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Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931–19361934
In 1934, Stalin did not receive visitors in the Kremlin office from July 30 to October 31. Such a long vacation this time could be justified by the relative improvement in the situation in the country.
1934 was the quietest of the thirteen years of Soviet history that began with the "Great Leap Forward" and ended with the German attack. It was in 1934 that some of the fruits of the tortuous industrialization struggle of the previous five years appeared.
Kaganovich to Stalin April 13 [1934]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. P. D. 742. L. 1–3. Autograph.
Hello, Dear Comrade Stalin!
1) I consider it necessary to send you the statements received by me of Dovnar and Kovshik arrested in Belarus. Yezhov has them, but without your instructions he will not cope with them.
2) I would very much like you, Comrade Stalin, to call the Muscovites or Khrushchev alone and hear about the preparations for May 1st . Before leaving, I gave instructions, but this is such a thing that requires verification by the Central Committee. In particular, I am concerned about the passage this year of heavy tanks and artillery in places where the soil of the underground mines is weak and can precipitate.
I wrote to Muscovites to carefully review the route in order to bypass these weak points. Please, if tt. the military will not quite reckon with this, to support the Muscovites.
3) On the 11th, Pravda published a resolution of the Council of People's Commissars on the budget of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. It seems to me that it is not clearly drawn up and can confuse the reader, for example: paragraph VII of “investment” says: “a) working housing construction 697500000 rubles” in itself this amount is large, but in our country billions are spent on housing construction rubles, and in the majority this is working housing construction, it was necessary to stipulate in some way what kind of working housing construction it is, also about hospitals, etc. The reader, and especially the foreign reader, these figures in this form can be misleading.
4) I read about the changes in the NKZem and NKSovhozov, it turned out well. I am, of course, sorry to give Levin away, but for the good of the cause I am ready to endure .
Well, I'll end here, I'm having a good rest 3 .
Hello. Your L. Kaganovich.
13/IV
_____________________
1 Khrushchev was at a reception in Stalin's office on April 23, 1934 (Historical archive. 1995. No. 3. P. 130).
On April 24, 1934, by a decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR, republican and local land bodies were reorganized. On April 10, 1934, the PB made a decision on personnel reshuffles in the People's Commissariat of the USSR, in particular, Ya.A. Chernov, and A.A. Levin (deputy head of the agricultural department of the Central Committee) was approved as deputy people's commissar for political affairs (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 943. L. 22, 33). April 4, 1934 by decision of the PB T.A. Yurkin was relieved of the post of people's commissar of state farms, M.I. was appointed in his place. Kalmanovich, who was relieved of his post as chairman of the State Bank of the USSR (Ibid., p. 21).
3 By decision of the PB, Kaganovich was granted leave from March 30 to May 15, 1934 (Ibid. D. 942. L. 26).Stalin to members of the Politburo and Adoratsky July 19, 1934
Archive: RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 950. L. 82–86. Script. Typescript.
To members of the Politburo and Comrade Adoratsky.
In sending out Engels's article "The Foreign Policy of Russian Tsarism," I consider it necessary to preface it with the following remarks.
Comrade Adoratsky proposes to publish in the next issue of Bolshevik, dedicated to the twentieth anniversary of the world imperialist war, Engels' well-known article "The Foreign Policy of Russian Tsarism", first published abroad in 1890. I would consider it quite normal if it were proposed to publish this article in the collection of Engels' works or in one of the historical journals. But we are offered to publish it in our military magazine, in Bolshevik, in the issue dedicated to the twentieth anniversary of the world imperialist war. Consequently, they believe that this article can be regarded as guiding, or in any case deeply instructive for our Party workers from the point of view of clarifying the problems of imperialism and imperialist wars. But Engels' article, as can be seen from its content, despite its merits, unfortunately does not these qualities. Moreover, it has a number of such shortcomings, which, if published without criticism, may confuse the reader.
Therefore, I would consider it inexpedient to publish Engels's article in the next issue of Bolshevik.
But what are these disadvantages?
1. Describing the aggressive policy of Russian tsarism and paying tribute to the abominations of this policy, Engels explains it not so much by the “need” of the military-feudal-merchant elite of Russia in access to the seas, seaports, in expanding foreign trade and mastering strategic points, but by the fact that Russia's foreign policy was headed by an allegedly all-powerful and very talented gang of foreign adventurers who, for some reason, were lucky everywhere and in everything, who miraculously managed to overcome any and all obstacles on the way to their adventurous goal, who surprisingly deftly deceived all European rulers and achieved , finally, what made Russia the most powerful militarily state.
Such an interpretation of the question in the mouth of Engels may seem more than incredible, but, unfortunately, it is a fact.
Here are the relevant passages from Engels' article.
“Foreign policy,” says Engels, “is undoubtedly the area in which tsarism is very, very strong. Russian diplomacy is forming a kind of new Jesuit order, powerful enough to overcome, if necessary, even the royal whims and, spreading corruption around them widely, to stop it in their own midst. At first, this order was recruited mainly from foreigners: Corsicans, such as Pozzo di Borgo, Germans, like Nesselrode, East See Germans, like Lieven. Its founder, Catherine II, was also a foreigner.
“Until now, only one full- blooded Russian, Gorchakov, has held the highest post in this order. His successor, von Giere, again bears a foreign surname.
“This secret society, originally recruited from foreign adventurers, raised the Russian state to its present power. With iron perseverance, steadily pursuing the intended goal, not stopping either at treachery, or at betrayal, or at murder from behind a corner, or before cringing, corpses and at least one royal corpse - this gang, as unscrupulous as it is talented, did more than all the Russian armies in order to expand the borders of Russia from the Dnieper and Dvina beyond the Vistula, to the Prut, Danube, to the Black sea, from the Don and the Volga beyond the Caucasus, to the sources of the Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya. It was she who made Russia great, powerful, fearsome, and opened the way for her to world domination. (Cm.
One might think that in the history of Russia, in its external history, diplomacy was everything, and tsars, feudal lords, merchants and other social groups - nothing, or almost nothing.
One might think that if Russian adventurers like Gorchakov and others, rather than foreign adventurers like Nesselrode or Giers, were at the head of Russia's foreign policy, then Russia's foreign policy would take a different path.
I'm not talking about the fact that the policy of conquest, with all its abominations and filth, did not at all constitute the monopoly of the Russian tsars. Everyone knows that the policy of conquest was also characteristic - no less, if not more, of the kings and diplomats of all European countries, including such an emperor of a bourgeois formation as Napoleon, who, despite his non-royal origin, successfully practiced in its foreign policy and intrigue, and deceit, and treachery, and flattery, and atrocities, and bribery, and murder, and arson.
It is clear that it could not be otherwise.
Evidently, in his pamphlet against Russian tsarism (Engels's article is a good militant pamphlet), Engels got carried away a little and, being carried away, forgot for a minute about some elementary things well known to him.
2. Describing the situation in Europe and revealing the causes and prospects for the impending world war, Engels writes:
“The present situation in Europe is determined by three facts: 1) the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine by Germany, 2) the desire of tsarist Russia for Constantinople, 3) the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, which is flaring up more and more hotly in all countries, a struggle whose thermometer is the widespread upsurge of the socialist movement” .
“The first two facts determine the modern division of Europe into two large military camps. The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine turned France into an ally of Russia against Germany, the tsarist threat to Constantinople turns Austria and even Italy into an ally of Germany. Both camps are preparing for a decisive battle - for a war such as the world has never seen before, for a war in which ten to fifteen million armed fighters will face each other. Only two circumstances have hitherto prevented the outbreak of this terrible war: firstly, the unheard of rapid development of military technology, in which each newly invented type of weapon, before it can be introduced in at least onearmy, is overtaken by new inventions, and, secondly, the absolute impossibility of calculating the chances, the complete uncertainty of who will emerge victorious in the end from this gigantic struggle.
“All this danger of a world war will disappear on the day when things in Russia will take such a turn that the Russian people will be able to put an end to the traditional policy of conquest of their tsars and, instead of fantasies of world domination, take up their own vital interests within the country, interests that are threatened by extreme danger".
"... The Russian National Assembly, which wants to cope with at least the most urgent internal tasks, will have to decisively put an end to all aspirations for new conquests."
“With increasing speed, as if on an inclined plane, Europe is rolling into the abyss of a world war of unheard-of scope and force. Only one thing can stop her: a change in the order in Russia. That this should happen in the coming years is beyond any doubt.
"... On the day when tsarist power falls, this last stronghold of all-European reaction, on that day a completely different wind will blow in Europe" (see ibid.).
It is impossible not to notice that in this characterization of the situation in Europe and in the list of causes leading to a world war, one important moment was omitted, which later played a decisive role, namely, the moment of the imperialist struggle for colonies, for markets, for sources of raw materials, which already then had a very serious importance, the role of England as a factor in the coming world war, the moment of contradictions between Germany and England, contradictions that were already of serious importance at that time and later played an almost decisive role in the emergence and development of the world war, are missed.
I think that this omission is the main shortcoming of Engels' article.
From this shortcoming follow other shortcomings, of which it would not hurt to note the following:
a) Reassessment of the role of the desire of tsarist Russia for Constantinople in the brewing of a world war. True, initially Engels puts in first place, as a factor of war, the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany, but then he pushes this moment into the background and brings to the fore the conquest aspirations of Russian tsarism, arguing that "all this danger of a world war will disappear at that the day when things in Russia will take such a turn that the Russian people will be able to put an end to the traditional aggressive policy of their tsars.
This, of course, is an exaggeration.
b) Revaluationthe role of the bourgeois revolution in Russia, the role of the "Russian National Assembly" (bourgeois parliament) in preventing an impending world war. Engels argues that the fall of Russian tsarism is the only way to prevent a world war. This is a clear exaggeration. The new, bourgeois system in Russia with its "National Assembly" could not have prevented war, if only because the mainsprings of the war lay in the plane of the imperialist struggle between the principal imperialist powers. The fact is that since the Crimean defeat of Russia (the fifties of the last century), the independent role of tsarism in the field of European foreign policy began to decline significantly, and by the time before the world imperialist war, tsarist Russia played in essence the role of an auxiliary reserve for the main powers of Europe.
c) Reassessment of the role of tsarist power as "the last stronghold of pan-European reaction" (the words of Engels). That tsarist power in Russia was a mighty stronghold of all-European (and also Asian) reaction—of this there can be no doubt. But that it should be the last stronghold of this reaction—this can be doubted.
It should be noted that these shortcomings in Engels' article are not only of "historical value". They have or should have had still more important practical significance. Indeed: if the imperialist struggle for colonies and spheres of influence is overlooked as a factor in the impending world war, if the imperialist contradictions between England and Germany are also overlooked, if the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany, as a factor in the war, is relegated to the background before the desire of Russian tsarism for Constantinople, as a more important and even determining factor in the war, ifFinally, Russian tsarism represents the last stronghold of pan-European reaction—is it not clear that a war, say, between bourgeois Germany and tsarist Russia is not an imperialist, predatory, anti-people war, but a war of liberation, or almost a war of liberation?
It can hardly be doubted that such a train of thought should have facilitated the fall of the German Social Democracy on August 4, 1914, when it decided to vote for war credits and proclaimed the slogan of defending the bourgeois fatherland from Tsarist Russia, from "Russian barbarism", etc.
It is characteristic that in his letters addressed to Bebel, written in 1891 (a year after the publication of Engels's article), where he discusses the prospects for an impending war, Engels directly says that "the victory of Germany is, therefore, the victory of the revolution", that "if Russia will start a war - forward to the Russians and their allies, whoever they are!
It is clear that with such a train of thought there is no room for revolutionary defeatism, for the Leninist policy of turning the imperialist war into a civil war.
Such is the case with the shortcomings of Engels' article.
Apparently, Engels, alarmed at that time (1890–1891) by the Franco-Russian alliance, which was directed with its tip against the Austro-German coalition, set out to attack the foreign policy of Russian tsarism in his article and deprive it of any confidence in the eyes of public opinion in Europe before. all of England, but in realizing this goal, he lost sight of a number of other important and even defining points, which resulted in the one-sidedness of the article.
After all that has been said, is it worth publishing Engels's article in our militant organ, Bolshevik, as a guiding article, or in any case deeply instructive, for it is clear that publishing it in Bolshevik means giving it tacitly such a recommendation?
I don't think it's worth it.
I. Stalin.
19.VII.34Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin July 31, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 2. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow 31/VII-34. No. 1.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
It was reported from Turkey that Kemal could come to Ankara in mid-August and receive Karakhan. We are making a decision to leave Karakhan for Turkey in August, granting him leave only in September. September is a month of calm and holidays are possible.
Please provide your opinion 1 . HP 1.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
_____________________
1 Stalin agreed on August 1 in a cipher from Sochi at 8 o'clock. 15 minutes. (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 1). On the same day, the corresponding decision of the PB was drawn up (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 949. L. 34).Kaganovich, Molotov, Voroshilov to Stalin August 2, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 5. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 50. L. 1. Autograph of Molotov.
Encryption.
From Moscow 2. VIII - 34 at 22 o'clock. In. No. 2.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
Instead of large-scale all-army maneuvers, approved at the time by the Central Committee , 1 the People's Commissariat of Defense proposes to confine ourselves to intra-district maneuvers, which facilitate railroads, motor vehicles and supplies.
Ask for consent 2 . No. 1.
Kaganovich, Molotov, Voroshilov.
_____________________________
1 We are talking about the decision of the PB of June 13, 1934 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 16. L. 101).
2 Stalin agreed on August 3 in a cipher from Sochi at 1 pm. (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 4). On the same day, the corresponding decision of the PB was drawn up (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 16. L. 147).Kaganovich to Stalin August 3, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 8. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 50. L. 2. Autograph.
Encryption.
From Moscow 3/VIII - 34, 17 hours. 39 min. In. No. 3.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
Schmidt asks to appoint Bergavinov, head of the political department of the Glavsevmorput 1 . I think that this proposal can be accepted. On the South Eastern D. Bergavinov does not work.
Please let me know your opinion 2 . HP 3.
Kaganovich.
______________________
On July 20, 1934, the PB adopted a package of resolutions on measures for the development of the Northern Sea Route and the Far North, in which, in particular, it was recognized as necessary to create political departments and political agencies in the system of the Main Directorate of the Northern Sea Route. The PB instructed the transport department of the Central Committee, together with Schmidt, to select leading employees within a month (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 949. L. 13, 72–81).
2 On that same day, Stalin agreed in cipher from Sochi at 21:00. (Tamhe. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 7). The PB approved the appointment of Bergavinov as Deputy Head of the Main Directorate of the Northern Sea Route on September 16, 1934 (Tamhe. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 952. L. 4).Stalin to Kaganovich August 4, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 11. Autograph.
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU. Kaganovich.
Please answer: first, why is the decision of the Central Committee on Florinsky not carried out? 1 Second, why isn't the decision of the Central Committee on the outrages in trade enterprises and on the reprimand of people's commissars and other leaders being published in the press? 2
Stalin.
No. 4.
4/VIII.34 3
__________________
1 The decision to dismiss and arrest the head of the protocol department of the NKID D.T. Florinsky was adopted by the PB on July 27, 1934 (for details, see: Maksimenkov L. Muddle instead of music. Stalin's cultural revolution. 1936–1938. M., 1997. S. 205–208).
2 We are talking about the resolution of the PB "On the fight against weighing, measuring consumers and violating retail prices in trade", adopted on July 26, 1934, in which, in particular, the chairman of the Central Union Zelensky, People's Commissar of Supply Mikoyan and others were put on the lookout for “admission of underweight consumers and violation of retail prices in their subordinate stores” (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 949. L. 21, 88). On August 5, 1934, the resolution was published in Pravda.
3 Number and date entered by the secretary. Sent in code from Sochi on that he day at 14 o'clock. (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 10).Kaganovich to Stalin August 4, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 12. Certified typewritten copy; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 50. L. 3. Autograph.
Strictly secret .
Copy .
Cipher .
Sochi. T. Stalin .
