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Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931–1936Kaganovich to Stalin September, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 100. L. 14–16. Autograph.
T. Kaganovich .
1) Where did the decisions about technical colleges and factory studies go? Buried?
2) Where did the decision to pay playwrights go? Isn't it time to issue and print it (on behalf of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the Central Committee)? It would be nice to "tighten" it even more.
3) The newspapers write that Afinogenov's play "Lie" will be staged in the upcoming season. This number will not work. Look through the final version of the play, and if it does not fit, I advise you to ban it from staging. Let Afinogenov and Co. not think that they can disregard the Party .
4) Why is Pravda silent about the fact that Nizhny Novgorod overfulfilled the July-August grain delivery plan? What's the matter. Keep in mind that Moscow and you will be blamed for this silence, unworthy of the party. We need to put an end to this immediately .
Well, that's all for now. Hello.
1/IX 33 Stalin
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1In April 1933, the playwright A.N. Afinogenov sent Stalin the play Lie. “I will be happy with your every instruction, every marginal note, if you find it worthy of attention. In Moscow, they want to put the play on the 1st Moscow Art Theater and the 2nd Moscow Art Theater - in parallel. I would like to hear your opinion on this matter as well,” wrote Afinogenov. Stalin's response was negative. Having made a large number of remarks, Stalin wrote: “It is impossible to start a play in this form” (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 5088. L. 1, 121-121v). On November 9, 1933, Afinogenov again turned to Stalin with a letter: “T. Kirshon told me that you were dissatisfied with the second version of the play "The Ivanov Family" ("Lies"). Before filming the play, I would like to show you the results of work on it by the theaters of the Moscow Art Theater of the 1st and 2nd (in the first days of December this year). If you find it superfluous, I will immediately film the play myself.” On November 10, Stalin wrote in a letter to Afinogenov: “T. Afinogenov! I consider the play in the second version unsuccessful” (Ibid. D. 5087. L. 1).
On September 4, 1933, a telegram from the secretary
Gorky Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Zhdanov addressed to Stalin and Molotov, in which it was reported that the region had fulfilled the September grain procurement plan ahead of schedule by September 1 by 106%.Kaganovich to Stalin September 2, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 70. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow 2/IX, 17:00. 12 min. In. No. 13.
Tov. Stalin.
Sheboldaev asks to throw off 3 million poods of grain from individual farmers, who were given obligations for 9 million poods, and the plan for deliveries to the state from them was determined at 6 million poods.
Chernov proposes to throw off 1 million pounds.
Submit your opinion 1 . HP 13.
Kaganovich.
Stalin to Kaganovich September 2, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 70. Autograph.
Number 13. You need to throw off three million pounds.
Stalin.
No. 12.
2/IX-33 1
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1 Number and date entered by the secretary.
On September 3, 1933, the PB adopted a resolution “On grain supplies in the North Caucasus”, in which it allowed the North Caucasian Regional Committee and the Regional Executive Committee “within 3 million poods, at the expense of the reserve of obligations issued, to allow discounts from grain supplies for individual farms with a reduced harvest with the transfer of the discount made in arrears to be collected in the autumn of 1934 ”(RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 930. L. 22).Kaganovich to Stalin, Voroshilov September 2, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 73. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow 2/IX - 33, 21 hours. 28 min. In. No. 14.
T. t. Stalin, Voroshilov.
The French General Staff raised the question of including an official military mission among the participants in the flight of the Minister of Aviation Kota. It must include Gen. Barres with a group of officers. However, this mission makes it a condition of its arrival that we agree to show some parts and institutions of our air fleet.
Tukhachevsky and the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs consider it expedient to agree.
Please let me know your opinion 1 . HP 14.
Kaganovich.
____________________________
1 September 3, 1933 in cipher from Sochi at 9 o'clock. 50 min. Stalin agreed (Ibid. L. 72). On the same day, the PB made a corresponding decision (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 55). French Aviation Minister Pierre Cot was in the USSR from 13 to 22 September 1933 on an official visit. He visited various enterprises, aviation educational institutions. P. Kot was received by the Deputy People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR M.N. Tukhachevsky (DVP. T. XVI. L. 856, 857).Kaganovich to Stalin on September 2 [1933] (long )
Stalin to Kaganovich September 3, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 77–80. Autograph.
Central Committee of the CPSU. Kaganovich .
First. The plan for the fourth quarter is acceptable.
Second. It seems to me that a yield of 9 whole and 9 tenths of a centner is not an indicator of an ideal standing crop, but of a real yield based on threshing results. I think that the outline of the Central Commission should be accepted. Printing can be delayed for a month or more.
Third. As for Dalugol, decide for yourself, as you have planned.
Fourth. For cotton, I advise you to approve at least 26 million poods. You can confine yourself to the resolution of the SRT, and send a directive from the Central Committee not for publication.
Fifth. It is possible that the architects are right about the Sukharev Tower. The question is specific and it can be solved only in Moscow.
Stalin.
No. 14
3/IX.33Kaganovich, Kuibyshev to Stalin September 3, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 81. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow 3/IX - 33, 23 hours. 37 min. In. No. 16.
Tov. Stalin.
A number of telegrams were received from the localities with a request to allow the issuance of cash advances to the collective farms along with in-kind cash advances.
In view of the fact that the delay in the issuance of money slows down the development of trade, we plan to adopt the following decision of the Politburo: “To allow, without waiting for the general distribution of cash income, the issuance of collective farmers on account of the worked days, along with advances in kind, issued in accordance with the decision of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, cash advances in the amount of 20-30% of the amounts received by the collective farms for the products sold.
We ask for your consent 1 . HP 16.
Kaganovich, Kuibyshev.
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1 Stalin agreed on September 4 in a cipher from Sochi at 12 noon. 15 minutes. (Ibid. L. 80). On September 4, 1933, the proposal of Kaganovich and Kuibyshev was accepted by the PB (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 930. L. 24).
Kaganovich to Stalin September 4, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 84v. Script. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow 4/IX - 33, 15 hours. 57 min.
In. No. 17.
Tov. Stalin.
The following encryption was received from Leonov:
“Today I am sending by mail the joint decision of the Bureau of the Regional Committee and the Presidium of the Regional Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan, in which they recognized the decision of the Central Committee of August 15 1 as absolutely correct and gave a detailed criticism of their work. The bureau recognized its management of the districts and a number of the most important regional bodies as unsatisfactory. To discuss the decision of the Central Committee and to improve the health of the Party organizations, a joint plenum was scheduled for September 10th. On the advice of Comrade Yaroslavsky, we are delaying the publication of the adopted resolution until it is agreed with the Central Committee.
We ask: 1) To authorize the convening of the plenum by telegraph so that we have time to convene it; 2) After reading the text of our resolution, give an indication of what needs to be added or changed and whether it can be published in the press.
Should the convening of the plenum be authorized? Wouldn't this mean that a few more speeches and resolutions would be added to the ten speeches and resolutions instead of the practical work of uprooting all rot.
Please let me know your opinion. HP 17.
Kaganovich.
____________________________
On August 15, 1933, at a meeting of the PB, the issue “On the persecution of workers of the NKSnab in Eastern Siberia and Kyrgyzstan” was considered. The adopted decision stated: "a) In connection with the materials submitted to the Central Committee on the illegal removal of representatives of the People's Commissariat for Supply by the party and Soviet organizations of Kyrgyzstan and Eastern Siberia, to recognize the state of the organization in these regions of the USSR as unfavorable." To "rectify the situation and take appropriate measures to improve the party and Soviet organization" E.M. Yaroslavsky was sent to Eastern Siberia (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 928. L. 2).Stalin to Kaganovich September 4, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 84. Autograph.
On your HP 17. Plenum is not needed. Advise Leonov from the decisions of the Bureau of the Regional Committee and the Regional Committee of the Committee to go straight to execution and immediately organize an audit of the implementation of decisions.
Stalin.
No. 16
4/IX.33Kaganovich to Stalin September 5, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. P. D. 80. L. 87. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow 5/IX — 33 1 hour. 27 min. In. No. 18.
Tov. Stalin.
The Cominternists very much ask that the consideration of the Comintern's reply to the British Independent Party be expedite.
If you have the material, please urgently report your opinion. For this assignment, I send the fifth material by mail. No. 18.
Kaganovich
Stalin to Kaganovich September 5, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 87. Autograph.
Your HP 18 1 . I cannot and should not give an opinion on any and all questions raised in the PB. You could consider and work out the answer to the English Independents yourself.
Stalin.
No. 18
5/IX.33Kaganovich, Kuibyshev to Stalin September 5, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 90. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow 5/IX — 33 1 hour. 27 min. In. No. 19.
Tov. Stalin.
Litvinov asks the Central Committee to respond to the Germans' request for the appointment of an assistant military attaché for maritime affairs in Moscow. He believes that it is inconvenient to refuse, because. we have maritime attachés in some countries.
We consider it possible to agree, please let us know your opinion 1 . HP 19.
Kaganovich, Kuibyshev.
____________________
1 On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 11 o'clock. 50 min. Stalin agreed (Ibid. L. 89). The PB decision was taken by poll on September 5, 1933 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 930. L. 27).Kaganovich, Kuibyshev to Stalin, Voroshilov September 5, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 93v. Script. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow 5/IX - 33, 18 hours. 45 min.
T. t. Stalin, Voroshilov.
Today at 8 o'clock in the morning flew from Moscow to Sevastopol on ANT 7 TsAGI Baranov with his wife, Goltsman, Gorbunov - director of plant No. 22, Zarzar - member of the State Planning Committee Presidium, Petrov - deputy head. Aeroflot, Dorsman - a pilot, Plotnikov - a flight mechanic, and before reaching Serpukhov, the plane crashed. All those in it died.
To find out the cause of the disaster, a commission was created consisting of Tukhachevsky, Prokofiev, Kharlamov (TsAGI) and Yezhov, and in addition, a funeral commission consisting of comrades Yenukidze, Kaganovich M., Tukhachevsky, Khrushchev and Akulov 1 . The order of burial was outlined as follows: on the sixth we transport the dead to the House of the Unions and on the seventh in the evening cremation. We wall up the urns of Goltsman and Baranov on Red Square. We are giving separate notices to the newspapers from the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, and, in addition, with regard to Goltsman and Baranov, it is planned to draw up a short letter from the comrades. Nr 20.
