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Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931–1936Source ; "Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931–1936 Moscow" (ROSSPEN), 2001
1931
Going on a long vacation in 1931 (according to the visitor log, Stalin did not receive anyone in his Kremlin office from August 6 to October 11, 1931 1 ), Stalin for the first time left Kaganovich to manage the daily work of the Politburo. However, at the same time, Stalin was not going to let things out of control, he regularly received information and sent his comrades-in-arms who remained in Moscow.
Note:
1 Historical archive. 1994. N° 6. S. 37.Stalin to Kaganovich [previously August 6, 1931]
T. Kaganovich. For memory.
1) Be objective in relation to R. and S.
2) Million 80 points (for blanks) Kabakov 1 .
3) Northern channel = help 2 .
4) Resolutions on cooperation = a very important matter 3 .
5) Narpit resolution = very important matter 4 .
6) Determination and distribution of funds of goods (manufactory, foodstuffs, shoes, etc.) by quarters and months to take over (do not leave undividedly in the hands of NKsnab).
7) Do not make the determination of funds for export dependent on a fight between NKtorg and NKsnab, but take matters into your own hands.
8) Pounce on the bird: there will not be enough meat this year, the bird can take out (as well as rabbits) 5 .
9) Pay special attention to the gold industry 6 (give Serebrovsky and Yakovlev and Chekh).
10) Remember aluminum! The bourgeois approach to the question of profitability is to peck 7 .
11) The work of Marxist-Leninist indoctrination of party members has been launched: our party is large and entirely young, Marxist badly educated, but there is no intensive work on Bolshevization, on Marxist indoctrination of “ordinary” party members. This is a big danger. This gap needs to be filled immediately, without postponing the matter indefinitely 8 .
12) Follow Pravda, Popov and Mekhlis and help them systematically: both of them often burrow and can break their necks.
I. St.
________________
On July 24, 1931, the PB determined the grain procurement plan of the Urals for grain at 95 million poods and indicated “to prohibit any discussion about the grain-forage balance and the grain procurement plan. Consider the presented plan final and forbid any talk of revising the plan” (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 10. L. 128). On August 8, the PB reconsidered this decision, establishing a new plan of 80 million poods, and again repeated the instruction about the inadmissibility of discussions about the grain procurement plan (Ibid. L. 153).
On August 10, 1931, the PB rejected the proposal of N.M. Yanson and G.E. Prokofiev to postpone the construction of the White Sea Canal and instructed the Council of People's Commissars and the STO to consider within a ten-day period the cost estimate for the construction of the canal and the application for building materials and release the necessary cash before the end of the year means and materials (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 841. L. 5).
3 See Note 4 to Document No. 3 and Note 8 to Document No. 79.
4 See note 1 to document No. 13.
5 See note 6 to document No. 7.
On August 10, 1931, the Politburo appointed A.P. Serebrovsky as the manager of the northern association Tsvetmetzoloto, and A.I. Yakovlev as his deputy for Vostokzoloto (Ibid. D. 841. L. 5).
7 See note 4 to document No. 7.
On August 15, 1931, at the initiative of Kaganovich, the OB considered the question “On the Marxist-Leninist Education of Party Members” and instructed the commission to develop a draft directive of the Central Committee (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 114. D. 251. L. 14). Until the end of 1931, no other solutions could be found in the OB materials.Kaganovich to Stalin August 10, 1931
S. secret.
Encryption.
Dispatched from Moscow 18–47 10/VIII — 31.
Received for deciphering 10/VIII - 31 23-45
In. Number 3.
Immediately . Tov. Stalin.
On the tenth, the question of the credit rate on German orders was considered. It turned out that in connection with the crisis in Germany, the discount rate of the Reichsbank constantly fluctuates upwards, at present it has reached 17%. In order to counteract a further increase in the discount rate, it was decided: a) to send Pyatakov to negotiate with the industrialists on the restoration of a fixed maximum discount rate, b) to suggest to Pyatakov, Lyubimov and Khinchuk to find out the situation in Germany with a view to raising this issue with the German government and, without entering into negotiations with by the German government, to communicate their views immediately to the Central Committee, c) to instruct Rozengolyd to submit to the Central Committee a note on the amount of our orders in Germany covered by the increase in the interest rate . Please let me know your opinion 2.
Kaganovich.
0 hour 45 min. 11/VIII - 31 3
________________
1 Resolution of the PB of August 10, 1931, reported by Kaganovich, see: RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 10. L. 149. See also documents No. 3, 5, 17.
On August 11, Stalin and Molotov agreed (Ibid. L. 3).
3 Date and time of decryption.Kuibyshev - Kaganovich August 10, 1931
Archive: RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 739. L. 26–27. Autograph.
To the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade Kaganovich.
1. On directives for the second five-year plan.
Only today I will send to the Central Committee the draft "main lines of the second five-year plan" and a special note on metal. I propose to convene a meeting after Comrade Stalin has spoken, to whom the materials must be sent immediately. If you still deem it necessary to convene a conference before Comrade Stalin's word, then I propose to convene it on August 14 at 8 o'clock in the evening.
2. About directives on control figures 32 years .
The commission, which was chosen by the PB, actually collapsed due to the departure of comrades Stalin and Molotov. The exchange of opinions at the first meeting of the commission and the failure to convene the subcommittee (representatives of the most important economic organizations did not come—the Supreme Council of National Economy, Tsentrosoyuz, municipal services, etc.) makes me make the following proposal:
a) Limit yourself to those directives that have already been adopted by the PB (35% increase in production, 20–22 billion capital works, concentration of funds on metal, coal, transport and mechanization, imports of metal and equipment below last year);
b) not to distribute capital work among departments and organizations, however, setting a limit on capital work for the entire national economy at 20–22 billion rubles;
c) on the basis of these general directives, the departments submit their draft control figures to the State Planning Committee by 25/XI, and the republics by 10/XI.31 (the deadlines established by the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of 21/VII);
d) Gosplan is obliged to submit to the PB and the government a consolidated national economic plan for 1932 by April 1, 1931;
e) directives drawn up by the State Planning Commission to be sent out only as material to departments and republics.
We agree with these proposals. Mikoyan, Grinko, Rukhimovich, Odintsov.
3. About vacation .
I ask you to grant me leave from 20/VIII to 5/X due to my illness.
4. About my future work .
In view of the fact that I am clearly not coping with the duties of the head of the State Planning Commission, I ask you to relieve me of this work, giving me a job according to my strength (it would be better if it were in a region or district).
V. Kuibyshev.
10/VIII.31r.Kaganovich to Stalin [August 11, 1931]
Hello dear comrade. Stalin!
Yesterday at the PB we considered a number of issues (we are sending you the protocol). On some of them, we have not made final decisions, it would be nice to receive your comments on the most important ones before the 15th
1. About orders in Germany. First of all, about the abuses of firms, they often supply obviously unusable equipment, allowing for simply criminality. For example, welding of one shaft from three pieces, etc.
The Supreme Council of National Economy adopted a resolution approved by us on sending receivers, but this is not enough. We instructed to work out by the 15th other measures to combat firms that commit abuses that even capitalist morals do not justify. Expose them [publicly] and sometimes even refuse orders. Then, for orders, now the main issue is the interest rate, it jumps up all the time, now it has already reached 17%. There were proposals at the PB, on the one hand, to cancel orders now, on the other hand, it was proposed to continue in the same spirit, regardless of the interest rate. We have made a decision already known to you. Pyatakov is not leaving until we receive your reply. It turned out that this jumping interest rate captures not only the orders that we are now giving, but also a large number of previous orders. Some have stated
2. About Japan. We have considered the proposal of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs for a response to the statement of the Japanese ambassador. We must edit it, our answer (draft) is too sugary. At a time when, for example, the Japanese are throwing accusations at us that the USSR is pursuing a policy of completely ousting the Japanese from our waters, the NKID's response is always a tone of self-defence. Shouldn't it be pointed out, for example, that there are sentiments in Japan to revise the concluded treaty and illegally expand their rights. Since we will be editing this draft approved in the main PB, it would be good to get instructions from you by telegraph.
3. About Argentina. Rozengolts made a proposal to send a telegram on his behalf to stop the purchase and import of goods of Argentine origin and the use of Argentine ports, transit routes, etc. I am sending you a draft of his telegram, we have postponed the matter in order to ask for your opinion.
4. We postponed until the 15th consideration of the issue of ensuring the participation of customers in orders. The commission allocated at one time by the PB did not actually work. There is a project by Comrade Akulov, who proposes to transfer the operational work on the import of equipment to the appropriate associations of the Supreme Council of National Economy, and to leave the regulation, control and supervision of the work of import organizations to the NKVT and trade missions. This seems to correspond to the so-called "Berlin Agreement" between Pyatakov and Lyubimov.
5. About non-ferrous metallurgy. We have so far approved the personal composition of the leaders. As agreed, we will examine the merits on the 15th, since on the questions of aluminium, we must once again hear the relevant comrades. The main controversial issue in the aluminum smelting program for 32–33: 8 tons [thousand] tons are planned for 32, which is clearly not enough, and 50 tons [thousand] tons for 33. You pointed out the need to bring it up to 70-80 tons [thousand] tons. For all other sections, the decision is acceptable. Sergo and I agreed to talk about it again.
6. We considered the issue of revising technical assistance agreements. Things are apparently still going badly. There is not enough oversight of this case. Foreign firms often violate contracts, but ours do not make any claims. Often designs come to us, drawings are outdated, while in some parts we ourselves have already gone further. With regard to unsuccessful treaties, Tolokontsev especially distinguished himself. We approved the draft resolution and entrusted the editorial board to Sergo and me. I think that in the editorial it is necessary to strengthen some points regarding the requirement for greater supervision and responsibility of associations.
7. Approved the resolutions completed by the commission on cooperation and on public catering. The main thing seems to be captured. These drafts were sent to you and Comrade Molotov. We will not publish until your instructions.
We divided the opening of stores by months, the pace is tense, but they (cooperators and NKSnabovtsy) undertake to fulfill it. In the section on improving the operation of the trading network, we emphasized self-financing, pulling up the ruble. In the decree on public catering, to the extent of our now limited materials, in addition to organizational changes, we outlined specific measures for the further expansion of the network not in terms of the number of dishes, but in terms of coverage of people and the creation of a material base, including spoons, knives, forks, etc. .d. 2
8. We postponed the issue of fuel and the balance of coal in view of the fact that Kuibyshev was not there. At the next meeting, we will put this issue among the first and thoroughly work it out. The fuel situation seems to be serious.
9. And finally, about a rather strange letter from Comrade. Kuibyshev, which I received after the PB tonight. I am sending you a letter. I spoke with him on the phone about the completely incomprehensible reasons for his resignation. I wanted to meet him right there, but he asked later, and later I did not find him anywhere.
The conversation on the phone was rather incoherent, he only told me that "I will achieve my departure at any cost." It seems that he wrote the letter and spoke to me on the phone in a state of "special inspiration." In any case, the letter has been written and will have to be interpreted. Tomorrow I will try to talk to him, it is hardly necessary to collect the PB now. I will wait for your instructions on this matter, it would be nice by telegraph.
I'll end with this for now. As much as we would not like to tire you, especially in the first days of rest, but we will have to do this more often than normal, because it is difficult for us to manage without you.
Greetings Comrade Molotov.
Hello Nadezhda Sergeevna.
Yours L. Kaganovich.
PS After reading my letter, I see that I did not fulfill your directive to master punctuation marks, I started, but did not work out, with all the workload, this can be overcome. I will try to include dots and commas in subsequent letters.
