Molotov's report on a trip to Ukraine, the Urals and Bashkiria on grain procurement matters. January 25, 1928

V.M. Molotov's report to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the STO on a trip to Ukraine, the Urals and Bashkiria on grain procurement matters. January 25, 1928

Archive: RTSKHIDNI. F. 82. Op. 2. D. 136. L. 1-55. Typewritten text with edits by the author.

January 25, 1928

Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, STO. Copy of NKTorg - comrade Mikoyan

I'll start with preliminary remarks.

My trips for grain procurement were very short. The business trip to Ukraine took 9 days, from December 28 to January 6; business trip to the Urals and Bashkiria - 8 days, from January 11 to January 19. On the second trip, the road took most of the time. During the trip, I had to be in the following cities and villages: Kharkov, Melitopol and in the Melitopol district: the village of Prishib, p. Tsarevodarovka, with. Sent, p. Vtoro-Pokrovka and on the way to talk in the car for 1-2 hours with the leaders of party-Soviet work and the practical leaders of grain procurement organizations in the cities. Zaporozhye, Krivoy Rog, Kremenchug, Poltava; in the Urals he stopped in Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk and in Bashkiria - in Ufa.

The whole situation and, above all, the extreme insufficiency of the time that turned out to be for the grain procurement campaign, required a special impact of work. Proceeding from the need for this impact, I also tried to achieve an appropriate attitude towards the grain procurements on the part of local Party organizations and the grain procurements themselves. This work was greatly assisted by the comrades accompanying me: responsible instructors of the Central Committee TT. Grinevich and Yakovlev, and the chairman of Khleboprodukt, comrade Lobachev, who joined us.

In connection with what has been said above (the short duration of the trip, the impact of the work), I do not have to claim the completeness of my comments and conclusions. Nevertheless, the opportunity I had to acquaint myself with many facts of local work gives grounds to dwell not only on the most important questions for the grain procurement campaign, but also on a number of separate essential questions from the field of practical work of party, Soviet and cooperative bodies as a whole. I divide the report into three parts: a) remarks about the trip to Ukraine; b) remarks about the trip to the Urals and Bashkiria and c) conclusions (from observations from both trips).

I. Notes on the trip to Ukraine

1. Progress of grain procurements. The Ukraine occupies an exceptionally important place in the USSR's overall plan for grain procurements this year, fulfilling 37% of the overall plan. This is 265 million pounds. (including 15 million poods of seed oil). The course of grain procurements for the six months of July-December, in comparison with the previous year, can be seen from the following diagram .

Thus, starting from October, grain procurements fell from month to month. The course of grain procurements for December showed a sharp fall, and the fifth December five-day period, which we received after we had already arrived in Kharkov, was the worst in December. As of December 1, only 51% of the annual target was completed against 64% in the previous year. For individual crops, harvesting for wheat was relatively better, it was especially bad with corn.

Despite the catastrophic drop in grain procurements in October-December, the majority of leading workers in Ukraine did not attach due importance to this fact. In a reassuring sense, among other things, the following circumstances influenced: firstly, the fact that the absolute size of grain procurements on December 1 exceeded the corresponding figure of the previous year, namely, reached 136 million pounds. against last year's 125 million pounds; secondly, and this is especially important, the Ukrainian leading bodies proceeded from their November resolution on a reduced grain procurement plan to 245 million poods. (with oil-seeds), and the private task set in connection with this by Ukraine itself for December 25 was completed in the amount of 115%, i.е. with an excess of 15%. Meanwhile, these outwardly good figures concealed a completely unsatisfactory situation with grain procurements.

2. Annual grain procurement plan. The question of the annual plan (task) for grain procurements is naturally the main and first question of the entire campaign. Upon arrival in Kharkov, I found out that the situation with this issue in Ukraine was clearly unfavorable. While the People's Commissariat of the USSR proceeds from a plan of 265 million pounds, the leading party and Soviet bodies of Ukraine set their plan of 245 million pounds back in November, while Comrade Chernov, the People's Commissariat of the Ukrainian SSR, declared in his first conversation with me that from the People's Commissariat of the USSR, he, in essence, does not have an exact assignment. In confirmation of this, Comrade Chernov presented me with a letter dated November 30, Comrade Weitzer, a member of the board of the People's Commissariat of the USSR (see Appendix No. I) 4*. I must admit that this letter from Comrade Weitzer does not constitute a sufficiently firm directive on the annual grain procurement plan in the Ukraine. The People's Commissariat of Trade of the Ukrainian SSR did not receive any other directives on the issue of the annual plan, despite the fact that the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine and the UESO adopted another reduced plan mentioned above and were guided in their work by this latter, and not by the plan of the People's Commissar of the USSR.

In view of the above circumstances, of course, I could not enter into a detailed economic analysis of the substantiation of one or another figure of the annual task. First of all, I had to proceed from the plan established for Ukraine by the People's Commissariat of Trade of the USSR, which, at my request from Kharkov, was confirmed in the amount of 265 million pounds. However, in addition to the formal obligatory nature of the directives of the allied bodies, I had a number of considerations in favor of insisting on the annual task of the USSR People's Commissariat of Trade. These considerations were expressed by me and consisted of the following.

Firstly. At a meeting with grain producers on December 30, with the participation of comrades. Chernov, Chubar and Kaganovich, it turned out that of the 20 million poods subject to additional appropriation among grain purchasers. one Khleboprodukt agreed to take on an additional task of 5 million pounds. This means that Khleboprodukt alone took on the fulfillment of 25% of the additional task, while the role of Khleboprodukt in the overall grain procurement plan in Ukraine was limited to only 12% of the overall plan. The corresponding statements by Comrade Borovsky, representative of the Ukrainian office of Khleboprodukt, and Comrade Lobachev, the chairman of Khleboprodukt, who knows Ukraine well, testified to the unconditional possibility of raising the grain procurement plan adopted in Ukraine.

Secondly. The very compilation of the grain forage balance and the determination of grain surpluses could not but raise a number of significant doubts about the correctness and completeness of the relevant data. This doubt was fully confirmed by the facts as soon as we made the first attempt to sort out on the spot the specific data for one district - Melitopol.

Running a little ahead, I will focus on the Melitopol example. Upon arrival in Melitopol, we established that the grain-forage balance approved in August was based on surpluses in the district for rye and wheat of 15.5 million pounds. and from the lack of the rest of the bread about 4 million pounds. It turned out further that the plan for grain procurements of 14.1 million poods, adopted in the autumn by the Melitopol authorities. was by the time of our arrival (January 1) already fully completed, and actually done by gravity. Then it turned out that, on the basis of the general plan of 245 million poods, the Ukrainian central authorities, on the basis of the general plan of 245 million poods, assigned the task of 21 million poods to the Melitopol district. This task aroused strong objections in Melitopol, and agreed to a plan of 17.5 million pounds. And after that I, however, not without significant insistence, managed to get the consent of the Melitopol Okrug Committee to adopt a plan of 23 million pounds, which was established by the Central Committee of the CP (b)U, based on the last plan (265 [million pounds]). This shows how incorrect and, moreover, grossly underestimated were in Ukraine (and, obviously, not only there) the calculations of the grain forage balance and, in particular, the calculation of grain surpluses. As a result of a discussion with senior officials of the CP(b)U Central Committee of the annual grain procurement plan in Ukraine, the Politburo of the CP(b)U Central Committee came to a unanimous decision on December 30, adopting a plan of 265 million poods.

Familiarization with the question of the annual plan for grain procurements in Ukraine emphasized the following points: a) the extreme unsatisfactoriness of the grain-forage balances and, in particular, the obvious underestimation of their surpluses;

b) the lack of elementary clarity and discipline in the work of the Soviet authorities in the field of grain procurement (the absence of a clear task from the USSR People's Commissariat of Trade; "their own" procurement plans for Ukraine; decisions of Ukrainian centers, district procurement plans).

3. Campaign plan and purveyors. The main role in this year's grain procurements in Ukraine is played by cooperation, which accounts for 66% of all procurements against 40% last year. A more detailed distribution of the plan (245 million poods) among the procurers is as follows: Rural gospodar66 - 36%, VUKS - 30%, Ukrkhleb - 21% and Khleboprodukt - 12%. It is important to note here that, according to its calculations, the co-operatives produce supplies through approximately 4,000 grass-roots cooperatives (1,500 agricultural and 2,500 consumer cooperatives), and in fact now much more; Ukrkhleb produces blanks mainly through its mills; Khleboprodukt with the help of elevators belonging to him. Each of the purveyors (Khleboprodukt, Ukrkhleb) also carries out a significant part of the procurement on the basis of agreements with cooperation.

