Marx-Engels | Lenin | Stalin | Home Page
Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931–1936Kaganovich to Stalin October, 1933
Stalin to Kaganovich October 1, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 76. Autograph.
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU. Kaganovich .
Your plan for distribution of tractors and trucks for the fourth quarter is alarming. Please delay making a decision. I send my opinion by mail.
Stalin.
No. 58.
1/X-33 1
________________
1 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day it was sent in code from Gagra at 16:00. 20 minutes. (Ibid. L. 75).Kaganovich to Stalin October 1, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. P. D. 81. L. 77. Certified typewritten copy.
Strictly secret .
Copy .
Cipher .
Gagra. Stalin.
The plan for the distribution of tractors and machines has not yet been finally adopted by us. We are waiting for your letter. No. 52/2031/sh.
Kaganovich.
1.X.33Stalin to Kaganovich October 2, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 79. Autograph.
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU. Kaganovich.
It would be good on behalf of yours, Molotov, Voroshilov and mine to send a greeting and publish it, firstly, to Prokofiev, Birnbaum and Godunov, as unsurpassed heroes of the stratosphere, brilliantly fulfilling the task of the Soviet government 1 , secondly, to Miretsky, Benevolensky and Ekht, as the masters of the historical rally, who also brilliantly completed the task of the Soviet government 2 . In both greetings, it must be said that we are entering the Central Executive Committee with a proposal to award the participants in the flight and run with the Order of Lenin .
Stalin.
#59
2/X.33 g 4
_________________
On September 30, 1933, the crew of the first Soviet stratospheric balloon "USSR" consisting of commander Prokofiev G.A., pilot Birnbaum E.K. and engineer Godunov K.D. rose to a record height of 19 thousand meters. On October 3, 1933, Pravda published a greeting to the crew signed by Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich.
2 Motor rally Moscow - Kara-Kum - Moscow, 9500 kilometers long, started on July 6, 1933, consisting of 23 Soviet-made cars and ended on September 30, 1933.
3 PB approved the draft resolutions of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR submitted by the commission on awarding participants and organizers of the flight into the stratosphere and the Kara-Kum run on November 6, 1933 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 934. L. 11, 34, 35).
4 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day it was sent in code from Gagra at 3 o'clock. 40 min. (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 78).Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin October 2, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 81. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow 2/X - 33 at 3 o'clock. In. No. 48.
Tov. Stalin.
To the German note handed to Khinchuk, which was sent to you yesterday, we think that we could not reply with a note from the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, but confine ourselves to the following TASS report:
“On September 29, the Embassy of the USSR in Berlin received a note verbale from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs in response to the protests of the Soviet Embassy in Berlin and in connection with the decision of the Soviet press to recall its representatives from Germany and the decision of the Allied Government to stop the activities of German journalists in the USSR.
The note passes over in silence numerous cases of bullying and police persecution against representatives of the Soviet press, which were pointed out in the note of the people's commissars. Litvinov, and an attempt is made to explain the Soviet measures solely by the case of the arrest of Soviet journalists in Leipzig. As we managed to find out, the German note verbale made an unfavorable impression in Soviet government circles. They believe that if earlier the German government attributed certain actions of the German authorities to “indiscipline”, speaking disapprovingly about these actions, then with its last verbal note it seems to cover these actions and accept full responsibility for them, and that such a position fully confirms the correctness and inevitability of the conclusions made by the Soviet government.
Submit your opinion 1 . HP 51.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
_____________________________
1 On the same day in cipher from Gagra at 17:00. 10 minutes. Stalin agreed (Ibid. L. 80). On September 3, 1933, a TASS report was published in Pravda.Kaganovich to Stalin on October 2 [1933]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 741. L. 80–89. Autograph.
2/X
Dear comrade Stalin.
1) You asked what operational task we gave the resettlement committee for 1933. We gave it the task at the end of August to organize resettlement by the beginning of 1934 to the Kuban and Terek 10 thousand], and together with the previous tasks, only 14 thousand [thousand] families and Ukraine (steppe 15–20 thousand [thousand] families) 1 . The other day, after the arrival of Comrade Muratov, we called him and as a result of the conversation we were convinced that so far they are only recruiting in military units, but so far nothing has been prepared on the spot. We instructed him to develop almost the entire issue: to determine the resettlement points, to send people to provide housing and all the necessary equipment, to give a dispatch schedule with exact dates, to provide food, etc.
In a couple of days he will present it all. We think that in these remaining 3 months of 1933 he will no longer be able to do it, so we have not yet given him an additional task. It may be necessary to organize spontaneous resettlement starting from some regions of the Middle Volga. This will have to be discussed.
2) I can give preliminary data on the grain trade, because Comrade Mikoyan is not present at the moment, and in the People's Commissariat of Supply all the threads on the grain trade are with him. The state of affairs is as follows: stores are open in all 151 cities, trade has begun everywhere, but they sell less than the intended supply of bread. For example: the actual daily sale of bread in the 61 cities recorded is 3215 tons against the planned sales plan of 5649 tons. In Chelyabinsk, instead of 90 tons, they sell 30 tons; in Tiflis, instead of 200 tons, they sell 80 tons. In Voronezh, instead of 120 tons, they sell 80–85 tons per day; instead of 70 tons, Tula sells 55 tons. In Moscow, too, daily sales have been declining lately: in May 442 tons, in June 440 tons, in July 412 tons, in August 413 tons, in September 300 tons.
There are several reasons for this: firstly, the trading network is not developed enough, and often there are many stores in one area of the city, and very few in another. Secondly, poor delivery of bread. Thirdly, the poor quality of bread, this applies especially to provincial towns. In the 4th, apparently, the appearance of new bread affects, this especially applies to the south. They say that on the market in Ukrainian cities a peck of flour already reaches 30 rubles, and bread in our stores costs more. Upon Mikoyan's arrival, we will discuss all the questions arising from these facts. I kindly ask you to send your instructions by this time 2 .
3) Today, we are sending telegrams specifically to each region separately regarding grain deliveries and delivery of grain by state farms. In particular, we lean on the Lower Volga. At the same time, we are thinking in the press of hitting individual grain trusts and state farms, because state farms are going the worst of all . According to the plan for procurement in the 4th quarter, we will accept certain figures tomorrow and send you by telegraph. The digging and hauling of beets is going badly, worse than last year, we will have to press harder on the districts and, apparently, we will have to throw an additional number of motor vehicles into the sugar beet-growing districts.
4) Regarding military factories: we specifically heard the factories directly, we hope that they will catch up, but it will be necessary to check 4 .
I personally attached myself to the 8th plant in Mytishchi, which failed with a tank gun, with an anti-aircraft gun, etc. Now, according to your instructions, we will deal with submarines 5 .
5) At the PB yesterday we heard Pyatakov's message about the Ural Carriage Works. It's bad there. We pointed out to the Ural Regional Committee and suggested that they take measures to help. They entrusted Pyatakov with day-to-day checks of execution, so that in November he would go there again, and in December to hear a report on the progress of construction at the PB .
6) We also listened to the question of mineral fertilizers raised by the S[ir]x[oz] department. Yakovlev knows how to press for more, but the use of fertilizers is ugly. There are no warehouses, fertilizers fall downhill, deteriorate and lose their properties, turning into just earth. Workers on the ground treat fertilizers badly, even hostilely. We sharpened this issue and created a commission to develop this issue in all its breadth, and most importantly, to ensure in practice the correct use of fertilizers 7 .
Hello to you. Yours L. Kaganovich.
PS The Komsomol members want to issue an appeal in connection with the 15th anniversary of the Komsomol, but they also want the Central Committee to adopt a resolution. The draft appeal is large and I am not sending it to you, but I am sending you the draft resolution of the Central Committee and I ask you to let me know your opinion. In addition, they hinted at women's day awards. Please let me know your opinion on this as well.
Shake your hand. Your L. Kaganovich.
_____________________
On August 131, 1933, by a poll of PB members, the deputy chairman, secretary and members of the resettlement committee were approved. The resettlement committee was given the task “to organize the resettlement by the beginning of 1934 of at least 10 thousand families to the Kuban and Terek and 15–20 thousand families to Ukraine (Steppe) (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 930. L. 8).On February 28, 1933, in the conditions of famine and the rationing system, the PB decided to open the free sale of bread in special bakery shops at higher prices in Moscow, Leningrad and Kharkov (Ibid. D. 916. L. 31, 92). Gradually, this decision spread to other industrial centers. On October 16, 1933, after Stalin's inquiries, Mikoyan sent a note to Kaganovich and Molotov (and Kaganovich, in turn, sent the members of the PB) a note. He reported that as of October 1, 1933, free trade in grain was conducted in 145 cities, and after October 1 it would open in 15 more cities. For all the time from the opening (in March 1933) until October 1, 335 thousand tons of wheat and rye bread were sold for 950 million rubles. After the harvest, there was a decline in sales volumes everywhere, especially in the southern regions with the highest yields. In September, the free sale of bread was significantly lower (by half in some places) than the established norms. In this regard, Mikoyan proposed by the end of October to reduce retail prices for free-selling bread in a number of southern cities, where market prices have strengthened at the state level. In other cities, if necessary, Mikoyan proposed to reduce prices no earlier than November (AP RF. F. 3. Op. 43. D. 46. L. 2–5). On November 9, 1933, the PB decided to reduce the price of bread sold through free sale from state stores (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 934. L. 12–13).
On October 3-4, 1933, the PB approved a resolution of the Central Committee and Council of People's Commissars on grain procurements, which spoke of the failure of the plan for the delivery of bread at the Beloglinsky grain state farm in the North Caucasus region. The director of this state farm was removed from his job and put on trial. In this regard, all directors of state farms were warned that in case of delays in the delivery of grain to the state, they would be subjected to "severe penalties." At the same time, telegrams were approved to the leaders of Ukraine, the Central Black Earth Region and the Lower Volga Territory, indicating the activation of grain procurements (Ibid. D. 932. L. 10–11, 34–37).
4 September 30, 1933 Deputy Ordzhonikidze M.M. Kaganovich wrote to him: “A thunderstorm passed on the 29th of [his] month. We heard the directors of factories 8–92 and Barricades at the KO commission. So far, there have been no reprimands, but the situation with the program is difficult” (Ibid. F. 85. Op. 27. D. 214. L. 25).