L. K-h. 3
____________________
1 Stalin's answers to the questions posed in this letter, as well as decisions on them, see Document No. 5.
2 On August 10, 1931, the PB approved, with amendments, a draft resolution on the restructuring of consumer cooperation and the development of Soviet trade, including a clause stating "that one of the deputy directors of enterprises should be on the board of workers' cooperation." The final editing of the draft resolution was entrusted to a commission consisting of L.M. Kaganovich, A.I. Mikoyan, I.A. Zelensky (RGASPI. F. 17. On. 3. D. 841. L. 3). See also Note 1 to Document No. 13 and Note 8 to Document No. 79.
3 In the upper right corner of Kaganovich's litter "August 1931"Kaganovich to Stalin August 12, 1931
Hello Comrade Stalin!
Today I had a conversation with Comrade Kuibyshev. He explains his statement, firstly, by the fact that there is an organizational collapse in Gosplan: Rosenthal wants to leave Gosplan 1, the cell is trying to command, continues to study Rosenthal, in particular for the fact that he proposed to invite Strumilin to head the work on compiling the five-year plan. In 2, bad relations with departments, especially with the Supreme Council of National Economy, he gives an example that an order was given for the Supreme Council of National Economy to give materials only to Kuibyshev personally, but not to the apparatus of the State Planning Commission, other departments also begin to be disregarded and therefore he, having no materials, is paralyzed. And NKFin is also unimportant, competing, as it were, with the State Planning Commission. All this, Comrade Kuibyshev declared, testifies to the fact that he is not coping with his work. I pointed out to him the incorrectness of such a formulation of the question, that the Central Committee can help both the people and the cell to say that it should not lay claim to management, and that relations between departments can also be corrected by the Central Committee, if there is anything abnormal, in any case ,
He asked to be allowed to leave now, I did not give consent, pointing out that he connected his vacation with resignation, that I sent his application to you, and we will wait for your instructions.
My impression is that the application was written ill-conceived, and that he would take it back, it might be useful for him to go to Sochi to you.
Now some business questions:
1) There was Kosior Stanislav, he complained that the deterioration of the harvest had captured a number of grain regions, such as Zinoviev, Krivorozhsky, Kherson, Odessa, Nikolaevsky, etc., that the shortage in the gross harvest would reach 170 million. pud. To my instruction that, on the other hand, the Right Bank has a better harvest than last year, Comrade Kosior pointed out that this would not be blocked. They are not now raising the question of revising the plan, but apparently they are preparing the ground for this, so far their preparations are going well, in general the south is going well. The middle Volga is going well, the Lower Volga is lagging behind, a request has been received from Bashkiria and Tataria to revise the plan. Bashkiria asks instead of 44 to give them 28, we are thinking of resolutely rejecting and giving a firm directive 2. In general, we must take a firm tone that we will no longer revise any plans, otherwise grain procurements will be demagnetized. On 15 we will put on the PB "questions of grain procurements" and. apparently, we will have to watch vigilantly the grain procurements in each region, as was the case last year.
2) In the Donbass, things are bad with supplies, both technical (crutches, etc.) and food. On the 15th, they put it on the PB in order to take a number of practical measures in order to improve the supply and increase production. We will listen to the message of the salary. Postyshev and Gurevich 3 , we will make a final decision after your advice, this increase in coal and metal will cost 70 million by the end of 31, and 200 million next year, but this will have to be done.
3) On railway transport, apparently, following the report of Kishkin and Blagonravov (on the 15th), we will have to organize an inspection of the preparation of railways for autumn. Judging by preliminary information, the situation is unimportant. How do you feel about the fact that, after some verification by the members of the Central Committee, the report of the NKPS with a call from the roads of 20 people should be put on the PB.
4) I am sending you the PB agenda for 15. Now we are preparing a list of key issues for 5-6 meetings to send to you in advance.
Greetings Comrade Molotov.
Yours L. Kaganovich.
August 12, 31
PS We decided to meet on the 14th about the 2nd five-year plan, we are sending you the materials. OK.
PS A couple of words in addition to the conversation with Comrade Kuibyshev.
On my instructions that we have an instance that can resolve all contentious issues, in particular the question of establishing normal relations with the Supreme Council of National Economy ist. Sergo, comrade Kuibyshev answered me: “If Sergo’s relationship with Molotov could not be resolved, then it certainly will not succeed with me, because the whole story (the Sergo-Molotov conflict), says comrade Kuibyshev, ended in Sergo’s triumph and victory, after all He didn't take back his words. It goes without saying that it is ridiculous to talk about some kind of victory and triumph, but such an approach is quite characteristic. Your L.K.
_______________________________
On September 3, 1931, the PB approved the appointment of K.Ya.
On August 18, L931, the PB rejected the proposals of the Bashkir regional party committee to reduce the grain procurement plan for 1931, while the Bashkir leaders were asked to “stop any discussion about the grain procurement plan and develop energetic work to fulfill the grain procurement plan” (Ibid. D. 843. L. 6).
On August 15, 1931, the PB heard a report by P.P. Postyshev and A.I. Gurevich on the restructuring of the wage system in the coal industry and ferrous metallurgy, and basically approved the work of the commission. P.P. Postyshev, A.I. Gurevich and N.M. Shvernik were entrusted with the final version of the project (Ibid. D. 842. L.Z). See also Note 7 to Document No. 42.Stalin to Kaganovich August 14, 1931
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Poskrebyshev for Kaganovich 1 .
First . With regard to German firms, it is necessary to act more boldly, up to the immediate refusal of orders. We won't achieve anything without refusing some of the orders, they will rip us off like a stick.
Second . It is possible to conclude an agreement with the Japanese on fish on the basis of Troyanovsky's proposal, that is, to secure 49 per cent for the Japanese for three years, and keep 51 per cent for oneself .
Third . As for Argentina, it's better to wait.
Fourth . As for the participation of customers in giving orders, you can wait. Akulov's project is insufficient 3 .
Fifth . Eight thousand tons of aluminum for next year is ridiculously small. It is necessary to take at least twenty thousand tons.
Sixth. The use of technical assistance by our business executives is carelessly criminalized. Draconian measures must be taken against such an attitude to the matter .
Seventh . Interviewed with Yakovlev. He will enter the Politburo with some new proposals that must be unconditionally supported .
Eighth . Kuibyshev must be overtired. He should have been given leave until the first of September 6 .
Stalin.
Hp4/sh
11 o'clock - m.
14/VIII-31 7
______________________________
1 This cipher is Stalin's reply to Kaganovich's letter dated August 11, 1931.
On June 25, 1931, Japanese Ambassador to the USSR Hirota handed over to the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR L.M. Karakhan a statement from the Japanese government about the need to start negotiations in connection with the complications that arose in the fishing issue. On August 10, 1931, the PB decided: "To accept the proposal of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to inform the Japanese of consent to discuss controversial issues in the manner of normal diplomatic negotiations, and not in the manner of a conference." The commission consisting of: L.M. Kaganovich, A.I. Mikoyan, M. M. Litvinov and L. M. Karakhan was instructed to finalize the draft answer (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 10. L. 150). On August 18, 1931, a statement from the government of the USSR to the government of Japan was handed to Hirota (See DVP. Vol. XIV. pp. 473–476). See also Note 1 to Document No. 63.
3 This issue was considered by the PB in the presence of Stalin on October 20, 1931. It was decided “to take as a basis the draft submitted by Comrade Rozengolts so that it would be softened in the sense of granting maximum rights to the Supreme Council of National Economy and its associations in giving orders, monitoring implementation and in the matter of their acceptance. The commission consisting of: V.M.Molotov, L.M.Kaganovich, YL.Pyatakov, A.P.Rozengolts and I.A.Akulov was instructed to develop and submit specific proposals for approval of the PB (RGASPI. F. 17. On. 3. D. 855. L. 2). On October 25, 1931, the proposals of the commission were approved (Ibid. Op. 162. D. 11. L. 33, 35).
4On May 5, 1931, the PB adopted a resolution “On the revision of technical assistance agreements and on the procedure for their conclusion”, which stated “an extremely unsatisfactory situation and a complete disorganization of the entire industrial system” in the use of technical assistance agreements concluded with foreign firms. The Supreme Council of National Economy of the USSR was proposed to restructure the entire system of leadership and the organization of technical assistance within a month, the OGPU was instructed to check the use of contracts by economic organizations within two months and submit a report to the Central Committee and the government (Ibid. D. 10. L. 30-32). On August 10, 1931, the PB approved new proposals for the revision of treaties and the procedure for their conclusion. Considering the resolution of May 5, 1931, as unfulfilled, the PB suggested that the Supreme Council of National Economy ensure its implementation within a month (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 841. L. 2, 10–11). On September 10, 1931, at the request of the Supreme Council of National Economy, the PB postponed his report until October 15 (Ibid. D. 847. L. 12). On December 8, 1931, in the presence of Stalin, the PB approved, with amendments, a draft resolution on the issue of revising technical assistance agreements, in which the Supreme Council of National Economy was again criticized (Ibid. Op. 162. D. 11. L. 85, 86).
5 Probably, we are talking about the reorganization of the Zernotrest, the decision on which was taken by the PB on August 25, 1931.
6 By decision of the PB of August 30, 1931, Kuibyshev was granted a month and a half leave from September 5 (Ibid. Op. 3. D. 845. L. 6).
7 Date, number and time entered by the secretary.Stalin to Kaganovich August 14, 1931
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b).
Poskrebyshev for Mikoyan.
Copy: Politburo, Kaganovich.
It is reported from Abkhazia and Mingrelia that there are no grain warehouses there to supply tobacco growers and tea producers and are not being built. Mikoyan reported to the Politburo that a whole series of grain warehouses had already been built. Who is right and who is misleading the Central Committee? Is it possible to find out how many warehouses have already been built, where exactly they have been built, how many are being built and when they will be built, how many poods of grain have already been concentrated in warehouses and how much will be concentrated by the end of September. There is no way to tolerate further deceit. Is it possible to get an honest and direct answer.
Stalin.
Nr 5/sh
2 p.m.
14/VIII - 31 1
F. 558. Op. 11. D. 76. L. 8, 8v. Autograph.
1 Date, number and time entered by the secretary.Kaganovich to Stalin August 15, 1931
Hello Comrade Stalin!
1) On the 14th we held a meeting on the second five-year plan, after a rather lengthy exchange of opinions we came to the conclusion that this draft directive was no good and that it should be revised. Firstly, there are many incorrect formulations and attitudes, for example, that already in the 2nd five-year plan we will be able to overtake and overtake the advanced capitalist countries. You set the resolution of this task in 10 years, and for good reason, because one cannot underestimate the effort that the resolution of this task requires, and the Gosplanners decided from Bagdatiev's "realism" to run "forward" to maximalism. Hence their metal program of 45 mil. tons in 37. We proceeded from the installation that you once gave. We rejected 45 and accepted 25–30 mil. tons. We instructed to rework this draft directive, proceeding, firstly, from the task of equal distribution of productive forces in the country, both industry and X. Secondly, to develop in particular the questions and measures connected with the material and living conditions of the workers. The sharpness is not so much in the 6-hour working day, but in telling the worker clearly (on the basis of calculations) what his position will be, then he will go to the factory faster. Expand the question of liquidating the hunger for goods, of the urban economy, elaborate on the question of personnel, and in general do not get away with the phrase, and, moreover, incorrect, that there will be no classes in the second five-year plan, and only small-property psychology, bureaucracy and snatching. Apparently, we will first have to adopt a shorter directive in the PB so that on the basis of this directive the control figures for the 2nd Five-Year Plan will be developed, which, probably, will be a detailed document for the plenum of the Central Committee and the party conference1 .
2) Today at the PB we discussed first of all a number of issues related to fuel and Donbass. The fuel situation requires vigorous action. We created a commission, which was given a number of instructions both in the distribution of fuel and in the organization of production 2 .