All this makes procurements highly dependent on the work of the cooperatives. This dependence for a given moment (year) in Ukraine is excessively large. This can be seen at least from the following. In the autumn the co-operative centers fought stubbornly for the maximum expansion of their procurement plan. On the other hand, when the issue of an additional 20 million [poods] to the annual plan adopted in Ukraine was now being decided, it was the cooperation, both agricultural and consumer, that offered the greatest resistance to this.

There is no need to prove that, despite the necessity and expediency of gradually strengthening the role of the co-operatives in grain procurement, the work of the co-operatives in this field under the present conditions also has its own enormous specific difficulties. These include: the relative youth and great weakness of many local cooperative organizations; democratic (elected) nature of the governing bodies in the absence of often elementary cooperative discipline; and, finally, the class character itself (the predominance of the middle peasants, and sometimes the direct influence of prosperous kulak elements) of co-operatives, which makes itself felt at every step in such a matter as grain procurement. Therefore, with an undoubted improvement in the work of co-operatives in the countryside, which sometimes already leads to completely unacceptable complacency among co-operative workers.

Meanwhile, the situation of the state procurers in Ukraine is far from being considered normal. Firstly, in Ukraine there are two state organizations (Khleboprodukt and Ukrkhleb), which are fiercely competitive with each other. Secondly, the whole policy and practice of the leading Ukrainian organizations is such that ever greater advantages are systematically created for the work of the local organization (Ukrkhlib), and, on the other hand, an absolutely abnormal situation has already been created for the all-Union organization, Khleboprodukt, not to mention the fact that that the role of Khleboprodukt in Ukraine this year has been extremely reduced (to 12% in general against ... 5* last year), an unfriendly atmosphere has been created around the entire work of Khleboprodukt on the part of local purveyors who compete with each other, but oppose Khleboprodukt more or less unitedly and together with the People's Commissariat of Trade. I must also note that Khleboprodukt's agreement to increase its grain procurement plan by 5 million poods out of an additional 20 million poods did not, in any case, improve the attitude of the local procurement and regulatory bodies towards it. After that, attacks on Hleboprodukt on the part of some leading workers reached accusations of adventurism, disorganization of grain procurements, and so on. (for example, the case of Comrade Safronenko, what's next).

In spite of all this, I had to raise the question of a radical change in this abnormal situation at the present moment when the grain procurements are in full swing. But in the future grain procurement campaign, it is undoubtedly necessary to reduce the work in the field of grain procurements to two main channels: the cooperative and the state. At the same time, along the cooperative line, it is necessary to achieve unity on certain conditions in the work of agriculture and consumer cooperation. On the state line, it is necessary to create a single all-union organization with the participation and provision of the interests of the localities in it. Then it will be easier to achieve much-needed normal relations between state and co-operative bodies. I will say a few more words about the secondary purveyors - MSPO and LSPO, who carry out their procurement through mills belonging to them, as well as through grass-roots cooperatives. Must, however, to say that in the Melitopol district I had to observe the facts of a completely abnormal operation of the MSPO mill at the Fertility station, which, in the pursuit of bread, contributed a lot to the disorganization of the market, raising prices, etc. The question should be raised of ending the procurement work of such organizations from next year.

Considering the impossibility of major changes in the organization of grain procurements, I considered it my task, along with every possible support for the work of the co-operatives, to especially emphasize the role of state procurers at the present moment. Precisely because the state procurers are directly and entirely subordinate to the Soviet government and have a clearer and more disciplined apparatus, and therefore they can quickly and energetically take up the shock task of decisively intensifying grain procurements, I insisted in every possible way on increased support for the work of the state procurers. In this regard, I must especially emphasize the correctness of the following decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine: “The Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (b) U especially emphasizes that the immediate strengthening of the work of state procurers should contribute to the rise and whipping up of cooperative bodies.

Finally, I should note one very significant circumstance. When discussing the annual grain procurement plan, the heads of grain procurement organizations (especially cooperators) were extremely skeptical about the fulfillment of the plan even for 245 million poods. I had a firm conviction that in this case the isolation of grain procurement work from the Party was to a large extent. In fact, for at least the last couple of years, grain producers have been doing their work, so to speak, at their own peril and risk, i.e. more or less by itself. The Party's participation in this most important cause has been extremely insufficient over the years. Perhaps, in connection with this, some comrades have formed such an idea that it is "quite natural", that "this is how it should be." It was evident that some of the grain buyers looked at the mobilization of party forces and the concentration of the party leadership on grain procurement as a temporary "hype". At the same time, the majority of workers in grain procurement organizations showed a clear "disbelief" in the possibility of a decisive change in grain procurement. This was reflected in the well-known isolation of practical Soviet and co-operative workers from the Party. One must think that the current months will introduce serious “corrections” into these sentiments of practical communists, and the party organizations themselves are closer to general directives, and often even from simple phrases, they will approach the matter, to practical Soviet and cooperative work.

4. Measures to strengthen grain procurements. The question of measures to achieve a decisive change in grain procurements is closely connected with the question of the immediate causes of their failure in the last quarter of 1927. At the same time, I consider that the question of the reasons for the failures in grain procurements as a whole is beyond the scope of my report. Therefore, I confine myself here to only the most general remarks on this subject. Proceeding from the premise that the economic policy pursued by the Party is correct (which, however, does not exclude the existence of a number of discrepancies in the practical implementation of economic policy), I believe that the major difficulties that have arisen in the field of grain procurements are mainly due to the following: The levers of the Soviet and co-operative apparatus necessary for carrying out the big grain procurement plan were inactive or acted badly, and sometimes even in the wrong direction, and the Party organizations stood aloof from this most important task. Meanwhile, the most important fact - the fact of a significant economic upsurge in the countryside over the past three harvest years, especially today, required the strengthening of a number of the most important economic and partly administrative levers of the Soviet power, as well as cooperation.

Such an assessment of the situation with grain procurements also leads to measures for the speediest correction of the situation that has arisen. These measures, which we carried out in practice, can be divided into the following three groups: 1) incentive measures (increased supply of manufactured goods to the village), 2) coercive measures (increased collection of payments and arrears in the countryside, as well as increased attraction of peasant funds into cooperation) and 3) correction of discrepancies in price practice (improvement of the ratio of prices between grain and non-grain products in favor of the former).

To these economic and, to some extent, administrative measures, one more important measure should be added directly on the line of the Party, namely, the mobilization from top to bottom of the best Party forces for grain procurement. The importance of this measure can be judged, if only by the fact that by the time our work in the Ukraine was over, at least 7,000 to 8,000 party workers, headed by almost all the leading workers of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, had been transferred to grain procurement.

What exactly the measures to increase grain procurement consisted of can best be judged from the detailed resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, adopted jointly with me on December 30th. I am enclosing this resolution, in its main part sent to the leaders of the district party organizations, to the report (see Appendix No. 2 ) . I will briefly list only the main events from this resolution.

In terms of supplying villages with manufactured goods, it was decided: a) to send at least 80% of all goods arriving in the coming months to the village, and of this mass, at least 70% should be sent to 15 main grain procurement districts; b) to use for this also the available commodity resources in the warehouses of the district unions, Gostorg and local industry; c) take measures to maximize the output of the local state and handicraft industries for the countryside; d) allocate a special fund of complex agricultural machines and engines in the amount of 40% of their total number for sale for cash; e) The People's Commissariat of Trade and cooperative bodies to oblige the distribution of goods among the regions in direct proportion to the amount of grain procured (preventing the exchange of goods).

