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  Vilnis Sipols

Diplomatic Battles Before World War II

Chapter III

THE WAY TO MUNICH AUSTRIA, HITLER’S FIRST VICTIM

As the Nazi rulers of Germany prepared for war, their appetites were growing. Having strengthened the Reich’s Western frontiers by the occupation of the demilitarized Rhineland and taking advantage of the overall exacerbation of the international situation, the Nazis were gradually getting down to carrying through their aggressive designs in Central and Eastern Europe. Their first object was to take hold of Austria.

The Soviet Union proceeded from the assumption that to preserve Austria’s independence was an important matter of principle for the maintenance of peace in Europe. The annexation of Austria would provide Germany with good vantage-ground from which to launch her aggression against Czechoslovakia. The USSR was prepared to co-operate with other nations in the defence of Austria. As early as 1935, Litvinov wrote that the fate of Austria seriously affected the security interests of the Soviet Union. "We cannot be indifferent,” he pointed out, "to any intensification of Nazi Germany whatsoever.” “1” in February 1936, the Soviet Ambassador in Paris, V. P. Potemkin, reaffirmed in a conversation with the French Foreign Minister, Pierre Flandin, that the USSR was prepared to join other members of the League of Nations in imposing collective sanctions against the aggressor in the event of attack on Austria.”2”

On July 11, 1936, the Nazis forced the Austrian government into an agreement compelling it to concert its foreign policy with Germany. Describing that agreement and its implications for Austria, the Soviet Ambassador in Vienna, I. L. Lorents, wrote in May 1937 that Berlin kept up in its violent and brutal pressure on Austria. "There is a growing realisation here that the agreement of July 11, 1936, 142in its Berlin interpretation, must be an instrument to mako the Anschlufi with." “3”

On June 24, 1937, Germany’s War Minister W. Bloniberg endorsed a directive for (lie invasion of Austria codenamed "Operation Otto”. As he set out his foreign policy programme to the top members of the General Staff on November 5, 1937, Hitler emphasised that "there is only one way—the way of violence" to achieve Germany’s aims. The primary task was to capture Austria and Czechoslovakia.” On December 7, 1937, Blomberg signed the plan of preparations for the seizure of Czechoslovakia “(Operation Grim”).

Italy’s accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact in November 1937, the opening of negotiations to transform that pact into a military-political alliance of the three aggressors, and Italy’s withdrawal from the League of Nations a month later all pointed to the growing danger of war.

The USSR Urged Resistance to Aggressors

The Soviet Union proceeded from the belief that to keep the peace, the aggressor bloc had to be confronted by a united front of the nations interested in preventing war. The view in the USSR was that the sooner the ruling circles of Britain, France and the United States realised the need for a collective effort to safeguard peace, the easier it would be to put paid to the aggressive action by the fascist states in preparation for another world war.

The forces of peace were stronger, not weaker, than those of aggression and war. Therefore, the action by aggressors, who, besides, resorted to bluff and blackmail, could have been checked. The Soviet government was consistently pressing for urgent and united action by the peoples and nations keen on preserving peace to straitjacket the aggressors.

The League of Nations could still do much towards forestalling aggression. The aggressors, on their part, were trying hard to scuttle the League by all means to the extent of getting its Covenant revised. More particularly, they insisted on the deletion of Article 16 providing for sanctions against the aggressor. "The major driving motive 143behind the intriguing of Beck and other agents of Germany, Italy and Japan against the League of Nations,” the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs emphasised on January 4, 1938, "is the desire to do away with the Franc Soviet and Soviet-Czechoslovak pacts based on Article 16 of the League’s Covenant."

The People’s Commissar pointed out, explaining the Soviet position with regard to the League of Nations, that it would be a matter of immense political importance under the prevailing circumstances to publish a joint Anglo-French-Soviet Declaration in defence of the League of Nations, which the USSR had been urging for over a year. Yet Britain fought shy of such a declaration.”5”

The Soviet Union was calling most serious attention to the storm clouds gathering over Austria. The Soviet government realised that a Nazi seizure of that country would be nothing but a link in the whole chain of events which would ultimately lead to another world war. The Soviet government urged collective action to safeguard peace in Central Europe.

