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Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931–19361932 August
On June 1, 1932, the Politburo decided to grant Stalin a month and a half leave . However, as follows from the register of visitors to Stalin's Kremlin office, he did not receive anyone from May 29 to August 27, 1932, i.e. absent from Moscow for almost three months 2 . It was one of the leader's longest vacations, which also began two months earlier than vacations in previous years.
Note:
1 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 12. L. 156.
Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin August 1, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 78. L. 116. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
In. No. 68.
Tov. Stalin.
Today at the meeting we considered the proposals of the Molotov commission on the material and technical supply of transport 1 . The commission found out that the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry would not be able to fulfill the requirements of the NKPS. The Commission proposes to import 40,000 [tons] of metal in the third quarter to meet the needs of the NKPS, primarily for the production of spare parts and the repair of rolling stock, with a foreign currency expenditure of 3 million rubles and with payments in 1934.
We believe that this proposal should be accepted. Tell us your opinion 2 . HP 70.
Kaganovich. Molotov.
1/VIII - 32
_______________________
On July 16, 1932, the PB referred the question “On the material and technical supply of transport” to a commission consisting of: Molotov, Rudzutak, Pyatakov, Mironov and Smilga (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 892. L. 10 ).
2 The next day, Stalin agreed (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 78. L. 116). The resolution of the PB "On the material and technical supply of transport" was formalized in the protocol of the PB of August 1, 1932 (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 894. L. 2; Op. 162. D. 13. L 47).
Kaganovich to Stalin August 1, 1932
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 78. L. 113. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
In. No. 69.
Tov. Stalin.
The People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade submitted a request from the Persian government to sell it 10 airplanes, 3,000 cavalry saddles, and 100,000 pairs of military-style boots.
We consider it possible to go for the sale of airplanes, saddles and shoes. Submit your opinion 1 . HP 71.
Kaganovich.
1/VIII-32
_____________________________
1 The next day, Stalin agreed (Ibid.). The decision of the PB was formalized in the minutes of August 1, 1932 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 13. L. 47).
Kaganovich to Stalin August 1, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 78. L. 119. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
In. No. 70.
Tov. Stalin.
Today we have adopted a number of measures on financial issues. Please provide your opinion on the following two items of third quarter financial measures:
First. Purchase in the third quarter abroad raw materials, semi-finished products, finished consumer goods (approximately shoes, knitwear, fabrics, hardware, Greek tobacco, cocoa beans for the confectionery industry, rubber, etc.) in the amount of up to twenty million rubles in foreign currency with payments not earlier than 1934 in order to sell these goods within the country at commercial prices in the amount of up to five hundred million rubles.
Second. By September 1, reduce the available composition of the administrative apparatuses of state institutions, economic agencies, construction projects by at least 10 percent so that this reduction is carried out by the heads of institutions, economic agencies and construction sites not indiscriminately mechanically, but from the point of view of improving the work of apparatuses. Control over this reduction should be carried out by the bodies of the NC RCT. HP 72.
Kaganovich.
1/VIII - 32
Kaganovich to Stalin August 1, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 78. L. 125. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
In. No. 71.
Tov. Stalin.
The progress of harvesting at state farms and MTS is unsatisfactory. According to available information, some heads of state farms and MTS are somewhat perplexed. Today it was considered expedient to send directly to the directors of state farms and MTS the following telegram from the Central Committee and SNK signed by you and Molotov:
“The course of grain harvesting at your state farm (MTS) is completely unsatisfactory. The Central Committee and Council of People's Commissars expect from you a decisive increase in the pace of harvesting, timely stacking with simultaneous deployment of threshing, careful accounting of grain and a resolute struggle against theft, and timely fulfillment of tasks for grain delivery. The Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars are confident that you will mobilize all your forces for the Bolshevik fulfillment of these tasks.
Stalin, Molotov" 1 .
Please telegraph consent 2 . HP 73.
Kaganovich.
1/VIII-32
_____________________
On August 1, 1932, at a meeting of the PB, the question “On harvesting and grain procurements” was considered. It was decided to send people with experience in agricultural work to state farms for 10-15 days to work on harvesting grain, and also to send a telegram from the Central Committee and SNK about intensifying the harvesting campaign (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 894. L. 2).
2 Stalin agreed on August 2, 1932 (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 78. L. 125).
Stalin to Kaganovich August 2, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 78. L. 119, 119v. Autograph.
Nr 72. I strongly object to the point about the import of raw materials for consumer goods. I have already written to Molotov 1 about the reduction of apparatuses by 10 per cent .
Stalin.
No. 76.
2/VIII.32
Kaganovich to Stalin August 2, 1932Archive: Personal archive of M.L. Kaganovich.
August 2, 1932
Dear comrade Stalin.
Yesterday we sent you a number of telegrams on the issues that were discussed at the PB. Some of these issues of our decisions I want to explain in more detail in this letter.
1. About financial events. We adopted a number of resolutions, about which I have already written to you and which were partly set forth in Comrade Grinko's note . Along with this, at an additional new measure: the first is the reduction of staff, even if it were not connected with financial measures, this would have to be done because our staff has swelled to the point of impossibility, especially in economic non-budgetary organizations. Of course, it is necessary to avoid, as you once said at the PB, a purely mechanical approach. In no case should the reduction be in the nature of a purge. RCTs should have focused on this task 2. This work would be useful for the RKI itself, which, frankly speaking, is doing very little now to fight for the economy and is cut off from economic and people's commissariat institutions. And the second event, more risky and more controversial. I personally, to be honest, doubted the expediency of this, but we all more or less agreed that, perhaps, we could go for a purchase of 20 mil. [rub.] with revenue, with payments in the 34th year, up to 500 mil. I repeat, this is the least desirable measure. Your objections are quite understandable to us, we will, of course, remove this question. In the face of our difficulties with the currency, perhaps it would be better to abandon this idea.
2. On the question of non-ferrous metals, a really very unpleasant misunderstanding has arisen; frankly, it's a mistake. You really wrote about equipment for the production of non-ferrous metals, but erroneously, apparently due to an optical illusion, we have your listings below - copper, aluminum, tin, etc. mistakenly perceived as an indication of the possibility of purchasing non-ferrous metals, especially since the pressure on us along this line is exceptional. The situation is indeed very difficult with non-ferrous metals. We have already taken several times from the reserve fund and all this for only one week. That is why we were forced to expand our purchases of non-ferrous metals, partly by reducing other imports, and partly by increasing the limit of payments. As a result, we got payments for the 32nd year of 71 mil. instead of the planned 67 million 573 thousand and 89.5 mil. for the 33rd year instead of the planned 85. We pressed hard, but believe me, we could not squeeze more. I send you detailed materials on this matter and ask you to write your opinion.
2. We have just gathered specifically for a talk on the question of the draft decree. The draft decree combines three sections in the spirit of your instructions. He objected to the third section yesterday ... [so in the document], today he was not there, he left. Doubts and even objections on the 2nd and 3rd 3 were also in ... [sic in the document], but in the end we settled on this text in the main. I am sending it to you. The decree is undoubtedly timely, many in the localities have such an idea that, if not firmly, they will let the kulak sit on the neck and disintegrate the collective farms, therefore it should be issued as soon as possible. If the proletariat does not use the full force of its concentration of economic] and political power to strengthen the new economic system, then the kulak may gain some success.
3. We heard a message about the harvesting campaign and grain procurements. Harvesting became better in the last five days, but it cannot be said that it was satisfactory. We outlined a number of practical measures, in particular, we proposed to select temporarily 10-15 days worth of people from the cities who are familiar with agriculture, not from factories and plants, to help the state farms. The situation is bad with beets, especially with digging and with preparation in the fight against the second round of caterpillars. There is still something that can be done here, in particular with regard to weeding and fighting the second round of caterpillars. We have asked the Central Committee of the CP(b)U and the Central Chernozemy what they are doing and what measures they are proposing. There were proposals to announce that for every hectare of beet weeded and kept from caterpillars, the peasant would receive 5-6 poods of bread. Counting a million hectares of crops, you get 5-6 mil. pounds, but we have not yet taken this measure,
On the question of grain procurements, we approved the plan. The July plan was carried out very poorly; 285 mil. pounds. It was decided to strengthen the grain procurement apparatus by recruiting 300 workers for permanent work.
4. We have approved the figures for autumn sowing and autumn plowing, proceeding from the perfectly correct position you have given regarding the inadmissibility of increasing the amount of expansion of sown areas. So we increased the expansion by one mil. for state farms, and the rest of the collective farm and peasant sector was left at last year's level. We think we did the right thing.
5. NKTyazhprom made a number of proposals on the opening of Dneprostroy. We have postponed the issue. I think that we need your opinion on this matter. In my opinion, it would be possible to open not on the 25th, and it’s too late, we won’t have time, we could open on September 10th. Money for bonuses and expenses they ask for 2 mil. 750 thousand is too much. And, of course, it is absolutely unacceptable to propose a trip of the entire composition of the PB, someone from the members of the PB will have to go. I beg you to write your opinion. I am sending you materials.
6. We discussed some international questions yesterday. We heard a report on the proposal of the Minister of Commerce of France to resume trade negotiations. As long as the message is taken into account, no practical solutions are needed, as negotiations will not start until September 4 . Krestinsky proposed that a memorandum on the question of the White Guards be presented to the French government, considering the present moment to be the most favorable. We did not accept this proposal, because we believe that it is just untimely.
I am sending you a short note from Karakhan about a request from the Japanese Naval Ministry to our military attache Bologoy. There were two kinds of proposals at the PB: there was a proposal to instruct Bologoy to answer the Japanese so that they would contact the trade mission and that he hoped that the trade mission would consider and react favorably to their proposal, and another proposal was to instruct Bologoy simply to answer that this was a trade and economic matter and that they should address this issue to the trade mission.
I think this second sentence is more correct 5 . We must agree to any trade and economic deal, we sell oil to everyone, but not in the way they have done, connected with America.
7. I am sending you two notes, a recording of Alexandrovsky's conversation with Niedermeier and Vinogradov's conversation with Reventlov. Both notes are of interest 6 .
8. I am sending you the materials received from Pyatnitsky. Pyatnitsky raised the question of creating a commission, but we have postponed this matter until we receive your considerations from you. It is possible that Schyatnitsky] exaggerates, but there is no smoke without fire, and the letter shows that N[eiman] really messed up something. Judging by the letters, there is something factional, but is it necessary to inflate it, especially at a time when you can congratulate our German comrades. with success in the elections.
Greetings to you. Your L. Kaganovich.
_____________________________
On July 28, 1932, the PB allowed the State Bank to issue 150 million rubles (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 13. L. 51). On August 1, 1932, after hearing Grinko's report on financial measures in the third quarter, the PB decided: "It is firmly decided that the budget of the fourth quarter must necessarily be not only deficit-free, but also with an excess of income over expenditure." Wage arrears to workers and employees were ordered to be liquidated by August 15 (Ibid. L. 49, 50). On August 2, the PB allowed the State Bank to issue 200 million rubles in wage arrears to eliminate them. (Ibid. L. 53).
2 The question of reducing the apparatus and liquidating associations was considered at a meeting of the PB on October 8, 1932. The RCT of the USSR was instructed to reduce all representations of local, regional and republican economic and Soviet organizations in Moscow; organize staff commissions for people's commissariats from representatives of the RCT, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the corresponding people's commissariat and the Central Committee of the trade union, obliging them to draw up firm staffs with a ban on increasing without the sanction of the RCT and reducing the number of employees by 10-20%, etc. (Ibid. Op. 3. D. 902. L. 3).
3 The second section of the decree of August 7, 1932 provided for the use of execution or, under mitigating circumstances, a ten-year sentence for theft of collective farm property. The third section provided for sentences of 5 to 10 years in camps to "kulak-capitalist elements" who "use violence and threats or preach the use of violence and threats against collective farmers in order to force them to leave the collective farm."
4 Soviet-French trade negotiations resumed on October 20, 1932.
On August 7, 1932, the PB approved the text of a telegram to Troyanovsky, in which Bologoy was instructed to answer the Japanese that “the issue of oil is best resolved by concluding an agreement on the supply of oil by us for many years (3.5 and more years). The contract can be concluded as an ordinary commercial contract between the Marine Ministry and our Trade Mission in Tokyo or a Soyuzneft representative” (Ibid. Op. 162. D. 13. L. 53). See Document #234.
6 Notes missing.
Kaganovich to Stalin August 3, 1932Archive: Personal archive of M.L. Kaganovich.
August 3rd, 1932
Hello, dear Comrade Stalin.
1) I am sending you Loganovsky's note about the conversation with Barlow, from which it is clear that we answered him correctly and that he, apparently, came for election purposes, perhaps even as Hoover's intelligence agent. In the future, whatever details he suggests, it seems to me that we need to stick to our firm position.