On November 5, 1933, the Politburo approved the schedule for the construction and commissioning of 20 M-type submarines in 1933, developed by the commission under the leadership of Ya.B. Gamarnik, after correcting “design defects identified during testing” on them (Ibid. F. 17 162. D. 15. L. 130). See also: Dmitriev V.I. Soviet submarine shipbuilding. M., 1990.
On October 1, 1933, the PB considered the issue of the Ural Carriage Works. Deputy People's Commissar of Heavy Industry Pyatakov was instructed to "establish personal systematic monitoring of the implementation of all directives for the implementation of construction tasks" and at the end of November-December go to the site. The leaders of the Ural Regional Party Committee also received various assignments. It was decided to consider the issue of the plant again in December (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 931. L. 3).
On October 1, 1933, the PB adopted, in the main, a draft resolution on the use of mineral fertilizers presented by the Central Committee's agricultural department. The commission, led by Kaganovich, was instructed to develop the question of the implementation of the program for the production of mineral fertilizers and their use (Ibid., L. 4).Molotov, Kaganovich, Chernov to Stalin October 3, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 87–88. Script. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow 3 / X - 33 at 19 o'clock. In. No. 50.
Tov. Stalin.
After the discounts made by the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars on grain deliveries in individual regions, 1,080 million poods of obligations to supply grain to the state throughout the Union remain handed over to collective farms and individual farmers.
The annual grain supply plan was approved by the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars in the amount of 1,054 million poods (together with insurance - 42 million).
Excluding the discounts made in individual regions (the Middle Volga, the North Caucasus, Kazakhstan, the Urals, the Lower Volga) from the basic plan, the current annual plan for the Union is 1,006 million poods.
The reserve of obligations delivered, therefore, amounts to 74 million poods against the reduced annual plan and 26 million poods against the original plan. Of the reserve falling on individual farmers, a part - approximately 40 million poods - is unrealistic.
777 million poods will be delivered by grain deliveries on October 1st.
We propose to establish a delivery plan for the fourth quarter in the amount of 263 million poods. In this case, 1040 million poods will be collected at the expense of grain deliveries.
The annual plan for the delivery of grain by state farms is 152 million poods. As of October 1, 83 million poods were delivered. It remains to hand over 69 million poods, in the amount of which we propose to establish a plan for state farms for the fourth quarter.
The annual plan for the receipt of payment in kind, minus the discounts made, is 164.6 million poods. Received on the first of October 114.3 million pounds. We propose to set the plan for the fourth quarter in the amount of the balance, i.e. 50.3 million pounds.
Last year's grain loans should be returned this year 34.6 million pounds. On October 1, 15.1 million poods were returned. We are transferring 19.5 million poods to the fourth quarter.
In addition to all this, we are arranging for the fourth quarter the receipt of garnets in the amount of 31 million poods. If the plan for the garnet is fulfilled, we will have a 55% fulfillment of the garnet by the first of January.
Thus, we plan the entire receipt in the fourth quarter in the amount of around 432 million poods.
Approximately one billion poods will arrive on the first of October for all types.
Please provide your opinion. HP 54, 55.
Molotov, Kaganovich, Chernov.Stalin to Molotov, Kaganovich, Chernov October 4, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 92–93. Autograph.
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU.
Molotov, Kaganovich, Chernov.
It is now unprofitable to give a quarterly plan for grain deliveries, since in the field, with a quarterly plan, they may weaken the work for the first two months and try to transfer the main work to the last month, which will delay the implementation of the annual plan, possibly until January and beyond. It would be better to decide that the annual plan for the USSR should be completed by the end of November, and for some regions by the end of October, and in accordance with this, give each region a monthly plan for October and November.
Stalin 1 .
#62
4/X.33 2
______________________
1 On the same day, Stalin asked for the final figure for grain procurements for the sixth five-day period in September - (Ibid. L. 94) and received an answer from B.A. Dvinsky: “Gagra. Stalin. For the sixth five-day period of September, fifty-six million four hundred and twenty-one thousand poods of grain were procured. For the whole of September, three hundred and ninety-four million, two hundred and ninety-four thousand poods of grain were procured. Since the beginning of the campaign on October 1, one billion two million nine hundred twenty-five thousand poods of grain have been procured” (Ibid. L. 95).
2 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day, it was sent in code from Gagra at 15:00. (Ibid. L. 91).Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin October 5, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 97. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow 5/X - 33 at 2 o'clock. 25 min. 1 In. No. 52.
Tov. Stalin.
We propose to establish a grain delivery plan, except for the garnets, for October - 328 million poods, November - 74 million poods.
In this case, all regions complete the annual plan in November, except for the Northern Territory, Leningrad, Western, Ivanovo, Urals, Middle Volga, and Kazakhstan, which complete the plan in October.
In the North Caucasus and Ukraine, only corn passes to November. They finish their spike crops in October.
We set the plan for garnets for October, November, December at 11 million for each month. HP 57.
Kaganovich, Molotov 2 .
_______________________
1 The copy of the document preserved in the case bears the date “4.X.33” (Ibid. L. 98).
2 On the same day, in cipher from Gagra at 19:00. 35 min. Stalin agreed (Ibid. L. 96). On October 6, 1933, the grain supply plan for the fourth quarter was approved by the PB (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 932. L. 14).Kaganovich, Molotov, Voroshilov - Stalin October 6, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 100. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow 6 / X - 33 at 2 o'clock. 35 min. 1 In. No. 53.
Tov. Stalin.
Hirota responded to Yurenev's statement on September 28 with references to the legal nature of the arrests at the Chinese Eastern Railway and the independence of Manchuria, as well as assurances that the arrests were not made on the advice of the yappra. This answer by Hirota is not published in the Japanese press and by us. In recent days Hirota and his agents have more than once offered to continue private meetings about the CER, but ours refuse, referring to the situation that has developed in Manchuria. There are no new arrests on the Chinese Eastern Railway, and so far Rudy has not been summoned to the prosecutor, which was scheduled in Manchuria.
However, in view of the jappra's desire to lubricate our note, we suggest:
1) Publish correspondence from TASS about the preparation of arrests and the participation of the Japanese in this case.
2) Give an interview to Andreev, pointing out the Japanese-Manchurian outrages that are happening on the CER and using what was said in Yurenev's statement in the interview.
Sokolnikov considers it necessary to warn the Japanese before the publication of the documents that the documents will be published if the arrested are not released immediately.
Report your opinion. HP 60.
Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov.
______________________
1 The copy of the document preserved in the file bears the date “5.X.1933 ” (Ibid. L. 101).Stalin to Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov October 6, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 100, 100v. Autograph.
Molotov. Kaganovich. Voroshilov.
Hirota must be answered that the arrests are not legal, but grossly arbitrary, since there is absolutely no evidence of the guilt of those arrested. It is not worth warning him about the publication of documents, since such a warning has already been published in our earlier note. I agree with you about the publication of documents and Andreev's interview.
Stalin.
#65
6/X.33 1
________________________
1 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day it was sent in code from Gagra at 21:00. 15 minutes. (Ibid. L. 99).Stalin to Kaganovich October 6, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 100. L. 34–35. Autograph.
Hello, Comrade Kaganovich!
1) I am sending my amendments to the draft decision of the Central Committee in connection with the anniversary of the Komsomol. The project is sloppy.
You will have to give 10-15 orders (or 20) to Komsomol members 1 .
2) How long will you endure outrages in the enterprises of NKsnab, especially in canning factories? Over 100 people were poisoned again! Why don't you take action against NKsnab and Mikoyan? How long will they mock the population. Your (i.e. PB) long-suffering is truly amazing.
3) It is extremely suspicious that Vangenheim plays the first violin in the development of materials for stratospheric balloon 2 , the same Vangenheim who, at the head of the Weather Bureau, promised us a great drought by the summer of 1933 and who organized the GOIN in Murmansk, which was then destroyed by us like a nest of German spies. What's the matter here? Where does such trust in this subject come from?
Well, that's all for now. Hello I. Stalin 3
6/X-33
___________________
On October 29, 1933, the PB approved the draft resolution of the Central Executive Committee "On awarding the Order of Lenin to the leaders and advanced workers of the communist youth." Orders were awarded to 34 people (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 933. L. 29, 58–61).
On September 30, 1933, the crew of the first Soviet stratospheric balloon "USSR" climbed to a height of 19 thousand meters, setting a world record. After that, the preparation of new flights continued.
3 On the first sheet there is a mark: “Read. Voroshilov.Kaganovich, Molotov, Voroshilov to Stalin October 7, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 111. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow 7 / X - 33 at 23 o'clock. 27 min. In. No. 56.
Tov. Stalin.
We plan the following composition of the delegation to Turkey: 1) Voroshilov, 2) Litvinov, 3) Bubnov, 4) Budyonny, 5) Krzhizhanovsky, 6) Koltsov from Pravda, 7) Raevsky from Izvestia 1 .
Please let us know your opinion 2 . HP 62.
Kaganovich, Molotov, Voroshilov.
__________________________
1 We are talking about sending a government delegation headed by Voroshilov to celebrate the decade of independence of the Turkish Republic.
On October 28, Stalin agreed at 21:00. 25 min. (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. PO). The next day, the PB approved this composition of the delegation (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 99).Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin October 7, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 113. Original. Typescript.
Encryption .
From Moscow 7 / X - 33 at 23 o'clock. 18 min. In. No. 57.
Tov. Stalin.
Vareikis appealed to the Central Committee with a petition: 1) Transfer 6 million poods to arrears from grain deliveries in the Central Chernobyl region for collective farms, 5 million poods for individual farmers. 2) Reduce the plan for payment in kind by 2.5 million poods, leaving the original plan of 10 million poods. 3) Reduce the grain delivery plan by state farms by 4.95 million poods.
In connection with the decrease in the harvest in the northern part of the region (the former Oryol province), we consider it necessary to ease the Central Chernobyl region and offer:
1) Transfer to arrears 5 million poods for collective farms and 5 million for individual farmers. The reserve of obligations delivered against the plan now amounts to 5.5 million poods in the Central Chernobyl region for collective farms and 7.6 million poods for individual farmers.
2) Reduce the plan for payment in kind by 2.5 million poods.
3) Reduce the grain delivery plan of the state farms by 4 million poods instead of the 4.95 million poods requested by Vareikis.
Submit your opinion 1 . HP 63.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
________________________
On October 1 , 8, Stalin responded with consent from Gagra at 9 p.m. 25 min. (Ibid. L. PO). On October 9, 1933, the PB approved this proposal (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 99).