Kaganovich, Kuibyshev.
____________________
1 The PB Commission was established on September 5, 1933 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 930. L. 26).Kaganovich to Stalin September 5, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 96. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow 5/IX - 33, 23 hours. 16 min. In. No. 21.
Tov. Stalin.
Director[om] of the North Caucasian Grain Trust instead of the removed Katenev, we nominate the candidacy of Pestun, ex. secretary of the Middle Volga Regional Committee, now head of the political department of one of the grain farms of the Middle Volga.
I think it can be sent. He is an energetic person and will certainly cope with the case.
Please let me know your opinion 1 . Nr 21.
Kaganovich.
______________________
1 September 6 in cipher from Sochi at 17:00. 38 min. Stalin agreed (Ibid. L. 95). In February 1934, E.G. Pestun was transferred from the post of director of the North Caucasian Soyuzzernotrest to the post of head of the political department of the Gigant grain farm (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 938. L. 6).Stalin - Kuibyshev, Kaganovich September 6, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 93. Autograph.
Kuibyshev. Kaganovich .
The notice must say why Baranov and others died. Under pain of expulsion from the party, flights of non-pilots in response should be prohibited without the permission of the Central Committee. We must strictly enforce the prohibition and without fail exclude those who are guilty, regardless of their faces. If it's not too late, put my signature under the short letter from the comrades, not at the beginning, but in the middle or at the end of the list of signatory comrades 1 .
Stalin.
No. 19
6/IX.33 g.2
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September 1 , 6 at 5 p.m. 12 min. Voroshilov sent a coded message from Sochi with a request to put his signature under the obituary letter as well (Ibid. L. 98).
2 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day, it was sent in cipher from Sochi at 13:00. (Ibid. L. 92).Kaganovich to Stalin on September 7 [1933] long
Kaganovich to Stalin September 8, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 103. Original. Typescript; RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 101. L. 20. Typewritten text with notes by Kaganovich
Encryption.
From Moscow 8/IX - 33 20 hours. 30 minutes.
In. No. 23.
Tov. Stalin.
Sarkis was here today, and we have outlined the following composition of the secretariat: 1) To nominate the current secretary for metallurgy, Vainov, as the second secretary, who is also the secretary for coal. 2) Okorkov, chairman of the Central Committee of the Union for metallurgy, a lively, capable worker, should be given as secretary for metal from Moscow. 3) Instead of Okorkov, appoint Terekhov as chairman of the Central Committee of the Union for Metallurgy, recalling him from Donbass.
As a possible candidate for the second secretary, Sarkis also named Bulatov from the OPTU.
Please let me know your opinion 1 . HP 22. Kaganovich.
_____________________________
September 1 , 9 Stalin in cipher from Sochi at 13 o'clock. 20 minutes. answered: “Bulatov cannot be touched. I agree with the rest” (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 102). On September 11, 1933, the PB approved A.R. Vainov as the second secretary of the Donetsk regional committee and secretary for coal. K.I. was appointed secretary of the regional committee for metal. Okorkov, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Union for Metallurgy. R.Ya. Terekhov was appointed chairman of the Central Committee of the Union for Metallurgy and recalled from the Donbass (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 930. L. 35).Kaganovich to Stalin September 9, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 10bA Original. Typescript; F. 81. Op. 3. D. 101. L. 21. Typewritten text with Kaganovich's notes.
Encryption
From Moscow 9/IX - 33, 22 hours. 55 min.
In. No. 24.
Tov. Stalin.
The Central Committee of the CP(b)U schedules a plenum of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U for September 20-25. He formulated the order of the day as follows:
1) On the results of harvesting, on the progress of grain delivery, autumn sowing and questions of the organizational and economic strengthening of collective farms.
2) On the results of the implementation of the Leninist national policy in Ukraine and the main tasks in this area.
I think that we can agree. Please let me know your opinion 1 . HP 23. Kaganovich.
__________________________
1 The next day in cipher from Sochi at 15:00. 46 min. Stalin agreed (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 105).
Stalin to Kaganovich, Kuibyshev September 10, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 109. Autograph.
Kaganovich. Kuibyshev .
Report by letter the assumptions of the State Planning Commission, the People's Commissariat of Agriculture and TsUNKhU about the grain yield per hectare in the south and the USSR and about the gross grain harvest in the USSR. A final decision on these issues should not be rushed.
Stalin.
No. 23.
10/IX.33 1
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1 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day, it was sent in code from Sochi at 15:00. 47 min. (Ibid. L. 108).Kaganovich, Kuibyshev to Stalin September 10, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558 Op. 11. D. 80. L. 111–112. Script. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow 10/IX — 33 6 hours. 45 min. In. No. 25.
Tov. Stalin.
A. According to a report received from Deribas, near Sanchagou, in the area of the Pogranichnaya station, the Starogirins concentrated about 3 thousand people with four guns with the intention of going on the offensive against the Japanese-Manchurian units occupying the city of Sanchagou. On September 8, an official of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Manchukuo told our consul at Pogranichnaya that Sanchagou was being besieged by 2,500 Hunghuzi , and fighting was going on. He also stated that the possibility of a retreat of Japanese units to the territory of the USSR was not ruled out. The consul sent a message about this to the NKID. According to intelligence data, the Japanese believe that the events in Sanchagou were inspired by the Soviet side and intend to protest. Deribas reports that he has strengthened the precautionary measures and the protection of the border and asks for an indication in case they retreat to our territory.
B. In view of the need to give an urgent answer, after discussing the situation, we issued the following directive to Deribas through the OGPU signed by Yagoda:
“1) Take all necessary measures to strengthen the border, for which, without noise, transfer maneuver groups to the area of \u200b\u200bthe possible passage of the Japanese.
2) In the event that Japanese units cross over to our territory, without engaging in an armed clash, declare them interned with the surrender of weapons.
3) Provide temporary accommodation on our premises.
4) Immediately inform the NKID agent about the crossing of the Japanese parts of our territory, and at the same time inform the NKID agent in detail.
B. Today, in a conversation with the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy, Sako, the head of the Far Eastern Department, Yushkevich, on behalf of Sokolnikov, verbally informed Sako of the statement made by the consul at the Pogranichnaya station, warning that if the Japanese units crossed the border, they would be interned and disarmed in accordance with international law. Sako pleaded outright ignorance and stated that he would notify Tokyo, while at length expressing regret over the tense situation between Soviet and Japanese units on the Manchurian border. Sokolnikov was instructed to inform Yurenev with a warning that no demarches should be made at this stage.
Please let us know whether you consider the directive sent to Deribas to be correct. If necessary, you can send additions and corrections.
In view of the fear of complications in the removal of weapons from Japanese officers, the question will arise whether it is acceptable to agree to leave the weapons to the officers. We consider it possible to agree. Please provide your opinion. HP 24, 25.
Kaganovich, Kuibyshev.
______________________
1 Honghuzi (from the Chinese Honghuzi, literally red-bearded), members of armed gangs in Manchuria from the middle of the 19th century to 1949.Stalin to Kaganovich September 10, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. P. D. 80. L. 112. Autograph.
Kaganovich .
Your numbers are 24 and 25 .
I think your directive is correct. As for the Japanese officers, you can make concessions.
Stalin. #24
10/IX.33 1
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1 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day it was sent from Sochi in cipher at 18:00. 40 min. (Ibid. L. PO).Kaganovich to Stalin on September 10 [1933]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 741. L. 36–42. Autograph.
10/IX
Dear comrade Stalin.
1) We have finally completed the drafting of a resolution on the payment of playwrights. We propose to completely abolish the existing system of payment, according to which the authors enter into a direct deal with the theater, which has a monopoly on the premiere and receive from the theater a percentage of the gross collection by the number of acts in the play, at 1.5 %for the act. Therefore, a 5-act play gives 7.5% of the collection. As a result, with a large theater network and even greater demand, the authors raked in 45-50 thousand [thousand] rubles in one year, the same thing is repeated the next year for the same play. We propose to the state, represented by a special commission or committee, to purchase this or that play in its entirety for a one-time payment, paying, depending on the quality, from 5 to 50 thousand, I doubted the figure of 50 thousand, but this is a one-time payment and he will not receive more, except for the possible royalties for publishing a book to read. Not all writers will, of course, be dissatisfied, but for stimulating good plays, this is a big plus. Just in case, if such a radical breakdown were deemed undesirable, we prepared the 2nd possible option, leaving the modified old system with a reduction in deductions.
I am sending you our draft resolution. It is very unpleasant for me to load you with these papers, but this question, it seems to me, is not an easy one.
2) At the next PB (on the 15th) we will probably discuss the question of NKVOD—the commission's proposals.
The question that we talked about, about the people's commissar and the [head] of the political department, arises. The following candidates are possible: Antipov, Muklevich, Zhdanov, Kadatsky. Ryndin, Vlad Ivanov, and Zashibaev from Nizhny were appointed to the post of head of the political department of the NKVOD.
3) In the same way, there is the question of the head [head] of the Main Directorate of the Aviation Industry instead of Baranov and the head [head] of the Civil Air Fleet instead of Holtsman. In the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry for the aviation industry, the following candidates could be: Prokofiev, Khalepsky or Alksnis, from the workers of the aviation industry they name Korolev, Poberezhsky? and ... Makarovsky. The following comrades could take the post of head of the Civil Air Fleet: Janson (if removed from NKVOD), Zhukov (NKSvyaz), Lomov, Unshlikht and Anvelt (deputy Holtzman), although they say that he is weak.
Please let me know your thoughts on these issues.
4) The situation in the Moscow region has become very complicated. As a result of completely unprecedented downpours, which took on the character of a literal disaster, crop yields dropped significantly. Oats blacken and germinate. We threw all our strength into hauling from the field and threshing, even raw sheaves, for there are not enough rigs and barns to store bread in sheaves. In the Central Chernobyl region, in the former Oryol province, the situation is similar. Vareikis came and we increased the discount fund for him (in addition to the previous 3rd from 0.5 million poods) by another 4 million poods. I did not raise the question of the Moscow region here, but I put it before you, Comrade Stalin, and I ask you to help us. Chernov personally got acquainted with the state of affairs and considers it necessary to help us. We have already prepared a fair amount of bread, 25.5 mil. pounds - 76% of the plan. We would certainly be able to prepare not only the main plan, "but also part of the insurance, but a number of collective farms may find themselves in a difficult situation, especially in areas where oats are the main crop. That is why I am asking you - as secretary of the MC - to support us. I am enclosing the proposal formulated by Comrade Chernov and asking you to communicate your opinion, if possible by telegraph.