2) I am also sending you a recording of the conversation with Cooper, he apparently kept himself impudent, ours gave him, in my opinion, a rather weak rebuff. As for the essence of the question of Negroes, we instructed Postyshev to find out, we think that this film could be dispensed with. They did this (Mezhrabpom) without any permission from the Central Committee.
3) I am also sending you, for your perusal, 2 interesting notes by Aleksandrovsky and Vinogradov about conversations with Reventloff and Niedermeier (a general staff officer who has been with us for about 8 years). It can be seen from the notes that even the fascist elements are compelled to assure us that they do not intend to disturb the relations that have developed with us. This, of course, is very important, because, apparently, despite the results of the elections, these elements will remain in power in Germany.
4) I beg you, through comrade Yenukidze, to tell me your opinion on the projects for paving embankments, either vertical or inclined, these latter are much cheaper, require fewer building materials and, it seems, are more beautiful. I gave the drawings to Comrade Yenukidze.
Recently, as you advised me, I had to break into the affairs of the city economy in order to pull up a number of cases. It's late now, next time I'll write you a detailed letter concerning Moscow affairs, in particular, we held a meeting of architects here, where there was an exchange of views on the planning of the city, I developed those considerations that I talked to you about more than once, about preserving the existing city with its radial-ring system, improving it, straightening the streets, creating squares and developing new construction, both in the center and along the embankment, which should take an important place in the further reconstruction of the city. By the way, I can tell you that 2 houses near Smolensky Boulevard, which you mentioned to be demolished, are already broken, now the square is being cleared, it turned out great both for traffic and for decorating the city.
I end with this. Greetings to you.
Your L. Kaganovich.
Stalin to Kaganovich August 4, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 99. L. 121–123. Autograph.
Hello, Comrade Kaganovich!
1) I return the draft decree on the protection of public property with amendments and additions. As you can see, I expanded it a bit. Publish it soon.
2) I have no objection to your import plan, although it would be better to reduce 1 more .
3) Comrade Karakhan's note on the reply to the Japanese maritime department is correct.
4) The plan to open Dneprostroy is overblown. Why the hell do we need such a pump? It needs to be cut in half . A list of persons by order and honorary board can be accepted. If Kalinin opens the door, and Molotov and Chubar make speeches, then this is not enough .
5) Disgraceful things are happening on the railways. Employees along the line are raped and terrorized by hooligans and homeless children. The TOGPU organs are sleeping (fact!). We can't tolerate this nonsense any longer. Call TOGPU to order. Make him keep order on the line. Give a directive to TOGPU to have armed people on the line and shoot hooligans on the spot. Where is TOGPU? What is he doing? How can Comrade Blagonravov endure all this anarchy and disgrace? 3
Greetings! I. Stalin. 4/VIII - 32.
_____________________
On August 16, 1932, the PB approved the draft resolution on the import plan for 1932 submitted by the Molotov commission (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 13. L. 59, 66–71).
On August 8, 1932, the PB decided to send Kalinin and Ordzhonikidze to the opening of the Dnepropetrovsk hydroelectric power station. To consider the opening program, a commission was created, which was instructed to "reduce the proposals of NKTyazhprom by 3-4 times" (Ibid. Op. 3. D. 895. L. 6).
On August 7, 1932, the PB considered the issue of hooliganism in transport. Deputy Commissar of Railways G.I. to the protection of railway cargo ”(Ibid. L. 13). On August 16, 1932, the PB heard and approved the report of Menzhinsky and Blagonravov on the course of the fight against hooliganism in transport (Ibid. D. 896. L. 8).
Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov August 5, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 78. L. 123. Autograph.
Kaganovich. Molotov .
For winter crops, state farms can leave a million hectares of growth, although this figure is tense. As for the collective-farm sector, I consider it wrong to keep last year's area;
Stalin.
#78
5/VIII. 32 year 1
___________________________
1 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 16:00. 45 min. (Ibid. L. 122).
Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin August 5, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 78. L. 131. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
In. No. 74.
Tov. Stalin.
The collective farms retained last year's grain area, but they have added 672,000 hectares of industrial crops (sunflower, rapeseed, coriander), transferred from spring to autumn on the basis of the experience of recent years.
Is it necessary to add five hundred thousand hectares? Please inform. No. 76.
Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin August 5, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 78. L. 128. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
In. No. 75.
Tov. Stalin.
Litvinov asks if he can meet Reventlov in Berlin. We consider this to be inappropriate.
Please provide your opinion. Nr 77.
Kaganovich, Molotov.
5/VIII-32
Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov, Voroshilov August 5, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 99. L. 125–131. Autograph.
Kaganovich. Molotov. Voroshilov and other members of the PB.
The main shortcoming in the work of the governing bodies in agriculture (higher and lower) consists ( at the present moment) in organizational gaps . Defects in the organization of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, defects in the organization of the Tractor Center and MTS, defects in the training of personnel for the MTS and state farms, defects in the alignment of forces, the uselessness of the Kolkhoztsentr and its local bodies—such are organizational gaps. Many people think that the organizational question is a trifling question. This is a gross mistake. After the correct line has already been worked out, the organizational question is the decisive question, since the organizational question means putting into practice, fulfilling the requirements of the correct line.
How to resolve - eliminate this discrepancy between the presence of the correct line and the absence of its correct organizational resolution?
Necessary:
1. Separate the grain and livestock farms from the NKZem into a separate people's commissariat, and leave the work of the collective farm as the main one to the People's Commissariat of Agriculture.
2. Differentiate the Tractor Center and MTS according to the main crops (grain, cotton, sugar beet, flax, etc.) and make the skilled workers of the MTS permanent salaried workers.
3. Strengthen the role of the regional bodies of the MTS and ensure real control over them by the regional committees 1 .
4. To ensure that the heads of the MTS are not only technicians (who know tractors and agricultural machines), but also agronomists and politicians - social activists who know how to deal with the "muzhik" like real Bolsheviks. For what:
a) transform "Sverdlovka" and the regional komvuzs, which now give us "know-it-alls" we don't need, into an agricultural school of a new type , capable of giving us completely modern and economically savvy chiefs of the MTS, secretaries of district committees, foremen , heads of departments of grain farms and farms of collective farms and livestock farms;
b) determine the capacity of these agricultural schools (Moscow and regional ones) at 15-20 thousand students, and enroll the latter among foremen, assistant chiefs of the MTS, chief employees of district committees and riks, employees of collective farm centers, etc .;
c) to organize these schools as three-year schools for the secretaries of district committees and foremen (with a broader political program) and as two-year schools for the rest , plus six months of preparatory courses for the semi-literate (i.e., two and a half years) 2 .
5. Destroy the system of collective farm centers from top to bottom, as a system no longer needed, and transfer its workers to the bodies of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture and the new state farm people's commissariat, making the district committees, riks, MTS and ray[zo] 3 the main organizational levers of influence on the village .
6. Organize sensible and fully qualified briefings at both people's commissariats for agriculture (in all branches of the latter).
While all. Hey!
5/VIII - 32.
I. Stalin.
PS Comrade Yakovlev visited me and he is familiar with this letter. He also spoke on a number of issues, about which he will inform you orally. I. St. four
____________________________
On October 1, 1932, the PB adopted a decision to separate grain and livestock state farms from the People's Commissariat of Agriculture and organize the People's Commissariat of Grain and Livestock State Farms of the USSR. The People's Commissariat of Agriculture and the entire system of land authorities were instructed to focus "mainly on the maintenance and management of collective farms." The resolution provided for the reorganization of the Tractor Center, forming a number of branch specialized tractor centers in the People's Commissariat of Agriculture (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 902. L. 9). Stalin's proposals were finalized in January 1933, when the political departments of the MTS were created.
2 These proposals of Stalin were largely implemented in the resolution of the Central Committee of September 21, 1932 "On the organization of higher communist agricultural schools" (CPSU in resolutions ... T. 5. S. 418-420).
3 The collective farm center, republican, regional and district collective farm unions were liquidated by the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of November 29, 1932 (GA RF. F. R-5446. Op. 57. D. 21. L. 97).
4 Signatures of Voroshilov and Rudzutak on the first page.
Kaganovich to Stalin August 5 [1932]Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 740. L. 122–148. Autograph.
5/VIII
Hello, dear Comrade Stalin!
1) Today we drew up a draft decree on the fight against speculation. It came out short with us, but in the end the matter is in the essence, and the essence is expressed in accordance with your instructions.
The OGPU letter (attached) is longer, but it seems to be generally acceptable. It is not harmful for the Chekists if they are explained in more detail, so that there are no excesses. Please let me know your opinion.
2) Karahan agreed with Hirota on an agreement on the fishing issue. We have exchanged views and consider this agreement acceptable, it basically corresponds to the decisions of the PB taken in your presence. However, in view of the importance of the issue, I am sending you a draft agreement and awaiting your response.
3) Barlow is still clinging to contact with us and intends (as can be seen from the attached note) to prepare for us in America drawings of his invention, keep in touch with Bogdanov and receive money from us to cover his expenses. At the same time, he wants to find out what we have in this area under the guise of presenting us with drawings of his bombs. Apparently, he is quite an experienced scout. We believe that he should be politely dismissed altogether and his drawings should be abandoned, which he will not hand over to us in America anyway, as if we can believe that Roosevelt will protect him, and he will be able to prepare a military invention in America for another country. It goes without saying that we will not give him any information about the bombs. Please let us know your opinion.
4) The Central Committee of Armenia asks to allow them to let 350 families of Armenian refugees from France and Bulgaria into Armenia (last year, 6,500 people were accepted by the permission of the Central Committee's PB). At the PB, we had some for, some against, the question was postponed. How do you look at this case?
5) Today we received your telegram about the size of the sown area for winter sowing. I missed writing to you that the area of the collective farms is not expanding in terms of grain, but is expanding by 700 thousand [thousand] in terms of technical ones, transferred from spring to autumn (sunflower, etc.). Perhaps, in addition to this, they should be given another 500 thousand hectares of grain. We will resolve this upon receipt of your response to our telegram.
6) Briefly about our Moscow affairs:
a) Sowing went well with us, the entire area increased by 10%, they were afraid that it would not be feasible for oats, but nevertheless they increased the area by 80 thousand [thousand] hectares, for flax by 30 thousand [thousand] hectares. The harvest was not bad, almost the same as last year, although some reduction in rye will be due to hail. The harvesting campaign has already begun, 77% of winter crops and 25% of spring crops have already been harvested, flax picking is going well. Harvesting is going badly on state farms because of the poor organization of work and the lack of draft power, but the main thing is the shortcomings of the work. Our state farms generally do not work well, this must be admitted. They are small and scattered across different organizations. We think that it would be better if we attach a significant part of the state farms to enterprises and to large industrial centers, especially to the mountains. Moscow. It is necessary to ensure that the Moscow Council would also deal with agriculture. affairs, would have state farms both around the city and in the region. If we have achieved that Moscow is almost entirely supplied with potatoes and vegetables at the expense of the Moscow region, then we must also ensure that milk, butter, eggs, chickens, rabbits, mushrooms, berries, etc. Moscow provided for itself at least partly. In this direction, we are now developing a lot of work. After you rightly reproached some 1st secretaries and clearly hinted at others to do more farming in their regions, and I delved deeper into these matters, and although we have a grain procurement plan small, but concretely distributing by districts, you study the district as a whole with all its features to a greater extent. As regards the collective farms, at the last plenum of the Moscow Committee, along with the questions of harvesting and procurement, we discussed all the specific questions of the collective farms. In our area, the improvement of business depends most of all on the subjective factor, on organization, because with draft power, natural conditions, we are more prosperous and more favorable than others. True, we have trade, and its negative aspects may be more acute, but in the end this also depends on our work.