Molotov, Kaganovich to Stalin October 8, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 119. Certified typewritten copy.
Strictly secret.
Copy.
Cipher.
Gagra Comrade Stalin.
We consider it expedient to reduce the fourth quarter plan for the export of vegetable oil from 23,000 tons to 10,000 tons, for cotton, flax, castor and soybean oil seeds from 94,000 tons to 20,000 tons. This reduction is defined as 4.100 thousand rubles in foreign currency. To compensate, we propose to export an additional 10 thousand tons of cake, which gives 250 thousand rubles of currency and 10 million poods of wheat and corn, which gives up to 4 million currency. Of the 13 thousand tons of oil removed from export, we propose to sell 5 thousand tons through Torgsin, which should give 2 million rubles in gold in excess of the quarterly plan, the remaining 8 thousand tons of vegetable oil should be left in stock for supply in the 1st quarter.
Submit your opinion 1 . No. 64/2126/sh.
Molotov, Kaganovich.
8.X.33
_____________________
1 Stalin agreed on October 9 in a cipher from Gagra at 3 p.m. 40 min. (Ibid. L. 118). On the same day, the PB approved this proposal by poll (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 100).Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin October 9, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 117. Certified typewritten copy.
Strictly secret .
Copy .
Cipher .
Gagra. T. Stalin.
We accept in final form the following distribution of tractors and trucks. KhTZ and STZ tractors: Narkomzem - 12.800, Narkomsovhozov - 2.200, Narkomsnab - 500, Tsentrosoyuz - 50, Narkomtyazhprom - 400, Narkomlegprom - 130, OGPU - 50, Narkomvneshtorg - 50, GUITU - 20, Narkomvoenmor - 120, People's Commissar 10, Moscow (suburban farms) - 24, Leningrad (suburban farms) - 25, NKPS - 50, Narkomles (for the forest) - 50, Narkomvod - 10, Tsudortrans - 200, BAM - 25, Volga-Moscow - 25, GULAG - 25, the Institute of Experimental Medicine - 5, the reserve of the Council of People's Commissars - 15, a total of 16.785 pieces. ChTZ tractors: Narkomzem - 500, Narkomsovhozov - 500, Narkomsnab - 10 (for the Guryev tract), Narkomtyazhprom - 60 (including 40 pieces for timber), Narkomvoenmor - 30, NKPS - 10, Narkomles - 210, BAM - 20, Volga -Moscow - 10, the reserve of the Council of People's Commissars - 15, a total of 1.365.
Trucks: Narkomvoenmor - 2,000, OGPU and GULAG - 125, Narkomtyazh - 1,500, Narkomzem - 3,000, Narkomsnab - 500, Narkomsovhozov - 900, Komzag SNK - 800, Tsentrosoyuz - 50, Narkomlegprom - 150 local, Narkomles - 30, NKPS - 30 building materials - 100, Moscow - 25, Leningrad - 20, Metrostroy - 100, reserve of the Council of People's Commissars - 48, total 9.378.
They ordered the People's Commissariat of the USSR to send at least 150 pieces of caterpillars to the Far East, and other caterpillars - to the steppe MTS (Ukraine, the North Caucasus, the Volga region, the South Urals, Siberia, Kazakhstan) so that in each steppe MTS there were from 2 to 4 caterpillars.
All products of KhTZ ("Communards") were sent to the People's Commissariat of Defense.
Decided that of all the trucks released to the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, 1,000 units from the first batches should be sent for the export of beets; of the trucks released to the People's Commissariat of Supply, 300 units from the first batches should also be sent for the export of beets.
Please let us know your opinion. No. 66/67/2131/sh.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
9.X.33Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov October 9, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 116. Autograph.
Kaganovich. Molotov .
Received from the courier a plan for the distribution of tractors and trucks. This plan is wrong. I have already expressed my opinion in a letter addressed to Kaganovich. I insist on my opinion. It is strange that the plan was submitted to the Central Committee not by the Council of People's Commissars together with the agricultural department of the Central Committee, but by the People's Commissariat of Heavy. Such a procedure for presenting the distribution plan for tractors and trucks is completely intolerable. Waiting for an answer.
Stalin.
#69
9/X-33Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin October 9, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 120. Certified typewritten copy.
Strictly secret.
Copy.
Cipher.
Gagra. T. Stalin.
The draft you received was sent before your letter was received. Upon receipt of your letter, we changed the plan in accordance with your instructions. The plan was sent by telegraph yesterday. As for the order of deposit, we agree with the order suggested by you. This time we started from the existing order 1 . No. 68/2136/sh.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
9.X.33
_______________________
On October 11, 1933, the PB approved the tractor distribution plan submitted by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Agricultural Department of the Central Committee (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 932. L. 23).Kaganovich to Stalin October 9 [1933]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558 Op. 11. D. 741. L. 90–97. Autograph.
9/X
Hello, Dear Comrade Stalin.
1) About tractors and motor vehicles, I have already sent you a cipher, in which I explained that the distribution plan sent to you was the initial draft drawn up before receiving your letter. We have now drawn up a distribution plan according to your instructions. As for the original draft, about which I wrote to you, we proceeded from the fact that when we approved the plan for the 3rd quarter, we said that since in the first [artale] it will be possible to satisfy other consumers to a certain extent, but with cars and, especially, with ChTZ, it turned out to be too much satisfaction for other, non-agricultural consumers, which we corrected as soon as we received your instructions.
2) In terms of agricultural campaigns, harvesting is coming to an end, although in a number of regions the grain is still in windrows in the field, not stacked and not even stockpiled, so today we sent a telegram to these regions. Now we are leaning on the harvesting of potatoes, which is proceeding in a number of areas unimportantly. Beet digging is going badly, mainly in terms of quality, there is little digging and poor yields are cited. Now Mikoyan has arrived, and tomorrow or the day after tomorrow we will take concrete measures. Winter sowing is not over yet. Lagging behind are mainly the southern regions: the Ukraine, the Northern Caucasus, the Crimea, the Lower Volga.
Regarding the delivery of grain, we sent directives for each region separately, and sent Chernov to the Lower Volga for 10 days 1 . Along the Northern | For the Caucasus, Mikoyan believes that the plan will be fulfilled, since they only have to harvest corn, the harvest of which is not bad.
3) I can report the following about poisonings: as soon as we received the message, we instructed the GPU to find the roots of this case. It has now been established that a wrecking group was operating. Apparently, when the investigation is over, it will be necessary to organize the process.
At the same time, we will discuss the issue in the PB in the spirit of your perfectly correct assessment of the management of the work of canneries, which led to unsanitary conditions and facilitating the work of pests by poor supervision. We will discuss this issue at the PB on the 15th.
4) About Eastern Siberia, I completely agree with you, perhaps, it is even necessary to speed up, from there cipher after cipher comes, characterizing the collapse of the work. Comrade Razumov can be named as a replacement for Leonov. He'll handle that edge. Instead of him, such people could be nominated: Malinov from the Central Chernobyl Region, Gurevich, one of the secretaries of the Middle Volga (he did not work well with Shubrikov), Leppa from Central Asia, he will certainly cope with Tatarstan.
In any case, if you agree on Razumov, then it is easier for Tataria to pick up. Please let me know your opinion.
5) Measures have been taken on the export of metal. On the 11th we will have a commission on transport, we will put it for verification.
6) We discussed at the Organizing Bureau about the Institute. Gorky and postponed so that I could get your opinion. We think that it should not be inflated into a large educational institution. It is rather a scientific-literary-research institute, at which 50-100 people are attached as graduate students, that's the essence of the issue in a nutshell. Please let me know your opinion. I would not bother you with them, but they are rushing to start organizing and studying.
Hello to you! Your L. Kaganovich.
__________________
On October 7, 1933, the PB sent the chairman of the Procurement Committee M.A. Chernov for ten days to the Lower Volga Territory to "take, together with the regional committee, all the necessary measures for the speedy raising of blanks" (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 932. L. 15).Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin October 10, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 125. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
From Moscow 10/X - 33 at 20:00. 10 minutes. In. No. 63.
Tov. Stalin.
Please reply to our telegram about the distribution plan for tractors and trucks. HP 70.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov October 10, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 125. Original. Typescript.
Yours 70. I agree on everything, but I ask that wheeled tractors be given to agriculture not 15,000, but 16,000 1 .
Stalin.
#71
10/X-33 2
_______________________
1 Stalin's proposals were implemented in the Politburo resolutions "On the plan for the distribution of wheeled and caterpillar tractors in the 4th quarter of 1933 " and "On the plan for the distribution of vehicles and tractors in the 4th quarter", adopted on October 11, 1933 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op 3. D. 932. L. 23–24, 44–47).
2 Number and date entered by the secretary. Sent in code from Gagra on October 11 at 0000 hours. 45 min. (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 124).Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov, Voroshilov October 10, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 122. Autograph.
Kaganovich. Molotov. Voroshilov .
I have no objection to Gamarnik's visit for 2 weeks, but I consider it necessary that he should return to Dalvost in 2 weeks. Keep in mind that the Japanese are certainly preparing a war for us, and we must always be on the alert.
Stalin 1 .
#72
10/X-33 2
____________________
1 Stalin responds to Voroshilov's cipher of October 10: “Gamarnik asks for permission to come to Moscow for a while to report and raise a number of questions on the Far East before the Central Committee, the Council of People's Commissars and the people's commissariats. I have information about Gamarnik's poor health. I ask for consent for a two-week visit by Gamarnik, who is currently in Chita ”(Ibid., L. 122). On October 19, Voroshilov sent a new cipher to Stalin: “Gamarnik must definitely report to you on the situation in OKDVA, Dalkrai and Vostsibkrai. Shouldn't he come to you for this purpose. Waiting for an answer". Stalin on the same day agreed (Ibid. D. 82. L. 12).
2 Number and date entered by the secretary. Sent in code from Gagra on October 11 at 0000 hours. 48 min. (Ibid. D. 81. L. 121).Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Molotov - Stalin October 10, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 128. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 48. L. 3. Typewritten text. Signatures are autographs.
Encryption.
From Moscow 10/X - 33 at 22 o'clock. 10 minutes. In. No. 64.
Tov. Stalin.
Five grocery stores at increased prices, to be opened [in] Vladivostok and Khabarovsk according to the decision of the Central Committee, are ready. Trading can be started on October 15th. Khloplyankin, by agreement [with] the regional committee, announces the need to set prices on average 30% higher than the prices approved for Donbas stores.