Hello to you. Your L. Kaganovich.Stalin to Kaganovich September 11, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 116. Autograph.
Central Committee of the CPSU. Kaganovich .
First, Sokolnikov's proposal for a steamboat is acceptable. Secondly, Preobrazhensky can be arranged in the People's Commissariat of State Farms. Third, I agree about the Ukrainian academicians, in a reasoned decision, announce that they sold out to Polish landowners. Fourth, the proposal to try Petrikovsky is erroneous, the point is not in the court, but in the daily verification of execution. Fifth, I agree about the flight ban.
Stalin.
#25
11/IX.33 1
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1 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day, it was sent from Sochi in code at 13:00. 20 minutes. (Ibid. L. 115).Kaganovich, Mikoyan to Stalin September 12, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 118. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow 12/IX-33: 1 hour. 57 min. In. No. 26.
Tov. Stalin.
Until the full implementation of the annual plan for the mandatory supply of potatoes, collective farm trade and decentralized potato harvesting are prohibited. In order to combat speculation, improve the supply of potatoes and provide for groups of the population not accepted for centralized supply, we consider it expedient to organize in the near future the free sale of potatoes: in Moscow with a daily sale of 400 tons in 80 stores, in Leningrad 250 in 50 stores, in Kharkov 60 in 20 stores. We plan the price of 1 rub. 20 kop. kilo (the price for normalized sale is 25 kopecks), the market price ranges from 1 rub. 25 kop. - 2 rub. 50 kop. Vacation in one hand is planned to be limited to three kilograms. We plan to start trading in Moscow and Leningrad on September 25, and in Kharkov on October 1.
Please telegraph your opinion 1 . HP 26.
Kaganovich, Mikoyan.
________________________
1 On the same day at 12 noon. 42 min. in a cipher from Sochi, Stalin agreed (Ibid. L. 117). On September 13, 1933, the PB made this decision by poll (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 970. L. 39).Stalin to Kaganovich September 12, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 123. Autograph of S. Chechulin.
Encryption.
Dispatched from Sochi 16–38 12/IX 1933
Moscow. Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, comrade Kaganovich.
Copy: Kislovodsk Comrade Ordzhonikidze.
Whom do you think to appoint instead of Baranov? The candidacy of Alksnis or Lominadze is unacceptable. Consider Korolev, Poberezhsky, or anyone else associated with the production.
No. 28 Stalin.
12/IX-33Stalin to Kaganovich [earlier September 13, 1933]
Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 100. L. 105–106. Autograph.
T-shchu Kaganovich.
1) I will not read projects about technical colleges and factory teachers. I left the papers, and you bombard me with a pile of papers. Decide for yourself and decide as soon as possible, because this matter cannot be put off any longer .
2) As for Manchugo's answer, I agree 2 .
3) Also about the process of setting fire to the Reichstag 3 . Hey!
I. Stalin.
PS I beg you to take special care of the issue of the timely export and delivery of ore, fluxes, refractories, coke, coal for metallurgy . You have an appropriate decision, but the point is not in the decision, but in its execution . Without this task, we will slaughter the ferrous metallurgy.
PP. SS. As for the thin-sheet mill (order for the USA), I will write when I understand the issue.
I. St.
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1On July 1, 1933, the PB approved, as amended, a draft resolution submitted by the Kaganovich Commission on improving the organization of the training and use of personnel (in higher educational institutions, technical schools and factory departments). It provided that all young specialists who graduated from universities, technical schools and technical schools should work for 5 years at certain enterprises at the direction of the People's Commissariats, which were in charge of these educational institutions. Unauthorized employment was subject to criminal liability. Other measures were planned to increase the number of specialists directly in production. Similar decisions were made on the FZU, graduates of which were forbidden to transfer to other educational institutions (technical schools, universities) after completing their studies. At the direction of economic organizations, they had to work in production for at least three years. To speed up the training of workers, the period of study in the FZU was reduced from two years to six months (training during the year was retained for the most complex specialties) (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 925. L. 5, 36-43) . On September 15, the rulings were published. See also Document No. 309.
2 Perhaps we are talking about the approval of the letter of the Consul General of the USSR in Harbin, M.M. -White Guards in Manchurian territory. It denied these accusations and protested "that the Manchu authorities allow the passage of white gangs to Soviet territory" (DVP. Vol. XVI., pp. 502-504).
3 The burning of the Reichstag building in Berlin on February 27, 1933, a month after Hitler was appointed chancellor, was used by the Nazis to increase their terror against the left. In particular, the leader of the German Communists, E. Thalmann, and one of the leaders of the Comintern, G. Dimitrov, were arrested. The trial of Dimitrov and others accused of arson began in Leipzig on 21 September 1933. Dimitrov was acquitted in December 1933 (See Carr EH Twilight of Comintern. London, 1982, pp. 87–88, 101–102). On September 13, 1933, the PB approved a commission chaired by A.I. Stetsky on the leadership of the press in connection with the process of setting fire to the Reichstag (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 930. L. 38). See also Document No. 355.Stalin to Kaganovich, Kuibyshev September 13, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558 Op. 11. D. 80. L. 125. Autograph.
Kaganovich. Kuibyshev .
I fully support the proposal of Kaganovich and Chernov on a discount for the Moscow Region under the grain procurement plan.
No. 29 Stalin.
13/IX.33 1
_____________________
1 Number and date entered by the secretary.Stalin to Kaganovich September 13 [1933]
Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 100. L. 99. Autograph.
Hello Comrade Kaganovich!
1) About the playwrights 1 and the people's commissar 2 it would be better to postpone my arrival.
2) In terms of the aviation industry, it would be better to nominate Poberezhsky or, as a last resort, Queen 3 .
3) Unshlikht can be put forward instead of Holtzmann 4 .
4) I have already telegraphed my agreement on a discount for Moscow on grain deliveries .
While all.
Greetings!
13/IX
I. Stalin
__________________
1 In the Kaganovich fund, a draft resolution on the remuneration of playwrights with Stalin's corrections has been preserved. Stalin expressed doubts about a number of provisions of the document. On top of the text, he wrote: “Nevertheless, it would be better to postpone this issue until my arrival” (RGASPI. F. 81. Op. 3. D. 93. L. 99–101).
2 The issue of the people's commissar of water transport was considered only on March 13, 1934. The PB "satisfied the request" of N.M. Yanson to relieve him of the duties of the people's commissar and approved N.I. Pakhomov as the new people's commissar. Yanson was appointed Deputy People's Commissar for the marine part, and V.V. Fomin for the river part (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 941. L. 21).
On September 13, 1933, Ordzhonikidze sent a cipher addressed to Stalin: “I consider Korolev the most suitable of the available candidates, and Poberezhsky should be sent instead of Korolev” (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 137) . On September 15, in a cipher addressed to Kaganovich, Stalin agreed to Ordzhonikidze's proposal (Ibid. L. 136). On September 15, 1933, the PB appointed G.N. Korolev, director of the Rybinsk plant, as the head of the Main Directorate of the Aviation Industry. I.I. Poberezhsky was appointed the new director of the Rybinsk plant by the same decision (Ibid. F. 17. Os 3. D. 930. L. 6).
4 On September 21, 1933, the PB approved I.S. Unshlikht as the head of the Main Directorate of the Civil Air Fleet (Ibid. D. 931. L. 18).
5 On September 15, 1933, the PB increased the fund, placed at the disposal of the authorities of the Moscow Region, by 4,600,000 poods for discounts on grain deliveries to individual collective farms and individual farms with reduced yields (Ibid. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 57) .
Kaganovich to Stalin on September 13 [1933]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558 Op. 11. D. 741. L. 43–46. Autograph.
13/IX
Hello, Dear Comrade Stalin.
1) In one of the last deciphers there is a very important message about the military meeting on the actual capture of the CER. Li-ShaoGeng at a board meeting demanded new rights for a Chinese assistant manager, but so far there has been no action in this direction. However, we need to be prepared to respond. We think that, firstly, it is necessary to give the newspapers a message with the following content: “According to reliable information received from Harbin, the Manchurian authorities intend to take a number of measures aimed at the actual seizure of the CER by grossly violating the rights of the Soviet governor, whose orders are supposed declared valid only with the approval of the Manchurian assistant. At the same time, the police authorities will be instructed to prepare fabricated charges against the Soviet employees of the CER, which would serve as a pretext for raids, searches and arrests. Secondly, in the future, if they really do something, we will have to present our protest. We have drafted such a directive to Yurenev, the end of it is very mild, but for now we believe that it is not worth writing more sharply. I am sending you this directive and asking you to communicate, if possible by telegraph, your opinion.
2) In connection with Comrade Karakhan's trip, he made a number of proposals. We cannot solve them without you. At my suggestion, he shortened his note by a factor of 3, bringing it to the size of a cipher, which I am sending you and asking for your opinion .
3) On the ore and the rest for metallurgy, they were included in the agenda of the PB (15th) in order to verify compliance. We will do everything necessary in accordance with your instructions, I will personally monitor this.
Hello to you. Your L. Kaganovich.
PS We are writing a special letter about productivity.
OK.
_____________________
1 We are talking about preparations for the visit of Karakhan, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, to Persia. On September 19, 1933, the PB approved a decree on trade with Persia (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 79).Ehrenburg to Stalin on September 13 [1934]
Archive: RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 4591. L. 4–7. Script. Typescript. The signature is an autograph.
Odessa, 13 September.
Dear Joseph Vissarionovich!
I hesitated for a long time whether I should write you this letter. Your time is precious not only to you, but to all of us. If I nevertheless decided to write to you, it is because without your participation the question of organizing the literatures of the West and America that are close to us can hardly be resolved.
You probably noticed how much the composition of the foreign delegations present at the congress of writers did not correspond to the weight and significance of such a phenomenon. With the exception of two Frenchmen - Malraux and J.-R. Blok, the Czech poet Nezval, two (not first-rate, but still gifted) German writers Pluvier and O. M. Graf, and finally the Dane Nekse, there were no serious representatives of Western European and American literature at our congress. This is partly due to the fact that the invitations to the congress, which for some reason were sent out not by the Organizing Committee, but by the MORP, were extremely poorly drafted. They invited the wrong people who should have been invited. However, the main reason for the low composition of the foreign delegations at our congress is the entire literary policy of the MORP and its national sections, which cannot be called otherwise than Rapp's.
