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Vilnis SipolsDiplomatic Battles Before World War II
THE WAR IN THE FAR EAST
Outbreak of the Japan-China War
On July 7, 1937, Japanese troops provoked an incident will) Chinese forces in the area not far from Peking. Thai was the start of the Japanese invasion of North and then Central China.
The Japanese government had worked out a plan to establish Japanese domination of Eastern Asia—"Basic Principles of National Policy”. First, of all, the Japanese militarists intended to capture North China and then the rest of China. Japan proposed to swell her armed forces stationed in Korea and Manchuria so as, subsequently attacking the USSR, "strike a decisive blow at the Russians at the very outbreak of the war”. They planned, besides, to penetrate the South Seas area. It was found necessary to speed up and bring off the preparation of Japan’s Armed Forces for war in order to achieve all those designs. “119”
The Japanese ruling quarters believed that the intervention by Germany and Italy in Spain created a favourable context for their aggressive plans to be carried out. The U.S. Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles pointed out in that connection that the "bandit nations drew together; their respective policies became more and more clearly synchronized". “12”°
Once through with her preparations, Japan set about carrying out her far-reaching plans of aggrandizement in July 1037. That was how the Japan-China war started.
It was one of the conflagrations later to become part of the Second World War.
The Soviet government clearly realised the full gravity of the situation as it shaped up both in Europe and in the Far East. Izvestia unequivocally put the question: "Peace or War?" in its leading article "Against War, Against Fascism”. This question, the paper pointed out, sounds today as ominous as never before for it is agitating the minds of millions of people anxious about their future.”121”
Japan’s aggressive action was exacerbating the international situation and seriously affected the interests of the monopolies of the United States, Britain and France. The 122Anglo-Franco-American alignment was potentially far stronger than Japan. Joint action by these three powers could have deterred the aggressors. All the more so since Japan’s war plans could have been nipped in the bud, should the U.S., Britain and France have established co-operation with the Soviet Union. The governments of the three powers, however, wanted no trucks with the USSR, although they were thereby undermining their own positions.
The reactionary quarters of the Western powers still hoped that the war between Japan and the USSR would begin sooner or later. And in that case, they presumed, Japan would have to stop her expansion into the areas where she would be threatening the interests of the United States, Britain and France. Moreover, the Western powers expected that such a war would certainly weaken both the USSR and Japan which would give the United States, Britain and France an opportunity not only to maintain their positions in the Far East, hut even reinforce them.
British imperialists kept on conniving at aggression in the Far East as well as in Europe. They clearly sought a compromise arrangement with Japan at China’s expense. However, they were not averse to their interests being defended by others. It was a war between Japan and the USSR that, as stated earlier on, suited Britain most of all.
The United States thought its interest to be far more hurt by Japan’s actions in China than by the Italian aggression in Ethiopia, the German and Italian intervention in Spain and other developments in Europe. Japan was the United States’ major imperialist rival. Nevertheless, the U.S. also took up a rather restrained position over the Japanese invasion of China. The U.S. ruling circles feared, in particular, that should it have joined the war against Japan, Britain and France would shift its brunt to the United States. This led to the U.S. together with Britain and France conniving at Japanese aggression. Measures, taken by the U.S., Britain, and France in connection with the Japanese aggression boiled down to an attempt at somehow protecting their major interests in China by means of an imperialist collusion with Japan. The ruling quarters of those countries did not so much as contemplate any defence of China’s interests or any assistance to it in resisting the Japanese invasion. On the contrary, the imperialist powers feared that the Chinese, should they have succeeded in healing back the Japanese imperialist incursion, could have also expelled other colonialists from their country.
The Soviet Union at China’s Side
The Soviet Union was alone ready to lend a helping hand to China in the struggle against the Japanese aggressors. The Soviet government had no particular contractual obligations to China. Nevertheless, true to its policy of supporting the victims of imperialist aggression, it was ready and willing to come to the aid of the Chinese people in their .struggle against foreign intervention.
The Soviet government took advantage of Anthony Eden’s visit to Moscow in 1935 in order to talk the issue of a Pacific Pact over with him. What the Soviet Union offered to conclude was no longer a non-aggression pact but one of mutual assistance. The People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs said on the eve of Eden’s visit: "We are prepared to co-operate with Britain as well as with other nations in securing peace in the Far East.” "In concrete terms we contemplate a regional Pacific Pact of Mutual Assistance involving the USSR, China, Japan, Great Britain, the United States, France, Holland.. .” The Pact meant essentially that "Japan’s further aggression would be resisted by the forces of all the other parties to the Pact." ”122”
On March 28, 1935, the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs emphasised in a conversation with Anthony Eden that for a lasting peace to be ensured in the Pacific "there must be collective efforts by all the interested nations”. However, Eden did not go along with that proposal. He questioned the United States’ readiness for active cooperation in safeguarding peace and security in the Far East.”123”
The British government was not inclined to share in setting up a collective security system in the Far East, but it sought to put the blame for abetting the Japanese aggression on the United States.