Please let me know if you have any objections 1 . HP 71.
Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Molotov.
_______________________
1 Stalin agreed on October 11 from Gagra at 3 p.m. 07 min. (Ibid. L. 127). On October 13, 1933, the PB made this decision by poll (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 932. L. 25).Kaganovich, Molotov - Stalin October 12, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 130–132. Certified typewritten copy; F. 558. Op. P. D. 48. L. 4–7. Typewritten copy with corrections by Kaganovich. Signatures - autographs
Strictly secret .
Copy .
Cipher.
Tov. Stalin.
We inform you about cases related to the publication of Japanese documents.
The first responses in the Japanese press to the documents published by TASS appeared on October 10, and on the same day the first statement of the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was printed. This statement characterized the publication of the documents as a violation of international confidence and argued that the documents were fakes, that this publication could force Japan to take countermeasures, and if the Soviet Union insisted on its position, then Japan "would be forced to take a decisive and final step."
Newspaper reports emphasized that the Ministry of War was particularly indignant and that it proposed to require the Soviet government to take back the documents. Further, it was reported that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs intended to break off negotiations on the CER and instruct Ote to file a protest in Moscow against the publication of false documents, demanding that they be returned. Finally, it was reported that it had been decided to expel the Tokyo TASS correspondent for sending the text of the TASS message to Japanese newspapers, despite the Shimbun Rengo's refusal to publish it. Only the Asahi newspaper announced on October 10 that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would continue to pursue a policy of mediation between the USSR and Manchukuo, hoping that negotiations on the CER could still yield favorable results.On October 11, the statements of the press and the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs show a significant difference in comparison with the statements made on October 10. Nitsi-nitsi stated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not link the negotiations on the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway with the incident of the publication of documents and is in favor of continuing the negotiations. Miaka said that Manchukuo intends to continue negotiations unless the situation develops into an emergency. Asahi reported on October 11 that Hirota had not yet given any instructions to Ota and, instead, was waiting for a full report from Ota before finally deciding on a course of action. The newspapers mainly dealt with the issue of the expulsion of the TASS correspondent, initially continuing to claim that the expulsion had been resolved, and then reporting a different version, namely that the TASS representative would be summoned to the ministry for explanations, and the issue of his expulsion would be decided depending on the explanations which he will give. In the evening newspapers on October 11, it was reported that the TASS correspondent explained to the head of the information bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the documents were sent out in accordance with the procedure established by the agreement with TASS. Amo suggested that he refrain from doing so in the future, to which the Tokyo correspondent of TACC stated that he took this instruction of Amo into account, stipulating the right of TASS to protest this change in the contract. Amo stated that he would relay this answer to Hirota. Thus, even the question of the expulsion of the TASS correspondent was up in the air.
Particularly significant is the second speech of the representative of the Foreign Minister, who on October 11 stated that the reports of the newspapers about the instructions allegedly given by Ota to make a protest in Moscow are premature, that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the contrary, is waiting for Ota's report and has not yet entrusted him with a demarche. Further, the representative of the Foreign Minister stated that the intentions of the Soviet government were not clear: whether the documents were published because the Soviet government wanted a military conflict or because it hoped in this way to support moderate elements in Japan. The spokesman for the Foreign Ministry then stated that the proposal to require the Soviet government to take back the published documents was the private opinion of some military men that there was no such government decision. The question of the steps to be taken will be coordinated with the Ministry of War in the next few days and, if necessary, will be submitted to the Council of Ministers. A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry declared that the publication by the Soviet government of documents without the Japanese government knowing them first was a violation of diplomatic customs. However, he later admitted that the Japanese government had been informed of the contents of the documents by Sokolnikov's and Yurenev's statements. This time the Foreign Minister's representative completely refrained from contesting the authenticity of the documents, and also softened, as can be seen from what has been said, the formula about the violation of international confidence. For the time being, we have limited ourselves to publishing leading articles in Pravda and Izvestia, and tomorrow we will publish some telegrams about press responses with very short comments.
We will inform you about the future. If we have to make decisions, we will ask. HP 2186/sh.
Kaganovich. Molotov.
12.X.33
___________________________
1 The telegrams were published in Pravda on October 14, 1933.
Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin October 13, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 134. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 48. L. 8. Typewritten text with corrections by Kaganovich. Signatures are autographs.
Encryption.
From Moscow 13 / X - 33 at 3 o'clock. 51 min. In. No. 66.
Tov. Stalin.
We are sending you Skvirsky's ciphers received from America , and we outline the following reply through Skvirsky:
“Tell Bullitt that his message does not satisfy us, because it ignores our usual statements about the need to first restore normal relations before discussing controversial issues, as this was done by England, France, Italy and other countries.
We consider it necessary to exchange notes on the restoration of relations unconditionally, after which we will be ready to discuss any issues.
We do not rule out, however, the possibility of a preliminary discussion with the president of certain issues of a procedural nature, if Roosevelt insists on this, but for this we need to know the list and wording of these issues. Only then will we be able to propose amendments to the text of the letter to Kalinin.”
Please provide your opinion. HP 77.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
___________________________
Skvirsky's first cipher was sent from Moscow on October 13, 1933, at 3 o'clock. 51 min. No. 67: "Morgenthau Jr called me in from New York for an urgent date with him today. I recently met with him. He told me that during our last meeting he assured me of Roosevelt's friendly plans. Now he will prove it to me by the arrival of Bullitt from the State Department with an order from the President. Bullitt soon came and for the time being "unofficially" handed over to me a draft letter from Roosevelt addressed to Kalinin for transmission to you. Both stated that if the text of the letter was acceptable to the Soviets and I communicated this to Roosevelt through Bullitt or Morgenthau, Jr., then Roosevelt would sign this letter to hand it to me for a reply on Kalinin's behalf. If Moscow does not agree with the text or if its amendments are not acceptable, then everything that happened is kept completely secret.
After reviewing the text, I pointed out that the question actually boils down to preliminary negotiations, to which the Sovpra has always objected. Bullitt replied that the document meant something more, since I would be given an official letter from the President and since the President invited our representatives to speak with him personally. Of course, I agreed to complete secrecy and to the transfer of the text of the letter to Moscow.
In the present relations with the Japanese, I would recommend that Litvinov come to Washington to talk with Roosevelt. This would strengthen our position. Delay the answer. Skvirsky” (Ibid. D. 81. L. 136).
Skvirsky's second cipher was sent from Moscow on October 13, 1933 at 5 o'clock. 36 min. under No. 68: “I am handing over the translation of the draft letter from Roosevelt addressed to Kalinin. Details additional. “From the beginning of my entry into the administration, I considered it desirable to make an attempt to put an end to the present abnormal relations between the 125 million population of the United States and the 160 million population of Russia. It is worthy of great regret that these two great peoples, between whom there has existed for over a century a happy tradition of friendship beneficial to both sides, are now without a practical method of direct communication with each other. The difficulties that have created this abnormal situation are serious, but, in my opinion, not insoluble, that the difficulties between the two great peoples can be eliminated only by frank friendly conversations. If you are of the same opinion I would be glad to accept any representatives you have indicated to discuss (the English word "explor") with me personally all the issues that exist ("outstanding") between both countries. Participation in such a discussion would not, of course, bind either side as to the future course of action, but it would indicate a sincere desire to arrive at a satisfactory solution to the relevant problems (the "problem of scirinvolv"). I hope that such talks could end up doing good to the peoples of both sides." Skvirsky” (Ibid. L. 138). but it would indicate a sincere desire to arrive at a satisfactory solution to the relevant problems (the "problem of the zirinvolves"). I hope that such talks could end up doing good to the peoples of both sides." Skvirsky” (Ibid. L. 138). but it would indicate a sincere desire to arrive at a satisfactory solution to the relevant problems (the "problem of the zirinvolves"). I hope that such talks could end up doing good to the peoples of both sides." Skvirsky” (Ibid. L. 138).Stalin, Rudzutak - Kaganovich, Molotov October 13, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 134. Text - Stalin's autograph. Signatures are autographs.
Kaganovich. Molotov .
We think that we should agree to the text of Roosevelt's letter and then, upon receipt of his official letter addressed to Kalinin, reply that we are sending our man to talk with Roosevelt. It would be better to send Litvinov 1 .
Stalin. I. Rudzutak.
#74
13/X.33 2
__________________
On October 17, 1933, the PB approved a draft response letter from the Soviet government to US President Roosevelt and appointed Litvinov as a representative for the talks. (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 112, 124).
2 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day it was sent in code from Gagra at 21:00. 50 min. (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 133).Kaganovich to Stalin [October 13, 1933]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 741. L. 98–104. Autograph.
12/X 1
Hello, dear Comrade Stalin!
1) We held another meeting of the transport commission. They listened to Mironov's report on the Perm road, recognized the work as unsatisfactory, and pointed to a whole series of outrageous outrages. Discipline there is very bad not only for transport workers, but also for the industry that transport serves. The regional committee also pays very little attention to the road. We also heard about the repair of steam locomotives, adopted a resolution in the spirit of your instructions on the average and current repairs. You are absolutely right that here, too, the situation is extremely unfavorable with an average repair. The old NKPS instruction on accounting for loading was canceled, according to which the redirected cars were included in the number of loaded, so for example: if a wagon with cotton arrives in Moscow and is redirected to Ivanovo, then it is included in loaded. This ugly business was legalized; deception of the state was legalized. The instruction was published a number of years ago, so now it’s hard to even find the culprit, but what they endured is an outrage. Now a new instruction has been developed. The transport still works with a creak, though a little better.
2) Remembering last year's lesson that you gave us, we click on the meat for Moscow, Leningrad and Donbass. I hope that last year's mistake will not be repeated.
3) At one time I wrote to you about Sokhatsky. Tov. Pyatnitsky sent a draft statement of the Central Committee of the Polish Party that Sokhatsky turned out to be a provocateur. I consider it necessary to send you this project and ask for your opinion.
4) We have just finished a conference on two questions: the first is about a telegram from America on Roosevelt's draft statement. All sent to you by telegraph, so you are aware of the matter. And the second small question, which required an immediate answer, was about Yurenev's request on how he should behave tomorrow at dinner in a conversation with Hirota. We answered him briefly that we must adhere to the old directives. We sent you a detailed telegram yesterday about the rest of the Japanese affairs, there is no more news yet. By the way: Comrade Voroshilov was not here today. He gets angry when we do not send him a telegram when he is outside Moscow, but when he is in Moscow, he is angry that we are breaking the day off and does not come to the meeting.
