Beria Case

TRANSCRIPTS FROM SOVIET ARCHIVES

Lavrenty Beria Case

Soviet Archives/Beria Case/Beria Case Plenum.pdf

MEETING OF JULY 4

Evening meeting

Khrushchev (chairman): Let us continue the work of the Plenum, comrades. Andrianov has the floor. Comrade Voroshilov, get ready.

Andrianov: Comrades, the resolution of the Presidium of the Central Committee on the enemy of the people Beria is the only correct and timely decision. Members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, comrades Malenkov, Khrushchev, Molotov, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, thoroughly and with all the necessary completeness revealed the face of this conspirator and insidious enemy.

As has now become quite clear, we are not talking about a simple careerist, an upstart. This is a dangerous enemy - a traitor who has penetrated into the core of leadership - the brain of our party, and had in his dirty hands an armed, and in some parts, loyal apparatus.

This is why the work of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the government was so difficult. This is precisely where the profound and courageous measures taken by the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU can be seen, which made it possible to neutralize this beast without the slightest shock. His main aspiration was to seize power in order to elevate himself to the rank of dictator in the style of Tito-Rankovich, and to replace the ideological foundations - Marxism - with Americanism. Therefore, it is no accident that he came close to Tito-Rankovich.

That is why, comrades, we are all deeply confident that the Plenum of the Central Committee and our entire party will unanimously approve this wise and at the same time courageous decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee of our party.

We, local workers, did not know much before the Plenum of the Central Committee, and it was difficult to assume the treachery of this man even slightly. When dealing with him on business, many had to listen to all sorts of insolence from him, not excluding the obscenities with which he equipped almost every remark. Often we attributed this to his specific nature, taking into account his personal data , and, in addition, we were afraid, since he could get his way.

First of all, in the Ministry and locally, in the regions and republics, he carried out a mass replacement of Chekist personnel, and in the selection of personnel the only principle was personal loyalty. The opinions of the party organs, as it turned out at the Plenum, were not taken into account and were recklessly trampled. I would like to dwell on this issue of personnel and use the example of the Leningrad region. In the Leningrad region, about a year before this, in place of the dismissed bankrupt head of the Directorate, the Central Committee approved and a comrade came who was just beginning to get involved in the matter 89 . New leadership of the Ministry came. They also replaced the head of the Leningrad Regional Directorate, despite the objections of the regional party committee, allegedly under the guise of illness, although this person was healthy and did not want to admit that he was sick. I contacted the Ministry to find out the reasons for the dismissal and ask to continue working as the head of the Directorate. Apart from insolence, nothing could be heard. I did not agree with such behavior of the Ministry and appealed to the Central Committee, especially since I knew that a number of dubious people had been nominated to the Ministry, for example, the former head of the Leningrad Directorate, Gorlinsky, who was removed by the decision of the Central Committee and dismissed from the agencies, I will say more about him below. He turned out to be the approved head of the Economic Directorate of the Union Ministry of Internal Affairs; Rodionov, who was engaged in provocation in the Ministry and in the regions, one of the active participants in the concocted provocation case of Comrade Shakhurin, and others. People like Kobulov and others were replaced . It seemed to me that such a concentration of the Ministry's forces was dangerous, and the practice of selecting personnel was unacceptable. I expressed my thoughts on all this to the Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Shatalin. I directly stated that the dangerous concentration of dubious people in the Ministry was unacceptable and that the removal of the head of the Directorate in the Leningrad Region was incorrect. The new head of the Directorate has arrived. He was appointed Minister and began to fulfill his duties. Apparently, he knew about my attitude towards him and about the prejudice , he did not come to me at all , did not consider it necessary to inform the regional party committee. Moreover, he forbade his staff to go to party organs.

About a month ago I was forced to call Comrade Kruglov at the Ministry and ask him to pay attention to the head of the Department so that he would change his attitude toward the regional party committee. I did not consider it necessary to talk about the dirty tricks of this man, who collected all sorts of materials on party organs for information to the Ministry.

Now the question of amnesty. I think that this is a vile deed by provocateurs from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, that they have left a dirty mark on this case . Notorious thugs were released, even without any elementary training on the part of the police. As soon as these people appeared in the city, daggers began to work. An alarming situation was created among the population. And certainly fair complaints were sent to local authorities, and to the Government, and to the Central Committee, and to the secretaries of the Central Committee. Comrade Khrushchev drew our attention to the need to restore order, we heard about the state of public order in the city and the region at the bureau of the regional committee, outlined a number of measures to restore order, criticized the police for their poor work.

The regional committee's interference in this matter was perceived painfully when they began to correct these shortcomings. In the same way, distortions were allowed: unfounded arrests and indiscriminate arrests of people. Instead of blows to hooligans, honest people were hit. One could cite a number of other examples characterizing the arbitrariness of some employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The question arises: why have such things been happening in the Ministry of Internal Affairs for a number of years? What is the matter here?

I think, comrades, it was certainly bad that such nasty, one can simply say, people like Yagoda, Yezhov, Abakumov, Beria made their way into the leadership of the Ministry. They kept honest people and even the governing bodies in fear rather than enemies, all the elementary norms of relations between the party and the Ministry of Internal Affairs were violated. The disproportionately large apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, costing 18 billion rubles, turned into such a brainchild that it began to stop taking into account even those who created this body. They held many things in their hands in the country, but they fought the enemies poorly, as was quite rightly noted here at the Plenum.
It would be unforgivable to underestimate and belittle the role of Soviet intelligence. It is therefore not a question of weakening, but of strengthening intelligence, but of doing everything to put it in its place. Comrade Stalin drew attention to the fact that the spearhead of intelligence must now be turned against external enemies. Beria, for his own selfish purposes, completely ignored and discarded this Stalinist position. Contrary to the decisions of the Central Committee, he introduced economic and secret-political directorates and departments at the center and in the regions, when the situation at the time did not require this, and this contradicted the decision of the Central Committee of the Party. Other internal directorates and departments were also inflated, and intelligence and counterintelligence work turned out to be secondary. The regional apparatuses were inflated, made colossal - thousands of people.

If we add to this and take into account that agents were planted in a number of cases without need or benefit for the cause not only in institutions but also at enterprises, then it is difficult to imagine fruitful, well-thought-out work for the actual intelligence and counterintelligence work of the Chekists. If we take a closer look at what kind of agents they were sometimes planted with, then, comrades, we sometimes have to be perplexed as to who they were working for and with whom.

Some time ago, while Comrade Stalin was still alive, we accidentally discovered that one of the terrorists who participated in the murder of Sergei Mironovich Kirov was brought from the camps to Leningrad to work, as we were told by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, among the anti-Soviet intelligentsia.

The second case was solved: an agent of the MVD Directorate was persuading a citizen to commit a terrorist act - the murder of one of the leaders who came to Leningrad. This person, whom the agent was persuading, came, and told us. When we began to find out who this person was who was persuading this matter , the Directorate told us that our agent was conducting such conversations allegedly to check the intentions of the person with whom he was talking. Of course, the provocation was obvious. I wrote a note on this issue to Comrade Stalin. Beria was also entrusted with the analysis of this statement , but he did not say a word about this and a number of similar outrageous outrages, which are described in the note on the shortcomings of the Directorate's work.