First. In connection with the arrival of Selyama 1 , Litvinov asked very much for a couple of days to delay the arrest of Florinsky, but these couple of days dragged on for 6 days. This is my fault. Florinsky will be arrested today.
Second. The decision with a reprimand to the people's commissars was also not published due to my omission. Now we are going to print. No. 1897/sh.
Kaganovich.
4.VIII.34
__________________________
1 We are talking about the arrival in Moscow at the end of July 1934 of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Estonia Seljamaa.Kaganovich to Stalin August 5, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 14. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 50. L. 4. Typewritten text with corrections by Kaganovich.
Encryption.
From Moscow 5/VIII - 34 at 0 o'clock. 45 min. In. No. 5.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
Unshlikht makes a proposal to resume negotiations with the American company Pan American Airways on the organization of air communication between the USSR and the USA , 1 with the creation of a mixed joint-stock company of the Dereluft 2 type , managed on an equal footing, with the seat of the board in Moscow.
Unshlikht proposes not to object to the creation of a mixed technical commission to study, determine the route and other issues. Conduct the work of the commission in such a way that by the spring of 1935 begin to implement the plan for organizing the planned line. NKID for this proposal.
Please let me know your opinion. HP 5.
Kaganovich.
______________________
1 Negotiations with the Americans on the organization of air communication between the USA and the USSR were started by the GUGF in February-March 1934 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 16. L. 1).
2 "Deruluft" - Russian-German Society of Air Communications.
Stalin to Kaganovich August 5, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 14, 14v. Autograph.
To number 5. I advise you to postpone the case and not give consent yet. The American proposal is dictated by the goals of military intelligence. If they wanted to help, they would have sold us the rails, but they did not 1 . No. 5.
Stalin.
5/VIII.34 2
___________________
1 On the purchase of rails in the USA, see: DVP. T. XVII. pp. 164, 179, 195.
2 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 14:00. 45 min. (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 13). '
Kaganovich to Stalin, Kirov August 5, 1934
A source: Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931–1936 Moscow: (ROSSPEN), 2001 Pp. 418
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 23. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 50. L. 5. Typewritten text with corrections by Kaganovich.
Encryption.
From Moscow 5/VIII - 34 at 16 o'clock. 59 min. In. No. 6.
Sochi, v. t. Stalin, Kirov.
Krestinsky said that in August 1935 the British Association of Municipal Officials wanted to organize a tour of the cities of the Baltic Sea, including Leningrad.
Krestinsky asks permission to answer that there are no objections to the excursion's arrival in Leningrad, and that the Leningrad City Council is ready to render its assistance to her.
Please let me know your opinion 1 . HP 6.
Kaganovich.
_____________________________
Stalin and Kirov agreed in cipher from Sochi on August 6 at 1 pm. 13 min. (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 22). On August 7, 1934, the decision of the PB on this issue was drawn up (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 950. L. 5).Kaganovich to Stalin August 5, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 20. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 50. L. 6. Autograph.
Encryption.
From Moscow 5/VIII - 34, 16 hours. 59 min. In. No. 7.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
Yagoda proposes that Comrade Prokofiev. I consider it acceptable.. Please let me know your opinion 1 . HP 7.
Kaganovich.
_____________________________
1 On the same day, Stalin agreed in a cipher from Sochi at 13:00. 12 min. (Ibid. D. 83. L. 19). The PB decision was drawn up on August 1, 1934 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 950. L. 5).Stalin to Kaganovich August 5, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 100. L. 43–46. Autograph.
T. Kaganovich!
I am sending you my comments on the behavior of the Bolshevik editors in connection with their comments (From the Editorial Board) to Engels' letter addressed to Ioan Nadezhda.
I think that the comments of the Bolshevik editors are not accidental. It seems to me that this is the work of Comrade Zinoviev. If the editors refer to the fact that they did not receive my previous remarks, approved by the Central Committee, on Engels's article "On the Foreign Policy of Tsarism," 1 it will be a formal reply, for they undoubtedly knew them through Comrade Adoratsky.
I think this is a serious matter. We cannot leave Bolshevik in the hands of such boobies whom Comrade Zinoviev can always fool. It is necessary to find out the culprits and remove them from the editorial office.
It would be best to remove Comrade Zinoviev.
Hey!
PS Send my enclosed letter to PB members and others.
I. Stalin.
5/VIII - 34.
PP. SS. Knorin and Stetsky should have been shown my remarks on Engels' article, although they are familiar with them.
I.St.
________________________
1 On July 22, 1934, the PB deemed it inexpedient to publish Engels's article "The Foreign Policy of Russian Tsarism" in Bolshevik (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 949. L. 18). This decision was preceded by a letter from Stalin to members of the PB and V.V. Adoratsky on July 19, in which Engels's article was given a critical assessment (see Appendix No. 3). The letter was published in May 1941 (see Bolshevik, 1941, No. 9, pp. 1–5).Kaganovich to Stalin August 5 [1934]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 742. L. 4–14. Autograph.
5/VIII
Hello, Dear Comrade Stalin.
1) Today we had the first meeting of the PB after your departure. We approved a number of resolutions that had been prepared for a long time, somehow: on dyes, on canned food and fish, on the construction of a new type of dam according to the method of engineer Senkov, and so on. 1. We discussed some issues raised by the party control: about the stock exchange operations of NKVneshtorg, which, contrary to the decision of the Central Committee, which prohibited the purchase of cotton on the stock exchange and not even real cotton, but futures, this year it repeated the speculative operation with cotton. We put on the look of Boeva. We battered NKVneshtorg for perversions in bonuses, where, in fact, almost a system of bribing workers was practiced. The Party Control Commission also introduced the question of electric welding, where, along with serious achievements, there are also shortcomings, and most importantly, this matter needs a new impetus. This issue was discussed quite passionately. As a result of the discussion, we created a commission to work out proposals. The Council of People's Commissars submitted a question and proposals to improve seed production for cotton. I considered this project insufficient, mostly declarative, in it, for example, there is nothing about the organization of the business, there is no definition of areas for seed production, there are no measures to stimulate collective farms, etc. As a result of the discussion, we created a commission to develop proposals. The question still arose in my mind whether this question should not be connected with the whole question of cotton in the formulation you gave. I beg you to write in what direction to work on the issue of cotton now or maybe postpone it until autumn? We approved the plan for flax and instructions for harvesting and processing flax. in what direction should we work on the issue of cotton now, or maybe postpone it until autumn? We approved the plan for flax and instructions for harvesting and processing flax. in what direction should we work on the issue of cotton now, or maybe postpone it until autumn? We approved the plan for flax and instructions for harvesting and processing flax.
We called the Gorky people in connection with information about outrages and theft at the car factory and in the ORS. The Gorkyites themselves disputed some of the facts, and we decided to send Pyatakov, Kosarev, and Sorokin there to check on the spot . The situation there with the management of the plant is bad, no matter how it is necessary to replace Dyakonov, of course, if necessary, we will ask you.
Today we adopted a resolution on the subway of the 2nd stage. Basically, the project that you edited remained. Added 2 points. The resolution is attached to the PB protocol. I ask you to inform me whether to print it (Comrade Molotov doubts) and if it is to be printed, then to allow it to be printed under your signature?
2) We held a meeting of prosecutors 3 . Our impression of them is unimportant, the people are rather weak. There are also good workers who, with support, can turn around. They are, of course, very pleased with both the decision of the Central Committee and the very fact of convening the conference. They criticized themselves and promised to raise the work. At the meeting, it turned out that too many people are being brought to court, often they are judged in vain. There are areas in which more than half of those convicted and brought later are acquitted and the sentences are cancelled. The quality of judges and their work is low. Therefore, the central issue is the selection and training of people, and we will deal with this issue at the next Orgburo.
3) Stetsky proposes that a declaration on the tasks of Soviet writers be adopted at the congress of writers, so that all participants in the congress sign it. We think that it is impossible to force everyone to sign, because there will be different people there. The declaration could be adopted, but by a simple vote. Please let us know your opinion. In addition, it is supposed to adopt an appeal against war and fascism.
4) Ukrainians turned to us with a request to add a discount for the Dnepropetrovsk region of 4 mil. pounds. Khataevich himself asks for 6 million. We haven't given them an answer yet. Please let me know your opinion. Just in case, I am sending you their letter addressed to you.
5) Today there was a very unpleasant incident with the artillery battalion of Osoaviakhim. I won't go into detail. The note about this case is short, and I am sending it to you. We instructed Yagoda and Agranov to personally lead the investigation. In the morning there was information that Nakhaev, the chief of staff of the division, was insane, Comrade Voroshilov had such information. Now I spoke with Comrade Agranov, he says that from the first interrogation he got the impression that he was a normal person, but with some anguish. He gives evidence hard. At night there will be an interrogation protocol, and I will send it to you. Here it is necessary to find out whether he is alone, whether there are accomplices? One thing is clear that Osoaviahim slipped up. I will keep you updated on the progress of the investigation.
This concludes my letter. I am very sorry that in the very first days I made two omissions with Florinsky and with the publication of the resolution. Both of these have already been fixed today.
Hello to you.
Your L. Kaganovich.
_____________________________
1 All decisions, which Kaganovich reports later in the letter, were recorded in the minutes of the PB meeting of August 5, 1934 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 949).
2 The report of the commission on the trip to the Gorky Automobile Plant was heard at a meeting of the PB on September 23, 1934. The PB basically approved the conclusions of the commission and instructed it to draw up a draft short resolution based on the conclusions and exchange of opinions in the PB and submit it for approval by the PB (Ibid. D 952. L. 4). Again, the commission's report was on the agenda of the meeting of the PB on December 23, 1934, but was removed (Ibid. D. 955. L. 50).
3 A meeting of prosecutors in the Central Committee took place on August 1, 1934. See the transcript of the meeting: Ibid. Op. 165. D. 47.Stalin to members of the Politburo, Adoratsky, Knorin, Stetsky, Zinoviev, Pospelov August 5, 1934
Archive: RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 950. L. 87–89. Script. Typescript.
Members of the Politburo
t.t. Adoratsky, Knorin, Stetsky, Zinoviev, Pospelov.
In issue 13-14 of Bolshevik there is a note "From the Editor" (pages 86-90), which comments on F. Engels' letter to Ioan Nadezhda of January 1888 and where Engels' views on the coming war are clearly falsified.
Incorrectly and jugglery using Engels' letter to the Romanian Ioan Nadezhda (1888), the editors of Bolshevik assert in their note that:
a) Engels "stands wholly in a defeatist position", in a position of defeat "and his bourgeois fatherland";
b) “Lenin defended a similar position in the war of 1914”;
c) Lenin, therefore, did not give anything essentially new in the matter of determining the nature of the war and the policy of the Marxists in connection with the war.
In this way:
1. The editors of Bolshevik hid from readers that Engels did not understand the imperialist nature of the coming war, which is clear both from Engels' letter to Ioan Nadezhda (1888) and from his article "The Foreign Policy of Russian Tsarism" (1890), as well as from his famous letters to Bebel (1891). It suffices to compare with these works of Engels the tables of Lenin published in the same issue of Bolshevik "The experience of summarizing the main data of world history after 1870", where Lenin notes the imperialist struggle of the powers (including Germany) for colonies and spheres of influence , even at the beginning 80s of the last century, as the cause of the war, in order to understand the whole difference in the views of Lenin and Engels on the nature of the war.
2. The editors of Bolshevik hid from readers that Engels, 2-3 years after the letter to Ioan Nadezhda, when the Franco-Russian alliance began to take shape as opposed to the alliance of Germany, Austria and Italy, changed his attitude towards the war and began to speak out already not for the defeat, but for the victory of Germany (see especially Engels's letters to Bebel of 1891), and, as is well known, Engels retained such an attitude until the end of his life.
3. The editors of Bolshevik concealed from the readers that between Engels's passive defeatism ("to wish them all to be defeated"), which he later abandoned in favor of defencism , as was said, and Lenin's active defeatism ("the transformation of the imperialist war into civil war") - there is no way to draw an equal sign.
4. The editors of Bolshevik concealed from the readers the undoubted fact that Lenin, and only Lenin, gave a fundamentally new and only correct line both on the question of the nature of the war and on the question of the policy of the Marxists in connection with the war.
Such is the case with the tricks of the editorial staff of Bolshevik.
That Engels was and remains our teacher, only idiots can doubt it. But it does not at all follow from this that we must gloss over Engels' mistakes, that we must hide them and, even more so, pass them off as indisputable truths. Such a policy would be a policy of lies and deceit. Nothing is so contrary to the spirit of Marxism and the precepts of Marx-Engels as such a policy unworthy of Marxists. Marx and Engels themselves said that Marxism is not a dogma, but a guide to action. This explains why Marx and Engels themselves repeatedly changed and supplemented certain provisions of their works. This means that Marx and Engels considered that the main thing in their teaching was not the letter, not individual propositions, but the spirit of this teaching, its method. It cannot be otherwise, since with a different installation , further developmentMarxism would have been unthinkable, for Marxism would have turned into mumuya. It cannot be otherwise, because otherwise Lenin would not have been the man who not only restored Marxism, but also developed it further. And if Lenin developed Marxism further, is it not clear that we should not be afraid to record in Lenin's asset what is new about the war that belongs to him by right and what is given to them as new, in the interests of the further development of Marxism?
There can be no doubt that only disrespect for Marxism and its founders could have dictated to the editors of Bolshevik a policy of glossing over and concealing facts, a policy of belittling Lenin's role in working out a new line of Marxism in questions of the nature of the war and the policy of the Marxists in connection with the war.
I think that in their note the editors of Bolshevik tacitly proceed from one Trotskyist-Menshevik line, by virtue of which Engels supposedly said everything that needed to be said about the war, its nature and the policy of the Marxists in connection with the war, which the Marxists All that remains is to restore what Engels said and apply it to practice, that Lenin allegedly did just that, taking “a similar position in the war of 1914”, that whoever does not agree with this is revising Marxism, he is not a real Marxist.
As is well known, the Trotskyist-Menshevik gentlemen proceeded from the same attitude when they denied the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country, referring to the fact that Engels in his Principles of Communism (1846) denied such a possibility, that Engels had already said everything what needed to be said, and whoever continues to insist on the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country is revising Marxism.
It is hardly necessary to prove that such an attitude is thoroughly rotten and anti-Marxist, for it dooms Marxism and its method to stagnation, to vegetation, sacrificing it to the letter.
I think that this wrong attitude lies at the root of the mistake made by the editors of Bolshevik.
It seems to me that the Bolshevik magazine is falling (or has already fallen) into unreliable hands. The very fact that the editors tried to publish Engels's article "On the Foreign Policy of Russian Tsarism" in Bolshevik as a guiding article does not speak in favor of the editors. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, as is known, timely intervened in the matter and stopped such an attempt. But this circumstance, obviously, did not go to the editors for the future. On the contrary, the editors, as if in defiance of the instructions of the Central Committee, placed after the warning of the Central Committee such a note that cannot be qualified otherwise than as an attempt to mislead readers about the real position of the Central Committee. But Bolshevik is an organ of the Central Committee.
I think it's time to put an end to this situation.
I. Stalin.
5.VIII.34Kaganovich to Stalin August 7, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 26. Original. Typescript; F. 558. On. 11. D. 50. L. 7. Typewritten text with corrections by Kaganovich.
Encryption.
From Moscow 7/VIII - 34 at 19 o'clock. 40 min. In. No. 8.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
Schmidt considers it correct to designate the editors of the three-volume edition of The Chelyuskin Epic as follows: "under the general editorship of Schmidt, Baevsky, Mekhlis."
Please let me know your opinion 1 . HP 8.
Kaganovich.
__________________________
1 August 8 in cipher from Sochi at 10 o'clock. 45 min. Stalin replied: "Schmidt's proposal can be accepted" (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 25). On August 9, 1934, the decision of the PB on this issue was drawn up (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 950. L. 9).Kaganovich to Stalin August 8, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 30. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 50. L. 9. Typewritten text with Kaganovich's notes.
Encryption.