The "International Congress of Revolutionary Writers", which took place in Kharkov several years ago, was entirely under the sign of the RAPP. Since then, April 23rd has happened. For us, this is a sharp line between the two epochs of our literary life. Unfortunately, April 23 did not change the policy of the MORP.
Who is in charge of the MORP? Several Hungarian, Polish and German writers of the third magnitude. They have been living with us for a long time, but this sedentary life did not affect either their psyche or their creative work. On the other hand, they have completely cut themselves off from the life of the West and they do not see the profound changes that have taken place in the thickness of the Western intelligentsia after the fascist offensive.
I will give a few examples. In America, the local "Rappers" push away from us such significant writers as Dreiser, Sherwood Andersen, Dos Pasos. They reproach the authors of novels for the "inconsistency" of the political line of this or that character in literary works, and I'm not talking about criticism, but about accusations of renegade, etc.
In France, the organ of the section of the MORP, the journal Commune, arranged a questionnaire among writers. The writers responded, but their responses were printed like this: twenty lines of the writer, and after that forty lines of editorial explanations of extremely rude and full of personal attacks. This behavior of the MORP section alienates even the writers closest to us: André Gide, Malraux, Roger Martin du Gard, Fernandez, and others. Suffice it to say that even Barbusse is in a position of hardly tolerable.
As regards the Germans, Radek, in his concluding remarks at the congress, clearly showed the narrowness and, even worse, the swagger of the literary circles which had seized the leadership of German revolutionary literature.
I might add that the same is happening in other countries. In Czecho-Slovakia, Vanchura and Olbrecht were thrown back. In Spain, the organization consists of several snobs and teenagers. In the Scandinavian countries, anti-fascist writers are treated as "worst enemies". Etc.
The situation in the West is now extremely favorable: the majority of the most prominent, talented, and even the most famous writers will sincerely follow us against fascism. If instead of the MORP there were a broad anti-fascist organization of writers, it would immediately include such writers as Romain Rolland, André Gide, Malraux, J.-R. Block, Barbusse, Wildrac, Dürten, Giono, Fernandez, Roger Martin du Gard, Gehenno, Chanson, Alain, Aragon, Thomas Mann, Heinrich Mann, Feuchtwanger, Leonard Frank, Glaeser, Pluvier, Graf, Mering, Dreiser, Sherwood Andersen, Dos Pasos, Godd, and others. I have listed only three countries and authors known to us from translations of their books. In short, such an organization, with rare exceptions, will unite all major and uncorrupt writers.
The political program of such an organization must be very broad and at the same time precise:
1) The fight against fascism.
2) Active defense of the USSR.
The Western European and American intelligentsia listen to the "big names". Therefore, the significance of a large anti-fascist organization headed by famous writers will be very great.
But to create such an anti-fascist organization of writers, we need, firstly, the sanction of our governing bodies, and secondly, the dissolution or radical reorganization of both the MOWP and its national sections.
The All-Union Congress of Writers will play an enormous role in attracting the Western European intelligentsia to us. At this congress, for the first time, questions of culture and craftsmanship were raised in their entirety, in accordance with the growth of our country and with its right to worldwide spiritual hegemony. At the same time, the Congress showed how much all our writers, non-Party as well as Party, are united around the Party in its creative work and in its preparation for the defense of the country. The way our writers greeted the delegates of the Red Army will allow the Western intelligentsia to understand our position within the country and our organic connection with the cause of its defense.
In turn, the disagreements that have affected the congress on questions of creativity and technology will show the same intelligentsia how amazingly we have grown in recent years. The majority of the congress warmly applauded those reports or speeches that insisted on raising the cultural level, on overcoming provincialism, on the need for research and inventions. These speeches and this applause also aroused warm sympathy among the foreign writers present at the congress. We can safely say that the work of the congress prepared the way for the creation of a large anti-fascist organization of writers from the West and America.
Forgive me, dear Iosif Vissarionovich, that I have taken so much time from you, but it seems to me that, in addition to our literary field, such an organization will now have general political military significance.
With deep respect, Ilya Ehrenburg.
Stalin, Voroshilov - Kaganovich, Kuibyshev September 14, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 130. Handwritten text. Signatures are autographs.
Cipher .
Moscow. Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Comrades Kaganovich, Kuibyshev.
We support the formation of two brigades of 15,000 people for Zudortrans 1 . Stalin, Voroshilov. No. 31. 14/IX.33 2
_______________________
1 After signing the cipher, Stalin added: “I voted under duress, like a man liable for military service” (Ibid. L. 130). On the same day sent from Sochi at 20:00. 12 min. (Ibid. L. 129). On September 15, 1933, the PB decided to form two brigades with a total number of 15 thousand people for road construction in the Far East, in the likeness of a railway building (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 57).
2 Date and number entered by the secretary.Stalin, Voroshilov - Molotov, Kaganovich, Kuibyshev September 14, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 132. Handwritten text. Signatures are autographs.
Cipher.
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Molotov, Kaganovich, Kuibyshev.
In connection with the enormous underfulfillment of the program of military orders for aviation, tanks, artillery, shells, we ask you to consider the issue in the Defense Commission with the call of people from the factories and resolutely tighten up the implementation and punish the guilty 1 .
Stalin, Voroshilov.
#32
14/IX.33 2
______________________
1 Text in italics added by Stalin.
2 Number and date entered by the secretary.
Stalin, Voroshilov - Molotov, Kaganovich, Kuibyshev September 14, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 134. Text - Stalin's autograph, signatures - autographs.
Molotov, Kaganovich, Kuibyshev.
According to reliable data, the implementation of the plan for the construction of a torpedo plant in Makhachkala is going very badly. All deadlines are violated, the disorganization of work is complete. We are in danger of being left without torpedoes—there will be submarines, there will be no torpedoes, the fleet will be disarmed. We propose to call the construction organizers to the commission and take draconian measures to create a turning point, to complete the plant on time.
Stalin. Voroshilov.
#33
14/IX-33
Kaganovich, Kuibyshev to Stalin September 16, 1933
Archive: RGASPI R. 558. Op 11. D. 80. L. 141. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow 16/IX-33 About an hour. 22 min.
In. No. 30.
Tov. Stalin.
The Politburo discussed the issue of organizing the production of row-crop tractors of the Formol type. Revealed the need for release in addition to the previously released for import of two hundred thousand rubles., Another six hundred thousand rubles. import.
We consider it possible to agree to this in order to include these expenses in the import plan of the Narkomtyazhprom for 1934.
Please let us know your opinion 1 . HP 30.
Kaganovich, Kuibyshev.
____________________
1 September 16 in cipher from Sochi at 22:00. 35 min. Stalin agreed (Ibid. L. 140). On September 17, 1933, the PB decided to allocate an import contingent for the Krasny Putilovets plant to the NKTP to order equipment in the amount of 600 thousand gold rubles at the expense of the import contingents of NKTyazhprom for 1934, ensuring the delivery of equipment no later than March 1, 1934 (RGASPI. F. 17. Inventory 162. D. 15. L. 78).
Kaganovich to Stalin on September 16 [1933]
Kaganovich to Stalin September 17, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 5. Certified typewritten copy.
Strictly secret .
Cipher.
Copy.
Tov. Stalin.
Pravda asks that Koltsov be sent to Paris to cover the process of setting fire to the Reichstag. Personally, I doubt the expediency of his trip. Please let me know your opinion.
17.IX.33
Kaganovich.
Stalin to Kaganovich September 18, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 2. Autograph.
CC . Kaganovich.
Issues such as the threat of the Chinese Eastern Railway or the change of borders with Persia cannot be dealt with in the usual way. It was imperative to request all the absent members of the PB. You will receive my and Voroshilov's opinion today.
No. 37.
Stalin.
18/IX.33 1
____________________
1 Number and date entered by the secretary.Stalin to Kaganovich September 18, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 4. Autograph.
Kaganovich .
I have no objection to Koltsov's trip to Paris.
Stalin.
No. 38.
18/IX.33 1
___________________
1 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day it was sent in code from Sochi at 16:00. On September 19, 1933, the PB decided not to object to the trip of M.E. Koltsov to Paris to cover the trial of the Reichstag fire in the press (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 78).Stalin, Voroshilov - Kaganovich September 18, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 7. Text - Stalin's autograph. Signatures are autographs.
Kaganovich .
First. You will receive an answer to the account of Japan and the CER by letter on September 20th. Second. We are resolutely against any talk of ceding territory to the Persians. After a boycott by the Persians, such a concession will be counted as a boycott premium. On other issues, we consider Karakhan's note acceptable.
No. 39
Stalin. Voroshilov.
18/IX.33 1
_________________
1 Number and date entered by the secretary. Sent in code from Sochi on September 18 at 4 p.m. (Ibid. L. 6).Stalin, Voroshilov - Kaganovich September 18, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 10. Certified typewritten copy.
Strictly secret .
Cipher .
Copy .
Sochi. T. Stalin.
What I sent you about the CER and Persia, including the press release, is only a draft. We didn't make any decisions.
In the future, we will take into account your instructions to request all the missing members of PB1. No. 33/1895/sh.
Kaganovich.
18.IX.33Stalin to Kaganovich [September 18, 1933]
Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 100. L. 109. Autograph.
T. Kaganovich!
We are sending you our amendments to Sokolnikov's draft on the CER. We insist on our amendments. We believe that in the press, direct responsibility should be laid for all the outrages in Manchuria on the Japanese [government] government 1 .
Stalin.
___________________
1 The statement of the government of the USSR to the government of Japan was published in Soviet newspapers on September 22, 1933. It stated, in particular: “The Soviet government considers that the Japanese government is directly responsible for these violations. Not Manchukuo, which is powerless and incapable of answering for the events in Manchuria, but the Japanese Government, which is the real master in Manchuria, should be directly responsible for all violations of the agreements on the CER, as well as for the impending seizure of the road ”(for more details, see the introduction to the section ).Stalin, Voroshilov - Kaganovich September 19, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 13. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
Dispatched from Sochi 17–05 19.IX. 1933
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade. Kaganovich.