It was precisely this chief Gorlinsky, about whom I spoke above, that we managed to remove only with the active help of the Central Committee and personally of Comrade Malenkov , he was fired from the organs. When Beria came there , this Gorlinsky turned out to be the head of the Economic Department of the Ministry of the Union, and Rodionov was similarly promoted to a leading position in the Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. What could be expected from such personnel? It seems to me, comrades, that we also sometimes overestimate the work of the organs incorrectly. In fact, we resolve any issue more quickly and often without discrimination, when the question of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is brought up, than any other competent workers. This can be judged from the note of comrades whom we know, as well as from a number of local facts. Moreover, some of them were made specialists in Marxist theory, in the national question, whereas upon deep familiarization it turned out that such figures in quotation marks had little to do with Marxism, and their offices are filled not with literature, but with means of debauchery. This truth is certainly bitter to hear, but the facts demand that the proper conclusion be drawn from them.

In the national question, the exposed provocateur has caused great harm. He tried to oppose and embitter other nationalities against the Russian people, he inspired and activated the bourgeois nationalists. This is, undoubtedly, a great act of sabotage.

Furthermore, there is, it seems to me, a not entirely correct practice, when appointing senior officials, including party officials, we, as a rule, resort to checking these officials through the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, while all the possibilities, and no less, are in the hands of the party bodies themselves. It is necessary to put everything in its place and oblige the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to conduct work in full accordance with the decision of the Central Committee on active reconnaissance against our external enemies.

And in the example of the Leningrad region, we have an expensive, thousand-strong apparatus in the Ministry of Internal Affairs , and this apparatus has not revealed a single American or English intelligence officer, although the Leningrad region, as is known, borders other states both by sea and by land.

It is imperative, as Comrade Malenkov quite correctly said in his speech, to increase the ideological education of Chekist cadres, to increase the activity of party organs in implementing the daily and specific leadership of the organs, and to increase revolutionary vigilance.

Comrades, I think there is no need to exaggerate the personality of this villain. The party masses and the people do not know him, he has never been anywhere, he did not know the life of party organizations. The leading cadres knew him as a bold and rude person, and now they know him as a provocateur and a traitor.

The Leningrad party organization, deeply devoted to the Central Committee of our party, like our entire party, will unanimously approve the decisions of the Central Committee and brand this insidious villain with shame and will rally even more closely around the Leninist-Stalinist Central Committee, our great Communist Party. (Applause.)

Khrushchev: Comrade Voroshilov has the floor, Ketskhoveli should prepare.
Voroshilov: Comrades, the decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee of our party to expel Beria from its ranks and arrest him, as well as the current discussion of this issue at the Plenum of the Central Committee, are matters of great political importance, aimed at preserving the unity of the leading core of our party, and therefore the unity of the party, the people, and achieving success for our entire cause.

I believe that Comrade Malenkov's report, the speeches of the members of the Presidium and the Central Committee have sufficiently fully revealed all the criminal abomination of the traitor Beria. However, the question reasonably arises: why, even after all the talk, was Beria able to work in the leadership of the party for such a long time, without having been previously exposed, enjoying such great authority, occupying such high party and state posts? The question is legitimate, natural, and personally suggests itself.

First of all, comrades, answering this question, joining in a very clear report, we must keep in mind Beria. He is the type of a wily, cunning enemy, the type of a complete adventurer, an intriguer, who knew how to cleverly gain trust and who knew how to hide for a long time and wait for a convenient moment. He saw the daily life of our great leader Comrade Stalin together with us, he knew that Comrade Stalin had often become ill in recent years , and, obviously, this inspired him to a certain extent and dictated that he be secretive. He expected that sooner or later Stalin would be gone. As the facts have now shown, after the death of Comrade Stalin this adventurer hoped for the rapid implementation of his criminal plans against the party and the state. That is why he was in such a hurry after Stalin's death, and perhaps he was hurried. We do not yet understand everything, we do not know everything - perhaps he was hurried, pushed into criminal activity . But the criminal activity of this traitor was unraveled, well understood, and stopped in time.

During Comrade Stalin's lifetime, Beria was impudent, rude, arrogant, brazen, always trying to show his superiority over others, disregarding human pride and dignity. Comrade Zverev looks at me and thinks: I am telling the truth. How many nasty, vile things he said to him . There is not a single comrade present here, from among the members of the government, be it a former minister or a current one, to whom Beria has not said the most impudent, the most brazen and completely unprovoked nasty things, insults, pointed out God knows what kind of vile things, incongruous with everything. Just to offend and humiliate a person. At the same time, he knew how to court those people he needed. Therefore, there were always people who were on good terms with him for a day or two.

With all these special qualities of his, Beria was afraid of Stalin, he fawned on him, I must say frankly, he fawned on him in his own skillful way; he whispered to Stalin . And we only felt from the mood of Comrade Stalin, when we met in business and non-business settings, that today they had "dropped the bomb on you." (Laughter in the hall.) I remember how at one time, and this is known to both Comrades Molotov, Kaganovich, and especially to the Georgians from Tbilisi who are present here, what a vile role this Beria played in the life of the remarkable communist Sergo Ordzhonikidze. He completely spat on him, and simply brought him down before Stalin. Sergo Ordzhonikidze told terrible things about this man, even then seeing him as a real enemy. He said that he was an impudent fellow and an enemy.

Voices from the audience: Correct.

Voroshilov. He set the people he worked with against each other, created an atmosphere of nervousness. Beria pursued this line of disunity throughout all the years of his work. He became especially unbridled during the illness and after the death of Comrade Stalin. Stalin was still alive, unconscious, and Beria began to act. He is the first in everything and constantly, he proposes everything, he foresees everything, he knows everything, he commands everyone. Is that how it was, comrades? (Addressing the members of the Presidium.)

Voices from the Presidium: Yes, that's right.

Voroshilov: We were with Stalin until our last breath, and he immediately showed himself , like, keep in mind, I'm here. They indicated the candidacy of Georgy Maximilianovich Malenkov, but then he began to commit all sorts of meanness before our eyes. We all recognized Comrade Malenkov as a natural and legitimate candidate. Beria could not name himself, and it was impossible to expect that any of us would name him. (Laughter in the hall. Applause.) Therefore, he decided to take some special path to the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers. He chose the path of the enemy, but even in this roundabout path he chose the most roundabout roads. First, he began with an amnesty. We saw that there was much here that could be caused by the evil one, but nevertheless, to a certain extent, it was for the benefit of the party, because at that moment some acts were needed that would show that our Central Committee, our party were acting. I must say that during this time I have become well acquainted with our judicial practice. There is too much talk here about swindlers and scoundrels, a lot of lies, a lot of talk and writing that they are being beaten, and when you start calling, calling chairmen, prosecutors, secretaries and asking what is being done, they say that nothing is being done. Of course, nevertheless, there are many things that need to be corrected and eliminated.

The second act is the cleaning of the Augean stables. Everyone knows that Beria was either the direct head of the MGB or a patron throughout his life . Both those abominations and that meanness are there to a significant extent.

Voices. Correct.

Voroshilov: This is the department the gentleman was counting on. Everyone was saying: Minister Beria, Beria discovered, Beria proposed, Beria is the Minister of Internal Affairs , etc., and at the same time he was shoving his people there .

Voices. Correct.

Voroshilov. He was distributing his forces, thinking that he would win by doing so. It seems to me, comrades, that despite the fact that this man was cunning and stupid, and that he had no real, Marxist, generalizing mind , and that he had not known this state body of the Ministry of Internal Affairs before and did not know it now, because along with the scoundrels who were really doing dirty work against the government, the majority of honest people, good people, worked in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, on whom we can fully count.

Voices. Correct.

Voroshilov: If only one of them would write a letter saying what you did to our great leader. (Laughter). There was nothing like that. No one considered him a leader, no one really knows him and spits on him, and if we say what he was like, they will spit three times.

Voices. Correct.

Voroshilov. He counted on him to proclaim himself , and then gradually got closer. What abominations was he capable of? He was capable of everything.