5) In the apparatus of the Central Committee, we began preparing materials for the report at the Party Congress. According to custom, this time, apparently, these materials will also have to be published. We have outlined schemes and departments have already begun to prepare. Maybe you will have comments about the acceleration, maybe some of the most important materials to submit to you? Please give me instructions.
Hello to you. Your L. Kaganovich.
__________________
1 The letter was apparently written on the night of October 13th.
Molotov, Kaganovich to Stalin October 14, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 141. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 48. L. 12–13. The text is Molotov's autograph. Signatures are autographs.
Encryption.
From Moscow 14 / X - 33 1 at 0 o'clock. 10 minutes. In. No. 70.
Tov. Stalin.
Dirksen informed Khinchuk in Berlin that the German government had taken as a political demonstration Krestinsky's unwillingness to be in Berlin after the Chancellor had expressed a desire to meet him.
Litvinov scolds Khinchuk for his awkward behavior, but he considers it unnecessary and even inconvenient for Krestinsky's current arrival in Berlin from Vienna, where he is now on medical business.
Considering it inappropriate to emphasize the deterioration of our relations with Germany, we think that Krestinsky should stop by Berlin and visit Hitler, since the latter made such an offer . HP 83.
Molotov, Kaganovich.
______________________
1 On the draft of the encryption (Ibid. D. 48. L. 12–13) and the copy of the document preserved in the file, there is the date “13.X.33” (Ibid. D. 81. L. 142).
2 On the same day in cipher from Gagra at 15:00. 43 min. Stalin agreed (Ibid., L. 140).Molotov, Kaganovich to Stalin October 16, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 144. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 48. L. 14. Handwritten text. Signatures - Kaganovich's autograph.
Encryption.
From Moscow 16/X - 33 at 1 o'clock. 54 min. In. No. 71.
Tov. Stalin.
In view of the changed situation in connection with Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations, the question of Krestinsky's visit to Berlin, in our opinion, should disappear. HP 84.
Molotov, Kaganovich.Stalin, Kalinin - Molotov, Kaganovich October 16, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 144, 144v. The text is Stalin's autograph. Signatures are autographs.
It is not clear why the question of Krestinsky's arrival should disappear. What have we to do with the League of Nations, and why should we make a demonstration in honor of the insulted League and against Germany, which insulted it? Maybe we do not know all the circumstances? We learned about leaving the League only from your encryption and we don’t know anything else.
Stalin. Kalinin.
#76
16/X.33 1
_____________________
1 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day, with the note "immediately" sent in cipher from Gagra at 14:00. 30 minutes. (Ibid. L. 143).Kaganovich, Molotov, Voroshilov - Stalin October 16, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 81. L. 148. Autograph of Kaganovich.
Stalin.
We give in print a greeting to the Epronovites who raised the icebreaker "Sadko" from the bottom of the White Sea. We consider it necessary to put your signature. Ask for consent 1 .
Kaganovich. Molotov. Voroshilov.
16.X.33
_____________________________
1 Stalin agreed on October 17 from Gagra at 1 o'clock. 32 min. (Ibid. L. 147). A greeting signed by Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov and Yanson to the head of Epron in connection with the raising of the icebreaker Sadko, which sank in the Kandalaksha Bay in 1917, was published in Pravda on October 17, 1933.Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin October 16, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 82. L. 2v. Script. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 48. L. 15. Handwritten text. Signatures - Kaganovich's autograph.
Encryption.
From Moscow 16 / X - 33 at 11 o'clock. 13 min. In. No. 72.
Tov. Stalin.
According to the telegrams received from Eastern Siberia, it is clear that an intolerable situation has arisen there, which must be resolved by a quick change of leadership.
Please let us know your opinion on the possibility of replacing Leonov with Razumov and Razumov either by Lepa (the most acceptable candidate) or by Malinov. HP 85.
Kaganovich, Molotov.Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov October 16, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 82. L. 2. Autograph.
Kaganovich. Molotov .
First. I vote for Razumov to Siberia and for Lepa to Tataria 1 .
Second. Hurry up with the answer to Roosevelt. The situation is now such that our positive answer may provide the desired solution to the question. We get a plus also on Dalvost.
Stalin.
No. 77.
16/X.33 2
___________________
On October 18, 1933, the PB decided to "remove comrade Leonov from the post of first secretary of the Eastern Siberian Regional Committee, as having failed in his work, recalling him to the disposal of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks." MO Razumov, the first secretary of the Tatar regional committee, was approved as the new secretary. A. Klepa (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 933. L. 7) was approved as the first secretary of the Tatar Regional Committee.
2 Number and date entered by the secretary. Sent in cipher on October 17 from Gagra at 0000 hours. 22 min. (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 82. L. 1).Kaganovich to Stalin October 16 [1933]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 741. L. 105–107. Autograph.
16/X
Hello, Dear Comrade Stalin.
1) Yesterday at the PB we discussed poisonings in Dnepropetrovsk. Along with sabotage, the work of our business executives was ugly. We adopted a rather strong decision, proposed that Markov, the head of the Main Conservation Department, be brought to trial, reprimanded Ukhanov and exposed Comrade Mikoyan. In addition, we instructed 2 commissions to work out the question: the first on canning factories and the second on the organization of sanitary affairs .
2) Things are not going well with the transportation of oil. We decided to send comrades Janson and Fomin to Baku and the Volga .
3) We listened to Osinsky about productivity. He slightly lowered his initial figures, but we still did not accept them definitively. In view of the fact that the localities require the earliest possible determination of the yield in order to make payments in kind, we basically approved Osinsky's proposals as the starting point for payments in kind. We will determine the final figures later 3 .
(Osinsky figures: winter rye 9.7
winter wheat 11.1
- " - spring 7.3
spring barley 11.1
oats 9.3).
4) Appropriate measures have been taken for all your assignments, in particular, the perpetrators of the accident of the Krasnaya Zvezda airship 4 have been punished . Hello to you. Your L. Kaganovich.
___________________________
1 We are talking about mass poisoning in Dnepropetrovsk with canned food produced by the Odessa cannery. On October 15, 1933, the PB suggested that the prosecutor's office organize a process with bringing to trial "all those responsible for this case." The People's Commissar of Supply of the USSR Mikoyan was called out by the Politburo for "lack of proper control over the work of canning factories and failure to take all necessary measures to combat the unsanitary state of the factories." The PB organized two commissions, which were instructed to develop measures to improve the situation at food industry enterprises, including sanitary supervision (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 932. L. 3–4).
On October 15, 1933, the PB made a decision on the transportation of oil. Yanson and Fomin were sent to the places “to increase the export of oil” (Ibid. D. 932. L. 5).
On October 15, 1933, the PB considered the issue of yield. A commission was created consisting of: Molotov, Kaganovich, Osinsky to edit the draft resolution submitted by Osinsky (Ibid., L. 2).
On October 15, 1933, the PB adopted a resolution on the airship V-3 "Red Star". It stated that the crash of the airship on 3 November was "the consequence of the negligent and criminal preparation of the airship for flight." Several employees were brought to justice (Ibid. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 105).Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin October 16, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 82. L. 6–7. Certified typewritten copy; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 48. L. 16. Typewritten text with corrections by Kaganovich. Signatures - autographs; F. 81. Op. 3. D. 101. L. 37–38. Typewritten text with Kaganovich's correction.
Copy .
Owls. Secret .
Cipher .
Gagra. Stalin.
Skvirsky said that Roosevelt expected to receive a draft of the full text of the joint response to the draft of his appeal. Upon receipt of such an acceptable text, Roosevelt's official communication would be given to Skvirsky. We send you two ciphers of Skvirsky 1 and Kalinin's draft reply:
" I received your telegram. I have always considered extremely abnormal and regrettable the situation that has existed for 16 years, in which the two great republics - the USSR and the United States of America - do not have the usual methods of relations and are deprived of the benefits that these relations could give them. I am glad to note that you have come to the same conclusion. There is no doubt that difficulties, if they exist or arise between two peoples, can be resolved only if there are correct relations between us, and, on the other hand, they have no chance of being resolved in the absence of such relations. I will also allow myself to express the opinion that the abnormal situation, to which you rightly point out in your telegram, adversely affects not only the interests of the two states concerned, but also the general international situation,
In accordance with the foregoing, I gladly accept your proposal to send a representative of the Soviet government to the United States of America to discuss with you questions of interest to our countries. Kalinin.
Please let us know your opinion. In addition, I inform you that Litvinov considers his trip inexpedient and proposes to send Sokolnikov 2 , but we stand on the same position and believe that Litvinov 3 should go .
No. 86/87/2229/sh.
Kaganovich. Molotov.
16/X.33
_____________________________
1 We are talking about the following ciphers of Skvirsky: “I just met Bullitt, since he left for the day, Morgenthau Jr. left for a few days. I passed on your reply to Bullitt. He phoned Roosevelt's secretary in front of me. He will see the latter today and give him this answer. Bullitt told me that the President expected to receive from me a draft of the full text of the response of the Soviet to the draft of his appeal. Upon receipt of such an acceptable text, Roosevelt's official address will be transmitted to me. To avoid undue delay, please send the full text as soon as possible. Your short answer is not enough. Additional details of the conversation. Skvirsky. 16/X.33" (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 82. L. 8; D. 48. L. 17).
“Based on his conversations with the president, Bullitt again proposed the following order: 1) I am handing over to him for Roosevelt the draft of the full text of Kalinin’s response, which I requested from you, on the substance of the president’s letter, which has already been agreed with you. 2) If the text of our response is acceptable, then I will be handed an official letter from the president. 3) Upon receipt of this formal letter, I reply to Roosevelt, on behalf of Kalinin, with our letter. 4) After the exchange of letters, the issue of the day of publication and the content of the press statement will be decided. 5) It is assumed that by this time I will receive information from you to inform Roosevelt who will represent the USSR in a conversation with him. Bullitt is very optimistic, saying that the President wants not only to establish normal relations, but also close contact. Skvirsky. 16/X-33. (Ibid. D. 82. L. 9; D. 48. L. 18).