We had a fight over the transportation of fuel to Leningrad by sea by foreign ships. Kuibyshev, and partly Sergo, and the people of Leningrad stood up for this. But the PB rejected this proposal and decided to lean on our Volga water transport, apparently it would be necessary to send authorized representatives of the Central Committee and SNK there, as we did with railway transport 3 .
3) We adopted a decree on non-ferrous metals and in the section on aluminum adopted 20 thousand [thousand] tons in 32 and 70 thousand [thousand] tons in 33, although our industrialists tried in every possible way to prove the unreality and impossibility of this. Apparently, to carry out this solution, you will still have to press 4 .
4) The course of grain procurements in the first half of August inspires some apprehension. Procurement is going badly in the Lower Volga, no matter in the North Caucasus and elsewhere (for 10 days of August, 20% of the plan for the USSR). We decided to send directives to each region separately and in general to deal with more specific operational management of grain procurements. We are not sending people. Let the localities show themselves in the procurement work, unless it is necessary to send several members of the Central Committee to certain regions, depending on the course of the work .
5) Extremely bad with meat. Today I had to quarrel with Mikoyan. Instead of specific proposals to increase procurement, he made only one proposal to reduce consumption and then verbally adds that the reduced rate is unlikely to be sustained. We accepted a reduction in consumption even in Moscow, but instructed him to develop and submit to the PB a specific plan for economic measures, and in particular for poultry procurement 6 .
6) On the 20th, the question of the situation with the export-import plan and the currency will have to be discussed. The other day, in the commission on the Supreme Economic Council's currency plan for August, we had to go, on the one hand, to increase payments in America in comparison with what Rozengolts proposed, and, on the other hand, to cut the requirements of the Supreme Economic Council. We are not doing new orders now, but you have to pay for the old ones, for which 40% has already been paid. The Supreme Economic Council demanded 8–9 mil. rub. We calculated that it is really necessary to pay, and settled on 6 million, but the situation with the currency is extremely tense. I must tell you, Comrade Stalin, that the whole arrangement of the import business made a very bad impression on me, they cannot answer the question of what kind of equipment we are importing in August, as a result, maybe we are in a hurry to import in August what will be six months later lie dead capital, as is the case in some factories. It is not known what payments we have by quarters, to whom and for what we pay. It is felt that there is no unity between the order, the movement of equipment and the movement of payments. If you consider it expedient, perhaps we could deal here with these questions of properly staging matters in Foreign Trade and the Supreme Council of National Economy.
7) We put aside the question of cotton procurement. The fact is that they contracted for 40 mil. pounds. Now it turns out that the data on sown areas were exaggerated by 18-20 percent, and now there is a discussion, including Shadunts, about how much cotton to harvest. One says 32 mils, another 24–22, and so on. Under these conditions, to give us only a general directive, to keep within the bounds of what was contracted and not to name an exact figure, means to pass over the fact that a discussion is underway that will demoralize the cotton producers. We must give a firm directive on how much to prepare (a figure) and forbid all discussion and chatter, and we decided to postpone it until the 20th in order to get your opinion. Please telegraph.
8) We adopted a resolution on OGIZ today. We will not publish it now. Maybe you and Comrade. Molotov there will be some amendments . About the school was postponed, the question turned out to be very tedious. It was delivered to the PB exceptionally in a timely manner. The commission found out that some projectors led the school along the path of destruction. I'll write more next time .
9) About cooperation and public catering we send the edited text. If you have no amendments, then I ask you to inform us by telegraph so that we can publish them. If there are any corrections, please send them.
Well, with this I will end my protracted letter, Comrade Stalin. I don't know, maybe I'm overloading you with questions and don't let you rest, especially in the early days, but the need is even greater.
Greetings Comrade Molotov.
How do you rest. Are you getting better.
Hello Nadezhda Sergeevna.
Yours L. Kaganovich 9 .
_____________________________
1 See note 3 to document No. 18.
On August 15, 1931, the PB approved a draft resolution submitted by Ordzhonikidze on providing labor for the coal industry and housing construction in the Donbass, an order on the Supreme Council of National Economy of August 14, and a resolution of the People's Commissariat of Supply of August 11 on the supply of Donbass. Narkomsnab was instructed, together with the Central Union, to develop within 15 days "such a procedure for supplying the Donbass, which would guarantee in the future against any interruptions in the supply of Donbass" (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 842. L. 5 ). To finalize the resolution, a commission was created under the chairmanship of Ya.E. Rudzutak, whose decisions were approved by the PB on August 25 (Ibid. D. 844. L. 3, 14–17).
On August 15, 1931, the PB rejected the proposal to deliver oil to Leningrad by sea, confirming the decision of the PB of June 16 to import all oil fuel along the Volga (Ibid. D. 842. L. 2). On August 20, by decision of the PB, they were appointed authorized by the Central Committee and SNK to promote oil: to Astrakhan and Baku - G.I. Blagonravov, to Nizhny Novgorod - G.N. Pylaev and A.A. Zhdanov, to Samara and Saratov - A.I. Krinitsky (Ibid. D. 843. L. 3).
4 On August 15, 1931, the PB approved a draft resolution on non-ferrous metals, gold and platinum. It said: “In connection with the change in the figure for aluminum smelting (up to 20,000 tons in 1932 and up to 70,000 tons in 1933), instruct the Supreme Economic Council to develop measures to ensure the implementation of this decision” (Ibid. D. 842. L. 8 , 28–34). Real aluminum smelting reached 900 tons in 1932 and 4.4 thousand tons in 1933 (Industry of the USSR. M., 1936. P. 525).
On August 15, 1931, the PB instructed the CT, together with Mikoyan, to draw up a draft directive for local organizations, "both in terms of quantitative indicators of procurement, and in relation to their nature and methods." The CT was asked, if necessary, to schedule the dispatch of several members of the Central Committee to those areas where the situation with grain procurements is exceptionally bad (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 842. L. 7).
On August 15, 1931, the PB allowed the People's Commissariat of Supply to reduce the supply of meat for the third quarter in connection with the reduction in the plan for procuring livestock (Ibid. D. 842. L. 6). On August 30, the PB approved a draft resolution proposed by the People's Commissariat for the Organization of a new livestock campaign "so that the People's Commissariat for Supply would concentrate the work of its bodies on the actual implementation of this decision and on providing the main working areas, primarily Moscow and Leningrad, with meat" (Ibid. D. 845 L. 2, 15–20).
On August 15, the PB approved a draft resolution on the report of the OGIZ (Ibid. D. 842. L. 8, 50–56). In its final form, the document was published in the newspapers on September 3, 1931 as a resolution of the Central Committee "On Publishing Work."
8 The Decree “On Primary and Secondary Schools” was adopted by the PB on August 25, 1931 (Ibid. D. 844. L. 8, 22–29) and published in the newspapers on September 5. In particular, it condemned “attempts to base all school work on the so-called “project method”, which “leaded in fact to the destruction of the school.”
9 In the upper right corner of Kaganovich's litter "August 1931"Stalin to Kaganovich August 15, 1931
Cipher.
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Poskrebyshev for Kaganovich.
In the letter of the Central Committee to the regional committees and regional committees about the reasons for the changes in the leadership of the OGPU, a mistake made by the scribe crept in. Paragraph 4 of the letter says: "The OGPU is and remains the naked sword of the working class, which accurately and skillfully defeated the enemy." Instead, it should be: "The OGPU is and remains the naked sword of the working class, accurately and skillfully smashing the enemy." Please correct the error and report the correction to the secretaries of the regional committees 1 .
Stalin.
Nr 6/sh.
12:00 p.m.
15/VIII-31 2
_______________________________
On July 25, 1931, Stalin raised the question of the GPU at the PB. The following were appointed as deputy chairmen of the OGPU: I.AAkulov (first), G.G.Yagoda (second), V.Abalitsky (third). The members of the board were: A.Kh.Artuzov, Y.SAgranov and
D.A Bulatov. SAMESSING was released from work in the OGPU, and Ya.K. Olsky from the duties of the head. Special Department of the OGPU (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 10. L. 127). On August 5, 1931, the PB again considered a package of issues of the OGPU: G.E. Prokofiev was appointed head of the Special Department of the OGPU, L.N. Asia, F.D. Medved was left by the OGPU PP in Leningrad, etc. The PB suggested that the OGPU submit to the PB a report on the economic organizations existing under the OGPU (without camps) indicating their financial balance. The commission consisting of: Stalin, Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze, A.A. Andreev and V.R. Menzhinsky was instructed to compile a commentary on the decisions of the Central Committee on changes in the composition of the OGPU and the transfer of some members of the OGPU collegium to another job. Secretaries of regional committees, regional committees, the national Central Committees were instructed to report these changes to a narrow meeting of the active workers of the GPU in the regions, territories, republics (Ibid. Op. 3. D. 840. L. 1, 2). On August 6, 1931, the PB approved a draft letter to the secretaries of the national Central Committees, regional committees and regional committees signed by Stalin, in which they were asked to give the following explanation: Messing, Velsky, Evdokimov “waged within the OPTU a completely intolerable group struggle against the leadership of the OGPU [...] spread among the employees of the OGPU there are completely untrue corrupting rumors that the case of sabotage in the military department is a “phony” case, ”etc. Further, the resolution stated that "the Central Committee dismisses the talk and whispering about the "internal weakness" of the organs of the OGPU and the "incorrectness" of the line of their practical work, as rumors coming without a doubt from the hostile camp."
2 Date, number and time entered by the secretary.Kaganovich to Stalin August 15, 1931
S. secret.
Encryption.
Dispatched from Moscow 15–37 15/VIII — 31.
Received for decryption 18-00 15/VIII - 31
In. No. 7/sh.
Tov. Stalin.
Menzhinsky and Akulov ask for a speaker on the OGPU asset on the decision of the Central Committee. Wouldn't it be better to entrust one of them. Please share your opinion with whom to entrust.
Kaganovich.
18–50
15/VIII-31
Sochi.Stalin to Kaganovich August 15, 1931
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Poskrebyshev for Kaganovich.
I insist that the decision of the Central Committee be carried out and that the secretary of the regional party committee must be the speaker on the active side of the OGPU. This is necessary so that the report is not regarded as a massacre of this part of the OGPU against another part of it. This is demanded by the interests of unity and cohesion of all the workers of the GPU.
Stalin.
Nr 7/sh.
23h 45m
15/VIII - 31 1
F. 558. On. 11. D. 76. L. 10, 10v. Autograph.
1 Date, number and time entered by the secretary.Kaganovich to Stalin, Molotov August 16, 1931
S. secret.
Encryption.
Dispatched from Moscow 22-59 16/VIII - 31.
Received for decryption 1-15 17/VIII - 31
In. No. 9/sh.
Tov. Stalin and Molotov.
Please let me know your opinion on the resolutions on cooperation, state trade and public catering. Is it possible to publish them now 1 .
No. 1067/sh.
Kaganovich.
13–35
17/VIII-31 2
Sochi.
__________________
1 See Document No. 12, Note 1 to Document No. 13 and Note 8 to Document No. 79.
2 Date of decryption.Stalin to Kaganovich August 17, 1931
I sent my opinion about Narpit by letter, you will receive the eighteenth. You did not send a resolution on cooperation, so I could not express my opinion. Nr 10/sh.
Stalin.
17/VIII-31 1
F. 558. Op. 11. D. 76. L. 13. Autograph.
1 Number and date entered by the secretary.Stalin to Kaganovich [August 17, 1931]
Hello, Comrade Kaganovich!
1) I return the draft resolution] of the Central Committee on public] catering with my comments and amendments to the text 1 .
2) The draft resolution] did not receive the Central Committee on cooperation .