We propose to approve the following proposals:
1) Accept the proposal of Comrade Voroshilov on the concentration of all Rolls-Royce passenger cars in a special garage and on the return of the rollers by comrades who have these cars for personal use.
2) Consider that henceforth Rolls-Royce cars should not be imported.
3) Buy abroad 4 covered (limousine) six-seat cars of the Cadillac system and 8 pieces of open six-seat Packards of 1933 production with a full set of spare parts and spare parts for the existing Rolls-Royce fleet.
4) Release one hundred thousand rubles in foreign currency for expenses under paragraph 3. We offer:
1) Approve a delegation for a return visit to Turkey consisting of comrades Voroshilov and Litvinov.
2) The comrades accompanying them should be determined by comrades Voroshilov and Litvinov in the amount of no more than 10-15 people in total.
Stalin. Voroshilov 1 .
___________________
1 On the draft of the encryption there is a note “For” and the signatures of Stalin and Voroshilov (Ibid. L. 14-18). On September 20, 1933, the PB approved Voroshilov's proposals on cars and the composition of the delegation for a return visit to Turkey (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 81).Kaganovich to Stalin September 19, 1933
Archive: RGASPI R. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 31. Certified typewritten copy.
Owls. Secret .
Copy .
Cipher .
Tov. Stalin.
The composition of the brigade of the Central Committee in the Krivoy Rog basin is planned as follows: Akulov (leader), Kaner, Lauer, Avirom 1 .
Please let me know your opinion 2 . No. 34/1901/sh.
19.IX.33
L. Kaganovich.
_____________________________
1 On September 15, 1933, the PB considered the issue “On the supply of ore and fluxes to the metallurgical plants of the South”. The PB considered it necessary to send a commissioner or brigades of the Central Committee to Krivoy Rog to intensify the export of ore, instructing Kaganovich and Kuibyshev to outline candidates (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 930. L. 3). On September 21, 1933, the PB approved the composition of the brigade (Ibid. D. 931. L. 17).
2 Sent on September 20 in code from Sochi at 2 p.m. 47 min. Stalin agreed (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 30).Kaganovich to Stalin, Voroshilov September 19, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 24. Certified typewritten copy; F. 81. Op. 3. D. 101. L. 26. Typewritten text with Kaganovich's notes.
C. secret .
Cipher.
Copy .
T. t. Stalin, Voroshilov.
Today at 11 o'clock in the morning Comrade Tukhachevsky was visited by Pierre Cote and General Barres. Pierre Cote stated that "two countries in the world do not want war - these are the USSR and France, and that therefore these countries can fearlessly acquaint each other with their achievements and that he has a proposal to establish more permanent and closer cooperation between French and Soviet aviation, which is doing he is in the most preliminary form, but that, nevertheless, he can offer cooperation on two fronts.
In the field of production, sending our engineers to study the French aviation industry, or inviting French engineers to our industry, or, if we wish, both together. Secondly, Pierre Cot proposed sending our commanders to study French aviation units and to go through French aviation schools.
Pierre Cote was interested in the forms in which cooperation appears to Tukhachevsky. Tukhachevsky did not give him a definite answer. Promised to report to the government 1 .
They leave on 21. IX. Please let us know your opinion. Is it advisable to give Pierre Cote and Barres a positive answer about establishing a more systematic connection between our and their aviation and the aviation industry and about sending our commanders and engineers to study French aviation and the aviation industry.
We would consider it expedient to give a positive answer 2 .
No. 35/36/1910/sh.
Kaganovich.
19/IX-33
____________________
We are talking about the visit to the USSR of the Minister of Aviation of France, P. Cote, and the inspector general of French aviation, General Bares, who accompanied him, and other leaders of the Ministry of Aviation (see DVP, vol. XVI, pp. 856–857). On September 20, Tukhachevsky sent Kaganovich the following message: “Yesterday at a dinner arranged in honor of the French guests, I had to have conversations with Pierre Cot, General Bares and engineer Kako on various issues of aviation technology. The issues of flights in conditions of poor visibility, cooling of engines at high altitudes, aircraft weapons, bomber training methods, organization of night flights, etc. were raised. On all these issues, the French are very willing to give answers and openly talk about new aircraft cannons and machine guns (1,200 rounds per minute). Fighter, armed with an automatic cannon, they promise to show it in a few months (now it is under construction). The French are very pleased with the reception, in particular, General Barres says that he is completely fascinated by the reception, that he is an old friend of the USSR and that back in 1927 he agreed with Herriot about a joint trip to the USSR, but that then it did not work out . So far, Barres has been very reserved. They invite me and Comrade. Alksnis with a group of commanders to come to France to study aviation and promise to show all the equipment and training methods ”(RGASPI. F. 81. Op. 3. D. 101. L. 27).
2On October 23, 1933, the French ambassador to the USSR, in a conversation with People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov, again raised the question of Tukhachevsky's visit to France. Litvinov replied that "the issue was not discussed with us", and he does not even know whether Tukhachevsky received an invitation from anyone. On November 30, 1933, an adviser to the French embassy handed over to B.S. Stomonyakov, a member of the NKID board, a memorandum from the French embassy, which confirmed the invitation to Tukhachevsky and Soviet pilots to pay a visit to France in response to the visit of Kot (DVP. T. XVI. S. 555 , 859–860). On December 10, 1933, the PB accepted Kot's proposal to send Soviet commanders to French aviation schools for improvement and outlined the composition of those sent. Ambassador to France V. SDovgalevsky was instructed to inform the French side of his intention to send in the spring of 1934. a squadron of aircraft to Paris in response to the visit of the Cat (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 152). The visit of the Soviet aviation delegation headed by the head of the Main Directorate of the Civil / Air Fleet Unshlikht took place in August 1934 (DVP. T. XVII. M. 1971. P. 811).Stalin to Kaganovich September 20, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 22–23. Autograph.
Moscow. Kaganovich.The French climb to us for reconnaissance. They are interested in our aviation because it is well established in our country, and we are strong in this area. Aviation cooperation is acceptable, but it must be conditional on cooperation in building naval ships, especially submarines and destroyers, where we are somewhat weak. The French should answer as follows: first, since they have already visited some of our aviation enterprises, to allow our engineers and commanders to familiarize themselves with French aviation enterprises on the spot, and then it will be possible to allow French engineers to visit us; secondly, to allow our engineers and naval commanders now to get acquainted on the spot with French enterprises for the construction of naval ships and equipment for them. If the French do not agree, give them a polite but transparent hint that we consider cooperation with them impossible without the last condition.
Stalin.
#45
20DH.331.
______________________
1 Number and date entered by the secretary. Sent the same day in code at 12 noon. 52 min. marked "immediately" (Ibid. L. 21).Stalin to Kaganovich September 20, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 26. Autograph.
Moscow. CC ON. Kaganovich .
Cipher.
First 1 . In the presence of current and medium repairs of tractors, it is absolutely sufficient to have 50 per cent of capital repairs. Not only 80, but also 60 percent are too many and superfluous. Second. It is impossible to yield to Winter by locks. Third. I consider it necessary that the construction of the Volgodonsk Canal, not the Manych Canal, but the Volgodonsk Canal be included in the five-year plan. Fourth. What Shulkin are you writing about? Goldin should not be removed until the issue is fully clarified. Fifth. Could you tell us what operational tasks were given to the Resettlement Committee for 33 years?
No. 43 Stalin.
20/IX.33 2
_______________________
1 Further, Stalin answers the questions posed by Kaganovich in a letter dated 16 September.
2 Number and date entered by the secretary. Dispatched same day at 2pm. 45 min. (Ibid. L. 25).Kaganovich to Stalin on September 20 [1933]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 741. L 55–62. Autograph.
20/IX
Hello, Dear Comrade Stalin.
1) In connection with the reduced, and in some places extremely low, harvests in the eastern part of the Middle Volga, the northeastern part of the Lower Volga, the southern part of the Urals, and Western Kazakhstan, Comrade Chernov proposes to increase the fund of discounts on grain deliveries for the collective farms of these regions with a reduced harvest.
On the Middle Volga 10 mil. pud.
- "- Lower Volga 6 mil. pud.
- "- Ural 6 mil. pud.
- "- Kazakhstan 5 mil. pud.
In the Lower Volga, he also proposes to transfer last year's grain loan to the arrears of 34 years. I am sending you a note. Chernov. I consider his proposals acceptable. I would add to this a discount to the state farms of the Middle Volga for 3 million. The crop failure fell just on the areas where the state farms are located. There are state farms that have collected only 3 centners per hectare. Please let me know your opinion. The last five days give a slight decrease in grain procurements, but so far we do not press.
2) In connection with the deterioration of the work of the textile industry, especially the increase in marriage, reaching up to 9% of the 1st category of marriage and up to 20-25% of the 2nd category of marriage, the MC gathered in Orekhovo a regional conference of cotton workers on product quality.A whole series of ugly facts of bad management, poor organization of labor and bureaucracy came to light. The functionality went so far that, having eliminated the functionality in the work of workers, it was left in the so-called specialization of factories. For example: all ancillary materials - shafts, reeds, used to be produced at each factory and they were provided, and now the People's Commissariat of Light Industry has taken it from the factories and created the "specialized" trust "Detalmashina", as a result, the factories are groaning from the absence of these so-called parts. On the evening of the 17th, I drove to Orekhovo, visited the factory and then at the conference. I think, Comrade Stalin, that you will instruct me to take up the task of correcting the outrages in the textile industry, not only in the order of the MK, but also in the order of the Central Committee. It comes to the point that instead of the usual alignment of fabrics after finishing, they are artificially stretched beyond the norm, the width and length are increased, and the footage is increased for statistics on the fulfillment of the plan.
3) We gave instructions about the Reichstag arson trial that it should be covered without artificial inflating, otherwise the intention was to give its coverage the same character as the Gorgulov trial2.
4) I wrote to you about Shulkin, who, according to the note of the OGPU and according to his own confession after his arrest, was a double-dealer and in fact rallied a right-wing opportunist group. If you do not have these materials, I can send them.
5) For tractors, we will make the amendment indicated by you in today's telegram, i.e. not 60%, but 50% overhaul. This will make them pull even tighter.
6) About the Sukharev Tower: after your 1st telegram, I instructed the architects to submit a project for its restructuring (arch) in order to facilitate movement.