From Moscow 8/VIII - 34 at 17:00. 50 min. In. No. 10.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
First. The Japanese oil concession in Sakhalin has applied for permission to survey a route for the construction of a Piltun-Katangly telephone line. We plan to make the following decision:
“In view of the existing agreement, to satisfy the request of the Japanese oil concession “Katakarafutoseki Yukabusikikaisha” for permission to survey the route for the construction of the Piltun-Katangly telephone line.”
Second. The Manchurian authorities demanded the registration of the forest concessions of the CER. We plan to make the following decision:
“In connection with the order to register forest concessions, propose Rudom to inform the Ministry of Trade and Industry of Manchukuo on behalf of the Chinese Eastern Railway that the rights of the Chinese Eastern Railway to forest concessions are based on an international treaty. At the same time, in the order of information, to offer comrade. Rudy to provide information on all forest concessions and forest plots under the jurisdiction and operation of the CER.
I ask for your consent 1 . HP 10.
Kaganovich.
___________________________
1 On the same day, Stalin agreed in code from Sochi at 22:00. 30 minutes. (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 29). The PB decision was drawn up on August 9, 1934 (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 950. L. 21, 22, 38).Stalin to Kaganovich August 8, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 33. Autograph.
Kaganovich .
Got a letter. Kosior's demand at the expense of the Dnepropetrovsk region must be satisfied, but the Ukrainians must be firmly told that we cannot give any new help, except for what is now being given, and that they themselves must collect all the necessary seeds for themselves . No. 11.
Stalin.
8/VIII.34 2
___________________
On August 9, 1934, the PB granted the petition of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine for an additional reduction in the annual grain supply plan for the Dnepropetrovsk region by 4 million poods. The leaders of Ukraine and the Dnipropetrovsk region were warned that this plan was final and "subject to unconditional implementation" (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 17. L. 5).
2 Date and number entered by the secretary. Sent in code from Sochi on August 9 at 0 o'clock. 40 min. (Ibid. F. 558. Op. P. D. 83. L. 32).Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin August 8, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 36. Certified typewritten copy; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 50. L. 11. Typewritten text with Kaganovich's correction. Signatures are autographs.
Strictly secret.
Copy.
Cipher.
Tov. Stalin.
From the ciphers you know about the state of negotiations in America. Trojan asks for directives.
We outline the following instructions: “The Kelly Memorandum 1 is declared unacceptable and you are invited to continue negotiations on the basis of the directives given to you earlier.
To your 10573. There is no need to give the Americans a new scheme in writing, as they have a brief but perfectly clear note handed to Bullitt by Litvinov.”
Please let us know your opinion 2 . HP 1939/sh.
Kaganovich. Molotov.
8.VIII.34
__________________________
1 We are talking about negotiations on the settlement of financial claims between the USSR and the USA. On August 3, 1934, the head of the East European Section of the US State Department, Kelly, presented AA-Troyanovsky with a memorandum containing the American proposals (DVP, vol. XVII, pp. 534–536).
2 Stalin agreed on August 9 in a cipher from Sochi at 7 p.m. 55 min. (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 34). On August 9 Troyanovsky was sent a telegram with these instructions (DVP. Vol. XVII. P. 552).Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin August 8, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 39. Certified typewritten copy; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 50. L. 10. Typewritten text. Signatures are autographs.
Strictly secret.
Copy.
Cipher.
Sochi. T. Stalin.
From the ciphers you know about the state of negotiations with Hirota, about his latest proposals. The Japanese press launched a big campaign around this issue. We plan to issue the following directive to Yurenev and Kozlovsky:
"1. Instruct Comrade Yurenev to tell Hirota that the Soviets have already gone far towards Hirota and Manchukuo in the negotiations on the CER, however, in view of the fact that Hirota’s last price is too low and, moreover, as if it was an ultimatum, having considered again, at Hirota’s request, this question, sees no way to accept Hirota's latest offer.
2. Instruct Comrade Kozlovsky in the evening of the same day, when Comrade Yurenev makes the above statement to Hirota, in a suitable private conversation with Togo or other influential Japanese figures, at the choice of our delegation in Tokyo, to state as his personal opinion that he, Kozlovsky Seeking a way out of the new difficulties created in the negotiations on the CER by the Japanese-Manchurian side, I would be ready, on my own behalf, to recommend and defend in Moscow proposals for the sale of the CER for 150 million rubles, if such a new proposal were made by Hirota.
We ask for your opinion.
Through the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, there is information about the intention of the Japanese gendarmerie in Harbin to apply repressions against Soviet citizens. HP 1931/sh.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
8.VIII.34Kaganovich to Stalin August 8, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 42. Certified typewritten copy; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 50. L. 12. Handwritten text.
Strictly secret.
Copy.
Cipher.
Stalin.
At the suggestion of Lyubimov, we propose to approve Yeremin and Fushman as deputy people's commissars of light industry. We ask for your consent. HP 1940/sh.
Kaganovich. 8.VIII.34Stalin to Kaganovich [August 8, 1934]
Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 100. L. 135–136. Autograph.
T. Kaganovich.
Got a letter.
1) As for cotton, I had in mind a three-year plan for the development of cotton growing along the lines of: a) raising yields (fertilizers, better processing, watering), b) expanding areas both in Central Asia, and especially in Transcaucasia (Mugan, Mil steppe, etc.). This matter should be given for study and then a decision should be made.
2) Ask Zhdanov about the congress of writers and the declaration, who will be in Moscow one of these days .
3) I have already reported about Khataevich and Dnepropetrovsk region in code.
4) The Nakhaev case is a bastard case. He is, of course (of course!), not alone. It is necessary to press him against the wall, force him to tell - tell the whole truth and then punish him to the fullest extent. He must be a Polish-German (or Japanese) agent. Chekists become ridiculous when they discuss with him about his “political views” (this is called an interrogation !). A corrupt skin does not have political views, otherwise he would not be an agent of an outside force. He called on armed men to act against the government, which means he must be destroyed.
Apparently, not everything is going well in Osoaviakhim.
Hey! I. St.
_______________________
On August 23, 1934, the PB approved a resolution to be submitted to the Congress of Writers (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 950. L. 51, 103).Stalin to Kaganovich August 9, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 38, 38v. Autograph.
Kaganovich .
On your 11. Kozlovsky's appeal to Hirota with his personal proposal for the price of the CER is inexpedient, since it can only increase the impudence of the Japanese. I propose not to reduce the price for the time being, but to respond to the Japanese campaign with a counter-campaign in the press in the spirit of the fact that the Japanese do not want to buy the CER, but want to get it for nothing, or seize it by force and declare war on the USSR, that the Japanese are pursuing an aggressive line and are looking for a reason for war and etc. 1 HP 13.
Stalin.
9/VIII.34 2
____________________
1 We are talking about negotiations on the sale of the CER.
2 Date and number entered by the secretary. Sent in code from Sochi on August 9 at 15:00. 57 min. (Ibid. L. 37).
Stalin to Kaganovich August 9, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 41. Autograph.
Your 13. I am against Fushman. The other day he was so disheveled in Pravda that nothing was left of him as a deputy. It is necessary to find another, more honest and more party, with a long production experience. We need someone like Mikhail Kaganovich.
Stalin.
HP 14.
9/VIII.34 1
_________________
1 Date and number entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 17:00. 10 minutes. (Ibid. L. 40).Kaganovich to Stalin August 9, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 45. Certified typewritten copy; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 50. L. 13–15. Autograph.
Strictly secret.
Copy.
Cipher.
Comrade Stalin.
As it turned out, the note from the editors was actually written by Zinoviev. Adoratsky agreed with these comments. Before printing, it was reviewed by Knorin and Pospelov, with the exception of minor remarks. They did not notice the main thing and missed the note. They knew that the Central Committee was not allowed to print Engels's article on the foreign policy of Russian tsarism, but they claim that they did not read the motives. This in no way removes the blame from them. Your letter to the PB members has been sent out. We'll make a decision tomorrow.
Today I am drafting a resolution. I think that, firstly, it is necessary to give at least a short resolution on the essence of the letter itself and Engels's article and the editorial note in the spirit of your letter. Secondly, it will be necessary to remove Zinoviev, to expose Knorin and Pospelov. It would be best to replace Knorin as an editor with Stetsky and introduce Mekhlis and Tal to the editorial office.
Tomorrow, when we finally make a decision, I will let you know again. If there are instructions, please let me know. HP 1942/sh.
Kaganovich.
9.VIII.34Stalin to Kaganovich August 9, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 44. Autograph.
Your 14. Zinoviev must be removed not simply, but with suitable motivation. Knorin can be removed and replaced by Stetsky. Mehlis and Tal can be introduced to the editorial office.
Stalin.
No. 15
9/VIII.34 1
___________________
1 Date and number entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 17:00. 12 min. (Ibid. L. 43).Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin August 9, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 47. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 50. L. 16. Typewritten text. Signatures are autographs.
Encryption.
From Moscow 9/VIII - 34 at 21 o'clock. 16 min. In. No. 15.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
The Japanese embassy applied to the NKID with the following statement on the issue of payments for the lease of fishing plots: “Since the question of the course is the subject of negotiations between both sides, the embassy considers it right to make rental payments for the second half of 1934 and for the future at the current rate without any conditions, however, it, depending on the opinion of the Soviet side, has no objections to making those at the current rate, with the proviso that if, as a result of the current negotiations, there is a change in the current course, the issue will be settled at the revised rate.
We outline the following decision: “To satisfy the request of the Japanese embassy to accept rent payments for the second half of 1934 at the rate of 32 and a half sen per ruble, with the proviso that if, as a result of negotiations on the rate of the ACO bond, a change in the current rate occurs, the Japanese fishermen will be obliged make the final settlement at the newly established rate.
Please let us know your opinion 1 . HP 15, 16.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
______________________
1 Stalin agreed on August 10 in a cipher from Sochi at 1300 hours. 05 min. (Ibid. D. 83. L. 46).Kaganovich to Stalin August 9 [1934]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 742. L. 15–20. Autograph.
9/VIII
Hello, Dear Comrade Stalin!
1) I am sending you the draft decision adopted by the PB on the errors of the Bolshevik editorial board.
The editors, of course, admitted their mistake, but this cannot lessen their guilt, for Zinoviev has taken the place of their chief specialist in international affairs. He himself, Zinoviev, behaves fraudulently. Yesterday, of course, he was crying, I didn’t know something, Adoratsky approved, etc., but despite the fact that we offered him to write explanations, today he has not yet given them, he has gone to the country and seems to be writing. We repeatedly demanded written explanations, but the important thing is that he is cheating, because if he honestly considered the comments to be incorrect, then he would have no reason to think about writing explanations to the Central Committee. It didn’t even escape from him, but quite naturally flowed out of his rotten insides. I am sending you his book, published in 1931, The Teachings of Marx and Lenin on War. In this book, he develops these views even more broadly, especially on pages 178-179. This shows that his comments in Bolshevik are not accidental.
At the PB, when we discussed the issue, we had 2 options: one is longer, the other is shorter, we settled on a shorter one.
We will send your letters with the PB protocol to the members of the Central Committee. The question is whether they can be mentioned in the editorial of Bolshevik, which will be presented to us in a couple of days, and we will send it to you.
In general, it must be said that both your comments on Engels’s article and the letter about the errors of Bolshevik teach how to understand Marxism in a Leninist way, and not in a Trotskyist way, so it would be good in some form for the activists to know these the documents.
I ask you to inform us both about the draft resolution and further coverage of this issue. By the way, as an editor, we also discussed the candidacies of Mekhlis and Zhdanov, Mekhlis, of course, “rebels” with Stetsky and does not want to work.
2) The investigation about Nakhaev is unfolding slowly. He himself fell ill, due to his attempted poisoning, and is difficult to interrogate. Tomorrow they will interrogate him. The remaining testimonies have not yet disclosed the links.
I'm sending you two little notes Nick. Kuibyshev, who, on my instructions, began to check the Osoaviakhimov barracks. They confirm the biggest defects.
As soon as we collect solid material, we will make practical proposals.
T. Voroshilov is not in Moscow now, he is in Leningrad.
3) About Japan: We have just received your directive. We fully agree with her. Today, the newspapers have already published "correspondence from Khabarovsk", tomorrow we will also prepare a telegram in the spirit of yours. They are barking great now. Even Ota and he had courage in one of his last telegrams.
Well, I'll end with this. Greetings to you and Comrade Kirov. Your L. Kaganovich.
PS Zinoviev's explanations have just been brought, I am sending them to you, they do not give anything new. It can be seen that it is spinning. L. Kaganovich.Kaganovich to Stalin August 11, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 54. Certified typewritten copy; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 50. L. 18. Typewritten text with Kaganovich's notes.
Copy .
Owls. Secret .
Cipher .
Sochi. T. Stalin.
As People's Commissar of local industry of the RSFSR, Myshkov can be nominated, who, as a former executive committee worker, knows local industry, and as an employee of the People's Commissariat for Heavy Industry, knows industry and economy in general. We think that this candidacy is suitable. Sergo objects, although he considers it appropriate.
I ask for your opinion. No. 1967/sh.
Kaganovich.
13-30.
11.VIII.34Kaganovich to Stalin August 12, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 53. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 50. L. 19. Typewritten text with corrections by Kaganovich.
Encryption.
From Moscow 12/VIII - 34 at 2 o'clock. 08 min. In. No. 18.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
Tvardovsky, in a conversation with Krestinsky, asked for permission to fly the Luft-Hansa Yu-52 aircraft through the USSR. He said that the German side did not agree to Xinjiang, but to another route through Siberia, because. it is important for them to test a new long-range aircraft. The Germans are ready to take on board any of our representatives.
I think that the proposal of the Germans should be rejected. Please let me know your opinion. HP 19.
Kaganovich.Stalin to Kaganovich August 12, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 53, 53v. Autograph.
Your 18 and 19. It would be better to put Myshkov as the first deputy of the light industry, and Eremin as the second. People's Commissar of local industry can put another. If you find the best candidate for the light industry, you can put Myshkov on the local industry.
The Germans should be denied entry.
No. 18
Stalin.
12/VIII.34Kaganovich to Stalin August 12 [1934]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 742. L. 21–27. Autograph.
12/VIII
Hello, Dear Comrade Stalin!
1) I am sending you another letter from Zinoviev and a letter from Adoratsky. They were all alarmed, but it’s bad that they are strong in hindsight. As for Zinoviev, I think that he still consciously wanted to draw him into an open discussion with Engels, so that he became Engels' defender. He, of course, did not expect such a sharp reaction and is now hitting the lights out. Last night the editors of Bolshevik gave us a draft article, but since it needs a number of amendments, we will correct it and send it to you to have a look.
2) In the case of Nakhaev, you are absolutely right in your assessment of both the case on the merits and the weaknesses of the interrogation. He doesn't show his real roots yet. All his behavior is confirmation that he is a foreign agent. In a couple of days it will be necessary to finally resolve the issue in the spirit of your instructions. I am sending you, just in case, a certificate from the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. Sending another little note to Nick. Kuibyshev about the barracks, very significant and interesting 1 .
3) Literary affairs are aggravated. Yesterday Comrade Gorky sent an article to Pravda directed against Comrades Vareikis and Yudin, in which he attacks them with exceptional harshness. But the point is not only in harshness, but in the fact that there are politically incorrect provisions there, such as that "an old, mutilated, still wild village is going to factories, factories, cities." I agreed to Mehlis not to publish this article for the time being. Yesterday Kryuchkov called comrade Molotov, that Gorky asked to come to him, comrade Molotov invited me. I suggested at least postponing until Comrade Zhdanov's arrival in order to receive your instructions through him. At the same time, a large campaign was launched (Kirshon, Afinogenov, Bruno Yasensky) against the leadership of the organizing committee. Gorky insisted on taking Averbakh to the congress of writers from Moscow, but this did not work out, which warmed him up even more. It seems to me,2 . It is impossible to give them a command, but through Gorky they achieve this. According to available information, a number of writers are not very satisfied with the categorical and decreed nature of Comrade Gorky's speeches. I am sending you the article and the note by Mekhlis.