On October 16, Litvinov sent the following telegram to Gagra: “Gagra. Chechulin. Roosevelt's draft letter and the invitation to send representatives, and not just one, indicates his desire to conduct substantive negotiations on all issues, including monetary claims. The talks will be conducted in an atmosphere of a frenzied campaign of the mobilized forces of organizations hostile to us, to the pressure of which Roosevelt is very sensitive. My personal participation in the negotiations can be interpreted as our excessive interest and readiness for big concessions. The optimism of Skvirsky and Bullitt may not be justified. Under these circumstances, I would consider it more correct to send not me, but Sokolnikov. It is possible that the negotiations will have to be interrupted, and then I would go in case of resumption. Litvinov. 16.X.33" (Ibid. L. 10.).
3 After Stalin's telegram on October 17, 1933, the PB approved Kalinin's reply to Roosevelt without changes. Litvinov was appointed representative of the Soviet government for negotiations with Roosevelt (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 112, 124).Stalin, Kalinin - Molotov, Kaganovich October 17, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 82. L. 5. Stalin's autograph.
Molotov. Kaganovich .
We consider your draft reply letter to Roosevelt to be correct. We insist on sending Litvinov. Act boldly and without delay, because now the situation is favorable 1 .
Stalin.
#78
17/X.33 2
_____________________________
1 At the end of the encryption, Stalin first wrote and then crossed out the phrases: “I spoke with Kalinin”, “Kalinin approved. I hand over the project to Kalinin. Next to Stalin's signature is Chechulin's mark: "Kalinin agrees." Sent in cipher at 4 p.m. 30 minutes. October 17 from Gagra signed by Stalin and Kalinin (Ibid. L. 4).
3 Number and date entered by the secretary.Kaganovich, Molotov - Stalin, Kalinin October 19, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 82. L. 21–22. Script. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 48. L. 25–26. The text is Kaganovich's autograph. Signatures are autographs.
Encryption.
From Moscow 19 / X - 33 at 22 o'clock. In. No. 79.
T. T. Stalin, Kalinin.
We are sending you the encryption received today from Skvirsky 1. “I gave Bullitt a draft of your answer this morning. I translated the words "correct relations" in the project "regular relations". Roosevelt, according to Bullitt, said that the word "regular" would be interpreted by the opposition as recognition of the USSR even before the meeting with Litvinov, which would cause sharp criticism of him and damage the cause. He asked to change this word. Bullitt suggested the word "direkki" instead of "regular". In order not to slow down the whole thing, and given that such a replacement does not essentially change anything in the text, I agreed. In the evening Bullitt visited me and handed me a letter signed by Roosevelt. I gave him our letter on behalf of Kalinin and attached to it my cover letter addressed to Roosevelt, signing "For the NKID". Thus, we have applied a very simplified procedure. On Friday at 4:30 p.m., the President will read both letters to the press. Roosevelt asked that our press should not publish anything until such publication in the United States. On the question of your coming, Roosevelt told me through Bullitt that he wanted you to come as soon as possible. Bullitt asked for your arrival by the beginning of November.
I strongly recommend that you leave without delay for Washington. Please let us know the date of your departure in order to settle the visa issue. Also indicate the city where you want to get a visa. Skvirsky.
Tomorrow evening we are going to press for printing the twenty-first. In our opinion, Litvinov should leave in the coming days, refusing to travel to Turkey. Instead of him, Karakhan can go. When the draft directive to Litvinov is ready, we will ask you. If there is now an indication to draw up a directive, please let us know. HP 94, 95, 96.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
19/X-33
______________________
1 Reading the cipher, Stalin further inserted the words: "In the name of Litvinov."Stalin - Molotov, Kaganovich October 20, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 82. L. 22. Autograph.
Molotov. Kaganovich .
I agree about replacing Litvinov with Karakhan for a trip to Turkey.
Stalin.
No. 81
20/X.33 1
_____________________
1 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day it was sent in code from Gagra at 14:00. 25 min. (Ibid. L. 20). On October 20, 1933, the PB introduced Karakhan to the delegation to Turkey instead of Litvinov (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 116).Kaganovich to Stalin October 20 [1933]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 741. L. 108–111. Autograph.
20/X
Hello, Dear Comrade Stalin!
1) I received the papers with your resolutions, and appropriate measures have been taken on all of them.
2) I am sending you Comrade Litvinov's note "On America", which should serve as a directive for him. I ask you to communicate your opinion by telegraph, as he will leave in the next few days.
3) Yesterday we approved the transportation plan for November. The average daily loading was determined at 59 t[ys] 200 wagons, attention was paid to the transportation of finished industrial products, in particular, they added to metal products.
4) As for cleaning, we are already approaching the full end. The ploughing of the chilly season is going badly. Sowing in the USSR is completed by 83%. For grain deliveries, 33% of the monthly plan was fulfilled in 15 days. The Ukrainians promise to complete the plan in October. In the Lower Volga they pressed, Chernov is sitting there. North Caucasians refer to corn, which should pull them out. Some confusion is felt in the CCHO. Of course, from the point of view of a general assessment of the preparations, the results are good, because we have already prepared almost as much as for the whole of last year, but we need to achieve the full implementation of the established plan.
Greetings to you cordial.
Yours L. Kaganovich.
Stalin to Kaganovich October 21, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 100. L. 37–42. Autograph.
Hello, Comrade Kaganovich!
1) I am strongly opposed to the fact that the materials for the report at the Party Congress 1 prepared by the apparatus of the Central Committee should be published and published. The writer's itch of the "apparatchiks" did us a lot of harm. The apparatus of the Central Committee (departments) should confine itself to giving information to the secretaries of the Central Committee as materials for the final reports of the secretaries at the congress. Only! Everything else is nonsense.
2) The situation with artillery is very bad. Mirzakhanov laid out a wonderful plant. Pavlunovsky has confused and is ruining the business of artillery. Sergo needs to be scolded for entrusting a big deal to two or three of his favorites - fools, and is ready to sacrifice the interests of the state to these fools. All the Mirzakhanovs and Pavlunovskiys must be driven out and demoted according to their "rank". Otherwise things will not get better.
3) The situation with Baku oil is bad. This year we mine 15 mil. tons of oil. Next year it is necessary to extract 21-22 mil. tons. To do this, it is necessary to inflate exploration , intensify the current drilling in already explored areas, strengthen the "caspar" 2 , urgently build reservoirs in Makhach-Kala and Krasnovodsk, etc. If all this is not done by the deadline (i.e. over the winter with the start of work immediately), the business will be ruined. Despite this, the Oil Directorate is sleeping, and Sergo gets off with pious promises. It will be a disgrace to us if we fail to force the NKTyazh to get down to business immediately and give us a report on the measures taken at every meeting of the PB. I am sending you the corresponding explanatory notes of Beria. I consider them correct, with the exception of the note about the Makhach-Kala-Stalingrad kerosene pipeline. Get to know them and act decisively 3 .
4) I am sending you information from Beria about rare metals in Georgia. This matter must also be moved forward 4 .
Well, that's all for now. Hey!
I. Stalin.
21/X - 33
_____________________________
1 We are talking about the XVII Congress of the CPSU (b), which was held in January-February 1934.
2 Caspian Shipping Company.
3Judging by the certificate preserved in the fund of the Molotov secretariat, the secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee, Beria, prepared and, apparently, handed over to Stalin personally a number of notes, including on the development of the oil industry. He raised the question of including in the plan of 1934 the construction of crackers and plants for the primary processing of oil, the Makhachkala-Stalingrad pipeline and the expansion of the Baku-Batum oil pipeline, the conduct of geological exploration work on new areas in Azerbaijan, the construction of new ships for the Caspian Shipping Company (GA RF. F. R-5446, inventory 82, file 25, sheets 259-260). On October 31, 1933, the PB instructed the NKTP to prepare proposals on Azneft issues for the next meeting of the PB (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 933. L. 31). However, the issue was considered only on December 5 with the participation of Stalin. The PB approved a resolution on Azneft, which established new plans for oil production and capital works. In connection with the discussion of the issue of oil, personnel changes were carried out in Azerbaijan. The PB dismissed Ruben from the post of the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan and recommended Bagirov, chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the republic, instead of him (Ibid. D. 935. L. 2, 32-34).
On October 31, 1933, the PB reviewed Beria's notes on rare metals in Georgia. On the issue of Chiatura manganese, the NKTP was asked to prepare proposals for the next meeting of the PB. Questions about molybdenum, lead-zinc deposits and the production of aluminum oxide were postponed "until the consideration of the control figures for 1934" (Ibid. D. 933. L. 31). The discussion of the problem of Chiatura manganese did not take place, and the issue was removed on December 3, 1933, already in the presence of Stalin (Ibid. D. 935. L. 25).Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov [October 21, 1933]
Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 100. L. 131–134. Autograph.
T. t. Kaganovich and Molotov!
In my opinion, it is time to begin a broad, meaningful (not loud!) preparation and processing of the public opinion of the USSR and all other countries about Japan and, in general, against the Japanese militarists. It is necessary to develop this case in Pravda, partly in Izvestia. It is also necessary to use the GIZ and other publishing houses for the publication of relevant brochures and books. It is necessary to acquaint people not only with the negative, but also with the positive aspects of life, life, conditions in Japan. It is clear that the negative, imperialist, predatory militaristic sides must be brought out in full force.
Recently, the book “Fascist Military Movements in Japan” has been published. It is issued (Razvedprom) for Dalvost and only for selected individuals. Why such a limitation? This pamphlet should be published openly and for everyone immediately , with a preface and some corrections from Radek. This is absolutely necessary. It is also necessary to publish in Pravda " Travel Notes on Japan and Korea" and in general it is necessary to begin a long solid (quiet) preparation of the reader against scoundrels from Japan.
Keep this in mind and move forward. I. Stalin 1 .
__________________
1 On the first sheet of the litter: “ To members of the bureau for review. V. Molotov ”and the signatures of Andreev, Mikoyan and Ordzhonikidze on familiarization.Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin October 21, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 82. L. 25. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 48. L. 28–29. The text is Kaganovich's autograph. Signatures are autographs.
Encryption.
From Moscow 21/X - 33 at 0 o'clock. 26 min. In. No. 82.
Tov. Stalin.
The following code has been received from Berlin:"Litvinov. Fischer stated that Hitler personally gave the order to admit our journalists Bespalov and Kait to the trial. He expressed confidence that our journalists would be objective. I pointed out that our journalists have always been objective in their information. Therefore, there was no reason to deprive them of the right to be at the trial. Bünger demanded a government representation from Fischer, so Fischer went to Bünger to make a representation about the admission of journalists on behalf of the government. The culprit in the arrest of Bespalov and Kite will be punished. I pointed out that this should be published. Fischer raised the question of the fate of German journalists.