During the last month we have had noticeable exits from the collective farms. As a result of extensive work, and especially as a result of the correct measures taken by us after your letter, we have by now not only suspended the exits, but also returned a significant part of those who left. For example, in one district of Volovskoye, in one village, our workers made an erroneous tactic, they allowed to clean in areas divided between those who left the collective farm, etc., they generally approached liberally, as a result, mass exits from collective farms began throughout the entire district, when we sent representatives of the MK , who found out that a Socialist-Revolutionary-Kulak group was in charge there, when a number of questions were posed to the collective farmers about the return of loans to the state, about the inadmissibility of disorganizing harvesting and the entire economy, the best part of the collective farmers immediately stood out, which led the rest, and the kulak elite turned out to be politically isolated, and ours certainly ensured its isolation in the full sense of the word. Of course, relapses are still possible, but today we have a fairly stable position in our region. We now face a very difficult task, this is cleaning, transporting and harvesting vegetables, there will be a lot of them, we will have to work hard on this matter.
b) As for the municipal economy, it must be said that we are going better than last year, although the plans are far from being fulfilled, as follows:
bb) we are doing better on pavements than in all other sectors of the economy; compared to the last half of the year, we have already completed 2 1/2 times more. The plan was fulfilled by 103%, and for asphalt it is 5 times more than the last half of the year, only 300 t[ys]. sq. meters, 47 streets and lanes, of which 30 are paved. By the end of the year, we hope to have delivered the planned one million sq. m. meters. The old paved streets are poorly maintained, repairs are untimely. I had to press and now the repair turned around. The Daman-Asphalt (dry asphalt) plant has already been completed and will be launched in a few days, then the problem of repairing and asphalting tram tracks will be resolved much easier. In any case, in this matter we are ahead of other industries and within a few years we will eliminate mainly cobblestone “as a class”.
c) in housing construction, we built in the first half of the year 90% of what we built in the entire last year, a total of 200 thousand [thousand] square meters. meters of living space, but this is only 16% of the annual plan, we hope that we will pull it up in the second half of the year, the main reason is, of course, the lack of building materials. The quality of the construction sites themselves is incomparably better, but the architecture and a significant part of the plots are still old, because in a significant part of the construction sites the foundations were laid last year. Nevertheless, this year we will have a number of new houses with decent decoration on prominent streets on Mokhovaya, Sadovaya, Tverskaya, etc. The superstructure of the floors turned out well, however, since many aspired only to build walls and get apartments, they did not take into account the fact that they disfigured the houses, did not finish the superstructure externally, we suspended further spreading of the superstructures and suggested that the trust and supervising organizations concentrate on the design (plastering, etc.). The repair of houses is going better than in the past, the main forces are concentrated on repairs inside the houses, especially now they have firmly taken up the refurbishment of textile dormitories, etc. barracks. We, of course, must put an end to this ugly legacy of the past, we have quite a lot of them (these barracks), but we have set ourselves a combat mission at all costs by the 15th anniversary of finishing this work.
yy) with water this year is better than last year, 32.5 mil. buckets instead of 27 m[m] in the first half of last year, but the pressure is very high, now an additional unit is being installed and this will improve the situation. It is very bad with pipes, the factory built last year supports us. Now a plant for wooden pipes has been launched, and a plant for reinforced concrete pipes is being prepared for commissioning, but this is not for central lines. With your help, before your departure, we received something for the new main conduit, but not much, because we must definitely complete the 7th conduit. The Rublevskaya dam is finished, we can get more water, we just need to mount new units and get a new conduit. The construction of the Istra dam has already begun. Work has finally begun on the Volga-Moscow canal, but the main turn of the work will be next year. The choice of direction is now recognized by all as the best. At the same time, preparations must already be made in the inner-city water basin itself, both in the development of a network of canals, and projects and sites of ports. Recently, we have dealt with these issues in detail and, among other things, came to the conclusion that it is possible to remove the Babiegorod dam without waiting for the end of the canal, i.e. next year, by building a new Prervinskaya dam 3 meters higher than the current one and starting next year through steamship traffic. Now we still managed to raise the Prervinskaya dam by 1.5 meters and the water opposite the Kremlin has risen by one meter, as for steamship traffic, we have already installed 10 piers, the number of steamboats has increased by 10 pieces, in the next 2 months we should get more 25-30. The river has been revived a little, but still very little. I cannot say that all your instructions have been carried out.
As for the embankments, I sent samples of drawings from Comrade Yenukidze, I hope that we will still have time to do something this year.
dd) work on the construction of the Metro has begun, they are going by the mine method, as we decided at PB 1 , along the section from Sokolniki to the Palace of Soviets. Already 21 mines have been laid. In addition to the German and English consultations, we organized a consultation of our professors and engineers. The Germans, of course, spoke in favor of the open method of work, they formed their opinion in advance and did not even go into details, simply declaring that they refused to consider the mine method of work. The British have not yet given an opinion, but, judging by the information, they are in favor of the mine method, the French have arrived and are still studying, our expertise worked conscientiously for 20 days (there were 25 people) and gave their specific opinion on the sites based on the analysis of geological conditions, it basically boils down to the following:
1) the section from Sokolniki to Sverdlov Square - by mine method.
2) from Sverdlov Square to the Palace of Soviets, also a mine with a gradual transition to a shallow foundation.
3) from the Palace of Soviets to Krymskaya Square to build in an open way.
4) to build a section from the Comintern to the Smolensk market in an open way due to the absence of Jurassic clays and the favorableness of the upper layers.
Thus, the majority of those planned in the 1st stage, approximately 2/3 will go by the closed mine method. They did not give a conclusion about the rest, they are waiting for the final geological data.
Rotert at a meeting of consultants said that he agrees with their conclusions, but in fact continues to twist.
We will submit the final proposals to the PB when we receive the conclusions from the British and French. Personally, I think that our Soviet consultation worked through the issue conscientiously and approached the issue in a businesslike manner.
ee) in my last letter I already wrote to you that we have dealt with the question of the general plan of Moscow and the architectural design of houses, squares, and streets. At a meeting of architects, I had to point out the topicality of the issue. I recalled that during the drafting of the resolution of the June plenum of the Central Committee, along with specific issues of improving the city, you proposed setting the task of developing a general plan for Moscow, because it is impossible to rebuild the largest city and rebuild it in a socialist way without a single plan for organizing territories, houses, transport, etc. I must say that the architects revealed a certain narrow-mindedness and passivity, the old ones are still under the influence of the Shestakov and Shchusev plans, and the young ones are in the sky and rush about with projects to build a new Moscow nearby, and leave the current one as a museum for history, this ridiculous nonsense had to be hit, simultaneously sharply criticizing and rejecting Shestakovism. Moscow is exceptionally favorable to the restructuring and improvement of its radial-ring system; it lends itself incomparably more easily to redevelopment than, for example, Paris. In addition, 86% of the houses in Moscow are one and two-story, and if we just do not delay the plan, then we can radically transform it in a planned manner within a certain period of time. If we talk about cutting new territory, then, in the first place, not boundlessly, but in the second, we are not at all obliged to cut evenly in a circular way, but to go along the embankment, as you once pointed out. It is there that we will find favorable conditions in order to give the population a good place with clean air and plenty of space.
Now my letter has dragged on, I will not spread it any longer, if I manage to edit the transcript, I will send it to you.
This planning work, like the study of the question, has to be done in fits and starts, but I want to finish it, so that if I had to move, then finish this general plan, submit it to the Central Committee and complete a certain cycle of work. This should probably end now. I can only tell you, comrade Stalin, that we have firmly taken up the markets of the city, we are building a covered market on Arbatskaya Square, we have increased the number of markets, bringing them to 44 markets, now we are streamlining them, asphalting them, etc. There have been more products on the market lately.
Greetings to you. Your L. Kaganovich.
PS I am sending you a new letter from Neiman recently received from Comrade Pyatnitsky . L. Kaganovich.
____________________________
1 We are talking about the decision of the PB of May 23, 1932 “On projects and estimates for the construction of the subway” (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 885. L. 4).
2 The letter is missing.
Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov August 6, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 78. L. 128. Autograph.
Nr 77. If Reventlov seeks a meeting with Litvinov, he must agree to a meeting.
Stalin 1 .
No. 79.
6/VIII.32 2
_____________________________
1 Sent in code on August 6 from Sochi at 13:00. 50 min. marked "immediately" (Ibid. L. 127). On the same day, the PB decision was drawn up (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 13. L. 55).
2 Date and number entered by the secretary.
Stalin to Kaganovich, Molotov August 6, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 78. L. 131. Autograph.
HP 76. It would be good to add 500,000 hectares of grain to the collective farms for the winter season.
Stalin.
No. 80
6/VIII.32. 1
_____________________________
1 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 23:00. 10 minutes. (Ibid. L. 130). The next day, August 7, 1932, the PB accepted Stalin's proposal (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 895. L. 14).
Kaganovich to Stalin August 7, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 78. L. 134. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
In. No. 76.
Tov. Stalin.
The League of Nations officially applied to the NKID with a request to allow members of the Lytton Commission to transit through the USSR.
We believe transit visas can be allowed. Please let me know your opinion 1 . HP 78.
Kaganovich.
7/VIII-32
_______________________
On August 1 , 8, Stalin agreed (Ibid.). The PB formalized the decision by poll on August 9 (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 13. L. 63).
Stalin to Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Molotov August 7, 1932
Stalin to Kaganovich August 8, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 99. L. 132–137. Autograph.
Hello Comrade Voroshilov , Comrade Kaganovich and Comrade Molotov !
I had Yenukidze.
1. I agree with you that it is better to build the banks of the Moscow River obliquely.
2. Yenukidze says that the experts have accepted the installation for deep tunneling through the subway. If this is correct, congratulations.
3. Of all the plans of the "Palace of the Soviets" Iofan's plan 1 is the best. Zholtovsky's project looks like Noah's Ark. Shchusev's project is the same "Cathedral of Christ the Savior", but without the cross ("for now"). It is possible that Shchusev hopes to “complete” with a cross later . It would be necessary ( in my opinion ) to oblige Iofan: a) not to separate the small hall from the large one, but to combine them according to the instructions of the government; b) arrange the top of the "Palace" by continuing it upwards in the form of a high column (I mean a column of the same shape that Iofan had in his first project); c) put a hammer and sickle over the column, illuminated from the inside with electricity; d) if for technical reasons it is impossible to raise the column above the "Palace", - put the column near (near) the "Palace", if possible, as high as the Eiffel Tower, or a little higher; e) in front of the "Palace" to put three monuments (to Marx, Engels, Lenin).
4. I am depressed by the thought that because of me Molotov's vacation is spoiled or can be spoiled (what time?). Let Molotov go on vacation immediately . I will be in Moscow soon, very soon. This is my decision regardless .
Greetings! I. Stalin.
7/III-32.
PS I have just received a letter from Kaganovich and Molotov.
1) As for the decree on industry (organizational question), I will answer tomorrow (on acquaintance with the draft decree). On other questions I will also answer Molotov.
2) I will answer tomorrow about the draft decree on speculation (upon acquaintance).
3) About the agreement with Hirota - also.
4) I would not advise simply and "politely" escorting Barlow out of the USSR. All bourgeois foreign specialists are or can be intelligence officers. But this does not mean that they should be "politely" escorted out. No, it doesn't! I advise you: do not break ties with Barlow, be attentive to him, give him some money, take drawings, but do not show him your achievements (you can say that we are backward people and are ready to learn from Barlow, of course - of course! - for money).
For other questions - later (the courier hurries). Art. 3
_______________________
On June 5, 1931, the PB decided to build the Palace of Soviets on the site of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow. The Palace of Soviets provided for the construction of two halls - for 12-15 and 4-5 thousand people (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 828. L. 17).
On August 12, 1932, the PB granted Molotov leave from August 14 for a month and a half (Ibid. Op. 162. D. 13. L. 63).
3 Voroshilov's signature on the first sheet.
Stalin to Kaganovich August 8, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 99. L. 139–142. Autograph.
Hello, Comrade Kaganovich!
1. I read Neumann's letters. It is clear that he has a group and he is doing factional work. He needs to be held accountable. For the first time, in my opinion, you can limit yourself to a serious warning and removing him from the post of PB candidate.
2. Decree "on the fight against speculation" I return with amendments. Menzhinsky's directive is acceptable (albeit a long one).
3. I can only say one thing about the agreement with the Japanese on fish: it must be accepted .
4. Armenians can be allowed to resettle 2 .
5. Things in Moscow are apparently going well for you. This is very good.
6. The draft resolution "On the organization of industrial management" (sent for review by Molotov), in my opinion, is not suitable. Wrote about this to Molotov 3 .
Hey! I. Stalin
8/VIII 32.
PS I'll be in Moscow soon. I. St.
7. First, Menzhinsky's directive should be sent to the OGPU PP and members of the Central Committee (in a copy), and then, say, in 8-10 days, a decree on combating speculation should be published. In directive. Menzhinsky should be mentioned that in 8-10 days a decree on the fight against speculation will be published, in pursuance of which the order of the OGPU 4 is given . I. St.
______________________________
On August 10, 1932, the PB decided to sign a draft fishing agreement with Japan proposed by L.M. Karakhan (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 13. L. 63). The agreement on fishing issues was signed by Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs L.M. Karakhan and Japanese Ambassador to the USSR Hirota on August 13, 1932 (DVP. T. XV. C. 469-471).
On August 16, 1932, the PB accepted the proposals of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to allow the arrival of Armenian refugees "on condition that they renounce foreign citizenship" (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 13. L. 60).
