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Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich correspondenceStalin - Molotov, Kaganovich August 3, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 741. L. 5. Typewritten copy.
T. t. Molotov, Kaganovich (L. M.).
Please view the attached materials 1 . It seems to me that it is unfavorable in Narkomfin . It is necessary, in my opinion, to check the entire apparatus and to remake it in the spirit of Bolshevism 2 .
I. Stalin.
3.VIII.33
___________________
1 No materials available.
2 In the upper left corner of the litter: “I agree. We need to discuss. Molotov. Kaganovich.Stalin, Voroshilov - Molotov, Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze August 19, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 101. L. 18. Certified typewritten copy. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 741. L. 6. Typewritten copy.
Top secret.
Molotov. Kaganovich. Ordzhonikidze.
According to Zhdanov, according to the plan, the Volga should transport 7.5 million tons of Baku oil during the navigation period, and it transports by months not only less than the plan by 20 percent, but also less than last year by 15 percent.
The reason for the lag is allegedly that there is no oil in Baku. But it's incredible, because Baku still has more oil this year than last year.
I'm afraid that a significant part of the oil destined for the Volga is transported in tankers.
What does the Transportation Committee do? Why don't they give oil to the Volga? Why should the bulk fleet of the Volga be out of work? When will this mess be put to an end?
Call Zhdanov, find out the case, check Zhdanov's message and put an end to the disgrace. We cannot leave the North without oil.
Stalin. Voroshilov.
19/VIII - 1933.Molotov, Kaganovich to Stalin, Voroshilov [August 19, 1933]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 8–12. The text is autographed by Malotov. Signatures are autographs.
Stalin. Voroshilov .
Our delegation reported that on August 18, in a private meeting, Ohashi proposed a settlement rate of 25 sen [1/100 yen] and asked for our figure. Ohashi explained that he was based on a ransom of 50 million yen. Ohashi declared that he renounced the economic justifications of the price, approached the question of price purely politically, and considered the work of the business commission proposed by us aimless until we named our figure and the hope for an agreement on the price became clear.
We propose to issue the following directive to our delegation to respond to the Manchus on August 22 at a private conference:
1. The Soviet delegation confirms its agreement to discuss the exchange rate of the gold ruble in sen, which is a confirmation of the desire of the joint delegation to meet the Manchus in lowering the exchange rate of the gold ruble.
2. The Joint Delegation states that Ohashi's statement on the exchange rate of the gold ruble on 25 sen is a simple repetition, in other words, of the previous redemption sum of 50 million yen, and therefore the Joint Delegation cannot consider this statement by the Manchus as a response to the joint delegation's consent to discuss a lower exchange rate for the gold ruble.
3. The Soviet delegation considers Ohashi's statement about the unacceptability of a business discussion of the recalculation course for the Manchus as an attempt to disrupt the Soviet-Manchurian conference and lays responsibility for this disruption on the Manchus.
4. The Soviet delegation insists on the formation of a commission on practical issues.
Please let us know your opinion 1 . Molotov. Kaganovich 2 .
_____________________
1A conference on the sale of the CER opened in Tokyo on June 26, 1933. Manchukuo was represented at the conference by Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Ohashi. The main point of contention was the price that Manchukuo agreed to pay for the road. The originally proposed price of 50 million yen was rejected by the Soviet side. After a series of formal meetings, the discussion continued at "intermediate" meetings with a small number of delegations. On August 17, the Manchukuo delegation proposed a lower exchange rate for converting gold rubles into paper yen: which meant repeating the offer of a redemption price of 50 million yen (See more: DVP. Vol. XVI. S. 837-838). On August 20, Stalin and Voroshilov from Kazan agreed to Ohashi's draft reply (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 4, 6). Negotiations for the sale were soon interrupted and resumed only in 1934.
2 Dated from a typewritten copy (Ibid. L. 7).Molotov, Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze to Stalin, Voroshilov [August 22, 1933]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 17–18. Typewritten text with editing by Molotov and Ordzhonikidze. Signatures are autographs.
T. T. Stalin. Voroshilov 1 .
This year, from the beginning of navigation until August 15, 3,050 thousand tons of all oil products, including 2,170 thousand tons of oil fuel, were shipped from Astrakhan along the Volga. Last year, during the same period, 4,000 thousand tons were transported, including 3,012 thousand tons of oil fuel.