4) As you pointed out, we have developed appropriate press coverage of Japanese affairs by printing both telegrams and articles. Yurenev's last cipher shows that Hiroda is not so ultimatum as he portrayed it at the beginning. I ask you to indicate whether the telegrams and articles of recent days about Japan are successful, in order to know how to navigate further.
5) About cotton: then, in the direction of your letter, we will begin to work on the question, and about seeds, we will accept it without waiting for the whole question.
6) We considered the regulation on the People's Commissariat of Forests in the commission. We ask you to give your instructions on the following issue: now the protection of forests and afforestation are scattered among the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, and at the People's Commissariat for Forests, and partly at the People's Commissariat of Transportation, should not all this work be united in the People's Commissariat for Forests with the assignment of full responsibility for the preservation of forests and their cultivation ?
7) From Yezhov, I received an answer to my request that while he was not feeling better, he was now sent to a resort in Austria and promised to be cured. The diagnosis of our doctors is rejected and the gastrointestinal disease is determined 3 .
Hey! Your L. Kaganovich.
_______________________
1 At that time, several notes were sent to PB members and Stalin regarding the Nakhaev case: notes from N. Kuibyshev dated August 10 and 11 on checking the state of security of the barracks of the Moscow garrison and on the disorder in Osoaviakhim, as well as a note from the NKVD on the state of the barracks and military camps in Moscow and the NKVD certificate on the Nakhaev case (AL RF. F. 3. Op. 50. D. 407. L. 101–133). See also documents No. 443, 450, 456, 461, note 6 to document No. 483.
2 Members of the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers.
On August 26 and 29, 1934, B. ADvinsky informed Stalin about reports received from Vienna about the progress of N.I. Yezhov, and on August 31 told him the text of Kaganovich's telegram to Vienna about the opinion of Moscow doctors: to refrain "without urgent need from operating Yezhov" (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 84. L. 14, 18, 67).Stalin to Kaganovich August 12, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 100. L. 48–52. Autograph.
T. Kaganovich .
1) Pay attention to Comrade Dvinsky's note (attached) about the shortcomings in grain procurements and read my proposals there 1 . If you allow the slightest complacency in grain procurement, we may run aground this year. Don't forget that this year's procurement plan is less than last year's actual procurement by 70 mil. n[udov].
2) The resolution on Bolshevik should include a clause on the removal of Comrade Knorin from the post of editor-in-chief. You can't blame everything on Comrade Zinoviev. Tov. Knorin answers no less, but more than Comrade Zinoviev. Then, you can not kick out all the current members of the editorial board - you can leave Knorin and Pospelov as ordinary members. If the Mehlis "rebels" you can not enter it. Stetsky as Managing Editor 2 .
3) At the expense of Nakhaev - click on. Call Cork and his pompolit and give them a scolding for their sloppiness and slovenliness in the barracks. The People's Commissariat of Defense must issue an order in all districts in connection with the discovered slovenliness. Let the control check the barracks, weapons depots, etc. more energetically.
4) Pay attention to the rotozey - Adoratsky, who was familiar with my remarks on Engels's article and nevertheless approved the Bol[chevy]ka's editorial note. With IMEL, it doesn't matter at all. The “scientist” Orakhelashvili turned out to be a hat (again!). Where is his "scholarship"?
5) Pay attention to the People's Commissariat of Internal Trade. Where is he and, in general, does he exist? Where is Weitzer? It's very important, mind you.
Hey! I. Stalin. 12/VIII 34.
__________________
1 The second page of Dvinsky's note with Stalin's resolution has been preserved: “Vol. Kag[anovi]chu . I fully agree with Comrade Dvinsky. I propose: 1) to give the krais the strictest directive on the individual with the obligation to report to the Central Committee every five days about preparations among individuals; 2) harshly punish Kazakhstan and the Sar[atovskiy] region for negligence and wastefulness; 3) deploy the fight against the flare and severely punish the mouth-waterers; 4) press brutally on the return of loans. Complacency in preparations is criminal. I. Stalin. PS Where it is bad with blanks, semssudoy, ticks, etc. - it would be necessary to return the secretaries from vacations and force them to straighten things out ”(RGASPI. F. 81. Op. 3. D. 100. L. 53.)
These proposals of Stalin were largely implemented in the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee "On the Progress of Grain Procurement", approved by the PB on August 19, 1934.
On August 16, the PB adopted a decision “On the error of the editors of the Bolshevik magazine. The placement of an editorial note on Engels' letter to Ion Nedezhda (Bolshevik No. 13-14 of July 31, 1934), written by Zinoviev, was recognized as a "gross political mistake." “This note,” the resolution said, “falsifies Engels’ views on the coming war, asserting that Engels supposedly “stands entirely on a defeatist position,” that “Lenin defended a similar position in the war of 1914,” and thereby hides the undoubted fact that Lenin, and only Lenin, gave a fundamentally new and the only correct attitude both in the question of the characterimperialist war, and in the question of the policy of the Marxists in connection with the war. The comments written by Comrade Zinoviev are an expression of the Trotskyist-Menshevik attitude, which does not recognize the new that Lenin introduced into the treasury of Marxism. The PB recognized as "entirely correct" Stalin's remarks about Engels's article "Foreign Policy of Russian Tsarism" dated July 19 and his letter to the PB dated August 5 about the error of the editors of Bolshevik (see appendices Nos. 3 and 4). The editors of Bolshevik were reprimanded, G.E. Zinoviev was removed from the editorial board, and V.G. Knorin is removed from his post as editor-in-chief of the journal. The following were appointed to the new editorial staff: AI. Stetsky (editor), B.M. Tal, V.G. Knorin, P.N. Pospelov. The editors of Bolshevik were instructed to submit to the Central Committee an editorial criticizing Zinoviev's comments within two days (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D.Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin August 14, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 57–58. Certified typewritten copy; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 50. L. 22. Text - Kaganovich's autograph. Signatures are autographs.
Strictly secret .
Copy .
Cipher.
Tov. Stalin.
We are sending you Troyanovsky's encryption. Litvinov's proposals were requested.
When we receive, we will inform you.
We think that Troyanovsky is a bit panicky.
Kaganovich. Molotov.
Troyanovsky's cipher: “Roosevelt sanctioned Hull's decision to find out this week whether an agreement with us is possible and, in the event of a negative result, break off negotiations. If the latter happens, it will certainly lead to a strong deterioration in our relations. I have long been told that Roosevelt is very angry and scolds Litvinov with might and main. At the last meeting, Moore, reflecting the mood of Roosevelt more than others, burned with anger and could not listen to me without indignation and hatred. To such an extent, the outrage was unexpected for me. In view of this, a decision may be unexpected even in the very near future.
Today, Hull, when asked by journalists, said that he could tell them something new even before he leaves for vacation, that is, on August 15 or 16. Rather, Roosevelt, who was engaged by his policy, would not break.
Also, although I am assured by a number of comrades that the English word Loban undermines almost the entire form of credit, yet Roosevelt will not easily defend such an interpretation in public (he is partly angry about it).
At the same time, if we start making concessions immediately, we will find ourselves in a difficult position in the negotiations and the State Department will not make further concessions.
I think it's best to state, we've made a lot of concessions, now it's the State Department's turn, if it makes a much better offer, we'll try to accommodate them for our part. I assume that the form of the loan will not be difficult to negotiate, the amount of debt of 100 million dollars can be persuaded to accept. At some small percentage of the amount of debt from 1 to 3, the State Department will insist. An agreement is likely for the amount of loans of $200 million. A significant difficulty will be with the interest that we agree to pay for the loan.
The most difficult issue will be the question of the terms of the loan, it seems to me that we should immediately think about such a compromise: in addition to the wording on our part, which would say: we simply renounce mutual claims, we receive part of the loan, for example , half, i.e. 100 million dollars on our terms for a full 20 years (with the refusal to cancel bills every 5 years or directly for 20 years - this is a secondary issue), and for example the second 100 million on the basis of a revolving loan with a term for each transaction improved in comparison with the American offer.
If you are inclined to such a decision, then give me the limit to which I can bargain. Keep in mind that the decision must be made soon, because Roosevelt is seriously going to make a decision within a few days. It would be dangerous for us to procrastinate given the current mood. Hurry up. Troyanovsky. HP 2010/sh.
14.VIII.34Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin August 14, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 64. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 50. L. 20. Typewritten text with corrections by Kaganovich. Signatures are autographs.
Encryption.
From Moscow 14/VIII - 34 at 18 o'clock. 55 min. In. No. 20.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
On July 5, the Politburo allowed the NKVT to agree to include in the agreement on new import credits in the amount of 200 million marks a clause on our agreement to place ordinary orders in Germany on the old terms, but without fixing this amount. The Germans are now insistently raising the issue of fixing this amount at 60 million marks or including in the agreement the wording that we will strive to keep current orders at least at the level of the last twelve months.
NKVT, Rosengolts asked permission to agree with the second wording of the Germans. If we accept the wording of the Germans, then we owe ordinary orders worth more than 60 million marks, since in the second half of 1933 and the first half of 1934 we placed orders worth 74 million marks. In our opinion, we should not go for such a large amount.
We think that we should leave the previous position 1 and only as a last resort agree to place regular orders in the amount of not more than 30 million marks. Please provide your opinion. HP 20.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
____________________________
On July 5, 1934, the PB decided to “renounce our right to use an additional loan of 25 million marks in Germany” (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 16. L. 113).Stalin to Kaganovich August 14, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 64 rev. Autograph.
Your 20. To take a loan for current orders on normal terms means to take them on worse terms compared to a 200 million loan. We need 200 mil. credit with improved conditions in order to pour in most of the current orders. If we accept the German proposal, we will enslave ourselves. Therefore, we must not go beyond 20 or at most 30 million marks.
Stalin.
No. 20.
14/VIII.34 1
______________________
1 Number and date entered by the secretary. August 15 sent in code from Sochi at 1 o'clock. 31 min. (Ibid. L. 63).Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin August 14, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 61. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 50. L. 21. Typewritten text with editing by Molotoe. Signatures are autographs.
Encryption.
From Moscow 14/VIII - 34 at 18 o'clock. 55 min. In. No. 19.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
Osinsky raises the question of resuming the publication in the press of the monthly results of the TsUNKhU on the work of industry.
Please provide your opinion. 1 HP 21. Kaganovich, Molotov.
______________________
1 Stalin at the bottom of the cipher wrote: “Your 21. It is more expedient to print quarterly results. I. Stalin. 14/VIII.34" (Ibid. D. 83. L. 61). On the same day, the corresponding decision of the PB was issued (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 950. L. 27).Kaganovich to Stalin August 14 [1934]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 742. L. 28–34. Autograph.
14/VIII
Dear comrade Stalin.1) Yesterday, having read M. Gorky's report to the Congress of Writers,1 we came to the conclusion that the report in this form is not suitable. First of all, the very construction and arrangement of the material - 3/4, if not more, is occupied by general historical and philosophical reasoning, and even then incorrect. Primitive society is presented as an ideal, and capitalism at all its stages is portrayed as a reactionary force that hindered the development of technology and culture. It is clear that such a position is non-Marxist. Soviet literature is hardly covered, and yet the report is called "On Soviet Literature." In view of the seriousness of our changes and the danger of disrupting the report, we (I, Molotov, Voroshilov, and Comrade Zhdanov) went to see him, and after a rather lengthy conversation, he agreed to make corrections and changes. He seems to be in a bad mood. For example: he started talking about children, that their upbringing is bad, inequality, sort of like a division into poor and rich, some clothes are bad, others are good, it would be necessary to introduce one uniform and give everyone the same clothes. The point, of course, is not that he spoke of difficulties in this respect, but of the taste with which it was said. These conversations reminded me of Comrade Krupskaya. It seems to me that Kamenev plays an important role in shaping these sentiments in Gorky. He can’t calmly talk about Vareikis and Yudin, he scolds them with might and main. Although his article has not been published, it is circulating around and, according to Kryuchkov, 400 people have already read it. Today we exchanged opinions and think that it is better, after making some amendments, to publish it than to allow it to be read as illegal2. The struggle of small groups in connection with the congress is developing with might and main. We instructed Comrade Zhdanov to convene tomorrow the party group of the Organizing Committee and demand that they stop the squabbles and hold the congress at the appropriate ideological and political level, and postpone talk of leadership until the end of the congress.
2) Today, at the meeting, we finally edited the regulation on the special meeting. I am sending it to you, if you have no corrections or changes, please inform me by telegraph.
3) Today we heard comrade N. Kuibyshev about the barracks and Osoaviakhim (comrade Voroshilov was already present). A detailed note from Comrade Kuibyshev is being sent to you, from which you will see all the laxity with passes to the barracks. It is impossible to explain this only by the fact that the Moscow Council did not evict all the residents from the yards where the barracks are located. Of course, they should be evicted, but the guilt of the military, comrade-in-arms, is beyond doubt. Tomorrow we will work on an offer that we will send you. Nakhaev does not yet admit to his connections, we have given instructions to conduct an investigation without discussion, but in accordance with all the rules.
4) The article for Bolshevik is already ready. With all the unwillingness to load you with papers, I still consider it necessary to send you it. It seems to me that now it fits in the main, the article was written by Knorin, edited by Stetsky on the basis of our instructions. I ask you to inform me whether to submit it for printing or to remake it.
5) With the People's Commissariat for Supply, the division was delayed, because Weitzer had an operation in Berlin and he was delayed. One of these days he will arrive, and we will carry out the division of functions, apparatus, property and people4.
6) I am sending you a short note by Comrade Litvinov about the Soviet-Turkish-Persian-Afghan-Iraqi pact. We think Comrade Litvinov's proposal is acceptable. Please let me know your opinion.
Hello to you. Your L. Kaganovich.
_____________________
1 The First All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers, at which Gorky made a report, worked from August 17 to September 1, 1934.
2 The article has not been published. On December 29, 1934, the secretary of the Union of Soviet Writers, A.S. Shcherbakov, wrote to Kaganovich about Gorky’s new article, which caused discontent among the authorities: “The article was written in the spirit of the one that was delayed by the press before the congress” (“Happiness of Literature.” The State and Writers. 1925–1938 Documents compiled by Babichenko D.L. M., 1997. P. 185).
3 At the end of August 1934, informing Stalin about the work of the congress (quoted from a draft letter), A.A. Zhdanov wrote: “The general tone set at the congress somehow ruled out immediately the possibility of turning the congress into an arena of group struggle[.. .] A major role in this matter was played by the warning that we made at 2 meetings of communists before the congress - the party groups of the organizing committee and the congress, where they warned about the danger of Rapp's moods and that the Central Committee would hit group moods hard if they crawled out to the congress ("Literary Front". History of political censorship 1932 - 1940. Collection of documents. Compiled by Babichenko D.L. M., 1994. P. 13).
4 On August 22, 1934, the PB adopted a resolution on the issues of the People's Commissariat for Internal Trade of the USSR. Zhdanov, Mikoyan and Weitzer were instructed to divide the workers and property of the former People's Commissariat for Supply between the People's Commissariat for Food Industry and the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. People's Commissar of Trade I.Ya. Veitser was instructed to "immediately begin to deploy the work of the People's Commissariat and receive the apparatus and current affairs from the People's Commissariat for Supply", and also to submit a scheme for the organizational structure of the People's Commissariat within three days (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 950 L. 46).Stalin to Kaganovich August 15, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 67–69. Autograph.
Kaganovich.
First. Mekhlis' remarks on Gorky's article I consider correct. You can not print articles without the necessary changes. It must be explained to all Communist writers that the master in literature, as in other fields, is only the Central Committee and that they are obliged to obey the latter unquestioningly.
Calm Kirshon and others and tell them that we will not allow either a general or partial restoration of the RAPP.
Second. It seems to me that Troyanovsky has some truth, and we could make some concessions to Roosevelt. Keep in mind that an agreement with Roosevelt can facilitate both the implementation of the eastern regional pact with all the ensuing consequences, and the fight against Japan, which is very important for us. No. 21.
Stalin.
