developed the following draft resolution on grain purchases. Please let us know your opinion.
Kaganovich. Molotov. Zhdanov 1 .
______________________
1 Further, the text of the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR “On an additional plan for the purchase of bread” was attached to the encryption (Ibid. L. 48–51). Stalin agreed on the same day from Sochi at 2 p.m. 23 min. (Ibid. L. 52). On November 2, 1934, the PB approved a resolution on an additional plan for the purchase of bread in the amount of 43.7 million poods. These purchases had to be carried out in the fourth quarter in excess of the plan for grain purchases approved by the resolution of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars on September 11, 1934 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 954. L. 39 - 40).Kaganovich, Molotov, Kuibyshev to Stalin October 27, 1934
A source: Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931–1936 Moscow: (ROSSPEN), 2001 Pp. 517-518
Archive: RGASPI F. 558 Op. 11. D. 87. L. 54–55. Script. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 51. L. 56–57. Typewritten text with Molotov's editing. Signatures are autographs.
Encryption.
From Moscow 27A - 34 at 5 o'clock. 15 minutes. In. No. 139.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
We propose, in response to Hirota's statement of October 22 of this year, to give the following directives to Hirota's response:
1) Since Hirota did not talk more about the balance, but only about the obligations of the CER and stresses our alleged refusal of our earlier consent to cover by us all obligations not included in the certificate of March 22, we declare that we remain firmly on the position of our previous proposals and we take nothing back, therefore, we assume obligations that are not included in the certificate. Together with the Manchus, we agree to check the certificate and include in it road commitments issued after March 22. We declare, however, that the certificate does not include various claims filed by the CER and have not yet been finally resolved in court due to the fact that they are not obligations of the CER. Payment of the sums awarded both in claims already filed, and which may be filed after the signing of the agreement, must be entirely assumed by the buyer of the CER. Verbally explain to Hirota that our acceptance of obligations on such claims would encourage the Manchu courts to resolve almost all cases against the CER and would encourage the authorities to file new unfounded and absurd claims. (For clarification, we recall that in a ciphered telegram published last year by the Japanese ambassador to Manchuria, it was proposed to force creditors of the CER to make claims and seize the property of the road. Moreover, the corresponding Japanese departments had special meetings with imaginary creditors for this). that in a coded telegram published last year by the Japanese ambassador to Manchuria, it was proposed to force the creditors of the Chinese Eastern Railway to make claims and seize the property of the road. Moreover, the relevant Japanese departments had special meetings with imaginary creditors for this).
2) Insist on leaving the premises of the consulates in our possession and try to bargain for 2-3 more premises to serve the Soviet citizens remaining in Manchuria. Ultimately, to accept Hirota's proposal to leave behind each party the decapods and wagons remaining on its territory, but until concessions are received from Japan on other controversial issues, continue to defend the transfer to us of all decapods and wagons that do not belong to the CER.
3) Clarify that we get the right to transfer money due to us to other countries without any restrictions, regardless of the laws that may be issued in this regard in Japan.
4) Offer a compromise on exchange rate fluctuations up to 8%.
5) Establish a term for commodity deliveries of two and a half years from the date of signing the agreement.
6) Insist on receiving bonds both for the remaining cash payments and for commodity deliveries and for these bonds to be guaranteed by the Japanese government or a syndicate of Japanese banks. Renounce the demand that Japanese prices be reduced to world prices by insisting that we receive general export prices or domestic prices for goods not normally exported abroad. Insist on arbitration in resolving the conflict in connection with non-deliveries with the provision to the arbitration court to establish a monetary payment in case of non-fulfillment of Commodity deliveries.
7) Agree, as a last resort, to refuse the Interest on commodity deliveries, limiting the interest only on the monetary part of the payment.
8) Insist on a separate settlement agreement with workers and employees. HP 176, 177, 178.
Kaganovich, Molotov, Kuibyshev 1 .
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1 On the same day in cipher from Sochi at 14:00. 23 min. Stalin agreed (Ibid., L. 52). We are talking about negotiations on the sale of the CER. The sale agreement was signed on March 23, 1935 (for details on the progress of the negotiations, see DVP. Vol. XVII. pp. 658-660, 680-683).Kaganovich, Zhdanov, Molotov - Stalin October 28, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 87. L. 66. Certified typewritten copy.
Strictly secret .
Copy .
Cipher
Sochi. T. Stalin.
November 1 marks the fifteenth anniversary of the Tolmachev Military-Political Academy. We consider it necessary to award the Academy with the Order of Lenin 1 .
Please let us know your opinion. No. 2877/sh.
Kaganovich. Zhdanov. Molotov.
28.X.34
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On October 31, 1934, the PB decided to award the Academy with the Order of Lenin (RGASPI. F. 17. On. 3. D. 954. L. 10).Kaganovich to Stalin October 28, 1934
Archive: RGASPI Personal archive of M.L. Kaganovich.
October 28, 1934
Hello, Dear Comrade Stalin.
1) After receiving your letter, we worked out proposals for grain purchases, which I sent and telegraphed to you. Today we gave a number of assignments to Weitzer, Kleiner and others about the preparation of the question of the transition from the card system, new prices and wages. It will be a big and good thing. With bread, hopefully, we'll go out well. Procurement, of course, will have to be organized for real.
The grain procurement plan has already been fully implemented, but we are not giving any press releases yet, because the procurement will still come from the reserves of obligations.
2) Things are still going badly with cotton. T. Kuibyshev will leave for Tashkent on the 30th to put pressure on the cotton procurements.
Greetings Comrade Stalin. Yours L. Kaganovich.