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Lavrenty Beria Case
Soviet Archives/Beria Case/Beria Case Plenum.pdf
MEETING JULY 3
Evening meeting
Khrushchev. Let's continue the work of the Plenum. Comrade Patolichev has the floor. Comrade Kirichenko - Ukraine, get ready.
Patolichev: Comrades, we have listened to the detailed report of Comrade Malenkov, the speeches of Comrades Khrushchev, Molotov, Bulganin, Kaganovich, and now the full picture is revealed to each of us, and for me, for example, the first thought that came to mind was that 3 months was not such a long period of time that was needed to expose and neutralize such a cunning and dangerous enemy of the party and the state as Beria turned out to be.
It must be said that the leaders of the party and government, members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, in such a difficult matter demonstrated steadfastness and determination and, I would say, the necessary flexibility and skill.
What pleases me most, comrades, is that the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee acted in a united manner at a difficult and crucial moment for the party and the state, acted as was required of the Lenin-Stalin Central Committee. Now our Central Committee will be even stronger, even more monolithic, and under its leadership, our entire party.
We, the members of the Central Committee, approve of the actions of the Presidium of the Central Committee.
I would like to speak about the national question. As is known, Beria, in his hostile adventurist goals, acted under the banner of the alleged liquidation of the distortions of our party's national policy, but in reality this was a distortion of the Leninist-Stalinist national policy, unprecedented in the history of the Soviet state , a distortion calculated to undermine trust in the Russian people, to break the great friendship of the peoples of our country.
I, for one, believe that this was a genuine act of sabotage on the part of Beria. Apparently, for the first time in the history of our multinational state, experienced party, and Soviet personnel, loyal to our party, are being removed from their posts simply because they are Russian.
The head of the Mogilev regional department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Comrade Pochtenniy, has worked in Belarus almost all his life and has been working for the Cheka for at least 20 years . Beria was fired only because he was Russian.
Beria, in one stroke, without the knowledge of the party organs, and in Belarus, without the knowledge of the Central Committee of Belarus, removed Russians and Ukrainians from leadership positions, starting with the Minister of Internal Affairs of Belarus, the entire leadership of the ministry and regional departments. Such a replacement was being prepared, including the district police officer.
a Here and further in N. Patolichev’s speech, the words highlighted in bold were crossed out from the uncorrected transcript in the process of its preparation for printing and distribution to party organizations. — Comp.
ь The words "Comrade Honorable" have been inserted. Here and further in N. Patolichev's speech, the footnotes on each page contain the text inserted into the uncorrected transcript during its preparation for printing and distribution to party organizations. — Comp.
Beria caused enormous harm with his hostile actions in the national question. I think that the Presidium of the Central Committee will immediately correct all this, will give correct clear instructions to the party organizations in the national question based on the teachings of Lenin and Stalin.
As for strengthening the Ministry of Internal Affairs and improving leadership on the part of party organs, it is necessary, from my point of view, to decisively eliminate the consequences of Beria’s hostile activity in the matter of personnel placement.
It is necessary to restore to their former positions the personnel expelled by him, Beria, and thereby show that all this has nothing to do with the line of our party, with the activities of the Central Committee.
Furthermore, since Beria expelled from the Cheka all party workers sent by the party to the organs to strengthen them, it is necessary to return these personnel and send additional party workers.
Molotov a . All party cadres?
Patolichev: Almost all that have been sent recently.
Voice from the floor. There was a directive to expel.
Molotov: You can't expel them all. Most of them are honest.
Patolichev: Precisely honest ones.
Beria contaminated the Chekist cadres with politically dubious people. He recruited them, picked them for a reason, he needed cutthroats. It is necessary to decisively purge the organs of these people.
Next, I wanted to say, comrades, that there are many honest people working in the Cheka. They resisted Beria's actions, his actions to separate the organs from the party, as best they could. I can give many examples from Belarus, but there is no need. I will dwell on only a few. Things got to the point that one day the Minister of Internal Affairs, Comrade Baskakov, was in the office of the First Secretary of the Central Committee. Beria called him and said: "Where are you?" - "To the Central Committee, to the First Secretary." - "Go to your place, call." Comrade Baskakov reported with , that there was such a demand d , went, called e . An order was given to collect national data from f Cheka organs, without reporting this to the Central Committee of Belarus. But Comrade Baskakov immediately reported to the Central Committee. He refused to write a note, then he was summoned to the Ministry in Moscow and forced to write, and then thrown out as an objectionable person.
a Is it true that they were expelled?
b picked up
with me
d he was told
e to him
f data on the national composition of party, soviet and
I want to say, comrades, that Beria did not have and could not have support not only in the party, among the people, but also in the organs. This is what caused his actions to expel party workers, honest Chekist personnel from the organs and to pollute these organs with his own people, pleasing him.
Comrades, I fully agree with the statements of the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee regarding the need to strengthen party work, strengthen the political education of communists and workers, and more successfully resolve a number of urgent economic tasks. We will draw the most necessary conclusions for ourselves from this.
In conclusion, I want to say: The exposure of the enemy and adventurer Beria reminds us again and again how dear to us is the unity of the party ranks, the unity and cohesion of the leading core of our party.
The Presidium of the Central Committee, thanks to its unity and solidarity, has done an invaluable job - it has saved the party and the state from great trouble. With such unity we are invincible. This unity must be protected like the apple of our eye.
The present Plenum of the Central Committee demonstrates the unshakable unity and steadfastness of the Leninist-Stalinist Central Committee.
Comrades, I consider it my party duty to declare that the party organization of Belarus, like our entire party, will actively support the actions of the Central Committee and will unite even more closely around our Leninist-Stalinist Central Committee. (Applause.)
Khrushchev (chairman): Comrade Kirichenko has the floor, comrade Mikoyan must prepare.
Kirichenko: Comrades, the convincing report of Comrade Malenkov and the equally convincing speeches of Presidium members Comrades Khrushchev, Molotov, Bulganin, Kaganovich about the anti-party, anti-state actions of Beria showed us how far this presumptuous adventurer and provocateur had gone. It must be said frankly that with his hostile conspiratorial actions, which have been reported here in detail, Beria was preparing the ground for himself to be a dictator in the party and the country. With his provocative sabotage actions, especially recently, he has caused enormous harm to our party and the Soviet state.
Beria is the most vile traitor and betrayer of the interests of the party and the people. He acted like a Judas. Everyone still remembers his speech at the funeral rally on March 9 of this year 74 , where he called on the entire party, the entire Soviet people to unite. And he himself, immediately after the death of Comrade Stalin, raised his dirty hand against the unity of the party, against its Central Committee, went against the party.
In connection with the exposure of Beria, I would like to dwell on some facts from Ukraine, which, it seems to me, complement the disgusting image of this vile provocateur.
Immediately after Beria's appointment as Minister of Internal Affairs, he recommended a certain Meshik, a man with a very dubious past, as Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine. He is now under arrest, just like Beria. This Meshik began his work in Ukraine by indiscriminately expelling all leading Chekist personnel, and first of all, he expelled from the state security organs party workers, specially selected and approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU to strengthen the organs. Recently, Meshik demonstratively expelled from the ministry deputy ministers - former party workers, also sent there by the Central Committee, and almost all the heads of regional departments. Meshik said to the former deputy minister for personnel: "You do not know how to protect Chekist personnel, therefore you have no place in the organs of the MGB." When this deputy asked: "How can I understand from whom I should protect them?", he hesitated, quickly ended the conversation, and changed the subject. Old experienced Chekists, good communists were also expelled, including Strokach, now appointed Minister of Internal Affairs, who was expelled from Lvov. There was great haste. In the last few days, almost all heads of regional departments of the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs were replaced again within two hours.
Instead of these honest communists who had given many years of their labor and life to selfless service to the party and the Soviet people, Meshik, with Beria's blessing, dragged people who did not inspire any confidence into the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Thus, he dug up a certain Milshtein somewhere and brought him to the Ukraine for the post of First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs.
Who is Mil'shtein? He used to work in Georgia for Beria as an assistant, head of the special sector of the Central Committee of Georgia. I will not characterize him for long, I will only say that Mil'shtein's father, mother, brother, and aunt live in New York, and another brother was convicted and executed for espionage. Meshik placed people from the Dynamo sports society, from various camps and other organizations that had nothing to do with the Cheka and party work in the apparatus of the Ministry. Meshik always emphasized: Lavrenty Pavlovich knows this person personally, he recommends this person, this is an order from Lavrenty Pavlovich, etc. All this, naturally, caused bewilderment and indignation among the communists of the party organization of Ukraine. The regional committees, the communists, the employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs had a legitimate question: who gave Beria and Meshik the right to grossly violate the party principle of selecting personnel based on political and business qualities. After all, all the transfers in the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, all the appointments of deputy ministers, heads of regional departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were made without the knowledge of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. It must be said that this has never happened in our party, personnel have always been the primary concern of the party.
a Here and further in A. Kirichenko's speech, the words highlighted in bold were crossed out from the uncorrected transcript in the process of its preparation for printing and distribution to party organizations. - Comp.
Beria and various Meshiks imagined that they could do everything, that they were allowed to do everything; they imagined that the Ministry of Internal Affairs was their fiefdom, and not a party organ. Meshik behaved like a nobleman, he wanted to become above the party organization of the republic, above the Central Committee of the Ukrainian party. In the image and likeness of Beria, he aimed to be a small dictator. Meshik tried to erect a wall between the party organization and the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, through which the party eye could not penetrate and see what and how was being done there. I will cite the following fact. In Stalino 75, employees of the district department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs carried out a provocation against the communist head of the city post office. They took one monetary document signed by this head, tore off the top of the filled-in part of this document, and on the lower part, where the signature is, printed the following provocation: "I, gaper such-and-such, sign everything that is slipped to me. I am helping spies and saboteurs, etc." And all this nonsense was published in the press. (He addresses the members of the Presidium and explains how this was done.)
When this fact became known, the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine made a decision and instructed the workers to investigate this matter. Meshik opposed this, he refused to say anything about how this happened, and even more so he refused to help the workers of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine to sort this matter out, and in response to my call he said that this was a purely operational, Chekist matter, clearly emphasizing that the party organs should not deal with this issue. We reported this fact to the Central Committee of the CPSU. However, only now has it become clear to me what Meshik was leading to, where the hostile line came from, aimed at separating the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs from the Party, in order to place the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs above the Party. Literally that same day, Beria called me and asked how things were going and immediately said: You see, don’t engage in politicking in relation to the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
To tell the truth, I didn't even understand what the matter was.