Accordingly, with the decision made in January, from the planned delivery of manufactured goods to Ukraine in the amount of 64 million rubles. slightly more than 50 million rubles are sent to the village. (about 80%). In the first ten days of January, the shipment of cotton fabrics was assigned only to the rural sector. Sou-horse woolen goods, shoes, glass (except for Bemsky 6*) in January are also sent entirely to the village. Of the entire mass of scarce goods in the second quarter, 83.5 million rubles will go to the village. It is now necessary to follow most closely the exact implementation of the adopted directives on supplying the countryside with manufactured goods. Undoubtedly, there will be many attempts to smear the adopted directives out of unwillingness to offend "their" cities. Even the plan of the NKTorg of the Ukrainian SSR, as can be seen from its own data, already inaccurately implements the decisions adopted by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, cutting here and there the designated supply of the village with manufactured goods.

On the question of the exchange of goods, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine from the very beginning had a completely definite negative line. Party and Soviet bodies remained in this position, which made it possible in the future to avoid amending the decisions taken from the very beginning.

In terms of financial measures and cooperation, the decisions were mainly as follows: a) the urgent collection of all payments due from the peasantry (agricultural tax, state insurance, arrears); b) the urgent implementation of self-taxation for the local needs of the village on the basis of a new decree; c) the all-round dissemination of the "Loan for the Strengthening of the Peasant Economy" in the countryside; d) increasing the size of shares in cooperation up to 10 rubles. and their urgent collection; e) enhanced collection of advance payments in the countryside for the purchase of manufactured goods and agricultural machinery, as well as the collection of peasant funds for the organization of cooperative enterprises for the processing of agricultural raw materials; f) limitation in the current quarter of the issuance of loans on agricultural credit to the amount necessary for lending to the poor and collective farms, as well as increased collection of overdue loans.

This series of financial and cooperative measures in the present conditions plays an enormous role in strengthening grain procurements. This can be seen at least from the fact that all these measures, according to far from complete estimates of the NKFin of the Ukrainian SSR, can ensure the attraction of up to 65 million rubles to state and cooperative bodies of peasant funds in the next three months, and, according to the conclusion of the same NKFin, free cash the mass of the Ukrainian village 7 * is determined approximately. at 130-150 million rubles.

On the example of the corresponding work of the bodies of the NKFin, cooperation, as well as the NKZem and agricultural credit, one could especially clearly see the inactivity of many, many of our Soviet and cooperative institutions. Only through the agricultural tax, the size of which turned out to be clearly low this year, is there a normal inflow of payments. But through the State Insurance, semsudy, agricultural credit, etc. there are numerous arrears. It is quite weak in cooperation in collecting shares, increasing them, collecting advance payments for goods, collecting peasant funds for the cooperative industry, etc.

The energetic implementation of the decree on self-taxation is now of particular importance. In Ukraine, even before the decree, the practice of self-taxation was quite common and in some cases reached 100 percent or even more in relation to the amount of agricultural tax. With the low agricultural tax and the enormous need of the peasants for the development of local cultural and economic activities, it is not only possible, but it is necessary now to press the lever of self-taxation as much as possible. It should be noted that in the decree on self-taxation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (unlike the RSFSR) took an important step forward in the direction of strengthening progressiveness in taxing the village elite. This can be seen from the fact that this progressivity, according to the decree on self-taxation in Ukraine, is approximately three times higher than the corresponding norms for agricultural tax.

The distribution of the peasant loan will also be of the greatest importance. There is no doubt that this loan will be a great success, in particular in Ukraine.

Finally, I will dwell on the question of prices. In connection with this question, I will dwell more on the growth of the material well-being of the peasantry.

With the Party firmly pursuing a policy of lowering prices for manufactured goods, the question of the state of prices for grain and non-grain products of the peasant economy is of the utmost importance. There is no doubt that in the interests of the intensification of agriculture, it is expedient and necessary to have such a ratio of grain and non-grain agricultural prices, in which, in comparison with the pre-war period, some advantage would be on the side of prices for livestock products and industrial crops. Therefore, the corresponding policy, in particular, of the NKTorg of the USSR, is basically correct. However, in practice this fall, there was an obvious excess in this matter, which had harmful consequences, among other things, for grain procurements.

Without entering into a detailed analysis of this important issue, I will limit myself here to some illustrations, which I will supplement in the second part of the report.

It is known that as a result of more favorable prices for livestock products, the peasantry this year paid a significant part of their payments to the state through the sale of these products. This is understandable. Thanks to increased state procurement of meat, pork, eggs, etc. and the considerably increased prices of these products—prices which, even during the period of seasonal decline this year, often fell below their usual levels—the incomes of the peasantry along this line jumped up quite unusually. For example, I will give data for the Melitopol district. These data show that in the second half of 1926 the local peasants received 264,000 rubles from egg harvesting, and in the same half of 1927, 660,000 rubles. The corresponding data on livestock procurement are 390 thousand and 1078 thousand rubles. Finally, data on butter procurement for the last quarters of these two years: 28 thousand, and 246 thousand rubles. This is just one of the private illustrations of the growth in the income of the peasantry from the procurement of agricultural non-bread products. I was also told that the recently built bacon factory in Poltava had such a large influx of bacon pork that, contrary to all expectations, it had recently been unable to cope with the import of even local raw materials. I bring from memory more data on beets. The incomes of the peasantry in the sugar-beet regions, as I was told in Kharkov, have doubled this year compared to last year (from about 35 million to 70 million rubles). And one more remark: in the market of non-grain agricultural goods, the private speculator still continues to play a major role. As a result, according to the statements of responsible comrades, for example, a dozen eggs in Melitopol reach 75 kopecks in the market, and up to 1 ruble in Kremenchug.

Therefore, the People's Commissariat of the USSR, although belatedly, but correctly, on December 21 issued a directive to reduce prices for meat and livestock products. The Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine passed a decision to reduce the conventional prices for meat products and livestock by 10%, in view of the fact that in practice, the purveyors often significantly exceeded the conventional prices, the implementation of the directive to reduce prices by 10% should have led to more than by 10%, a decrease, about which I received the first information from individual districts by the end of the first decade of January. Henceforth, such a significant gap in the increase [of prices] of non-grain agricultural products should not be allowed, as was the case last year.

I will note one more unfavorable circumstance for grain procurements from the practice of regulating grain prices. Just in October, the month of the beginning of a decisive deterioration in grain procurements, according to the directive of the USSR People's Commissariat of Trade, there is a slight decrease in grain prices. This measure could not but have its negative consequences for the further course of procurement. By the end of 1927, the practice of local authorities and the instructions of the NKTorg partially corrected this situation. It goes without saying that such secondary errors are absolutely inevitable in the extremely complex matter of regulating agricultural prices in our country.

The most important factor in the disorganization of the grain market is still the competition of procurers and their knocking down the established grain prices on the basis of competition. Along with the above-mentioned measures to increase grain procurements, the establishment of a united front of procurers in the localities, the elimination of unhealthy forms of competition and a merciless struggle against disorganizers who undermine the established conventional prices in various ways are of great importance. Of great practical importance in this respect should be the dispatch of leading workers to the localities, since only in this way, and at the same time taking decisive measures on the spot, without fail and along party lines, can order be achieved in the work of the grain procurement bodies and, in general, the correct implementation of the decisions taken to strengthen grain procurements.

In conclusion, once again I consider it necessary to support the decision of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U adopted, at my suggestion, on the import of complex agricultural machines and tractors in the amount of 5 million pounds. grain, subject to "fulfillment of the full grain procurement plan of 265 million pounds. in Ukraine". In view of the fact that the plan is 265 million pounds. in the present conditions, when the precious time for grain procurements of the last months of last year has been missed, which is undoubtedly very tense and really difficult, this measure (import) will be of great importance in stimulating local organizations to the full implementation of the set task.

5. Practical work in the field. I can only speak in a very limited sense about the practical implementation of the measures taken to increase grain procurements. I will only note what I could observe during the five days of my stay in Ukraine, after the decisions adopted by the Central Committee of the CP(b)U on December 30th. Here are some examples from live practice in the Melitopol district.