Thanks to the comrades who are sitting here, they exposed him. I was the last to know about it. (Laughter.) I never trusted him, he felt it and did not particularly respect me.

Malenkov: Correct.

Voices. Correct.

Voroshilov. We got rid of him in time. Don't think that he was the only one who disappeared. But imagine that the head of the government could have disappeared at the same time .

Voices. Correct.

Voroshilov: We, living in such an international situation that now surrounds us, having camouflage (laughter), would be in a difficult position. Therefore, this gentleman was removed in time. This is the greatest merit of our comrades from the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party, and now the entire Central Committee, which unanimously and with a real understanding of the matter understood this issue. (Stormy applause.)

After the death of Comrade Stalin, the tasks that arose before our party, the state, the Soviet people as a whole, when we were left without Stalin, demanded, dictated to us the preservation of unity in our ranks, solidity, and strength. Each of us protected the party like the apple of our eye.

This is explained by the fact that we established unity, colluding and not colluding, each of us internally experienced all of this near the body of our great leader , we understood that unity is everything, unity of action, the path that was shown to us by the great Lenin and the great Stalin, which we must at all costs keep free for our movement forward - this is our sacred and obligatory task. And this guy thought that they did not notice him. This explains why he worked hard for three months and imposed some things on us, even things that we would not have liked, but we needed . Here I must say this directly . We needed it - let him unbolt himself further, and in the end we would see. And we saw, I have already said this. His final goal was not really clear to us, we only saw it during his actions.

Our task, comrades, now consists not only in branding the crimes of Beria, who has done much harm to our cause, but also in directing our efforts to the implementation of all those plans that Stalin outlined for us at the time together with our entire party, in relation to those tasks that are especially prominent for us today . Comrade Malenkov spoke about this here, and other comrades spoke about this , regarding the fact that we must now , having cleansed ourselves of this filth, and this filth (the Russians have many good sayings, and one saying is to a certain extent appropriate here - every cloud has a silver lining) - this is a great evil, but the good will be no less. In what sense? We will now be more circumspect, more careful, more vigilant , and we will recognize all sorts of scoundrels more quickly and bring them to light.

This is one task, but the main task that we must now, while maintaining the unity of our ranks, while preserving the purity of our party, is to ensure that we do economics and domestic and international politics in a truly genuine manner.

Our agriculture is, as has already been said, in a state of neglect. We need agriculture, we need to revive collective farming a little, we need to make our state farms - comrade Skvortsov, don't laugh, you worked a lot, but didn't do much - we need to make them real state farms , Soviet farms, because they are now very pitiful and ineffective, unprofitable.

Voice. Correct.

Voroshilov: We need to truly raise our entire agriculture, both public and state, to the proper level.

Voice. Correct.

Voroshilov: This is a big, complex, but quite solvable task. I will not speak about other issues: our industry, the defense industry - all this is in a more or less proper condition, but agriculture needs vigilant and, I would say, great attention from our party, the state.

Having cleansed ourselves of the traitor and scoundrel Beria and his ilk, if they still exist and will be encountered anywhere, we become only stronger, more united, even more confident in the rightness of our great cause - the cause of Lenin and Stalin. No enemy will knock us off that glorious path that was shown to us and humanity by Lenin and Stalin. Our wise party has led and will lead the Soviet people with confident steps to those shining heights of communism for which we have fought, are fighting, and are convinced that in this fight we will emerge victorious. (Prolonged applause.)

Khrushchev. Comrade Ketskhoveli has the floor. Comrade Arutinov - Armenia, get ready.

Ketskhoveli. The conclusions and measures taken by the Presidium of the Central Committee in relation to Beria are correct, and our entire party, the entire Soviet people will approve of them completely and entirely. In their report, Comrade Malenkov, the speakers Comrades Khrushchev, Molotov, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, and other comrades characterized Beria's criminal activity. Now that the vile face of the traitor has been revealed, the name Beria will become synonymous with cunning, perfidy, and meanness.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia A. Mirtskhulava accused me of a number of offenses. In this regard, allow me to give an explanation.

a The letter "t" is inserted. Here and further in Z. Ketskhoveli's speech, the footnotes on each page contain the text inserted into the uncorrected transcript during its preparation for printing and distribution to party organizations. — Comp.

I have never been a member of any party other than the Communist Party. In 1918-1919, when I was 16-17 years old, I joined the youth organization of the National Democrats. I did not actively work in this organization, and did not pay membership dues. I did not hide this from the party. I was arrested by the Cheka in 1922 (at that time I was working in the village) before a holiday, I think May 1, for several days. No charges were brought, I was released after 5-6 days. Then they said that it was for preventive purposes. (Laughter of X.) I did not hide this from the party. I joined the party late - at the end of 1938 as a candidate. Before that, I really had a conversation with Beria in connection with my summons to the Central Committee (at that time he worked as the secretary of the Central Committee of Georgia) to be appointed deputy commissioner of people's commissars. He recommended that I join the party.

Since 1921, since the establishment of Soviet power in Georgia, I have devoted all my energy, all my strength and knowledge to Soviet construction. My life is as clear as day, it can be traced from beginning to end.

In April 1952, at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, Beria, who was sent by the Politburo to participate in the work of the Plenum, actually recommended me as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic. This position is included in the nomenclature of the Central Committee of the CPSU. I do not know who recommended me to the Central Committee. Comrade Malenkov dealt with this issue, he will probably remember. Obviously, not Beria. Then, when he had the opportunity to nominate after the death of Comrade Stalin, in April of this year I was not nominated, but dismissed from the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic. Beria nominated people who pleased him, such as, for example, Mirtskhulava. Mirtskhulava stated that party members allegedly spoke out against me at the district party conference in May of this year. Indeed, one delegate made a number of accusations. I was not present at the conference, I was in the district, I was present at another party conference. I dismissed this delegate Chichibai from work at the time . Seeing that I was not at this conference , he slandered me with .

I was elected to the party conference, I received only one or two votes against.

Why did Mirtskhulava need to inflate the facts and make a number of other accusations e ? For example, the head of the railway Ipatzef, who has worked for a long time, is slandered , Comrades Kaganovich and Beshchev know him very well and can talk about him . g

Kaganovich. Good worker.

Ketskhoveli. Mirtskhulava slandered h and by this he wants to save himself. His revenge

- Beria . Mirtskhulava also uses this weapon skillfully.

and for some misdeeds.

ь tried to slander. (Here and further in Z. Ketskhoveli's speech, the words highlighted in bold were crossed out from the uncorrected transcript in the process of its preparation for printing and distribution to party organizations. — Comp.)

c How did the party organization react:

d delegate to the city party conference, and

e to slander me and a number of other employees

f Kiknadze

g excellent. Comrades Kaganovich and Beshchev know him and can tell you what kind of worker he is.

h others

i Slander of others is a tactic to save one's own skin. Mirtskhulava wants to neutralize himself by slandering others, to show himself as pure. Revenge was Beria's weapon. He instilled it in his agents and protégés.

It would be good for the Central Committee of the CPSU to take up the issue of the former Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Georgia, Ignatoshvili, who is now under arrest, about whom Mirtskhulava spoke, as if he were a Menshevik, whose only guilt, it turns out, was that he wrote several letters to Comrade Stalin about the state of affairs in the republic, and not very pleasant for Beria. He was arrested.

After April of this year, that is, after the Central Committee of the CPSU considered the case of the former Mingrelian nationalists and their arrival in Georgia, persecution of the so-called close people ( I emphasize, in quotation marks ) of Comrade Stalin began. It turns out that my guilt is that, having been several times at the Plenums of Comrade Stalin, he called me . I spoke about the state of affairs in Georgia, but since this accusation could not be brought directly, they are looking for ways to denigrate c . The Central Committee of the Party will look into the accusations brought against me and make a decision.