3) I advise you to discuss Comrade Syrtsov's note on the forest. It is possible that it contains healthy elements 2 .
4) I propose to postpone the issue of Ramishvili's departure abroad (to emigrate) until the fall, until the members of the PB return from vacation.
5) Comrade Kuibyshev's note and, in general, all his behavior makes a heavy impression. Looks like he's running away from work. On the other hand, Comrade Ord[zhoniki]dze is still behaving badly. The latter, apparently, does not realize that [that] his behavior (with sharpening against comrades Molotov, Kuibyshev) objectively leads to undermining our leading group, historically formed in the struggle against all types of opportunism - creates the danger of its destruction . Doesn't he understand that on this path he will not find any support from our side? What nonsense!
6) Now it is clear to me that Kartvelishvili and Gruzzek's secretariat, with their reckless "grain procurement policy", brought a number of regions of Western Georgia to starvation . They do not understand that the Ukrainian methods of grain procurement, which are necessary and expedient in grain -growing regions, are inexpedient and harmful in non-grain regions, which, moreover , do not have any industrial proletariat. Hundreds of people are being arrested, including members of the party , who clearly sympathize with the discontented and do not sympathize with the “politics” of the Georgian Central Committee. But arrests will not get you far. It is necessary to intensify (speed up!) the delivery of grain now, without delay. Without it, we can get bread riots .despite the fact that the grain problem has already been resolved in our country. Let immediately upon receipt of this letter the PB oblige Mikoyan to increase the supply of grain to Western Georgia and personally oversee the execution. Otherwise, we will surely create a political scandal.
_____________________
1 On August 10, 1931, the PB approved, with an amendment, a draft resolution on the state and development of public catering, “including in it a clause that in canteens, along with standard meals, there would be meals at increased prices.” The final editing of the draft resolution was entrusted to a commission consisting of: Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Zelensky (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 841. L. 3). The final version of the document was published in the press on August 20 as a resolution of the Central Committee "On measures to improve public catering" of August 19, 1931. See also documents No. 1, 7, 11, 12, 13.
On August 20, 1931, the PB decided to discuss the note by S.I. Syrtsov on the costs of exporting timber at a meeting on August 25 when considering the issue of exporting timber as a whole (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 843. L. five). However, on August 25, the discussion did not take place. On August 25, a decision was made by polling members of the PB to refer questions about exports and expenses for exporting timber for preliminary consideration to the currency commission (Ibid. D. 844. L. 12).Stalin to Kaganovich August 19, 1931
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU. Kaganovich for members of the Politburo. Please send to the members of the Politburo my first telegram on grain warehouses for tea growers and tobacco growers, Mikoyan's reply 1 and my present telegram representing a reply to Mikoyan's telegram.
First . Point one of Mikoyan's telegram is calculated to mislead the Central Committee. The existing three grain warehouses in Batumi, Sukhumi and Poti are intended not for tobacco growers and tea growers, but for urban consumers. Mikoyan could, with the same dubious right, refer to the presence of grain warehouses in Tiflis, Baku. That is why the Central Committee adopted a special decision at the beginning of July to set up new grain warehouses for tea and tobacco growers, because the old warehouses are intended for other purposes. Mikoyan kept silent about all this.
Second . The second paragraph of Mikoyan's telegram is designed to bureaucratically unsubscribe from the Central Committee, hiding behind Rozit's "decree" and Mukhtarov's "official report" on the construction of new warehouses. But Mukhtarov is not a builder. And what are the "official reports" of such "builders" that have not been verified by the competent authorities, we know well from experience. It is clear to me that a new violation of the decision of the Central Committee is being prepared, for, as it is clear even from Mikoyan’s smoothed telegram, by the end of the year, not only will the construction and commissioning of new warehouses not be completed, but even the selection of sites and the supply of building materials will not be completed. This is what we call deception of the Central Committee, with a covert reference to "official" papers.
Third . From the third paragraph of Mikoyan's telegram, it is clear that the bureaucratic conceit of the People's Commissariat of Supply has no limits. We had an experience when the People's Commissariat of Supply counted its own grain reserves for four months and still could not count them properly. After such a sad experience, one should have been more modest. But Narkomsnab does not suffer from modesty, apparently counting on the fact that the long-suffering of the Central Committee will never end.
Fourth . I propose to put the whole business of building new grain warehouses for tea growers and tobacco growers in western Georgia under the control of the RCT, send people to the places, involve the Zakchek, in particular Beria, in the work, and ensure that all new warehouses are built and put into operation no later than the start of November 2 . Nr 11, 12/sh.
Stalin.
11h. 30 m
19/VIII - 31 3
______________________
In response to a request from Stalin, Mikoyan sent a telegram to Stalin and Kaganovich on August 18, 1931: “I inform you about the grain warehouses in Western Georgia: First, in 1930, Soyuzkhleb built three warehouses with a total capacity of 760,000 poods, of which 250,000 poods were built in Sukhumi, in operation on October 10, Batum 210 thousand pounds on October 1, Poti 300 thousand pounds on December 1, 1930. The second - the decision of the Central Committee on the construction of warehouses in 1931 was adopted on July 10. On July 12, Soyuzkhleb, signed by Deputy Chairman Comrade Rosita, ordered his Transcaucasian representative Mukhtarov to build 10 warehouses with a total capacity of 950,000 poods to supply tea growers and tobacco growers ... Thus, first, it is not true that no warehouses were built last year. Second, it is not true that no warehouses are being built now. I am deprived of the opportunity to establish who and why is deceiving the Central Committee,
On August 20, the PB considered Stalin's telegram and accepted his demands (for more details, see the introduction to the section).
3 Date, number and time entered by the secretary.Kaganovich to Stalin August 19, 1931
S. secret.
Encryption.
Shipped from Moscow on 21-13 19/VIII - 31.
Received for deciphering 20/VIII - 31, 4 hours - m.
In. No. 12/sh.
Stalin.
The Politburo adopted a resolution on increasing coal and coke resources (on the balance of coal). Minor amendments have been made to the draft with which you were familiar. I ask you to let me know your opinion on whether to print this resolution in the newspapers.
Kaganovich.
9 a.m. — m.
20/VIII - 31
Tskaltubo.Stalin to Kaganovich August 20, 1931
Although I am not familiar with the final draft, I vote for it by confidence. An amendment should be made to split the coke association into two associations: Southern and Eastern. I do not object to publication 1 . Nr 13/sh.
Stalin.
10:30
20/VIII - 31
Tskaltubo. 2
_________________
On August 15, the PB considered the issue “On measures to improve the balance of coal in the USSR” and approved the draft resolution submitted by the Supreme Council of National Economy on increasing coal and coke resources. The final editing of the resolution was entrusted to a commission consisting of: Kaganovich, Kuibyshev and Ordzhonikidze. The final version of the resolution included a clause on the division of the coking association into two: southern and eastern. (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 842. L. 5, 35–42). On August 24, 1931, it was published in Pravda.
2 Date, number and address entered by the secretary.Kaganovich to Stalin August 20, 1931
Hello, dear Comrade Stalin! Today we had a meeting of the PB on some issues, we postponed the decision in order to request you.
1) About CER. In connection with the difficult financial situation of the road, the Rudzutak commission developed a number of proposals along the line of streamlining the financial economy of the road, but among them there are points that could cause complications with the Chinese. For example: the demand for an immediate sharp reduction in road spending on lending to Chinese government agencies and the issuance of non-repayable loans, the maintenance and transportation of security troops, etc. If we add organizational issues to this, such as the question of the rights of the manager, his Chinese deputy, then all this can cause an aggravation of relations. We ask you to tell us your opinion whether it is worth going to the known exacerbations now. The project has been sent to you 1 .
2) On the conclusion of an agreement with a Belgian firm for the sale of Soviet bread. At one time, the PB rejected this offer due to the high interest rate for warrant loans (16%), now the Belgians have received a new offer of 12% per annum, but instead of half a million pounds they give 200 thousand pounds. Commission 1% instead of the expected 1, 1/4 and 1.5% depending on the size of the bread sold. Exportkhleb introduces two representatives to the company who will promptly participate in the sale, and if the sale is unsatisfactory, then they (Exportkhleb's representatives) have the right to sell themselves, etc. Since this year the realization of our grain exports will encounter considerable difficulties, the question arises whether these new conditions should be abandoned. We are waiting for your opinion, it would be nice to telegraph 2 .
3) The third question, which has taken on great urgency among us, is the question of new orders in America. Specifically, we decided to ask you about new orders for Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsstroy. Guided by the decision of the PB of July 20, we today allowed to supplement orders in America for Avtostroy, Kharkiv Trak[orny] and Dneprostroy by 3 mil. 900 thousand rubles, as regards Magnitostroy and Kuznetsstroy, we postponed the issue. Paragraph "e" of the PB resolution makes a difference between these plants (I am sending you this resolution). I must say that we also have a significant overrun for the first plants. For example: according to Avtostroi, contingents [ents] were scheduled for 19 mil. 160 tons, already purchased for 22 mil. 356 tons. Now they are asking for an additional 5 mil. 180 tons. We gave 3 mil. 364 tons. We reduced it by, for example, 40 lathes, transferred for some reason from Europe to America. The same was also reduced by 800 thousand rubles for various equipment transferred from Europe to America, etc. When discussing all these questions, the degrees, as usual, rose very high. It began already in the morning at the commission on foreign exchange, in fact, it began already at the commission a week ago when discussing the August plan for foreign exchange payments of the Supreme Council of National Economy in America. Rozengolts proposed to set 2 mil., which turned out to be clearly untenable, because the orders were given, 40% had already been paid, and the refusal to further payments meant a scandal in America. The Supreme Council of National Economy demanded 8 million, we stopped, as you know, at 6 million. The exchange of courtesies between Roz[engolets] and Sergo was very unpleasant, but ended more or less tolerably, for we released 6 mil. But if we were forced there due to the fact that orders must already be redeemed......*
And when today we agreed on the commission, attacks and counterattacks began. We wanted to discuss export issues - the implementation of the plan, the report on upcoming payments, etc. Sergo demanded that, first of all, the issue of American new orders be discussed, arguing that Rosengoltz was acting outrageous by sending a telegram to America prohibiting new orders until further notice. We agreed and put this question first, but Sergo, instead of a report on the merits, began to prove that the plants were important, they must be ordered, otherwise the program would fail and, in fact, reduced to the fact that we were approved by contingents of 80 mil. to America + 8 mil. remaining from a special quarter and that we must proceed from these 88 mil. ruble I suggested that we be calmly told with the numbers and nomenclature of orders for which factories, what they want to order, what could be transferred to Europe, so that we do not blindly decide, but having understood. Then Sergo allowed himself unacceptable tactlessness, for example: “You,” he said, “are afraid to force Rozengolts to comply with decisions, etc. If you yourself, they say, are afraid, then we will ask those who left, etc. (as if we should ask only for fear of deciding the issue). Sergo had no basis for such a statement, because he did not raise this issue in the PB. I answered him that we can request it regardless of such a statement, but such a statement of his is wrong, because the PB can force any people's commissar to comply with the decisions of the PB, even such as Sergo. ” (as if we should ask only when we are afraid to decide the issue). Sergo had no basis for such a statement, because he did not raise this issue in the PB. I answered him that we can request it regardless of such a statement, but such a statement of his is wrong, because the PB can force any people's commissar to comply with the decisions of the PB, even such as Sergo. ” (as if we should ask only when we are afraid to decide the issue). Sergo had no basis for such a statement, because he did not raise this issue in the PB. I answered him that we can request it regardless of such a statement, but such a statement of his is wrong, because the PB can force any people's commissar to comply with the decisions of the PB, even such as Sergo.