The U.S. government still preferred a different, way of ensuring its interest in the Far East. That was stated quite openly by Walton R. Moore, U.S. Deputy Under Secretary of State, in a conversation with the Soviet Charge d’ 124Affaires in the United States A. F. Neuman. ft will take several years, he said, for the United States to gain superiority over Japan. "It hoped,” Nenman commented, "that the USSR would make things easier for it by starting a war against Japan." ”124”
The Chinese Head of Government Kung Hsiang-hsi ( President of the Executive Yuan) asked the Soviet Ambassador 1). V. Bogomolov in October 1935 whether China could count on getting any war equipment from the USSR in case it needed to put up armed resistance against Japan. On November 20, 1935, the Soviet Ambassador informed Kung about the Soviet consent to supply China with war equipment. ”125” The Chiang Kai-shek government, however, hoping to avoid an outright armed conflict with Japan through concessions, had itself begun stalling negotiations on the enforcement of that accord.
In the meantime, the Japanese militarists were increasingly aggressive. Japan’s expansionist plans were still directed against the USSR as well. The German Ambassador to Japan, von Dirksen, reported to Berlin on December 28, 1935, that Japan was hostile towards the USSR and " determined" to settle her differences with the Soviet Union "by force of arms as soon as she feels militarily strong enough".”126”
The Japanese octopus began to stretch out its tentacles towards the Mongolian People’s Republic as well, intent on capturing it as a stepping-stone in preparation for war against the USSR. On March 28, 1936, the Kwangtuug Army Chief of Staff, General Itagaki, in a conversation with Foreign Minister Arita, explained what the seizure of the MPR could mean to Japan: "Should Outer Mongolia be annexed to Japan and Manchuria, the security of the Soviet Far East would be struck hard. . . Therefore, the Army is planning to extend the influence of Japan and Manchuria to Outer Mongolia with all the means at its disposal". ”127” In view of the threat of Japanese aggression, the Soviet government had concluded a gentleman’s agreement with it back on November 27, 1934- at the request of the MPR government—providing for "reciprocal support by all measures in preventing or forestalling the threat of an armed attack and also in lending one another assistance and support in the event of any third party attacking the USSR or the MPR".”128”
Since the danger from Japan continued to grow (it came to full-scale lighting across the MPR border), the USSR and the MI’H signed a protocol on mutual assistance on March 12, 193(>. Referring to the import of that protocol, the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs pointed out in a letter to the Soviet, Ambassador in Japan that it "is a new link in the chain of consistent actions whereby we are curbing the aggression against the MPR. Now Japan is, of course, in no doubt that her conquest of Mongolia would lead to a war against the Soviet Union." ”129” That protocol, just as the gentleman’s agreement, was of tremendous importance for safeguarding the security of the MPR and strengthening peace in the Far East.
On March 1, 1937, Litvinov took the question of a pacific Pact of Mutual Assistance up with the Chinese Ambassador to the USSR Jiang Ting-hi. "It is my conviction,” he said, "that such a pact alone can definitely stop Japan’s aggression and ensure peace in the Far East.” He went on to point out that this had to be brought home to the other powers, particularly Great Britain and the United States, and that both Chinese and Soviet diplomacy had to work towards that end.”130”
The Soviet Ambassador to China (Nanking), 1). V. Bogomolov received detailed directives in mid-March for his negotiations with the Chinese government. The directives proposed concluding a treaty of friendship with the Nanking government providing for "either party to refrain from taking any step or concluding any agreement which could benefit a third state threatening to attack the other contracting party”. It also provided for both parties to take steps "with a view to protecting their common interests”. The Soviet government expressed its readiness to conclude a military and technical agreement with the Nanking government providing for the sale of aircraft, tanks, and other military and technical equipment to be paid for out of a 50 million dollar credit granted to this end, as well as for Chinese airmen and tankmen to be trained in the USSR.