3 On May 8, 1932, the question of the organization of industrial management was instructed to consider a commission chaired by Molotoi, which also included Stalin (Ibid. Op. 3. D. 883. L. 2). In early August, the draft resolution was ready. Having sent it to Stalin, Molotov on August 8 (without waiting for Stalin's answer) submitted the draft for consideration by the PB. The PB approved the draft resolution on the organization of the management of the industry of union subordination and instructed Molotov to prepare its final version. However, on the same day, August 8, 1932, Stalin criticized the project in a letter to Molotov: “The draft resolution “ On the organization of industrial management”. I don't think it fits. It is too general and generic. Schematic and nonspecific. The question of the organization of the ebsha is crumpled, but it is an important question and stands differently for different industries. The issue of supplying enterprises (distribution of metal, building materialsetc.) is also crumpled and handed over to the NKTyazh. We can no longer allow the NKTyazh to distribute (supply!) metal, building materials, and so on. at your discretion. I am afraid that if such a decree is issued, we will slow down the work of industry for at least half a year, since the respected "Bolsheviks" will abandon the matter and spend all their energy on the matter of endless transplanting from place to place. Wouldn't it be better to go through each branch separately, in passing determining the staff of each trust and the number of workers transferred from the liquidated association to the enterprises. Is it possible to postpone this matter until the fall” (Ibid., F. 82, op. 2, d.
On August 13, 1932, the PB, at the suggestion of Kaganovich, decided to approve the decree on the fight against speculation and publish it on August 23, and take note of Menzhinsky's letter to the OGPU organs on the fight against speculation and send a copy of it to all members of the Central Committee (Ibid. F. 17 List 3, file 896, sheet 13).Kaganovich to Stalin August 9, 1932
Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 78. L. 137. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
In. No. 78.
Tov. Stalin.
Since Hirota has to travel to Tokyo and is in a hurry to sign the fish agreement, please telegraph your opinion on the agreement. HP 80.
Kaganovich.
9/VIII-32
Stalin to Kaganovich August 9, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 78. L. 137 Autograph.
HP 80. Will have to sign an agreement with the Japanese.
Stalin.
No. 82
9/VIII. 32 year 1
________________________
1 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 22:00. 7 min. (Ibid. L. 136).
Kaganovich to Stalin August 9, 1932Archive: Personal archive of M.L. Kaganovich.
August 9th, 1932
Hello, dear Comrade Stalin!
1) The decree has already been published and made a very strong and good impression. In Moscow, we launched a great deal of work to explain its meaning. Most of the workers perceive it very well, not to mention the Communists, there are also those who interpret this decree in an opportunistic way, in particular, they find fault with the word "sacred".
Today, in a speech at the MK, I ridiculed them, these chicaners. Lenin used this term "sacred". Even Dahl explains this word in the following way: "Treasured, indestructible", but in essence this formulation sets off even more clearly the fundamental difference between our slogan and the slogan of the bourgeoisie.
2) In general, the mood of the workers is not bad. It doesn't matter only for textiles who are now returning from vacation from the countryside. We mobilized the organization, launched explanatory work. Opposition elements, both right-wing and Trotskyists, revived a little. We are thinking one of these days of seizing and deporting a group of active Trotskyists. The Rights are more cautious organizationally, but they are undoubtedly doing the work. In a short time we will receive more detailed data. The other day we held a party day on issues of agriculture, where we developed the main issues of our policy and practice. Simultaneously exposing right-wing and Trotskyist sentiments.
3) Yesterday at the PB the question of an anti-war congress was discussed, and a commission was set up . Prior to the decision would like to receive your guidance. Apparently, it will be necessary to send a couple of big people from us to this congress, otherwise it may turn out to be pacifist rubbish. Gorky nominates Bukharin. I think that this is not good, especially since he was a Comintern worker. The question is also about Gorky himself. He himself refuses, it seems to me that he is not averse to going. What do you think, if Lunacharsky or Radek were to be sent? Please telegraph.
4) We discussed the plan for the use of forage crops, but we postponed the issue. It is very important to get your opinion before making a decision. I am sending you a note.
5) We have not resolved the issue regarding diesel locomotives, we only accepted that Orsk is the base of diesel locomotive construction, but for now, construction should be deployed at the Kolomna plant. Since you were especially interested in this issue, I ask you to read the note and write your opinion 2 .
6) On the 15th the plenum of the ECCI is to open, the theses have been sent to you. I beg you to write your opinion, what you can advise them.
7) Over the past two days, we have had a lot of fires - in peat mines, forests and in the city of Moscow in 4 places, barracks at factories, including at the Ball Bearing, we managed to defend the plant.
We have now taken a number of vigorous measures. Wreckage is not ruled out, but regardless of this, a number of major defects in the fire department have been discovered, which we are now eliminating 3 . Our weather is very bad right now. Dryness and winds are unprecedented, but, unfortunately, we cannot eliminate this.
I'll end with this. Greetings. Your. L. Kaganovich.
______________________
1On August 8, 1932, the PB instructed a commission composed of V.M. Molotov, L.M. Kaganovich, O.A. Pyatnitsky, A.I. Stetsky and A.M. Gorky to discuss the issue of an anti-war congress and submit their proposals to the PB (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 895. L. 2, 3) . After Stalin's telegram on August 13, the PB made a decision: “In view of the importance of the anti-war congress, send a delegation of 8 people consisting of comrades. Gorky, Radek, Lunacharsky, Shvernik, Stasova and three professional workers, including 2 women [...] To appoint comrade Gorky A.M. as the Chairman of the delegation. [...] Instruct Comrade Pyatnitsky to organize the development and consideration by the delegation of the draft program of work, speeches, etc., sending it to the members of the Politburo ”(Ibid. D. 896. L. 12, 13). The congress opened in Amsterdam on August 17, 1932. However, Gorky and Shvernik were denied visas (San EH The Twilight of Comintern, 1930–1935 London and Basingstoke, 1982, pp. 387–389).
2 The draft resolution "On diesel locomotives" was considered at the PB on August 8, 1932 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 895. L. 2, 3).
On July 23, 1932, Akulov and Pyatakov reported at the PB on the state of the fire protection of the industry of the USSR (Ibid. D. 893. L. 5). On August 8, 1932, based on the report of Kaganovich, the PB adopted a resolution: “a) Recognize the need to issue a special resolution of the STO on the issue of fighting fires [...] b) Instruct the STO to outline practical measures and report to the Politburo, c) Allow local organizations to use military forces to extinguish fires [...]” (Ibid. D. 895. L. 10). On August 10, the PB approved a draft resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "On fire-fighting measures" (Ibid. D. 896. L. 10, 27).
Stalin to Kaganovich August 11, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 99. L. 144–151. Autograph.
Hello, Comrade Kaganovich !
Letter dated 9/VIII received.
1) The Decree on the Protection of Public Property is, of course, good and will soon take effect. Also good and timely is the decree against speculators (soon to be issued). But all this is not enough. It is also necessary to issue a special letter-directive from the Central Committee to the party and judicial punitive organizations on the meaning of these decrees and the methods of carrying them out. This is absolutely necessary. Tell who should prepare a draft of such a letter. I'll be in Moscow soon and look through 1 .
2) We will talk about questions about the ECCI plenum, the use of grain forage crops and diesel locomotives upon arrival in Moscow.
3) The most important thing now is Ukraine. Things in Ukraine are bad. Bad on the party line. They say that in two regions of Ukraine (I think, in Kiev and Dnepropetrovsk) about 50 district committees spoke out against the grain procurement plan, recognizing it as unrealistic. In other district committees, the situation, they say, is no better. What does it look like? This is not a party, but a parliament, a caricature of the parliament. Instead of leading the districts, Kosior constantly maneuvered between the directives of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the requirements of the district committees, and now - he got to the point. Lenin correctly said that a person who does not have the courage to go against the current at the right moment cannot be a real Bolshevik leader. Badlyalong the Soviet line. Chubar is not a leader. Bad on the line of the GPU. Redens is not up to leading the fight against the counter-revolution in such a large and unique republic as the Ukraine.
If we don't get down to righting the situation in Ukraine now, we may lose Ukraine. Keep in mind that Pilsudski is on the alert, and his agents in Ukraine are many times stronger than Redens or Kosior think. Keep in mind also that the Ukrainian Communist Party (500,000 members, hehe) has quite a few (yes, not a few!) rotten elements, conscious and unconscious Petliurists, and, finally, direct agents of Pilsudski. As soon as things get worse, these elements will not hesitate to open a front within (and outside) the Party, against the Party. The worst thing is that the Ukrainian elite does not see these dangers.
It cannot go on like this.
Need to:
a) take Kosior from Ukraine and replace him with you, leaving you as secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks;
b) following this, transfer Balitsky to Ukraine to the post of representative of the Ukrainian GPU (or PP of Ukraine, since the position of representative of the GPU of Ukraine does not seem to exist) leaving him as deputy chairman of the OGPU, and make Redens Balitsky's deputy for Ukraine;
c) a few months after that, replace Chubar with another comrade, say Grinko or someone else, and make Chubar Molotov's deputy in Moscow (Kosior can be made one of the secretaries of the Central Committee of the CPSU);
d) Set yourself the goal of turning the Ukraine in the shortest possible time into a real fortress of the USSR, into a truly exemplary republic. Do not spare money for this.
Without these and similar measures (the economic and political strengthening of Ukraine, in the first place, its border regions, etc.), I repeat, we may lose Ukraine.
What do you think about this?
This matter must be tackled as soon as possible—immediately upon arrival in Moscow 2 .
Greetings! I. Stalin.
11/VIII-32
PS As for Balitsky and Redens, I have already spoken with Menzhinsky. He agrees and welcomes this matter in every possible way 3 .
________________________
Stalin himself was already involved in the preparation of this document after returning to Moscow. On September 1, 1932, at a meeting of the PB, at the suggestion of Stalin, a commission was created under the leadership of the deputy chairman of the OGPU Akulov, which was instructed to "consider specific instructions for the implementation of the decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on the protection of public property both through the OGPU and through the judicial and prosecutor's office” (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 898. L. 1). On September 8, the draft instruction prepared by the commission was basically approved by the PB. The final version of the document (taking into account the exchange of opinions at the meeting of the PB) was entrusted to the commission by Akulov and Stalin (Ibid. D. 899. L. 2). Finally, the instruction "on the application of the resolution of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated 7 / VIII - 32 on the protection of property of state enterprises, collective farms and cooperation and strengthening public (socialist) property” was approved on September 16. It determined the crimes that fell under the law of August 7, established the categories of robbers and the penalties for each of them, the procedure for considering cases, the timing of the investigation, etc. One of the objectives of the instruction was to soften the extremely harsh (and therefore difficult to enforce) sanctions of the 7 August law. In particular, executions were ordered to be used for systematic theft, but not for petty theft of socialist property (Ibid. D. 900. L. 33-33v). The instruction also contained a top secret part, which was classified as a “special folder”, which provided for a simplified procedure for approving sentences to death (Stalin's Politburo in the 30s. M., 1995. S. 61–62).
2 See the introduction to the section for details.
3 This proposal of Stalin was carried out gradually. In November 1932, V.A. Balitsky was appointed special representative of the OGPU in Ukraine (S.F. Redens remained the head of the GPU of Ukraine). In February 1933, Balitsky officially replaced Redens as chairman of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR, plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU in Ukraine (Shapoval Yu., Prystaiko V, Zolotarev V. Cheka - GPU - NKVD in Ukraine. Kyiv, 1997. S. 47–48, 436 ).
Stalin to Kaganovich August 12, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 78. L. 140. Autograph.
Cipher.
Kaganovich .
The anti-war congress is a very important matter. I advise you to send a delegation of seven people, including Gorky, Radek, Lunacharsky, Shvernik, Stasova and two women from the trade unions, who are intelligent and know one of the European languages. Women are needed in the delegation. It would be inappropriate to include Gorky and Bukharin as chairman of the delegation as the recent leader of the Comintern. Explain this to Gorky and Bukharin.
Stalin.
No. 83.
12/8–32 1
______________________
1 Number and date entered by the secretary. On the same day sent in cipher at 15 o'clock. 54 min. (Ibid. L. 139).
Kaganovich to Stalin August 12, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 78. L. 142. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
In. No. 80.
Tov. Stalin.
Slavutsky reports that in connection with the negotiations on the transshipment pier, Manchzhuguo agrees to return the pier to the actual use of the CER, however, insists on concluding an agreement that will give them the opportunity to interpret that the contract recognizes the ownership of the Manchzhugo pier. This compromise is reportedly proposed by … 1 from Japan.