The decrease in traffic by 1 million tons is explained by:
1). In 1932, oil reserves in the fields of Baku and Grozny by the beginning of navigation, due to weak export in 1931 and in the winter of 1932, both by water and by rail, amounted to 3.256 thousand tons, and in 1933 by the beginning of navigation these reserves amounted to only 655 thousand tons.
2). Oil production in Azneft for 7 months is higher than production for 7 months of last year by 554 thousand tons, and production in Grozny for the same period is lower than last year's production by 1,700 thousand tons.
3). Daily production in Baku reached 45,000 tons in August against 32,000 tons in August last year; according to the August decision of the PB, in October Baku should increase daily production to 56,600 tons.
For the remaining 3 months of navigation, 2,400 thousand tons of oil, of which 1,620 thousand tons of oil fuel, will be presented for transportation along the Volga with the full implementation of the production program for oil. Thus, in total, 5,450 thousand tons will be transported along the Volga for navigation against 6,356 thousand tons in 1932, including 400 thousand stuck in Astrakhan and 400 thousand frozen on the Volga. Within three days, we will develop measures to ensure the full export of 2,400 thousand tons of oil with a maximum import to the north.
Rail transportation of oil fuel for the first months of navigation this year is somewhat lower than last year, and there are 10% of unused tanks.
In Baku, we are taking all measures to fulfill the decision of the PB on the extraction of 56,600 tons in October, which we will inform you about separately. In Grozny, where production is extremely low (13-13.5 thousand tons, with a plan of 18.5 thousand), we send a group of workers led by Comrade. Serebrovsky.
Molotov Kaganovich. Ordzhonikidze.
____________________________
1 Dated according to a copy of the telegram, which bears the note: “Received on 22.VIII.33” (Ibid. L. 16).Kaganovich to Stalin [August 22, 1933]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 22. Certified typewritten copy.
Tov. Stalin.
Regarding the directive on the procedure for issuing grain to collective farmers on workdays, he asked for the opinion of comrades Kosior, Postyshev, Vareikis and Khataevich. Everyone agreed with the draft and made minor amendments.
I am handing over to you the final text of the telegram to the secretaries of the regional committees and the chairmen of the regional executive committees, which must go for the signatures of yours and comrade. Molotov.
Please let me know your opinion 1 .
Kaganovich 2 .
____________________
On August 23, in a coded message from Stalingrad, Stalin agreed (Ibid. L. 21). On August 23, 1933, the PB approved a draft resolution “On the procedure for issuing grain to collective farmers on workdays” signed by Molotov and Stalin with the stamp “Not for printing” (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 929. L. 20, 50).
2 Marked on the document: "22.VIII.33".Stalin to Molotov, Kaganovich, Yagoda August 25, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 25. Autograph.
Molotov. Kaganovich. Yagoda.
According to Yevdokimov, the Whites are preparing a terrorist attack against Herriot in Odessa or other parts of the USSR. In my opinion, Evdokimov's assumptions are justified. Balitsky must immediately be instructed to visit Herriot's places of residence himself and take all preventive measures against possible excesses. There will be a scandal if the White Guards manage to carry out at least an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Soviet territory 1 .
Stalin.
No. 1
25/VIII - 33 2
_____________________________
1 French Prime Minister Edouard Herriot was in the Soviet Union from August 26 to September 9, 1933. He visited Moscow, Odessa, Kiev, Kharkov, Rostov-on-Don, Dneproges, visited a number of collective farms and state farms, industrial enterprises and scientific institutions.
2 Number and date entered by the secretary.Molotov, Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze - to Stalin, Voroshilov August 25, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F.558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 36. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
In. No. 1.
T. t. Stalin, Voroshilov.
We consider it necessary to accept the proposal of Gamarnik-Tukhachevsky on the organization of construction units from those liable for military service specifically for the Far East, similar to the railway corps. These units must carry out the construction work of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs in the Far East, which will require 10-15 thousand, and a number of the largest construction projects of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, such as Shipbuilding and Aviastroy in Komsomolsk, which will require 15-20 thousand. This will make it possible to reduce the number of Ulagovites, whose accumulation in the Far East is undesirable (except for Bam).