The Soviet Union called for the treaty of friendship to incorporate a pledge by both parties to do their utmost towards the early conclusion of the Pacific Pact of Mutual Assistance. On April 1, Bogomolov passed these proposals to Kung Hsiang-hsi.”131”
However, the Chinese government was still wavering. On 126June 16, 1937, the Soviet Ambassador in China reported to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that the Chinese government looked askance at the idea of a Pacific Pact because it, was afraid of arousing Japan’s displeasure and "finally closing the door to a bilateral agreement with Japan which Chiang Kai-shek was still hoping for”. The Chinese were giving no reply to Lo the proposal for concluding a treaty of non-aggression and helping China with supplies of war equipment.”132”
On May 14, Prime Minister Joseph Lyons of Australia also came forward with a proposal to conclude the Pacific Pact, which, however, was a pact of non-aggression, rather than one of mutual assistance. The Soviet government decided, therefore, to try once more to get the Pact concluded.
In the latter half of May, Litvinov while in Geneva for a session of the Council of the League of Nations, was negotiating the Pacific Pact with the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, and the President of the Executive Yuan of China, Kung Hsiang-hsi.”133” The Soviet Ambassador in London I. M. Maisky was instructed to talk the matter over with Lyons. The Ambassador was asked to inform the Australian Prime Minister about the Soviet Union’s positive response to his proposal, but along with suggesting a pact of mutual assistance.”134”
On June 15, Maisky had an appropriate conversation with Lyons. The latter reacted favourably to the idea of concluding a pact of mutual assistance, but suggested that neither Britain nor the United States were prepared to conclude such an agreement. ”135”
The Soviet Ambassador in Washington Troyanovsky was asked to find out where the United States stood on the matter. "True,” the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs wrote to him, "we meant a Pacific Pact of Mutual Assistance, while Lyons is reducing the whole thing to a pledge of non-aggression." ”138”
Roosevelt, however, showed no desire to join the pact. He told Troyanovsky on June 28 that the U.S. could not enter into any alliances or any similar agreements. As to Lyons’ proposal for concluding a Pacific Pact of Nonaggression, Roosevelt did not second it either on the plea that there was no point in concluding such a pact with no Japan in it.”137”
When the Japanese invasion of China began on July 7, 1271937, The Soviet press roundly condemned that action of the Japanese aggressors. "This is a new and important stage in the imperialist struggle in Eastern Asia and in the Pacific”, the Izvestia wrote, "and a new and essential stage in the aggression of Japanese imperialism seeking to subjugate the Chinese people." ”138”
It was on July 19, 1937, that the Chinese government finally ventured to accept Soviet aid. It asked the USSR through the Soviet Ambassador to provide war equipment and grant appropriate credits.”139” The Soviet government responded to China’s request for aid. On July 29, the Soviet Ambassador to China was instructed to inform the Chinese government about the Soviet consent to meet its request.”140”
While expressing its readiness to supply China with war equipment, the Soviet government found it necessary for the USSR and China to conclude, tentatively, a treaty of friendship and non-aggression because there had to be a guarantee that "our weapons will not be used against us”. The Soviet Ambassador raised the matter several times with representatives of the Chinese government. ”141”
Meanwhile, China was pressing hard for the conclusion of a Soviet-Chinese treaty of mutual assistance. The matter was raised with the Soviet Ambassador on July 16 by the President of the Legislative Yuan of China, Sun Fo. Chen Li-fu, who was negotiating with the Soviet Ambassador on instructions from Chiang Kai-shek, insisted on such a treaty being signed when he conferred with him three days later. ”142” Explaining the sum and substance of those Chinese proposals, the Soviet Ambassador wrote in his dispatch to Moscow: "Banking on a Japanese-Soviet War remains Chiang Kai-shek’s idee fixe." ”143”
As China was already in a virtual state of war with Japan, the Soviet government, naturally, did not find it possible to conclude a bilateral treaty of mutual assistance with her.”144” Maxim Litvinov wrote to the Soviet Ambassador that "the idea behind the Chinese insistence on this issue at the present moment is, in point of fact, that we should get involved in a war with Japan right now".”145”
On August 21, 1937, the USSR and China signed a treaty of non-aggression which was, under the circumstances, one of supreme importance for strengthening China’s international position. In an editorial on the treaty, Pravda emphasised that the treaty was a fresh expression of the 128friendship which the peoples of the USSR had for the Chinese people in battle for their freedom and independence. The Soviet-Chinese treaty, the article pointed out, practically confirmed and anchored the principle of the indivisibility of peace and the need to defend peace both in the West and in the East. "The Soviet-Chinese Treaty shows to all nations the way to oppose the war threat... It is a new instrument of peace." ”146”
The conclusion of the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Non– Aggression, the Soviet Ambassador to Japan Slavutsky pointed out, produced a "tremendous impression" in Japan.”147” Tokyo qualified the treaty as a diplomatic setback for Japan.