I didn't promise that we were already giving up on breaking, but I told them that it depended on how well their project solved the problem of movement. Now I would like to ask you to let me wait a bit to get a project from them. Since he, of course, will not satisfy us, we will announce to them that we are breaking the Sukharev tower. If you think that there is no need to wait, then, of course, I will organize this matter faster, that is, now, without waiting for their project.
Well, I'll end with this.
Hello. Yours L. Kaganovich.
P.S. Comrade Molotov arrived today.
OK.
_____________________
On September 16–17, 1933, the Moscow regional conference of the cotton industry on the quality of products was held in Orekhovo-Zuyevo, at which Kaganovich spoke about the fight against marriage. On September 22, 1933, Pravda published an editorial titled "Why is there so much marriage in the textile industry?" in which it sharply criticized the leadership of the cotton industry. These days, Kaganovich wrote to Ordzhonikidze: “I had to get into the issues of textiles, it’s very bad there. They produce an outrageous quality of products, the Party will have to take up this matter firmly. It comes to the point that, in order to fulfill the plan, fabrics are artificially stretched in footage, which means that after washing a shirt, whoever buys 5 meters gets a children’s shirt instead of an adult one ”(Stalin’s Politburo in the 30s. P. 137).
2 Kaganovich is referring to the trial in France of the Russian émigré P. Gorgulov, who on May 6, 1932 mortally wounded French President P. Doumer in Paris. Gorgulov stated that his terrorist act was a response to French support for the Bolsheviks. September 14, 1932 Gorgulov was executed by guillotine.
On September 15, 1933, the PB approved a draft resolution submitted by a commission under the leadership of Kaganovich on providing tractor fleet with spare parts for the spring sowing campaign and for 1934. The resolution provided for the repair campaign of 1934 to proceed from the fact that no more than 60% of the available tractor fleet as of January 1, 1934 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 930. L. 1–2, 49–50). On September 20, after Stalin's telegram, the PB changed this decision and established that "no more than 50% of the available tractor fleet as of January 1, 1934 should be subjected to major repairs." (Ibid. D. 931. L. 18). On September 24, 1933, the resolution of the STO of the USSR on the organization of the use of the tractor fleet of September 21, 1933 was published in the newspapers, which took into account Stalin's requirements.Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin September 22, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 36. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow 22DH - 33, 1 hour. 30 minutes.
In. No. 37.
Tov. Stalin.
Litvinov sent a note about the pact with Greece and Iraq. The summary of the note is as follows:
1) Rushdi Bey, without asking us, convinced the Greeks of the need to conclude a pact with the USSR like the Soviet-French or Soviet-Italian. Turkey formally puts before us the question of concluding a pact with Greece, having already received the consent of the latter. We have repeatedly declared our readiness to conclude pacts with all states. Litvinov considers it inconvenient and inexpedient to avoid a pact with Greece, especially since she can be considered our closest maritime neighbor and is the only Balkan country with which we have normal relations.
2) Persia intends to conclude a non-aggression pact with Iraq. Turkey can only allow this on the condition of its own participation in such a pact. Iraq under the de facto protectorate of England. Rushdie puts forward the idea of a pact between Turkey, Persia, Iraq and England. This will strengthen England throughout the Middle East and politically bring Turkey closer to England. Rushdi Bey asks for our consent to this pact and is even prepared to make our participation in the pact or the resumption of relations between the USSR and Iraq a condition. Litvinov considers it obvious that the planned pact does not meet our interests. We could give conditional consent to our participation in the pact. Undoubtedly, England will in no case allow our participation, even if it even agrees to the pact proposed by Turkey. The pact can be broken in this way.
We think that it would be better to postpone both issues until our delegation travels to Turkey.
Please provide your opinion. No. 38, 39.
Kaganovich, Molotov.Stalin - Molotov, Kaganovich September 22, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 36–36 rev. Autograph.
Molotov, Kaganovich .
Your 38 and 39. It is better to postpone both questions until the return of our delegation from Turkey. Rushdie Bey must be told that we do not intend to entrust him with our representation before Greece and Iraq, and he should not confront us with a fact if he does not want us to ever embarrass him to the whole world.
Stalin.
#48
22/IX.33 1
_______________________
1 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day, it was sent in code from Gagra at 15:00. (Ibid. L. 35).
Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin September 22, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 33. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow 22/IX-33 at 4 o'clock. 40 min.
In. No. 38.
Tov. Stalin.
Despite the fact that correspondents of all countries were admitted to the Reichstag arson trial, only our correspondents were not admitted (including the representative of TASS).
Tov. Litvinov proposes that we protest and warn that we, for our part, will not remain in debt and will send their correspondents and recall ours.
Please let us know your opinion 1 . HP 40.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
_____________________
1 On the same day, Stalin agreed at 15:00. 22 min. (Ibid. L. 33). On September 22, 1933, the German authorities arrested a TASS representative and an Izvestia correspondent in Berlin on their way to the Leipzig Trials. On the same day the Soviet journalists were released. On September 23, the PB instructed the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Germany, L.M. Khinchuk, to protest to the German government about the arrests and searches of Soviet correspondents at the trial. On September 26, the PB approved for the press a TASS report on the recall of Soviet correspondents from Berlin and the expulsion from the USSR of all representatives of the German press in Moscow (DVP. T. XVI. P. 858; RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L 82, 85).Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov September 23, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 46–48. Autograph.
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU.
Kaganovich. Molotov .
It can be seen from the materials that the Rudzutak commission plans to increase turnover with Persia, meaning the sale of a large amount of sugar and manufactory to Persia. I don't think this will work. We will not raise more than twenty million export-import turnover. Romantic Eliava does not understand this. But we must understand this. Sugar and manufactory will be needed for their own market, which has already become very demanding due to the large harvest. Buying sugar for Persia abroad is stupid, since such an operation has so far given nothing but minuses.
Stalin.
#50
23/IX.33 1
__________________
1 Number and date entered by the secretary.Kaganovich to Stalin [not earlier than September 23, 1933]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 741. L. 79. Autograph.
Dear comrade Stalin!
I am very concerned about the incident with the boat at Pichunga 1 . We have no information other than the fact itself .
I firmly shake your hand and kiss you. Your Lazar.
___________________________
1 Correct: Pitsunda.
On September 23, 1933, the border guards of the Pitsunda outpost fired shots at the boat in which Stalin was. The incident was most likely caused by a mistake: the border guards did not receive prior notification of the boat's movement in the protected area and acted according to the instructions (for the circumstances of the incident, see: Beria. End of Career. M., 1991. S. 362–364).Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin September 24, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 43. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow 24/IX-33 at 2 o'clock. 40 min.
In. No. 40.
Tov. Stalin.
Tov. Sheboldaev appealed to the Central Committee with a request: first, to give the collective farms of the region an additional discount on grain deliveries in the amount of 5 million poods, and second, to reduce the increased plan for payment in kind by 5 million poods.
According to Sheboldaev's note, part of the collective farms of Sevkavkrai, due to undersowing in the spring and a decrease in yields that occurred in July, will have a shortage of seeds and experience difficulties in food when fulfilling obligations on grain deliveries. In part of the collective farms, up to 1–2 k[i]l[ogram]m will be needed per workday.
In Sevkavkrai, one million poods of wheat from the reserve of obligations delivered and the insurance of the Central Committee in the amount of 4 million poods remained unused, the discount of 5 million poods does not affect the main plan.
We propose the following ruling:
1) To increase the fund of discounts from grain deliveries in the North Caucasus for collective farms with reduced yields by 5 million poods with the transfer of the discount to the arrears to be collected in the autumn of 1934.
2) To reduce the plan for payment in kind for the work of the MTS on the collective farms in the North Caucasus by 5 million poods.
3) To warn comrades Sheboldaev and Larin that this discount has completely exhausted the reserve and insurance of grain deliveries in the North Caucasus, and they are personally responsible for the fulfillment of both the plan for grain deliveries and the plan for payment in kind in the region in full and by the deadline set by the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars.
Please let us know your opinion 1 . HP 42.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
_____________________
1 On the same day in cipher from Gagra at 13:00. 25 min. Stalin agreed (Ibid. L. 43). On September 24, 1933, the PB approved this decision (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 84).Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin September 24, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 53. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow 24/IX-33 at 15:00. 57 min.
In. No. 42.
Tov. Stalin.
Belmaus 1 - the Latvian envoy in an unofficial manner, through comrade. Lawrence (former plenipotentiary representative in Latvia) sounded out our attitude to the possible proposal of the Latvian government to allow the arrival of the Latvian squadron to Moscow.
The People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs consider it expedient to answer the Latvian envoy in the same informal manner, that if an official proposal comes from Latvia, it will be accepted favorably.
Litvinov considers it possible to respond to the arrival of the Latvian squadron with our corresponding flight to Latvia, and that such an exchange of "air visits" would not only help establish contact with the Latvian army, but would also have a favorable effect on our political relations with Latvia.
We consider Litvinov's proposal acceptable. Please let us know your opinion 2 . HP 44.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
_______________________
1 That's right - Bilmanis.
2 September 25 in cipher from Gagra at 1 o'clock. 55 min. Stalin agreed (Ibid., L. 52). On September 26, 1933, the PB approved Litvinov's proposal (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 84).
Stalin to Kaganovich September 24, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 100. L. 17–21. Autograph.
24/IX 33
Hello, Comrade Kaganovich!
1) I have no objection to facilitating grain deliveries in both Volga regions, the Urals, and Kazakhstan 1 .
2) You must press to the fullest on the textile industry both as secretary of the Moscow Committee and as secretary of the Central Committee. The guilty must be punished without fail, without looking at the faces and their "communist" ranks.
3) I have no idea about the Shulkin case.
4) In the repair of tractors (as well as steam locomotives), the main thing for us is not capital repairs, but current and medium ones . If the latter are well placed, capital repairs cannot rise above 40%. Those who demand 60% or 70% and even 80% of capital repairs are not masters, but bunglers or direct enemies, since they ruin our current and average repairs. The main thing is to raise the current (minor) and medium repairs. Without this, our tractor fleet will limp all the time, even if we accept 100% overhaul. Yakovlev does not understand this, since he is not the master, but a talker, an empty and inflated talker. And you must understand this. Along with the decision on 50% of the overhaul, it is necessary to make a decision on raising, on the mandatoryraising current and average repair. I repeat, this is the main thing.
5 ) As for the Sukharev Tower, I'm not going to rush you . Hey!