Determine the total number of construction units in the Far East at 30,000. Start educating them immediately.
Submit your opinion 1 . HP 1.
Molotov, Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze.
25/VIII-33
_________________
On August 27, Stalin and Voroshilov agreed from Sochi at 5 p.m. 31 min. (Ibid. L. 36). On August 28, 1933, the PB issued a resolution at the suggestion of Gamarnik and Tukhachevsky (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 51).Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin August 26, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 26–27. Script. Typescript.
Encryption.
In. No. 3.
Tov. Stalin.
According to Beria's letter and Ruben's telegram, they did everything necessary, now they have reached 48 tons per day. We consider it necessary to send the following telegram to Beria, Ruben, Barinov and Bagirov signed by you, Molotov and Ordzhonikidze:
“The technical equipment you require, pipes and transport, have been shipped and are being shipped. To improve the food situation of the workers, according to your request, the following are released per quarter: meat - 764 tons, animal butter - 56 tons, herring - 64 tons, cereals - 328 tons, sugar - 198 tons, tea - 2 tons, rice - 172 tons, soap linen - 65 tons, flour - 596 tons, vegetable oil - 167 tons, cheese - 67 tons, confectionery - 370 tons, cotton - 545 thousand meters, various manufactured goods for 2 million rubles. Your request for equalization in the supply of oilmen to Moscow and Leningrad has been granted.
The Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars propose that you mobilize all your forces for the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the program assigned to you.
The Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars are confident that, considering the importance and necessity of maximizing oil production for our country, you will not only fulfill the program of five hundred thousand tons of oil given to you from above before the closure of navigation, but also exceed it. Grozny will let you down this year, we need to put pressure on Azneft with all our might.”
Please give consent 1 . Nr 2.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
26/VIII-33
______________________
1 On the letter, Stalin's resolution is in the upper left corner: “Although you are overfeeding Azneft according to the “requirements” of all kinds of grabbers, I think that the telegram can still be accepted. I. St. He made some corrections to the text of the telegram. At the end of the encryption there is a note: "30/VIII - 33 - 15" - perhaps this is the date and time when Stalin's answer was sent. On the copy of the encryption preserved in the case, the date “25.VIII.33” is indicated. (Ibid. L. 28).
Molotov, Kaganovich to Stalin August 26, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 33. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
In. No. 2.
Tov. Stalin.
The decision of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee on the supply of meat to the state in 1934 adopted by the Central Committee in your presence must be published 1 .
We ask for your consent to sign this resolution 2 . Nr 3.
Molotov, Kaganovich.
26/VIII-33
_______________________
1 Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On the mandatory supply of meat to the state in 1934" was adopted at the meeting of the PB on August 15, 1933 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 928. L. 4, 43–45).
On August 27, Stalin responded with consent from Sochi at 1700 hours. 30 minutes. (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 32), on August 29, 1933, the resolution was published in Pravda.Molotov, Kaganovich to Stalin August 26, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 31. Certified typewritten copy.
Top secret .
Copy .
Cipher.
Tov. Stalin.
Herriot will arrive in Moscow on September 6, when Molotov will be in Mukhalatka. We consider it possible that Molotov should receive Herriot at Mukhalatka. Herrio Crimea is included in the route. Tell us your opinion 1 . No. 4/1602/sh.
Molotov, Kaganovich.
26.VIII.33
___________________________
On August 29, 1933, Stalin sent a coded message to Molotov: “Herriot's reception in the Crimea may be considered intimate, which is undesirable. It is better to receive him in Moscow, where receptions are generally held on a general basis. Of course, I don't mind a long vacation. Stalin” (Ibid. L. 47). On August 31, Molotov telegraphed Stalin that he had postponed his trip to the Crimea and would receive Herriot on September 2 (Ibid. L. 62). On September 3, 1933, Pravda published an announcement that Herriot had been received by Molotov.Kaganovich to Stalin [August 26, 1933]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 51–52. Script. Typescript,
Tov. Stalin .
We are sending the cipher of the delegation dated the 23rd (see appendix) 1 .
We propose the following response:
“The delegation must proceed exactly from the directive of the instance of August 20 (four points). You should not persuade the Manchus to put off breaking off the talks by putting yourself in the position of a party entangled by the break and succumbing to blackmail. To Ohashi's threat of a break in negotiations, reply that you place all responsibility for the break on the Manchu delegation.