Agreement on the actual deliveries of war equipment to China on account of the Soviet-granted long-term credit was reached as early as September 14. The delivery of the first batch of aircraft was to be within the shortest possible time-limits at the request of the Chinese delegation. The Soviet side undertook to ship the first 225 aircraft, including 02 medium bombers and 155 fighter planes to China by October 25, 1937. ”148” The Chinese Ambassador to the USSR Jian Ting-fu declared in a conversation with Deputy People’s Commissar Stomonyakov that the Chinese were most pleased with the spirit and outcome of the negotiations which had given China even more than they had expect- ed. ”149”
By the middle of 1938, the Soviet Union had delivered to China 297 aircraft, 82 tanks, 425 guns and howitzers, 1,825 machine-guns, 400 motor vehicles, 360 thousand shells, 10 million cartridges and other items of war equipment. ”15”° Soviet aid made it possible for China to hold out, avoid being defeated arid having to surrender, and to keep up resistance to the Japanese aggressors.
Because of Soviet aid to China, however, the danger of Japan attacking the USSR had increased. The French Foreign Minister, Delbos, told the U.S. Ambassador in Paris, Bullitt, on August 26, 1937, that he had received a message from the French Ambassador in Japan saying that "Japan is likely to declare war on the Soviet Union”. The British Ambassador to Japan Craigie also pointed out that the Japanese "would have to square their accounts with the USSR”. The U.S. Assistant Military Attaché in Japan Weckerling wrote to Washington that "the Japanese Army regards Soviet Russia as its principal enemy”, and that there 129was a feeling of certainty that "nothing can prevent another Russo-Japanese war.”151” The Soviet Ambassador to Japan, Slavutsky, states that the Japanese militarists were trying with might and main to make the Japanese people accept the "inevitability of an imminent war with the Soviet Union".”152”
What complicated the Soviet Union’s international position even more was that in the event of war in the Far East, it would have to reckon also with serious complications across its Western border. The Japanese Ambassador in Berlin told the French Ambassador A. Francois-Poncet that the German and Italian governments had promised to Japan "active military aid in the event of the USSR being involved in a Far Eastern conflict on China’s side".”153”
The position of Poland also aroused grave apprehension. The Japanese military attaché in Poland General Sawada asking the Polish government on August 24, 1937, to support the Japanese during the discussion of the Japan-China conflict in the League of Nations, stressed that China was co-operating with the USSR while Japan and Poland had "common interests" in respect to the Soviet Union. The Polish government readily responded to that request in the belief that "Japan is Poland’s natural ally".”154”
Japan did not venture, however, into a war against the USSR. Along with the rapid economic growth of the Soviet Union, its defence capability was mounting. Besides, the Soviet government had been constantly giving most careful attention to strengthening the defences of its Far Eastern border. This could not but produce a sobering effect on the Japanese aggressors.
Japanese Aggression and the League of Nations
In mid-September 1937, the Chinese government officially asked the Council of the League of Nations for sanctions against Japan under the terms of the Covenant. The Soviet government informed China that it would support its request.”155”
The governments of Britain and France found it undesirable for the Japanese aggression to be considered in the 130League of Nations, first of all, because they did not propose to take any measures against Japan. Besides, if there was no way at all of avoiding a discussion of this issue, London and Paris wauled it to involve also the United States of America. Therefore, Britain and France preferred to see the Japan-China conflict considered in any agency representing the United States as well, rather than in the League of Nations.