We think to inform Slavutsky that this compromise is acceptable if the agreement is concluded for 3-5 years, and to require him to send the final text for consideration and approval. Please let me know your opinion 2 . HP 82.
Kaganovich.
12/VIII - 32
_________________
1 Refine the document. In the surviving issue of the document there is the word “according to instructions” (Ibid. L. 143).
2 The next day, Stalin agreed (Ibid.). The PB issued a corresponding decision on August 13, 1932 (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 13. L.
Stalin to Kaganovich August 12, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 99. L. 153–155. Autograph.
Hello, Comrade Kaganovich!
1. The letter about Ukraine must have already been received. Please keep the details of the plan outlined in the letter secret for the time being.
2. Representatives of the city of Poti (Georgia) are asking for three or four buses. Molotov, it turns out, promised them five buses, but he could not fulfill the promise due to the fact that Moscow (yes, Moscow!) intercepted (over-re-captured!) the entire reserve of buses. Give up a few pieces.
3. Beria makes a good impression 1 . A good organizer, businesslike, capable worker. Looking closely at the Transcaucasian affairs, I am becoming more and more convinced that in the matter of selecting people, Sergo is an incorrigible bungler. Sergo defended Mamulia's candidacy for the post of secretary of the Central Committee of Georgia, but it is now obvious (even for the blind) that Mamulia is not worth Beria's left foot. I think that Orakhelashvili will have to be released (he insistently asks for it). Although Beria is not a member (and not even a candidate) of the Central Committee, he will still have to be nominated for the post of first secretary of the Zakkraykom 2 . Polonsky (his candidacy) is not suitable, since he does not speak any of the local languages.
Greetings! I. Stalin. 12/VIII - 32.
_________________
1 July 13, 1932 L.P. Beria wrote to Kaganovich: “I visited Comrade Koba twice and had the opportunity to inform him in detail about our affairs” (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 120. D. 75. L. 15).
On October 29, 1932, the PB granted “comrade Orakhelashvili’s request to release him from the duties of the first secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee” and appointed Beria as the first secretary, leaving him the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia (Ibid. Op. 3. D. 903. L. 8).
Stalin to Kaganovich August 14, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 78. L. 145, 145v. Autograph.
Cipher
Kaganovich.
I learned about the arrest and exclusion from the party of the head of the armored forces of the Belarusian district Korneev. He is accused of murdering a thief - a collective farmer who climbed into his house at night for robbery. I know Korneev as a good party member and an excellent commander, who has great services to the republic. I do not allow him to allow himself hooliganism and arbitrariness. It seems to me that they were too hasty with the arrest and expulsion from the party. I'm afraid that Aronshtam wants to distinguish himself in this matter. I ask you to request materials and transfer the case to the Central Committee for analysis with my participation.
Stalin.
No. 85.
14/VIII.32
Stalin to Kaganovich August 14, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 79. L. 2–3. Autograph.
Kaganovich.
I consider it unacceptable that the state is spending hundreds of millions on organizing MTS to serve the collective farms, and yet it still does not know how much the peasantry is paying it for MTS services. Are the MTS unprofitable or profitable, how much grain and other products does the state receive from the collective farms for the work of the MTS, how much did it receive last year, how much will it receive this year? The tractor center adds up its income to the amount of grain harvested on the collective farms and shows us the total figure as the sum of the grain harvested. But this is wrong and unacceptable. The only correct method is to separate the revenues of the MTS from the grain harvested on the collective farms and give them periodically a separate summary. I have already spoken with Yakovlev about this. Without this, MTS from state-owned enterprises reporting to the state, become an almshouse or a means for the systematic deception of the state. MTS should not be allowed to operate uncontrollably.
Stalin.
#86
14/VIII.32
Kaganovich to Stalin August 14, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 79. L. 5. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
In. No. 82.
Tov. Stalin.
In connection with the flooding in Harbin, the Four 1 offer to donate 20 thousand days from the Red Cross in favor of the affected population. We think we can agree with this. Please let me know your opinion 2 . No. 84.
Kaganovich.
14/VIII-32
_____________________________
1 This is how the Consul General in Harbin and the leaders of the CER signed their messages to Moscow (See, for example, DVP. Vol. XV. P. 295).
2 Stalin answered on June 15 at 0000 hours. 50 min.: “I agree. It was possible to give more” (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 79. L. 4).
Kaganovich to Stalin August 14 [1932]Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 740. L. 149–152. Autograph.
14/VIII
Hello, Dear Comrade Stalin!
In two days the plenum of the ECCI opens. Today we did not have time to convey with Molotov a summary of the contents of the theses "On the international situation and tasks of the Comintern." Abstracts were not distributed to the members of the plenum. I am sending you this document by plane in order to have time to receive a telegraphic reply from you before the opening of the plenum. T. Molotov will be able to inform you verbally.
2) I am sending Brandler's letter 1 addressed directly to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, although he begins sweetly with "dear comrades" and ends with "communist greetings", but the letter is filled with opportunistic poison and betrayal.
3) Dovgalevsky informs (as you will see in detail from the ciphers sent) that the French government is ready to sign the pact with some amendments, firstly, and when signing with Romania, secondly. The amendments, apparently, are not very significant, but is it worth it for us to enter into a discussion of the amendments in essence, since they are connected with Romania. Wouldn't it be better to start on Rumania at once. Are Leger's proposals acceptable to us (see cipher), I beg you, by telegraph on the 16th, to communicate your opinion 2 .
4) Troyanovsky has been sending disturbing telegrams in recent days, in particular, he sharply raises the question of Asatkin, i.e. about removing it. I think that we could agree to the removal of Asatkin. If you agree, we will find a replacement candidate and telegraph you.
5) I would like to send you the finalized control figures of the export-import plan for 1933, but next time.
Greetings to you.
Your L. Kaganovich.
PS About Korneev sent you a telegram.
_______________________
1 The letter is missing.
2 On the negotiations on the text of the non-aggression pact conducted by V.S. Dovgalevsky and Director of the Department of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Léger, see more details: DVP. T. XV. pp. 462–463, 481–495.
Kaganovich to Stalin August 15, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. P. D. 80. L. 10. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
In. No. 83.
Tov. Stalin.
Korneev was already tried in Smolensk, sentenced to 6 years. Voroshilov believes that it is possible to pardon the CEC without re-considering the case. In any case, Korneev will have to be released now before the whole question is analyzed. The case for exclusion from the party requested the Central Committee. HP 85.
Kaganovich.
15/VIII - 32
Stalin to Kaganovich, Voroshilov August 15, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 79. L. 8, 8v. 9v. Autograph.
Kaganovich. Voroshilov .
I do not agree with Voroshilov in assessing the Korneev case. Korneev must be immediately released and given a proper job in another district, for example, in Moscow. Korneev had the right to shoot hooligans who climbed up to him at night. It is not good and ugly on the part of the authorities to defend hooligans against an honest and devoted commander. I propose to find out: the first, who ordered the arrest of Korneev, the second, who proposed expulsion from the party, the third, in what the Revolutionary Military Council showed concern for its commander, who was attacked by thieves and hooligans. I propose to immediately restore the party position of Korneev. I insist on my proposals, because I think that it is necessary to finally shed light on this dark matter. Please, consider the case to coincide with my arrival.
Stalin 1 .
No. 88.
15/VIII.32. 2
_______________________
1Stalin responds to Voroshilov's cipher: “Comrade. Stalin. In response to your telegram Comrade. I inform Kaganovich about Korneev. Three seasonal workers - young guys (15 - 18 years old) at eleven o'clock at night climbed into the garden where Korneev lodged, for apples. Hearing a rustle, Korneev went into the garden and found no one. When he was already entering the house back, the guys rushed to run away from the garden and, according to Korneev, began to scold him. Korneev ran out the gate, grabbed one by the collar and, according to Korneev, wanted to take him to the police. When the captured man rushed to run, Korneev opened fire, after which he returned to the apartment, believing that the guys had fled. In the morning, under the fence, a few steps away, the corpse of an eighteen-year-old guy was found and another guy was wounded - both seasonal workers. This was reported to me and I, having made inquiries on the merits of what had happened and taking into account that the case was outrageously wild, he ordered that Korneev be put on trial. Aronshtam did not take part in this matter. On August 11, Korneev was tried in Smolensk and sentenced to 6 years in prison. Korneev pleaded guilty and did not protest the verdict, although, from my point of view, the verdict is unnecessarily harsh and unfair. Korneev said that he would ask for pardon, which was also requested by the military commander Lapin. Conclusions: first, Korneev should have been put on trial, because. among other things, the case received wide publicity. Secondly, it makes no sense to keep Korneev in prison, and therefore the request for pardon will need to be granted and Korneev released after a while. Third, the question of Korneev's party position should be discussed in the Central Committee after his release, in the future, to send Korneev to the Far East or Turkestan for work. HP 86. Voroshilov. 15/VTII - 32" (Ibid. L. 8–9).
2 Number and date entered by the secretary.
Kaganovich to Stalin August 16, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 79. L. 13. Certified typewritten copy.
Cipher. Top secret.
Copy .
Telegram.
Sochi. Stalin.
I am announcing the Politburo resolution adopted today on Korneev:
“Consider it wrong to expel Comrade Korneev from the Party, reinstate him as a member of the Party.
Instruct t.t. Postyshev and Gamarnik to get acquainted with all court materials and report to the Politburo.
Release Korneev immediately" 1 .
No. П112/22/С.
Kaganovich.
16.VIII. 32
No. 88/1484/sh.
__________________________
1 Resolution PB see: RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 896. L. 14. On September 1, 1932, Postyshev, already in the presence of Stalin, reported to the PB about this case, and the PB approved the release of Korneev from prison and his reinstatement in the party. It proposed to the Supreme Court of the RSFSR to reconsider the case "in the sense of imposing a suspended sentence on him." Voroshilov at a meeting of the PB made a statement that he was using Korneev for military work outside the Belorussian district (Ibid. D. 898. L. 5).
Stalin, Molotov - Kaganovich August 16, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 79. L. 18–20. Molotov's autograph.
Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Kaganovich .
1. The theses of the ECCI on the current situation are in the main acceptable, but they need to be revised in the spirit of greater concretization of the revolutionary tasks for the countries. We advise you to raise the question of the situation in the Far East, Japan's war against China, and the threat of war against the USSR as a separate issue. In the theses on this question, we advise you to criticize the corresponding resolution of the Second International, to expose the shortcomings of the European Communist Parties that have failed to prevent the export of weapons to Japan, and to outline the specific tasks of the Communist Parties of Japan, China, the USSR, and especially the European and American Communist Parties in organizing action committees, port and transport committees to disorganize the export of weapons. As speaker on this issue, we propose the Japanese Katayama or another reputable Japanese comrade.
2. On the question of France and Rumania, we propose that Litvinov's opinion be sought and only after that the question be settled. If you find it necessary to ask us, send Litvinov's opinion beforehand.
3. Asatkin can be recalled 1 . Stalin, Molotov. 16/8–32
№90 2
______________ __________
On August 17, 1932, the PB released A.N. Asatkin from the post of trade representative in Japan (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 897. L. 11).
2 Number and date entered by the secretary. Sent in code from Sochi at 0:00. 8 min. (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 79. L. 17).
Stalin, Molotov - Kaganovich August 16, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 79. L. 22. Stalin's autograph.
Kaganovich for the Politburo.
In view of the difficult situation in the Ukraine, we consider it absolutely necessary to urgently involve troops in both harvesting and weeding work .
Stalin, Molotov.
#91
16/8–32 2
_____________________________
1 On August 17, 1932, the PB recognized the need to increase the number of troops in Ukraine engaged in harvesting and weeding. Postyshev was instructed to find out how many troops were needed for harvesting and weeding, and to coordinate this issue with Voroshilov (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 13. L. 76).
2 Number and date entered by the secretary. Sent in code from Sochi on August 17 at 2 o'clock. 10 minutes. (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 79. L. 21).
Stalin to Kaganovich August 16, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 79. L. 24. Autograph of S. Chechulin.
Kaganovich.
I think that the time has come when it is necessary to announce to the Ukrainians about the reduction of the grain procurement plan. Call Kosior and tell him. The shortening of the plan must be carried out in the spirit in which I wrote to you at the time.
Stalin.
#92
16/8–32 1
______________________________
1 Sent in code from Sochi on August 17 at 1 o'clock. 21 min. (Ibid. L. 23).
Kaganovich to Stalin August 16, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 79. L. 26. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
In. No. 87.
Tov. Stalin.
Today, the following draft resolution of the People's Commissariat of Labor, introduced by Yakovlev, was discussed: “To establish in rural areas (regional centers and villages) for all Soviet, collective farm, economic and public enterprises and institutions, in relation to the conditions existing in rural areas, a discontinuous seven-day week with a single day off ( Sunday)".