I replied that I would inform Moscow and find out how the matter stood. Khinchuk.We think that it is possible not to insist on the admission of the Pravda representative to the trial and give the following answer:
"Berlin. Plenipotentiary. Yours No. 11630. If it is published that Bespalov and Kait are admitted to the trial and that those responsible for their arrest in Leipzig are punished, we will let the German journalists back. It goes without saying that Chernyak should be given the right to return to Berlin, and this should be specifically stipulated right now.
Please let us know your opinion 1 . HP 98.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
__________________________
1 On the same day, Stalin replied in cipher from Gagra at 3 p.m. consent (Ibid. L. 24).
Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin October 22, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 82. L. 29. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 48. L. 33. Typewritten text with corrections by Kaganovich; F. 81. Op. 3. D. 101. L. 36. Typewritten text with notes by Kaganovich.
Encryption.
From Moscow 22/X - 33 at 3 o'clock. 05 min. In. No. 83.
Tov. Stalin.
1) Litvinov is leaving in 2–3 days 1 . In view of the fact that he will be passing through Germany, he put the question before us: is it necessary for him to stop in Berlin or pass without leaving the car?
We believe that it is advisable for him to stop in Berlin and not refuse to talk with Neurath. Or, if Hitler wishes, then with him. In essence, if they propose to sign a protocol stating that all conflicts have been settled, then this can be done provided that they publicly, in one form or another, express regret over a number of incorrect actions by the German authorities in the conflict about journalists. If they do not demand a protocol, then they will confine themselves to a conversation in a tone that makes them understand that we do not intend to deepen the conflict, that we are ready to do everything necessary to restore the old relations.
2) Following Berlin, Litvinov will pass through Paris. We think that even there he should not refuse to meet with Paul Boncourt. If an appropriate offer to Litvinov is made.
Please let us know your opinion 2 . HP 100.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
_______________________
1 We are talking about the visit of M.M. Litvinov in the USA.
2 On the same day in cipher from Gagra at 15:00. 20 minutes. Stalin agreed (Ibid. L. 28). On October 25, 1933, the PB approved without changes the directives set out in the letter to Litvinov on meetings in Berlin and Paris (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 119). On October 28, Litvinov met with German Foreign Minister Neurath and discussed with him the issue of resolving the conflict with journalists. After agreeing, a few days later, a Soviet-German communiqué was published about the exhaustion of the conflict and the continuation by journalists of both sides of their previous activities. On October 31, 1933, Litvinov met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, Boncourt (DVP, vol. XVI, pp. 589–592, 595–596).Stalin - Molotov, Kaganovich October 22, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 82. L. 32. Original. Typewritten text with Stalin's editing.
Molotov and Kaganovich.
I ask the TEZHE trust to give 50,000 rubles worth of imported essential oils for the production of perfumes on the domestic market, which will improve the quality of products, and the cost of products will increase over the program by ten million rubles.
Stalin.
#85
22/X-33 1
______________________
1 Number and date entered by the secretary.
Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin October 22, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 82. L. 34. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 48. L. 34–35. Typewritten text with Kaganovich's correction. Signatures are autographs.
Encryption.
From Moscow 22 / X - 33 at 14 o'clock. 18 min. In. No. 84.
Tov. Stalin.
On the basis of your telegram of September 23 about a turnover of 20 million rubles with Persia, we immediately instructed Eliava to warn the trade representative in Persia about a decrease in trade turnover and forbidding him to report contingents. Eliava gave an inaccurate directive. Shostak, as well as Karakhan, on behalf of the Soviet government, reported the total amount of our purchases of 25 million rubles.
Now a situation has arisen in which the refusal of purchases already announced and confirmed by Karakhan can embitter the Persians and put us in an uncomfortable position.
We ask you to inform us of your opinion in the current situation, whether the statement to the Persians by Shostak and Karakhan, the total amount of turnover in the amount of 25 million rubles, should be left in force. HP 101.
Kaganovich, Molotov.Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov October 22, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F 558 Op. 11. D. 82 L. 34. Autograph.
It is necessary to punish Karakhan and Eliava for violating the directive and extravagance, and the amount of 25 million will have to be left in order to actually fulfill 20 million.
Stalin.
#86
22/X.33 1
___________________________
1 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day it was sent in code from Gagra at 23:00. 16 min. (Ibid. L. 33). On October 23, 1933, the PB decided to accept an annual volume of trade with Persia of 25 million rubles in order to actually fulfill 20 million rubles. The PB called out Karakhan and Eliava for violating the directive and extravagance (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 118).Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin October 23, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 82. L. 37. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 48. L. 36–37. Kaganovich's autograph.
Encryption.
From Moscow 23 / X - 33 at 4 o'clock. 45 min. In. No. 85.
Tov. Stalin.
In connection with the attack on our consulate in Lvov, we propose to entrust Antonov-Ovseenko with a protest with the publication in the press:
“On October 21, an attack was made on the Consulate General of the USSR in Lvov, as a result of which an employee of the named consulate, Mailov, was killed, and another employee, Dzhugai, was wounded, this attempt cannot but be put in connection with the campaign that has been going on for a long time in some voivodships, among them in Lvov in particular, a campaign that knows no boundaries in harassment, slander and incitement against the Soviet Union and aimed at inciting certain sections of the population against the USSR. This attempt could only have taken place in the atmosphere created by the campaign mentioned above, which, despite its obvious impermissibility, was condoned by some Polish authorities.
On behalf of my government, I present to you, Mr. Minister, a formal protest against this new attack on the Soviet representation in Poland.
The Government of the USSR has authorized me to tell you that it expects an urgent and comprehensive investigation into the attack that took place and the identification of direct and indirect culprits and instigators of this attack, as well as the punishment of those responsible.
On the results of the investigation, as well as on the measures taken by the Polish government to prevent the possibility of a recurrence of such cases in the future, I ask you, Mr. Minister, to inform me.”
Please let us know your opinion 1 . HP 102, 103.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
_____________________
1 On the same day, Stalin agreed in a cipher from Gagra at 4 p.m. 40 min. (Ibid. D. 82. L. 36). On October 23, 1933, the PB approved a draft note of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Poland V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland Beck (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 117).Kaganovich to Stalin October 24 [1933]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 741. L. 112–115. Autograph.
24/X
Hello, Dear Comrade Stalin!
1) I received your letters last night.
On the question of more profound and serious coverage in the press of our relations with Japan, you are absolutely right, just like the situation in Japan itself. Tomorrow we will discuss and give appropriate directives to the press and publishers .
On the question of preparing materials for the Party Congress, I agree with you, we will not publish them, appropriate instructions will be given to the heads) of departments of the Central Committee.
On the issue of oil, your criticism is especially confirmed by the example of Grozny, where, because of the ugly attitude towards exploration and drilling, the most important basin was virtually reduced to nothing. We will send Beria's note to the members of the PB and, perhaps, put it on the PB on November 1st. The same is true about rare metals in Georgia.
As regards artillery, we have pressed the matter now after your first letter, but we will have to raise the question again.
2) Now the question of organizing the correct distribution of income is becoming acute. On the ground, this matter is underestimated, despite the fact that this year's agricultural work is already close to an end. It would be necessary to issue a directive from the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars. We have developed such a directive. In view of the importance of this question, I am sending you this draft (it is small, 3 pages) and I ask you to familiarize yourself and, if possible, communicate by telegraph your comments and consent to your signature. Just in case, I am also sending the developed draft instruction of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, which gives more specific instructions. If you find it necessary not to issue an instruction from the NKZem, but to take a number of practical points into a directive of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, then please let me know .
Hello to you! Shake your hand. Your L. Kaganovich.
_______________________
On October 1 , 25, a meeting was held in Stalin's office in the Kremlin, which was attended by members of the PB Molotov, Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze, Mikoyan, as well as the head of the department of party propaganda and agitation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks A.I. Stetsky, Pravda editor L.Z. Mekhlis and Izvestia editor I.M. Gronsky (Historical archive. 1995. No. 2. P. 193). Most likely, the issue of anti-Japanese propaganda in the press was discussed at this meeting. As early as October 26, Pravda published a large piece entitled "From Travel Notes in Japan and Korea." Subsequently, articles about Japan appeared regularly.
On November 14, 1933, the PB considered a draft instruction of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture on the procedure for distributing income. The question was removed, i.e. left without a decision (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 934. L. 19).Stalin - Molotov, Kaganovich October 24, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 82. L. 41–42. Autograph.
Molotov. Kaganovich .
I received Litvinov's note about America. The note is unobjectionable. I propose to add in the section on our counterclaims that we also mean our claims on intervention, and in the section on religion to say in addition to what has been said that religion is an internal issue and is not subject to discussion.
Stalin.
No. 88.
24 / X - 33 1
____________________
1 Number and date entered by the secretary. Sent in code from Gagra at 3 o'clock. (Ibid. L. 40). On October 25, 1933, the PB made a decision about America, with additions made by Stalin. The following paragraph was also included in the decision: “Comrade. Litvinov not to shy away from a specific conversation about our relations with Japan. If Roosevelt seeks some rapprochement with us or even a temporary agreement against Japan in a conversation, then Comrade Litvinov should take this favorably ”(RGASGSh. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 119).Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin October 24, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 82. L. 44. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 48. L. 41. Text - Kaganovich's autograph. Signatures are autographs.
Encryption.
From Moscow 24/X - 33 at 1 o'clock. 18 min. In. No. 88.
Tov. Stalin.
Litvinov asks for instructions on the following question: if Roosevelt in a conversation raises a question concerning relations with Japan, can he touch on these questions? And within what limits?
We think that he can be allowed to touch on these issues without being bound by any statements that go beyond our usual statements about our peace policy and readiness to give a firm rebuff in case of an attack on us.
Please provide your opinion. HP 106.
Kaganovich, Molotov.Stalin - Molotov, Kaganovich October 24, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 82. L. 44, 44v. Autograph.
Molotov. Kaganovich .
Number 106. Your project is not enough. I think that Litvinov should not shy away from specific talk about our relations with Japan. I think that if, in a conversation with Litvinov, Roosevelt seeks some rapprochement with us, or even a provisional agreement against Japan, Litvinov should treat this favorably.
Stalin.