 

Chamberlain’s “Riding the Tiger” Dream

In preparation for overrunning other countries, Hitler attached paramount importance, notably, to his diplomatic stock-in-trade. The Nazi foreign service was charged with the business of forestalling concerted action by the USSR, France and Britain as that would have virtually made German aggression impossible. Ribbentrop, who was appointed ambassador to Britain in 1936, lost no time in brainwashing the British ruling element, banking, above all, on their anti-communism and anti-Sovietism. For example, talking to Winston Churchill, he sought to prove that Germany was striving for friendship with Britain. She would even "stand guard for the British Empire in all its greatness and extent,” but "what was required was that Britain should give Germany a free hand in the East of Europe." ”6”

Ribbentrop’s assurances that Germany was seeking an understanding with Britain were, naturally, sheer fraud. In one of his secret documents, Ribbentrop wrote that the task before German diplomacy with regard to German-British 144relations was to "foster England’s belief that a settlement and an understanding between Germany and England are still possible eventually”, along with "quiet but determined establishment of alliances against England".”7”

Ribbentrop had the full understanding and confidence of many members of the British government because his assurances were consonant with their hopes that the Nazi aggressors would turn East, first of all.

Neville Chamberlain, Prime Minister since late May 1937, was the most consistent champion of an accommodation with Germany. Chamberlain had intestinal hatred for everything progressive. Communism was his "Enemy No. 1" and the Soviet Union an object of vicious hatred. Even British historians who have studied Chamberlain’s policies could not fail to admit it. For example, Robert Sencourt stated that Soviet Russia was Chamberlain’s "declared enemy”, ”8”

Chamberlain’s political sympathies were with the extreme reactionary forces both in Britain and elsewhere. He saw Hitler and Mussolini as his class allies, first and foremost.

Chamberlain took it into his head that he was destined to carry through a two-fold plan: strangle the Soviet Union with Nazi hands and wear out the forces of Germany as Britain’s imperialist rival. "Neville believes that he is a man with a mission to come to terms with the dictators”,”9” Anthony Eden pointed out in his memoirs. He believed that one could come to terms with the aggressors, and do so under conditions that would not affect the basic interests of the British Empire. Chamberlain thought, as Churchill aptly said about him, that one "can ride the tiger".

The position of Anthony Eden, as the Britain’s Foreign Secretary, differed from Chamberlain’s by methods of exercising foreign policy rather than by substance. Beck wrote, commenting on the pronouncements of the British Foreign Secretary in a conversation with him, that Eden had revealed an intention "to come to terms with Germany" but showed his "typical restraint" with regard to Russia.”10”

The policy of France was no less short-sighted. There was no doubt that the French government perfectly realised the full gravity of an impending hurricane. That meant that France should not have allowed the Nazi Reich to overrun other nations and so strengthen itself. She could have relied in that policy on her Treaty of Mutual Assistance 145with the USSR, yet the French ruling circles did not wish to co-operate with the Soviet Union.

With the Popular Front government in office in 1930, it was the domestic political considerations that came to play a growing role in foreign policy options of the bourgeois parties. Whereas in earlier days, many of their leaders had favored a firm independent foreign policy with a view to strengthening the security of the nation and, in that context, promoting co-operation with the USSR, after the victory of the Popular Front in the elections, the fear of the "Red menace" prompted most of them to collude with the aggressors "at any price”, that is to betray the national interests. The same considerations had a growing influence on the right wing of the Radical Socialist Party which formed part of the Popular Front. That was true, in particular, of such leaders as Edouard Daladier, Georges Bonnet, to mention just these two, who were playing a major role in framing France’s foreign policy.

The class motives behind the policies pursued by Britain as well as by France were brought out by Litvinov in his conversation with the French Ambassador to the USSR, Robert Coulondre. The People’s Commissar pointed out that Britain would have sought a closer relationship with the USSR, if there had been no social hostility of Britain’s dominant classes towards the Soviet Union in the way. The same can well be said about France where there are quite a few influential personalities (like Flandin) who are openly advocating a Four Power Pact. ”11” The Soviet Ambassador to France, Surits, wrote that there was a declining intention in that country to impart an effective character to the Soviet-French Treaty of Mutual Assistance and to treat it from the standpoint of its "original designation”. This treaty, like relations with the USSR in general, was being seen in France "not in the sense of general opposition to the German threat, not in the positive sense, but rather in negative: there is a prevalent desire to keep the USSR as far away from Germany as possible, and to prevent and obstruct German-Soviet rapprochement".”12”