Or this fact: Meshik sent a group of workers to the Stalin region with the task of checking how the settlers from the western regions of Ukraine were being accommodated. This check surprised the workers on the spot, since the party and Soviet organs were capable of sorting out this issue. At the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, which discussed the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Meshik made a cheeky, intimidating speech - know ours, they say.
Meshik's speech at the Plenum was met with great hostility by those present. He had also behaved very vilely at the recent party conference of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. True, he had been slapped on the wrist there, and the party organization had rejected all the proposals and other proposals had been put through. Meshik's behavior and Beria's statement about politicking had agitated us and made us wary. Then, after Beria's call, we exchanged opinions at the Central Committee bureau about Meshik's behavior . We had agreed, in connection with my trip to Moscow , to report to the Central Committee and to come to Beria personally and tell me about how Meshik was behaving. (Laughter.) Well, I would have told him.
a The words "Meshik declared" are inserted. Here and further in A. Kirichenko's speech, the footnotes on each page contain the text inserted into the uncorrected transcript during its preparation for printing and distribution to party organizations. - Comp.
Only now, after the report of Comrade Malenkov, the speeches of Comrades Khrushchev, Molotov, Bulganin, Kaganovich and other comrades, has it become clear why Beria so zealously protected the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs from the Party organs. The adventurous activity of Beria and his other henchmen, like Meshik, was aimed at implanting the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs with people henchmen. Enemies of the Party and the people Beria and his henchmen like Meshik implanted in the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, among other things, arrogance, and grandeur. It is difficult for an ordinary worker to get to the head of a department, the head of a directorate. It must be said, as the communist Chekists say, that this came from the Central Apparatus of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.
The employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are breaking away from the party, from the people, and this leads to degeneration, to an attempt to place the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs above the party. Back in 1937 , the Central Committee of our party and the Council of People's Commissars then made a decision that prohibited investigative groups or departments in operational departments, that is, separating investigation from operational work 75 . With the arrival of Beria, all this was restored, when the same people were responsible for arrest and investigation.
We must quickly root out this evil that is causing harm to the party and the people.
I would also like to mention Beria's well-known note on the situation in the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR. Of course, there were shortcomings in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Council of Ministers in this matter, in the matter of leading the western regions, and there were many of them. But nevertheless, I would like to say that Beria compiled this note based only on data from Meshik and agents. Most of this material was obtained from agents without deep knowledge of the situation on the ground. The agents, as has now become known, were very dubious. We know these agents, for example, the "author", the "objective". We know these people, and they dictated what should be done and how it should be done. Moreover, they wrote a note to Meshik, Beria summoned them to him in order to give proposals on how to improve the situation after the decision of the Central Committee. They stated that it was necessary to return from some other countries people who had fled from Western Ukraine at one time. The note does not provide data on the number of killed Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists. It is unclear why he needed to make these figures public, everyone knows them . But it did not say that about 30 thousand party workers, d bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, soldiers and officers of the Soviet Army, party-Soviet and collective farm activists died in Ukraine at the hands of nationalists, the worst enemies of the Ukrainian people.
And he didn't count how many orphans were left either. In Beria's note, it is unclear why the following terms appear: "Western Ukrainian intelligentsia", "Western Ukrainian cadres", "Russians", "Russification", "Western Ukraine".
and 1938
ь in the western regions
c from now
d workers
And this is at a time when these words have long since fallen out of use in Ukraine. Ukrainian and other Soviet peoples are a single family, and there are no Western Ukrainians and Eastern Ukrainians in it, there are no such terms as Ukrainians, much less "Rusaki" and others.
The Ukrainian people have always treated and treat the great Russian people with a feeling of deep love and respect. Beria dug up these words, for some reason they turned out to be necessary for him, and I must state here directly that these words are suitable for nationalists. They put us in a difficult position when we were preparing for the resolution of our Plenum of the Central Committee - we thought about what to do with these words, against which our entire people rebel.
Local communists spoke at the plenary sessions of the Lvov and other regional party committees. We informed the Central Committee of the CPSU about this. Representatives of the local intelligentsia spoke with gratitude about the people who arrived from the eastern regions of Ukraine and other places in the Soviet Union. These people have carried out and are carrying out great work there to build a new Soviet life.
By the way, almost none of those who arrived from the eastern regions have been fired from their jobs yet, except for the Chekists I reported on.
Now I want to say something here about the orders for the republic. I got a call from one of the workers, I don’t remember his name, from the Council of Ministers. He called me with the following question: please tell me who was your most important figure on the cultural front in the past, besides Shevchenko. I named Franko, Kotsiubynsky, Lesya Ukrainka. Then he asks me: is there anyone greater than Shevchenko? (Laughter.) I say: no. He asks me again: do you have some Shevchenko? I answer: yes, we have Taras Grigorievich Shevchenko. (There is excitement and laughter in the hall.) I ask: what’s the matter? He answers: comrade Beria instructed me to find out if you have a greater figure than Shevchenko? And I ask: why do you need this? He answers: he means to establish orders for the republic for the workers of the cultural front. (Animation in the hall, laughter.)
and the Soviet people
ь , these words,
with and to us
Comrades, the Presidium of the Central Committee of our party has shown exceptional political foresight in exposing the political adventurer and provocateur Beria. The hand of the Presidium of the Central Committee did not tremble. It acted decisively, faithfully, and quickly, as befits the Presidium of the Central Committee. The members of the Presidium of the Central Committee acted as loyal servants of our party and our people. We, the members of the Central Committee, see how the Presidium unanimously and harmoniously decided the issue, with what ruthlessness it cut off the hands of the sworn enemy who was trying to weaken the unity of our party. Therefore, such unanimity expressed here at the Plenum is understandable, and it is understandable that the decisions taken by the Presidium of the Central Committee and those taken by this Plenum will be unconditionally approved by our entire party, by our entire people.
We, all members of the Central Committee, sincerely and ardently support the actions of the Presidium of the Central Committee, its correct and decisive measures.
Comrades, once again the experience of building our Soviet state teaches us that those leaders and employees of the state security agencies who tried to place the MGB and the MVD above the party, to oppose them to the party, broke away from the party, inevitably suffered political bankruptcy, and fell onto an anti-party, hostile path, like all other dissenters and enemies of our party.
For us, communists, only the party's cause is important; for us, it means more than the people who belong to it. We have decisively torn the scum out of the ranks of our party, and because of this our party will become even stronger, even more monolithic.
Our Communist Party, as is well known, is the guiding and leading force of the Soviet state. The most important areas of communist construction are within its field of vision, all state, economic and other bodies operate under its daily control. Anyone who forgets this, who tries to escape the control and influence of the party, is committing an anti-party act, and he will be mercilessly swept away from our path.
Comrades, in connection with the exposure of the enemy of the party and the people, Beria, the Presidium of the Central Committee made extremely important conclusions, which Comrade Malenkov reported here - these are about a radical restructuring and improvement of the work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, about a decisive increase in vigilance among all workers, about cultivating high-quality party spirit and intransigence among communists, about the need to strengthen ideological and educational work among the masses, about work to further improve the material well-being of workers, in particular issues of agriculture.
My time limit is running out, I would like to dwell on only three questions on agriculture b . We have many shortcomings in industry and in other areas of work, Comrade Kaganovich spoke about this, but in agriculture we have many shortcomings that we can very quickly correct. For example, the issue of personnel has not been resolved for many years. I mean engineering and technical personnel. The state has provided first-class equipment, but we have almost no personnel. There is a problem with vegetables and potatoes. All this can be quickly corrected. Comrades spoke about this here.
and in the party and
ь stop your attention only on agriculture.
The implementation of all those measures outlined by the Presidium of the Central Committee will play a huge role in the further consolidation of our entire party, all workers around the Central Committee, around the government. Rolling up our sleeves, we must carry on the implementation of these measures with all our might, and this will be supported by all communists, all party members, all workers.
Allow me to assure the Plenum of the Central Committee, the Presidium of the Central Committee, that the party organization of Ukraine will close its ranks even more closely around the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, will work tirelessly to solve these problems, as always, will be its faithful support, the vanguard in the struggle for the great cause of communism. The communists of Ukraine will hold high the banner of party spirit, will guard the unity of the party, the friendship of the peoples, the purity of their ranks like the apple of their eye.
Khrushchev: Comrade Mikoyan has the floor. Comrade Shatalin, get ready.
Mikoyan: Comrades, in the speeches of comrades Malenkov, Khrushchev, Molotov, Bulganin, Kaganovich the entire state of affairs with Beria's criminal adventure is quite clearly outlined and documented, the political assessment is made and the organizational and political conclusions that the party must draw from this sad but instructive event in our party are noted.
I fully agree with what the comrades have said. I would like to add some additional considerations and a number of facts that confirm that what has been said is absolutely correct.
From the day that Comrade Stalin fell ill and the doctors told us that he would not recover, the main concern for each of us was to preserve the iron unity of the party, for the unity of the party had already been ensured during Stalin’s lifetime.
When the leadership of the state and the party was being formed, all of Stalin's students, who had worked under his leadership for many years, became responsible for the matter. And everyone understood that Stalin's leadership could only be replaced by collective leadership . At first, the work went smoothly and there were obvious successes of our party and government in foreign policy. However, soon signals began to appear that Beria was taking measures to put pressure on everyone in our midst. We had known Beria's intriguing character before, but we saw it in such an unbridled form only after the death of Comrade Stalin, when he went too far, playing a criminal game, and finally played himself out.
Many comrades will say how the members of the Central Committee, having known Beria for many years, were unable to neutralize the terrible man. This is not such a simple matter, it is not so easy to achieve. Firstly, not all the facts were known. The facts were known at different times. We must not forget that there was a great deal of clever work to disguise, to cover up his meaning and to interpret him in a completely different meaning. There were many facts in the shadow of which negative facts were hidden.
It must be said honestly and truthfully that the Presidium of the Central Committee, first and foremost Comrades Malenkov, Khrushchev, Molotov and Bulganin, showed foresight and accomplished a feat by immediately finishing off this adventurer in one sitting. The Party will always be grateful to them for the feat they accomplished.