I. Stalin.
_____________________________
1 September 26, 1933, at the suggestion of the People's Commissar of Agriculture M.A. Chernov, the PB increased the fund of discounts from grain supplies for collective farms with reduced yields in the Middle and Lower Volga regions, the Urals and Kazakhstan (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D 15. L. 85). See also Document No. 355.
2On August 17, 1933, the newspaper Rabochaya Moskva published a message about the upcoming demolition of the Sukharev Tower. At the end of August 1933, a group of well-known architects (I.E. Grabar, I.A. Fomin, I.V. Zholtovsky) sent a letter to Stalin and Kaganovich in which they "strongly objected" "to the destruction of a highly talented work of art, tantamount to the destruction of a painting Raphael". The architects proposed to quickly develop a project for the reorganization of Sukharev Square, which would allow both the preservation of the tower and the resolution of transport problems (Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 9. S. PO). Apparently, initially Stalin agreed with the proposals of the architects. Kaganovich gave the task to develop the project. After a telegram from Stalin and Voroshilov dated September 18, on September 20, Kaganovich requested additional instructions on this matter. In the spring of 1934 the Sukharev Tower was destroyed.Kaganovich to Stalin on September 24 [1933]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 741. L. 63^71. Autograph.
24/IX
Hello, Dear Comrade Stalin!1) In connection with your instruction to check the fulfillment of military orders, we have gathered the Defense Commission and heard reports from all branches of the military industry. It turned out that the implementation of the program is unsatisfactory. In total, 2251 aircraft were to be handed over to the military department for 8 months, and 1629 or 72% of the plan were handed over. NKTyazhprom disputes these figures, but even if we take their figures, we get 80% of the plan. In terms of tanks, the figures of the NKVoenmor differ sharply from the figures of the NKTyazhprom, because the NKVoen does not consider the surrendered tanks hit 1932, but even here, even if we take the figures of the NKTyazhprom, it is unsatisfactory. Worst of all is the execution of artillery, both guns and ammunition. After an exchange of views, we gave a number of additional instructions for aviation, tanks, and artillery to work on the issue, and appointed the next meeting for 29 with the call of the factory directors for the appropriate "blessing".
2) Sheboldaev received a long note on the situation with crop yields in a number of regions. We outlined the essence of his request and motives in a telegram, but in view of the fact that he has a lot of vague things in his note, and also in view of the exceptionally poor harvesting progress in state farms, we decided to send to the North. Caucasus Mikoyan for five days and Yurkin for a longer period. To my reproach over the phone, why he had a lot of obscure and vague things, Sheboldaev replied that they did not know a clearer situation in the regions. Apparently, we will have to look closely at Sev. Caucasus.
3) Grain procurements for the last five days have shown a slowdown. Of course, comparing with last year and even with 1931, we have run far ahead. If last year we prepared 411 million at this time, and in 1931 about 580 million, then this year, as of September 20, we have 886 million. However, there is a danger of “dizziness from success”. Now it may be too early to sound the alarm, because during these five days the diversion of forces for winter sowing has a great influence, but, in my opinion, it is necessary to be alert. I ask you Comrade Stalin to write whether we need to react to the slowdown, especially if this 5th five-day period will be the same. Cleaning is going well, they have already removed 78 mil. ha - 92%. Harvesting is going badly on state farms, especially in the south. Mikoyan and Yurkin will take the necessary measures to the North. Caucasus and on the way they will stop in Kharkov.
4) They again raise the question of allowing foreign correspondents to travel around the USSR. It may indeed be possible, leaving the procedure for issuing permits in each specific case, to allow more frequent visits of correspondents. Please let me know your opinion.
5) On the CER, upon receiving from you the corrected directive to Yurenev, at the same time, since Comrade Sokolnikov, although without instructions, made this statement to Ota, we published this statement the very next day in our press. It turned out very opportunely, because Yurenev's statement turned out to be wrong because of the ugly mistake of the cipher department of the NKID. The fact is that the cipher was transmitted in two steps, but after the first part there was no written “to be continued”, and our “sharp-witted” ambassador, having received this, as he himself writes a strange telegram, went to Hirota and told him that was in part 1. The next day he had to go again and already declare in full. We instructed Yagoda to investigate and he established that the NKID cipher department was to blame. We decided to put three of them in jail for 10 days, one was removed from work. Yesterday we edited articles and notes for publication. Today we received reports that 2 chiefs of Kalin and Kubli services and 2 chiefs of the Manchuria and Pogranichnaya stations were arrested in Harbin. We issued a directive that Rudy immediately appoint other Soviet people. Slavutsky protested.
We will inform you about the future immediately.
Hello. Your L. Kaganovich.
Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin September 25, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 56–57. Script. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow 25/IX-33 at 23:00.
In. No. 43.Tov. Stalin.
We transmit the ciphers of Kabakov and Oshvintsev: “The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union to Kaganovich. Today, a decree of the Ural Regional Commission on Cleansing was published, which notes that the chairman of the regional executive committee, Oshvintsev, is responsible to the party and the government for the outrages that took place in the work of the Sverdlovsk City Council. As chairman of the City Council, he entrusted his work to Deputy Popkov, he himself did not delve into the essence of the work and did not check people, which made it possible for anti-party elements, outsiders to operate, plunder the people's property. The secretary of the Sverdlovsk city committee, Karklin, did not supervise the work of the city council faction, did not check how his decisions were being implemented, was not interested in how the party cell and the city council apparatus work. After that, is it advisable to leave at this job. He asks to be relieved of the duties of the chairman of the regional executive committee, Karklin made a statement about his resignation. Today the issue will be discussed at the bureau of the regional committee. With such a wording of the decision of the purge commission, Oshvintsev, the chairman of the regional executive committee, and Karklin, the secretary of the city committee, cannot be left at work. In addition, in Perm, the chairman of the city council, Pykhteev, was expelled; in Chelyabinsk, we removed the chairman of the city council; the chairman of the Magnitogorsk city council was removed and expelled from the party. Now in the Urals there is a sharp disproportion in a number of local bodies between the gigantic growth of economic construction and the level of leading workers, often people cannot cope with what they themselves built. I ask you to tell me your opinion regarding the release of Oshvintsev and Karklin, to send 10 people of high-profile workers to the Urals for leading party and Soviet work. Now we need a manager immediately. regional committee organizer, secretary of the Sverdlovsk city committee, chairman of the city council of Magnitogorsk, decide on the chairman of the regional executive committee. An exceptionally difficult situation with workers in the Regional Committee, there is no secretary of the district committee in Nadezhdinsk. Kabakov.
“Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Comrade Comrade Stalin, Kaganovich. Today, the regional press published the decision of the regional purge commission in the case of Popkov, which at the same time made a conclusion regarding me. Taking into account the extreme complexity of the leadership of such a large region, under the circumstances I consider it impossible to remain chairman of the Ural Regional Executive Committee. Please release me. Oshvintsev.
Looking forward to getting more details. They suggested to Kabakov not to make decisions until the Central Committee's consideration. HP 45, 46.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov September 26, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 57. Autograph.
Yours are 45 and 46. All those exposed must be driven away and punished 1 .
Stalin.
No. 54.
26/IX.33 2
_____________________________
On October 1, 1933, the PB granted Oshvintsev's request to be released from work in the Urals (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 931. L. 5).
2 Number and date entered by the secretary. Sent in code from Gagra on September 26 at 23:00. 10 minutes. (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 55).Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin September 26, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 61–62. Script. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow 26/IX — 33 0 hour. 18 min.
In. No. 44.
Tov. Stalin.
In connection with the arrests in Harbin of two chiefs of the management service of the Chinese Eastern Railway and two chiefs of the Manchuria and Pogranichnaya stations, Slavutsky protested to the Commissar of Foreign Affairs of Manchzhuguo. In addition, we think that it is necessary for Yurenev to declare orally, with the transfer of the text, a protest in the following form:"Comrade's statement. Yurenev to the Japanese Foreign Minister. September 24 p. Japanese and Manchurian police officials in Harbin arrested (such and such). On the same day, officials of the Japanese border detachment at the Manchuria station arrested the head of the Manchuria station (surname). At the Pogranichnaya station on the night of September 24, the chief of the Pogranichnaya station (surname) was arrested by the ranks of the Manchurian border detachment. These actions of the Harbin police and the Japanese and Manchu border detachments constitute an illegal and violent interference in the activities of the legitimate administration of the CER, clearly aimed at violating Soviet rights to the CER and indisputably contradicting the existing agreements on the CER. The fact that measures of this impermissible nature were being prepared by the Japanese and Manchu authorities was made known to the Japanese government a few days ago by statements made by Deputy NKID G.Ya. Sokolnikov to the Japanese ambassador Mr. Ota in Moscow and the Soviet plenipotentiary in Tokyo, Mr. Yurenev. The Soviet government, in addition to these warnings, declares to the Japanese government that, according to irrefutable data now at its disposal, these measures represent the beginning of the implementation of a detailed plan adopted in Chan Chung at a series of conferences at the Japanese military mission in Manchuria with the participation of the most responsible Japanese leaders of the Manchu administration. If necessary, the Soviet government will publish these documents in full, establishing with exhaustive completeness the methods of action of the Japanese military command in Manchuria and the Japanese administration in Manchuria. The Soviet government, in the above-mentioned statements made to the Japanese government, warned that the entire responsibility for the implementation of the plan of attacks on Soviet rights on the CER lies with the Japanese government. The Soviet government once again emphasizes that the meetings that worked out the plan for the seizure took place at the Japanese military mission and that the arrests of Soviet employees were carried out with the participation of Japanese border units and Japanese police officials. The Sovpra believes that such actions of the Japanese authorities in relation to the CER cannot but be calculated to disrupt the ongoing negotiations on the sale of the CER. The Japanese government bears full responsibility for the consequences."
Please let us know your opinion1. HP 47, 48.
Kaganovich, Molotov
_______________________
1 September 26 in cipher from Gagra at 13:00. 12 min. Stalin agreed (Ibid. L. 60). On the same day, K.K. Yurenev handed this statement to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan (DVP, vol. XVI, pp. 545–546).
Stalin to Kaganovich September 28, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 100. L. 22–24. Autograph.
T. Kaganovich!
1) In addition to airplanes, tanks, artillery and ammunition, it is also necessary to check the production of submarines. It is very bad with submarines, they are produced slowly, outrageously bad. We must press on this matter from day to day, continuously, without respite . The quality of the submarines is bad, very bad.