Speaking before the Assembly of the League of Nations on December 21, the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov emphasised that aggression was manifesting itself in new and more violent forms. However, the League of Nations stayed out of those events, without reacting to them. The People’s Commissar called on all nations to pool efforts in working for peace and opposing aggression. Ho pointed out that the "League’s resolute policy in dealing with one case of aggression would spare us all other cases. And then, only then, would all nations come to see that aggression does not pay and that aggression is not worth making.” “156”
The Soviet Union has gone down in the history of the League of Nations as the most consistent champion of the victims of the German, Italian and Japanese aggression, and as the protagonist of those forces in it which demanded the full maintenance of the Covenant.”157”
In advance of the League of Nations’ discussion of Japanese aggression, scheduled for September 27, the People’s Commissar had received the following directive: "It is desirable for us both to see Japan voted aggressor and most effective sanctions applied against her. However, in case of an obviously passive reaction of other states . .. we do not consider it politically expedient for the Soviet delegation to be the pace-setter risking straining still more the Soviet Union’s relations with Japan and to give more food for charging us with incitement. Should, however, the other members of the League of Nations show a serious intention to raise the question of Japan’s responsibility and of declaring her to be an aggressor, you ought to be active in supporting this effort. Since it takes a unanimous vote for her to be found guilty of aggression, it is doubtful that such a vote could be obtained. If, after all, in spite of all expectations, such a decision were taken and the question of sanctions automatically arose, nothing would prevent you from 131declaring ... for the application of most effective sanctions against Japan." “158”
The representatives of Britain and France in the League of Nations did not conceal that the two powers did not intend to take any steps against the Japanese aggressor.”159” They referred to the fact that they did not know the position of the United States.
Under instructions from Moscow, the Soviet Charge d’ Affaires in the United States, Oumansky, approached Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles asking him to explain the position of the United States. The latter replied that the U.S. government was not in a position to draw any distinction between the aggressor and the victim of aggression and "to sympathise with the victim on any ground whatsoever". “16”° After hearing Welles make his point, Oumansky described the U.S. policy as "very discouraging".”161”
Under those circumstances, the League of Nations’ decisions on Japanese aggression adopted on October 6 turned out to be extremely inconclusive. The League limited itself to stating that Japan had broken its commitments under the existing treaties and to declaring "moral support" for China. It recommended to the Powers concerned to call a special conference on the matter.”162”
The Brussels Conference
Preparations began, under a decision of the League of Nations, for a conference of nations with a stake in the Far Eastern situation. Brussels had been chosen as the venue for it.
The question of attendance arose right away. It was the United States, Britain and other sponsors of the conference that were particularly anxious to get the Japanese aggressors invited. Owing to this, Litvinov wrote to the Soviet Ambassador in the United States Troyanovsky that by urging the Japanese to attend the conference, they were assured in every way that "it will consider a reconciliation rather than any measures against Japan whatsoever." “163”
The Government of Japan declined, however, to attend the conference.
In the opinion of the U.S. government, the conference was to have tried to reconcile Japan and China. Roosevelt told the leader of the American delegation at the conference 132Norman Davis that the word "sanctions is to be rigorously avoided".”164”
The British government also proceeded from the assumption that "the conference was not meeting in order to consider whether sanctions should be imposed against Japan,” but for "restoration of peace by agreement".”165”
Only the USSR was still urging effective steps against the Japanese aggressors and for the defence of China. The Soviet delegation in Brussels worked under instructions to press for a declaration or a resolution of the conference to recommend to all participants "to render China all possible and maximum assistance both individually and collectively". “166” Litvinov wrote on October 20, 1937, that the USSR considered it desirable for effective sanctions to be applied against the Japanese aggressor.”167” In a conversation with the U.S. Ambassador to the USSR on October 29, the People’s Commissar again stated that the Soviet Union was seriously interested in ending the aggression and establishing peace and collective security. The USSR was prepared to take up a resolute stand in co-operation with the United States, France, and Britain, he declared.”168”
It was the U.S. delegation that called the tune at the Brussels Conference, which opened on November 3, 1937, with its programme of “appeasement” of the Japanese aggressors. Norman Davis did not find it right and proper to point out in his speech who was the aggressor and who was its victim. Japan and China, he said, "have come into conflict and have resorted to hostilities”. And he proposed that the conflict should be solved on a basis that is "fair to each and acceptable to both".”169” That could mean only one thing: the United States was prepared to see Japan’s aggressive ambitions gratified at China’s expense, and the Chinese people humbly putting up with it. The British and the French followed in his footsteps. Anthony Eden and Yvon Delbos declared that they subscribed to all Norman Davis had said.