I first met Beria in 1920 in Baku after the establishment of Soviet power. At that time, he was sent to Georgia by the Baku Party Committee as a courier to deliver a secret letter. I did not know him before that. After that, I did not meet him in Baku since I myself was transferred to the Nizhny Novgorod Regional Committee four months later.
a From here on in A. Mikoyan's speech, the text that has been edited is underlined. - Comp.
After that, Beria and I had the same relationship as with many other members of the Central Committee. Relations were uneven, sometimes good, and in the last two months they were bad, when he rejected several correct proposals I had made.
In 1919, while in hiding, the Baku Bolshevik organization used two Azerbaijanis who were well-known socialists to maintain illegal communications with Astrakhan when Kirov was working there ... Their task, as well as that of the communists assigned to them , was to have complete information in order to check the illegal organization in Astrakhan. At that time, we transported kerosene and other things to and from Astrakhan. Then we transported gasoline in large quantities on boats. I had not previously allowed the possibility that Beria was sent as... but now I strongly doubt it.
Having received such an accusation, such a blow at the Plenum of the Central Committee that he was working in bourgeois counterintelligence and was not sent by the party, as he claims, he did not consider it necessary to present documents confirming the truth, in order to remove such a stain from himself. He was scrupulous on such issues. In another case, he would never have missed such an opportunity. This means that he was not in the regional organization. Therefore, Comrade Khrushchev is absolutely right when he said: "Whether he was or was not sent by the party organization, this does not increase confidence when he is exposed in our eyes." Indeed, it is unknown whether his work in counterintelligence was not a screen for carrying out orders not from the Communists, but from other masters.
Malenkov : No one has confirmed that he was sent by the party organization?
Mikoyan : Not a single person, and he never tried. He never spoke to me. Sergo asked me at that time, I told him . Comrade Stalin asked me, I told him the same thing, but he never tried to get a paper from Comrade Stalin, or Sergo, or at the Plenum of the Central Committee , or anywhere else, that he had been sent. Meanwhile, such a paper was necessary.
Now that the whole matter has been exposed, this way of posing the question by Comrade Khrushchev is completely legitimate.
Malenkov: Who could have sent it?
Mikoyan: We sent two or three dozen. I sent the top guys there, and Sarkis assigned people to them, then Viktor... 76 I was in the Soviet Union for four months, came to Baku with a report to the Central Committee and returned to Baku with the troops.
Even before his arrival in Moscow, and especially when he was in Moscow, he managed to cleverly, by hook or by crook, gain the trust of Comrade Stalin. Even during Comrade Stalin's life, especially in his last years, when he could no longer do business, when he began to meet with people less, to receive information, at that time he cleverly got himself into the position of Comrade Stalin's chief informant.
It must be said that Comrade Stalin had not trusted Beria lately. Beria was forced to admit that Stalin did not trust him, that the Mingrelian case was created in order to arrest Beria on this basis, that Stalin had not managed to achieve what he wanted. During the war, Comrade Stalin divided the Ministry of Internal Affairs and State Security. Also, it seems to me, out of some mistrust of him. There was no point in dividing the ministry. Then he was appointed to the Council of Ministers. This was also an external sign of mistrust. But despite this, Comrade Stalin trusted him very much.
Beria's information was usually of an intriguing nature and served special purposes. He managed to carry out many difficult decisions, and it was known that if Beria was against this or that decision, it would fail. This is how he created authority for himself. He pretended to be a friend of one or another worker . We all saw this, but we did not attach such importance to it as it acquired after Comrade Stalin passed away.
I first learned about his intrigues from Sergo. I remember talking to him a few days before his death. He was walking around very agitated. He asked me: "I don't understand why Comrade Stalin doesn't trust me. I am absolutely loyal to Comrade Stalin and don't want to fight him, I want to support him, but he doesn't trust me. Beria's intrigues play a big role here. Beria from Tbilisi gives Comrade Stalin incorrect information, and Stalin believes him."
In addition to intrigue and treachery inciting some against others, Beria's main weapon was duplicity. Some may say to us: why didn't you discover this scoundrel in time? I explain this matter to myself as follows: the trust he enjoyed with Comrade Stalin, his high position among the leadership caused great difficulties in recognizing everything in a short time without Stalin, bearing in mind the disunity between the members of the Presidium, which excluded the possibility of exchanging opinions, as is customary among the Bolsheviks, in order to give a full assessment of this or that fact. Sometimes you analyze some facts and think: maybe I am mistaken, since the opinion of other comrades is unknown. The main obstacle was that we wanted to preserve the unity of the collective. It was difficult to recognize him so quickly and to make such a decision in one sitting, an unprecedented decision in the history of our party . Knowing Beria's negative sides and condemning him, it was still difficult for me to agree to the arrest of a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee. However, during the discussion, Beria's full adventurist image became clear and the danger of a conspiratorial threat became obvious. This led to Beria's complete isolation and the adoption of a unanimous decision to arrest him.
How did Beria's duplicity manifest itself?
At first I said to him: why do you need the NKVD? And he answered: we need to restore the law, we can’t tolerate this situation in the country. We have a lot of people under arrest, they need to be released. The NKVD needs to be cut, the guards sent to Kolyma and one or two people left for security. These are the kinds of statements he made. And then, when it came to work, he began to do the opposite, he twisted things even more. When he spoke on Red Square over the grave of Comrade Stalin , after his speech I said: there is a place in your speech to guarantee every citizen the rights and freedoms provided for by the Constitution. In the speech of a simple orator this is not an empty phrase, but in the speech of the Minister of Internal Affairs it is a program of action, you must implement it. He answered me: I will implement it. And then he made a proposal to arrest people for ten years without trial or investigation. This kind of duplicity gradually began to be revealed.
That he was a great scoundrel and falsifier is evident from the following: recently, a few days before this event, after a meeting in the Kremlin, several people were walking. Beria started a conversation, he sometimes liked to discuss how we live. And sometimes he indulges in frankness, and sometimes his frankness is careless on his part.
The brochure written by Beria about Transcaucasia concerns the creation of the party by Comrade Stalin. No one can deny this. But he said such things that "when I wrote this brochure, there was a lot of falsification in it. For example, I attributed some articles, some facts to Comrade Stalin without proof and thought that he would like it." He really needed a springboard to jump from the regional scale to the top of our party. His brochure began to be studied in all circles. He received the aura of a theoretical worker and a loyal Stalinist. Hence the rest - all this helped him to gain Stalin's trust. You see, Beria is a good guy, he selected the material, he is working on himself, Comrade Stalin said. He understood that it is impossible to come to the leadership of the party without good revolutionary services to the party. He created all this according to a plan, specially developed for him to behave. He was a sly one.
Another issue is duplicity. In the early days, he advocated a cult of personality. We understood that there had been excesses in this matter during Comrade Stalin's lifetime. Comrade Stalin harshly criticized us. Comrade Stalin said that the cult around me was being created by the Socialist Revolutionaries. We could not correct this matter then, and it went on like that. We need to approach personality in a Marxist way. But Beria advocated it. It turned out that he wanted to undermine the cult of Comrade Stalin and create his own cult. (Laughter.) But this must be done in a collective leadership. This soon became apparent when his report was attached to the Central Committee's decision on the western regions of Ukraine and Lithuania. Moreover, the Central Committee's decision was not signed by the members of the Presidium, not a single name is mentioned there , but only the name of Minister Beria, where all the guidelines are given in the report. The decision had to be worked out with only the name of Beria. This was duplicity. In order to maintain the cult of his own personality, he sought to ensure that the departmental ministry he led, even when these interests were wrong, was defended to the end.
Here is one example of how external difficulties were created from these departmental considerations. When it was necessary to sign an agreement on trade deliveries with Czechoslovakia for 1953, negotiations lasted for six months. The ministry that I head came up with a decision to provide somewhat smaller deliveries, to accommodate the Czechs, who said that they could not fulfill the agreement that was signed several years ago. We had a long-term agreement on deliveries. True, perhaps the deliveries could have gone somewhat better, but that is not the point. And Beria went crazy when he somehow found out about this long-term agreement. The long-term agreement provided for the delivery of 800 pieces of oil diesel engines with 500 horsepower each, that is, 400 thousand horsepower for an oil rig. This is a crazy figure. Once, comrades mistakenly included this quantity in the application. The ministry checked and found out that the oilmen did not need that much, that they only needed 400. Our ministry. Gosplan together with the oilmen included 400 units . He then says that the multi-year agreement provides for 800, and Mikoyan offers 400. On what basis is such a breakdown, such a concession to the Czechs, and so on. And after that, the twist began, they negotiated with the Czechs for two months.
The same with oil equipment. They don't need so much, the Czechs can't master it. This is a new, difficult task for them now, they don't own factories yet, they have a lot of bastards at their factories, and only when he was arrested, the Presidium approved, tomorrow we will sign the agreement for 1953 77 . This is already in the second half of the year, instead of doing it at the beginning of the year or signing it on the eve of the year. Of course, the Czechs are thinking about how to build relations between us, how easy it is to do business with the Russians when disputes have been going on for six months.
Or another question. The Presidium of the Council of Ministers discussed the question of India. The Indians are playing between us and the Americans. They asked us, Russians, to give them some grain, about 300 thousand tons, and in exchange they would give them their goods. The Presidium of the Central Committee said that it would be good not to refuse the Indians, in order to reduce the influence of the Americans and knock the ground out of the hands of those enemies of the Soviet people who exist in India. They instructed Molotov and me to draw up such a project. We prepared it. We found grain from export resources, by canceling sales to other capitalist countries, in order to sell this grain to the Indians, having in mind a politically more advantageous deal. We made a proposal. He says that we cannot accept it, it is unknown where this grain comes from. I say that it has been calculated that it is within the limits of the Export Fund. And he says that maybe then exports should be reduced, who checked the balance? I answer him that it is within the export limits, there is no overspending. Then he says that a commission must be created, and the question of India was removed, and Benediktov, the new ambassador, he sat and waited. And only when Beria was arrested, we managed to pass this decision 78 , which was introduced by Molotov and me, because it was correct.