On the very first morning upon my arrival in the Melitopol district, I came across the following fact while stopping at the Prishib station. This station has a grain elevator; right there is the mill of Ukrkhleb (it is also the chleboprodukt's bulk station!); right there is the EPO "Smychka", which is responsible for the procurement of bread (by the way, for the MSPO mill, located 12 versts at the Fertility station!). We walked around the elevator and barns of the Ukrkhleba and Smychka mills - everywhere with grain it was almost empty. However, at one small station, what a rich confusion with the grain buyers, confusing not only any normal procurement work, but also the peasants themselves. It is worth, for example, to ask yourself why at the Prishib station, in the presence of an elevator, the harvesting of the EPO "Smychka" is being carried out, when all the harvesting in this area could be done perfectly by one elevator, and when harvesting,

But this example of the Prishib station is curious in yet another respect. Here we directly got acquainted in practice with the attitude that has been created in Ukraine towards Khleboprodukt. It turned out that the non-Party comrade Buyuros-Kirilenko, the head of the elevator, was put on trial by the Melitopol prosecutor's office and removed from office for violating conventional prices in the past, 1926/27. However, this was a clear injustice in relation to comrade Buyuros - last year the head of the elevator was not him, but communist N (I don’t remember his last name), but Comrade Buyuros was only a deputy head. However, the Melitopol prosecutor's office left communist N alone and brought the non-party Buyuros to trial, clearly violating Soviet laws. It is even more curious how comrade Buyuros and the Ukrainian office of Khleboprodukt dodged in the situation created for them. It turns out that although Buyuros is considered to be brought to trial and removed from his post, as we saw on the spot, he safely continues to work at the same elevator, but under the name Kirilenko, taking advantage of the fact that he has a double surname (Buyuros-Kirilenko). Can't you see from this what an abnormal situation Khleboproduct is working in?

All this forced me to have a serious conversation with the local prosecutor's office in Melitopol. The latter, like a real Themis blindfolded, was sure that she was “fighting speculation”, “punishing the malicious enemies of the Soviet power” by such measures, and for a long time could not understand all the bureaucratic disgrace that she had done in relation to Buyuros. Meanwhile, Comrade Buyuros, according to Khleboprodukt and my personal impressions, is a really good, honest worker. With the full approval of Comrade Demchenko, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks who came with me, and Comrade Fesenko, the secretary of the Melitopol Okrug Committee, I had to directly order (due to an insurmountable difficulty in persuading) the assistant of the Melitopol Prosecutor, Comrade Shapsina, to immediately stop the Buyuros case. I received the execution of this order the day after my departure from Melitopol.

In Melitopol, however, the local communist railroad workers drew my attention to the following fact: recently a huge number of members of the families of railroad workers from the central provinces began to come here for bread. Entire trains were filled with them, and on the basis of so-called single tickets, they took 2 poods of bread for each person in the baggage car and 2 poods with them in the passenger car. One can imagine the situation that arose on the railroad, when often, supposedly, from the family of one railroad worker, 4-5 family members came with one-time tickets. At my insistence, the People's Commissariat of Railways, together with the Central Committee of Railway Workers, issued an order to ban the transport of flour and grain on single tickets (with the exception of 35 kilos of luggage - regardless of the number of people in a given family), and also canceled, until March 1, travel through provisions to places of grain procurement. This is undoubtedly an essential measure for combating speculation in a number of grain-procurement regions.

I had to sanction one local "arbitrariness". The case concerns the printing in Melitopol of temporary receipts for the collection of a preliminary subscription to a peasant loan. Thanks to the energy of local workers, the next day after our arrival in Melitopol (January 2), comrades who had come to the districts on business trips of the regional committee already took these temporary receipts with them. I know that in response to my request on this issue to the NKFin of the USSR, the latter objected to these temporary receipts. However, even before receiving this opinion from the NKFin of the Union, I authorized the use of these temporary receipts until receipt of the relevant receipts from the center and did not cancel this order. But the implementation of this measure, apparently, contributed to the fact that the NKFin of the USSR very quickly sent out its temporary receipts. The latter, of course, will immediately replace locally produced receipts. I know, however, that the deputy of the NKFin of the Ukrainian SSR, comrade Arson, threatened to severely punish Comrade Kislitsyn, head of the Melitopol district of finance, for "arbitrariness." For my part, as I declared to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U, I declare so now that I take full responsibility for this measure.

In order to combat laxity, philistinism and a bureaucratic attitude to business, at my insistence, repressive measures were taken against three comrades: in Melitopol, against a member of the bureau of the regional committee and head of the regional land department, Comrade Tchaikovsky and the chairman of the Vtoro-Pokrovsky RIK t Aksenovich, when checking the work of which in s. Vtoro-Pokrovka, I ascertained inactivity and obvious carelessness. In Kharkov, I was forced to submit to the Central Control Commission the question of Comrade Safronenko, head of the grain department of the NKTorg of the Ukrainian SSR. The latter, clearly philistine and with bureaucratic inattention, reacted to our work in Melitopol, and my demand to carry out with the strictest accuracy the orders for the shipment of bread for the center began to be portrayed before the Kharkov governing bodies and before the NCTorg of the Union as disorganization and inducing terror on the local procurement apparatus. The three comrades mentioned were condemned - in the first case by the Melitopol OKK, in the second by the Central Control Commission of the CP(b)U, with a warning to the said comrades about expulsion from the party for repeating such an attitude towards the case.

It is especially necessary to dwell on the issue of the fulfillment by the Ukrainian NKTorg of orders for the shipment of bread for the center (including for Central Asia and Transcaucasia). This was clearly not a good thing.

When, upon arrival in Melitopol, I drew attention to this and suggested Comrade Demchenko, authorized by the Central Committee of the CP (b) U, decisively press on the execution of orders for the shipment of bread, and Comrade Demchenko perfectly undertook this task, the NKTorg of the Ukrainian SSR showed extreme distrust to the appropriateness of the measures taken. Tov. Demchenko quickly established that the Melitopol organizations did not fulfill the shipment orders, and meanwhile there was enough bread in Melitopol for this. It turned out that some organizations that had little grain had orders for shipment, and those that had a lot of bread did not have them. It is clear that Comrade Demchenko had to force those organizations that had bread to carry out the orders. For this, an instruction was given that organizations that have outfits should mutually receive bread from other organizations, with the obligatory replacement of this grain from the nearest procurements, and pressure was also made on local mills that had large stocks of grain. It was this that Comrade Safronenko was considered to be responsible for the disorganization of grain procurement work, for terror in relation to the Soviet cooperative apparatus, and so on.

However, such an attitude stemmed from the former policy of the People's Commissariat of the Ukrainian SSR. In this case, Comrade Safronenko, perhaps, repeated the mistake of Comrade Chernov only to the strongest degree. During my second visit to Kharkov, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine noted in its resolution a significant non-fulfillment of shipping orders for the center. However, despite the critical situation in the center, the People's Commissariat of Trade of the Ukrainian SSR did not take measures to fully fulfill its orders with the full opportunity to fulfill these latter. In this regard, I cannot but consider the reference to the inadmissibility of exporting grain from Ukraine as a simple excuse. This exile would only be legal if the Ukraine faithfully carried out its orders and if it could satisfy these orders completely with flour. However, if the central allied organs are in an extremely difficult situation with grain, then it is clear that that the duty of the People's Commissariat of the Ukrainian SSR is the unconditional fulfillment of all orders of the center, including orders for grain. More than this, the situation created for the center certainly required, in the event of a delay in the shipment of flour, to carry out orders, in extreme cases, with the shipment of grain. Meanwhile, the NKTorg of Ukraine, as already mentioned, had a significant backlog in the execution of orders. I could not call such an attitude on the part of Comrade Chernov otherwise than localism. This is what I did in a telegram to Moscow, with a copy to Kharkov, January 3 (see Appendix No. 3)4 *. Despite all my pressure back in Ukraine, the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was forced on January 8 to make a special decision, strictly obliging Comrade Chernov, Commissar for Trade of the Ukrainian SSR, to immediately fulfill the underload for the past time and continue to accurately fulfill the orders of the center. For my part, I believed and continue to believe that the center's supervision of the strict fulfillment of orders for the shipment of grain is one of the most important levers for strengthening grain procurement. This was especially important in the first period of the struggle for a decisive change in grain procurements. Unfortunately, on the part of the NKTorg the Union was not shown in this respect, and, perhaps, even now it is not showing due attention.

After a tour of a number of districts, we returned to Kharkov for one day, and at a meeting of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U a number of additional measures were taken to strengthen grain procurements. In all respects, the decisions of the Central Committee of December 30 turned out to be expedient and were reflected in the practice of local organizations.