It was the Soviet delegation alone that took up a position of principle at the conference. The leader of the Soviet delegation in Brussels, Maxim Litvinov, in his speech on November 3 expressed his disagreement with the policy of the United States, Britain and France which advocated a peace "acceptable to both”. He pointed out that there was nothing easier than to say to the aggressor: "Take your plunder, take what you have seized by force, and peace be with you,” and to say to the victim of aggression: "Love your aggressor, resist not evil”. But that can call forth nothing but more acts of aggression, he emphasised. In such a case, the conference could turn out to be a "tool of the aggressor”, instead of acting against aggression. Having reiterated the oft-stated position of the USSR regarding action to oppose aggression, Litvinov stressed the necessity of rallying the nations working to keep the peace. “17”°
The assessment of the Soviet delegation’s position given by Norman Davis is noteworthy. "Litvinov is arguing to me”, he wrote to Washington, "in favour of close co– operation and understanding between Britain, the United States and Russia on the ground that if Japan were confronted with such a combination, she would agree to stop hostilities.” “171”
On November 6, the conference drew up the text of another appeal to Japan inviting her to join it. Then it was adjourned pending her reply.
In the meantime, Japan went on intensifying and expanding her military operations in China. On November 12, Japanese troops captured Shanghai, thereby appreciably strengthening their foothold in Central China. On the same day, the Japanese government once more rejected the appeal from the Brussels Conference.
The Brussels Conference resumed on November 13. The Chinese representative raised the question of economic sanctions against Japan and assistance to China. However, the representatives of the United States, Britain and France turned a deaf ear to it. Norman Davis intimated that he was still hoping to get Japan to co-operate.
The Soviet delegation again came out in support of the Chinese proposal. Potemkin, who now led the Soviet delegation, declared that to end the aggression there would have to be "co-operative and effective efforts by the powers interested in keeping the peace in the Far East. Every concrete initiative in this sense would be supported by the Soviet Union.”172” Davis reported to Washington that Potemkin "was very insistent in urging us to recommend concrete measures against Japan" because there was no other way to stop the conflict. Potemkin reiterated that the USSR "would join in anything the British and ourselves might be prepared to do”.”173”
On November 24 the conference adopted a declaration to say that it was suspending its sittings temporarily in order to afford the participating governments the time "to further explore all peaceful methods by which a settlement of the dispute may be attained.” “174” That was the last meeting of the conference.
The breakdown of the Brussels Conference was a direct sequel to the policy of abetting the Japanese aggression which was pursued by the United States, Britain and France, While the major responsibility for “non-intervention” in the German-Italian invasion of Spain lay with the British and French “appeasers”, the main blame for the policy of abetting the Japanese aggression rested with the United States.
The ruling circles of the United States, Britain and France considered that the best way out of the situation thus created was through an imperialist collusion with Japan for the “peaceful” plunder of China by all of them so as to have the Japanese aggression turn against the Soviet Union. Since the Japanese imperialists continued their acts of aggression in China, in violation of the interests of the United States, Britain and France, and showed no intention of attacking the USSR for the time being, the governing quarters of the Western powers tried to push the USSR into some kind of action against Japan. That came to light in the closing days of the Brussels Conference.
Potemkin wrote from Brussels, reporting his conversation with the Chairman of the conference, Paul Spaak, Belgium’s Foreign Minister, that the latter had provocatively declared that "the best means to make Japan more tractable was by sending a few hundred Soviet aircraft to give Tokyo a scare”. Potemkin replied that there must have been some in Brussels who evidently were too fond of " having others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them".”175”
The Soviet government gave a sober assessment of the situation. It was prepared to undertake most effective measures in assisting China in its struggle against the Japanese aggressors, but it wanted to do so together with the United States, Britain and France. The Soviet Union could not fail to take into account under the circumstances the fact, in particular, that in the event of war with Japan, it could have run the risk of being attacked by Germany and even, perhaps, by some other of its Western neighbours who had 135long been co-operating with Japan on an anti-Soviet ground.
After the conference, Litvinov, writing to the Soviet Ambassador in the United States, Troyanovsky, pointed out that the USSR had, right from the start, been skeptical of the possible outcome of the Brussels Conference, and, therefore, had held a "rather restrained position" at it, but the conference ended "even more disgracefully than one could have expected it to".”176”
The utter futility of the Brussels Conference because of the position of the Western powers had the effect of intensifying the Japanese aggression in China. On November 27, that is, two days after the conference was over, Japanese troops launched an offensive against Nanking, which was the home of the Chinese government at the time. The city fell to them on December 13.
Japanese Aggressors Defeated at Lake Khasan
The events which occurred in the area of Lake Khasan, the Soviet Far East, in July and August 1938, provided clear evidence of the Soviet Union’s determination and readiness to give a resolute rebuff to aggression.