15/VIII.34 1
______________________
1 Number and date entered by the secretary. Dispatched same day at 4pm. 18 min. cipher from Sochi. (Ibid. L. 66).Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin August 15, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 72. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 50. L. 28–29. Typewritten text with Kaganovich's correction. Signatures are autographs.
Encryption.
From Moscow 15/VIII - 34 at 23 o'clock. 50 min. In. No. 24.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
The government of Manchukuo published an official declaration on the state of negotiations, in which it states that in the event of a failure of negotiations on the CER, the responsibility for the failure should be borne entirely by the USSR. This statement is accompanied by a statement to Ohashi Yurenev about the decision of the Manchukuo delegation to leave for Manchuria, since the delegation has nothing to do in Tokyo, although it does not consider the negotiations broken off.
In addition, the desire of the Japanese government to arouse in the Japanese public and abroad an idea of our aggressiveness has been noticed more and more lately.
In view of the foregoing, is it inappropriate to publish a brief TASS report on the main stages of negotiations on the CER, with a price in yen, offered and now offered by us and the Japanese.
Please provide your opinion. HP 27.
Kaganovich, Molotov.Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov August 16, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 72, 72v. Autograph.
Your 27. Quite appropriate. It would be necessary to quote first the price in gold rubles, and then in the current paper yen, so that our great pliability would be clear to everyone. Our current price of 160 million paper yen is barely 50 million gold yen or rubles at the exchange rate. It should have been said about this in a TASS report.
Stalin.
No. 22.
16/VIII.34 1
___________________
1 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 13:00. (Ibid. L. 71).Stalin to Kaganovich [after August 16, 1934]
Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 100. L. 154–160. Autograph.
T[ovari] to Kaganovich.
1) An editorial for Bolshevik is not suitable . First, the article complicates matters by introducing the question of Stalin. It was necessary to take the juxtaposition of Engels-Lenin . The article complicates matters by adding to this juxtaposition the Engels-Stalin juxtaposition. It's unwise tactically. This is stupid from the point of view of the essence of the matter. I made the corresponding change in the article. But then, after reading the article to the end and thinking about the question, I came to the conclusion that the article as a whole is not suitable. That the role of Lenin should not be belittled is clear. But one must also not scold Engels and belittle his role as a politician. And it turned out that Engels is a worthless politician. It doesn't fit.
I suggest:
a) not to give an editorial article in general , but to confine oneself to a change in the composition of the editorial board.
b) Postpone the question of an article depicting Lenin's role in the development of Marxist thought until my arrival.
This is a delicate matter and you cannot say everything in a letter. An exchange of opinion, lively and thorough, is required.
2) Our counter-campaign against Japanese lies and provocations is unsatisfactory and helpless. You must systematically refute every incorrect report in the Japanese press or officials. This is necessary to win the public opinion of Japan, Europe, the USSR. And you sleep safely and do nothing. It is necessary to whip the NKID for hibernation, blindness, myopia. Instead, you are trailing behind the onlookers from the NKID.
I propose to refute, through TASS, the attached report by "Nitsinizi" about a secret treaty between the USSR and China 1 .
I propose to systematically refute the lies of the Japanese press about the USSR through TASS or in separate articles.
You can't yawn and sleep when you're in power! I. Stalin.
______________
On August 22, 1934, the PB adopted a decision "On the refutation of the fictions of the Japanese and Manchu press." The NKVD was asked to "systematically submit to the Central Committee refutation of false reports spread by the Japanese and Manchu press on issues related to the Chinese Eastern Railway." In particular, on the same day, B.S. Stomonyakov was asked to submit draft comments or rebuttals to the report of the Japanese newspaper Nitsi-Nitsi about the allegedly existing secret Soviet-Chinese treaty and other reports (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 17. L. 12).Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin August 17, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 1. D. 83. L. 84. Original. Typescript. Signatures are autographs.
Stalin.
We are sending you the text of the TASS message about the main stages of negotiations on the CER. We believe that it should be submitted for publication today. If you do not have major amendments, then please let us know your opinion today 1 .
Kaganovich. Molotov.
17.VIII.34
_______________
1 On the same day, S. Chechulin telegraphed: “Comrade. Dvinsky, I convey the opinion: “There are no objections to the text. You can print” (Ibid. L. 74). The TASS report was published in the newspapers on August 18, 1934.Stalin to Kaganovich August 18, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 95–96. Autograph.
Kaganovich.
The protection of forests of all kinds should not be entrusted to any one body, and hence to the People's Commissariat for Forests. The protection of forests of local, non-industrial significance, for example, in the upper reaches of rivers, near industrial centers, etc., as well as afforestation in these places, must be taken away from the People's Commissariat of Agriculture and transferred to the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. The protection of industrial forests, as well as afforestation there, should be entrusted to the people's commissariats that exploit them, i.e. NKLesu, NKTyazh, NKPS. Forest plantations in the steppes, as one of the means against drought, as well as its protection, should be entrusted to the NKZem. I don't see any other way out .
Stalin.
#24
18/VIII.34 2
______________________
1 We are talking about the draft decision of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "On the reorganization of the People's Commissariat of the Forestry Industry of the USSR and its local bodies." On September 15, 1934, the PB adopted a draft resolution taking into account all Stalin's proposals (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 952. L. 9).
2 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 21:00. 10 minutes. (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 94).Kaganovich to Stalin August 18 [1934]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 742. L. 35–40. Autograph.
18/VIII
Hello, Dear Comrade Stalin!
1) Your instructions on grain procurements are absolutely correct and timely. The last five-day period does not give an increase in rates, and in a number of regions it even gives a decrease, especially in such regions as: Kursk, Voronezh, in the Middle Volga, in the Gorky Territory and in the regions of Ukraine, especially in Dnepropetrovsk.
The Saratov Territory harvests poorly and, in general, it is necessary to look closely at it in the same way as the Stalingrad region.
For individual farmers, the 3rd five-day period does not improve. Last night we sat over the drafting of a resolution and specific instructions for lagging regions. Today I will finalize them and tomorrow we will accept and send them to the places. It is especially necessary to look closely at the progress of procurement in Ukraine. They have areas there where the crop really died, but here the main thing is to use the discount given to them. But there, according to available information, because of these bad districts, an unimportant mood for preparations is created, I think to talk personally with Comrades. Kosior and Postyshev on the phone about these concerns, and if necessary, call one of them to Moscow.
2) The Congress of Writers opened yesterday. Gorky's opening speech, as you already know from the newspapers, came out well.
The report, of course, is not so, but the mood at the congress is good and cheerful.
Comrade Zhdanov assembled the party group and put before them the question of ending groupism and attempts to restore Rappovism. Most reacted well to this, and the rest fell silent. It must be assumed that now the congress will be held at a higher level of principle.
T. Zhdanov delivered a good welcoming speech.
We did not go to the opening of the congress, but Gorky asks us to call on him the other day to talk with foreign writers who have come to the congress, apparently we will have to go.
3) The Komsomol members want to convene a congress of the Komsomol in the second half of November with the following order of the day:
1) Report of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks;
2) Report of the Central Committee of the Komsomol;
3) Report of the delegation to KIM;
4) Report of the People's Commissariat of Heavy and People's Commissariat of Land on the technical training of youth.
Please let me know your opinion. I think you can accept their suggestion 1 ;
5) So far, we have not approved a trade representative for Germany. Rozengolts nominated Frumkin, I think that this candidacy cannot be accepted. Ozersky could go to Berlin, and Kisin to London 2 .
Please let me know your opinion.
Hello to you.
Your L. Kaganovich.
___________________
1 The decision to convene a congress of the Komsomol on December 1, 1934 was adopted by the PB on November 9, 1934 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 954. L. 31).
2 A.V. Ozersky was in Great Britain in 1932–1936 as a trade representative. D.V. Kandelaki was appointed trade representative to Berlin by decision of the PB of December 5, 1934 (Ibid. D. 955. L. 20).Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin August 19, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 98. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 50. L. 32. Typewritten text. Signatures are autographs.
Encryption.
From Moscow 19/VIII - 34 at 19 o'clock. 45 min. In. No. 26.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
On the Mongolian-Manchurian border, 2 Japanese and 1 Chinese were detained, who crossed the border under the pretext of "looking for treasure."
We believe that in the current situation it is not worth creating a conflict because of this and we plan the following solution: "Recommend to the Mongolian government to sentence those arrested to expulsion and expel them immediately."
Please let us know your opinion 1 . HP 29.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
_____________________________
On August 1 , 20, Stalin agreed in a cipher from Sochi at 0000 hours. 42 min. (Ibid. D. 83. L. 97).Kaganovich to Stalin August 20, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 101. Original. Typescript; F. 558 Op. 11. D. 50. L. 33. Autograph.
Encryption.
From Moscow 20/VIII — 34 0 hour. 12 min. In. No. 27.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
1) Myshkov was approved as Lyubimov's first deputy 1 .
2) People's Commissar of local industry could be selected from the following candidates: Ukhanov, Ryabinin, Gilinsky.
3) Khinchuk is waiting for an appointment, we think that he can be appointed People's Commissar for Internal Trade of the RSFSR. He himself agrees.
Please let me know your opinion 2 . HP 30. Kaganovich.
_______________________
On August 19, 1934, the PB approved the deputy people's commissars of light industry of the USSR: N.G. Myshkov - the first, and I.G. Eremin - the second (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 950. L. 49).Stalin to Kaganovich August 20, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558 Op. 11. D. 83. L. 101. Autograph.
Your 30. Ukhanov is suitable for local industry 1 . Ryabinin is not suitable. Gilinsky must not be touched, he has a big job 2 . I have no objection to Khinchuk's account.
Stalin.
No. 26.
20/VIII - 34 3
___________________________
On August 22, 1934, the PB appointed K.V. Ukhanov as People's Commissar of Local Industry of the RSFSR (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 950. L. 49).
2 Further, Stalin crossed out: “Weitzer has already been appointed People's Commissar of the Interior. There is no reason to change this decision. Khinchuk can be appointed as his deputy.” On August 22, 1934, L.M. Khinchuk was appointed People's Commissar of Internal Trade of the RSFSR (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 38).
3 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 16:00. 50 min.Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov August 20, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558 Op. 11. D. 83. L. 106. Autograph.
Whether the protest is addressed to the Japanese or the Manchus, it is not clear from your encryption 1 . I propose to delete the word “resolute” in the text before the word “protest” and replace it with the word “one’s own”, and also to delete the words “will not be slow to do it” at the end of the text and replace them with the word “will do it”.
Stalin.
No. 27.
20/VIII.34 2
____________________
1 Stalin responds to Kaganovich and Molotov's cipher dated August 20, 1934, which contained the text of a note of protest against the arrests at the CER (Ibid. L. 104-106). The note was presented to the Japanese Foreign Minister on 22 August 1934 and published in the newspapers on 24 August.
2 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 16:00. 51 min. (Ibid. L. 103).Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin August 21, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 111–113. Script. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 50. L. 37. Typewritten text with Kaganovich's notes.
Encryption.
From Moscow 21/VIII - 34, 3 hours. 07 min. 1 In. No. 29.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
Litvinov, asked by us in connection with Troyanovsky's telegrams, gave the following answer:
“If the financial loan is rejected, then Troyanovsky must put forward my proposal, which we discussed at the session on the day of my departure, namely: we buy in America the goods we need on credit, but without any obligation on our part, and in those cases when the export-import bank participates in loans at 75%, we agree in advance to pay a predetermined percentage for the loan, say seven. A part of this interest may be used by the bank to pay off Kerensky's debt, but there must be no written agreement on this.
The terms of the loan are determined for each transaction on a case-by-case basis. We conclude an agreement with the American government only on the dates when our purchases on credit with the participation of the bank reach a certain amount, which must be calculated in advance, all American monetary claims will be considered liquidated. If Troyanovsky offers Hull a choice of both options, i.e. either financial credit, as I suggested to Bullitt, or commodity credit, as above, this, plus the threat of publication or arbitrage, will immediately soften the situation.
We discussed his proposal in detail and came to the conclusion that, due to its uncertainty, it is unlikely to be accepted by the Americans, and at the same time, for us, it may turn out to be completely unprofitable in practice. Therefore, we propose not to change the entire structure of the agreement already being discussed with the Americans and to make only a partial concession.
The essence of this concession is set out in the attached draft telegram to Troyanovsky and in the draft Memorandum.
Please let us know your opinion 2 . HP 35.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
Appendix No. 1 to telegram HP 35; draft telegram to Troyanovsky:
“I am sending you by separate telegram the text of the memorandum, which you must hand over to the State Department. From this memorandum, you will see that we have accepted your proposal regarding the forms of loans and will demand from the Americans only $100 million in the form of a long-term financial loan, and the remaining $100 million are ready to take in the form of a commodity loan with a term of at least 5 years. We do not agree to pay any interest on the old debt, and we will pay no more than 7% on the loan we receive, together with the premium. Finally, we cannot bind ourselves with a promise to buy cattle and other agricultural products from America. Consider that our concessions are extreme and in your negotiations adhere strictly to the content of the memorandum. Krestinsky" 3 . HP 36.
Annex No. 2 to telegram No. 35; draft memorandum 4 .
____________________
1 On the copy available in the case is the date "20.VIII.34" (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 114).
On August 21, Stalin and Kirov sent a reply in cipher from Sochi at 3 p.m. 30 minutes. (Ibid. L. 110).
On August 21, 1934, this telegram was sent to Troyanovsky (DVP, vol. XVII, p. 565).
4 Not published, fully published: see DVP. T. XVII. pp. 570–571.Stalin to Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Molotov [earlier August 21, 1934]
Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 100. L. 149–151. Autograph.
tt. Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Molotov .
So far I have managed to look through the first part of the "regulations" on the People's Commissariat of Defense 1 .
I have major revisions. I don't know if you read the points of the "provisions". It seems to me that our comrades misunderstood the idea of turning the NKvoenmor into the NCOB. This transformation pursued only one goal : to unite all types of defense formally (in fact, they are already united) - the army, the Navy, the air fleet - into one hand. And according to the "position" it turned out the abolition of the SRT, the transformation of the People's Commissariat of Defense into the STO, the transfer of a number of functions of the Central Executive Committee to the People's Commissariat of Transport. Subparagraphs “b” (end), “d”, “g”, “h”, “i”, “n”, “p” of paragraph 5 of the “Regulations” on the People's Commissariat and subparagraphs “a”, “b”, “c ”, “g” of paragraph 6 of the same “provision” - they explicitly say this.
I will write about the rest of the remarks after reading the rest of the "regulations".
It is clear to me that a "provision" in this form is contrary to the constitution and breaks the elementary concept of the Leninists about the proletarian state, in general, about the National Security Committee, in particular.
Hey!
I. Stalin.
__________________
1 In June 1934, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, a collegium of the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs, was liquidated, and the People's Commissariat itself was renamed the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR. On August 14, Voroshilov sent the following telegram to Stalin: “Sochi. Stalin. I was informed that the regulation on the People's Commissariat of Defense is in your papers in Sochi. We kindly ask you to look at this provision and tell your opinion. Please excuse the inconvenience. I sincerely wish you a good rest. Voroshilov” (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 59).Stalin to Kaganovich, Zhdanov August 21, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 100. D. 55–59. Autograph.
T. Kaganovich. Zhdanov.
a) I am returning the “regulations” on the drug mob, districts and the military council.
I already wrote that we cannot turn the drug commissar either into the Central Executive Committee, which only has the right to call the population for military service, give pensions , etc., or into the Council of People's Commissars or the STO, which alone have the right to give instructions to all people's commissariats, to mobilize national economy for defense, etc.
For other remarks, see the texts of the "provisions".
It would be necessary to combine all three "provisions" into one, reducing them as much as possible.
The Central Military Council should be created under the People's Commissariat of Defense, and not under the People's Commissar. The work plan of the Military Council should not be limited to some "individual" issues, but the right of the members of the council to put any question on the agenda should be granted. Otherwise, there is nothing to create a “Military Council”.
As part of the Directorate of the Naval Forces, it would be necessary to create something like a headquarters (in the manner of the Directorate of the Air Force), which develops issues of maritime operations.