6. The work of party organizations. During the trip, we had to make sure everywhere that the party organizations, and consequently, the practical workers of the Soviet cooperative apparatus, were completely unaware of the general critical situation with grain procurements. Undoubtedly, this is the fault, first of all, of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

In connection with the pre-Congress situation, the attention of the party organizations was diverted towards the opposition. No serious attention was paid to the question of grain procurements, and even after the two-fold decisive directives of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of December 14 and 24, 8 * there was no real build-up, and in some places, apparently, they were viewed not as the most important directives, but as to "agitation" by the Central Committee. It was necessary, starting from Kharkov, to achieve a sharp turn in attention to grain procurements in all work. For my part, I did everything to emphasize as sharply as possible to the Party activists the difficult situation and shortcomings in the work of the Party, Soviet and co-operative bodies.

Despite the aforementioned December instructions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the attention of local party organizations in December (and was supposed to be in January) was largely diverted by re-election campaigns in the soviets and cooperatives. Party organizations, carrying out day-to-day work, usually limited themselves to "general directives" on the question of grain procurements and prepared "their own" campaigns (re-election campaigns). It has already been reported in the press that even in mid-December, in such an important grain procurement district as Zaporizhia, at the plenum of the district committee, the question of procurement was in current affairs. It was put on the order of the day only at the suggestion of Comrade Khinchuk, who had arrived. In the same Zaporizhzhia, already on December 3, a plenum of the district executive committee met, in the order of the day of which there was no question of grain procurements at all. This became clear when passing through Zaporozhye in my conversation with the secretary of the district committee, comrade Taran, and others.

Decisions had to be made everywhere to postpone re-elections until the summer (this was before the decision of the Central Executive Committee of the Union to postpone the elections to the soviets until autumn) , 67 to postpone plenums, and so on. So, in Melitopol, the congress of komnezams was held, at my suggestion, during two sessions, instead of the planned three days. These measures contributed to shifting the attention of party organizations to grain procurements.

Particularly conspicuous in the localities was the departmental nature of the work of the Soviet and cooperative bodies. "Departmentalism", as can be seen from what has been said, was striking in the work of party organizations. The departmental narrowness was clearly reflected in the work on grain procurements. The workers of these bodies go to all sorts of subterfuges, and sometimes even illegalities, in order to fulfill their tasks, while thinking little about the duty of unity of action, about Soviet and cooperative discipline, about the exact fulfillment of the directives of the central bodies. However, the work of the central bodies themselves is imbued with this departmentalism, which, obviously, is reflected, only in a cruder form, in the practice of local bodies.

The Party organizations, as if, should wage a decisive struggle against this departmentalism. However, they often have “their own” departmentality. This departmental narrowness was clearly reflected in the fact that party committees paid little attention to such an important matter as grain procurements, often standing aloof from this matter. The so-called general directives, which usually resemble general phrases, cannot, of course, be regarded as real Party leadership. As a result, we got what we had to meet at every step when traveling to the localities: among the grain producers, cut off from the Party, left without proper support and guidance, disbelief in the feasibility of the tasks assigned to them, and among the leaders of the Party organizations - ignorance of the matter and writing "general" unhelpful directives.

With all the numerous facts of philistine-compassionate attitude and laxity that had to be observed among the Communists during the trip, it must be said that on the part of the overwhelming majority of the leaders of organizations and the main part of the party activists, our report about the difficult situation with bread forced these basic party cadres. As soon as the main workers of the local organizations found out about the real state of affairs, it usually quickly showed that they were really imbued with militant revolutionary interests and really set to work. I believe that the fact that 7,000 to 8,000 Communists, headed by the leaders of the central organs, were mobilized for grain procurement within a week proves that during this time the CP(b)U has firmly established itself in this military post.

Now about the method of work

The method was dictated by the impact of the task. After the work carried out in Kharkov and the adoption of the decision of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U of December 30, where we happened to be, many local leading workers of the party, Soviet and cooperative apparatus worked not only during the day, but often at night, not only on weekdays, but and on holidays. The shake was decent.

First of all, it was necessary to achieve clarity in tasks and strict monitoring of the implementation of directives. First of all, it was necessary to establish by months, and for January and by decades, the fulfillment of the grain procurement plan. Other tasks for the work of the Soviet and cooperative apparatus (state agricultural tax, insurance, cooperative shares, distribution of the cross loan, self-taxation, etc.) were also required, in most cases, divided into certain parts with an indication of the approximate timing of their implementation. Measures like calendar deadlines, digital assignments, etc. were used in some organizations very widely, from the district to the district and beyond. Of course, mistakes and excesses are possible on this basis, and, in any case, the most careful observation of the practice of carrying out such tasks and the immediate correction of inevitable errors are required. In some places, in connection with this, I had to come across remarks that such methods of work resemble the People's Commissariat of Food, "war communism", etc. I think this is a misconception. At a party meeting of all leading officials of the Central Committee, the Council of People's Commissars, the VUSPS, the Central Committee of the KLSMU and the Bureau of the Kharkov District Committee, I had to dwell on a question of this kind posed to me, pointing out not only the role of the People's Commissariat of Food in the past, but also the fact that some elements of the work of the People's Commissariat of Food (clarity , discipline, etc.) is extremely useful to carry out even now, and that the weakness of these qualities in Soviet and cooperative bodies is now one of their main shortcomings. With this opinion, I remain to this day and that the weakness of these qualities in Soviet and co-operative bodies is now one of their main shortcomings. With this opinion, I remain to this day. and that the weakness of these qualities in Soviet and co-operative bodies is now one of their main shortcomings. With this opinion, I remain to this day.

I can't get past the work of the courts and the prosecutor's office. According to our local impressions, these are organs where the party spirit is especially little felt. Jammed paper and casuistry, even the Communists. Circumstances forced me at each new point (and not only in Ukraine) to pay special attention to the work of the judiciary and sharply emphasize that their work should be aimed not only at protecting certain formal rights of individual citizens, but to no lesser extent and even in the first head to protect the interests of the Soviet government. Unfortunately, the practice of the judiciary is often such that even the communists here perfectly "remember" the articles of the law that allegedly protect the speculator, kulak, slob, etc., and often "forget" about the laws of the Soviet power against speculation, against violators of revolutionary legality, against slackers and bureaucrats. The above example with Comrade Buyuros-Kirilenko could be supplemented by a number of others similar to him. There is no doubt that this situation with the judiciary requires decisive party action, not only in Ukraine.

The method of work also includes combative criticism of the shortcomings of the Soviet co-operative apparatus, as well as Party organizations, to which we paid great attention in all our work in connection with grain procurements. In this matter, the press began to play an important role, although it is not always able to really catch specific shortcomings, indicating the exact names, institutions, etc. Inevitably, there was also a wider use of "demonstrative" repressive measures in the party and Soviet order.

But the question of the political approach to the campaign has taken on particular importance. An increased supply of manufactured goods to the countryside is now being carried out depending on the importance of the districts in grain procurement. The necessary advantage for the peasants who donated grain, including the non-cooperative peasants, in some places aroused the alertness of the poor peasants and rural communists. On the other hand, the need to increase the sale of agricultural machinery for cash also required special measures to protect the interests of the collective farms and the poor. Appropriate instructions were given. Everywhere attention was also drawn to the fact that the collective farms should immediately hand over their "surplus".

However, the main question, of course, was and remains the question of the delivery of grain by the middle peasants and the top of the village. Now, in the second half of the agricultural year, the question of bread for the prosperous kulak part of the countryside has taken on special significance. The latter, in view of the relatively low state payments of this year and in view of the large revenues from other items, until recently occupied a clearly wait-and-see position with the sale of grain. Better than anyone else in the countryside, knowing the difficulties of the Soviet government with grain, the kulaks, on the one hand, developed speculation in the grain market, on the other hand, withheld the bulk of the grain, counting on price increases. It is clear that in order to achieve a breakthrough in grain procurements, it was necessary, by a combination of measures, to firmly press precisely on the kulak elite. Only in this way, and by a resolute struggle for stable prices and a united front of the planners, could the necessary breakthrough be achieved. Only by the combination of these measures, which in some cases required severe repressions (arrests, fines, severe judicial punishments) against the kulak elements, was the well-known turning point achieved fairly quickly.