At the commission, we then adopted a number of decisions in order to prepare questions, because Rozengolts turned out to be unprepared neither in terms of exports, nor in calculations of forthcoming payments. The question of urgent orders in America, we instructed to calculate how much orders are calculated for 4 plants of the 1st group: AMO, Avtostroy, Dneprostroy and Kharkov Tractor Plant and for the 2nd (Kuznetsstroy and Magnitostroy) and transferred to PB.
At the PB, after the proposal to decide now on orders for the 1st group of plants, i.e. about orders for 3 m[ln]. 900 thousand [thousand], but to postpone about Magnitostroy and Kuznetsstroy, once again look at what we are ordering, and at the same time ask you, Comrade Sergo quite unexpectedly again sharpened the question, I will not detail the entire course of his reasoning, he, for example, said: “ You say you want to play the role of statesmen here, but when the factories fail, I will have to answer, and not to those who are conducting a “serious discussion” here. Why does Sergo need to create this atmosphere, as he does not understand that the PB cannot satisfy all his requests, that we must be objective. The more difficult it is for us without you, the more everyone should restrain themselves. He ended with a ridiculous statement that I (Kaganovich) was yelling at him, and that he would not allow this.3 without refusal and not allow such a situation that it would be impossible to object to one or another incorrect proposal by Sergo.
I may have stated all this in too much detail, but, Comrade Stalin, this excited me very much.
In essence, we ask you to answer us, firstly, about orders for Magnitogorsk and Kuznetskstroy, maybe some of the orders can be ordered in Europe, and some in America. Secondly, Sergo places orders for Chelyabstroy, but this was not included in the contingents. Thirdly, tubular pipes and other oil equipment have been ordered in America, you will have to pay for this, but there are still a number of requirements for new orders. How to be with them. Apparently, they will have to be reduced.
4) Today we listened to Pyatakov's message about German orders. They easily dropped the accounting percentage down to 10%, because, as Pyatakov says, they really need our orders. They talked to him about the possibility of giving us a new loan of 200 to 300 mil. stamps, especially for metal orders 4 .
5) Telegrams from the Middle Volga, from Siberia, about the size of the crop failure. Eikhe has arrived and raises the question once again of revising the plan. He asks to reduce the plan from 100 mil. up to 63. I strongly criticized him for such counter plans, but he asks that we discuss his request. Haven't discussed yet. Perhaps it would be better to refuse now. There later, the question may become clearer.
The people of the Middle Volga are also asking for further] reduction. They certainly can be denied. They also decided about bread for Georgia today. Today I sent you our decision about warehouses. I will personally oversee its implementation.
6) I am sending you a resolution on publishing work (according to the report of the OGIZ) and on elementary and secondary schools. Since there was not a single detailed resolution about the school after the program, we therefore gave an introductory part, where achievements are noted at the beginning. Turning to the shortcomings, I emphasize the main idea that you emphasized when posing the question, that the fundamental shortcoming is the unsatisfactory general education knowledge. We had a lot of fights. Evidently all sorts of leftist and right elements, which the Party has suppressed in all other branches, have found shelter in the organs of education and in pedagogy. That is why we underlined in this resolution the task of combating these elements.
I'll probably end with this. Goodbye. Your Kaganovich. 20/VIII 1931
________________________________
1 In April-October 1931, 22 meetings of the Soviet-Chinese conference took place. The Soviet delegation proposed a draft resolution of controversial issues, including the financial situation of the CER and measures to increase its profitability; on lending to Chinese government agencies and the transportation of guard troops; about the activities of the office of the chairman of the board - director of the road, etc. During the discussion, only the introductory part and certain points of this list were agreed upon. On this, in connection with the Japanese aggression in Manchuria in September 1931, the work of the Soviet-Chinese conference actually stopped (DVP. T. XTV. pp. 786-788). See Document #24.
On July 30, 1931, when considering the issue of selling Soviet grain in Belgium, the PB suggested that the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade respond to the Belgian company about the unacceptability of a high percentage for the USSR (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 10. L. 132). On August 25, 1931, after Stalin's telegram (see document No. 24), the PB decided to agree with the proposal put forward by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade "on concluding an agreement with a Belgian company for the sale of our grain in Belgium with the provision of a warrant loan" (Ibid. L. 170).
3 The end of the sheet is cut off.
4 On August 20, 1931, the PB took note of Pyatakov's message and approved "the measures he had taken to implement the Politburo's decision to establish a fixed maximum interest rate." The PB also decided to hear on August 25 a report by Pyatakov and Rozengolts on measures to combat abuses by firms in the execution of orders. (Ibid L. 164). See also document #2.Stalin to Kaganovich August 21, 1931
Cipher.
For Kaganovich.
Your last undated letter was received on the twentieth.
First . It would be possible to give a plan for cotton procurements of 34,000,000 poods of fiber, of which not less than 28,000,000 poods would be in Central Asia, excluding Kazakhstan .
Second . Your task for the second five-year plan on the account of cast iron is incorrect. It was necessary to give not 25-30 million poods of pig iron 2 but 25 million. Evidently, our dear comrades have not yet outlived the Kriklivoleva sentiments .
Third . Sent comments about Narpit. I will send my comments on cooperation after reading the resolution.
Fourth . It seems to me that you have handed over the currency to the Supreme Council of National Economy through American payments. If you do this, there will be no end to the self-seeking of the Supreme Council of National Economy. It is necessary now, and at all costs, to cut the payments and orders of all people's commissariats to America as much as possible, not paying attention to howling and hysteria. You will see that the people's commissariats will then find ways and means to meet their needs through European orders and our domestic production.
Fifth . Send a brigade of the Central Committee at the head, say, with Unshlikht, to Turkestan immediately to speed up the procurement of cotton .
Sixth . Pravda is being conducted very poorly. Boastful articles about the "decisive" victory of the Chinese Red Army over the troops of Chiang Kai-shek and about the "victories" of the revolutionary movement in India represent nothing but self-deception. Popov's long feuilletons could have been placed in Bolshevik, freeing the corresponding pages of Pravda for more valuable items. Call Popov to order.
Seventh . Report the decision of the Politburo on grain warehouses in western Georgia.
Stalin.
Nr 14/sh, 15/sh.
9:40 a.m.
21/VIII - 31 5
__________________________
On August 25, the PB determined the volume of cotton harvests for the 1931 harvest at 34 million poods, including 28 million poods for Central Asia without Kazakhstan. The Sredazburo of the Central Committee was asked to stop all discussions about the procurement plan and to maximize work on the implementation of the decision of the Central Committee (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 844. L. 2). See also document no. 7.
2 So in the text. That's right: 25-30 million tons of pig iron.
3 See document No. 7. Stalin's proposal was adopted at the meeting on the second five-year plan (see document No. 27). The 17th Conference of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in February 1932 outlined a task for 1937 of 22 million tons of pig iron. Subsequently, this figure was reduced to 18 million tons. For the first time, V. I. Kuzmin reported on the work of meetings at the PB on the second five-year plan and on the agreement with Stalin on the figures for cast iron without reference to the archives (Kuzmin V. I. In the struggle for socialist reconstruction. 1926–1937. M. 1976. P. 188 ).
On August 23, 1931, the PB sent a brigade of the Central Committee of 18 people under the leadership of I.S. Unshlikht to Central Asia for cotton procurement. The term of the business trip is until the recall of the Central Committee (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 844. L. 10).
5 Date, number and time entered by the secretary. The encryption was sent from Kutaisi at 14:00. 55 min. August 21 (Ibid. L. 20).Kaganovich, Postyshev to Stalin August 21, 1931
Encryption.
Dispatched from Moscow 18–52 21/VIII — 31.
Received for deciphering 1 h. 30 m. 22/VIII - 31
In. No. 15/sh.
Tov. Stalin.
one). I received a telegram from the Middle Volga people, Khatayevich and others, in which, again, referring to new data on drought, they demand a new reduction in the plan from 120 to 97 million. We think to strongly scold and resolutely reject.
2). Eikhe came specifically to ask the Central Committee to revise the plan, in view of the large damage to the crop from the drought in a number of areas. He asks instead of 100 million 63 million. In a conversation with him, we rejected his request, but, judging by all the data, we cannot do without some reduction, to about 80-85 million poods. Please give directives.
Kaganovich, Postyshev.
3 o'clock - m.
22/VIII - 31 1
Tskaltubo.
_______________________
1 Date of decryption.Kaganovich to Stalin August 22, 1931
S. secret.
Encryption.
Dispatched from Moscow 22–01 22/VIII — 31.
Received for decryption 1 hour 30 minutes. 23/VIII - 31
In. No. 19/sh.
Tov. Stalin. I received your encryption dated the 21st.
1) We will talk about cotton on the 25th.
2) We will hold a meeting about cast iron and review it in accordance with your instructions.
3) From the letter sent to you dated August 20, acquaint yourself with the disputes that took place at the last Politburo on currency. Our installation completely coincides with your instructions, in the future we will pursue this line even more rigidly. As for the August plan, it turned out during the acquaintance that America's payments were such that it was impossible to postpone, perhaps something could be cut. Let's learn next time.
4) As for Pravda, I will give a proper scolding to Popov today and will continue to observe more carefully.
5) The decree about the warehouses of Georgia was sent in encryption, I will follow its implementation. Yesterday Mikoyan said that the bread was already being shipped.
Kaganovich. 3 o'clock - m. 23 / VIII - 31 g. 1
Tskaltubo.
_______________________
1 Date of decryption.Stalin to Kaganovich, Postyshev August 22, 1931
We'll have to slightly reduce the plan of the Siberians and the Middle Volga. I'm afraid that the Lower Volga will also have to be somewhat reduced. It would be possible to give the Middle Volga 100 million poods, Western Siberia 85, and when the Lower Volga raises a question, give it 100 million. Accordingly, the grain fund for animal husbandry will have to be reduced from 100,000,000 poods to 60 or 50 mil.* Hp 18/sh.
Stalin.
12:00 p.m.
22/VIII - 31
Tskaltubo 2 .
__________________
On August 25, 1931, by a poll of members of the PB, resolutions were adopted on the grain procurement plan for Western Siberia and the Middle Volga. The grain procurement plan for Western Siberia was reduced by 15 million poods (the final annual plan was 85 million poods), and for the Middle Volga by 20 million poods (the final plan was 100 million poods) (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 10 L. 170). Real procurements in Western Siberia amounted to 65.3 million pounds, i.e. were approximately at the level of the proposals of R.I. Eikhe, on the Middle Volga - 76.6 million pounds.
2 Date, number, time and address entered by the secretary.Stalin to Kaganovich August 23, 1931
Kaganovich .
The resolution on consumer cooperation seems to me insufficient. The main question of prices and price policy has not been developed there. In view of the spirit of speculation among the co-operators and the outright ignorance in the matter of determining retail prices, the question of prices and price policy cannot be bypassed. It would be necessary, first of all, to create a mixed committee of prices under the Council of People's Commissars. It would be necessary, further, to immediately reduce prices in commercial shops by 30 per cent. Finally, it would be necessary to announce fixed prices for baked bread for working-class regions and fixed prices for baked bread for non-working regions, and the latter should not exceed 50 kopecks per kilo. As for Yakovlev's amendments regarding the entry into the market of state farms and, to some extent, collective farms, I am wholly for them. Moreover, I am in favor of allowing associations of the Supreme Council of National Economy working for the mass consumer to immediately open their stores.1 . I have a bunch of other comments, but more on that in the letter.
Stalin.
Nr 20/sh.
12h. - m.
23/VIII-31 2
__________________________
1 The question of organizing department stores of the Supreme Council of National Economy was considered at a meeting of the PB on September 18, 1931 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 849. L. 4, 5). By January 1932, 83 department stores were opened, which sold goods to workers and employees of enterprises attached to them (GA RF. F. R-5446. Op. 13. D. 1058. L. 6, 29).