I am not convinced that there is a need for a special " fuel supply department". This is luxury.
In general, the "regulations" are slovenly drawn up, they are heaped up with a whole series of "administrations", "inspectorates" and "departments", the necessity of whose existence has yet to be proved.
Furthermore. I think that some bodies of the NCOba, which actually exist, did not find their expression in the "regulations".
The "Regulations" should be studied by the members of the PB and our control bodies in detail, they should be compared with the actual state of affairs in the People's Commissariat for Commissariat of Defense and only after that one general regulation on the NKOB should be adopted.
Comrade Kirov will tell you more.
b) Pay attention not only to the Saratov and Stalingrad Territories, but also to the Chelyabinsk Territory, where something unimaginable is happening with the blanks. Send Chernov, Kleiner, Yakovlev there (that is, to these parts) and make them prepare grain in an honest way .
Hey! I. Stalin. 21/VIII 34.
_________________
On August 25, 1934, the PB sent I.M. Kleiner to the Stalingrad Territory, and M.A. Chernov to the Chelyabinsk Region “to take measures to organize harvesting and grain procurement” (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 950. L. 54).Stalin to Kaganovich, Zhdanov August 21, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 122, 122v. Autograph.
Cipher.
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU. Kaganovich, Zhdanov.
It is obligatory to print in Pravda or Izvestia the reports of the representatives of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Tataria, Georgia and other republics. It is necessary to print them completely or at least 2/3 of each report. The reports of the Nationals are no less important than any other reports. Without their publication, the writers' congress will be colorless and uninteresting. If you need to give slip sheets for this, you need to give them without sparing paper. It is also necessary to print the speeches of speakers, if possible, all speeches. Pravda and Izvestiya apparently do not understand the significance of the writers' congress and do not give it sufficient space. This error must be corrected immediately 1 .
Stalin.
No. 29.
21/VIII.34 2
____________________
1 On August 22, 1934, the PB ordered Pravda and Izvestia to intensify coverage of the work of the writers' congress, "by printing reports on national literatures and organizing the placement of speeches by speakers and speakers from national literatures in full or at least two-thirds of each report" (RGASPI. F. 17. Inventory 3. D. 950. L. 40).
2 Number and date entered by the secretary. Sent on August 22 in code from Sochi at 1 o'clock. 15 minutes. (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 121).Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin August 22, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 125. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow 22/VIII - 34 at 18 o'clock. 50 min. In. No. 31.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
1) Deputies Weitzer are planned as the first Khloplyankin Mikhail, the second Bolotin. Weitzer agrees.
2) Deputies of Mikoyan are planned to be the first Belenky, the second Levitin.
3) We designate Kaminsky as the head of the All-Union Sanitary Inspectorate, leaving him with the USSR People's Commissariat of Health.
Please let us know your opinion 1 . HP 41. Kaganovich, Molotov.
_____________________________
On the same day, by cipher from Sochi, Stalin answered with his consent at 23:00. 15 minutes. (Ibid. L. 124). On August 23, 1934, decisions of the PB were drawn up (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 950. L. 50).Kaganovich to Stalin August 22 [1934]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 742. L. 41–51. Autograph.
22/VIII
Hello, Dear Comrade Stalin!
1) You are quite right in pointing out the extreme insufficiency of our press in responding to the false and provocative fabrications of the Japanese and other press. We have given something in our own and only in the foreign press, but this is absolutely not enough. Today we are publishing several notes, in particular, in connection with the report you sent about the "Soviet-Chinese secret treaty". We once issued a refutation, but it was very short and, moreover, only in the foreign press. Now we will follow this case more intensively.
You will learn the essence of affairs on the Chinese Eastern Railway and in Japan from ciphers and TASS. Today there is a message that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has made a statement in which it also outlines the entire course of the negotiations, of course, in its interpretation, but the figures are the same. Although they attack us in the end, of course, the tone is still such that they hope that an agreement can be reached. I have now instructed you to send this message by telegraph. In this regard, we instructed the NKID to draw up a draft of a new TASS report, and perhaps an interview with someone from the NKID. As soon as the project is ready, we will hand it over to you. Comrade Stomonyakov just called and said that he had Ota. In the first place, he informed him about the protest of the Japanese government against our publication of figures - the price of the CER. Secondly, Ota said that our TASS message made an impression on everyone, that we are finally breaking off the negotiations. Further, Sta talked about the essence of the price, that since construction in Manchuria] one mile costs 100 thousand yen, insofar as the price of the CER should be 100 million, and if Hirota named 120 mil. plus allowance, it's a good price. T[ov.] Stomonyakov told him; that in vain they have the impression that we are breaking up, that they know perfectly well that they themselves are pushing for a break, that he cannot talk about the price, by the way, Sta noticed the food, it would be good to discuss the price in a businesslike way. Thus, if we compare the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the conversation of Sta, it is clear that they are groping for the ground. Apparently, the TASS report pushed them a little against the wall. At the same time they are doing all sorts of vile things in Manchuria. Today there is a message that our arrested people are being tortured, beaten, seeking confessions from them. Today we are publishing an article about torture and beatings, with the aim of obtaining confessions of their participation in the organization of the crashes. They are now developing the entire anti-Soviet campaign around the issue of crashes and our participation in it. Moreover, you are right that we need to expose more vigorously. That is why we want to give one more message or interview, so that the question of the price and the sale of the CER will bring down their campaign about the crashes.1 .
2) Boev raised the question that since the situation of negotiations in America is not clear at the moment, he should stay here for some more time. We agreed to delay his departure until we received a response from Troyanovsky. Please let us know your opinion 2 .
3) We do not publish the article in Bolshevik.
4) I must confess that prior to your letter I had not read the provisions on the NGO's defense. After reviewing, I fully agree with your assessment and comments. Today we discussed this issue. There were references to the fact that points of the old regulation of 1929 were repeated here. Yesterday I carefully checked with the old regulation, there really is a lot in the old one. But in the 1st, not all, and such wordings that change character have been thrown out and changed, and secondly, even if some of these points were in the old position, this does not exclude that they are incorrect. For example, a) in the old regulation there was no provision for the leadership of the OGPU troops; b) in the old provision it was said "management and supervision of the activities of the mobilization apparatuses of all departments" (which is also incorrect), and in the new: "management of the mobilization work of the people's commissariats and the mobilization preparation of the national economy."
Why then really SRT ?
Or here's another: c) in the old provision, in the paragraph where it is said about the issuance of statutes, binding regulations, etc. it was written at the beginning like this: “The Tax Code for Military [military] and Marine] cases is provided in compliance with the laws in force ”, etc. In the new provision, this “with observance of existing laws” fell out, etc. etc. They argued and accepted the following | resolution: “Instruct the commission to revise the draft regulation in accordance with the instructions of Comrade Stalin. Introduce Comrade Kaganovich to the commission.” I will continue to carefully review the entire situation and ask you if you have any more comments to let me know. We will send you a new position, otherwise it may be even better to postpone until your arrival 3 .
5) We have already made a decision to guard the barracks and Osoaviakhim. They also sent out an order from Comrade Voroshilov. I won't say that it was adopted without controversy, but this decision now makes it possible to really take on the correction of the revealed shortcomings 4 . All your instructions were taken into account by us. Tomorrow I am gathering the top military of the Moscow Military District to explain this decision.
6) In accordance with your instructions, we worked out and sent out a short resolution on grain procurements (attached) 5 . In addition, you have to press the places with separate telegrams and telephone conversations. This five-day period gave a little more than the last one. In the past 84 m[ln]. 869 t[thous. pounds |, in this 87 m [ln] 295 thousand [thous. pud.] The shift is small, you will have to achieve more.
7) In response to your telegram regarding the printing of reports and speeches at the Writers' Congress, we have already taken action today. It is very useful, because the first days of the Nationals did not feel well. As a result of some measures, the mood has improved, but now, by the detailed printing of reports and speeches, they will feel completely equal . The convention is going well. The debates are substantive and pass with enthusiasm.
Hello to you. Your L. Kaganovich.
_____________________________
1On August 18, 1934, after negotiations over the sale of the CER had reached another deadlock, a TASS report was published detailing the history of the negotiations and announcing the amounts of the road to be bought out, around which there were disputes. The TASS report emphasized that the Soviet side was striving in every possible way for progress in the negotiations and made numerous concessions. In response, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Japan and Manchuria published statements containing their version of the development of negotiations, emphasizing the readiness of the Japanese-Manchurian side for compromises and the intransigence of the Soviet delegation. In addition, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs instructed the Japanese Ambassador to the USSR to file a protest over the violation by the Soviet side of the agreement on non-publication of data relating to the negotiations. At the same time, arrests of Soviet employees continued at the CER. From 13 to 21 August, 38 people were arrested on charges of involvement in the organization of derailments and attacks on trains (See DVP, vol. XVII, pp. 562-570, 815-817).
2 We are talking about Soviet-American negotiations on the liquidation of mutual financial claims. On August 13, Troyanovsky, Plenipotentiary Representative of the USSR to the United States, asked Moscow for permission to put forward new proposals on this issue. On August 21, a positive reply was sent to him (See DVP. Vol. XVII. S. 565, 816).
On August 22, 1934, the PB instructed a specially assigned commission of the Politburo to "revise—in accordance with Comrade Stalin's instructions—the Regulations on the People's Commissariat of Defense." Kaganovich was included in the commission (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 950. L. 44). The final regulation on the People's Commissariat of Defense was adopted by a survey of members of the PB on November 14, 1934 (Ibid. D. 955. L. 1a).
fourOn August 22, 1934, the PB adopted a resolution "On the work of Osbaviahim", in which this organization was sharply criticized, and its leaders received penalties (Ibid. L. 42, 93-96). On the same day, the PB approved a resolution "On the state of protection of the barracks of the Moscow garrison." It noted the low discipline of the guard services and took note of Voroshilov's message about sending him a special directive on putting the barracks security system in order (the directive itself of August 14, 1934 was attached to the protocol of the PB meeting). The resolution of the PB declared penalties to the command of the Moscow Military District, the Moscow Rifle Proletarian Division and employees of a special department of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD. The decree was sent to the military and party leaders in the field (Ibid. L. 41, 97-100).
On August 19, 1934, the PB approved the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks “On the Progress of Grain Procurement,” which noted that in a number of regions, territories and republics there was a threat to the fulfillment of the grain procurement plan. The resolution proposed to recall the leaders of these lagging regions from vacations, to send commissioners to their places, to ensure the fight against theft of grain, the return of loans to the state, and other measures (Ibid. L. 36, 91-92).Kaganovich, Zhdanov, Stetsky to Stalin August 23, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 141–142. Script. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow 23/V1II - 34 at 5 o'clock. 55 min. In. No. 32.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
The debate on the first question at the writers' congress is coming to an end. The question arises of how to end the discussion of Gorky's report. We consider it inexpedient for the congress to adopt Gorky's report as a program. You can't move on to the next question without any solution either. Therefore, we have drafted a short resolution, which we send and ask for your opinion 1 . The debate on the report is going on with great enthusiasm.
Kaganovich, Zhdanov, Stetsky.
“Draft resolution. The First All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers, having heard and discussed the report of A.M. Gorky on Soviet literature, co-reports on the literatures of Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Tajik, Turkmen, Uzbek SSR and Tatar ASSR, states that the Soviet fiction of the peoples of the Soviet Union As a result of victorious socialist construction and the defeat of the class enemies of the proletariat and working people, the USSR has grown into a mighty force of socialist culture and the education of the working masses in the spirit of socialism. Under the leadership of the heroic CPSU (b) headed by Comrade. Stalin and thanks to the daily assistance of the party, writers of all the peoples of the USSR came to their first congress as a team, ideologically, organizationally and creatively united around the party and the Soviet government in a single Union of Soviet Writers. The congress approves the activities of the organizing committee of the Union of Soviet Writers, which carried out the task of uniting Soviet writers in the Union of Soviet Writers and ensuring the preparation of their first congress. The congress notes the outstanding role in this work of the great proletarian writer Maxim Gorky. The congress instructs the governing bodies of the Union of Soviet Writers, taking into account the reports and exchange of opinions at the congress, to develop practical measures to assist Soviet writers in their creative work, to help young beginning Soviet writers and to strengthen the ties between writers and the working masses so that all the activities of the Union of Soviet Writers would ensure further rise in creative work in all areas of Soviet literature and the creation of highly artistic, imbued with the spirit of socialism, works of art. No. 42, 43.
_____________________
1 On the same day, Stalin agreed in code from Sochi at 4 pm. 35 min. (Ibid. L. 140). On August 23, 1934, the PB decided to submit the text of this resolution to the Congress of Writers (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 950. L. 51).Molotov, Kaganovich to Stalin August 23, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 151. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 50. L. 43. Text - Molotov's autograph with Kaganovich's correction.
Encryption.
From Moscow on 23/VIII-34 at 15:00. 55 min. In. No. 33.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
In view of the fact that the People's Commissariat of Internal Trade has begun work, we consider it expedient to take a decision to liquidate the Committee of Funds. Please let us know your opinion 1 . HP 44 Molotov, Kaganovich.
________________________
1 On the same day, by cipher from Sochi, Stalin answered with his consent at 22:00. 08 min. (Ibid. D. 83. L. 150). The PB decision was drawn up on August 23 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 950. L. 51).Stalin to Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze, Molotov August 23, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 146–149. Autograph.
Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze, Molotov.
Acquaintance with the specific material shows that our production plan for Azneft of 21 million tons without gas certainly exceeds our current maximum capabilities and cannot be met. This plan means an increase of 6 million tons per year. Such an increase from the point of view of normal production has no precedents in our country, and its introduction into the plan can only be explained by counting on an unprecedented increase in the production of flowing oil. But this calculation, as shown by the past 7 months, turned out to be unfounded. I propose to deal with Azneft in the same way as they did with Metrostroy, i.e. reduce the plan and give it a new plan of 19 million tons instead of the current 21 million. Such a plan would mean an annual increase of 4 million, i.e. undeniably a record figure. This is necessary if we do not want to destroy the workers of Azneft "Azerbaijan" and Transcaucasia. Over the past 7 months, these workers have shown ludes of initiative and energy and have given almost three million tons of growth, and they walk around with the stigma of criminals, like spat upon, failed planostates. And all this is due to the fact that we gave them a deliberately impossible maximalist plan. I propose to reduce the plan1 .
Stalin.
No. 32, 33.
23/VIII.34 2Stalin - Kaganovich, Zhdanov, Stetsky, Mekhlis August 24, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 742. L. 53–55. Autograph; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 153. Original. Typescript.
Kaganovich, Zhdanov, Stetsky, Mekhlis.
In Pravda of August 24, on the first page, something like a draft resolution of a congress of writers was printed, with the heading "Let's create highly artistic works." An undemanding reader might think that this is a draft of slogans for the congress, owned by an unknown author.
But in fact, this is the resolution of the First All-Union Congress of Writers.
This is bewildering. Any literate person will understand that the resolution of the congress must be titled precisely as the resolution of such and such a congress, adopted on such and such an item on the agenda of the congress. Explain to the illiterate bureaucrats from Pravda that congress resolutions cannot be printed in this form.
Stalin. 24/VIII-34 1
_____________________
1 Date entered by the secretary. Sent in code from Sochi on August 24, 1934 at 22:00. 25 min. (Ibid. D. 83. L. 153).Stalin to Kaganovich, Zhdanov August 25, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 83. L. 156–157. Autograph.
Kaganovich, Zhdanov .
It is necessary to scold the party organizations of Buryat-Mongolia, Yakutia and the Volga Germans for the fact that nothing is heard about them at the congress of writers. The same must be done with regard to the Bashkirs, who did not give the congress anything coherent or interesting. The Congress of Writers is a very important matter, for it shapes and strengthens the intelligentsia of the peoples of the USSR under the flag of the soviets, under the flag of socialism. This is very important for us, for the cause of socialism. The indicated republics found themselves at the tail end of events, turned out to be cut off from the real thing, and thereby dishonored themselves. We cannot pass by such a failure 1 .