Further. Beria, having completely lost his temper, apparently decided that he had everything in the country under his control. Lately he has been busy with the people's democracies. You read the report that his sycophants and agents were constantly saying that he would take everything into his hands.
We have three bodies cooperating between us and the countries of people's democracy - these are the Economic Council, the Military Organizational Committee, and the Secretariat of the Cominform 79 . Comrade Stalin took a very active part in the formation of these bodies at first , but in the last two years he has ceased to be interested in them. And representatives of the responsible organizations did not even gather and, of course, they worked poorly there. I am personally responsible for the Economic Council. Of course, part of it depends on me, but the greater part does not depend on me.
He did it cleverly. He criticized, the criticism was fair, and it was hard for me to protest. He, having taken the springboard of criticism of activity, drew a conclusion from this - to close all these organizations, create them on a new level, and he himself presented a long resolution 80 . Why himself, it is not clear, why does he know economic issues, military-organizational matters better than we do? He himself introduced the resolution, instead of assigning it to one of us.
Now the economic policy of all the countries of the people's democracy is being assessed, castigated as incorrect, and all countries are being held to the same standard, and a line is being given for further behavior, a recommendation is being made, and it is proposed to convene a meeting. A lot has been written. I have read it, I understand the meaning: to take it into one's own hands: and it is difficult to reject criticism. Malenkov calls me and says: "Have you read it?" I say that it is written in such a way that it is difficult to make major amendments. And you, he says, understand, you cannot cut all countries to the same standard : what is in Hungary, is not in Bulgaria.
Indeed, there was much that was wrong, and the document did not go through. And this is an example of how he wanted to get his hands on international and military affairs. He sacrificed both minor and major political issues to his dark plans, cleverly upsetting the ranks of our leadership and disorganizing its work.
Here are some more examples. By the spring of last year, we had already developed a meat supply crisis, to put it bluntly, an acute shortage of meat and animal fat. Comrade Stalin was told that we did not have enough meat. He said: why not enough? I answered that livestock farming was bad, we were not procuring enough , but demand was growing. He did not agree, he said that this was wrong. I thought it was right, but he was dissatisfied. And then he himself decided that it was impossible not to pay attention to this. Besides, what happened last year: we see that there is no meat, maybe we should give it to Moscow, Leningrad, Donbass, and put pressure on others. Comrade Stalin was right to criticize us. We had no choice.
This year we have accumulated meat reserves, pressed for procurement, and came out at the beginning of this year with reserves almost twice as large as last year. In the first half of the year we sold as much meat as in the whole of 1940 from centralized resources. However, we sell meat only in Moscow, Leningrad, with difficulty in Donbass and the Urals, and in other places with interruptions.
Kaganovich: In the Urals, not by half, but by a quarter.
Mikoyan: Moreover, since 1948, meat prices have been reduced as follows: if 1948 is considered as 100, then now it is 42, that is, more than twice.
Resources have not increased, and when prices for all goods fall, the economy is determined not by bread, but by the purchase of meat. The value of demand is growing faster than normal demand. The collective farm market is not growing, the collective farmers buy meat and milk from us. Crop rotation has been established, but we cannot resolve the largest issue, such as meat, potatoes, vegetables. Comrade Stalin sensed that something was wrong. In November, the Minister of Agriculture Benediktov reported on the state of affairs 81 . Benediktov reported formally. It turned out that the collective farmers are enemies of property, they do nothing. Comrade Stalin could brilliantly draw a conclusion from several facts. He said that if the collective farmers do not look after the cattle well, it means that they are not interested in public livestock farming, which means that it is necessary to create economically conscious collective farms for the development of livestock farming. And they decided to organize a commission of the Presidium of the Central Committee on livestock farming, headed by Khrushchev. I was a member of this commission. We worked conscientiously for two months , the question was about raising prices. I say: you can't raise prices as you want, it's obvious absurdity. The prices are as follows: the average price for meat is 25 kopecks.
Malenkov: Was this under Comrade Stalin?
Mikoyan: Yes.
Or take kerosene as an example. Peasants know how to think, people learn economics, they are forced to study it, they study Marxism-Leninism. Kerosene cost 10 kopecks in 1930, after repeated reductions - 1 ruble 50 kopecks. Previously, to buy 1 liter of kerosene, a peasant sold half a kilogram of livestock, and now four kilograms of cattle. In order to light himself with kerosene, he must give the same amount of cattle, and meat, matches - twice as expensive as before the war. After all, where they know how to truly care, they raise it to a huge level. Cotton has been raised, tea has been raised. I am convinced that flax will be raised. Why can't they solve such a problem and raise it, like livestock farming? They made a proposal. Khrushchev and I were of the same opinion that the pricing policy is a pressing issue. There were two options to choose from - whichever comrade Stalin wants to accept, that will be it. The average price of cattle is 90 kopecks and 70 kopecks, or one or the other, let him decide for himself. He said: I accept the third option - 60 or 50 kopecks, in this form. Before we could finish the question, Comrade Stalin came to the meeting. It would seem that four months had passed, the draft was ready, it could have been adopted, but it still hasn't been adopted. I raised the question in the Presidium several times. Khrushchev said - let's discuss the issue of livestock farming, and we almost dragged it out until April.
Khrushchev: Unfortunately, when there was a third option, he immediately made a proposal to increase the tax on collective farms and collective farmers, to raise the tax to 40 billion, and the total income is calculated at 42 billion.
Mikoyan. The current tax of 15 billion should be increased to 40 billion.
Khrushchev: No, increase the tax by another 40 billion. You know , I don’t know what that is.
Mikoyan: It was already impossible. At that time, we ourselves were in no hurry with this project.
Khrushchev: What was the hurry? It could have caused an uprising.
Mikoyan. After this, it would seem that it would be worth accepting such a project, and Beria himself would be indignant. It is clear to everyone that if we accept Comrade Stalin's proposal about the tax, it will mean raising a rebellion . These were his words, and as soon as Stalin was gone, we could not decide anything, but we could decide . About vegetables and potatoes . Back in 1950, there were enough vegetables and potatoes, and during the war it was not bad, but they trampled on this matter, they proposed three or four kopecks per kilogram of potatoes. If they prepare construction sand on the river, dig it up, deliver it, then it will cost more than planting, growing, digging up and delivering potatoes. What are we doing? Every year, Moscow institutions send employees who are paid a thousand rubles to dig potatoes. This is at the expense of the institutions, and the collective farmers watch, laugh a little , sell milk. Instead of getting the collective farmers interested, they send employees and skilled workers. The collective farmers need to grow potatoes, and the employees and workers need to do their own thing. After all, it is impossible to allow a skilled worker to dig kaotoshka while the collective farmer works in the city.
Khrushchev: How much more time do you need? You've been talking for 50 minutes already.
Mikoyan: Another 10 minutes. I'll cut back.
In total, 300 million were needed, prices for potatoes had to be raised, about 3 billion had to be added for meat. We had money, expenses were high, it was possible to reduce it, for example, at the expense of the Turkmen Canal. All this was thwarted.
Therefore, Comrade Khrushchev correctly explains why this was done: in order to undermine the authority of the leadership, he decided to disrupt these events. The new Minister of Agriculture, Comrade Kozlov, was in a miserable position. No matter what project he came up with, Beria attacked. Kozlov could not carry out any project until he agreed and brought what he himself considered wrong.
Finally, the next question. Comrade Stalin in his work "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR" said that objective economic laws cannot be ignored, but we trampled on these laws in the area of meat, milk, and potatoes. The political adventurer turned out to be an adventurer in economic policy as well. In order to disorganize the leadership and defeat the members of the Presidium, he cleverly maneuvered to get the necessary proposals rejected. For example, he failed to fulfill the supply plan for the second quarter under the guise of protecting reserves. I apologize, Comrade Khrushchev, but I know that all the comrades had complaints about me as a minister, so I must say something else. Comrade Malenkov said that in the second quarter the living conditions of the population should be improved.
There was a threat that we would reduce in the second quarter compared to the first quarter. Comrade Malenkov tells me: make sure that we do not reduce. We began to look for opportunities, gave a project to borrow ten percent of animal oil from state reserves, bearing in mind that with the increase in procurement this expense would be covered. It was necessary to immediately adopt a supply plan. But Beria rejected it, saying: this cannot be done. And only after his arrest was this plan approved and sent to the regions on the 30th.
It was such a disruptor, especially recently, that it was absolutely impossible to work calmly. That is why the decision taken not only does not weaken us, but opens up the opportunity to work creatively on the further rise and strengthening of our country.
Malenkov. The devil is not as black as he is painted.
Mikoyan. And how pathetic he looked at the Presidium!
I often consult with Comrade Malenkov about my business. And so, speaking about increasing commodity funds, I ask him to support me in increasing the commodity funds for the market by 20 billion against the annual plan. The government supported me 82 . Seeing such support, I got down to work with my sleeves rolled up. Comrade Malenkov asks me what industrial goods the country lacks. I answer him: the main thing is that there are not enough good fabrics for men's and women's suits, there are not enough good shirts, and we'll manage with the rest. They began to put pressure on Comrade Kosygin to find the means to increase the output of good fabrics. I suggested: there is free currency, there are some resources in our country, and we need to buy 2-3 million worth of good fabrics for suits in China, bring them in right away, and then we will dress our intelligentsia and workers in good clothes. Such an event would be without harm to our economy.
Or take the herring catch. Our catch is twice as big, but there is less herring on sale than under the tsar. Under the tsar, 280 thousand were imported instead of bread. We press and press, but the fishing industry does not give more.
Khrushchev: It may seem that we really sat and trembled before him. There were many cases when we gave him a good punch in the teeth and made decisions. But it seems that we sat and looked at him.
Mikoyan: I want to say how he disrupted things where it was clear to everyone that it was harmful to the state, so that if we threw him out of our midst, it would only strengthen our party and give us the opportunity to work well. He did not allow good decisions to be made, and when good decisions were made, he tried to implement them in such a way that instead of benefiting, they would cause harm. For example, our national policy is intended to eliminate certain excesses and distortions in practice. But the matter turned against the Russian nation, which creates national equality, which ensures national equality. This matter turned against our party. It is clear that only an enemy could do this: to liquidate the national policy, to use it in his own interests, to raise the peoples of the young Soviet republics like Lithuania, Western Ukraine, Latvia, and others against the Russians.