I ask you to communicate your opinion both on the merits and on the question of whether it should be published in the newspapers 1 . HP 89.
Kaganovich.
16/VIII - 32
______________________
1 Stalin replied on August 17: “ To Kaganovich. HP 89 agrees. It should not be published in newspapers” (ibid.). On the same day, the PB approved the draft resolution without publication in the press (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 897. L. 12).
Kaganovich to Stalin August 16 [1932]Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 740. L. 153–160. Autograph.
16/VIII
Hello, dear Comrade Stalin!
1) We believe that it would be better to resolve the issues of reorganization of the NKZem in your presence. Your program of events is absolutely correct. NKZem has been stuck in the original period for too long. Such a huge colossus cannot be covered in a single people's commissariat and in a single tractor center, without differentiating it by industry, by culture. In particular, I consider your suggestion about Sverdlovka and the komvuz in general to be timely. Kultprop is now moonlighting on this matter, and there will be concrete proposals by your arrival. If you think that we can make a number of decisions here now, please write to us.
2) With the decree and the letter of the OGPU on the fight against speculation, they acted as you advised. It will be published on the 23rd, and we have sent Menzhinsky's letter to all members of the Central Committee. Now I am preparing a draft letter to the party and judicial punitive organizations - as you wrote - about the last two decrees. It is difficult to stay within the framework of only these 2 decrees. We will have to touch on general issues, at least in passing.
3) I conveyed your opinion about Neumann to the Cominternists. They, of course, fully agree with the need to give a hand to Neiman and his group, perhaps even that they would like to strike even harder 1 .
4) About Ukrainian affairs:
a) I fully agree with your assessment of the state of affairs in Ukraine. The trouble is that among a part of the activists, the question of grain procurements, their arguments about the impracticability of the plan, have grown into the question of their attitude towards the policy of the Party. Uncertainty, lack of prospects, confusion and the formal fulfillment of "duty" - these are the main bacilli that are now corroding part of the asset, touching the "troshki" 6 (a little) and the top. The theory that we, Ukrainians, are innocent victims, creates solidarity and rotten mutual responsibility not only at the middle level, but also at the top. I believe that regardless of even the organizational conclusions, the moment has come when the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) should officially evaluate and call on the organization for a decisive change in a political document. They do not take the resolution of their conference seriously, considering it partly forced.
Such a political official decision of the Central Committee would correct a significant part of the asset quickly, and would easily facilitate the general correction of the situation in Ukraine.
You are also right in linking the issue with the international situation, with the work of Piłsudski and the extreme danger of such a spontaneous state of party organization and weak ideological militancy with rottenness and unscrupulousness. I myself was sorry to look at the Ukrainian asset, being at their conference.
b) With regard to the question of Kosior's replacement, I agree that he revealed great weaknesses and shortcomings. As leader of the largest organization in the party, he made the task of leadership easier. Can it be fixed? It's harder for me to judge than for you. Maybe if he was taken firmly in [...] (the word is illegible) wrinkled his sides, he might have learned the lessons, but, of course, the situation in Ukraine is now so difficult that there will not be enough time for training.
c) On the question of my person, I can say the following:
having a decent experience in the distribution and placement of personnel, analyzing the state of affairs, I realize that, apparently, there is no other way out. Of course, it will be easier for me to get down to business directly, because I know the country, the economy and the people. True, people are not the same anymore, I left them different, they have deteriorated a little, perhaps they have changed a lot as a result of “softness” and ease of management on the principle of “do not offend” and mutual amnesty. This, by the way, is one of the moments that spoil the mood, to start over again with people in the same Ukraine! But, Comrade Stalin, you have raised the question so broadly and clearly from the point of view of the interests of the Party that there can be no serious hesitations. And finally, you have not only an official political, but also a comradely-moral right to dispose of those whom you have formed as a political figure, i.e. meYour student .
d) I agree with you about the rest of the assumptions, the question may be about timing, but we’ll talk about that personally (about Grinko-Chubar). In particular, I now feel so physically exhausted (desperate headaches) that without rest-treatment it will be difficult for me to move to a new lift of a large load.
e) Moscow, of course, also worries me, who can be imprisoned here, after all, a decent amount of work has been invested, but we will also talk about this personally.
f) Apparently, we will have to think about other workers, about fresh blood (at least a little) for Ukraine.
5) Comrade Menzhinsky handed over your letter today. Of course, I did not tell anyone about your letter.
6) Beria was with me. Indeed, he makes a very good impression of a major worker. We discussed a number of his questions today at the PB, in particular, we removed another 300 thousand from Georgia. pud. bread and other questions. We will give them buses at the expense of Moscow . But we, comrade Stalin, didn't intercept her, we even didn't give enough on account of what was destined for Moscow .
Well let's end this. I shake my hand firmly. Your L. Kaganovich. Greetings Comrade Molotov.
______________________
1 One of the leaders of the Communist Party of Germany Neumann and his supporters fought against the leadership of the party headed by Thalmann. In April-May 1932, the leadership of the ECCI condemned Neumann's group as factional and sectarian. In the summer of 1932, Neumann spent his vacation in Sochi, where he met with Stalin. In the summer and autumn of this year, Neumann underwent a new study and was finally condemned as a factionalist (See M. Buber-Neumann. World Revolution and the Stalinist Regime / Edited by A. Vatlin. M., 1995. S. 7, 161-162 ).
On August 16, 1932, at a meeting of the PB, the questions posed by Beria were considered, including the reduction of the grain procurement plan for the Transcaucasus, the provision of seed loans to Georgia and the allocation of cars (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 896. L. 9; Inv. 162. D. 13. L. 62). On August 19, the PB decided to release 10 buses, 10 Ford cars and 8 trucks to Georgia in the 3rd quarter (Ibid. Op. 3. D. 897. L. 21).
Kaganovich, Kuibyshev - Stalin, Molotov August 17, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. II. D. 79. L. 29. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
In. 89.
T. t. Stalin, Molotov.
Today, together with Litvinov, we discussed and outlined the following resolution: “Instruct Comrade. Dovgalevsky to give the following answer to the French: 1) If France agrees to sign the Franco-Soviet non-aggression pact, the new amendments to the pact proposed by them will not be an obstacle. 2) Tov. Already in Geneva, Litvinov told the Poles and French mediating that he had no objection to moving the reference to the Soviet-Romanian disputes from the pact itself to the final protocol. Mr Leger's proposal may therefore be the basis for an agreement. Dovgalevsky therefore agrees to meet with Mr. Titulescu immediately to reach a final agreement. Instruct Comrade. Litvinov to give comrade. Dovgalevsky instructions for negotiations with Titulescu.
Please let us know your opinion 1 . HP 91.
Kaganovich, Kuibyshev.
17/VIII–32
_____________________________
1 Stalin and Molotov agreed on August 18 at 4 p.m. 25 min. (Ibid. L. 28). On August 19, the corresponding resolution of the PB was issued (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 13. L. 76). The non-aggression pact between the USSR and France was signed on November 29, 1932.
Stalin to Kaganovich August 17, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 99. L. 157–160. Autograph.
Hello, Comrade Kaganovich!
1. I am sending you a note from Comrade Sheboldaev. It seems to me that Comrade Sheboldaev is right, and his practical proposals should be accepted. And the sooner this is done, the better.
2. I considered Comrade Yakovlev's proposal on crop rotation throughout the USSR (he made it in a conversation with me in Sochi) and came to the conclusion that the proposal should be accepted. Report this to Yakovlev 1 .
3. Pravda is behaving stupidly and bureaucratically blind, not launching a broad campaign on the issue of enforcing the law on the protection of public property. The campaign must begin immediately. It is necessary: a) to explain the meaning of the law point by point; b) to criticize and expose those regional, city and district organizations (as well as rural ones) that are trying to shelve the law without giving it a run in practice; c) to pillory those judges and prosecutors who display liberalism in relation to plunderers of goods, collective farm crops, collective farm stocks, cooperative property, property of state enterprises, etc.; d) publish judgments in such cases in a conspicuous place; e) mobilize their correspondents accordingly, instruct them and print their correspondence; e) praise and encourage those organizations who try to conscientiously implement the law, etc. etc. This campaign should be systematic and long-term. We must systematically hammer at one point in order to force our workers to turn "face to the law" on the protection of public property2 .
4. For some reason I had to postpone my departure to Moscow for a few days. I will tell about the reasons verbally upon arrival in Moscow.
Greetigs.
17 / VIII - 32. I. Stalin.
______________________
1 After a long preparation, on September 29, 1932, the PB approved a resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks “On measures to increase productivity”, which, in particular, instructed the People's Commissariat of Agriculture during 1933 to introduce crop rotation in all collective farms and state farms “ as one of the best means of increasing productivity” (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 902. L. 7, 31–32). The destruction of the regular crop rotation system in 1930-1932. was one of the main causes of famine, especially in Ukraine (see: R. W. Davis, S. Wheatcroft // “Otechestvennaya istoriya”. 1998. No. 6. P. 98–99.).
2 Since August 20, 1932, Pravda regularly published extensive collections of materials under the headings “Public property is sacred and inviolable”, “The plunderers of socialist property - enemies of the people - to severe responsibility!” etc
Stalin, Molotov - Kaganovich August 18, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 79. L. 32. Autograph of Molotov.
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Kaganovich.
In connection with the article in Krasnaya Gazeta on the armaments of Germany, we consider it necessary to immediately declare the article incorrect, which appeared due to a misunderstanding, and publish it in Krasnaya Gazeta.
Stalin, Molotov.
#95
18/8–32 1 .
___________________
1 Number and date entered by the secretary. Sent from Sochi in code on August 19, 1932 at 0000 hours. 20 minutes. (Ibid. L. 31).
Stalin, Molotov - Kaganovich August 18, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 79. L. 34–35. Molotov's autograph.
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Kaganovich .
On the question of voting by the Communist Fraction in the election of the President of the Reichstag, we propose to adhere to the following position: at the first vote, we put forward our candidacy. At the second ballot, we withdraw our candidacy and give our votes to the Social Democrat, declaring that we are voting for the Social Democrat so as not to help the passage of the fascist.
Stalin, Molotov.
#96
18/8–32 1
________________________
1 Number and date entered by the secretary. Sent from Sochi in code on August 19, 1932 at 2 p.m. 24 min. (Ibid. L. 33).
Stalin to Kaganovich August 19, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 79. L. 37. Autograph.
Kaganovich .
As can be seen from the materials, not only the Ukrainians, but also the North Caucasians, the Middle Volga, Western Siberia, Kazakhstan and Bashkiria will talk to the Central Committee about the reduction of the grain procurement plan. I advise you to satisfy only the Ukrainians so far, reducing their plan by 30 million, and only as a last resort by 35-40 million. As for the rest, postpone the conversation with them until the very end of August 1 .
Stalin.
#97
19/8–32 2
______________________
1 Further, Stalin crossed out “or the beginning of September”, adding “most”.
2 Number and date entered by the secretary.
Kaganovich to Stalin August 19, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 79. L. 39. Original. Typescript.
Encryption.
In. No. 91.
Tov. Stalin.
We sent Stetsky to Leningrad to investigate the circumstances in which Kaisarov's article had been published in Krasnaya Gazeta. It is known that Kaisarov is non-partisan, a former officer, now an engineer of the Soyuztrans department. After the investigation, we will determine the penalties for those guilty of publishing such an article.
We will implement your proposal today. Is it not expedient to publish in Izvestia an article on disarmament, in which, without mentioning Krasnaya Gazeta, the state of armaments in Germany is presented in the spirit of our usual interpretation, in fact refuting the precepts of the article in Krasnaya Gazeta.
Please let me know your opinion. HP 93.
Kaganovich.
19/VIII - 32
Stalin to Kaganovich August 19, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 79. L. 38. Autograph of S. Chechulin.
Kaganovich.
Kaisarov to be punished and published in Krasnaya Gazeta. Do not give articles to Izvestia.
Stalin.
#98
19/VIII. 32.1 _
_____________________________
1 Sent in code from Sochi on August 19 at 10 p.m. 20 minutes. (Ibid. L. 38). On the same day, the PB accepted the proposal of Stalin and Molotov to immediately declare Kaisarov's article in Krasnaya Gazeta incorrect, which appeared due to a misunderstanding, and publish it in Krasnaya Gazeta (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 13. L. 76).
Stalin to Kaganovich August 19, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. P. D. 79. L. 43. Autograph of S. Chechulin.
Kaganovich.
Give Pravda a directive to scold the North Caucasian leadership for the poor fulfillment of the grain procurement plan. The North Caucasus fulfills the plan worse than the most backward regions, and according to all data, it should be in the first place. It is unacceptable.