In assessing the issue and documents on the so-called Mingrelian nationalists, it seems to me that it is permissible to ignore the fact that this case must be viewed in a new light. Comrade Stalin directed the party at the existing manifestations of nationalism that were developing into espionage. I believe that the inspiration of this, as I am now sure, was Beria. Sharia and a number of responsible officials were Beria's agents. Comrade Stalin, in documents that the Presidium of the Central Committee recently cancelled at Beria's suggestion, pointed out the existence of a connection between Gegechkori and recidivists in the Soviet Union . Who then, immediately after Comrade Stalin , made the hasty decision to release those arrested in this case? Beria.

I am not claiming that all those arrested were nationalists or residents or that there was some kind of organization, but among those arrested there were also people who were accused of major abuses. We need to look into this matter thoroughly, and I think it is wrong to reduce the whole matter to Beria's desire to appear popular.

What actually happened? Firstly, obviously, no one really understood the matter, and in order to cover up the tracks, Beria himself reported it. Secondly, they released all those arrested , who, in addition to nationalism and espionage, were accused of major economic abuses and crimes. Bakradze also spoke about this.

and at the reception

at his call, I - as they say -

from me. Obviously

d Mingrelian, imperialist spy, American intelligence officer

e residents

f same

g death

h was

and except, now I'm sure, interested
j even those,

Recently, Beria had been disposing of personnel from the Secretariat as he wanted, Shariy, about whom Comrade Molotov reported a . Comrade Mirtskhulava, Secretary of the Central Committee of Georgia, blindly and unquestioningly carried out Shariy's orders to remove undesirable workers and appoint people Beria needed. Maybe these are not nationalists b , but in any case this is a nasty thing.

Comrade Malenkov reported to the Plenum of the Central Committee about Beria's betrayal and the decisions taken by the Presidium. The Plenum will approve these decisions unanimously. Comrade Khrushchev is right when he says that the Party and the people will regard these actions and decisions of the Central Committee as correct decisions that Lenin and Stalin would have taken in a similar situation.

The Georgian people have been closely connected with the Russian people for centuries, and during the years of socialist construction they have proven their devotion and loyalty to the unbreakable friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union. They will perceive the decision of the Central Committee on the issue of Beria's betrayal as a victory of the Lenin-Stalin Central Committee in the struggle for the purity of the party, for the further strengthening of the Soviet system.

and they disposed of personnel as they wished. Sharia, about whom Comrade Molotov spoke, dictated,

b nationalism

Khrushchev (chairman): Comrade Arutinov has the floor; comrade Andrei Andreevich Andreyev must prepare.

Arutinov: I consider the resolution of the Presidium of the Central Committee to expose the adventurer Beria and arrest him to be the correct Leninist-Stalinist approach to assessing the actions of Beria, this careerist and a man who could by any means commit anything against the party, against the state in order to seize power.

I haven't met Beria in recent years , 7-8 years, but when I was in Georgia, I worked during the period when Beria worked as Secretary of the Central Committee and Secretary of the Regional Party Committee. The traits that have emerged recently, when we learned in detail after the speeches of the Presidium members and after Comrade Malenkov's report, these traits had been evident in him before. This careerism, naked desire for power, he subordinated everything to this - his attitude to people, his attitude to personnel, his attitude to the leaders of the party and government, and the behavior that Comrade Voroshilov spoke about in relation to Sergo Ordzhonikidze in the last years of his life.

Beria treated personnel exclusively from the point of view of using any person not for the interests of the party, but in order to advance himself higher in the leadership. He had the habit of being almost a sycophant in relation to leading comrades - to ministers or other workers who have access to the leadership and can put in a good word for him, he established sycophantic relations for the time being, until he uses the person, and then he begins to ridicule in unacceptable forms, laconically, in two or three words, in order to cool the political face of any leader.

The question is raised as to how all the previously known features took such forms that no one noticed them, that is, they noticed them but did not take timely measures. In my opinion, one circumstance provides an explanation for this question - this is that the Central Committee quite correctly proclaimed the slogan of unity and cohesion both in the ranks of the party and, first of all, in the leading core of the party and the government.

Our party organizations have accepted the appeal of the Central Committee with exceptional approval. It is precisely this absolutely correct appeal and the correct formulation of the question that can fill the great loss that we suffered after the death of Comrade Stalin. It seems to me that Beria wanted to use this situation from the point of view that, knowing that the question of unity, unanimity, solidarity is at the forefront, knowing that in this situation it is not so easy to break away or condemn, he used this situation and began to put his feet on the table, as is evident from the facts that were reported to us.

On the other hand, from the point of view of party loyalty, it was precisely this situation that helped expose him. Everyone knows that he was afraid of Stalin, had been afraid of him for a long time, ever since he worked in Georgia. After Stalin's death, he stopped taking everyone into account . I haven't seen him in recent years, haven't spoken to him, but from the documents that I read in the appendices to the Presidium minutes, I see that this man didn't take anyone into account, put his own self above all else, tried to put pressure on the party in order to take a certain position.

Knowing his careerist traits, when I read these documents, I was overcome with fear. I was also overcome with fear on Red Square when Beria spoke second. Then I thought that if he ends up in the leading troika, he will definitely reach for power. He has no party affiliation, no principles in his actions, just as he never had such devotion to Stalin as he tried to portray by publishing the book. Comrade Molotov was right here that this book was not compiled by him, it is not his study of the Transcaucasian organizations and the history of our party.

He hasn't read a single book. How could he, without the ability to approach the party archives, raise these documents? Many people working in Georgia know that Beria and the renegade, the well-known Menshevik in Georgia, Pavel Sakharulidze, participated there 90 . I don't know why this is being discussed, but the Georgian comrades don't talk about it. That's who authored this book. (Animation in the hall.) The archives were raised earlier than our central institutions could have raised them. That's the story of this book. The book was published for the purpose of a career. He achieved recognition that Beria was one of the Stalinists in the Transcaucasian organizations, who was the first to see the role of Comrade Stalin. How can one slander like that, but he achieved it.

Regarding some personnel. It is known that Beria, being a non-party man, being unprincipled, was a real ataman. He approached personnel from the point of view of personal loyalty to him. He did not recognize, did not respect even a drop of party loyalty in a person. He could ruin anyone. It is known how many good personnel were killed in Georgia in 1937 because many did not recognize him. It seems to me that in many places such personnel were seated who were not party members, who were personally loyal to him. Why he did this, we know now. Therefore, from the point of view of drawing lessons from this great event and from the point of view of helping to carry out the work, it is necessary to carefully study the personnel in some areas .

Shatalin. Tell me.

Arutinov: I can't say that. It was discussed here. It's about the Ministry of Internal Affairs, it's about some Transcaucasian workers.

Voices. Correct.

Arutinov: I do not consider myself an outsider in the republic, but I draw conclusions from the speeches of Georgian comrades.

Voices. Correct.

Arutinov: Comrades, I will not drag this out for long. I recalled the period in which I was aware of the matter and what anti-Party traits he displayed then . And I must say that now the Presidium of the Central Committee can be firmly confident that the entire Party will support this decision of the Central Committee of the Party, which will be made today or tomorrow, and that the Party organizations of Transcaucasia and the workers of the Transcaucasian republics will unanimously approve and will rally their ranks even more closely around the Leninist-Stalinist Central Committee and our Soviet government. (Applause.)

Khrushchev. Comrade Andrei Andreevich Andreev has the floor. Comrade Tevosyan, get ready.