From this it is clear, comrades, that having cleansed ourselves of this degenerate, this provocateur, we have become stronger. Now there are no obstacles in the work of our Central Committee. From this we must draw a conclusion not only for the Central Committee, but also for the local organizations and the entire party. This is not the only case for the party, there have been other cases. Therefore, as Comrade Khrushchev said, we must put the Ministry of Internal Affairs in its place. But this is not enough. We must put Bolshevik integrity at the forefront of the entire party , the work of the Central Committee and local party organizations. Intra-party democracy, the collective leadership of both the Central Committee and local organizations, the revitalization of local bodies, the question of intra-party democracy must raise here not only criticism and self-criticism, but also the responsibility of the Central Committee members to the Central Committee of the party, and of the member of the regional committee bureau to the regional party committee.
We have no direct data on whether he was a spy or whether he received assignments from foreign states , but the main thing is that he carried out the instructions of capitalist states and their agents.
The Central Committee of the Party, having cleansed itself of this scum, having become stronger in the organizational sphere, will become even more monolithic and will achieve new successes both in domestic and foreign policy, while fulfilling the instructions of Comrade Stalin on strengthening international ties with fraternal countries and parties. (Applause.)
Khrushchev. Comrade Shatalin has the floor. Comrade Mikhailov (Moscow) should prepare.
Shatalin: Comrades, the essence of the question in the report of Comrade Malenkov and in the speeches of the members of the Presidium is set out with the utmost clarity and thoroughly proven. I must say that as soon as I learned about what happened, I apologized for my expansiveness, I simply jumped for joy. And this is not accidental. And as I observed the secretaries of the regional committees, they were no less happy about this circumstance, this happy circumstance.
Voices. Correct.
Shatalin: Why did this happen and why did we respond to it in this way? Why did we react in such a Bolshevik way?
The point is that Beria's non-partisanship, his desire to oppose himself to the Central Committee, could be observed, so to speak , from afar. I mean comrades who were not closely connected with him in their work .
How did this manifest itself, how was it expressed, how could we observe these symptoms?
First of all, if we take the secretaries of the regional party committees, then few of them, the secretaries of the regional committees, the secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union Republics, have not experienced the arrogant, self-confident impudence and insolence of this scoundrel.
Voices. Everything is correct.
Shatalin. We in the Central Committee apparatus also felt a clear abnormality in relation to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, especially in the work with personnel. Beria has recently become so brazen that he has begun to clearly bypass at least the apparatus of the Central Committee. Under the banner he is a member of the Presidium and it can be implied that he approves of everything. He .... in the most genuine way on such people. In many cases, he appointed and dismissed people without permission from the Central Committee. I - please understand me correctly, without any ulterior motives - tried to grumble.
Khrushchev. He was.
Shatalin: I expressed dissatisfaction . Nikita Sergeyevich told me that in business conditions this dissatisfaction would be a wave of the hand, leaving it in the air (laughter), and he told me to follow the swing with a fist and a slap on the table. Restraint, comrade, that's how it was said. I must admit that at that time I didn't quite understand this whole story (laughter) and wasn't quite happy. But when these words were later confirmed by deeds, I, like all of us , feel that the real and genuine Bolshevik word and deeds do not diverge.
It is now completely clear that Beria, for criminal careerist purposes, went to any lengths. I have no need to repeat myself now, it would be completely wrong, I just want to emphasize once again that he cleverly, hiding behind Lenin-Stalin positions both on the national question and on other issues, ultimately harmed us very decently and decided every matter and every question exclusively from the point of view of his own person, from the point of view of his personality.
Indeed, take the case of the doctors. I think there is even a general opinion that the right decision was ultimately made, but why was a communiqué from the Ministry of Internal Affairs needed, why was it necessary to sway this issue in our press, etc. The fact that the doctors were arrested incorrectly, as has now become clear, was known in advance, that this was done incorrectly. It had to be corrected, but it had to be corrected so that it would not be to the detriment of our state, not to the detriment of the interests of our state. Why was it necessary to publish this? This was done in order to elevate oneself - that is what kind of a contender he is. And all the other issues that were discussed here.
In a few words I would like to dwell on the issue that characterizes the obvious non-party spirit, the hostile activity of Beria in terms of his attitude toward party organizations. Take the Georgian party organization. Would a real party man, a Bolshevik from among our leaders, ever allow himself, being from a Georgian party organization, to treat a Georgian organization in this way? I am more than convinced, as are all of you, that no one would allow themselves to do this. Is this the way it is done with us: with us, decent people, it is the opposite - to leave it to the organization itself to resolve issues as objectively as possible, that is, usually not only or not so much to bypass, in any case, they have a normal attitude toward this organization. What did Beria do?
Beria, in fact, tore the Georgian party organization away from the Central Committee of the party. Beria exclusively dealt with the Georgian party organization single-handedly. Beria selected the personnel himself and so on, that is, this characterizes him as an anti-party person, as a person who created all sorts of opportunities for himself just in case.
Take Beria's behavior recently: an obvious attempt to find a certain foothold among the secretaries of our regional party committees. Fortunately, our regional committee secretaries are not such eccentrics; he could not and did not succeed in doing this .
Here Vyacheslav Mikhailovich said that after everything that had happened, we, they say , washed our hands with satisfaction from the dirt, from the filth that had stuck to our core during this time. But here he had in mind the political side of the issue.
Molotov: Both.
Shatalin: In any case, the political side of the issue was discussed. I consider it necessary to acquaint the members of the Plenum with the facts that characterize Beria's moral character.
The Presidium of the Central Committee instructed me to find documents related to the activities of the former First Main Directorate in Beria's office in the Council of Ministers. While carrying out this task, looking through the contents of safes and other places where documents might be stored, we came across things and objects unusual for office spaces. Along with the documents, we discovered large quantities of all sorts of, what can I call it , attributes of women's attire. Here are brief excerpts from the inventory that I want to make public. Let me remind you and repeat that this is in the office in the Council of Ministers, here: women's tracksuits, women's blouses, women's stockings of foreign brands - 11 pairs, women's silk slips - 11 pairs, women's silk tights - 7 pairs, lengths for women's dresses - 5 lengths, women's silk kerchiefs, handkerchiefs of foreign brands, children's silk slips, some more children's things, etc., a whole list. I think that what I have published is already enough . We have found numerous letters from women of the most intimate, I would say, vulgar content. We have also found a large number of items of a debauched man. These things speak for themselves, and, as they say, no comment is required.
However, to make this side of the case more convincing, I will read the testimony of a certain Sarkisov, who worked in Beria's security for 18 years. He was most recently, the head of security.
Here is what this same Sarkisov testified: “I know of Beria’s numerous connections with all sorts of random women. I know that through a certain citizen S. (allow me not to mention her last name) Beria was acquainted ( the last name is stated in the testimony ) with S.’s girlfriend, whose last name I do not remember. She worked at the House of Models, and later I heard from Abakumov that this friend S. was the wife of a military attaché. Later, while in Beria’s office, I heard Beria calling Abakumov on the phone and asking why this woman had not been put in jail yet. That is, he lived first, and then asked why they had not put her in jail?
In addition, I know that Beria cohabited with a student of the Institute of Foreign Languages, Maya. Later, she became pregnant by Beria, and had an abortion. Beria also cohabited with an 18-20-year-old girl, Lyalya. Beria gave birth to a child with whom she lived at the dacha .
While in Tbilisi, Beria cohabited with citizen M., after cohabiting with Beria, M. had a child...
I also know that Beria cohabited with a certain Sophia, phone such-and-such, lives at such-and-such person, house such-and-such. At Beria's suggestion, she had an abortion in the medical unit. I repeat that Beria had many such relationships.
On Beria's orders, I started a whole list of women with whom he cohabited. (Laughter in the hall.) I subsequently destroyed this list. However, one list has been preserved, this list contains the names and phone numbers of 25-27 such women. This list is in my jacket pocket at my apartment.
A year or a year and a half ago I learned for sure about Beria's connections with prostitutes ( that's what he writes ). He suffered from syphilis, he was treated by a doctor from the Ministry of Internal Affairs clinic, such, and such. Signature - Sarkisov ."
Here, comrades, is the true face of this pretender, so to speak, to the leadership of the Soviet people. And this dirty little dog dared to compete with our party, with our Central Committee. This very dirty man tried to sow discord in the ranks of our Presidium, in the ranks of the Central Committee of our party, to sow distrust, that is, to violate the very thing that makes our party strong - unity. But this man did not succeed and no one will succeed in doing this. At a time when our Central Committee, when our entire people, our entire party, the Presidium of our Central Committee are united as never before, no one will succeed in violating this unity. No one will succeed in preventing us from building or fulfilling the plans that Comrade Lenin and Comrade Stalin bequeathed to us.
I, comrades, believe, and all of us together, apparently, believe, that with the help of the members of the Central Committee, our Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Committee, having cleansed themselves of filth, having driven this provocateur and adventurer from their ranks, I would say, having freed themselves from him, now having no obstacles, will all go forward together even more united, even more confident, and will fulfill those behests that were given to us by Comrade Lenin and Comrade Stalin. (Applause.)
Khrushchev: Comrades, there is a proposal to declare a break. No objections? No. A break of 15 minutes is declared.
Khrushchev. Let us continue the work of our Plenum. Comrade Mikhailov has the floor. Comrade Mirtskhulava, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, must prepare.
Mikhailov. Comrade Malenkov's report clearly and sharply sets out the whole essence of the question of the vile, provocative activity of the enemy of the party and the Soviet people, Beria. Comrade Malenkov's report also sets out the most important tasks of our party work.
This scoundrel has lost his human form. What we have just heard characterizes him as a man who has neither honor nor conscience, who has nothing sacred.
a Here and further in N. Mikhailov’s speech, the words highlighted in bold were crossed out from the uncorrected transcript. — Comp.
The words "Scoundrel Beria" have been inserted. Here and further in N. Mikhailov's speech, the footnotes on each page contain the text inserted into the uncorrected transcript during its preparation for printing and distribution to party organizations. — Comp.
Beria, as an enemy and provocateur, used many methods to seize the apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and use it for his dirty and vile purposes. Beria planted vile people alien to Soviet power in the work of the Cheka and destroyed workers loyal to the Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet government.