Stalin.
#99
19/VIII. 32.
Kaganovich to Stalin August 19 [1932]Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 740. L. 161-167. Autograph.
19/VIII
Hello, dear Comrade Stalin.
I have just received your letter of the 17th.
1) Tomorrow we will discuss Sheboldaev's note and make an appropriate decision. The joint threshing of grain by individual farmers is doubtful; this makes it easier for them to cheat and "collectively" prove that there is not enough bread.
I must say that the blanks for the North. The Caucasus is going badly, the real struggle is not visible yet. We have already compiled a telegram to them, now we will have to redo it a little, adding about the application of 61 Art. Criminal Code 1 for malicious non-fulfillment of the grain procurement plan, as requested by Comrade Sheboldaev 2 .
2) I told Yakovlev about the crop rotation. He will prepare an appropriate proposal. Today he showed me 2 draft resolutions: 1) on sustainable agriculture 3 and 2) on the reorganization of the NKZem. I recommended him to make some amendments to the first one, he made it, and the second one remained the same. I advised in the decree on reorganization to say a little critical about the work of the NKZem. It is possible, for example, not to publish this, but at least in the decision of the Central Committee it must be said that the creation of a single NKZem justified itself at first, but at a new stage the system of organization and work of the NKZem revealed a number of shortcomings, etc. Both projects are sent to you.
3) I have now summoned Mekhlis and Popov from Pravda. I informed them about your instructions in the letter and outlined a number of measures to launch a broad campaign.
I must tell you that even before the decree was issued, I told them about your instructions, I scolded them very much for placing the decree on the 5th page, we forced them to print the decree a second time on the 1st page, give an advanced one, then they calmed down again. Now we'll wrap this up. Tomorrow something will appear in Pravda, and then systematic coverage will begin. You are absolutely right that it is necessary to hammer at one point in order to prevent the liberals from turning the decree into an empty declaration. The letter to the party organizations will be ready tomorrow or the day after tomorrow.
4) Today was Kosior St. I told him about your telegram with a proposal to reduce the plan (we accepted a reduction of 40 million poods). He, of course, accepted this with great satisfaction. We agreed with him that in two days he would present us with a plan for distributing these 40 million only in the really affected areas, and by the 23rd we would discuss their proposals .
As regards other areas, we will adhere to your telegram today.
5) I am sending you a letter from America from Bogdanov, it does not shine with depth, but is of a certain interest. By the way, Cooper is trying to get an appointment with you and raised the question with Kuibyshev today about the work of his firm with us, as well as about the forms marking his merits in the construction of the Dneprostroy. I think that it would be possible to give him a letter of recognition commemorating the merits of his consultation.
He says that wherever he built, his merits were celebrated with a special act. I ask you to write your opinion. Greetings. Your L. Kaganovich.
Hi Comrades. Molotov and Kalinin. L. Kaganovich.
_______________________
1 Article 61 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR provided for sanctions for “refusal to perform duties, national assignments or work of national importance” - a fine up to five times the cost of the assignment, duty or work, or imprisonment for forced labor for up to one year. “The same actions committed by a group of persons by prior agreement with active resistance to the authorities” were punishable by imprisonment for up to two years.
2On August 14, 1932, Sheboldaev addressed Stalin with a letter in which he reported that "despite the massive grain procurement work, there is great resistance and a direct refusal to fulfill the plan in the individual sector." In this regard, he asked to authorize the following measures: to carry out joint threshing of grain with individual farmers under the control of the council, to deprive those who do not fulfill the plan of the right to purchase industrial goods, to bring to justice under Article 61 of the Criminal Code for failure to fulfill the grain procurement plan. Trying also to somewhat lighten the burden of grain procurement, Sheboldaev asked to cancel the 4-5 percent "insurance premium" to the plans of the districts, and also to replace five million poods of wheat (81,900 tons) for grain delivery with two million poods of rye and three million poods of corn. Stalin agreed with Sheboldaev's proposals,
On September 1, 1932, in the presence of Stalin, the PB adopted a resolution “On the establishment of sustainable land use of collective farms” (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 898. L. 4).
fourOn August 17, 1932, the PB accepted "Stalin's proposal to reduce the grain procurement plan in Ukraine by 40 million poods as an exception for the especially affected regions of Ukraine, so that the collective farms of the especially affected regions would withdraw half of the plan, and individuals - a third." Kuibyshev, S. Kosior and Kaganovich were instructed to determine the areas for which this decline is expected, while not allowing equalization (Ibid. Op. 162. D. 13. L. 76). On August 24, Kaganovich and Kuibyshev submitted their proposals to Stalin (see Document No. 280). On August 28, the list of districts was approved mainly by the PB. At the same time, it was noted that “the decrease in the plan falls mainly on beet-growing areas,” therefore, the PB recognized the need to “link this decrease with the provision of benefits to beet growers for grain procurement in order to stimulate the processing, digging and delivery of sugar beets” (Ibid. L.
Kaganovich to Stalin, Molotov August 20, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. P. D. 79. L. 44–45. Script. Typescript.
Encryption.
In. No. 92.
T. t. Stalin, Molotov.
Stetsky's investigation in Leningrad revealed the ugliest situation in the foreign department of Krasnaya Gazeta. All the affairs of the foreign department were run by a certain Shvarsolon - a non-partisan, 50 years old, Russified Frenchman, a former guards officer, during the civil war he was in a concentration camp for fabricating certificates for crossing the border, being the secretary of the then "Economic Life"; after the end of the civil war, he was among the employees of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, was in our embassy in China as an interpreter, was exposed from there for suspicious connections with foreigners, then worked for some time on the TASS line, then in the Smena newspaper, then in the Evening Red Newspaper »; lives widely.
It was this type that gave the order for the printed article. Shvarsolon was arrested, and the OGPU began an investigation into his cases. Kaisarov was also arrested.
We made this decision:
a) Reprimand the editor of Krasnaya Gazeta Sirkin for his negligent attitude to his duties and for the poor selection of employees.
b) Reprimand Anisimov, secretary of the editorial board of Vechernyaya Krasnaya Gazeta, for posting Kaisarov's article; remove Anisimov from newspaper work.
c) Abolish foreign departments in Krasnaya Gazeta (morning and evening) and Vechernyaya Moskva, obliging editors to personally review foreign telegrams published in newspapers.
d) Instruct the Kultprop of the Central Committee to urgently check the work and composition of the staff of the foreign departments of other newspapers in order to reduce the number of newspapers with foreign departments to a minimum
e) Propose to the Leningrad Regional Committee to appoint an editor of the Vechernaya Krasnaya Gazeta within two days and assign a fully qualified party member to head the foreign department of Leningradskaya Pravda, and also urgently check the personnel of the foreign department of Leningradskaya Pravda.
f) Propose to the Leningrad Regional Committee to purge Krasnaya Gazeta of the swindlers of the former tabloid press, the former Birzhevka, etc., who have clung to it.
g) Propose to the OGPU that the investigation of the Shvarsolon-Kaisarov case be completed as a matter of urgency . Nr 94, 95.
Kaganovich.
20/VIII - 32
_____________________________
1 The PB decision was drawn up on August 20, 1932 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 897. L. 12). The last item is included in the protocol of the "special folder" (Ibid. Op. 162. D. 13. L. 76).
Kaganovich to Stalin August 20 [1932]Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 740. L. 168–176. Autograph.
20/VIII
Hello, dear Comrade Stalin.
1) Today Gorky sent the basis of his speech at the anti-war congress. Having become acquainted with it, we think that it can be taken as a basis, but needs additions and changes. It started well, but it needs to be made more purposeful, less vague. It is necessary to provide material that exposes the imperialist machinations of gradually drawing them into war and deceit and chauvinistic intoxication of the working masses. It would be important for Gorky to show how spending on armaments is growing and how spending on culture is falling, and so on. It is necessary, further, to show the reality and the imminence of the threat of war against the only stronghold in the world—against the USSR. It is necessary to set certain practical tasks in the struggle against this threat, not only to the workers, but also to those circles of the intelligentsia and working people who stand for the defense of the USSR.
It seems to me that it would be necessary to differentiate the pacifists by separating the bourgeois, who in words defend the cause of peace, but in reality capitalism, from the pacifists, close to the proletariat, who are still afraid of the slogan "turning the imperialist war into a civil war," but who come out in defense of the Sov. Union and against imperialism. These should not be smashed, they should be pushed forward, but not pushed away.
Gorky did not succeed in this differentiation.
He has some other unfortunate formulations, such as "national wars" and so on. Today he spoke to me on the phone, and I spoke to him in this spirit, stipulating that these were preliminary considerations. He agreed with them. Since you rightly attach great importance to the congress, I send you this speech urgently. They leave on the 22nd in the evening. If you send your remarks by telegraph, we will have time to pass them on on the 22nd.
If by letter, we will send it to Amsterdam.
2) Manchukuo conveyed a protest against our supposedly wrong actions on the border (fortifications, incorrect definition of borders, supposedly crossing borders, etc.). All this information is rather vague. Slavutsky has not sent any details yet. We urgently find out what the matter is, when we find out, I will inform you of the details. One thing turned out that in January the NKPS renamed the 86th junction into the Otpor station without the permission of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars 1 .
3) I had Blagonravov and separately Zemlyachka. Both complain about Mironov and point out that the selection of people in the NKPS is unimportant. Transport work has deteriorated. We made some decisions, sent telegrams to the localities, but I think that when you arrive, you will have to talk about this in more detail .
4) At the next PB, we delivered reports from the people's commissariats on the implementation of their production program for consumer goods. Things are going extremely unsatisfactorily, it will be necessary to tighten up.
I'll end with this. Hello to you. Your L. Kaganovich.
Hello t.t. Molotov and Kalinin.
PS I have just received from Comrade Radek his draft on "Basic Tactical Questions", I am sending it to you and asking you also to let me know, at least briefly, whether it is suitable or not suitable. It seems to me that there is a certain difference between the current and the Hague Congress, and therefore, perhaps, now it is necessary to a greater extent than at that time to appeal to elements friendly to the USSR, even if they did not understand everything in our way. Otherwise, I think the practical proposals are acceptable.
L. Kaganovich.
______________________
On August 20, 1932, the PB instructed Yagoda and Karakhan to “immediately find out the state of affairs on the border (whether the 86th post was really renamed, who renamed it, are there fortifications, etc.) and report to the Politburo” (RGASPI. F. 17. Inventory 162. D. 13. L. 78). On August 23, 1932, the PB adopted the text of a reply to Manchukuo's note proposed by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs: “To the diplomatic commissar of Manchuguo. In response to your note of such and such date, I have the honor to announce the following: Message of the note about the crossing of the border by Soviet border detachments, as well as a message about the invasion of the Soviet detachment into the territory of Manchuria and the establishment of outposts, fortifications, etc. are devoid of any basis whatsoever and can only be the result of false information received by the Manchu authorities” (Ibid. L. 81).
2After Stalin returned from vacation, on September 8, the PB considered the “Statement of Comrade. Stalin on the NKPS” and decided to instruct A.A. Andreev, together with the chairman of the Central Control Commission-RCI Ya.E. repair of wagons, with the experience of this repair in June of this year, and develop practical measures that can correct the mistakes made, contribute to the correct organization of repairs and guarantee the country from repeating such mistakes in the future ”(Ibid. Op. 3. D. 899. L. 2). On October 2, 1932, the PB adopted a decision “On the mistakes of the NKPS in the repair of wagons”, which stated that “the Central Committee recognizes the correct and timely formulation by the NKPS of the issue of improving the wagon fleet. However, due to errors made in the instructions [...], as well as due to the lack of sufficient verification by the NKPS bodies [...] in June of this year, there was a huge accumulation of abandoned sick cars and some of the most important nodes and stations turned out to be sewn up. The Central Committee recognized I.N. Mironov and M.I. Kalashnikov as responsible for the mistakes made (Ibid. D. 902. L. 11).
Stalin, Molotov - Kaganovich August 21, 1932Archive: RAGSPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 79. L. 45, 45v. Stalin's autograph.
Kaganovich.
HP 94 and 95. It is proposed to add to the decision the following paragraph: "To oblige the secretariat of the Leningrad Committee to ensure that such errors do not occur in the Leningrad press in the future" 1 .
Stalin. Molotov.
No. 100
21/8–32 2
_______________________
1 The proposal of Stalin and Molotov was included in the decision of the PB of August 17, 1932 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 897. L. 12).
2 Number and date entered by the secretary. Sent in cipher the same day at 13:00. 50 min. (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 79. L. 43).
Stalin to Kaganovich August 21, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 81. Op. 3. D. 99. L. 161–163. Autograph.
21/VIII 32
Hello, Comrade Kaganovich!