Andreev: Comrades, I think it was right that our Presidium did not limit itself to a simple report, but decided to conduct a thorough discussion on the Beria case in order to reveal the real face of this enemy, his goals, his tactics, and to draw all the necessary lessons from this.

Beria is an unusual type of enemy that our party has had to deal with , and he used unusual tactics that the party has encountered before in its fight against enemies.

It is true that he was (yesterday Comrade Zavenyagin, speaking, spoke about this), he was rude, cynical, treated people badly, not well , but this would be too simple an explanation of the face of this enemy. It seems to me that from those very clear, sufficiently exhaustive reports that Comrade Malenkov made in the report, and the speeches of the members of the Presidium, it is clear that in the person of Beria we had an old provocateur, which he undoubtedly was long before his arrival in Moscow , before his transfer to Moscow. It is obvious that his literary work , which was so extolled for some time, was only an approach to the beginning of his broad hostile work. So he is an old provocateur, an old adventurer.

I also do not agree with comrade Zavenyagin that he was a narrow-minded person. No, comrades, we should not underestimate. He was a smart, very clever enemy, otherwise he would have been exposed long ago, but look how long he held out. And then it is clear that he is a seasoned political enemy of international scale, an agent of the imperialists. I think there is no doubt about this, he was not alone.

Voices. Correct.

Andreyev. If he could not have a more or less large number of his supporters in our country, he certainly relied on some force, and this force pushed him, equipped him, dictated. He was certainly an international agent of the imperialists. And I think that all the sinews must be sucked out of him so that there would be a clear picture of his relations with foreign countries, then a great deal will be revealed to us. We still do not know everything about him, therefore, we must reveal all aspects of his hostile work. But even now, from what the comrades, members of the Presidium, have said, it is clear that he had a plan, developed, of course, not by him alone, but dictated by his masters, for the liquidation of the Soviet system in our country. Of course, he had such a plan.

What was Beria's plan? Unlike what the enemies had carried out before, this plan was somewhat different . To split our party is a hopeless endeavor, proven in practice. To use terror, to incapacitate individual leaders, is also a proven endeavor in the sense that the party will unite even more after this. By this I do not mean that the enemies have abandoned terror, they will carry out terror. Beria's plan in this sense differed from the plan of the traitors to the Soviet people, the former enemies. As is now clear, what was this plan ?

First, to gain Comrade Stalin's trust at all costs. This is the main key to his activities, because once you have Comrade Stalin's trust, you can do anything. And so he tried to gain Comrade Stalin's trust in every possible way. Did he achieve this? Of course, he did. This is the first huge harm that was done. Here the comrades were saying that Comrade Stalin had such a weakness. Comrade Stalin is a great man, but he had such a weakness - gullibility.

This means that he had a plan, first of all, to gain Comrade Stalin’s trust, and he achieved this.

The second task that he had in his plan was to break the Bolshevik core. You know that all our enemies have long been trying to somehow shake, break the Bolshevik core. And Beria, obviously, set this task as the main task - to break the Bolshevik core, to undermine the trust of individual leaders in Comrade Stalin, to sow discord.

Has he achieved anything in this regard? He has certainly achieved something.

Here comrade Voroshilov spoke about comrade Ordzhonikidze. He was the most honest, noblest Bolshevik, and there is no doubt that he became a victim of Beria's intrigues...

Voice. Correct.

Andreev ... died prematurely at the hands of this intriguer and enemy. He destroyed Ordzhonikidze, put him out of action.

Further. All of us, old Chekists, and new ones too, know what a warm friendship there was between Comrade Stalin and Comrade Molotov. We had a good friendship, we were all happy about this situation. But then Beria appeared in Moscow – and everything changed radically, Comrade Stalin’s relations with Comrade Molotov completely deteriorated. Comrade Molotov began to be subjected to undeserved attacks from Comrade Stalin. Obviously, Beria succeeded in undermining Comrade Stalin’s trust in Comrade Molotov. This was, of course, his serious achievement.

Let's take other facts about comrade Malenkov. Beria knew that comrade Stalin trusted comrade Malenkov completely and fully, considered him his friend. And so Beria needed to incite comrade Malenkov. Pretending to be a friend, in fact he cleverly concocted the case of Shakhurin and Novikov, not he personally, of course, but he was in charge of the state security organs. This was certainly done by Beria.

Voices. Correct.

Andreev. It is known that during the difficult years of transport restoration and during the war, Comrade Kaganovich did a lot for the successful operation of transport. Everyone also knows how Beria sought patronage over transport, how Comrade Kaganovich was relieved of transport and Khrulyov, who understands nothing about transport issues, was put in his place.

Let's take this question. Everyone knows who Voroshilov is , what his specific weight is in our party, and everyone knows about the close friendship between Comrade Stalin and Voroshilov. With the appearance of Beria, the situation changes completely, the friendship is broken, Comrade Voroshilov is erased , in fact, for some time without work . This was the work of Beria.

Voroshilov. He worked and worked.

Andreyev: The same can be said about other members of the Politburo, for example, Khrushchev, Mikoyan, who were also subjected to great attacks. I want to say by this, comrades, that he tried in every way to ensure that all members of the Politburo were marked, that they had spots, but he was clean. And in fact, look, you can’t bring anything against him – he’s clean. (Laughter in the hall.) It was a subtle calculation. I think that this should be viewed as a new method of work by the enemies. Previously, they went more or less head-on, our enemies had donkey’s backs , they had some opposition, but he had nothing . Only recently, on the German question, has his degeneration shown itself. He has implemented the new tactics of the enemies – to be a loyal comrade, and to do his dirty work.

This means to put individual leaders out of action, to disorganize the leadership, to destroy the friendship that had developed in the core of our party, to undermine Comrade Stalin's trust in individual members of the Politburo, this means to undermine their trust in the country as well - this, in fact, was his task. He succeeded in some things for a time, but he was unable to achieve his goal.

We see this very well at the present Plenum when our leading core of Bolsheviks is stronger and more unanimous than ever. (Applause.) The enemies have always aimed to destroy this core, like an atomic core, but it did not work, all the efforts of the enemies remained in vain. The core of our party has proven stronger than the core of any atom, it cannot be destroyed.

That's one plan. Beria's next move, as is evident from all the materials, was to disrupt the work of the government, the Council of Ministers. Many ministers, deputies, former and current, who are present here, know that with Beria's appearance in the Council of Ministers, and especially when he began to chair, the situation changed dramatically. A thorough discussion of issues became the exception, and a conveyor belt became the rule. 40-50 questions were planned, pre-prepared proposals were read out, and the questions were submitted to the commission. I must say that although I no longer had good health - and before that I had been fine - I sometimes wanted to express my thoughts. No way! He cuts me off. Question for the commission. What 's there to argue about?

As a result, endless red tape of important issues in the Council of Ministers was deliberately organized - I am convinced of this - deliberately organized. Only those issues that were personally reported by individual members of the Politburo to Comrade Stalin were dealt with quickly. The remaining issues were left lying around for months without being resolved.

This was a conscious, subversive, disorganizing work of government bodies. This was a new tactic of the enemy to disorganize the work of our government.

What else did the enemy try to do to strike at the Soviet system and the party? To sow discord between peoples. But this is a very difficult task. Beria did not dare to do this during Comrade Stalin's life, and if he did, he did it very carefully. And only when Comrade Stalin was gone, he subtly and cleverly carried out this vile business through his notes on Western Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic republics. But, as you can see, he failed to do this, like many other things.

Now, after the death of Comrade Stalin, it is clear that he began to force his way to power, and, probably, he was rushed, as Comrade Voroshilov correctly said, and he became even more insolent. What he did not dare to do during Comrade Stalin's life, he began to do after his death, he began to discredit the name of Comrade Stalin, to cast a shadow on the greatest man after Lenin. In fact, the appearance of Chekist materials in the minutes of the Presidium on Doctors , where the shadow of credulity in crimes is cast on Comrade Stalin's name - after all, this is his business.