D. Lloyd George considered the French government’s repudiation of the Franco-Soviet pact to have been an act of sheer folly. Referring to the question of who could save France in the event of war, he rightfully pointed out: "Not Britain, but the USSR alone ... A victory over Germany 146can be decided only by a large land army. It is the USSR alone that has such an army.” ”13”

Nevertheless, the ruling circles of France proceeded from the assumption that Britain was her most important ally. Yet those were utterly baseless illusions. Here is a note, made by British General Ironside, in his diary on February 6, 1938, that is particularly indicative in this respect. "Our government appears to recognise,” he wrote, "that if we again land an Army in France, it must mean a repetition of the 1914–1918 struggle under more difficult circumstances. ... The present Government has rightly made up its mind not to do this, even in the face of the danger that France may be overwhelmed." ”14”

However, the military doctrine of the French themselves corresponded to the British one in principle. The French Vice Premier Daladier believed that France must show concern for her lines of communication with her North African colonies; for the rest she "would be able to live safely behind the Maginot Line no matter what might happen in Central and Eastern Europe".”15”

The government of the United States had also been informed of the aggressive plans of Nazi Germany. Assistant Secretary of State Messersmith wrote on October 11, 1937, that the plans of Nazis boiled down to the following: seizure of Austria and Czechoslovakia; establishment of Germany’s domination of Southeast Europe, capture of the Ukraine; isolation of Russia; weakening of France through breaking off her alliance with Russia; gradual dismemberment of the British Empire; finally, action against the United States.”16”

Nevertheless, the United States, far from intending to lake any steps whatsoever against the aggressors, went on encouraging the policy of accommodation with them which was pursued by the ruling establishment of Britain and France. The French Foreign Minister, Yvon Delbos, did not even conceal during his meeting with Maxim Litvinov on November 6, 1938, that the United States was pushing France into an accommodation with Germany. " The reason behind that position of the United States, was, as Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles admitted in his memoirs, the prevalent view in the United States in the autumn of 1937 that Hitler would not go to war against the Western powers unless and until he had destroyed his true enemy—the USSR.”18”

American historian Frederick L. Schuman, describing the policies of Britain, Franco and the United States, wrote that the propertied classes of the Western powers "admired fascism and supposed that their own interests would be served by maintaining and extending fascist power”. Moreover, many of the political leaders of those countries " fondly hoped and Fervently believed that a Free hand for the Fascist Triplite . . . would eventuate in a German-Japanese attack on the Soviet Union”, that "civilisation would thereby be saved from Bolshevism, and that France, Britain and America could remain neutral while fascism and communism destroyed one another". ”19”

Striving for an understanding with the Nazis, the British government decided to send one of its most influential members, the Lord President of the Council, Lord Halifax ( former Viceroy of India) to Germany. A conversation between Lord Halifax and Hitler took place on November 10, 1937. Halifax praised Hitler for having "achieved a great deal .. . by destroying Communism" in Germany which meant she "could rightly be regarded as a bulwark of the West against Bolshevism”. He intimated that should there be a "general settlement" whereby Germany would have undertaken to respect the integrity of the British Empire, the British government was prepared to give her a free hand in Central and Eastern Europe. Halifax said this applied to Germany’s designs on Austria, Czechoslovakia and Danzig. He qualified his statement by saying that Germany must expand without resorting to armed force.”20”

The reservation was due, in part, to the fact that, taking into account the existence of a military alliance between France and Czechoslovakia, the British government feared that the invasion of Czechoslovakia by German forces could have led to an armed conflict which would have involved Britain next to France. And that war would have dashed all hopes of British reactionary quarters for a war between Germany and the USSR.

On November 24, Halifax reported to a British Cabinet meeting about his visit to Hitler. On hearing him, Chamberlain pointed out that the object of his tour had been to find out the German position with regard to the possibility of an Anglo-German agreement and expressed his profound satisfaction with the outcome. ”21”

The French Premier, Chautemps, and the French Foreign 148Minister, Delbos, were invited to London late in November 1937 to concert the subsequent plans of the two Powers regarding the negotiations with the Reich. They seized the occasion, to specify their position in the event of German aggression against Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain firmly declared that Britain must not be involved in the war over Czechoslovakia. Delbos, setting out the position of France, noted that her treaty with Czechoslovakia would come into effect if there was an act of armed intervention by Germany but should Germany annex the Sudetenland without a direct "act of aggression”, the treaty "would not come into operation".”22”

That statement showed France prepared to see her ally broken up without, however, certain "rules of the game" being broken. As we shall yet see, Chamberlain would make every effort to let Germany commit all her acts of aggression without a gross violation of those “rules”.