Last year, on the initiative of the Central Committee of the Party, Comrade Stalin, a group of party workers was sent to the Ministry of Internal Affairs 83 . The Central Committee of our Party was engaged in their selection. The best and most honest comrades were sent from the Moscow Party Organization to the Chekist apparatus. What happened next? Beria began his work in the Ministry by creating unbearable conditions for party workers. Only the intervention of the Central Committee of the Party prevented Beria from dealing with some comrades, slandering, and defaming them. In the Ministry of Internal Affairs, where honest communists who had been kicked out of the walls of the Ministry of Internal Affairs turned, they were met with slander and lies spread by Beria's agents. When these communists turned to Beria as Minister with a request to find out who had created an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion around them, why they were not given the opportunity to get a job, the enemy feigned surprise, but in fact continued to persecute honest communists.
Instead of honest people trusted by the party, Beria took into his service people like Dekanozov, who was kicked out of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a morally dirty and corrupt person; people like Sharia, who has already been mentioned here; people like Kobulov.
But Beria could not seize the apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs into his own hands, because there were many honest communists there . There could only be a few who served him.
The fact that Beria wanted to place the Ministry of Internal Affairs above the party in order to escape control from party organizations can be judged by many facts. I will refer to the following fact from the life of the Moscow party organization. Beria sent workers to the Moscow Region Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, not considering it necessary to consult in any way with party organs, with the Moscow Party Committee.
During the reorganization, conferences must be held in all ministries and party committees must be elected. The only exception so far is the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Despite the repeated raising of the issue of the need to convene a conference, Beria thwarted this matter. For almost three months, the secretary of the party committee could not get to Beria to resolve issues of party work. This again reflected the disdain of this provocateur, an agent of foreign intelligence services, for our party organization.
ah , the majority of people there are honest communists.
We cannot name a case when the issues of the management of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were considered by the Moscow Committee of the Party without opposition from Beria. I will refer to the following fact: guided by the directives of the Central Committee of the Party, the Moscow Committee of the Party wanted to get more closely involved in the work of the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. What came of it? The Moscow Committee appointed a meeting on issues concerning the shortcomings of the work of the Moscow Directorate. Immediately there followed a call from the Ministry that this could not be dealt with, that there was no point in digging into the shortcomings.
Then the Moscow City Party Committee intended to examine the issues of shortcomings in the work of the Moscow City Police Department. And again there was dissatisfaction on this matter and again a demand to soften the criticism, etc.
The Moscow Regional Party Committee had in mind and checked some of the MVD departments of the region's districts. But there was dissatisfaction with this too, and the fact that the Moscow Party Organization could now not deal with the issues of the MVD's work. But we have dealt with these issues and will deal with them - only we will deal with them many times more. The Plenum of the Central Party Committee teaches us this, the leadership of our party teaches us this.
The anti-party, essentially anti-Soviet morals that Beria instilled cannot be tolerated. He tried to turn the apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs into a weapon of struggle against the party, against the Soviet government. But he miscalculated, he would never have succeeded. He was caught and exposed.
Comrade Malenkov's report, the speeches of comrades Khrushchev, Molotov, Bulganin, Kaganovich, and other participants of the Plenum showed us the face of this scoundrel without a mask. By exposing Beria, a great danger has been eliminated. The exposure of Beria as a provocateur, as an enemy of the Soviet people, who is undoubtedly an agent of foreign intelligence services, is a major victory for the Lenin-Stalin Central Committee, an indicator of the wisdom, strength, and determination of our Central Committee and the Soviet government. (Applause.)
We are happy that we have such a wonderful Leninist-Stalinist Central Committee of the Party. With it, you can overcome any difficulty, with it, you can solve all the difficulties with it.
Comrade Malenkov's report presents facts of Beria's subversive activity against the party. The party is the vanguard of the people, its dependable leader. Acting against the party, trying to split its unity, Beria, blinded by malice, anti-popular sentiments d , wanted to take matters in a different direction. If he had not been exposed, he could have brought a lot of trouble to the party and the people. It was not for nothing that he started a correspondence with Tito. It was a far-reaching plan.
From this we can see what a victory our Central Committee has achieved. We all unanimously approve of the firmness and determination shown by the leadership of our party and the Soviet state. There is no doubt that such actions will be supported by the entire Soviet people, all our friends abroad.
a city
ь statement that
c with difficult questions
d adventurism
e in total
Comrade Malenkov quite correctly raised the question of the tasks of further comprehensive improvement of our party work, our ideological work. In this matter we really have many serious shortcomings, and we have a great deal to do in this regard. But we will certainly cope with this matter under the leadership and with the help of our Central Committee of the Party.
Comrades, the Plenum is for us an exceptionally high school of education, the development of deep ideological commitment, integrity, and sharpness. The Plenum shows again with what Leninist-Stalinist ruthlessness we must treat the enemies of the people, how we must serve our Soviet Motherland, our Soviet people. The Plenum acts in the spirit of the precepts of Lenin-Stalin. The ideas of our great leaders Lenin-Stalin dominate our Plenum.
The exposure of Beria's anti-Soviet, anti-Party actions is a lesson for us. American and other imperialists will continue to try to send their agents to us, will try to harm and do us harm. We are required to be highly vigilant. We must educate all communists in this spirit. We must remind all communists again and again of the need to maintain high revolutionary vigilance.
We must also vigilantly guard the unity of our party ranks and give a crushing, most merciless rebuff to even the slightest attempt by enemy elements to undermine this unity. The party is everything to us.
The unity of our party ranks is a guarantee of our success, a pledge that we will be able to cope with any tasks and overcome any difficulties. We must all unite even more closely around the Leninist-Stalinist Presidium of our glorious Communist Party.
Comrades, the Moscow Party Organization will fully and completely approve the decisions of the Plenum of the Central Committee, which are of great importance for the Party and the entire Soviet people. The Communists of the Moscow Party Organization will devote all their strength and energy to the successful implementation of the instructions of the Plenum of the Central Committee.
Comrades, the Moscow Party Organization has always been, is and will be loyal to our Central Committee of the Party and is ready to carry out any of its orders and tasks.
The communists and all workers of Moscow and the Moscow region will unite even more closely around our Central Committee of the Communist Party, around the Soviet government.
Let all the enemies, all the miserable renegades and traitors to the Motherland, all these Beria’s and other agents of imperialist intelligence services know that there will be no mercy for them, that the punishing hand of the Soviet people will find them and deal with them, that there is not and will not be a force capable of shaking the Stalinist unity of our Communist Party, headed by our Leninist-Stalinist Central Committee, headed by the Presidium of our Party. We will firmly and unwaveringly follow the path indicated by Lenin and Stalin. (Applause.)
Khrushchev: Comrade Mirtskhulava has the floor. Comrade Zavenyagin, get ready.
Mirtskhulava: Comrades, Comrade Malenkov has given the Plenum of the Central Committee a detailed account of Beria's hostile actions. There is no doubt that we are dealing with a notorious provocateur who intended to disrupt the Leninist-Stalinist unity and cohesion in the leadership of our Bolshevik Party.
The deceiver and provocateur of the party Beria was caught and exposed by the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for the crimes he had committed. The resolution adopted by the Presidium of the Central Committee to remove Beria from his posts, to expel him from the ranks of the party and to arrest him is the only correct measure, because criminals and scoundrels like Beria have no right to breathe our clean Soviet air.
Comrades, I would like to dwell on some issues concerning the work of the Georgian Party Organization, since, as everyone present here knows, Beria exercised harmful patronage over the Georgian Party Organization.
While discussing in party organizations the resolution of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of April 10, 1953 on violations of Soviet laws in Georgia, we uncovered many blatant facts of trampling on Soviet laws, beating up honest, loyal party personnel, gross administration in party work and the imposition of morals alien to our party by former secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia Charkviani and Mgeladze.
Having listened to Comrade Malenkov's report yesterday and the speeches of the members of the Presidium, Comrades Khrushchev, Molotov, Bulganin, and others, I came to the conclusion that this scoundrel Beria played a big role in all of this. Feeling Beria's support, Charkviani and Mgeladze ignored the Central Committee of our party, they did not take into account the apparatus of the Central Committee and did not even go to the Central Committee of our party, they directly addressed Beria and resolved all issues directly in connection with Beria.
I worked , comrades, in the apparatus of the Central Committee of our party, I had the good fortune to work there for a year and a half and receive a large school of education. The Central Committee received many incriminating statements, complaints from communists of the Georgian party organization. Comrades working in the department of party organs for the Georgian party organization wanted to check the accuracy of these letters, but Beria's intervention did not allow this to be done, and these letters always remained without consequences.
Recently it has been established that everything that was written in the Central Committee by the Communists turned out to be correct. Now comrades say that from the minutes of the Presidium of the Central Committee they knew that Beria distorted the Leninist-Stalinist national policy , and this distortion of the Leninist-Stalinist national policy had been in Georgia for a long time . It is now becoming clear that in Abkhazia, when Mgeladze worked there as secretary, feeling support, he did not allow Russian comrades to work, gave instructions to the police not to register Russians. Mgeladze abolished the Russian theater in Sukhumi, which enjoyed the love of the population. A large number of Russian intelligentsia live in Sukhumi, but they were not given the opportunity to work.
The Central Committee of the Georgian Party knew about this, and I am convinced that Beria knew about this too, and that is why he always defended these scoundrels and rogues.
What is becoming clear , comrades: when we began to implement the last decision of the Central Committee of our party, during the discussion of these issues , the communists began to expose and identify people who had fraudulently infiltrated the ranks of our party. Previously, they were in someone else's party, and then they ended up in the governing bodies - in the party and the Soviet. I will list them. Shaduri, a former Menshevik, worked as the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia. The communists raised this issue and wrote to the Central Committee. An investigation was conducted, but Charkviani, as it turns out, immediately received a call from Beria. Beria intervened, and until recently this scoundrel Shaduri remained unexposed and worked in the governing party bodies. We expelled him from the ranks of our party for deceiving our party.
A former Menshevik, a member of the Menshevik Party, worked for a long time in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian Republic, who worked against the Bolshevik Party, but, as it turned out later, on Beria's recommendation he managed to join the ranks of the Bolshevik Party and he was nominated as Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian Republic. We, too, during the discussion of this decision of the Central Committee, exposed this scoundrel Metashvili 84 and expelled him from the party.