Voices from the audience: Correct.

Andreev: He did it deliberately, to bury the name of Comrade Stalin, to settle accounts with him.

Voices from the audience: Correct.

Andreev: I have no doubt that under his pressure, soon after the death of Comrade Stalin, all mention of Comrade Stalin suddenly disappears from the press.

Voices from the audience: Correct.

Andreyev: This is a disgrace to the party . They were overzealous before, this name was repeated hundreds of times in every article , and then suddenly it disappeared. What is this? I think it is his hand, his influence, he has frightened some people . The question of the personality cult has appeared out of nowhere. What kind of question is this? This question was answered long ago in Marxist literature, it has been answered in life, millions of people know the significance of a personality that leads a movement, they know the significance of a genius at the head of a movement , and then the question of the personality cult has appeared out of nowhere. This is his doing.

From the Presidium, Comrade Voroshilov. Correct.

Andreev. He wanted to bury the name of Comrade Stalin, and not only the name of Comrade Stalin, but also to slow down the people's acquaintance with Comrade Stalin's successor, Comrade Malenkov.

Voices from the audience: Correct.

Malenkov: We are all successors, comrade Stalin does not have one successor.

Andreev: After all, you are the Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

Voices from the audience: Correct. (Loud applause.)

Andreyev: I believe that it was not without his influence that the decision was made, which we read in the minutes, about holding the demonstration without portraits, not hanging portraits 91 . Why? On what basis? The people should know their leaders by their portraits, by their speeches. It was the wrong decision.

From the Presidium, Comrade Voroshilov. Wrong decision .

Andreev: It was a concession to the enemy.
From the Presidium, Comrade Kaganovich. Andrei Andreevich, this decision has been cancelled. (Loud applause.)

Andreev: This was, comrades, a subtle, clever game to clear the way for oneself, to begin to undermine the foundations of Leninism and the teachings of Comrade Stalin.

Voices from the audience: Correct.

Andreev: In this respect he is very similar to Tito.

Voices from the audience: Correct.

Andreyev. He has a past, fought under the banner of the Communist Party, etc. But in reality he liquidated everything and became a fascist. They have common tactics to a certain extent, and it will be dictated by the new tactics of our enemies.

Of course, comrades, people will ask how this fits together, everyone had the idea that Beria was doing great work, but turned out to be such a scoundrel. But the fact is that the enemy, in order not to expose himself, is forced to do useful work for us, that he was forced to do useful work, they used him, otherwise he would disappear in no time, and especially in our Soviet conditions, where thousands, millions of eyes watch an individual. Of course, he did great work at times, but it was camouflage work, and that was the difficulty of exposing him. He created an aura that he was doing great work during the war, etc., blackmailed with the name of Comrade Stalin. It was difficult to expose him.

I'll stop here, I've dragged out my speech, I apologize.

How will this be understood by the party and the people? In my opinion, well.

Voices from the audience: Correct.

Andreev: Firstly , because Beria has no roots either in the party or in the people.

Voices from the audience: Correct.

Andreyev: I am deeply convinced of this. The exposure and arrest of such a venerable, dangerous enemy will be regarded within the country and by our friends abroad as a major victory for us (stormy applause) and as a very serious defeat for the imperialist camp. (Applause.)

I have no doubt that everyone will say: this is a truly Leninist-Stalinist leadership, which did not lose its head, but acted decisively, as befits Leninists and Stalinists. (Stormy applause.)

Khrushchev: Comrade Tevosyan has the floor. Comrade Baibakov, get ready.

Tevosyan: Comrades, the facts presented in Comrade Malenkov's report and in the speeches of the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee and the members of the Central Committee have sufficiently fully revealed the true face of the man who, to our shame, was at the head of the party for many years. Now no one has any doubt that in Beria we are dealing with a notorious adventurer, an international provocateur, an enemy of the people, a completely morally degenerate man who, having infiltrated the party by unknown means, directed all his energy, all his activity, towards moving up, right up to the leadership of the state. His goal was to become a dictator surrounded by obedient executors, and his political program, as his actions show, especially in recent months, consisted in renouncing the gains of the October Socialist Revolution, the gains of our party achieved under the leadership of Lenin and Stalin during the years of socialist construction, the gains won with the blood of millions of workers and peasants.

His program was to create a bourgeois state system that would please the Eisenhower’s, Churchill’s and Tito’s.

To achieve his goals, he methodically and skillfully, like a spy, wove a web of all sorts of intrigues, sweeping away from his path all those who interfered with him, and did not disdain any means in doing so.

Comrade Molotov correctly noted that with the arrival of Beria in Moscow, when he joined the Politburo and then became Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the situation in the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers changed dramatically.

Observing the changes in this situation in the Council of Ministers, being at work as a minister and for some time as deputy. Chairman of the Council of Ministers, much was then incomprehensible to me, and not only to me, but also to other colleagues. We understood these actions as coming from the Politburo, from comrade Stalin. Now all this looks completely different.

Proceeding from his long-range policy, Beria managed to skillfully disunite the leading core of the Central Committee, the closest students and associates of Lenin and Comrade Stalin. Collegiality in the leadership gradually began to disappear. Intrigues, incitement and slander against a number of members of the Politburo and members of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers were carried out at their meetings. I mean comrades Molotov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Shvernik. Proceeding from the fact that the darker the night, the brighter the stars, Beria drove and scourged d all those who prevented him from advancing to the leading role. With the death of Comrade Stalin, he decided to force the events. For these purposes, in order to exalt himself, his name, Beria began to blacken the name of Comrade Stalin, a name sacred to all our party members e , to all our people f . The question arises - why did he need to repeatedly emphasize in the notes of the Ministry of Internal Affairs on the case of doctors and workers of Georgia, sent at his insistence to all party organizations, that the beating of those arrested was carried out on the direct orders of Comrade Stalin.

I would like to draw attention to what comrade Andreyev also pointed out, that after the death of comrade Stalin, the name of comrade Stalin gradually began to disappear from the press. It was with pain in my soul that I had to read comrade Stalin's statements without reference to the author.

Yesterday, from Comrade Kaganovich's speech, we learned that this scoundrel Beria objected to naming Comrade Stalin along with Marx, Engels, and Lenin when speaking about the teachings that guide our party. That's what this scoundrel has come to. The name of our teacher Comrade Stalin will forever remain in the hearts of our party members and the entire people, and no Beria will be able to tear it from our hearts. (Applause.)

Voices. Correct.

Tevosyan. During the life of Comrade Stalin, Beria did everything to rule in the Council of Ministers. After the war, the Council of Ministers ceased to be a collegial body and almost never met g .

a The word “accepted” has been inserted. Here and further in the speeches of I. Tevosyan and N. Baibakov, the footnotes on each page contain the text inserted into the uncorrected transcript during its preparation for printing and distribution to party organizations. The words highlighted in bold have been crossed out. — Comp.

ь By intrigues, incitement, and slander

c were relegated to the background
d defiled and soiled

and us, communists,

f Comrade Andreev already spoke about this

g was not convened

Beria tried to keep the ministers, as they say, in the fear of God. Endless shouts, threats to fire them, reprimand them, bring them to trial - this is the set of words in his speeches to the ministers.

Voices. Correct.

Tevosyan. Here is a set of words in his speeches addressed to the ministers.

Voroshilov: Correct.