During unofficial meetings of British and French leaders, their policy was being discussed even more frankly. Delbos, on arrival in Warsaw after his visit to London, described the mood prevalent in Britain: "Chamberlain is convinced that there is no other way to follow and that it is worthwhile coming to terms on co-operation with Germany and Italy.” It was clear from the talks with the British, the French Minister said, that "London lies turned sour on the USSR" and that "Britain has no objection to the USSR staying outside the Pact and, even more, to a conflict erupting between Germany and the USSR." ”23”

The talks which took place in London made it clear that neither Britain nor France were going to afford any help and support to Czechoslovakia if Germany sought to carry through her plans without resorting to outright aggression. Still less did they mean to oppose Germany’s take-over of Austria.

When the results of the Anglo-French negotiations came up for consideration at a British Cabinet meeting, Chamberlain reported that "an understanding was reached to continue the effort to seek a general settlement with Germany". ”24” The items to be thrashed out in an Anglo-German agreement were examined in detail at a meeting of the British government’s Foreign Policy Committee on January 24 and February 3, 1938. The question of the Soviet-French and Soviet-Czechoslovak treaties of mutual assistance was 149also taken up. The Cabinet members who attended the meeting did not conceal that they found those treaties to be hindrance to an accommodation with Germany. The British Ambassador in Berlin, Nevile Henderson, who was taking part in the discussion, said point-blank that "it would first be necessary for Czechoslovakia to escape from the arrangements she had made with Soviet Russia".”25”

Nor did Hitler have any reason to be concerned over the position of the ruling circles of the United States. Soviet Ambassador A. A. Troyanovsky stated on March 2, 1938, that "the fate of Austria is not arousing any particular anxiety over here. Isolationists of all stripes are generally prepared to put up with all fascist annexations".”26”

The Anschlu & Btail;

Early in March 1938, Hitler speeded up the drive to seize Austria. To make sure of his stakes, former German Ambassador in London von Ribbentrop now appointed Germany’s Foreign Minister, arrived in London on March 10 to "take leave”. Chamberlain and Halifax used the occasion to offer Hitler their heart and soul. ”27”

There was another meeting on the same day, not so official, yet no less important. That was the meeting of Horace Wilson, Chamberlain’s closest adviser, who clearly had the latter’s instruction to disclose more of the British government’s cherished plans to the Nazis, with an official of Ribbentrop’s staff, Krich Kordt. Wilson declared that Chamberlain was determined "to persist in his policy of bringing about an understanding with Germany and Italy”. Referring to co-operation between the West European powers and revealing the British government’s ultimate objective, Wilson stressed: "Russia ought to be left out entirely at the present time. The system there was bound to melt away some day." ”28”

Ribbentrop immediately reported to Hitler about the initial results of the assignment he had carried out to find out the position Britain would take up "if the Austrian question cannot be settled peacefully”. He expressed his conviction that Britain would offer no opposition. Chamberlain and Halifax were trying, Ribbentrop wrote, "to reach a peaceful understanding among the four Great Powers of Europe without the Soviet Union".”29”

Hitler found once more that lie could go ahead with his plans without fear of intervention by the Western powers. On March 11 he issued his directive for the invasion of Austria. "Unless other means achieve the end”, he wrote in that directive, "I propose to enter Austria with my armed forces." ”30” On orders from Berlin, the Austrian Nazis made a take-or-leave-it demand to Chancellor K. Schusclmig of Austria to resign and to be succeeded by the Fiihrer of local Nazis SeyB-Inquart. In the night of March 12, Hitler’s forces crossed into Austria and got her annexed to Germany. That act of the Nazis was in no way opposed by Britain, France or the United States. As one can see from a note in Chamberlain’s diary on March 13, in spite of the AnschluB he still hoped to start the Anglo-German talks again someday.”31”

It should, however, be pointed out that neither London nor Paris, nor Washington could Tail to realise that the AnschluB was the beginning of the end of the Versailles– Washington system of treaties which served as a prop for their dominant position both in Europe and in the rest of the world. Ambassador Maisky wrote on March 12, 1938, that there was "clear confusion" within the British ruling circles following the Nazi seizure of Austria. "The Premier’s prestige has been struck hard and the chances of an early realisation of a Four Power Pact have come to thought right away." ”32”