Tov. Sokolnikov offers another following option:
“Your proposal to specify our proposals on the recalculation rate in the coming days is inappropriate. Reject calling meetings before Baryshnikov's arrival, when you can make a reasonable course proposal, point out that discussions of the conversion rate should be conducted in a business-like manner with the participation of financial experts, and that Ohashi's statements about the unacceptability of a business discussion of the conversion rate, the uselessness of experts and the sufficiency of setting a policy are a rejection any real discussion of the exchange rate. It should be clear to you that by offering to discuss the political course, the Manchus are actually asking us to agree to consider "gold" rubles as Soviet paper rubles, but we, by offering a discussion of the economic course, continue to insist that, demanding 200 million. ruble, we mean gold rubles. Therefore, it is necessary to direct the work as outlined above. If the Manchus, in response to the postponement of the meetings until the arrival of our expert, threaten to break off the negotiations, you should not persuade them to postpone the break, putting yourself in the position of being intimidated by the break and succumbing to blackmail. To Ohashi's statements that it is necessary to end the negotiations, answer that you take this opinion of his into account and leave him to act as he sees fit, removing any responsibility for this break. Tell us your opinion answer that you take this opinion of his into account and leave it to him to act as he sees fit, disclaiming any responsibility for this gap. Tell us your opinion answer that you take this opinion of his into account and leave it to him to act as he sees fit, disclaiming any responsibility for this gap. Tell us your opinion2 .
_____________________
1 Application missing. Marked on the document: “Received 26.VIII. 33".
2 We are talking about negotiations on the terms of the sale of the CER. August 29 from Sochi at 16:00. 50 min. Stalin and Voroshilov answered in code: “Moscow of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - Comrade Kaganovich. We accept your answer for our delegation in Tokyo. Stalin, Voroshilov” (Ibid. L. 50). On the same day, this directive of the Soviet delegation was approved by the PB (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 51).Kaganovich to Stalin August 26 [1933]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. P. D. 741. L. 7–12. Autograph.
26/VIII
Hello, Dear Comrade Stalin.
1) Instead of a lengthy cipher, we decided to send you by plane materials and proposals on the affairs of the CER. We discussed it for a long time, but the most reliable way is to send it to you, which we do.
2) We had the first meeting of the transport commission. The first issue was the report on the implementation of the decisions of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars. Despite the usually calm report, from subsequent speeches by Kishkin, Zemlyachka and others, it became clear that the implementation of the decisions of the Central Committee was clearly unsatisfactory. The restructuring of the apparatus in terms of form and statistics is proceeding, but in the first place, it dragged on, and in the second, it did not lead to an increase in work in essence. Average daily loading, for example, in July is less than in June. The loading of bread was sluggish, although in recent days it has risen. There are a number of facts of sharp resistance to the implementation of the decisions of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, and the struggle is insufficient. Political departments are also still not felt 1. We recognized the work on carrying out the decisions of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars as unsatisfactory and decided to call on the commission 2 roads - Kursk and Ekaterininsky, on which we will make specific decisions. One of these days we will review the entire transportation plan in order to direct the wagons to transport the most necessary things, primarily grain, coal and ore 2 .
3) In connection with the case of incomplete shipment of combine harvesters, we had to meet and discuss the issue, not without a sharp argument. The fact is that Vyshinsky, in his speech in the chapter "Discipline, Accounting, Control" in the last paragraph, made a rather thick "hint" not only at the People's Commissariat of Heavy and People's Commissariat Land, but also at the persons who lead them. Tov. Sergo sent a protest and asked to discuss the issue. In the course of the discussion, it turned out that Comrade Molotov had read this before it was published in Pravda, and that Akulov had several conferences with him during the process. Hence the nature of the discussion is clear, although both tried to be restrained.
We adopted a short resolution in which we recognized this passage of Comrade Vyshinsky's speech as incorrect.
4) Now we are working on the issue of warehouses. The main thing is the mobilization of additional warehouses, in particular, textile factories have large cotton warehouses, largely free, we are thinking of using them, etc. At the next PB, which we are gathering on the 29th instead of the 25th , we will raise this question and take practical measures, as you indicated before leaving.