Tevosyan. And not only comrade Voroshilov saw him in a dream, he poisoned the lives and undermined the health of many leading workers. The late Vakhrushev in the last days of his life before his heart attack in a personal conversation told me about his difficult experiences caused by the rude, boorish attitude towards him of Beria - this notorious sadist.

He did not consider ministers and heads of regional party and soviet bodies to be political and state figures. He considered them to be mere servants who had to blindly follow his instructions. When deciding issues in the Council of Ministers, he approached them not from the interests of the state, but from his personal career and vile intentions. Comrade Khrushchev had already said how agricultural issues were decided: according to the principle - the worse, the better.

I can give a number of examples that show that he tried to ruin, sabotage, and delay decisions on a whole series of measures that were vitally important for our state, for its defense, and that came not from Beria but from other members of our leadership. But he pushed through things that contributed to his career, that were connected with his name and with the areas of work that he personally supervised, regardless of whether these measures caused damage to other industries, despite the significant objections of ministers, and contrary to common sense.

I will give one example. Knowing that Comrade Stalin, in order to increase the production of fertilizers for agriculture, was very interested in the problem of using the huge reserves of apatite on the Kola Peninsula and the complex use of the resulting nepheline concentrates for the production of alumina - aluminum raw materials, soda, potash and cement, Beria presented Comrade Stalin with a note and a draft resolution prepared by him and his staff, bypassing Gosplan, without involving Gosplan and the leadership of the relevant ministries. The branches of industry engaged in the production of fertilizers, aluminum and cement were not subordinate to him and were under the jurisdiction of other members of the Presidium. The issue was presented, as they say, in a large plan, criticizing the ministries and Gosplan. There were serious objections to the project from chemists and flower growers. They proposed a different geographic location for the production of fertilizers, alumina, cement, and soda with the same volumes of production of apatite concentrates and were against concentrating all this production on the Kola Peninsula as economically unprofitable and technically incorrect. Instead of examining these issues on their merits, Beria achieved a government decision in 1950 to build a large chemical plant on the Kola Peninsula 92 . This same decision reprimanded a number of ministers.

And so, only a few days had passed since Comrade Stalin's funeral, when suddenly Beria proposed, along with other construction projects, to stop building this plant on the Kola Peninsula. Now it became clear why this whole thing had been started. He needed all this for his career, he was not at all interested in developing the production of fertilizers and aluminum. He needed to show Comrade Stalin that only he was his loyal and dependable guide to the implementation of his ideas, and that others, on the contrary, were sabotaging, that only he thought and cared about the interests of the state, in order to further strengthen Comrade Stalin's trust in him.

And now Comrade Stalin is gone, and this adventurer immediately seeks to have the decision on the Kola apatites cancelled.

Comrade Khrushchev is absolutely right when he speaks about Beria's dark past. The entire period from his entry into the party in 1917 to the Sovietization of Azerbaijan - April 1920 - is completely dark. Having entered the party in March 1917, for some reason he needed to go to the Romanian front, while revolutionary life was seething and boiling in Baku.

Mikoyan: Then we returned to Baku from the front.

Tevosyan: They were returning to Baku from the front, and he went to the Romanian front when revolutionary life was seething in Baku and the Bolsheviks were preparing to seize power.

I can testify that what is said in his biography about the period of the Baku underground, that he allegedly led a cell of technicians from the beginning of 1919 to April 1920 and helped other cells, is completely fictitious. I was with the secretary of the underground district committee and I did not know him as a leader from the beginning of 1919. From the entire period of my work in Baku until March 1921, I vaguely remember one meeting at the end of 1919, when, on the recommendation of the Baku Committee, he was sent to be attached to a cell of the Baku Technical School.

Comrades, I am sure that his provocative work in the party began long ago - from the first days or from the period from which he considers himself a member of the party. We are fortunate that the Presidium of the Central Committee courageously and promptly, as befits the faithful disciples of Lenin and Stalin, tore this scum away from the body of the party. History will never forget this feat of comrades Malenkov, Khrushchev, Molotov, and Bulganin! (Prolonged applause.)

The lessons that our party must learn from this matter are clearly formulated in the final part of Comrade Malenkov’s report.

Now our party, united even more closely around the Leninist-Stalinist Central Committee of the party, will march in united ranks along the path outlined by Lenin and Stalin - to communism. (Prolonged applause.)

and as his biography says

b on behalf of the Baku Committee

c in that period

d city district party committee

e cells

f one of the executives

Khrushchev: Comrade Baibakov has the floor.

Baibakov: Comrades, for the third day now, at the Plenum of the Central Committee of our party, facts have been presented that reveal the disgusting face of Beria, a political adventurer and careerist who wormed his way into leadership.
In connection with the exposure of this adventurer, I would like to add, in addition to the comrades who spoke, some facts from Beria’s activities.

I completely and entirely agree with the assessment given to the adventurer Beria by Comrades Malyshev, Zavenyagin and other comrades, in terms of Beria’s attitude towards people and towards resolving production issues.

Rudeness, arrogance, mockery of people, humiliation of human dignity - these are the characteristic features of the behavior of this decomposed person.

Having known Beria from working together for over 10 years, I do not remember a single case where a conversation on the phone or at a personal meeting took place in calm tones. As a rule, he liked to express himself with obscene words, insulting with words like: "I'll break your legs", "I'll break your ribs", "I'll put you in jail", "you'll go to a camp", "I'll knock you off the tower you climbed " , and so on. (Laughter in the hall.)

Voice: From which tower?

Baibakov: He called the ministerial post a tower.

Unfortunately, such epithets were directed not only at the Minister of Oil Industry or his deputies, but also at other ministers and senior officials, regardless of their age or position. As a rule, after such conversations, you are driven not by inspiration for work, but by fear for tomorrow.

All our major initiative questions, as a rule, met with discontent, since they did not come from him, and, as a rule, in these cases some quibbles were found, and the document was returned to the ministry for so-called correction and revision. Thus, a new document was sent to him, beginning with the words: "In connection with your instruction ..." or "On your instructions ...". Only such documents were accepted by him for consideration.

a , lining

b which you are sitting"

The double-dealer Beria was greatly indignant when I tried to send letters to Comrade Stalin or a number of other leading officials of the Central Committee or the Council of Ministers. He could not tolerate it when secretaries of regional party committees, secretaries of central committees of republican communist parties addressed Comrade Stalin with complaints about shortcomings in the work of the oil industry. But usually I got it. Particularly strong epithets were poured out through me over the phone to the leaders of party or Soviet organizations of regions or republics.

I cannot say that he did not resolve issues. That would be wrong. But these issues were resolved, as a rule, in a tense atmosphere, rudely and tactlessly. Comrade Zavenyagin was right when he said that Beria resolved issues mainly in an official manner or by phone, without a careful personal study of the issue with the summoning of interested persons. As a rule, Beria rarely received people and listened to our requests and proposals. Suffice it to say that we ended up in his office 5-6 times a year, and over the past six months I have been to him only twice on the same assignment. It must be said that we ourselves were not eager to catch his eye (laughter), since we knew that we would leave the office staggering or broken.

Beria is a real double-dealer and hypocrite. For him, nothing is sacred, nothing is an authority for him.

I would like to dwell on one fact that characterizes Beria in this regard. In February of this year, he summoned me and gave me the order to explore and organize oil fields in the northern part of the Caspian Sea, and he said that this was a matter of great importance and that Comrade Stalin was personally interested in it.

We completed this work and submitted proposals for preliminary consideration to Beria. As expected, I was reprimanded for the work I had done and ordered to redo the measures in the direction of a sharp increase in work in the area I had indicated. At the same time, he agitated for the need to develop oil production in offshore areas.