No. 89
24/X.33 g 1
____________________
1 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day, it was sent in code from Gagra at 15:00. 30 minutes. (Ibid. L. 43).Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin October 25, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 82. L. 50. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 48. L. 42. Typewritten text. Signatures are autographs.
Encryption.
From Moscow 25/X - 33 at 17:00. 30 minutes. In. No. 89.
Tov. Stalin.
In connection with the difficulties caused by the poor harvest on the left bank of the Middle Volga, the Middle Volga Territory Committee asked for food, seed and fodder assistance to poor collective farms.
After discussing the issue, we outline the following solution:
1) In order to provide seed, fodder and food assistance to non-infertile collective farms in the Middle Volga Territory:
a) Leave at the disposal of the region all the grain received in excess of the basic plan for the supply of grain to collective farms established by the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars (one - one and a half million poods).
b) Permit the Central Volga Regional Committee to turn all the grain purchased by the Central Union (9 million poods) and the possible refulfillment of this task into seed, fodder and food aid, with the exception of a ten percent deduction for cooperation. Oblige Tsentrosoyuz to ensure the purchase of grain with the necessary goods. Permit Komzag SNK to carry out the exchange of purchased oats for wheat and rye pood for pood along the Middle Volga.
2) To reduce the plan for the receipt of grain through payment in kind by the MTS of the Middle Volga Territory by 800,000 poods.
3) Reduce the plan for the garnet collection along the region by 1,500,000 poods.
4) Permit the Central Volga Territorial Committee and the Regional Executive Committee to cancel the obligation to supply potatoes from the poor collective farms on the left bank in the amount of 92 thousand tons due to the surplus of delivered obligations for potatoes.
Please let us know your opinion 1 . HP 107.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
_____________________
1 On the same day, in cipher from Gagra at 2 p.m. 50 min. Stalin agreed (Ibid. L. 49). On September 26, 1933, the PB accepted the proposal of Kaganovich and Molotov (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 933. L. 23).
Stalin - Molotov, Kaganovich October 26, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 82. L. 53. Original. Typescript.
T. T. Molotov, Kaganovich.
I received the following code from Voroshilov from Dnepropetrovsk: “I ask you to give an answer to Litvinov's letter on the pacts with Greece and Iraq dated October 14 of this year. We will find ourselves in an extremely unpleasant position if we cannot give a definite answer to these questions of the Turks, put to the Soviet government two months ago. I can’t evade these questions under the pretext that I am a military man, because. I am traveling with a responsible representative of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs Karakhan, who is in charge of these issues. If we do not need these pacts, then it is better to give a direct negative answer than not to give any answer .
I gave you my opinion on the said pacts in a cipher dated September 22, No. 48. I have no other opinion, and tell Voroshilov about it. No. 92.
I. Stalin.
26/X-33 2
_____________________________
1 Cipher Voroshilov from Dnepropetrovsk from the letter train, see: Ibid. L. 54.
2 On the same day, sent in code from Gagra at 2:55 p.m. (Ibid. L. 53).Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin October 26, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 82. L. 56v. Script. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 48. L. 43. Typewritten text with corrections by Kaganovich.
Encryption.
From Moscow 26/X - 33 at 4 o'clock. 46 min. In. No. 90.
Tov. Stalin.
The situation in Germany, in which the campaign is taking place in connection with the elections to the Reichstag on November 12 and the referendum scheduled after Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations and the disarmament conference, is such that the Communist Party is deprived of the opportunity to conduct an election campaign by nominating its own candidates, and to achieve any a significant effect in the elections under these conditions is impossible (there will be one list of National Socialists in the Reichstag and a ballot for a referendum with the inscription "Yes" (which means approval of the foreign policy of the government) and "No" (against this policy)).
Cominternists offer:
1) Urge voters to boycott the elections. 2) Where the fascists will force voters to take part in the elections by force, cross out both the lists with the names of the National Socialists and the ballots of the referendum. 3) The campaign in connection with these elections, the Communist Party of Germany should conduct under the slogans: a) Against the Treaty of Versailles. In the struggle against bankers, breeders, landowners and their defenders of the Nazis. The working class of Germany, in alliance with the revolutionary workers of France, England and the whole world, will free Germany from the yoke of Versailles. b) Against fascism and against the policy of war, c) Against hunger and terror, d) Down with the fascist dictatorship. Long live the Workers' and Peasants' Soviet Republic.
The leadership of the KKE in the country agrees with the proposal of the Cominternists, the foreign bureau of the Central Committee of the KKE proposes to participate in the elections, crossing out the national socialist lists, and vote "No" in the referendum.
The foreign leadership of the Social Democratic Party of Germany also offers to participate in the elections and offers the same methods of voting as the foreign bureau of the Central Committee of the KKE.
We agree with the opinion of the Cominternists. Quick question - please let us know your opinion. HP 108, 109.
Kaganovich, Molotov.Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov October 26, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558 Op. 11. D. 82. L. 56. Autograph.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
Yours 108 and 109. The Cominternists are wrong. The boycott they propose is not an active Bolshevik boycott, but simple abstention from elections, simple absenteeism. The Bolsheviks never recognized such a boycott. The Bolsheviks recognize only an active boycott, connected with revolutionary actions and aimed at undermining or even disrupting the elections. But this, the only acceptable boycott, is now impossible in Germany. Therefore, not the Cominternists are right, but the foreign bureau of the Central Committee of the KKE. We must take part in the elections in the sense of crossing out the fascist lists and voting "no" on the referendum. We must create on this basis a united anti-fascist front with the Social Democratic workers and lead the latter behind us in order to carry out this work under the platform of the communists and under their leadership. Any other policy will benefit the fascists and social democrats1 .
Stalin.
#93
26/X.33 2
___________________
1 The last words “and to the Social Democrats” were entered by Chechulin and are present in the cipher sent on the same day from Gagra at 9 p.m. 55 min. (Ibid. L. 55).
2 Number and date entered by the secretary.Kaganovich to Stalin October 27, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 82. L. 59. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 48. L. 44. Autograph.
Encryption.
From Moscow 27 / X - 33 at 20 o'clock. 58 min. In. No. 91.
Tov. Stalin.
Beria asks to organize a political sector only under the people's commissariats of the Transcaucasian republics.
Please let me know your opinion 1 . HP 110.
Kaganovich.
____________________________
1 October 28 in cipher from Gagra at 4 o'clock. Stalin agreed (Ibid. D. 82. L. 58). On November 1, 1933, the PB granted the request of the Zakkraykom (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 933. L. 34).Kaganovich, Molotov, Mikoyan to Stalin October 28, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 82. L. 62. Original. Typescript; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 48. L. 45. Handwritten text. Signatures are autographs.
Encryption.
From Moscow 28/X - 33 at 1 o'clock. 22 min. In. No. 92.
Tov. Stalin.
The harvesting and stockpiling of potatoes has been completed in Moscow and will soon be completed in Leningrad. Market prices for potatoes have fallen sharply.
In this regard, we consider it necessary to reduce the price of potatoes, freely sold from state stores, by setting 75 kopecks per kilo instead of one ruble 20 kopecks 1 . HP 111.
Kaganovich, Molotov, Mikoyan.
_______________________
On the same day, in cipher from Gagra at 14:00. Stalin agreed (Ibid. D. 82. L. 62). On October 28, 1933, the PB accepted the proposal of Kaganovich, Molotov and Mikoyan (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 933. L. 28).Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin [October 30, 1933]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 82. L. 74. Certified typewritten copy; F. 558. Op. 11. D. 48. L. 49. Handwritten text.
Strictly secret.
Copy.
Cipher.
Sochi. T. Stalin.
Voroshilov sent a telegram indicating that it was impossible for him to return to Moscow by November 7 due to a trip to Smyrna and the Dardanelles. Despite his message, we sent him a confirmation of the need to return by November 7th, indicating that this was the opinion of the entire Politburo 1 . No. 115/2415/sh.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
_____________________________
1 Voroshilov was on an official visit to Turkey. See Document #429.Stalin, Kalinin - Kaganovich, Molotov October 30, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 82. L. 73. Text - Stalin's autograph. Signatures are autographs.
Kaganovich. Molotov .
We think that Voroshilov's presence in Moscow on November 7th is absolutely necessary. We must offer him to be in Moscow on the seventh of November. We will be in Moscow.
Stalin. Kalinin.
#97
30/X.33 1
____________________
1 Number and date entered by the secretary. Sent on October 31 in code from Sochi at 0 o'clock. 4 min. (Ibid. L. 72).Stalin to Kaganovich October 31, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 82. L. 71. Autograph of Chechulin.
T. Kaganovich.
I propose to add to the slogans of November 7 the following slogan: "The alliance of the working class and working peasants is the first source of strength for the dictatorship of the proletariat—Long live the alliance of workers and peasants."
I also propose to delete paragraphs 23 and 26, as well as the first two lines of paragraph 53.
Stalin.
#98
30/X.33 2
______________________
1 Further, the phrase: "the basis of Soviet power" has been crossed out.
2 Number and date entered by the secretary. Sent on October 31 in code from Sochi at 0 o'clock. 2 minutes. (Ibid. L. 70). On the same day, the PB approved the draft slogans with Stalin's amendment (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 933. L. 30, 62–65).Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov November 2, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 741. L. 117–118. Autograph.
Kaganovich. Molotov.
Pravda's behavior towards the Transcaucasian party organizations is becoming strange. In oil, cotton, and Abkhazian tobacco, Zakkraykom and local party organizations have achieved most serious successes. There are corresponding reports in Pravda. And "Pravda" hushed up the facts and did not publish reports. Reports of Chuvashia, Udmurtia are published. And the report of the Zakkraykom is rotting in Pravda. Pravda praises Barinov, although Barinov is a brake, not an engine of oil production, while the merits of the Communist Party organization are hushed up. And this rotten incongruity is admitted by the organ of the Pravda party. I think that Kahiani, who stood and stands against the current leadership in Transcaucasia, is to blame for this. Time to put an end to this mess. It is time to ensure that the friends of the left-bourgeois radicals - Kostanyan, Lominadze and others - do not have leading positions in Pravda.
Stalin.
2.X1.33
From Sochi 2 .
________________________
On November 15, 1933, Pravda published a large article by the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan “Baku Bolsheviks in the struggle for oil”, as well as the material “Soviet Florida” about the successes of agriculture in Transcaucasia.
2 Date and place of departure entered by the secretary. Departed from Sochi at 15:00. 35 min. telegram series "G" (Ibid. L. 118).