The Minister of Social Security was a member of the Menshevik Party, the Commissar of the Menshevik Party in different regions of Georgia, Elisavetoshvili. As has now been established, Beria knew about this when he was the Secretary of the Central Committee, and others knew too. It was necessary to expose Elisavetoshvili during this period, remove him from the post of Minister, and his party membership is being considered in the party organization.
It must be said, comrades, that with Beria's help, people who themselves actively fought against Soviet power, were in the ranks of the National Democratic Party, hid their membership in another party and fraudulently made their way into the ranks of the Communist Party, have also made their way into leadership positions. They had previously used Beria's name as a cover, as if Beria had accepted them into the ranks of the Party.
I must say here, comrades, that to our shame, Zakhary Nikolaevich Ketskhoveli, who is sitting here, is a member of the Central Committee of our party. He hides behind the name of Lado Ketskhoveli, a revolutionary, but he himself is a Menshevik, a member of the National Democratic Party. The Communists made an accusation that Ketskhoveli supported the National Democratic Party in 1917-1921 and was arrested twice by the Soviet authorities. We checked these documents, this statement by the Communists, and all these facts were confirmed. There is evidence. Ketskhoveli himself writes in the documents that he was indeed in the ranks of the Menshevik Party, fought against the Soviet government, but gives his word to the GPU that he will stop working against the Soviet government and will be loyal to all the activities of the Soviet government.
After this receipt, he was released by the GPU organs. In 1939, Ketskhoveli joined the Bolshevik Party, and in 1940, he became a member of the party. When we asked for an explanation, Ketskhoveli gave us the explanation that he joined the party on Beria's orders. These documents are lying around. It is as if Beria asked him in 1937 why he did not join the Bolshevik Party. He replied that he was not prepared to join the party. Beria then said: "It's okay, I recommend you, you need to join the party." This was advantageous for Ketskhoveli at the time because Beria was the deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. These are the explanations he gives. But there is another document, personally signed by Ketskhoveli, that he was in a foreign party, and was accepted into the Bolshevik Party incorrectly, because people from foreign parties are accepted directly by the Central Committee, and he was accepted by the primary party organization. He got into the party with Beria's help. He was nominated by the Chairman of the Georgian Government on Beria's recommendation. We have the documents. I have collected all this material and will now present it to the Central Committee for discussion. I don't know where it came from right away, but Beria found out and called me: what's going on, what kind of discussion are you having there, you're working on all the people like that. I asked him who he had in mind. He said that you were working on the head of the railway, Kiknadze, then Ketskhoveli. I said that we were working on them because they were Mensheviks, they had fraudulently entered the party, but remained Mensheviks. Beria said that it was wrong to do that. I said that the communists were making serious accusations. Then Beria said: "That's not true, I know them. Send me this material. They are such people that we know them all, and you have only just started working." I couldn't argue with Beria. I answered him: " Lavrenty Pavlovich , we will check this material again, but it has been proven and they themselves are giving evidence ."
I say this because Beria polluted the governing bodies of Georgia, party and Soviet, with alien elements. He wanted to gain cheap authority with this.
I said the name Kiknadze. He works for us as the head of the road. He is a former Menshevik. Look, the Central Committee is a Menshevik, the chairman of the Council of Ministers is a Menshevik, the head of the road is a Menshevik. They were Mensheviks before, they were in the Menshevik Party, they fought against the Soviet power, and now they have nothing communist. Then Beria says that Kiknadze is a good manager. I said that he is a good manager, but he has no party spirit. “Yes,” says Beria, “he will never be a party man, but he is a good manager. Look, we should not discuss him, otherwise your road is big, everything will fail.” I said then that we will see. I repeat that I could not argue with Beria.
I said that the communists are putting pressure and we cannot hide the truth from the communists. (Laughter in the hall.) Here is this material. Then we decided that when we are in Moscow, we will talk to Beria and the Central Committee of the Party, because it is impossible to work with former Mensheviks. The Party gave the Mensheviks the right to re -join the Party , but there is a certain order - this is an honest admission of one's mistakes and in the future to work tirelessly for the good of the Soviet Motherland. These same people not only worked poorly, but also carried out subversive work, putting personal interests above public and state interests.
Voice from the audience. The Central Committee will consider it.
Mirtskhulava. The material is known, you signed it yourself. You cannot deny that under Soviet power you were arrested twice as an enemy of Soviet power. I have been working there for two and a half months, we have done some things, but we could not resolve all the issues.
The next question is about Beria's calls. I can't say that he didn't call me, there was such a case. We have serious distortions in the line of party work, in the line of state work, in the line of spending state funds. People did not take into account Soviet laws, they believed that they (I mean the former secretaries of the Central Committee Charkviani and Mgeladze) were not subject to control, and they committed lawlessness, arrested people left and right. Ordinary communists criticized them correctly. Communists appealed to the Central Committee of the Party, wrote that the Charter of Collective Farm Work was being violated , the collective farmers were not getting anything, everything was being taken away, and they asked to intervene in this matter. The Central Committee forwarded these letters to the regional party committees. Taking advantage of this situation, Mgeladze gave incorrect information to the Central Committee, and arrested these people and put them in prison. Many applications sent from the Central Committee were examined, they were dealt with for a long time, and then a decision was made. Many of the leading officials were punished, and those who had been wrongly arrested were released and rehabilitated. All of this was set out in detail in an explanatory note and sent to Comrade Khrushchev in the Central Committee 85 .
Among those expelled was also the former secretary of the regional committee, who did not recognize Soviet laws and violated the decrees of the party and government in his personal interests. He appealed to Beria that the Central Committee had incorrectly expelled him. Beria called me and said: why was he expelled? I said: because he is a non-party person, he is an anti-state element. He asks: where is the material? I say: we have the material, we checked it and discussed it .
Why don't we have it? I say that I reported this issue in detail to the Central Committee of our party, reported it to Comrade Khrushchev. Then he tells me: send me this material. The next day they called to say that this material was serious, Comrade Khrushchev sent it to all members of the Presidium, and they told me that there was no need to send it, since we had already received it.
Comrade Bagirov here at the Plenum spoke about the establishment of republican orders. On Beria's instructions, the head of the secretariat called me, I have forgotten his name now, he said that...
Malenkov. The head of the secretariat is talking with the secretary of the Central Committee .
Mirtskhulava: Yes, the head of the secretariat spoke to me, that's how he introduced himself.
From the Presidium. Ordyntsev.
Mirtskhulava: Yes, Ordyntsev called. He said that Beria wants to submit to the government a project on establishing cultural orders in the union republics, and for Georgia he proposed establishing the Shota Rustaveli Order. He asks my opinion. Perhaps you have another contender? (Laughter, animation in the hall.)
I said that there could be no other way. Apparently, such a call was made in other republics as well.
Here Vyacheslav Mikhailovich mentioned Shariy, that he was incorrectly reinstated. Yes, comrades, we reinstated Shariy. He was reinstated, he was not expelled in 1948, but was expelled due to the fact that he was arrested as a Mingrelian nationalist. Since he was on political charges, he was expelled.
Molotov: But then the Central Committee acquitted him.
Mirtskhulava. Yes.
Molotov. And then we acquitted him.
Mirtskhulava. We did not understand when he ended up in the Council of Ministers' apparatus, but we could not say anything. We saw how he worked for Beria. Comrade Bagirov did not say anything about this. Beria had influence on the Georgian party organization, I will not say about other Transcaucasian party organizations, but on the Georgian party organization. It must be said that he obtained this influence by deception, systematically deceived the Georgian party organization, and created cheap authority for himself.
But I can assure the Plenum that our Georgian Party organization will implement the present decision of our Plenum with the same success as the Moscow Party organization, the Leningrad Party organization and other advanced Party organizations of our Communist Party.
I am very glad about Comrade Bulganin's statement that they will help us. We need help to sort out all the issues, since Beria has done us a lot of harm for several decades.
And to sort out these matters correctly, we must say frankly, we will not be able to do so without the help of the Central Committee of our party, we will not be able to do so because this Ketskhoveli wrote a paper, and here he denies it. He has no party conscience and that is why he does this (laughter), and tomorrow, when I present the material to the Central Committee, I do not know what he will say.
Comrades, the Georgian party organization, created on the basis of Lenin’s teaching on the Marxist party of the proletariat and nurtured on Lenin’s traditions by the great Stalin, has always been, is and will be a reliable support for the Central Committee of our Leninist-Stalinist party.
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, with the help of the Central Committee of our party , will always unswervingly implement all the instructions of the Presidium of the Central Committee, the Central Committee of our party and, implementing the instructions of the Central Committee of our party, the directives of the Central Committee of our party, with the help and under the direct leadership of the Central Committee of our party, will in the near future become one of the leading organizations of the Soviet Union.
Khrushchev. Comrade Zavenyagin has the floor. Comrade Andrianov - Leningrad, get ready.
Zavenyagin: Comrades, yesterday Comrade Malenkov spoke in his report about Beria's practice of ignoring the Central Committee and the government in the most important questions, including the question of using atomic energy. Comrade Malenkov said that the decision to test the hydrogen bomb was not reported to the government, was not reported to the Central Committee, and was taken by Beria alone. I was a witness to this story.
We prepared a draft government resolution. It lay with Beria for some time, he took it with him to read, or something . We had an idea that maybe he talked to comrade Malenkov. That was the idea. About two weeks later, he invites us and starts looking at the document. He reads it. He reads it at home, apparently, once, starts making corrections. He gets to the end. Signature - Chairman of the Council of Ministers Malenkov. He crosses it out . He says - not required. And puts his signature.
What is a hydrogen bomb, comrades? This is the most important question now, not only of technology, but not only of the work of the former First Main Directorate, now the new Ministry of Medium Machine Building, this is a question of global significance.
At one time, the Americans created an atomic bomb, detonated it 86 . After some time, with the help of our scientists, our industry, under the leadership of our government, we eliminated this monopoly of the atomic bomb of the USA. The Americans saw that the advantages were lost, and by order of Truman, they began work on the hydrogen bomb. Our people and our country are not fools, we also took up this matter, and as far as we know this issue , we think that we are not behind the Americans. This bomb is dozens of times more powerful, and its explosion means the elimination of the second monopoly of the Americans, that is, it means the most important event in world politics, and the scoundrel Beria allowed himself to decide such a question outside the Central Committee.