Finally, an option was presented that suited the adventurer Beria. However, this project was not presented to Comrade Stalin due to his death. Literally 5-6 days after Comrade Stalin's death, a phone call rang. He literally said the following with a broken voice: "To hell with Stalin's adventurist plan. Throw away or burn all the documents on oil exploration in the Caspian Sea," and hung up. (Indignation in the hall.)

a to the managers

b us

Voice from the audience: We should have informed the Central Committee.

Baibakov: Unfortunately, such vile expressions about Comrade Stalin were often made after that, right up to the meeting of the Presidium where the issue of reducing construction projects was discussed. I remember well when Beria addressed Comrade Kozlov with the following words: this is an adventure - landscaping and other issues, I immediately order you to present a project to stop all these things. Each such decision that was made by the Central Committee, he called in the presence of many people adventurous affairs and so on. This was no secret. And it seems to me that the comrades sitting here can confirm when such words came out of the mouth of this provocateur and scoundrel, and we, unfortunately, all silently passed by such facts.
During Comrade Stalin’s life, the double-dealer Beria was afraid of him, curried favor with him, and did not enter into polemics with him on issues on which he did not agree.

Beria often wrote notes to Comrade Stalin about the possibility of increasing oil production in certain regions, which, in my opinion, was not necessary, and all these issues could have been resolved with annual plans. Beria was especially active in issues of increasing oil production in Tatarstan and Bashkiria, as a result of which a five-year plan for the development of the oil industry was presented, which envisaged, as you know, an increase in oil production over five years by almost two times, that is, by 85 percent, and in terms of increasing refining capacity - by two or more times 93 . The oil industry will ensure this growth, although this is associated with a great overstrain of forces. However, I must say that this was done not to meet the needs of the national economy, but for Beria's careerist purposes.

Comrade Stalin, in his speech to voters in February 1946, 94 defined the paths of development of the national economy, including the oil industry, stating that at least three five-year plans would be needed to bring oil production to 60 million tons. Thus, it was assumed that oil production of 60 million tons would be achieved in 1960. However, in the course of implementing the plan, the post-war five-year plan, as a result of the discovery of a number of major oil fields, the Ministry considered it possible to propose extracting the said 60 million tons in 1955, that is, 5 years earlier than the date indicated by Comrade Stalin. At the same time, according to the calculations of the State Planning Committee, the indicated figure for oil production fully corresponded to the needs of the national economy and the accumulation of the corresponding reserve, and the State Planning Committee agreed with our plan in its outlines. Comrade Saburov remembers this well when we discussed the new plan of 70-75 million tons.

However, our argument that Gosplan considered it necessary to establish a plan for oil production of more than 60 million tons for 1955 only led to him scolding Gosplan employees, calling them donkeys. It must be said that he did not recognize Gosplan at all, ignored it and submitted his plans to the government, and Gosplan essentially only formalized them. As a result, although the oil industry is currently fulfilling the planned rates of growth in oil production, this is due to the infringement of the normal organization of the fields.

a landscaping is an adventure, imagine immediately

b Many decisions that were previously made

c we

d he has

e not

We have huge losses of gas and a lag in sealing of fields; a lag in housing construction. The construction of residential buildings in the regions of Tatarstan is carried out mainly at the expense of prefabricated wooden houses, since construction does not have the necessary base. There is a lag in the construction of oil refineries.

A disproportion has arisen in meeting the needs of the oil industry in a number of materials and equipment. The shortage of pipes and sheet metal is especially noticeable. Serious assistance is now needed in resolving a number of issues related to meeting the plan outlined in the five-year plan and approved by the 19th Congress .

I do not want comrades to understand me in such a way that I used this speech to draw attention once again to the oil industry and to help its further development. (Animation in the hall.) I am not saying this for this purpose. The oil industry has the potential to increase this production ; the reserves that have been prepared as a result of the discovery of oil fields make it possible to increase the production of the oil industry .

However, ensuring this rise will require enormous expenditures and overexertion, and everything that we will extract, a significant share of the oil that will be extracted in 1955, will go entirely to storage, will, as they say, lie there for a long time, since the country's need for the needs of the national economy, for current consumption, is significantly lower than the figures determined by the decision of H. Kaganovich. And there is nowhere to store it, there are not enough capacities.

Baibakov. Now the question of building a storage facility has arisen. We must build j twice as many storage facilities as we have made in 80 l years.

a due to construction delays

b big

c for the construction of capital buildings is not yet available

d five-year plan

e CPSU

f in 70 million tons

g provide a solution to this problem

h forces, whereas in 1955, with full provision of the national economy with oil products, we will be forced to put into reserve an excessively large quantity of oil products and waste them

i am sharp

j in the current five-year period

k with a bit more

l previous

I believe that the exposure of the traitor Beria will improve the situation in resolving a number of serious, major issues of industry and the entire national economy. The great deed that the Presidium of the Central Committee did by arresting and imprisoning the traitor Beria will only meet with approval among the working masses, among our population, since our masses will know that this decision is aimed at strengthening and solidifying the ranks of our party, leading us to new victories, to the victory of communism. (Applause.)

and in total

b they

Khrushchev: Comrades, a proposal has been made to end the discussion of the report here.

Voices. Correct.

Khrushchev: There will be no other proposals?

Voices. No.

Khrushchev: 24 comrades out of 46 who signed up spoke.

Voices. Stop.

Khrushchev: The question is clear. Apparently, no vote is required.

Voices. No.
Khrushchev: No one demands continuation of the debate, the comrades unanimously agree to end the debate.

Voices. Correct.

Khrushchev. The commission will report its proposals to the Plenum on Monday. We will continue our work on Monday, hold a meeting of the Plenum at 8 o'clock and hear the commission there. Are there any other proposals?

Voices. No.

Khrushchev: There is a proposal to hear the 2nd question now. Are there any objections?

Voices. No.

Khrushchev: Comrade Voroshilov has the floor to make a report.

Voroshilov: The chairman very loudly calls my speech a report, and I will have a short sentence for 3 minutes.

The Presidium of the Central Committee submits to the Plenum of the Central Committee the question of convening the next session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. It is proposed to convene the session in the second half of this year. The following questions are submitted for consideration by the session: firstly, approval of the state budget of the USSR for 1953 and approval of the execution of the state budget for 1951 and 1952. The state budget of the USSR for 1953 has been reviewed by the Council of Ministers of the USSR and is submitted to the session of the Supreme Soviet for approval . There are still several days left before the session for the work of the budget commissions of both chambers of the Supreme Soviet. Thus, this question will be fully prepared by the time the session opens.

Furthermore, by decision of the Central Committee, comrade Safonov was relieved of his duties as the Prosecutor General of the USSR. In his place, comrade Rudenko, the former prosecutor of Ukraine, is designated as the Prosecutor General 95 . The appointment of the Prosecutor General of the USSR is carried out in accordance with the Constitution of the USSR by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, therefore it is necessary to also include this issue in the agenda of the session.

In addition, it is intended to submit for approval to the session the following decrees adopted by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: on the formation of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building of the USSR, on the appointment of ministers of the USSR and the chairman of the State Planning Committee , on the election of members of the Supreme Court of the USSR.

It is also necessary to make editorial changes to Article 126 of the USSR Constitution, which follow from the decisions of the 19th Party Congress on changing the name of the party and on changes to the Charter of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

This is the entire so-called report, it boils down to the fact that I ask you to accept my proposal (animation in the hall).

Khrushchev: There is a proposal to accept the message of comrade Voroshilov .

Votes. Accept.

Khrushchev: There will be no objections?

Voices. No.

Khrushchev. Accepted.

Comrades, let us conclude the Plenum meeting here and schedule the next meeting for Monday at 8 o’clock in the evening in this same hall.

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