2 Date, number and time entered by the secretary.Kaganovich to Stalin August 23 [1931]
23/VIII
Dear comrade Stalin!
I am sending you the PB agenda scheduled for today for 25. Apparently, the main issues will be the reports of the NKVOD and the NKPS and the issues of the NKZem. Without you, it will be difficult for us to develop the issues of the NKPS and NKVOD, as it should be. The state of their work, especially the NKVOD, requires a great new pressure on them. The People's Commissariat of Water Transport is now cutting us off on the export of oil from Baku, and therefore, despite the fact that we rejected the proposal to transport oil to Leningrad by a roundabout route on foreign ships, this question continues to be raised. I think that now we must use all our possibilities, and then, if necessary, we will have time, because it is possible to deliver to Leningrad almost until January. We will not finalize the resolutions on NKVOD, we will send it to you for review. As for the questions of NKZem, Yakovlev informed me that all his questions were agreed with you. At t.1 .
2) We tried to sketch out a list of the main questions for the next month for the PB, so that it would be easier for you to give us your instructions in a timely manner. I am sending it to you.
3) In view of the fact that local wood procurement is bad, we are convening a small meeting at the Central Committee for 29 - in total 15 people from the Moscow, Leningrad, Nizhny Novgorod, Ivanovo, Ural and Western regions. It is necessary to pull up this matter, otherwise 2 will be left without firewood .
4) Grain procurement is not going badly now. Although the growth rate is slow, 14.8% of the annual plan has been prepared, and compared to last year, 221%. Last year, 108 m. 416 tons, now 239 m. 751 tons have already been harvested. As of August 20, the plan was fulfilled by 55% of the monthly plan. These 2 five-day periods must be very intense, since in order to fully fulfill the August plan (182 million have already been prepared), it is necessary to prepare 148 million more. pounds, i.e. rates should be almost doubled, and in Ukraine we have a decline in the last five days. Things are going especially badly in Kazakhstan, in the Urals, in Bashkiria, and also in Siberia, both Western and Eastern. We sent strong telegrams to these regional committees and regional committees, since these are the first telegrams, I am sending them to you for review (Siberia was not sent). We have not yet sent to other regions, we will see as we go3 .
Approximately in the same spirit, we sent telegrams to a number of regional committees for meat procurement, since the situation with meat is difficult 4 .5) On economic organizations at OPTU. T. Yagoda keeps hoping that this cup will blow them away, i.e. economic organizations will not be taken away from them. A note has been sent to you, we will discuss this issue on the 30th, if you have any changes, please send them5. They seized a lot of superfluous things along the party line, it turned out that the cell of the OPTU unites not only the employees of the OPTU itself, but also cadets of the Higher School, employees of the OPTU cooperative, a bakery, a waste plant and persistently asked to join the cell of Butyrskaya prison, although it is in another area. I consider such a structure of the party organization to be completely wrong and I think that they should leave only the workers of the OPTU, in extreme cases, allow school cadets together with them, although there are many of them and they could form an independent cell. I had to make the information on the asset. The decision of the Central Committee, apparently, is accepted very well. I told them that to be a good Chekist is, first of all, to be a Bolshevik, loyal to the party line, to be loyal to the Central Committee of the party. One thing is clear, that by the decision of the Central Committee and the way it was presented, a huge party work has been done. T. Stalin! I kindly ask you to give your final advice on the following question. Menzhinsky, Akulov, Bal[itsky] stubbornly resist the appointment of Agranov as authorized OPTU in Moscow, proving the impossibility of removing him from the Secret Political Directorate. They nominate others, Menzhinsky called Mantsev, I rejected this candidacy], because I think that this is Messing No. 2, there is a candidate] Leplevsky - an old security officer, worked in Ukraine, now here in the central office of the OPTU, and others. Of course, I consider Agranov's candidacy the most suitable. I ask you to write me your opinion, if possible, by telegraph.
6) I am sending you Bukharin's report (if you feel like reading it) made by him at a meeting in Sokolniki Park. In addition to the fact that the report, in my opinion, is superficial and even primitive and empty, there are obviously bad places in it, on page 2, for example, when analyzing the results of the 5-year plan, he states “we are dealing with such very important things as it should be as a food issue ... light industry”, etc. In my opinion, this is not an admission of his mistakes, but an accusation of us, apparently, even if he wants to get close to the Central Committee, he still does not admit his mistakes in his gut, at least not completely. How, for example, to explain that he has nothing about the Central Committee in his report? Of course, not 100% loyalty to the party line, but he understood his new position in such a way that the star of Nikolai would shine again in Moscow. He promised dozens of factories, institutions, universities to act, I think that he still has a group of people who organized the excitement around his performances. It is clear that as soon as we noticed this, we considered it necessary to place the regulation of these actions in the hands of the party organs. Of course, it is not necessary to deprive him of the opportunity to speak, and when he turned to me about speaking in the Hall of Columns in front of an audience of engineers, some of the directors, I did not mind, but if he understands his mission in such a way that he himself must go to meetings all day long, then this will harm both his work and meetings, so I advised him that he go to reports through the MK, as all other comrades do.
7) About "Pravda": I had a strong and thorough conversation with Popov, I cursed him both on those questions about which you wrote, and on others. There is no doubt that the comrades from Pravda are now crossing certain boundaries, both in terms of self-promotion and in the tone and nature of the material. After last year's criticism of you, they turned well to the economy, but now they get a solid drumbeat and often an orderly tone, they try to sort of manage; True, they must correct shortcomings, but they must also educate millions, raise their ideology, and in this they lack much. Apparently, after your arrival, you will again have to raise them to a new level, as you did last year, but before that I will observe here.
8) You are right that our decision about 25–30 mil. tons of pig iron leaves a loophole for leftist projectors, although we fought back and failed 45 mil. tons, but the figure was oscillatory, not clear, so tomorrow or the day after tomorrow we will hold a meeting and reconsider our decision.
I'll end with this.
Let me know if you are having a good rest in a new place, how you are getting better.
Shake your hand. Your L. Kaganovich.
PS 1) I have just received your encryption about cooperation, we discussed the issue of prices, but since there were few materials on this issue, we limited ourselves only to indicating that it is impossible to increase, this is of course not enough, upon receipt of your letter we will deal with processing. Now let's take a look at the prices. 2) We are waiting for your answer about the currency, although your setting is clear from the previous telegram.
L. K-h.
________________________________
1 August 25, 1931 - The PB approved the resolution of the USSR NKZ on the reorganization of Zernotrest, in which, in particular, “in view of the fact that since 1929 the number of grain state farms and the volume of production of Zernotrest has grown 20 times, and the number of grain state farms has reached 207, which makes it impossible to manage the production work of each of these state farms from one center, ”it was decided to create 9 allied grain trusts (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 844. L. 4, 20, 21).
On September 25, 1931, at a meeting of the PB, the proposals of the meeting under the Central Committee on logging and wood harvesting were heard and the decision of the Central Committee on logging and logging was approved (Ibid. D. 846. L. 9, 31–34).
3 There are no telegrams.
4 On August 30, 1931, the PB approved a draft resolution proposed by the People's Commissariat of Supply on the organization of a new cattle logging campaign in order to provide the main working areas, primarily Moscow and Leningrad, with meat (Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 845. L. 2, 15–20). See also Note 6 to Document No. 7.
5 The question “On the economic organizations existing under the OGPU” was considered at the PB on September 10, 1931 and was postponed (Ibid. D. 847. L. 6). The PB returned to its consideration again on November 10, 1931. It was decided to transfer the issue to a commission headed by P.P. Postyshev (Ibid. D. 859. L. 2). The final decision was made on January 8, 1932. It, in particular, provided for the OGPU to keep all state farms near Moscow, which ensured the supply of employees and command staff of the OGPU troops through the OGPU cooperative. All surplus production of state farms in excess of meeting the needs of the cooperative, calculated according to the norms of the People's Commissariat of Supply, was obliged to transfer to the OGPU at the disposal of the People's Commissariat of Supply, etc. (Ibid. D. 867. L. 24, 47).Stalin to Kaganovich August 25, 1931
Kaganovich .
First . In view of currency difficulties and unacceptable credit conditions in America, I speak out against any new orders for America. I propose to forbid the giving of new orders to America, to interrupt all negotiations already begun on new orders and, if possible, to break the agreements already concluded on old orders with the transfer of orders to Europe or to our own factories. I propose not to make any exceptions to this rule either for Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsstroy, or for Kharkovstroy, Dneprostroy, AMO and Avtostroy. I propose to cancel all previous decisions of the Politburo that contradict this decision.
Second . I have no objection to the agreement with the Belgians on a warrant loan.
Third . You can wait with the CER.
Stalin.
Nr 21/sh.
10 a.m. - m.
25/VIII-31 1
______________________
1 Date, number and time entered by the secretary.Stalin to Kaganovich August 25, 1931
Kaganovich .
I have no objection to the proposal of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture for seed aid if the amount of aid is necessarily reduced from 459,000 centners to 300,000 1 . Vneshtorg's offer to sell oats must be accepted 2 .
Stalin.
Nr 22/sh.
12:20 p.m.
25/VIII - 31 3
___________________________
1 On August 26, 1931, the PB decided to issue in the order of semsud: Ural 185 thousand, Western Siberia 80 thousand, Bashkiria 35 thousand centners of seeds (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 10. L. 178).
On August 25, 1931, the PB allowed the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade to export 110,000 tons of oats from cash warranted in ports in August - 50,000 tons (Ibid. L. 169).
3 Date, number and time entered by the secretary.Stalin to Kaganovich August 25 [1931]
25/VIII
Hello, Comrade Kaganovich! I received your last letter yesterday. The answer to the questions was given in ciphers.
1) I think that the question of American] orders is more acute than some] com[ari] cabbage soup think. It's not just the lack of currency. The point is, first of all, that if we do not refuse new orders for America on those draconian lending conditions that America practices, we may lose those favorable conditions that we have achieved in Germany, Italy, England (and we will achieve in France). The comrades of the Supreme Council of National Economy do not understand this. Of course, there may be exceptions, say, for Chelyabstroy or the military industry. But this is a special issue to be decided by the PB in each individual case.
I wrote about this to [ovari]schu Ordzhonikidze 1 .
2) I'm not sure that the resolution on cooperation should be published on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee. Why couldn't it have been released on behalf of the Enforcement Commission? Furthermore, it would not be bad if the question were postponed until the end of the month, when I would already be in Sochi and would have the opportunity to talk with Molotov about the final] text of the resolution.
Well, I shake hands. I. Stalin.
_____________________________
On August 1 , 26, Stalin sent the following telegram to Ordzhonikidze: “I received the letter. The answer is by letter. I disagree about American orders. If we do not refuse orders for America and the hooligan credit conditions practiced in America, we risk losing those preferential credit conditions that we won in Europe. You do not take this into account, and this is the main thing” (Ibid., L. 42).Kaganovich to Stalin August 26 [1931]
26/VIII
Hello Comrade Stalin!
1) We received your telegram about orders in America, which resolved our disputes even more radically than we here thought. We are here - we raised the issue at the PB, accepted your proposals, sent a telegram to America about the suspension of all new orders. Tomorrow we will convene a commission on the currency and we will specifically deal with the consideration of the portfolio of orders and the transfer of part to Europe, part to the USSR. It is possible that the disputes will again be heated on specific issues, but having a clear attitude, it will be easier to resolve all practical issues 1 .