While waging their war against China, the Japanese imperialists began to show themselves aggressive throughout the Far East, including the areas close to the Soviet frontiers. The Soviet government had to make repeated representations to the Japanese authorities. The Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Stomonyakov drew the attention of the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, Shigemitsu, to the fact, that there was a systematic campaign of slander and propaganda of war against the Soviet Union in Japan, often with the involvement, of official institutions and personalities. The Japanese military leaders did not stop short of direct calls for a war against the USSR. ”177”
Japanese troops systematically violated the Soviet border. About a dozen Japanese combat aircraft invaded Soviet airspace on April 11, for example. On June 8, the Japanese attempted to land a 29-man armed band on (lie Soviet bank of the Amur River. The Japanese authorities had more than once detained Soviet ships without any excuse 136whatsoever. On February 19, they seized the Soviet freighter Kuznetskstroi in a Japanese port, with a crew of 35 and 37 passengers. The Soviet press had every reason to qualify that as "yet another deliberate Japanese provocation".”178”
At the same time, the Japanese ruling circles, drilling the nation for a war of aggression against the USSR, were stoking up anti-Soviet feelings in Japan. "Japan’s position with regard to the USSR,” the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs said, "has become still more aggressive and arrogant.” The Japanese militarists "are systematically striving to exacerbate relations, without missing a single occasion or opportunity for it. They have Japanese diplomacy, with Hirota and Shigemitsu in the lead, at their service." ”179”
The Japanese acts of provocation had attained a particular degree of intensity by the middle of the year. The Japanese press (as the Asahi, Yomiuri and other newspapers) was openly calling for a war against the Soviet Union and the capture of the Soviet Far East. The Japanese troops stationed in Korea deliberately started acts of provocation against the Soviet frontier guards at Lake Khasan.”180”
In mid-July, the Japanese Charge d’Affaires in Moscow turned to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs with an unjustified claim that Soviet troops were illegally holding the western shore of Lake Khasan. The Japanese diplomat was offered to look through the 1869 Hunchung Agreement with a map appended to it which left no room for doubt that the western shore of the lake was part of Soviet territory.”181”
Calling on the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs on July 20, Japanese Ambassador Shigemitsu once more demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the area concerned. "Otherwise,” the Ambassador threatened, "Japan would have to conclude that she has to resort to force.” Litvinov reminded the Ambassador that the Japanese Charge d’Affaires had been shown the official documents which quite clearly indicated the borderline passing through the mountains west of Lake Khasan. Soviet frontier guards in that area have no other object, the People’s Commissar said, than to defend the Soviet frontier. "There is complete peace on the border, and it can only be broken by the Japanese-Manchurian side which, in that case, will be held responsible for the consequences.” "As to the resort 137to force,” the People’s Commissar emphasised, "if Mr. Ambassador considers such a threat and intimidation to be a good diplomatic expedient which may have an effect on certain states, in fact, he must know that such an expedient will not work in Moscow." ”182”
On July 29, 1938, Japanese troops launched military operations against the Soviet frontier guards on the Western shore of Lake Khasan. With a wealth of facts at its disposal, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East found in its indictment of the major Japanese war criminals that the Japanese attack at Lake Khasan had been deliberately planned by the Japanese. The Tribunal stated that "the operations of Japanese troops were of a demonstrably aggressive character." ”183”
Early in August, the Soviet forces launched resolute counter-action against the Japanese aggressors and cleared them out from Soviet territory on August 9. Heavily trounced, the Japanese had to retreat. A cease-fire agreement was achieved on August 10.
The defeat of the Japanese invaders in the area at Lake Khasan was a telling blow to the aggressive designs of imperialist Japan, those against the USSR, in particular. The Soviet head of government V. M. Molotov, summing up the events at Lake Khasan in his report to a meeting of the Moscow City Soviet on November 6, 1938, stated: "Can there be any doubt that the Japanese attack on our maritime provinces was a test of strength for launching a war in the Far East? Should the Soviet Union have failed to demonstrate the firmness of its foreign policy in real action and its immutable commitment to the defence of its frontiers by the force of the Red Army, that could well have served as an occasion for staging further acts of aggression. Our adamant position during those events brought those high-handed adventure-seekers both in Tokyo and Berlin back to their senses and compelled them to beat a retreat. Beyond dispute, the Soviet Union has thereby rendered the greatest possible service to the cause of peace." ”184”
The defeat of the Japanese troops at Lake Khasan was, in particular, a case of minor assistance to the Chinese people who went on fighting against the Japanese aggressors. Having demonstrated that the Japanese invaders were by no means omnipotent, those events went far towards reinforcing Chinese people’s will to resist the aggressors.