Comrades , I worked with Beria for quite a few years and had the opportunity to observe this man. From the very beginning, Beria's main quality was striking - his contempt for people. He despised the entire Soviet people, he despised the party, he despised the leaders of the party. And in this contempt he turned out to be blind, he considered the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee to be simpletons, whom he could at any moment take in his fist and isolate. But he himself turned out to be a simpleton, a blind sheep. Our Central Committee showed foresight, and this scoundrel, this adventurer, was isolated in time.
Much has been said here about Beria's negative qualities, I will not repeat it: about his arrogance, unceremoniousness, offensive rudeness towards employees. I will say that his non-governmental approach to many issues was striking . If, say, some issue was related to his personal authority, his personal reputation, he showed interest in it. If the issue had no relation to him personally, he tried to fail it. Many examples can be given.
After the war, Comrade Mikoyan raised the issue of restoring Severonikel, the largest enterprise on the Kola Peninsula, which supplies nickel to our country 87 . It was built by the Ministry of Internal Affairs , and operated by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Germans were driven out, and it would seem that the Ministry of Internal Affairs should have restored it, since it had powerful construction organizations. Stalin did not tell Beria this, and Beria decisively refused Comrade Mikoyan in this matter.
I remember Comrade Kosygin asking many times: give us Orlov. Comrade Orlov was the head of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he was a very prominent engineer and specialist in the paper industry, but things were not going well there. And, of course, the head of the Main Directorate could have been given the post of People's Commissar. "No way, we need people ourselves." When Beria was given this assignment, Orlov was appointed immediately .
When a matter does not concern him, although the matter is of the utmost state importance, he is indifferent to it. For Beria, nothing was sacred. Each worker had an epithet, of which he had a stock. He could not name, as they say, a single person whom he respected. Many times the famous Sobakevich came to mind, for whom there was not a single decent person in the whole city, there was one decent person - the prosecutor, and he was a pig. So Beria did not have people who deserved respect, to whom he himself could treat humanely.
Beria's very negative quality was the suppression of initiative. If you come up with some kind of proposal, you will be immediately cut off, put in your place: here is an inventor. If the matter does not originate from him and if the question is put in such a way that it does not originate from him, the question was rejected, and the state undoubtedly suffered greatly in this matter.
It seems to me that the assessment of Beria as an employee exaggerates some of his positive qualities. Everyone knows that he is an unceremonious person and as such a pushy person, did not take anyone into account, could easily advance any matter. This quality was there. But from the point of view of understanding the issue, getting to the heart of the matter, I would say he was a dull person . Without flattering the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, I can say: any member of the Presidium of the Central Committee understood the issues much faster and more deeply and could figure it out than Beria. Beria was an exception in this regard. Due to his stupidity, he could not get to the heart of the matter. And when we were dealing with some issue, he would say: drop it. To hell with dealing with this matter, you are the organizers. How can work be organized without understanding the essence of the matter?
Beria was known as an organizer, but in reality he was a desperate bureaucrat. He fenced himself off from people, sometimes for weeks, months he did not receive employees subordinate to him. Everything was done in correspondence. He had very large secretariats, documents went from one to another. Often absurd resolutions were composed. The resolution of issues was delayed for a very long time, complex issues took months to resolve. Let's ask, such a question as the use of atomic energy for the railways' own needs . This issue was not considered for many months and the issue of using atomic energy in aviation and the navy has not been considered to this day. Why? Because he had no time, and the most important matters were lying around due to his bureaucratic practices in work. The correspondence between the secretariats and the 1st Main Directorate acquired monstrous proportions. All the main employees of the main directorate were busy writing projects, redoing projects, a pile of paper, there was no time to sort things out, to work promptly on the management of research institutions and enterprises. And this is called an organizer? A very dangerous and harmful person.
Beria was arrogant, he thought that he knew everything, that he would notice in time, raise the question in time, and make the decision in time. In reality, because of his arrogance, the questions that were raised in time were not resolved. Here, Vannikov and I raised the question two years ago regarding the use of atomic energy for aviation and the navy. This question was not resolved, the question was left unanswered , and we are wasting precious time.
After Comrade Stalin's death, he had a tendency to play the game of economy: money is needed, we need to economize, develop industry, culture, help agriculture, but there are issues in which we could not afford excessive savings. We need to develop capacities in the field of atomic energy. The Americans are creating large bases to make bombs. Beria says: "To hell with it, you are throwing away a lot of money, stick to the five-year plan." When the five-year plan was being drawn up, it was clear what we should do in the next three years, what to build, but in the fourth year the volume of work on the construction projects that had begun was already declining, and in the fifth year we had to start new things. Therefore, in the 3-4 years, capital investments are cut in half compared to the third, and in the fifth - in half compared to the fourth. We could not put up with this, and the state cannot put up with it. He says: "To hell with it, stick to what we have."
Malenkov: This matter will have to be monitored because money was spent there without any control.
Zavenyagin: This is certainly true.
Kaganovich: They built resorts, not cities.
Zavenyagin: I can’t say that they built resorts, they built cities.
The question is, where were we who worked with Beria, what did we see, what did we do? I must honestly say here, comrades, that Beria did not charm me when I had to work with him. I was struck by his anti-party qualities, rudeness, unceremoniousness, disrespect for people. A person who does not respect other people is himself unworthy of respect and trust.
At times I thought with great anxiety that Comrade Stalin would die, there would be a new leadership of the party, Beria would fight his way to the leadership. What danger would this represent? Apparently, many comrades understood this.
What had to be done? Sometimes they snapped back. Perhaps Comrade Malenkov remembers one example. A telegram was received from Czechoslovakia that the program that the Main Directorate was planning required a large amount of funds. Astronomical figures were cited. This telegram came to Beria. He began to get indignant and swear. I said that it was enough to fool people, we were fulfilling the government’s decision, which instructed us to develop some program. The stupid figures that were cited were wrong, we would correct them. Swearing immediately : “Here is a hero.” I said that he was neither a hero nor a fool, why fool people. “Get out.” Get out. Then the man softened and tried to convince.
Here is another example. During the reorganization of the Ministry of Geology 88 , the question arose regarding uranium exploration. It must be said that our country is well supplied with uranium raw materials. We think that we are better supplied than all our possible opponents. But a significant share of this raw material is mined abroad. It is important to conduct accelerated exploration here . We believe that we will provide this matter better . Beria says : "No, you don't need to do it, let Tevosyan do it." Tevosyan himself believed that he had non-ferrous metallurgy, ferrous metallurgy, that he should not be entrusted with the extraction of uranium raw materials. I tried to convince Beria, but he cut me off. I said that give us this matter, we will do it, that others should not do it. Beria told me: "If you think so, we will find others." Then all sorts of additions to this matter follow.
Of course, it is impossible to think that an individual worker could fight Beria, he would slide into the wrong positions. We could count on the party leadership to figure out this man and give him the right direction . And our Central Committee passed this historical test.
I would like to touch upon several issues that do not pertain to the work of the 1st Main Directorate. Here is a question regarding Western Ukraine and Lithuania. When the members of the Central Committee received the document, they thought about the decision . And I had the idea that it would be wrong to leave only the national cadres and remove all the Russians, that this would only lead to a split in our multinational state. This is clear to everyone now.
The second question. Things are not going well in Western Ukraine, in Lithuania because of distortions in the national question. It seemed to us that this was not the only issue. Everyone remembers the huge bandit movement that was in Ukraine in the 1920s. It was not (as in the book. S.G.) along this line that the issue was resolved and the bandit movement was finished. Let's say, Western Ukraine was in Austria, under Franz Joseph, the Baltic republics were under the rule of Russian landowners. There was no such movement there. There are some other issues, economic issues, administrative ones, that were bypassed in Beria's proposals, not raised, not revealed.
Regarding the German Democratic Republic. It was not clear to ordinary party members, ordinary workers, how it was possible to agree to the unification of West Germany with East Germany. This meant handing over 18 million people and the German Democratic Republic to the clutches of the bourgeois bosses. This is absolutely obvious. It was impossible to resolve this issue in this way. We have special considerations on this issue, a lot of uranium is mined in the GDR, perhaps no less than the Americans have at their disposal. Beria knew about this circumstance, and he should have told the Central Committee so that these considerations could be taken into account.
Comrades, with the removal of Beria from the Presidium and the leadership of our party, the Central Committee of the party, the Presidium, without fear of intriguers, without fear of introducing discord into the ranks of the Central Committee, into the leadership of the party, can calmly discuss all issues of governing the state, calmly discuss all the shortcomings that were in our work, and confidently eliminate them. There is no doubt that the Central Committee of our party, the Presidium of the Central Committee, having freed itself from this scoundrel, will lead our party and the state forward to new successes.
Khrushchev: There is a proposal to end the work of the Plenum here. There is a proposal not to have a meeting of the Plenum tomorrow, but to create a Commission for the development of proposals and resolutions of the Plenum now. To convene the evening meeting at 8 o'clock, we will continue drinking, several comrades will speak, we will understand the resolution and with this we will end the work of our Plenum.
There will be no objections?
Voices from the audience: No.
Khrushchev: Before closing the Plenum meeting, allow me to resolve the issue of the commission for drafting the resolution. There is a proposal to create a commission of 13 people. Are there any other proposals?
Voices from the audience: No.
Khrushchev. I will name the comrades recommended for this commission: Malenkov, Molotov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Kirichenko, Mikhailov, Patolichev, Bakradze, Yusupov, Pospelov, Suslov, Shepilov.
Any other suggestions?
Voices from the floor. Accept.
Khrushchev: We will consider it accepted. After the closing of the Plenum meeting, the commission members are requested to enter the hall.
Another appeal to the secretaries of the Central Committees of the Union Communist Parties, to the chairmen of the Councils of Ministers, to the secretaries of the regional party committees, to the chairmen of the regional executive committees, to the agricultural workers who are present at the Plenum of the Central Committee, to stay for a few minutes. There are proposals regarding the use of daytime tomorrow.
I consider this Plenum meeting to be over. We will meet tomorrow at 8 o'clock.
next- MEETING JULY 4