Letter dated 19/VIII received.
1) There was a misunderstanding about Sheboldaev's proposal to reduce the grain procurement plan. At the moment when Sheboldaev's note and my letter about accepting Sheboldaev's proposal were sent to you, I did not know about the outrages in grain procurement in the North Caucasus. I received these and other materials about the North Caucasus in a day. At the same time I corrected this mistake of mine in two telegrams addressed to you, where: a) I proposed to postpone the consideration of Sheboldaev's proposal until the very end of August, when I would already be in Moscow; b) proposed to give a directive to Pravda to scold the North Caucasian leadership for their poor work in grain procurement.
Thus, I consider the misunderstanding settled.
In general, it must be said that Sheboldaev was somewhat over-praised, while he does not yet (yet!) deserve much praise, since he is often (sometimes too often!) Amenable to pressure, not quite healthy, and sometimes downright rotten environment from politically unstable elements.
I think that he should be scolded for some rotten passages in his note 1 .
2) Cooper must be caressed, put on the honor roll (mandatory!), issue a special certificate and publish it 2 .
3) I am going to leave on the 23rd, if illness (something like a mild sore throat) does not interfere. Deadly tired of sitting in Sochi.
Greetings! I. Stalin.
_____________________________
On August 20, 1932, Sheboldaev turned to Stalin with another letter about the progress of grain procurements. He noted that collective farmers "work this summer better than last year, but there is a heightened alertness in relation to grain procurements." The dissatisfaction of the collective farmers, Sheboldaev reported, is caused by poor management of agriculture, the intensity of work, and "administration." Peasants openly say that the same difficult situation is expected in the North Caucasus as in Ukraine. Under these conditions, the district leaders refuse to communicate the grain procurement plan to the collective farms in view of its tension. Sheboldaev asked to reduce the grain procurement plan (Ivnitsky NA Collectivization and dispossession. P. 193).
Stalin, as follows from his letter to Kaganovich, was dissatisfied with these proposals. At the request of Stalin, Pravda published on August 21 a selection of Grain Procurement. The North Caucasus is in last place, in the tail of the southern regions.
On August 22, Stalin forwarded Sheboldaev's note to Moscow, informing Sheboldaev in the following code: “Rostov-on-Don. Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party Comrade. Sheboldaev. Copy: Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade. Kaganovich. I received your note on the reduction of the plan and sent it to the Central Committee. I cannot support you because of the poor work of the region in the field of grain procurement. If the Middle Volga, which survived the drought, surrendered 4 million poods in the third five-day period, and your region did not surrender even 2 million, then this means that the regional committee has dwindled in the face of difficulties and surrendered its position to the apostles of gravity, or the regional committee is diplomatic and tries to lead the Central Committee by the nose. Agree that I can not support in this kind of work. No. 102/c. Stalin" (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 79. L. 51). On August 23, 1932, the PB adopted a corresponding resolution "On grain procurements in the North Caucasus."
2 As early as August 16, 1932, Stalin and Molotov telegraphed to the Central Committee about their agreement to issue awards to foreign specialists of the Dneprostroy, in particular, to Cooper (Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 79. L. 14). On September 1, 1932, the PB approved the list of awarded workers of the Dneprostroy and Moscow road workers with the amendment: “To award Cooper with the Order of the Red Banner of Labor, a diploma from the government and an entry on the honor roll” (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 898. L. 4).
Stalin to Kaganovich August 22, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 79. L. 49. Autograph.
Kaganovich.
First, about Gorky. The phrase "against national wars" is incorrect and scandalous. We stand not against, but for national liberation wars. It should be replaced by the words "imperialist wars" or "wars of conquest". Your remarks are correct.
Secondly, about Radek. The Hague directive, of course, retains full force for the Comintern and its sections. But we are now dealing not with a congress of the Comintern, but with a non-Party congress of individuals and organizations, of which a significant part cannot be recognized as communist, and many of the participants in the congress have not yet understood the questions of the struggle against imperialism, are vacillating between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, are trying to approach to us, but have not yet crossed over to our positions. It is clear that our tactics at the congress must take into account these peculiarities. Radek tries to run to the left so that they cannot accuse him of being right. We need to dissuade him from such jumps.
Stalin.
No. 101
22/VIII.32
Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Kuibyshev to Stalin, Molotov, Kalinin August 22, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 79. L. 63. Certified typewritten copy.
Copy
Top secret .
Cipher .
Stalin, Molotov, Kalinin.
In a conversation with Mezhlauk, Cooper offered, on behalf of General Motors, to sell us 100,000–200,000 used cars, trucks and cars, with a guarantee that they would work for at least another 150,000 kilometers, fully equipped and shod with new tires at a very low price, averaging around $200 for a car with a long-term loan. Duranty told Mezhlauk that the chairman of General Motors had agreed to a ten-year loan. The sales crisis is forcing Americans to such conditions. General Motors asks through Cooper for permission to send a man to us to negotiate on this issue.
The offer seems to be serious. In view of the advantageous terms of the sale, we would consider it expedient to reply to Cooper for the communication of General Motors with consent to send their representative.
Please provide your opinion. No. 99/1544/sh.
Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Kuibyshev.
22.VIII.32
Stalin, Molotov, Kalinin - Kaganovich, Kuibyshev, Voroshilov August 23, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 79. L. 61–62. Molotov's autograph.
Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Kaganovich. Kuibyshev. Voroshilov.
The General Motors used car case is very suspicious. They can cheat us and try to sell all sorts of rubbish. Moreover, our receivers have never been distinguished by conscientiousness and vigilance. However, you should try to buy no more than 50,000 cars if the price is lower, say $100 and a loan of at least 10 years. If the agreement for 50,000 yields good results and the machines turn out to be really fit, it will be possible to buy the same number of machines. It is imperative to clarify the issue of spare parts and the deal must be understood in such a way that the cars are sold with spare parts. We need mainly trucks. Therefore, out of 50,000 cars, 45,000 trucks and 5,000 cars should be taken.
Stalin, Molotov, Kalinin 1 .
No. 106
23/8–32.
__________________________
1 On the same day sent in code from Sochi at 19:00. (Ibid. L. 60). On August 25, 1932, the PB made a decision: “a) Instruct Comrade Mezhlauk to tell Cooper that we do not object to the arrival of representatives of General Motors, without binding ourselves with any promises and obligations, b) Upon the arrival of a representative of General Motors, so-called. Mezhlauk to make a message to the Politburo ”(RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 13. L. 75).
Kaganovich, Kuibyshev to Stalin, Molotov August 24, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 79. L. 65–66. Certified typewritten copy.
Copy .
Top secret.
Cipher .
T. t. Stalin, Molotov.
Together with Kosior and Chubar, today we have outlined the following distribution of the reduction in the Ukrainian grain procurement plan by 40 million poods:
“Reducing the grain procurement plan for Ukraine to be carried out in the following amounts: Vinnitsa region 9 million poods; Kyiv 11 million pounds. Kharkov 8 million poods, Dnepropetrovsk 4 million poods, Odessa 2 million poods. Donetsk 5 million poods and AMSSR 0.5 million poods, a total of 39.5 million poods, leaving 0.5 mil. pounds in the form of a reserve at the disposal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine.
Approve in the main the draft of the reduction of plans for the regions presented by the Central Committee of Ukraine and instruct the Central Committee of Ukraine, upon the final approval of the plans, to further concentrate the reduction on the most affected regions, reducing the number of regions in which grain procurement plans are reduced.
Establish that the reduction of plans for collective farms and villages should be carried out not mechanically for all collective farms and villages, but taking into account the characteristics of each collective farm and village (the main direction of the collective farm economy and its condition as a result of errors in determining plans last year), by calling in district of representatives of collective farms, chairmen of village councils and secretaries of party cells, or by going to collective farms.
Taking into account that the decrease in the plan falls mainly on the sugar beet regions, it is necessary to consider it necessary to link this decrease with the provision of benefits to sugar beet growers for grain procurement in order to stimulate the processing, digging and delivery of sugar beet.
In connection with this, the actual reduction of the plan in sugar-beet regions should be carried out by half immediately now, and the second half after the plan for the delivery of sugar beets by each farm is fulfilled.
Recognize it as inexpedient to publish a reduction in the grain procurement plan for Ukraine.
The reduction of the plan by 20-25 million poods will apply to the sugar-beet growing regions and will be used in half the amount to stimulate the processing of beet harvesting. We consider it inappropriate to publish the decision to reduce the plan of Ukraine, based on the fact that this may cause appeals from other districts and regions demanding a reduction in plans.
No. 104 / 105 / 1559/sh.
Kaganovich, Kuibyshev.
24.VIII. 32
Kaganovich to Stalin August 24, 1932Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 79. L. 67. Certified typewritten copy.
Cipher .
Copy.
Secret .
Tov. Stalin.
Today we adopted the following resolution on grain procurements in the North Caucasus.
a) Resolutely reject all attempts to reduce the grain procurement plan for the North. Caucasus.
b) Send Comrade Sheboldaev the following telegram:
“The Central Committee considers the position of the regional committee set out in your note about the possibility of non-fulfillment of the grain procurement plan for 10-15 million poods stated in your note to be completely incorrect.
Such a pessimistic attitude towards the fulfillment of the grain procurement plan, and even a precise determination of the figure for underfulfillment of the plan, does not help to mobilize the party organization and demobilizes it in the matter of fulfilling the grain procurement plan.
The Central Committee agreed to the replacement of 5 million poods of wheat with 2 million poods of rye and 3 million poods of corn, and demands unconditional procurement of these crops.
The shortfall for the month of August is added to the grain procurement plan of 30,000,000 poods determined for September.
The Central Committee proposes that the regional committee immediately take all necessary measures to decisively eliminate demobilization sentiments and mobilize the party organization and all the forces of the Soviet and procurement agencies for the full implementation of the grain procurement plan for this year.
No. 106/1561/sh.
Kaganovich.
24.VIII.32
Kaganovich to Stalin November 5 [1932]Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 740. L. 177–180. Autograph.
5/XI
Hello, Dear Comrade Stalin!
You already know our rules. In addition to what we have conveyed to you, we have adopted a number of measures in the area of the OGPU, the prosecutor's office, manufactured goods, the military, and so on. I am sending them to you for review. The whole question now is in their implementation. We wrapped up the car thoroughly, but I must tell you frankly that the laxity and softness here are exceptional in all branches of work.
At a meeting of the secretaries of the Kuban regions, we saw anything in their face, but not secretaries. These are Zemstvo, co-operators, the muzhik's advocates for the Party. In this spirit, they had to be shamed, scolded and corrected.
Yesterday we held a meeting of directors of state farms, the picture is even more dense. People acted, on the one hand, as beggars asking for Christ's sake, and on the other hand, some acted in a disorganized and even anti-Party way. If you shoot, then you would have to shoot more than half, some will have to be removed, and the rest need to be straightened. In the village, no one pressed the bread and sat down. The courts sentenced, but the sentences were not carried out, it is clear that in such a situation they mock us, cut off the ears, and then they say that the threshing showed a bad harvest. A new network of hand mills has been created. The counter-revolutionaries sit quietly. Yes, and the situation and our worthless work, i.e. the work of local organizations, liberalism, inaction and opportunism favor the creation of anti-Soviet organizations. Now you have to make up for what is missing, this will inevitably lead to some excesses. We will fight to prevent them, but since all this will be undertaken with a bang, it will be difficult to avoid everything to the end. In any case, the main task here now is to break the sabotage undoubtedly organized and directed from a single center.
Well, I'll end this now. Now I'm going from Krasnodar to the villages. I think to go to the most malicious Poltava, where there are 400 teachers, doctors and technicians + colonels, captains, etc. 1
Greetings! Goodbye.
Your L. Kaganovich.
PS T. Yagoda will tell you in detail.
L. Kaganovich.
________________________
1On October 22, 1932, the PB sent Kaganovich at the head of a commission of the Central Committee to the North Caucasus "in order to strengthen grain procurements" (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 904. L. 11). The commission included A.I. Mikoyan, M.A. Chernov, T.A. Yurkin, Ya.B. Gamarnik, M.F. Shkiryatov, G.G. Yagoda, A.V. Kosarev. On November 2, the commission arrived in Rostov-on-Don. On the same day, a meeting of the secretaries of the rural district party committees was held, and on November 4, a meeting of the directors of state farms of the region. Under the leadership of Kaganovich in the North Caucasus region, a purge of the party organization was carried out, mass arrests of "counter-revolutionaries" and deportation of peasants to remote regions of the country. In December 1932, the entire population of the Poltavskaya station mentioned in the letter (more than 9 thousand people) was completely rejoiced in the Urals (see for more details: Ivnitsky HA Collectivization and dispossession. P. 193–196).