China Aided by the USSR Alone
Getting war equipment abroad was still much of a headache to China. In January 1938, the Chinese government sent an emergency mission to the USSR, Britain and France, led by the Chairman of the Legislative Yuan, Sun Fo, to ask the governments of these countries for aid to China in her struggle against aggression. On his arrival in Moscow, Sun Fo told the Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Stomonyakov, that "in waging their war against the invaders, that is, for their liberation, the Chinese people are drawing their strength from the sympathies and support of the USSR”.”185”
From Moscow Sun Fo proceeded to London and Paris only to return several months later empty-handed. In a conversation with Deputy People’s Commissar Potemkin on May 19, 1938, he admitted that the results of his tour were discouraging and that Britain and France avoided giving any aid to China. "The USSR remains the only country to l)e giving real aid to China," ”186” Sun Fo declared.
Britain’s position in relation to China could be clearly seen from the memorandum submitted by the Foreign Office to the British government’s Foreign Policy Committee on May 31. China, the memorandum said, "is fighting our own battle in the Far East, for, if Japan wins, our interests there are certainly doomed to extinction. The Japanese Army and other high authorities have left us in no doubt about that. Our immense vested interests in North China and Shanghai will be the first to go and the Japanese Army and Navy set no limits to their appetites on the Continent and in the South Seas. If China can only fight Japan to a stalemate, we and the Americans will then be able to intervene with effective results and safeguard our position for another generation.” ”187”
On the following day, the Chancellor of the Exchequer John Simon flatly declared in the Foreign Policy Committee, which was considering the matter, that there could be no question of a British government loan to China. He also expressed some very serious apprehension that assistance to China, even if insignificant, could entail most negative consequences for Anglo-Japanese relations.”188”
China was still getting aid From the Soviet Union alone. Another agreement was signed between the USSR and 139China in Moscow on July 1, 1938, under which the Soviet Union supplied China with 300 aircraft, 300 guns, 1,500 automatic rifles and 500 machine-guns, 300 lorries and other war equipment.”189”
In a letter to the Soviet government, the President of the Executive Yuan of China Rung Hsiang-hsi expressed "most profound gratitude" for "effective sympathy and genuine friendship”. Kung Hsiang-hsi pointed out that as a result of the "splendid and valuable assistance" in the shape of combat aircraft and other war equipment, China got an opportunity of "wearing out the enemy’s aggressive forces and keeping up a sustained struggle". ”19”° The British historian Keith Middlemas pointed out that the USSR, supplying China with munitions once more "appeared as champion of the free world against aggression".”191”
Experienced Soviet military advisers (V. I. Chuikov, P. S. Rybalko, P. F. Batitsky, A. I. Cherepanov, to name just a few) arrived in China to share in making plans for the conduct of war against the Japanese invaders and in training Chinese officers and men. Over 90,000 people had their training under the guidance of Soviet instructors in various educational establishments and units of the Chinese Army. Soviet airmen had volunteered to join the battle against the aggressors in China.”192”
In the summer of 1938, particularly in the face of the determined position taken up by the Soviet Union during the armed conflict at Lake Khasan, the Chinese government was once more pressing hard for a Sino-Soviet alliance to be concluded and for the USSR to enter the war against Japan.”193” However, the Soviet government exercised the necessary caution. While providing China with an increasing amount of war equipment, the Soviet Union did not find it possible to go to war against Japan. The Soviet Ambassador to China, I. G. Luganets-Orelsky emphasised in a conversation with Sun Fo that the Soviet Union, by its military, diplomatic and economic moves, had already prepared extensive ground for the development of Soviet-Chinese relations whereas to have concluded the pact as proposed by China could have had some materially negative consequences. ”194”
On September 8, 1938, the Soviet Ambassador had received the following instructions as to the answer to give to the Chinese government:
“1. At present the USSR does not consider it expedient to go to war against Japan in isolation from Britain or the United States. . .
2. The USSR will go to war against Japan only under Hie following three conditions: a) if Japan attacks the USSR; b) if Britain or the United States join the war against Japan; c) if the League of Nations obliges the Pacific Powers to confront Japan.
3. The USSR is prepared, under all circumstances to help China by supplying her with defence facilities under the treaties concluded between China and the USSR.” ”195”
On the same day, Luganets-Orelsky passed this reply to Sun Fo.
The defeat of the Japanese aggressors at Lake Khasan and the Soviet Union’s effective assistance to China clearly demonstrated the potentialities of the USSR as well as its determination to Lake the necessary steps towards checking the aggressors.