The Nazi annexation of Austria went far towards straining the situation in Europe. On March 14, the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs stated that it appeared to be the major development since the First World War arid one "fraught with the greatest perils and, not in the least, for our Union”.”33”

Referring to Germany’s seizure of Austria, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov, pointed out in an interview that in the last few years the Soviet government had more than once denounced international crimes and declared itself to be prepared to "take an active part in all the measures directed towards organising collective resistance to the aggressor”. The Soviet government condemned the armed invasion of Austria and the act of violence in depriving the Austrian people of their independence. ”34”

At the same time the Soviet Union was exposing those 151who, by their policy of compromising with the aggressors, made the German takeover of Austria possible and paved the way for Hitler to Vienna. It is quite certain, Pravda pointed out, that the unbridled fascist aggression is a direct consequence of Chamberlain’s political strategy. "His policy of an explicit collusion with the aggressors and of renouncing the system of collective security has given the warmongers a free hand."“35”

With Austria annexed to the Reich, a direct danger faced Czechoslovakia.

The Polish Ultimatum to Lithuania

The reactionary ruling circles of Poland, who diamond of grabbing more land for themselves, that of the Soviet Union, first and foremost, were not idle either. The U.S. Ambassador in Warsaw, A. J. Drexel Biddle, arrived at the conclusion, drawn from his conversations with the Polish Foreign Minister, J. Beck, that Poland was striving for a close relationship with Germany and welcoming German Italian co-operation in opposition to communist Russia for she regarded her as her main enemy. ”36” The Nazis proceeded from the belief that Poland’s home and foreign policies fit in perfectly with those of Germany, Italy, and Japan, and she should, therefore, be brought into the Anti-Comintern Pact. They made appropriate suggestions to her on several occasions.”37” Finding it inconvenient to join the Anti– Comintern Pact openly (at least for the time being), Poland declared herself to be in solidarity with the signatories to the Pact in many ways, including her policy towards the USSR. On Juno’13, 1938, Beck told Germany’s Foreign Minister von Neurath that he considered combatting Bolshevism "the primary aim of his policy".”38” On March 31, (the new German Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop, took the opportunity of his conversation with the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, Jozef Lipski, to express his "haunting idea of broad anti-communist co-operation”. The Polish Ambassador replied by saying that he was convinced that co– operation between Germany and Poland "in the struggle against communism" was well worthwhile.”39” Whetting 152the appetites of the Polish ruling establishment, the Nazis made a point of telling Poland that it was "not enough" for her to have an outlet to the Baltic Sea, and that she must also have an "outlet to the Black Sea".”40”

Polish ruling circles had Lithuania, too, as yet another object of their aggressive aspirations. In the night of March 11, Polish frontier guards provoked an incident on the Polish-Lithuanian border to create a pretext for a Polish invasion of Lithuania. The Polish rulers of the day saw the takeover of Lithuania as a “compensation” for the support they gave to Germany’s aggressive plans against Austria.”41” The Polish Przeglad Powszechny magazine wrote: "We must get some compensation because of the AnschluC. . . Qualitatively, because of her geopolitical position, Lithuania is very valuable." ”42”

An emergency conference was called in Warsaw on March 12, attended by the Inspector-General of the Armed Forces Rydz-Smigly, Premier F. Skladkowski, and J. Szembek who deputized for Beck while he was out of Warsaw. It was decided to press for the political subordination of Lithuania to Poland.”43”

A large Polish force was concentrated near the Lithuanian border poised for an invasion of Lithuania at any moment.

Poland and Nazi Germany acted in the closest contact. For instance, during Beck’s visit to Berlin in January 1938 Goring informed him that Germany considered the Anschlufi to be her top priority. Hitler emphasised that he was prepared to resort to force to this end. Beck told the Nazis that Poland had no objection to the AnschluB: "Poland has only economic interests" in Austria; we have no political interests in that country".”44” During the subsequent discussions with Goring, on February 23 and March 12, Beck and Lipski reaffirmed their statements that Poland did not object to Germany taking over Austria. Goring replied that Hitler "will be obliged to Poland for such a stand".”45”