5) T.t. Kosior and Postyshev sent a telegram asking them to expedite the appointment of a secretary to Donbass. I am sending it to you. How to be?
I'm glad you had a good ride. Hello to you.
Your L. Kaganovich.
Hello Comrade Voroshilov. 26/VIII
______________________
1 Political departments in railway transport were created on the basis of a resolution of the Central Committee of July 10, 1933 (CPSU in resolutions ... V. 5. S. 118–120).
On August 29, the PB adopted a decision on the transportation plan for September 1933, which provided for the priority transportation of refractories, fluxes, ore, oil, coke, coal (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 929. L. 6).
3 On August 21, 1933, the PB adjourned its meeting from August 25 to August 29 (Stalin's Politburo in the 1930s, p. 229).
Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov August 27, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 100. L. 9–12. Autograph.
27/VIII 33
Hello, Comrade Kaganovich !
(show the letter to comrade Molotov and other comrades) 1) I received an answer from three about oil transportation along the Volga. The answer is not convincing. It can be seen that it was compiled by "dodgers" from the NKTP or the State Planning Commission, and you, as usual, "waved" 1 .
If more oil is produced in Baku this year than last year, exports have been reduced, and domestic consumption has increased, why do we export less along the Volga than last year? You didn't explain this.
2) I consider it our common crime that the Volga bridge near Nizhny is being built with the expectation of a single- track . In 6-8 years, when the Avtozavod will be expanded and the cargo turnover will rise several times, the Moscow-Nizhny-Perm railway line passing through this bridge will be literally slaughtered, and we will be forced to build a new bridge in a hurry. Who needs it? Is it possible to build large railroad bridges with the expectation of 3-4 years, and not 50-100 years? Is it really hard to understand that we cannot build such bridges every 3-4 years? You can not entrust the solution of such issues to the NKPS, which does not see anything further than its own nose. Where is the State Planning Commission, why doesn't it raise the issue, doesn't raise the alarm?
I propose that measures be taken immediately to transform the bridge with the expectation of a two-track track (parallel piers or something else). I will wait for an answer.
3) Who approves (which institution) we have the width and depth of locks at canals, dams, power plants? I'm afraid that bunglers (or hidden enemies) will let us down with gateways and make yix a bottleneck, ruin the business. Can you not tell me (as soon as possible) the projects or resolutions of the relevant institutions on the dimensions of the locks for the Moscow-Volga, for hydroelectric stations under construction on the upper Volga (Yaroslavl, Nizhny, Perm). I consider this issue important (the viability of canals and rivers depends on the size of the locks).
I will wait for an answer.
4) I'm afraid that the decision on the resettlement committee in its practical part will get stuck in the jungle of "apparatuses" in the same way as the decisions on technical colleges and factory studies got stuck. I propose : to immediately approve the personal composition of the resettlement] committee and also immediately give it an operational 1 task in the form of organizing resettlement by the beginning of next year to the Kuban and Terek (say, 10 thousand householders with families), to Ukraine ( steppe) 15–20 tons). This is a labor issue in the south, where there has always been a shortage of workers. Hurry up with this.
I will wait for an answer.
Well, that's all for now. Shake your hand.
I. Stalin.
T. T. Kaganovich and Molotov.
I consider Yurkin's "order" to remove Kosko a shame for us. We remove him (Kosko) not for illness, but for poor work . This must be said honestly and openly in the “order”, and [not] to breed mean-bourgeois diplomatic lies about Kosko’s “state of health” .
It is necessary to cancel Yurkin's order, as false and harmful, interfering with the proper education of cadres.
It is necessary to give another "order" from the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.
Publish both.
I. St.
___________________
On August 29, 1933, on the report of Ordzhonikidze, the PB adopted an agreed proposal of the NKTP and the People's Commissariat of Water Transport to ensure the export of 750 thousand tons of oil products from Baku to Astrakhan in September (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 929. L. 7). On September 2, the Politburo confirmed this plan to export oil from Baku in September. Export of oil by sea from Baku for the second half of August was determined at 306,000 tons (Ibid. D. 930. L. 18).Molotov, Kaganovich to Stalin August 27, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 41 Certified typewritten copy.
Strictly secret .
Copy .
Cipher.
Sochi. T. Stalin.