Stalin.
No. 35.
25/VIII.34 2
______________________
On August 28, the PB adopted a decision “On the preparation for the All-Union Congress of Writers of the Party Organizations of Bashkiria, Buryat-Mongolia, Yakutia and the Volga Germans”, which was “put in sight” by the secretaries of the regional committees and chairmen of the councils of people’s commissars of the mentioned republics because they “did not take into account the most important The All-Union Congress of Writers [..] did not pay due attention to the selection of delegates to the congress and the preparation of their reports and speeches at the congress, where they were to fully and clearly reflect the growth of the culture and intelligentsia of their people ”(RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3 D. 951. L. 8).
2 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 4 o'clock. 50 min. (Ibid. F. 558. Op. I. D. 83. L. 155).Kaganovich to Stalin August 25 [1934]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 742. L. 56–64. Autograph.
25/VIII
Hello, Dear Comrade Stalin!
1) I did not send you the TASS or Krestinsky message promised in the letter, because we received a message from Yurenev that Togo, Hirota's assistant, was with him and indicated the possibility of an increase by the Japanese of 10 million.
Today we sent you a draft of our directive to Yurenev. We have just received another cipher from Yurenev, in which he says that in Japanese circles a compromise is conceived as a division of the price difference in half. Apparently, this corresponds to reality, it seems to me, Comrade Stalin, that now we should receive a directive from you on where to conduct business now in the next week, because here we may end up with some marking time.
2) Today we had a PB meeting. We are sending you the protocol 1 . We discussed questions of the financial economy of the collective farms, where so far money is not counted, we have appointed a commission to develop proposals.
We discussed the issue of repairing tractors, the NKZem is already late with this matter, and our agricultural department is also working sluggishly now. Yakovlev is still sick. The proposed project needed to be revised, and we instructed to present the measures to us within 5 days. We made a decision about electric welding, paintwork, etc. Of the questions we have put aside, the question of trade unions and the criminal code deserves to be emphasized.
As for the trade unions, it did not turn out well at the PB. As you remember, Comrade Stalin, the commission was instructed to proceed from the need to split the trade unions from 47 to 145-150. We have developed this question." At the PB, Comrade Voroshilov questioned the whole question on its merits. Is it advisable to break it up, and how can Shvernik manage such a quantity, etc. T. Molotov essentially supported him, although he said rather vaguely that it was impossible to break and create new alliances every day, that this was a very serious matter, and so on. But it turned out, as they themselves declared that neither Molotov nor Comrade Voroshilov read the draft, but they made general speeches and, as they say, they let in the fog. We have postponed the issue.
I think that it does not need to be dragged out, since the trade unions are all in a transitional state, and their already weak work has fallen even more.
It would be good if you looked at the draft, but I am sending the draft to Comrade Poskrebyshev, if you can, he will acquaint you with it.
On the issue of the criminal code. At one time, the PB instructed Comrade Yenukidze's commission to draft the foundations of the Criminal Code of the Union and the Criminal Code of the Union Republics.
Now Comrade Yenukidze has made a proposal to draw up a unified Criminal Code of the USSR, a unified Code of Criminal Procedure of the USSR, and a regulation on the judicial system of the USSR. Since this makes changes to the constitution, we decided to postpone and ask for your opinion.
3) Today they accepted your proposal for oil, reduced it by 2 million. This is absolutely correct, otherwise people can muzzle themselves, and things will not work out.
4) Chernov is leaving for Chelyabinsk, while Kleiner has already left for Saratov and Stalingrad. Yakovlev is sick. We will keep an eye on the bakeries.
5) According to your instructions, a commission was created to develop cotton issues. The leadership of the commission was entrusted to me. I'll try to work out the issue in a fundamental way. When it is ready, we will send you the project.
6) The Writers' Congress is going well. The shortcomings that you pointed out in your telegrams have been corrected.
7) Your instructions on the position on the NK Defense, which you gave in the letter in your comments on the position and through Comrade Kirov, we will take everything into account. They correct the grossest mistakes that go beyond organizational ones.
Hello to you. Your L. Kaganovich.
_______________________
1 The decisions reported by Kaganovich are recorded in the protocol of the PB for August 25, 1934 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 950).Stalin to Kaganovich, Zhdanov August 25, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 100. L. 61–66. Autograph.
T[ovari] to Kaganovich and Zhdanov.
It is clear from the materials sent that you are all counting on a good harvest in Siberia, in the Urals, on the Volga, and, counting on it, reassure yourself that since a good harvest means that the harvests will be good.
There is nothing to prove that such calculations and hopes are absolutely wrong , illusory , dangerous , and can only bring down and run aground the state.
This is my conviction.
Necessary:
1) Immediately organize pressure (maximum pressure!) on the workpieces both in these regions and in other harvest regions, declaring war on sa-mo-te-ku.
2) Immediately start organizing the purchase of grain in all productive regions with the task of purchasing at least 200 mil. poods of grain at all costs , for which, in turn, it is necessary: a) to somewhat deprive the barren regions of goods in favor of the productive ones, now to create a serious additional commodity fund for the productive regions and move it there to the period of a reversal in the purchase of grain;
b) now increase the monetary pressure (seriously increase it!) in the harvest regions in order to create there a need for money and a desire to sell grain (I would not even object to certain “voluntary-compulsory” measures in the harvest regions to stimulate the purchase of bread).
All this is essential.
Hey! I. Stalin.
25/VIII-34Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin August 26, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 84. L. 2v. Script. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 50. L. 44. Typewritten copy with Molotov's corrections.
Encryption.
From Moscow 26/VIII - 34 at 1 o'clock. 07 min. In. No. 34.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
Yurenev had Togo on August 23 and, with the proviso that he was doing this allegedly on his own behalf, offered an increase of 10 million yen. Togo added that if we agree with his proposal, then he does not doubt the consent of Hirota and the Manchus. Togo persuaded Yurenev to find out Moscow's attitude to this proposal as soon as possible.
We think that Kozlovsky will have to go to Togo and, warning that he is speaking personally on his own behalf, and not on behalf of Moscow or Yurenev, say something like the following:
1) Kozlovsky is satisfied that the Japanese side is making a concession, but this concession is, however, completely insufficient.
2) The Soviet side proceeds from the proposals for the price and other conditions regarding the sale of the CER, which were announced by Yurenev on July 30, but if the Japanese side increased the price offered by Torz and in this way approached the last offer of the Soviet side, then Kozlovsky hopes that it would be possible to find a way to an agreement.
3) Of course, the prerequisite for this must be the release of the arrested Soviet citizens, the cessation of violent actions in Manchuria and the anti-Soviet speeches of the Japanese authorities and the Japanese press.
Please let us know your opinion 1 . No. 45, 46. Kaganovich, Molotov.Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov August 26, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 84. L. 2. Autograph.
Your 45 and 46.
I propose that Kozlovsky be instructed to declare on his own behalf that, in view of the desire shown by the Japanese to make a new, albeit insignificant, concession, he is personally ready to try to convince the Soviets to lower the price by 10 million and bring it up to 150 million yen, on the indispensable condition that the conditions for the sale of the CER, set out in Yurenev's statement of 30 July will be accepted by the Japanese 1 .
Stalin.
#36
26/VIII.34 2
___________________
1 We are talking about negotiations on the sale of the CER.
2 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 14:00. 10 minutes. (Ibid. L. 1).Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin August 26, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 84. L. 6. Original. Typescript.
Wire note.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
We propose to publish in our press the Japanese and, in an abbreviated form, the Manchu responses to the TASS report with the following new statement from TASS:
“In connection with the publication of the statement of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs of August 21 and the statement of the Manchu government of August 22 regarding the negotiations on the CER, TASS is authorized to report the following: the published statements of the Japanese-Manchu side repeat exactly the figures given by TASS in the message of August 18 . These figures and facts, however, are covered by both reports in a very subjective and one-sided way in an attempt to prove that the Japanese-Manchurian side was accommodating in the negotiations. As an example, one can point to the attempt contained in the statement of the Manchu government to convince public opinion that the Japanese-Manchurian side offered not 120, but 170 million yen for the CER. This last figure is obtained by including 50 million yen in severance payments, which should be paid to the Soviet and Manchu employees of the road in case of their dismissal. Meanwhile, it is quite clear that the dismissal or not dismissal of employees of the road after its purchase is the business of the new owner of the road, the Japanese-Manchurian side, which must naturally bear the costs associated with the dismissal.1 . The far-fetchedness and artificiality of all the arguments of both statements, aimed at justifying the presentation of the unilateral opinion of the Japanese-Manchurian side, frees TASS from the need to argue with them.
Please let us know your opinion 2 .
Kaganovich, Molotov.
26/VIII.34
__________________
1 Reading the note, Stalin after the words “it is natural to bear the expenses associated with dismissal” added the following: “for severance pay. At the same time, it is clear that such expenses cannot in any way be included in the price of the CER.
2 August 26 at 9 p.m. 59 min. Stalin agreed, taking into account the amendment he had made (Ibid. L. 4). On the same day, the PB decided to publish a new TASS statement refuting the allegations made in the statements of the Japanese and Manchu ministries of foreign affairs on August 21 and 22 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 17. L. 27-28). This TASS statement was published in newspapers on 27 August.Kaganovich to Stalin August 28 [1934]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 742. L. 65–74. Autograph.
28/VIII
Dear comrade Stalin.
1) Last night Vasya gave me your letter in which you write about grain procurements. Your warning, your signal is not only timely, but directly saving the cause of successful grain procurement. Today we gathered the PB, where we discussed the issues of grain procurement and cleaning. The picture is certainly disturbing. Early harvesting in the south led to a jump in harvests in July and early August, but the pace of the 2,3,4,5 five-day days of August gives a sharp decline in rates, as follows:
Five days of August [million pounds]
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
1933 43.2 73.9 94.5 94.8 98
1934 75.1 82.9 84.9 87.8 76.4
You are absolutely right that complacency is especially dangerous in the Urals, Bashkiria, the Middle Volga and other Volga regions and Western Siberia.
Yesterday the head of the Political Administration of the NKZem, comrade Levin, arrived from Siberia, and he told a whole series of facts testifying to complacency in Siberia. Today we have developed specific telegrams for regions and territories, but this, of course, is not enough. We scheduled Comrade Chubar to be sent to the regions, to the Stalingrad Territory, Chernov leaves for Chelyabinsk tomorrow, Kalmanovich to Bashkiria, and then we talked about Comrade Zhdanov's trip to Western Siberia. Tov. Molotov agreed to go either to Western Siberia or to Kazakhstan. Tov. Mikoyan will go south to harvest beets and at the same time to harvest them. We ask you to tell us by telegraph youropinion about the trip Zhdanov and Molotov. I personally could leave for 10 days, but then Zhdanov would have to stay. The same tt. we instruct to take measures for harvesting and threshing, because here too the situation is bad, especially in the eastern regions and territories. In addition, we decided to send to the places 10 members of the Party] and Soviet] control commissions for harvesting and procurement and to transfer all authorized commissions of the Party] and Soviet] control for 1 ½ months to the same matter.
On the allocation of the commodity fund and the purchase of grain, we instructed the commission, which included Comrades. Chubar and Zhdanov, to submit their proposals within 2 days 1 .
2) There is no answer from Japan yet, arrests continue.
I am sending you the cipher received today vol. 2 Potemkin about his conversation with Mussolini. Of course, Mussolini wants to make money here, but his conversation is very interesting.
I am also sending you a letter from Comrade Stomonyakov about your reception (after your arrival in Moscow) of the Japanese writer Kawakami .
3) Comrades Krestinsky and Surits put before us today the question of Surits's departure and directives to him. Surits believes that he should not rush now and, upon arrival there, should not raise the issue of the so-called East Locarno. Krestinsky, on the contrary, believes that Surits should leave now and, upon arrival, at a meeting with Neurath, should raise the issue of concluding an Eastern Pact. We bowed to Krestinsky's proposal and decided to leave Comrade Suritsa on September 3rd. We ask you to telegraph your opinion. Just in case, I am sending a letter to Krestinsky 4 .
4) When discussing the question of guarding the barracks, Comrade Voroshilov raised the question of removing Kork. Comrade Kork has now personally sent me a letter asking me to support his dismissal from the post of commander of the Moscow Military District. I personally don't think he should be released. I beg you to let me know your opinion.
5) In one of my letters I wrote to you about Comrade Litvinov's proposal for a Soviet-Turkish-Afghan pact. The other day, the Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs is coming - you will have to give an answer. I beg you to telegraph your opinion 5 .
6) As expected, Nakhaev confessed his connections with General Bykov, who worked at the Institute of Physical Education. And this general is a scout, as it has been established so far, Estonian. It must, of course, be assumed that not only Estonian. These are the first confessions. I will inform about the future 6 .
Hello to you. Yours L. Kaganovich.
______________________
1On August 31, 1934, the PB adopted a resolution on grain procurements. A telegram was approved to the leaders of regions, territories and republics, in which a demand was put forward to strengthen grain procurements, to send two-thirds of the members of the bureaus of regional committees, regional committees and members of the presidiums of regional and regional executive committees for the whole of September. The resolution demanded that the deliverers of bread be fined and brought to justice. In a change to the previous practice, it was decided to immediately purchase grain for the state by cooperatives from collective farms, collective farmers and individual farmers who had fulfilled their annual plans for grain deliveries. It was planned to strengthen the collection of all kinds of payments and arrears, etc. The Politburo sent Molotov to Western Siberia, Kaganovich to Ukraine, Kirov to Kazakhstan, Voroshilov to Belarus and the Western Region, Mikoyan to the Kursk and Voronezh regions, Chubar to the Middle Volga Territory, Zhdanov to the Stalingrad Territory, Chernov to the Chelyabinsk Region, etc. (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 951. L. 16, 81–83).
2 No encryption.
3 Japanese Ambassador to the USSR Ota turned to Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Stomonyakov with a request to organize a meeting between the Japanese journalist Kawakami, who was in Moscow, and Stalin. Stomonyakov addressed a letter to Stalin and received the latter's consent to a meeting (DVP. T. XVII. S. 586, 820). After agreeing with Stalin on September 1, 1934, the PB decided that it would be expedient for Stalin to receive Kawakami after Stalin's arrival in Moscow (F. 17. Op. 162. D. 17. L. 30). The meeting, however, did not take place. Kawakami left the USSR in September 1934.
4 Krestinsky's letter is missing. We are talking about the preparation of the Eastern Pact - an agreement between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe on a collective rebuff to the aggressor. On August 31, the PB decided to postpone the trip of Ya.Z. Surits to Berlin (Ibid. L. 29).
5 The issue of concluding a non-aggression pact between Persia, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Iraq was put before the Soviet representatives by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Persia in the autumn of 1933 and in July 1934. On August 3, 1934, Litvinov in a letter to the Central Committee reported his negative attitude towards this idea (DVP. T. XVII. S. 526, 812). On August 31, 1934, the PB, at the suggestion of Litvinov, decided to consider the negotiations on the conclusion of the Soviet-Turkish-Persian-Afghan-Iranian non-aggression pact as untimely and, accordingly, explain to Tehran and Ankara the desirability of postponing the negotiations (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 17 L. 29).
On August 26, Stalin also received Agranov's code in the Nakhaev case: “Sochi. T. Stalin. The arrested chief of staff of the artillery battalion Osoaviahima Nakhaev confessed that he made his speech in the red Perekop barracks at the direction of his former colleague at the Institute of Physical Education, former General Bykov Leonid Nikolayevich. Nakhaev knew about Bykov's connection through the Estonian embassy in Moscow with his brother-soldier in the tsarist army, now working as chief of the Estonian general staff. Bykov was developed by a special department on suspicion of espionage in favor of Estonia. Recently, Bykov was the head of the personnel sector of the Institute of Physical Education. Today he is arrested by us. I send Nakhaev's testimony by mail. No. 2145/. Agranov” (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 84. L. 15).Stalin to Kaganovich August 28, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 100. L. 67–71. Autograph.