However, these measures against the kulaks, directly or indirectly, but not infrequently, were objected by local comrades. In addition to formal objections to accelerating the collection of payments and arrears, accelerating the implementation of self-taxation, etc., political considerations were also put forward, which in the end amounted to not putting decisive pressure on the kulak elements because of fear about the middle peasants. In fact, such a presentation clearly reflected a blatant distortion of the party line. Absolutely necessary and absolutely obligatory caution in approaching the middle peasant cannot, of course, justify the failure to take decisive, including harsh, repressive measures against kulak elements engaged in speculation, listed as short-earners, threatening active Soviet workers in the countryside, etc. Vice versa, Such an attitude in practice amounts to pandering to the kulaks, in which it is impossible to create even the most united front of the poor peasants and middle peasants against the kulak. Moreover, the inevitable pressure (“coercive measures”) on the countryside in the absence of clarity on the question of the kulaks will certainly be directed towards the middle peasant and even the poor peasant to a greater than necessary degree (which happened, for example, in the Belebeevsky canton even before our arrival in Ufa). Therefore, in view of the presence of such sentiments, I had to dwell on the fact that such an attitude towards the question of the kulaks is nothing but a kulak deviation, against which the party has always fought.

On the other hand, one cannot close one's eyes to the fact that the impact of the work, and at the same time the insufficient preliminary preparation in individual cases of applying this pressure on the fist, will lead to errors and excesses. These disadvantages of the grain procurement campaign must be corrected as quickly as possible. And yet it must be said that at the present moment the main “excess” in the grain-procurement regions is undoubtedly, and now it will be rather the opposite, namely, in the direction of insufficient, sluggish, indecisive pressure on the kulak elements in the grain regions.

It goes without saying that that decent shake-up, which now usually passed like a life-giving stream through the Party organizations and which often thoroughly affected the Soviet and co-operative bodies, must be consolidated by further systematic work. It must give its considerable impetus to the advancement of Party and Soviet work. At the same time, we must prepare in advance and carry out the next grain procurement campaigns in a more normal manner. Not only the Soviet and co-operative bodies, but also the Party organizations must, in the near future, seriously begin preparations for next year's grain procurements.

7. Results. The first results of the intensified campaign are visible from the following data, given in the table and diagram for five-day periods for December-January.

The movement of grain procurements in Ukraine for December 1927 and January 1928

(in thousand poods)

       December 1927 January 1928

1 five-day week 2244    3215

2 five days        2543    3004

3 five days        2490    4241

4 five days        1763    5443

5 five days        1582

6 five days        2373

These figures are presented in the following diagram 3 *.

Only with the most persistent work, which does not weaken in the least in the future, only under this condition can the first, still completely insufficient, successes of grain procurements be consolidated and much greater be achieved in the remaining time, which is very insignificant for grain procurements. The data cited, however, show that the outlined plan, given the really hard work of the entire CP(b)U and the corresponding Soviet and cooperative bodies, is quite feasible.

II. Notes about the trip to the Urals and Bashkiria

In view of the short duration of my stay in the Urals and in Bashkiria, and in view of the fact that Comrade Frumkin was in the Urals before me, and Comrade Lobov was in Bashkiria, I will confine myself to brief remarks, which are mainly in the nature of an addition to the questions raised in the first part of the report.

I. The course of grain procurements, the annual plan and the purveyors. It suffices to cite the following indicators on the progress of grain procurements in the Urals. By January 1, procurement reached approximately 35% of the annual task of the USSR People's Commissariat of Trade. At the same time, the first half of January also showed a further deterioration against December stocks. In Bashkiria, by January 10, only 32% of the annual task was prepared. In the first half of January, there was also a deterioration in the procurement. Thus, the progress of procurement until recently in both regions was extremely unsatisfactory.

The annual plan in the Urals was adopted at 41 million poods, and local authorities proceeded from this until our arrival, while in the plan of the USSR People's Commissariat of Trade, 44 million poods were assigned for the Urals. After considerable objections, the Uralobkom Bureau decided on a plan of 44 million poods. How unfounded were the objections of some local leading workers against this figure, we clearly managed to establish only the next day after the joint discussion of the issue in the Uralobkom. It turned out that on October 21, the Bureau of the Uralobkom adopted the following decision on the issue of the grain procurement plan:

1. To note that the grain procurement plan for 1927/28 is planned in the amount of 41 million pounds ... 5 *

2. The bureau of the regional committee considers that the grain procurement plan will be increased by 3-4 million poods. can be produced only with a significant increase in the supply of manufactured goods.

Thus, at the end of October, Uralobkom itself recognized the plan of 44-45 million poods as feasible. with an increase in the supply of manufactured goods. Since the latter (increasing the supply of manufactured goods) is just now taking place, it is clear that the objections of some members of the Uralobkom against the figure of 44 million were completely unfounded and directly contradicted the decision of the Bureau of the Uralobkom, adopted long before our arrival. Meanwhile, Comrade Frumkin, who arrived before me, defended the opinion that the Urals could only procure 39 million pounds, and Comrade Frumkin agreed on this with the local comrades. I could not agree with this position and considered it harmful from the point of view of the success of the case. As mentioned above, Uralobkom agreed with me.

In Bashkiria, the annual plan was set at 18 million pounds. and has not been revised.

I will dwell in particular on the question of the role of individual procurers in the Urals. Here the main supplier is Khleboprodukt, where the local state organization Meltrest has recently joined. Khleboprodukt thus accounts for 86% of the annual plan in the Urals. Of course, Khleboprodukt conducts a considerable part (about half) of procurements through grass-roots cooperatives. However, it cannot be considered normal that the so-called centralized cooperative procurements in the Urals account for less than 14%. With all the expediency of Khleboprodukt's currently predominant role in procurement in the Urals (in order to ensure a firm supply of local workers), it cannot be denied that direct co-operative procurement here is excessively curtailed. For this, local cooperative centers repay those that ensure the fulfillment of their small workpieces and, until recently, they were completely frivolous in completing tasks for Khleboprodukt. The comrades-co-operators had to point out the complete inadmissibility of such an attitude to business, which in this case obviously suffered because of departmental vanity.

In Bashkiria, the situation is clearly abnormal with the number of procurers. There were seven of them: Khleboprodukt, Khlebotsentr, Tsentrosoyuz, MSPO, Bash-khleb, Elektrotod, distillery. And this is actually only for three cantons (Birsky, Ufimsky and Belebeevsky), which account for 9/10 grain procurements. This fact alone clearly testifies to the absence of real management of grain procurements in Bashkiria.

2. Measures to strengthen grain procurements. Basically, the measures taken here were similar to the corresponding measures in Ukraine. The supply of manufactured goods to the grain-procurement regions was intensified in every possible way, with a corresponding revision of plans. Both in the Urals and in Bashkiria, even more than in Ukraine, shortcomings in the collection of state payments and the accumulation of arrears in the countryside affected. In this regard, here too, accelerated calendar plans for collecting payments and arrears were drawn up. As in other places, the income of the peasantry from the sale of non-grain products, namely, meat, pork, butter, furs, etc., increased significantly here. Owing to the abnormally increased prices of these products, the situation with procurement plans for them was, of course, not at all the same as with bread. So, the annual plan for meat preparations was exceeded by 30-40%, etc. In the Urals, they especially noted the income of the peasantry from catching the so-called "water rats" (moles), which come true for 30 k, a piece and some of the farms provide a very significant income. And along with this, such a fact as the price of oats, which even at face value is almost 10% lower than the pre-war price, namely, 56 kopecks against the pre-war price of 61 kopecks! It is clear that this circumstance had its influence on the fact that this year the Urals are completely unable to cope with the procurement plan for oats. In this case, a clear error in price was made. worth even at face value almost 10% lower than the pre-war price, namely, 56 kopecks against the pre-war price of 61 kopecks! It is clear that this circumstance had its influence on the fact that this year the Urals are completely unable to cope with the procurement plan for oats. In this case, a clear error in price was made. worth even at face value almost 10% lower than the pre-war price, namely, 56 kopecks against the pre-war price of 61 kopecks! It is clear that this circumstance had its influence on the fact that this year the Urals are completely unable to cope with the procurement plan for oats. In this case, a clear error in price was made.

Along with other general and particular measures to increase grain procurements, here, especially in Bashkiria, the question of combating moonshine has acquired acute importance. Moonshine, according to local comrades, floods the village of Bashkiria, displacing the bread wine of state production. The fight against moonshine is clearly launched, which once again reflects the laxity of the Soviet apparatus.