Yagoda took measures to protect Herriot. In Ukraine, Balitsky is personally in charge. No. 5/1621/sh.
Molotov, Kaganovich.
27.VIII.33Stalin to Kaganovich August 28, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 43–45. Autograph.
Central Committee of the CPSU. Kaganovich .
From the telegram from Kosior and Postyshev it is clear that they do not take the purge seriously. Candidates nominated by them for chairmen of the purge commission for Donbass 1do not deserve attention. It seems to me that the Ukrainians want to slowly expel Sarkis from the Donbass to please Terekhov. Such a combination would mean a weakening of the Donbass. In my opinion, Sarkis as the first secretary would be stronger than Shvernik, who can be saddled by dodgers from the old company of Donbass. I propose to appoint Sarkis as the first secretary, and Terekhov as the second, if the latter begins to feint, remove him from the Donbass and send him to Dalvost to replace Schmidt. All this is somewhat risky, but one must take the risk, because otherwise the old family of workers, dangerous for the Donbass, may come to life again. Shvernik should be left at the post of the pre-purge commission, and then returned to the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions.
No. 5.
Stalin.
28/VIII - 33 2
__________________
The decision to purge the party was made by the PB on December 10, 1932 (based on the decision of the XVI Party Conference in April 1929) and approved by the plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in January 1933. On April 28, 1933, the PB approved the draft resolution of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission The All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the purge of the party, in which, in particular, it was ordered to begin the purge from June 1 in the Moscow, Leningrad, Ural, Donetsk, Odessa and other regions and finish no later than the end of November 1933 (RGASPI. F. 17. Inventory 3. D. 922. L. 50–54).
2 Number and date entered by the secretary.Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov, Ordzhonikidze August 29, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 49. Autograph.
CC ON. Kaganovich. Molotov. Ordzhonikidze .
For members of the Politburo.
I learned from Kaganovich's letter that you recognized as incorrect one passage in Vyshinsky's speech, where he alludes to the responsibility of people's commissars in the matter of supplying and accepting incomplete products. I think this decision is wrong and harmful. The supply and acceptance of incomplete products is a flagrant violation of the decisions of the Central Committee. People's commissars cannot but answer for such a case. It is sad that Kaganovich and Molotov could not resist the bureaucratic onslaught of the People's Commissariat of Heavy.
No. 7.
Stalin.
29/VIII-33Kaganovich to Stalin August 29, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 56. Certified typewritten copy.
Owls, secret .
Copy .
Cipher.
Tov. Stalin .
1) I completely agree about the secretary in Donbass. I'll talk to the Ukrainians and get Sarkis through.
2) I received the letter, we will take the necessary measures on all issues and prepare a response.
3) The Politburo met today, I am writing a detailed letter. No. 7/1653/sh.
Hello. Kaganovich.
29.VIII.33Stalin to Kaganovich [August 29, 1933]
Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 100. L. 107–108. Autograph.
T. Kaganovich!
1) I did not find Sokolnikov's "second" directive on the Chinese Eastern Railway in the papers. Regarding the two options for our delegation in Tokyo, we favored your option.
2) I have no objection to Sokolnikov's directives on the rate of recalculation.
3) It is very bad and dangerous that you (and Molotov) failed to curb Sergo's bureaucratic impulses at the expense of incomplete harvesters and sacrificed Vyshinsky to them. If you educate cadres in this way, not a single honest Party member will remain in your Party. Ugliness...
I. Stalin.
Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin August 30, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 58. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
In. No. 8.
From Moscow 30/VIII, 6:28
Tov. Stalin.
We propose to publish the following resolution from the Central Committee of the CPSU:
“Recognize as incorrect the order of the People's Commissariat of State Farms Comrade. Yurkin dated August 16, motivating the removal of the director of the Gigant state farm comrade. Kosko in poor health, while in reality Comrade. Kosko was removed for poor work on cleaning and grain delivery at the state farm.
In view of this, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party decides: 1) To cancel the order of the People's Commissariat of State Farms on comrade. Kosko, as hiding the real reason for the dismissal of Comrade. Kosko and thereby interfering with the proper education of cadres. 2) Remove goods. Kosko from the post of director of the Gigant state farm as having failed to cope with the tasks assigned to him by the party and the government.