T. Kaganovich.
1. The most serious question of cotton cannot (impossible) be exhausted in the Central Commission. It is necessary to involve in the Commission all the cotton workers in the cotton districts and all the corresponding regional secretaries of the party. It will be a semi-commission - a semi-conference. The main task : to ensure the fulfillment of the second five-year plan for cotton (I think 40-50 million poods of pure cotton) and to prepare this provision for years , starting to work immediately . Main paths to the goal :
a) raising the yield from year to year (improving processing, maximum fertilizer, watering, etc.);
b) expansion of areas (preparation of new and new areas for crops from year to year);
c) bonuses for high yields, benefits for expanding areas, orders for good workers;
d) control over the implementation of decisions.
In addition to the general guiding decision, it is necessary to take specific planning and guiding decisions for each cotton republic separately .
Without this, the decision will result in an empty declaration with good wishes 1 .
2. It seems to me that the time has come to liquidate the Sredazburo, linking Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikia directly with Moscow (Karakalpakstan can be included in Uzbekistan as an autonomous republic, and Kyrgyzstan - in the RSFSR). It would be another matter if there were a federation in Central Asia (in the manner of Transcaucasia), then the Sredazbyuro could develop. But since there is no federation there, the Sredazburo cannot exist for a long time, and it is already losing (if not already lost) the meaning of its existence. Moreover, the Sredazburo hinders the growth of the republics and turns into a regressive factor, into a mediastinum.
It is time to liquidate the Sredazburo, recall Bauman and Mayorov to Moscow, and place direct responsibility for the work on the republics. It will be better without mediastinum.
3. Of the four million poods of grain given to Kazakhstan to help weak collective farms and pastoral areas, 600,000 poods have not yet been used. Kleiner wants to take away all this remnant from Kazakhstan. I think that it would be possible to leave 150,000 poods to the people of Kazakhstan, and take the rest to the fund of the USSR 2 .
While all. Hello. I. Stalin. 28/VIII 34
_____________________
On August 22, 1934, the PB organized a commission chaired by Kaganovich "to work out issues of developing cotton growing in terms of raising productivity (fertilizers, better processing, irrigation), expanding areas both in Central Asia and Transcaucasia" (RGASPI. F. 17. Op 3. D. 950. L. 47). On September 23, the PB expanded the composition of the commission to include the leaders of local party organizations and suggested that the leaders of the party organizations of the cotton-growing republics, territories and regions develop and submit to the Central Committee no later than October 20 a specific plan for the development of cotton growing for 1935-1937. (Ibid. D. 952. L. 29).
On August 31, 1934, the PB approved Stalin's proposal (Ibid. D. 951. L. 15).Molotov, Kaganovich to Stalin August 29, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 84. L. 20. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow 29/VIII - 34 at 23 o'clock. 35 min. In. No. 40.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
In order to facilitate our transport to the Far East, we plan to accept the proposal of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade on the purchase of 100 thousand tons of Argentinean and Australian wheat for the Far East, with the simultaneous export of 50 thousand tons of oats and 50 thousand tons of barley to the European market. In monetary terms, this is beneficial.
Please provide your opinion. HP 53.
Molotov. Kaganovich.Zhdanov, Kaganovich to Stalin August 29, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 84. L. 43. Certified typewritten copy; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 50. L. 49. Typewritten text with Kaganovich's corrections. Signatures are autographs.
Copy.
Owls. secret .
Cipher.
Tov. Stalin.
On the 31st, elections for the board of the Writers' Union will be held. As possible candidates for the post of secretary of the board, one can nominate Ugarov from Leningrad, or Pozern or Nikolai Nikolaevich Popov. If these nominations are unrealistic, it may be appropriate to nominate Konstantin Sergeev from Siberia or Shcherbakov, Deputy Head. Department of Leading Party Organs of the Central Committee. Sergeev you know well. Shcherbakov is a worker like Sergeev, a good organizer and cultured person.
Please let us know your opinion. HP 2182/sh.
Zhdanov, Kaganovich.
29.VIII.34Stalin - Molotov, Kaganovich August 30, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558 Op. 11. D. 84. L. 20, 20v. Autograph.
Cipher.
Yours 53. The import of grain now, when they are shouting abroad about the lack of grain in the USSR, can only give a political minus. I advise you to refrain from importing. Barley and oats must be taken out, as we badly need currency.
Stalin.
#38
30/VIII.34 1
__________________
1 Number and date entered by the secretary. Sent on the same day in code from Sochi at 10 o'clock. (Ibid. L. 19).Zhdanov, Kaganovich to Stalin [August 30, 1934]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 84. L. 48–49. Script. Ticker-tape.
Sochi. Chechulin for transfer.
The following list of the Board of the Writers' Union and the composition of the Presidium is planned:
Presidium :
1) Gorky
2) Ivanov Vsevolod
3) Yudin
4) Kirpotin
5) Fadeev
6) Stavsky
7) Panferov
8) Seifullina
9) Lahuti
10) Leonov
11) Kirshon
12) Tikhonov
13) Fedin
14) Tolstoy Alexey
15) Klimkovich (BSSR)
16) Kulik (Ukrainian SSR)
17) Mikitenko (Ukrainian SSR)
18) Punch (Ukrainian SSR)
19) Toroshelidze (Georgia)
20) Javakhashvili (Georgia)
21) Majidi (Uzbekistan)
22) Aini (Tajikistan)
23) Tashnazarov (Turkmenistan)
24) Fefer (Ukrainian SSR)
25) Simonyan (Armenia)
26) Pavlenko
27) Sholokhov
28) Charyev
29) Serafimovich
30) Berezovsky
31) Bakhmetiev
32) Gladkov
33) Afinogenov
34) Jabarli (Azerbaijan)
In addition to the above members of the Presidium, the Plenum includes the following 59 writers:
35) Aseev
36) Poor Demyan
37) Bezymensky
38) Bolotnikov
39) Bil-Belotserkovsky
40) Gorbunov '
41) Ermilov
42) Chisel
43) Illesh Bela
44) Malyshkin
45) Novikov-Priboy
46) Slonimsky
47) Subocki
48) Shukhov
49) Yasenskiy Bruno
50) Parsnips
51) Shahinyan
52) Ehrenburg
53) Veresaev
54) Marshak
55) Ivan Kataev
56) Sobolev Leonid
57) Karavaeva Anna
58) Mikhail Koltsov
59) Wisniewski
60) Pogodin
61) Romashov
62) Semenov
63) Trenev
64) Gerasimova
65) Erdberg
66) Tretyakov
67) Nakoryakov
68) Ivan Le (Ukrainian SSR)
69) Kirilenko (Ukrainian SSR)
70) Kopylenko (Ukrainian SSR)
71) Tychyna (Ukrainian SSR)
72) Aleksandrovich (BSSR)
73) Kharik (BSSR)
74) Kupala Yanko (BSSR)
75) Kolas (BSSR)
76) Lahuti (Tajikistan)
77) Yashen (Uzbekistan)
78) Paolo Yagyavili (Georgia)
79) Euli (Georgia)
80) Alazan (Armenia) ,
81) Shirvanzade (Armenia)
82) Alikberli (Azerbaijan)
83) Burgun (Azerbaijan)
84) Tagirov (Bashkiria)
85) Najmi (Tatar)
86) Tokombaev (Kyrgyzstan)
87) Dzhangurov (Kazakhstan)
88) Kazakhstan
89) Kara-Kalpakia
90) Zolotov (Chuvashia)
91) Buryat-Mongolia
92) Yakutia
93) Karelia
The Secretariat includes as a secretary one of those that we informed you about this morning, and besides this, members of the Secretariat - Stavsky and Vsevolod Ivanov.
The list has not yet been agreed with Gorky. Gorky nominates Kamenev to the Plenum and Presidium, and Averbakh to the Plenum. In addition, there may be a question of introducing Bukharin and Radek to the Presidium. We are thinking of introducing Yudin to the Plenum, we would consider it expedient to include him in the Presidium not for a permanent job, but Gorky will probably object to his inclusion in the Presidium.
Please let us know your opinion on all these matters.
Zhdanov. Kaganovich 1 .
We are waiting for an answer in the morning.
_____________________
1 The draft of the telegram was written by Zhdanov (Ibid. L. 53–56).Kaganovich, Molotov, Zhdanov to Stalin [August 30, 1934]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 84. L. 34. Original. Ticker-tape.
Sochi. Chechulin for transfer.
We adopted the following resolution, sent as a directive to the regional committees, regional executive committees of the eastern and Volga regions (attached below) 1 .
We ask you to communicate your comments and agree to your signature under this document.
Kaganovich. Molotov. Zhdanov.
_____________________
1 The text of the resolution on grain procurements is not published.Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov August 30, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 84. L. 23, 23v. Autograph.
Kaganovich, Molotov .
I agree about the grain procurement project and the signature. But that's not the point. The main thing in the trip of Molotov, Kaganovich, Kirov, Zhdanov, Mikoyan, Voroshilov and other leaders to the regions of grain procurement. It would be good for Molotov to go to Siberia, and you to Ukraine. It would be good to recall some workers from vacation as punishment for poor performance in their areas. This measure is in effect. Immediately allocate commodity funds for productive areas at the expense of barren ones. It is possible to halve the funds of barren areas in favor of productive ones. This is necessary for the purchase of bread.
Stalin.
#39
30/VIII.34 1
____________________
1 Number and date entered by the secretary.Stalin to Kaganovich, Zhdanov August 30, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 84. L. 42, 42v. Autograph.
Kaganovich. Zhdanov .
Either Ugarov or Shcherbakov can be appointed secretary of the board of the Writers' Union. Sergeev and Popov must not be touched. The composition of the presidium must be replenished with Kamenev, Demyan, Yudin, Ehrenburg. The composition of the Board needs to be replenished with Pilnyak, a Dagestani, a German from the Volga region. Averbakh should not be entered 3 . Gorky acted disloyally towards the Party by silencing the decision of the Central Committee on the RAPP in his report . The result was a report not about Soviet literature, but about something else. Radek's report is good.
Stalin.
#40
30/VIII.34 5
_____________________________
1 Initially, Stalin wrote “it is possible”, then correcting it to “it is necessary”.
2 Initially, Stalin wrote “it is possible”, then correcting it to “it is necessary”.
On September 1, 1934, the PB adopted a decision "On the composition of the governing bodies of the Union of Soviet Writers", which outlined the composition of the Board, the Presidium, the Secretariat of the SSP, taking into account Stalin's proposals (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 951. L .28).
4 We are talking about the decision of the PB of April 23, 1932 “On the restructuring of literary and artistic organizations”, by which the RAPP was liquidated (Ibid. D. 881. L. 22).
5 Number and date entered by the secretary. Sent on the same day from Sochi in code at 16:16. (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 84. L. 41).Stalin to Kaganovich August 30, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 84. L. 58–59. Autograph.
Kaganovich .
First. Surits' trip to Berlin should not be rushed; it would be better to postpone 1 .
Second. The crust should not be removed. It's not just about Cork, but above all about the complacency and rotosity that prevails in all districts. Here the districts imitate the center. It is necessary to inflate the organs of the political administration of the army and the special department, which do not pull up, but demagnetize people 2 .
Third. As for the Soviet-Turkish-Afghan pact, I already wrote that it should be postponed.
Stalin.
#41
30/VIII.34 3
________________
1On September 3, 1934, B.A. Dvinsky handed over a telegram to M.M. Litvinov from Prague on September 1: “There is no need for Surits to postpone his departure and have a prepared answer to theoretical questions in advance. Let Germany first give a clear answer, principled, and we will already discuss the details. If she is ready to accept the pact conditionally, then let her list the conditions and we will discuss them. There is no need for Surits to give an answer even about the timing until the issue has been discussed by us with France. It would be nice to link him to me in Geneva in cipher. It is necessary to find out in advance in Paris about the chances of joining the League. In case of doubtful chances, I should, it seems, refrain from going to Geneva, even if a bureau were to be convened. It will be clear to everyone that I am not there for the sake of the bureau, and my presence there unnecessarily emphasizes the negative vote. Litvinov" (Ibid. L. 89) and SABessonov's telegram from Berlin dated August 31, 1934: “Hitler appointed an official reception for the diplomatic corps on September 12. The chief of protocol, Ausamta, proposes to organize the presentation of Surits' credentials on the same day, an hour before the official reception” (Ibid., L. 90).
2 September 5, 1934 A.I. Kork was removed from the post of commander of the Moscow Military District and appointed head of the Military Academy. Frunze.
3 Number and date entered by the secretary. Sent from Sochi in code on August 30 at 21 o'clock. 5 minutes. (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 84. L. 60).Kaganovich, Molotov - Stalin August 31, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 84. L. 75. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 50. L. 53. Typewritten text with Dvinsky's notes. Signatures are autographs.
Encryption.
From Moscow 31/VIII - 34 at 18 o'clock. 37 min. In. No. 42.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
In connection with your telegram, we plan the following decision on the question of the draft contingent for 1934:
1) Without prejudice to the staffing and organizational measures of the Red Army for 1935, to establish the total number of draft contingent of citizens born in 1912, called up in the autumn of this year, in total 817,500 people. Of them:
a) For the Red Army - 669400 people, including the call for the variable composition of the Red Army military units,
b) For units that are not part of the regular strength of the Red Army (the border and internal guards of the NKVD, escort troops, the Special Railway Corps, construction battalions) - 148,100 people.
2) The number of conscripts sent to the troops to be determined by the approval of the staffing and organizational measures of the Red Army for 1935 no later than October 1 of this year.
Please provide your opinion. HP 55.
Kaganovich, Molotov.Kaganovich, Molotov, Zhdanov to Stalin August 31, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 84. L. 69. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 50. L. 55. Handwritten text. Signatures are autographs.
Encryption.
From Moscow 31/VIII - 34 at 20:00. 32 min. In. No. 44.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
We propose to turn the newspaper Kooperatsia, Supply and Trade into an organ of the People's Commissariat of Internal Trade, the Central Union and the central committees of the respective trade unions, and also to change the title to Sovetskaya Torgov.
Please let us know your opinion 1 . HP 57.
Kaganovich, Molotov, Zhdanov.
________________
1 Stalin agreed on September 1 in a cipher from Sochi at 3 o'clock. 30 minutes. (Ibid. L. 68). On the same day, the PB decision was drawn up (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 951. L. 19).Kaganovich, Zhdanov - Stalin August 31, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 84. L. 72. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 50. L. 56. Handwritten text. Signatures are autographs.
Encryption.
From Moscow 31/VIII - 34, 20 hours. 32 min. In. No. 45.
Sochi. Tov. Stalin.
Stetsky asks to confirm Yudin as his deputy. I and Zhdanov consider this acceptable.
Please let us know your opinion 1 . HP 58.
Kaganovich, Zhdanov.
________________________
1 Stalin agreed in cipher from Sochi on September 1 at 3 o'clock. 31 min. (Ibid. L. 71). On the same day, by decision of the PB, P.F. Yudin was appointed deputy head of the department of culture and propaganda of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on cultural issues (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 951. L. 19).Stalin to Kaganovich August 31, 1934
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 84. L. 64–65. Handwritten text.
First. I agree with the draft of the Kaganovich commission on the division of large trade unions into smaller ones. I think that this is the only way to make the work of the trade unions concrete and to transfer the center of gravity of the leadership of the trade union movement from the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions to the central committees of the unions .
Second. I agree with the proposal of the Yenukidze Commission on the account of a single all-Union code. I think that we will have to create an all-Union people's commissariat of justice of a directive character, with the republican people's commissariats of justice subordinate to it .
Third. I have no objection to receiving Kawakami after my arrival in Moscow, provided that the Central Committee deems it necessary.
Stalin.
#43
31/VIII.34 2
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On September 1, 1934, the PB allowed the Yenukidze Commission to submit to the Central Committee the drafts of the Criminal Code of the USSR, the Code of Criminal Procedure of the USSR, and the regulations on the judicial system of the USSR (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 951. L. 19). The People's Commissariat of Justice of the USSR was formed on July 20, 1936.
2 The text was written by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 22:00. 45 min. (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 84. L. 63).