2) The pressure on grain procurements must begin immediately . "Then it will be too late. If you do n't start pressing hard right now, you'll miss time and decompose the workers and collective farmers.
3) It is impossible to allow "more frequent departures" of foreign correspondents. If they do not like the order established for them, they can leave for other countries. With regard to foreign correspondents, the current regime must be fully preserved.
4) Tell us how the commercial (“free”) grain trade is being developed.
Hey! I. Stalin.
28/IX 33.Kaganovich to Stalin September 28 [1933]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. P. D. 741. L. 72–78. Autograph.
28/IX
Hello, Dear Comrade Stalin!
1) Comrade Yaroslavsky arrived from Eastern Siberia. His conclusions are very gloomy, both in relation to the organization and in relation to the leadership. He believes that the leadership of the regional committee will not cope with the task of improving the organization. Leonov, on the other hand, sent a letter addressed to you and me, in which he guarantees that they will be able to cope. Now, after the departure of comrade Yaroslavsky, comrade Zirnis sent a telegram that the situation had become even more complicated, the Irkutsk city committee opposed the regional committee, and so on. Tov. Yaroslavsky is now writing a written report, when it is ready, I will send it to you. How can we determine our attitude to this whole matter? Please give me your instructions.
2) From Central Asia (Bauman and Huseynov) they bombard us about the need to remove Maksum and Khodjibaev. We sent them a telegram not to film them now, but sent all the material to us. Arrests of workers there are on the rise. How to be? Is it possible to create a small commission of 3, which would get acquainted in detail with all the materials. I ask for your instructions.
3) I fully agree with your instructions on the repair of tractors (emphasizing the average and current ones), it completely coincides with the position that I immediately took in the commission on spare parts. I also agree about Yakovlev, I understood this, because I directly encountered on business grounds 1. Today we were engaged in the distribution of tractors and vehicles. We have not yet established the final results, but we have outlined the main figures. We are in the 4th quarter of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture. we give fewer tractors than in the previous ones, because we did not satisfy all other consumers earlier, postponing until the 4th quarter. That is why we plan 11,800 out of 16,785 wheeled tractors for NKZema, 2,000 for NKsovkhozes, and the rest for various industrial and so on. consumers. According to ChTZ 1365 pcs. We, remembering your instructions, gave NKLes 250 pieces, and NKZem 200, NKSovhoz 400, NKVoenmor 150, NKTyazh 115, in reserve 135 pieces. and other small consumers 1 .
For trucks - 9635, we satisfied the industry: 2 t[ys] NKVoenmor, 2 t[ys] Komzag, for mills 800, NKZem was given 1500, NKSovkhoz 500, and partly to cities, the metro and others, people's commissariats.
Of the passenger cars, they gave 300 to the political departments, 400 to the district committees, 800 to the People's Commissariat of Transport, and 250 to the NKVoenmor. etc. We will send you the finalized plan.
4) I want to tell you a few words about the subway. The work is now deployed on a wide front, we are already laying mines on the Arbat. Almost all of Makhovaya has already been connected underground, but right now the failure of the leadership has become particularly acute. He complained - Rotert - that there was no manpower and no barracks. We organized a recruitment of physically strong Komsomol members living in Moscow who do not need premises. People went willingly, the workers are good. And now, when there are workers, it turned out that the concrete was not prepared, there was no gravel, etc. Apparently, Rotert needs to be replaced now. By whom? Here is the main question. Abakumov works well, but he is unlikely to be suitable as a chief, as the chief engineer there is one major engineer Sholokhov, and I put forward the possibility of 2 candidates for the chief: 1) Khvesin 2- He is the 1st deputy. prev. The Moscow City Council, a former military man and the city economy, including construction, knows well or the 2nd comrade. Abakumov in both the 1st and 2nd cases can be left as the 1st deputy, and Sholokhov as the chief engineer. I beg you, Comrade Stalin, to communicate your opinion.
5) I took up textile factories, I will try to complete your task. Well, I'll end with this. Hello to you. Your L. Kaganovich.
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1 On the left edge of the sheet, opposite the proposals for the distribution of wheeled tractors, Stalin wrote: "This is not true", and opposite "NKZem 200" - "Not enough."
2 In the margin opposite Khvesin's name, Stalin's postscript: "Fool."Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin September 29, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 66. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow 29/IX-33 at 2 o'clock. 15 minutes. In. No. 45.
Tov. Stalin.
1) The Poles put forward an official proposal to establish an air line Warsaw-Moscow 1 . The French (Chomier) also raised the question of extending their Paris-Prague-Warsaw line through Minsk to Moscow. Please speed up the response.
2) Lukasiewicz announced the desire of the Poles to organize a new flight of Filippovich to Moscow around October 15, this time with the head of the Polish military aviation Raisky.
Litvinov believes that both proposals should be answered in the affirmative. We agree with this, please let us know your opinion 2 . HP 49.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
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1 The issue of establishing air communication between Warsaw and Moscow was raised by YLukasevich in a conversation with M. M. Litvinov on September 5, 1933 and in a conversation with B. S. Stomonyakov on September 13 (DVP. Vol. XVI. P. 854).
2September 29 in cipher from Gagra at 9 p.m. Stalin agreed (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 65). On the same day, the PB decided not to object to the arrival of the Polish squadron in Moscow (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 87). The squadron, led by the head of the Polish aviation Raisky, was present on November 7 at the parade on Red Square, visited TsAGI. Raisky was received by Tukhachevsky and Krestinsky (DVP, vol. XVI, p. 868). On October 3, Stomonyakov informed Lukasiewicz that the agreement in principle of the interested departments had been received to accept the Polish proposal. On October 22, a delegation headed by Director of the Department of Civil Aviation Filippovich arrived in Moscow to negotiate. During the negotiations, the Soviet side proposed the formation of a Soviet-Polish mixed company to service the Warsaw-Moscow line. The Polish side proposed parallel and alternate service of this line by Polish and Soviet aircraft, signing an appropriate agreement between the governments. On October 28, 1933, Stomonyakov, in a conversation with Lukasevich, raised the question “about the participation of France in our air communication with Poland. France [...] requested our consent to the establishment of the Paris-Moscow air route. In view of the currently existing friendly relations with France, we have decided to satisfy this wish of France. Stomonyakov further stated that "we would like to resolve the issue through a tripartite agreement between the USSR, Poland and France." In response, Lukasiewicz said that, in the opinion of the Polish government, this matter should not be rushed. At the end of 1933, negotiations with Poland were interrupted, since it was not possible to reach an agreement on these issues (Ibid.Stalin to Kaganovich September 30, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 100. L. 25–33. Autograph.
Hello, Comrade Kaganovich!
1) Sergo informs (I enclose a code) that the export of metal is bad. Be sure to take action, I beg you 1 .
2) It is bad with Eastern Siberia. Leonov is weak. Apparently, he handed over all the practical and organizational matters to the dim-witted bungler Kozlov, while he himself is engaged in “higher theory”. They will lose business. It is necessary to carefully prepare the replacement (replacement, and not just removal) of the current top. Get this thing ready. Term month. You can't delay.
3) As for Central Asia, it would be better to create a commission with your participation. Arrests would be better suspended or limited. Call Maksum and Khadzhibaev to Moscow. Then they need to be replaced 2 .
4) I consider your plan for the distribution of tractors and trucks to be dangerous. It looks like they've gone astray. ChTZ was created primarily and mainly for agriculture, and out of 1365 caterpillars you give to NKZEM and NK state farms only 600 pieces, i.e. less than half . Why, on what basis? One might think that ChTZ was created not for agriculture, but for the so-called "other consumers". Of the 16,000 wheeled tractors, 3,000 are again given to some "other consumers." Why, on what basis? One might think that agriculture no longer needs tractors, or will not need them in the near future. Where did you get it from?
Out of 9,600 trucks, you give only 2,000 to NKZEM and NKSovkhozes. What kind of nonsense is this? Now that, through the political departments, real strongholds have been created in agriculture in the localities—and the questions of agriculture and its difficulties are far from being eliminated—you, no one knows on what grounds, are taking the direction of shifting the center of attention from agriculture to "other consumers." The bird sang early...
My opinion:
a) Out of 1365 caterpillars, 500 pieces should be given to the NKSovhozov, 500 - to the NKZem (a total of 1000 pieces), instructing the NKZem to give the caterpillars only to the steppe MTS (Ukraine, the North [northern] Caucasus, the Volga region, the South Urals, Bashkiria, Siberia, Kazakhstan). We must set ourselves the immediate goal of having two to four caterpillars in each steppe MTS .
Give NKLes 250 pieces, NKVoenmor 20 or 30 pieces (they now have all the Kommunar products from the Kharkov plant in their hands), Tyazhprom the same or a little more, and leave ten (ten, not 135) pieces in reserve.
b) Out of 16,785 wheeled tractors, give at least 15,000 units to NKZEM and NKSovkhozes.
c) Out of 9,600 trucks, give at least 4,000 to NKZem and NKSovkhozes, NKVoenmor 2000, Komzag 1000, the rest to others (the main type of industry).
d) I agree with you about the distribution of cars.
5) As for the subway, I find it difficult to say anything definite. We'll talk upon arrival.
6) You did not tell me what task was given to the resettlement committee.
Hello. I. Stalin.
30/IX 33
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1 No encryption.
2On December 1, 1933, the PB approved a resolution on the chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Tajik SSR, N. Maksum, and the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Tajik SSR, A. Khodjibaev. The decision stated that “the available materials do not give grounds for accusing Comrade T. Maksum and Khodjibaev in participating in a counter-revolutionary organization in Tajikistan against the Soviet regime. Maksum and Khodjibaev were accused of numerous mistakes: ties with kulak elements, insufficient struggle against the arbitrariness of the kulaks against the poor, and pursuing a bourgeois-nationalist line in their work. It was a foregone conclusion that both of them should be removed from their posts. Huseynov, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Tajikistan, was relieved of his post for failure to take measures. A special resolution spoke of the mistakes of the GPU of Central Asia and Tajikistan (“in the fight against anti-Soviet elements, they allowed excess of power, giving the arrests a wide mass character"). A special commission was instructed to consider the cases of those arrested and release those of them who were arrested "incorrectly" (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 935. L. 21, 67-69)