The laxity of the Soviet and cooperative apparatus can be judged by such glaring facts as grain procurement work in the Perm and Kungur districts. Although these districts play an insignificant role in grain procurements, their attitude towards the task entrusted to them is still characteristic. Over the past six months, Perm has fulfilled 2.1%, and Kungur 3.8% of the annual plan. At our suggestion, the Bureau of the Uralobkom made it clear to the entire staff of the bureau, both district committees, their negligent attitude to the matter and warned that “in the event that a real turning point in grain procurements is not achieved in the next week, the Uralobkom will be forced to raise the question of removing the secretaries of these party organizations." Another example is a fact that we came across in Bashkiria. Despite the great need for temporary cross-loan receipts, the latter had lain for a week before our arrival at the state bank in Ufa, and even the manager of the bank's Bashkir office and his deputy did not know about it. Both of them, at our suggestion, were given a severe reprimand by the Bashobkom with a warning about expulsion from the Party and with the publication of this decision in the press.

Both in the Urals and in Bashkiria, in addition to the comrades sent to the field, we managed to make trips there for the main executives. But in Bashkiria I had to resort to special measures. Having established from conversations with the workers of the Bashobkom that the lower Soviet and cooperative apparatus is exceptionally weak here, I agreed with the Bashobkom to send a special group of the most active local workers, mainly railway workers, to the three main procurement cantons. According to the list drawn up in the Bashobkom, 21 workers were allocated, in some part directly from production, and on the same night most of them were sent to places to work in the districts. Before the trip, they were present at the discussion of the question of grain procurements at the Bureau of the Bashobkom with our participation. In addition to the usual measures, I felt compelled to give them special mandates, separately along the party and Soviet lines (with identical content), on which, in addition to local Soviet and party bodies, he also put his signature, on one - as an authorized representative of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union, on the other - as an authorized SRT. I enclose a copy of the mandate (see Appendix No. 6)4*.

In the Urals and Bashkiria, we had to meet - in the first case, with the decision of the Uralobkom to provide bread deliverers with manufactured goods in the amount of 50% of bread, and in the second - with the decision of the Bashobkom on direct exchange of goods for bread deliverers. I will not prove the inexpediency of these measures in the present conditions. I will dwell only on how politically these measures were refracted on the ground. Such an approach meant relying only on manufactured goods (incentive measures) and thereby relegated the significance of other Soviet-cooperative measures (coercive measures) to the background. With such unacceptable one-sidedness, this measure could not at all have a positive practical significance, but politically in the localities it was refracted in the form of unwillingness to put pressure on the prosperous kulak part of the village. This was especially evident to us in Bashkiria.

3. The work of party organizations. As for the Party organizations, in the Urals, one must think, their work in the field of grain procurement will now be significantly intensified. Workers such as Shvernik and Lokatskov went with us to the two main grain procurement districts (Kurgan and Chelyabinsk). A number of other leading comrades also, in addition to those already posted earlier, went to the field. Party organizations began to seriously catch up.

Much worse in Bashkiria. Here the situation in the Bashobkom itself is clearly abnormal. Thus, the Bureau of the Bashobkom consists of the following comrades: Yurevich (secretary of the Bashobkom), Ismagilov (deputy secretary), Gorelov (head of the organizational department), Kushaev (chairman of the Bash. TsIK), Pozhilov (Narkomtorg), Oparin (BSPS), Mamaev (secretary 2 district committees), Bychkov (chairman of the Kantispolkom), Gismatulin (Narkompros), Kasimov (Narkomjust), Mukhametkulov (Predsovnarkom) and 6 candidates. And yet, Comrade Urazaev, head of the APO Bashobkom, is not a member of the bureau. It is also indicative that Comrade Yurevich, the secretary of the Bashobkom, could not carry out his proposal to introduce the head of the APO into the bureau of the OK at the time.

As for the leadership of the grain procurement campaign, it was extremely weak. The case was limited to "general directives", which did not give positive results. Meanwhile, here, in the catastrophic situation with grain procurements, the regional committee is more than anywhere else obliged to put a systematic check in practice of all measures, assignments, figures, etc. Soviet and cooperative bodies in this area. The absence of this led to the fact that here in the grain procurement work there were especially many outrages.

Finally, it is necessary to dwell on one significant political mistake of the regional committee. In response to our proposal to press harder and faster on the kulak in order to force him to turn in the grain more quickly and thereby set an example for the rest of the village that has grain, the members of the Bashobkom began to assure that in Bashkiria the kulaks represent an absolutely insignificant percentage. At the same time, a statement was made (which, as it later turned out, had earlier been put forward at the regional party conference) that there were only 2.6% of kulaks in Bashkiria. Of course, this is completely untrue. Bashkiria belongs to the number of significantly stratified regions, which can be seen from at least one figure, namely: here, according to the Central Statistical Bureau, 4.5% of households employing temporary workers, i.e. farms, which are overwhelmingly kulak. The underestimation allowed by the comrades from the Bashobkom, at least two times the percentage of the kulaks in Bashkiria, had to be specially explained. Meanwhile, this gross underestimation of the kulaks obviously had a harmful effect on the political approach of the organization to its tasks in grain procurement. Instead of decisive pressure on the kulak along the line of all coercive measures, and now, in particular, along the line of self-taxation, no measures were taken in this direction. The whole bet here was on manufactured goods, which, with the line adopted by the regional committee, was in advance and completely doomed to failure. I had to draw the attention of the local organization to this question (about the kulak).

The question of the kulaks is now all the more important because, for example, in the Urals the kulaks are trying in some places to go over to the counteroffensive, going so far as to noticeably more frequent beatings of active Soviet workers in the countryside. And this fact points to the need to put an end to the laxity of the Soviet apparatus and local party organizations, which must, by immediate decisive measures, stop all attempts at resistance to Soviet power by the kulaks. Undoubtedly, a firm line and a proper rebuff to the attacks of the kulaks are now especially necessary and will have their favorable effect on grain procurements. On this basis we must consolidate the bloc of the poor and middle peasants against the kulaks. Decisive measures against the kulaks will make it clear to the middle peasants, who have bread, the need for strict fulfillment of obligations to the state,

4. Results. The results of grain procurements in the Urals and Bashkiria for January are still extremely unsatisfactory. If in the Urals, nevertheless, there has been some improvement for the 4th five-day period, then in Bashkiria there is not even a hint of it yet. Compared to Ukraine, the harvesting season here ends about a month later, and therefore time has not yet been completely lost. However, only with immediate and furious pressure over the entire coming period and with a long-term concentration of the main Party forces on grain procurements and related measures can serious success be achieved in carrying out the outlined plan. In particular, a representative of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the STO will have to be immediately sent to Bashkiria for a longer period in order to increase the pace of work. Other, more general conclusions specifically in relation to Bashkiria can be left out of this report.

III. conclusions

Regarding the grain

1. The drop in grain procurements in the last months of 1927 was primarily due to shortcomings in the management of this business. To correct the situation that has arisen, it will be necessary to carry out measures, mainly in two directions: along the line of encouragement (increasing the supply of manufactured goods to the village) and along the line of compulsion (increasing the collection of payments and arrears in the countryside, as well as increasing the attraction of peasant funds into cooperation). Only the totality and simultaneity of these twofold measures can give and are already giving positive results in the field of grain procurements.

2. Of particular note are the negative consequences for the grain procurements of the delay in the implementation of such measures as the decree on self-taxation and the peasant loan. It is necessary to accelerate in every possible way the spread of peasant loans in the countryside. Of particular importance in this period is the implementation of the decree on self-taxation while fully ensuring the interests of the poor and strengthening the bloc of the poor and the middle peasants against the kulaks.

3. The unfavorable course of grain procurements was significantly affected by the incorrect price ratio between grain and non-grain products of the peasant economy. In order to correct this mistake, at the beginning of 1928 a certain reduction in prices for livestock products was inevitable, which, in view of the delay in this measure, at the same time requires additional other measures to increase the procurement of these products (including through the so-called economic regulation).