It was as early as March 16 of the same year that the Nazis “repaid” the Polish ruling circles. On that day Goring invited Lipski to talk over subsequent German and Polish co-operation. The Polish Ambassador informed him of Poland’s designs on Lithuania. In the same terms in which the Poles had couched their consent to the annexation of 153Austria by Germany, Goring announced Germany’s consent to Poland’s seizure of Lithuania, hedging it in only with a remark regarding Klajpeda. Lipski wrote that Goring showed understanding for our point of view. He stressed Germany’s interest in Klajpeda (Memel), otherwise expressing his desinteressement with regard to Lithuania".”46” Goring expressed some apprehension, however, that Poland’s action might cause complications in her relations with the USSR. In that context, he came out with "an open offer for Polish-German military collaboration against Russia”. Lipski immediately notified Warsaw of the position taken by the German government on "Poland’s possible action against Lithuania”, that is, regarding an invasion of Lithuania by Polish troops.

A German invasion of Lithuania was also in the preparatory stage. On March 17, Beck instructed the Polish Minister in Berlin to inform Goring confidentially that " relations with Lithuania got strained not only because of the frontier incident”. Lipski was to declare that in case of a rejection of the Polish ultimatum by Lithuania, there would be an invasion of Lithuania by Polish forces, and "German interests in Klajpeda would be respected by the Polish side”. Lipski lost no time in carrying out that instruction and assured Goring that ho would be keeping the German government abreast of the subsequent course of events. Lipski considered the conversation to have been extremely important because that allowed him to inform Warsaw about Germany’s stand on "Poland’s possible action against Lithuania.’"’”7” That is to say, Poland intended to take over Lithuania, with the exception of Klajpeda which she was prepared to “cede” to Germany.

Germany’s intentions were to be seen from Ribbentrop’s note of March 17. "In case of a Polish-Lithuanian conflict”, he wrote, "I consider the occupation of the Memel Territory necessary within the first few hours. Appropriate preparations for this have been made”. The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, Keitel had prepared a special map showing the German-Polish line of demarcation on the territory of Lithuania, according to which the German forces were to occupy Klajpeda Territory along with some other areas of Lithuania.”48”

Lithuania found herself face to face with the fatal 154danger from two aggressors at once—Poland and Germany, acting in close contact.

It was Soviet support alone that saved the Lithuanian people from being enslaved by foreign invaders. On March 1G, 1938, the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs summoned the Polish Ambassador in Moscow, W. Grzybowski, to tell him that the gravity of the situation compelled the Soviet government to draw the Polish government’s attention to the fact that the Soviet Union could not stand by, looking indifferently at Lithuania in danger.”49”

Meanwhile the Soviet government took steps to influence Poland through her ally, France. The People’s Commissar gave instructions to the Soviet Ambassador in Paris to see the French Foreign Minister Paul-Boncour immediately and urge him to take the necessary steps in order to "deter Warsaw from undertaking a reckless venture that can set the whole of Eastern Europe on fire”. The Ambassador was also to inform the French Minister about the statement made to Grzybowski.”50” On March 18, the Soviet government, considering the continued aggravation of the situation, gave the Polish Ambassador another strong warning. ”51”

The Soviet government’s intervention prevented Lithuania from being overrun by Poland and Germany. Besides, those events were the best evidence possible to show that the aggressors would have stood no chance of success, in other parts of Europe as well, should the Western powers have acted together with the Soviet Union instead of yielding ground to the aggressors.

The Polish rulers, however, did not give up their aggressive aspirations. The Polish ministers in Bucharest A. Arciszewski sought to prove to the Romanian King that Hitler Germany was stronger than the Soviet Union and that, in case of an impending war, Poland would join a bloc consisting of Germany, Italy, Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Hungary, Austria and Bulgaria; Poland would welcome the accession of Romania and, together with her—Yugoslavia and Greece—in that bloc.”52” In July 1937, the Chiefs of General Staffs of Poland and Romania concluded an agreement under which Poland committed herself to fielding 350,000 soldiers and Romania, 250,000 in the event of war against the USSR. It was decided that should the territory thus acquired fall into their hands, it would be divided between 155them: the territory south of’ the Vinnitsa—Kiev—Desna river line, comprising Odessa, would be annexed by Romania and those North of that line, comprising Leningrad, by Poland. ”53”

As will yet be shown, Poland closely co-operated with The Nazi Reich in the aggression against Czechoslovakia as well.