Please let us know your opinion 1 . HP 8.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
__________________________
1 On the same day, Stalin agreed (Ibid. L. 57). The resolution of the PB was drawn up on August 31 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 930. L. 9) and on September 1 was published in newspapers.Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin August 30, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 60. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
In. No. 9.
From Moscow 30/VIII, 6:28
Tov. Stalin.
We propose to form the Resettlement Committee in the following composition: Muralov chairman, deputy. chairman Rud (chekist) or Leonyuk is also a security officer, secretary Todres - an employee of the agricultural department, with the renaming of Todresov, members of the committee: Berman - GPU, Feldman - Narkomvoenmor, Gerchikov - Narkomsovkhozov, Postnikov - NKPS.
Please provide your opinion 1 . HP 9.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
______________________
1 On the same day, Stalin agreed (Ibid. L. 57). On August 31, 1933, the proposed composition of the Resettlement Committee was approved by the PB (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 930. L. 8).Kaganovich to Stalin August 30 [1933]
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 741. L. 13–19. Autograph.
30/VIII
Hello, Dear Comrade Stalin!
I received your letter.
1) By order of Yurkin, yesterday we drew up a draft resolution and sent it to you. You are absolutely right that such a rotten approach is capable of corrupting workers, and not correcting them.
2) About oil, we tried to understand the figures that we were given. It turns out that last year there was a reserve, but this year there was none, in addition, part of the oil from Baku was driven to Grozny for processing. Grozny himself failed and gave much less oil. It is possible that we did not understand everything. I promise you to check again within 2-3 days and report more accurately.
3) It is certainly wild and absurd to build the Volga bridge with the expectation of a single-track track. Tomorrow we will deal with this issue in the direction of fulfilling your proposal to transform it with the expectation of a two-track track. Let's find out about gateways in the same way. As for the locks of the Moscow-Volga canal, I can report that the project is as follows: the canal will have 8 locks throughout its entire length.
The length of the chamber is 160 meters, the width of the lock is 20 meters, and the depth is 4 meters 1 . The channel as a whole will have: a width of 42 meters, a depth of 4.75 meters. We will work out proposals on both questions and send them to you.
4) A meeting was held on the plan for the fourth quarter. They basically accepted the proposals of the State Planning Commission with some amendments. I am sending you a draft resolution of the PB and asking for your opinion 2 .
5) We also heard a message from Comrade Osinsky about the yield. On average throughout the USSR, the Central Commission for Yields determines the yield of grain at 9.9 centners. If we proceed from the fact that the sown area of grains is 100,842 thousand hectares, then according to these estimates of the Central Committee of the Central Committee, the gross harvest of grains should amount to 6 billion poods. But this is a calculation of an ideal crop in the vine, but if we count the losses during harvesting, then we will probably have about 5,500,000,000 poods in the barns. I am sending you a note by Osinsky and a draft of our brief resolution. We have not approved his figures, we believe that it is necessary to obtain the conclusion of the regional authorities. We approved only in the Crimea. I ask you to: 1) tell us your opinion about our project; 2) whether to print in the press data Center. Yield commissions or refrain for now 3 .
6) Yesterday at the PB we could not listen to the report of the Transportation Committee, since Comrade Rudzutak was not present for health reasons. But we decided that the plan should be drawn up by the NKPS itself, and then submitted for approval. At a meeting of the commission on transport, it turned out that the NKPS did not know the plan at all, although even under the current system, he should have known. In addition, we made a decision on the September transportation plan, added wagons for bread and ore. It was emphasized that these cargoes + coal and some others are top priorities 4 .
7) We put aside Dalugol. I am sending you a short draft of the resolution and asking for your opinion 5 .
8) We discussed the decision of the Council of Labor and Defense "On the plan for the procurement of cotton." A plan is outlined for 25 million poods of cotton-fiber, last year the plan was 27 million [m] 718 thousand [thousand] poods, and 23 million [m] 700 thousand [thousand] have been prepared. It seems to me that the plan is 25 mil. since the harvest of 1933 is small, it would be necessary to give at least 26 million pounds. The decision was not made - it was postponed.
I beg you to communicate your opinion by telegraph or by letter. Besides, shouldn't the decision be issued by the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee signed by you and Molotov. If you agree, then please let me know, the draft is attached 6 .