2) We have changed the number of cast iron by setting it firmly to 25 mils, in addition we have added the figure of 170 mils. hectares of sowing in the last year of the 5-year plan. Yakovlev informed that this was agreed with you, but we still have not yet formalized the decision of the meeting on the five-year plan through the PB. I ask you to let me know whether it is necessary to issue it through the PB in order for it to be a mandatory directive for all bodies and, first of all, for the State Planning Commission it would be necessary to do this.
3) We have taken some measures with fuel, now we are adopting a large resolution, mainly affecting the issues of use and transportation, because there were a sufficient number of important resolutions on extraction, the only thing is that it is carried out. We only instructed to specifically monitor the extraction of certain types of fuel, and take appropriate operational measures. We left one question. At this PB (on the 25th) it was again proposed to import oil by sea on foreign ships. This will require approximately 1.5 million rubles. Personally, I think that in any case it can be delayed for a month and a half. If we accept it now, it will lead to an even greater demobilization of our river transport. I ask you to write down your thoughts, since at the next meeting of the PB the question of the importation of oil on foreign ships will again be raised.
4) It is precisely for this reason that the question of water transport has taken on a rather acute character in our PB, I had to say a strong word about NKVOD. Janson delivered his report in an epicly calm tone. August gives a sharp decline, especially for oil. The June plan for oil transportation was fulfilled by 70 percent, the July plan by 76 percent, and for 20 days of August the monthly plan was fulfilled by only 23 percent. The main thing is in the inability to use the available resources, the barges stand idle for weeks unloaded. At one time, you especially emphasized the need to attract clientele. We issued a resolution, but the unfortunate NKVD does not even think about using its rights: "why quarrel." I had to point out that the NKVD was sleeping, had not raised a single question to the Central Committee, and was peacefully sailing past the quiet shores. It is clear that the NKVOD has not yet justified our hopes. Decisions made after the meeting are carried out very poorly.
5) Rukhimovich got off in his report with general talk instead of a specific analysis of what is and what needs to be done on roads, junctions, on certain types of tasks - half the time he cited statistics showing the disproportion between the growth of the economy and transport, spoke rather ironically about the established meters , which are not being fulfilled, and devoted the second part of the report to hysterics that transport is not given enough, that it is necessary to decisively change the attitude, etc. Rukhimovich once again revealed that he was thoroughly saturated with rotten skepticism towards our plans and possibilities, and the situation now is such that July and August are deteriorating - especially in the repair of steam locomotives. The practice of depersonalization is increasing again. The quality of repairs is poor, hence the increase in the percentage of sick locomotives, the Vorza factories do not work well, they scattered the repair of the track facilities on a wide front, and now there is a danger that by the autumn they will not have time to finish what they started. Counter traffic, the running of empty wagons and platforms not only does not decrease, but even increases in a number of places, etc. etc. Of course, it will be necessary to improve the technical supply of transport, but they don’t know how to really use what they get. From the minutes of the PB you will see that we have given the commission a large program, we will have to deal with the main issues closely, as was the case last year2 .
I would like to ask you to drop a few words, whether the question is correctly posed, because the work of the commission, apparently, will drag on a little. We will submit specific specific proposals on issues to the PB each time.
6) There is a paragraph in the resolution on special settlers, which says "to recognize as possible the restoration of the rights of young people who have reached the age of 18 before the expiration of a 5-year period in cases where this youth has shown itself on the positive side." Now the CEC has prepared a corresponding law. I began to doubt whether we should limit ourselves to allowing this in practice on the basis of the circular directive of the CEC, but without issuing and publishing such a law, I ask you to share your opinion.
7) Uglanov wrote an application with a request to be transferred from Astrakhan to work in Moscow. Today he was with me. He refers to malaria and difficult family conditions. I answered him that it would be possible to think about a transfer from Astrakhan, but as for Moscow, this would not work, since Moscow is dangerous for him, he might get confused here again, especially since he still continues to get confused in the line. From my conversation with him, I had the firm conviction that he had not changed much politically. “I,” he says, “broke off, I can’t judge the general situation.” He mumbled something about international issues and spoke especially animatedly about the "working question", that "the questions of wages and real wages should be moved forward as soon as possible," and so on. My impression is that he and those like him are not averse now to become, as it were, "defenders" of the workers in the Shlyapnikov style, and personally he became similar to Shlyapnikov, insincerity, hints, nothing like the "direct and sincere" Uglanov. I think that it would be possible to transfer him from Astrakhan as a last resort, but not to Moscow. In any case, we will wait until your arrival or advice by letter3 .
8) On wages for workers in the metallurgical and coal industries, Comrade Postyshev is sending you his draft.
Goodbye. Your L. Kaganovich.
____________________________
oneOn August 20, 1931, the PB approved the number of orders in America for equipment for the factories of AMO, Kharkov Tractor, Avtostroy and Dneprostroy at 3.9 million rubles. until the end of 1931. On the issue of orders in America for Magnitogorsk, Kuznetskstroy and other enterprises, it was decided to ask Stalin's opinion (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 10. L. 165). As Kaganovich reported, a sharp conflict arose on this issue. On August 25, the PB accepted Stalin's proposals set out in his telegram. The Currency Commission was instructed to urgently develop specific measures to implement Stalin's proposals and submit them for approval by the PB. Rosengolts, People's Commissar for Foreign Trade, was instructed to suspend the placement of orders in America (Ibid. L. 170). On August 30, the PB approved the decision of the currency commission, which contained an instruction from the Supreme Council of National Economy by September 5 to submit to the PB a report on the transfer of orders from America to Europe and the USSR. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade had to inform the Supreme Council of National Economy within four days what American orders were suspended, and submit a list of contracts that could be terminated. It was envisaged that the termination of contracts would be made only with the permission of the PB (Ibid. L. 179).
On August 25, 1931, the PB heard a report from the People's Commissariat for Transport on the preparation of transport for autumn and winter transportation and a report from the RCT on the implementation of the program for transport engineering for 1931 and on preparations for 1932. The commission, under the leadership of Kaganovich, was instructed to develop specific measures to prepare for autumn and winter transportation in the following questions: about the locomotive fleet, about paired driving and depersonalization, car fleet, capital construction, etc. It was decided to hear the first report of the commission at a meeting of the PB on September 5, 1931 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 844. L. 2, 3).
On July 25, 1930, by decision of the PB NAUglanov, he was released from the post of People's Commissar of Labor of the USSR and at the end of August he was sent to Astrakhan as chairman of the Astrakhan State Fish Trust (Ibid. D. 790. L. 5). In March 1932, Uglanov was appointed head of the sector for the production of consumer goods of the USSR NKTP (Ibid. D. 878. L. 27).Stalin to Kaganovich August 26, 1931
Hello, Comrade Kaganovich!
I am writing about Transcaucasian affairs. The other day I was visited by members of the Regional Committee, secretaries of the Central Committee of Georgia, some workers of Azerbaijan (including Polonsky). Their squabble is incredible, and apparently it won't end soon. According to my observations, the protracted nature of the squabbles and the stubbornness of the squabblers is explained, among other things, by the fact that the squabblers are confident that their anti-Party “work” will go unpunished, since they count on the fact that “in case of emergency” Sergo will “rescue” them.
I reconciled them somehow, and the matter has been settled for the time being, but not for long. Almost everyone lies and cunning, starting with Kartvelishvili. Beria, Polonsky, Orakhelashvili do not lie. But on the other hand, Polonsky admits a number of tactlessness and mistakes. The most unpleasant impression is made by Mamulia (Secretary of the Central Committee of Georgia), who, by right unknown to me, replaces Kartvelishvili. The comic impression is made by the pre-SNK of Georgia Sukhishvili - a hopeless dunce. It's really surprising that both of these types are recommended by Sergo.
If we do not intervene in the case, these people may foolishly ruin the case. They have already ruined business with the peasantry in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Without serious intervention by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Kartvelishvili and the Zakkraykom in general are powerless to improve things, if we assume that they want to improve things.
How to be?
Necessary:
1) To appoint now for the end of September (for my arrival) a report to the Organizing Bureau of the Zakkraykom, Gruzzek and the Azerbaijan Central Committee on the state of affairs;
2) Clean them thoroughly at a meeting of the Organizing Bureau and remove a number of people like Mamulia;
3) Appoint the third secretary of the Zakkraykom (I propose Meyerzon), giving him the appropriate order 1 .
4) Etc. in this kind.
Without such measures, the business in Transcaucasia will rot.
I. Stalin.
26/VIII-31.
F. 81. Op. 3. D. 99. L. 7–11. Autograph.
1 V.I. Polonsky was appointed the third secretary of the Zakkraykom.Stalin to Kaganovich August 26, 1931
Kaganovich .
I consider Rozengolts's directive regarding exports to Italy to be too moderate. It is necessary to add a clause with a threat that if our demands are not satisfied, we will stop giving orders and reduce exports from Italy 1 . I have no objection to the exemption from conscription into the Red Army 2 .
Stalin.
Nr 24/sh.
2 p.m. — m.
26/VIII - 31 3
____________________
On August 25, 1931, the PB approved the draft directive proposed by Rozengolts for conducting trade negotiations with Italy (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 10. L. 170, 174). On August 27, the PB accepted Stalin's proposal "to add to the directive a clause stating that if our demands are not met, we will stop giving orders and reduce exports from Italy" (Ibid. L. 179).
On August 25, 1931, the PB decided to exempt 10,000 skilled workers, engineers, technicians and craftsmen working at the enterprises of the Supreme Council of National Economy from conscription to the Red Army, and from the territorial fees of workers in the coal industry of the Donetsk and North Caucasian basins (RGASPI. F. 17 List 3, file 845, sheet 5).
3 Date, number and time entered by the secretary.Stalin to Kaganovich August 27, 1931
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU. Poskrebyshev. For Kaganovich. First. I subscribe to Kaganovich's proposal to appoint Agranov as the Moscow representative of the OPTU 1 .
Second. I join the request of the Zakkraykom and Mdivani to leave Mdivani at work in Tiflis. Stalin. Nr 25/sh. 27/VTII - 31 2
_____________________________
1 By decision of the PB of August 29, 1931, Agranov was appointed as the PG of the OGPU of the Moscow Region (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 845. L. 6).
2 Date and number entered by the secretary.Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze to Stalin August 27, 1931
Encryption.
Posted on 27.VIII. 20.28
Adopted on 27.VIII. 21.20
Stalin.
The Supreme Council of National Economy ordered the withdrawal from America of all commissions for placing orders. Do you think it is right to immediately recall everyone from office or to recall in parts.
Ordzhonikidze, Kaganovich.
No. 1165 sh.
Deciphered 28.VIII. 11h.Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze to Stalin August 27, 1931
Encryption.
Sent] 27.VIII. 20.28
Received on 27.VIII. 22.[0]5
Stalin.
The situation with water pipes is extremely difficult. Donbass, Stalingrad, Moscow, automobile industry and a number of other construction projects will be left without water. The Germans demanded 180 marks per ton for cast-iron pipes, we gave 150. Now the Germans will probably go for 165 or 160 marks. We consider it necessary to purchase pipes at a price of 160, in extreme cases, 165 marks, and also agree on welding pipes. We ask for your consent.
Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze.
No. 1164/sh.
Deciphered 28.VIII. at 13 o'clockStalin to Kaganovich August 28, 1931
Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU. Poskrebyshev. Kaganovich. The Commission of the Supreme Economic Council in America should be withdrawn without a demonstration, that is, piecemeal. Stalin. Nr 26/sh. 28/VIII - 31 1
_____________________________
1 Date and number entered by the secretary.Stalin to Kaganovich August 28, 1931
Kaganovich. I am against the import of cast iron pipes. Postpone the question until autumn if you can. Stalin.