4. The perversion of the political line in the practice of some local organizations, which found expression in the failure to take appropriate measures of decisive pressure on the kulak elements and speculators because of the completely false fear of hurting the middle peasant, had a noticeable negative effect. The Central Committee of the AUCP quite rightly pointed out the fallacy of this political approach more than once (in particular, in the directive of January 6, 9 * and in the directive of January 14, 10 *).

In view of the facts of direct attacks on the part of certain elements of the kulaks against the most active Soviet workers in the grain-producing regions, immediately apply the most severe judicial penalties against these counter-revolutionary elements.

5. The results achieved in strengthening grain procurements are completely insufficient. It is necessary not only not to weaken, but in many organizations to significantly increase the pace of work. In view of the impact of the present work, to follow most carefully and immediately correct the inevitable mistakes of local authorities, by no means allowing the pressure to be relaxed.

6. It is necessary to prepare for the future grain procurement campaign (including the spring sowing campaign) in the very near future.

As important practical measures for the future grain procurement campaign, the following must be borne in mind: a) to more carefully correct the ratio of prices for grain and non-grain products in favor of the former, but with certain advantages for livestock products and industrial crops in relation to pre-war indices; 6) to provide future grain procurements with the corresponding masses of manufactured goods; c) to reduce, as a rule, the number of purveyors to two main ones: a single state (Khleboprodukt - with ensuring the interest of places in this state organization in the form of participation in profits, etc.) and cooperative with the establishment, on certain conditions, of unity in the work of grain procurement between the consumer and agricultural cooperation; d) to strengthen the bodies of the People's Commissariat of Trade, regulating the matter of grain procurements, party forces and achieve greater discipline and clarity in work here; e) to subject the central and main local grain and fodder balance sheets and the very principles of their compilation to serious scientific verification, with due regard to the economic growth of the countryside, the increased commercial value of non-grain products, etc.; f) increase the agricultural tax by 100-150 million rubles.

With regard to the Soviet cooperative apparatus and party organizations

7. To take decisive measures to combat laxity and to strengthen Soviet discipline, to eliminate inconsistency and narrow departmentalism in the work of Soviet institutions. In this connection, systematic long trips to the places of the heads of central Soviet institutions to check the work of subordinate local bodies should be achieved. To assign special responsibility for carrying out measures to strengthen discipline in the Soviet apparatus to the RCTs 68 .

8. With the rapidly growing role of cooperatives in the countryside, cooperative bodies not only suffer from a lack of elementary cooperative discipline, but also from a weak development of truly cooperative social work (insufficient attraction of shares, lack of initiative in collecting peasant funds for the development of cooperative processing enterprises, not to mention completely insufficient attention to industrial cooperation). In addition, the task is to achieve real coordination of the work of state and cooperative bodies in the countryside with the provision of guiding influence for state bodies.

9. It is necessary to resolutely improve the work of the Party leadership and ensure that it is not reduced to so-called "general directives". It is essential that this manual essentially ensure the Party's verification of the work of the cooperative-Soviet apparatus, including the verification of all basic tasks and figures in such important economic matters as grain procurement, capital construction, collective agreements, etc.

10. It is essential that the shock grain procurement campaign now being carried out be used by the Party organizations to raise all Party, Soviet and co-operative work. To achieve this, Party committees must strengthen their control over the work of all cooperative and Soviet institutions, especially those carrying out tasks related to the grain procurement campaign (courts and the GPU, financial and land authorities, agricultural credit, etc.).

Individual offers

a) To establish before the end of February the reports of the People's Commissariat of Trade on grain procurements at each meeting of the Politburo. This is extremely important for the much-needed further pull-up of local organizations.

b) To change the resolution of the Politburo of January 5, 69 , accept the proposal of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine on the import of complex agricultural machines in the amount of 5 million pounds. bread, subject to the implementation by Ukraine of the full grain procurement plan of 265 million pounds.

c) Instruct the People's Commissariat of Trade within 3 days to settle the issue of the price of oats in the Urals, allowing, if necessary, a minimum price increase.

d) Not later than February 1, send to Bashkiria for two weeks an authorized Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and STO 70 . Instruct the Secretariat of the Central Committee to outline the candidacy and approve it in the Politburo.

V. Molotov.

1 * Pencil notes above the heading: “No. 2”, “Viewed - print. 25.01" and the signature "V. Molotov".

2 * Figures, as a rule, I give with the usual rounding, without tenths. (Approx. Doc.).

3 * No diagram in the text.

4 * Application not found.

5 * Refine the document.

6 * This refers to a type of building glass.

7 * The words “near the Ukrainian village” are written above the crossed-out text “in Ukraine”. However, the author himself put a question mark in the margins.

8 * See. while. № 17 and № 23.

9 * See doc. No. 32. The text indicates the date of distribution of the directive of 5 January.

10 * See. while. № 38.

66 Rural Gospodar - All-Ukrainian Union of Agricultural Cooperation. It was the central body of the entire system of agricultural cooperation in Ukraine, while special branches of agricultural cooperation had their own separate sales and supply centers. The rural ruler was directly in charge of the unions of credit and universal cooperation, but the credit unions were simultaneously subordinate to the leadership of Ukrselbank, the center of agricultural credit in Ukraine. The rural gospodar supplied the village with means of production and goods for household and industrial purposes, carried out work on agricultural credit and agro-events, was engaged in active production work: the construction of elevators, plants for processing agricultural products, bacon factories, etc. The rural ruler also organized briefings, opened training courses for cooperative workers, held lectures, distributed literature on issues of agricultural cooperation, etc. In 1928, the Rural Gospodar included 42 credit and universal unions, as well as 7 centers of special cooperation, uniting 2700 credit, 4798 special and 5028 machine and tractor associations, 6316 agricultural collectives, with a total number of united farms of 910 thousand ( All Cooperation of the USSR, Moscow, 1929, pp. 194-200).

67 Initially, the elections of 1927/28 were planned to be held from January to April 1928 (SZ USSR. 1927. No. 67. Art. 683). In January 1928, the Central Executive Committee of the USSR adopted a resolution stating: “In view of the petitions from individual union republics to partially postpone elections to councils for various dates in 1928 and the need that arose from this to establish a common period for the entire Union for the election campaign, ensuring the one-time her, - to propose to the central executive committees of the Union republics re-elections to councils and the convocation of volost (district), district (district), provincial and regional (territorial) and corresponding congresses of councils to be postponed to the autumn of 1928. (SZ USSR. 1928. No. 3. Art. 30). In the summer of 1928, the timing of the election campaign was specified: the pre-election reporting campaign was planned to begin in December 1928,

68 The People's Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (NK RKI) was created by a decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of February 7, 1920 as a body of "socialist control based on the involvement of workers and peasants in the higher state control bodies" (SU RSFSR. 1920. No. 16. Art. 94) . The task of the RCT was to fight for strict accounting of material values and food, for improving the state apparatus, for limiting private capital. V. I. Lenin attached great importance to the organs of the RCT. By decision of the XII Congress of the NC Party, the RKI was merged with the Central Control Commission (see note No. 25). The decisions of the XII Congress were legislated by the Decree of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of September 6, 1923 "On the reorganization of the RCT" and the resolution of the 3rd session of the CEC of the USSR of November 12, 1923, where a new regulation on the People's Commissariat of the RCT was approved. In 1924 The 13th Party Congress decided to reorganize also the local control commissions and the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection Commissions on the basis of the decision of the 12th Party Congress. Acting as a joint body, the Central Control Commission and the People's Commissariat of the RCT retained their independence: the members of the Central Control Commission were elected by party congresses, the People's Commissar of the RCT and his deputies were appointed by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. According to the decision of the XVII Party Congress (January 1934) on the need to strengthen Soviet control, the Central Control Commission - RKI was abolished as having fulfilled its task, and the Commission of Party Control under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Commission of Soviet Control under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (SIE. T 11, pp. 774-775).

69 Proposal of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U on additional imports of tractors in the amount of 5 million rubles. “as a measure to encourage the development of grain procurements” was adopted by the Politburo on January 5, 1928. A necessary condition for increasing imports was Ukraine's 100% fulfillment of the grain procurement plan (RTsKhIDNI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1772. L. 3).

70 On January 10, 1928, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided: “To consider it necessary that Comrade Molotov, when traveling to the Urals, visit Bashkiria and take appropriate measures to strengthen grain procurements” (RTsKhIDNI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 668. L. 9).