I wrote you a message about the Sukharev Tower, I am sending it to you. I end with this.
Hello. Your L. Kaganovich.
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1 Opposite the words "the width of the lock is 20 meters, the depth is 4 meters" Stalin wrote: "4 meters is not enough."
2 Decision of the PB "On limits on the national economic plan for the IV quarter of 1933" was adopted on September 4, 1933 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 930. L. 7, 8).
3 The resolution “On the size of the yield” was approved by the PB on September 5, 1933: “1. Approve the size of the yield of grain crops in the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic on average and for each region of the Crimea separately, established by the Central Committee. 2. To consider the yield sizes established by the CGC as a whole preliminary, subject to further clarification after the completion of harvesting and threshing. 3. Instruct the Central Committee to inform the CPC of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the regional executive committees of the Crimea, established by it, the yield rates established by it for the regions of Crimea, so that these yield rates established by the Central Committee should be taken as the basis for the establishment by special commissions on the ground (in accordance with the exemplary agreement between the MTS and collective farms) gross collections crops on collective farms served by the MTS. 4. To instruct the CGC to inform the regional secretaries of the regional sizes of grain crop yields established by it. regional committees and chairmen of the region. regional executive committees to receive their feedback on them. 5. Oblige regional committees, regional committees and regional. regional executive committees to give their opinion on the size of the crop yields established by the Central Committee within ten days. (Ibid. L. 27).
4 On August 29, 1933, in order to increase the loading of grain and ore, in September the PB decided to make the following changes to the plan approved by the ComSTO: increase the loading of grain by 500 wagons and the loading of ore by 100 wagons, while reducing the loading rate of industrial feed, phosphorites and fertilizers , junk, etc. The PB suggested that the NKPS “provide priority for the transportation of grain, refractories, fluxes, ore, oil, coke, coal and materials for the construction of airstrips and impact sites so that the number of cars planned according to the plan would be unconditionally loaded regardless of any there were circumstances” (Ibid. D. 929. L. 6).
5 The decision “On Dalugol” was adopted by the PB on September 4, 1933. The PB agreed “with the proposal of comrades Gamarnik, Lavrentiev and Bilik to liquidate the Dalugol trust, transfer the Suchansk mine administration to the People’s Commissariat for Commissariat and to dismiss the manager of the trust, comrade V. Schmidt. V., as not providing guidance. The PB decided to establish two coal trusts in the NKPS system in the Far East: Daltransugol and Vostoktransugol (Ibid. D. 930. L. 23, 24).
6 Above Kaganovich's proposal: "Give at least 26 million pounds" Stalin's note: "Correct." The resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on the plan for harvesting cotton from the 1933 crop and the text of the telegram to the secretaries of the regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties and the chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars and regional executive committees of cotton-growing regions were approved by the PB on September 5, 1933. The annual harvest plan was provided for in the amount of 26 million pounds in terms of fiber ( Ibid. L. 28, 63, 64).Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin August 31, 1933
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 64. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
In. No. P.
From Moscow 1/IX - 33
Tov. Stalin.
Potemkin reports 1 : “1) That Mussolini, in accordance with our proposal, accepts the disputed articles in the wording of the Franco-Soviet pact without any amendments. 2) That he would like to sign the pact no later than the second of September. 3) That, based on the friendly nature of our relations, which ruled out the possibility of mutual attacks even before the signing of the pact, and insufficiently fully expressed obligations of neutrality, Mussolini advocates that our treaty should receive a more adequate name of a pact of friendship, non-aggression and neutrality.
We consider it possible to agree. Please let us know your opinion 2 . HP 11.
Kaganovich. Molotov.
31/VIII-33
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1 Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Italy V.P. Potemkin to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs about Mussolini's proposals dated August 29, 1933, see: DVP. T. XVI. pp. 491–492. On September 1, 1933, the PB accepted the proposal of the Italian side to name the non-aggression pact the pact of friendship, non-aggression and neutrality (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 15. L. 54). The treaty was signed by Potemkin and Mussolini on September 2, 1933, and ratified in Moscow and Rome in October 1933 (DVP, vol. XVI, pp. 494–496).
2 Stalin agreed on September 1, 1933 (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 80. L. 63).