Nr 27/sh. 28.VIII.31 1
_____________________________
1 Date and number entered by the secretary. Sent in cipher from Kutaisi on the same day at 14:00. 25 min. (Ibid. L. 46).Stalin to Kaganovich August 30 [1931]
T. Kaganovich!
I received your letter of 26/VIII.
1) Why don't you report anything about the Polish draft of the pact (on non-aggression) handed over by Patek to Litvinov? This matter is very important, almost decisive (for the next 2-3 years) the question of peace, and I am afraid that Litvinov, yielding to the pressure of the so-called "public opinion", will reduce it to nothing. Pay serious attention to this matter, let the PB take it under special supervision and try to bring it to the end with all permissible measures. It would be ridiculous if we succumbed in this matter to the general petty-bourgeois fad of "anti-Polonism", forgetting even for a moment about the fundamental interests of the revolution and socialist construction.
2) How is the situation with Mezhlauk and orders in France? Why is it stuck there? Why are all orders sent to Germany, to England, but the French do not want to give orders?
3) You, apparently, succumbed to the pressure of the Supreme Council of National Economy regarding cast-iron pipes, especially since the communal workers are also pressing and demanding importation. Both you and the Supreme Council of National Economy are wrong, because: a) in the directive of the Central Committee on control figures for 32, the figure for metal imports for 31 is strictly defined , and at the expense of 32 years it is said that the figure for imports should be less than the figure for 31, between [by] how the Supreme Council of National Economy wants to overturn this decision of the Central Committee. and you agree with the Supreme Council of National Economy; b) talk about the fact that you will have to pay not this year is not convincing, because in 32 and 33 years. it will be harder for us in terms of currency than this year (the efforts of the USA are aimed at emptying our currency treasury and undermining our monetary position at the root, and the USA is now the main force in the financial world and our main enemy), so it is necessary save the currency not only for 31 years, but also for future years; c) instead of putting pressure on its apparatus and forcing it to smelt more pig iron, the Supreme Economic Council put pressure on the state treasury (i.e., the state, i.e., the working class), forcing the working class to pay with its foreign exchange resources for inability, inertia , bureaucracy of the apparatus of the Supreme Council of National Economy 1 .
That's how things stand, Comrade Kaganovich.
4) That is why I think that no concessions can be made to people (and institutions) who are trying to squander the hard currency resources of the working class for the sake of the peace of mind of their workers.
5) Assignments for the preparation of the second five-year plan can be issued through the PB, if required by the State Planning Commission or the Council of People's Commissars.
6) Concessions to those who want to transport oil by sea means the demobilization of the entire transport apparatus. It is impossible now to make such a concession 2 .
7) Let the PB and the Secretariat of the Central Committee take both the Narkomvod and the NKPS under special and systematic supervision and force them to work. Both people's commissars are in captivity to their apparatus, especially Rukhimovich, whose bureaucratic conceit is the reverse side of his backwardness and inertia in regard to the Bolshevik presentation of the case in the NKPS.
8) There is no need for any CEC law on the early restoration of the rights of individual former kulaks 3 . I already knew that donkeys from the townspeople and townsfolk would definitely want to crawl into this mouse gap. I ask you to postpone the question until autumn.
9) Read Bukharin's speech (transcript). Empty, out of touch with life, non-Bolshevik speech. At the same time, it is a clumsy, student attempt to give a "plan" of a platform to the former Rights against the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union along the lines of a number of economic questions and workers' supplies . This Comrade Bukharin is a strange man! Why did he need to break the comedy.
I think that the Central Committee placed Bukharin at the head of the Department of Technical] Propaganda of the Supreme Council of National Economy, not so that he would make speeches about technical [propaganda], about the need for technical [propaganda], but so that he would organize a lively and concrete technical [technical] ] propaganda. If he fails to complete this task, another one will have to be found.
If Bukharin asks, or the situation requires it, you can tell Bukharin this is my opinion.
Well, that's enough. I. Stalin.
30/VIII. Sochi.
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On September 25, 1931, the PB, following a report by Commissar of Public Utilities Komarov and Ordzhonikidze, considered the issue of supplying public utilities to industrial centers with water pipes. A specially created commission chaired by Pyatakov was instructed to submit proposals on this issue to the PB meeting on September 30 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 850. L. 5). At the next meeting of the Politburo, on October 5, the question was postponed (Ibid. D. 851. L. 3). By questioning the PB members on October 15 (Stalin had already returned to Moscow at that time), the question was referred to the STO for consideration (Ibid. D. 854. L. 9).
On September 5, 1931, the PB approved a resolution on speeding up oil transportation by water ways (along the Volga). (Ibid. D. 846. L. 8, 27–30).
On August 10, 1931, the PB approved the resolution of the commission on special settlers dated August 7. The resolution provided for measures for "the full use of the labor force of special settlers and their consolidation in the places of settlement, especially for the creation of permanent cadres of workers in the timber industry of Siberia, the Urals, the Northern [northern] Territory and other regions" (allocation of special settlers land for gardens and crops, livestock, tax incentives, organization of housing construction, etc.). The 31st paragraph of the resolution read: “Given the need for the speedy separation of the youth of special settlers from the counter-revolutionary part of the kulaks, it is possible to recognize the restoration of the rights of youth who have reached the age of 18 before the expiration of the 5-year [it) term in those caseswhen this youth showed itself from the positive side. Similar restorations are carried out by departments for special [special] settlements through the Central Electoral Commissions of the Union and Autonomous Republics, or regional and regional executive committees, with the provision of the right of free residence to them ”(Historical archive. 1994. No. 4. P. 164–169. Publication G.M. Adibekova). After Stalin's letter on September 8, 1931, the PB canceled this paragraph of the resolution (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 11. L. 5).
4 Bukharin, in a letter to Stalin, explained the circumstances of his speech as follows: “I was once invited to a huge meeting on technical propaganda (in Sokolniki Park). When I saw a sweaty crowd, thousands of people exhausted from the heat and waiting for a concert after the rally, I naturally began to make not a dry technical report, but “in general”. And there I said, among other things, that we were late with food and light industry (due to the problem of personnel and their qualifications). When a comrade objected to me, so that there would be no misunderstandings, I referred to the decisions of the 16th Congress, the articles in Pravda, and so on. [...] I must also say that a transcript that I had not corrected was put into circulation, which I could not get for a long time ”(RGASPI. F. 558. Op. P. D. 709. L. 82-83).Kaganovich to Stalin August 31 [1931]
31/VIII
Dear comrade Stalin!
Received your two letters dated the 25th and 26th.
1) We understood your proposal about America as a big maneuver, which should force the Americans to change their conditions. It is incomparably easier for us to do this now, because we have already placed the main orders for our giants.
2) About cooperation: I fully agree that the resolution should go on behalf of the Commission for Execution, but then prices will have to be discussed in a special resolution.
3) In Transcaucasia, tomorrow we will send them a telegram that their reports are scheduled for September 26th. You are absolutely right that the Central Committee can no longer be calm about how work is disintegrating in the largest province, it is necessary to intervene and take appropriate measures.
4) Yesterday we held a PB meeting. The most pressing issues were: on the implementation of the export-import plan for July and August and the plan for September, on the oil fleet, on the implementation of the financial plan in the 3rd quarter, on the harvesting of potatoes and vegetables, on the harvesting of livestock and poultry. According to the export-import plan, it turned out that there is little maneuvering in the market, we are weakly penetrating new markets, which leads to the fact that England alone takes 54% of timber exports, if something happened to England, duties or other pressure, and we find ourselves in a very difficult position. Also with furs, 52% to Germany. In numerical terms, the July plan was executed well, apparently Weitzer is doing a good job. In the export plan for September, there was a heated debate about the size of grain exports. Mikoyan, Yakovlev demanded a reduction in the plan, we gave the task proposed by the NKTorg 1.340 tons. Last year there was the same story, and I remember how you then clicked on the completion of the September task, of course, last year there was a different situation, but the plan for this September is smaller and it must be completed. We will send the appropriate directive to the localities.
5) With the order for oil tankers, an ugly picture emerged of deliberate delay and red tape on the part of the NKTorg, but meanwhile the PB directive was quite clear - to purchase 250 tons of vessels no older than 25 years, spending up to 25 million. ruble, and now you have to spend the currency on chartering. We are obliged to place orders for 90 thousand tons within 5 days and submit an exact plan for placing the remaining orders 1 .
6) With the implementation of the financial plan for the 3rd quarter, things are not going well, so we decided to strengthen the submitted draft directive with an indication of the areas where things are the worst 2 . We raised again the question of combating overstocking. Just on the eve of the PB, Khrushchev from Krasnaya Presnya gave me data that at only 12 enterprises of Krasnaya Presnya, the deposits of goods reach 6.5 million rubles. They refer to the lack of transport, etc. We are now checking this, the same facts at other enterprises, so we are thinking of sharpening this issue.
7) We held a meeting on logging, it turned out that both places and Glavlesprom were demagnetized. Fushman, apparently, has not yet mastered the business, is engaged in digital manipulations, but this is not the purchase of cotton on the exchange, but a matter that requires prompt management. leadership, the places are also in a state of some kind of hope, everyone was busy with requests and applications, instead of outlining a plan for how they think to get out of the situation. I had to cover them for this, to point out to them that if they do not mobilize, they will all find themselves in a difficult situation, because for heating and for small and even medium-sized enterprises they have nothing to rely on oil or Donetsk coal. We elected a commission, which was instructed to develop practical measures: on labor force, on technical supplies, tools, axes, saws, on food supply, on wages, on strengthening workers, about urgent measures for the removal and laying of narrow gauge railways, about the possibility of attracting tractors, etc. So I ask you, Comrade Stalin, to write your opinion, I think that we will have to use part of the tractors from NKZemovsky for timber, Yakovlev, of course, will climb the wall, but we will have to go for it, there is nothing wrong if we at least 10 th part of the tractors we use in winter. Isn't it too great a luxury for us to have motor forces unused all winter, especially since this winter will be difficult in terms of fuel.
8) We admitted that the actions of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs were wrong on one issue: they themselves, without putting it in the PB, gave a refutation to TASS about negotiations with Poland, after which Litvinov gave a thunderous interview, we essentially did not give an assessment, although we think that they were in a hurry. It was necessary to wait, to feel out, maybe there is a desire here to create a pretext for the French to break the treaty with them. In any case, they did not have the right to raise this issue without the PB, we raised this issue and wrote down "to recognize as incorrect the statement of the NKID with a refutation of the question of negotiations with Poland without first raising this issue in the PB."
9) Once again about Bukharin: he delivered a report in the Hall of Columns, 3 here and there he inserted some passages about the Central Committee, about the struggle against deviations, but the report contains a number of completely incorrect formulations. He demanded that the report be published in Pravda, but firstly, in For Industrialization, printing has already begun and Pravda does not want to reprint; . The whole report claims to discover America, man is trying to open a new era of our revolution, a technical revolution, but nothing but schematism, mechanical philosophy and Bogdanovism is achieved. That's why we don't print yet. Of course he is offended.
Well, I'll end with this. Check out how you feel? Do frequent guests let you rest?
Greetings Comrade Molotov.
Shake your hand. Your Kaganovich.
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1 This decision was made at the meeting of the PB on August 30, 1931 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 10. L. 178).
On August 30, 1931, the PB instructed a commission consisting of Postyshev, Mikoyan and Rozengolts to develop a draft directive to the regional committees on ensuring the loading of grain in ports with the establishment of a loading schedule. (Ibid. L. 176).
3 Bukharin's report at a meeting of assistant directors, shock workers, chairmen of the bureau of engineering and technical sections, workers of associations, research institutes and higher educational institutions (August 26, 1931) see: Bukharin N.I. Problems of the theory and practice of socialism. M, 1989. S. 309–330.