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Vilnis SipolsDiplomatic Battles Before World War II
SOVIET-GERMAN NON-AGGRESSION PACT
Soviet diplomacy was doing all it could to create a collective front to safeguard peace against aggression. It believed that peace in Europe could still be preserved by joint efforts of all the nations keen on preventing German aggression. Unfortunately, those efforts by the Soviet government were not crowned with success because of the policies of Britain and France.
The USSR remained, in point of fact, in international isolation in which it had found itself in the autumn of 1938 as a result of the Munich deal of Britain and France with German and Italian aggressors. Moreover, the Soviet Union had to take into account the fact that in the event of a German attack, it could be attacked also by certain of its western neighbours, as well as by Japan. So the Soviet state found itself face to face with a threat of war on two fronts. Besides, there was a danger of an anti-Soviet collusion of the entire imperialist camp.
The most important task before Soviet diplomacy was to forestall such a war. Since general peace and security could not be assured through the fault of Britain, France, the United States and some other countries, Soviet diplomacy had to do everything possible to limit the spread of German aggression and to keep the USSR as long as possible from being involved in war. It had to take steps to prevent the Soviet Union finding itself in a state of war in the West and in the East at once under extremely disadvantageous international conditions.
German Nazis Fearful of War with the USSR
Ever since the opening days of 1939, the German government began to show interest in normalizing relations with the USSR in some way. As one can see from utterances of Hitler and German military spokesmen, the Soviet Union was the only power whom Nazi Germany really feared to get into conflict with, and with whose position she reckoned.
Intent on channeling German aggression against the USSR the bourgeois propaganda machinery of the Western powers kept harping on the weakness of the Red Army and the fragility of the Soviet home front. Bourgeois newspapers kept claiming that the USSR was a giant with feet of clay. They sought to convince Hitler that he would quite easily make short shrift of the Soviet Union. It must be noted at this point, however, that they did not succeed in convincing Hitler and it was the ruling circles of the Western powers themselves that fell for these tales. Lord Halifax claimed at a meeting of the British government’s Foreign Policy 255Committee on July 4, that "Hitler rated Russia low from the military point of view”. “153” Hence, the natural conclusion: Nazi Germany will go East. Subsequently the British people had to pay in blood for the wishful thinking Chamberlain and his following substituted for reality.
The Nazis themselves used to write quite a lot in those years about the weakness of the USSR in an attempt to sustain the hope of the governing quarters of the Western powers that all the concern of the Nazi Reich was to do away with the Soviet State. When it came, however, to deciding, by deed, not by word, who of the opponents was the weaker side, and with whom it was less dangerous to fight, it turned out that Germany was prepared to measure swords with anybody but the Soviet Union in 1939.”154”
The German military command, taking into account the Red Army’s strength, considered that to fight the Soviet Union Germany must first build up her military potential at the expense of the countries of Western Europe, to " safeguard the rear”, create the necessary coalition and create a wide springboard for attack.”155”
This was proved with conclusive evidence by the testimonials of German generals Keitel and Brauchitsch. Asked by Hitler to say what would happen if the Reich attacked Poland, and France and Britain would come to her aid, both generals said they felt that Germany would finish Poland up within a month. Keitel believed that Germany would then crush France and Britain as well. Then Hitler put another question, what would happen if the USSR came out against Germany, too? General Brauchitsch replied that in that case "Germany would be beaten".”156”
The Nazis realised that had there been close co-operation between the USSR, Britain and France, Germany would have found herself in a very tight corner. Referring to Hitler’s comments in his conversation with Wehrmacht chiefs, the chief of the General Staff of Germany’s Land Forces, Haider, said: "It’s hard to swallow a pact between the British and the Russians. . . On the other hand, it’s the only tiling that will slop Hitler now."“157” Ribbentrop’s representative W. Hewel also quoted the Nazi Chancellor’s comment that in the event of the Moscow talks ending up in the conclusion of an alliance between the Western powers and the USSR, he would have had to give up the idea of attacking Poland. If the Western powers failed to sign an alliance 256with the USSR, Hitler declared, "I can smash Poland without any danger of a conflict with the West." “158”
This has been confirmed also by diaries of Weizsacker, State Secretary of German Ministry for Foreign Affairs. He wrote on July 30 that whether or not there was to be a war that summer depended on the outcome of the Anglo– Franco-Soviet negotiations in Moscow.”159”
Spokesmen of a faction within the German ruling establishment who believed that Germany was not prepared for a major war as yet and feared that one more warlike venture by Hitler could end up in Germany’s defeat, sent their representative to London to warn the British about Hitler’s plans. The man they had chosen to carry out that mission was an official of the German Foreign Ministry, Erich Kordt, whose brother Theodor Kordt worked as counsellor of the German embassy in London. The trip was undertaken under a perfectly plausible pretext: Erich had decided to pay a visit to his brother. Having arrived in London in the latter half of May, Erich Kordt had a secret meeting with R. Vansittart. lie warned that Hitler was still sure that Britain and France did not intend to lend Poland effective help. "What he is frightened of is Soviet Russia”, “16”° Erich Kordt declared.
Early in August Hitler declared on several occasions that he would not undertake military operations against Poland before he felt sure that Russia would not come to her aid.”161”
The USSR Rejected German Proposals
Since Hitler did not consider Germany for the time being to be adequately prepared to attack the USSR, he told Ribbentrop that it was "necessary to stage a new Rapallo episode in German-Russian relations" and that "it will be necessary to pursue a policy of equilibrium and economic cooperation with Moscow for a certain period of time".”162” As Weizsacker wrote later on, they had "begun to woo the Russians". ”163”
That became apparent shortly afterwards from the tone of German press comments. The German papers gradually stopped publishing all references to German plans with regard to the Ukraine just as any of their typical anti-Soviet insinuations. At the New Year’s reception on January 12, 257Hitler chatted for a few minutes with Soviet Ambassador A. F. Merekalov, something he had never done before on similar occasions. Hitler subsequently confessed that at that very reception he set course towards an accord with the USSR.”164” It was likewise typical of Hitler’s speeches of January 20 and April 28 that they lacked his earlier standard invectives against the Soviet Union. On May 12, 1939, the Soviet Charge d’Affaires in Germany, G. A. Astakhov, reported to Moscow that "the Germans are striving to create the impression of German-Soviet relations becoming or having already become warmer. Dismissing all absurd rumors fabricated here by the Germans or by importune foreign correspondents, one can state for the time being only one thing as a certain fact, and that is a marked change of the tone of the German press in dealing with us... But, while noting these points, we cannot, of course, close our eyes to their outstanding superficiality and to their character that is in no way binding on the Germans. . . The motives which make the Germans change their tone in dealing with us are much too clear to take them seriously enough." ”165”
Representatives of the German government most cautiously broached the question of a possible improvement of German-Soviet relations also in their conversations with Soviet diplomats. So, on May 17, Astakhov conferred with a high-ranking German Foreign Ministry official, an expert on economic affairs, J. Schnurre, on the question of the status of the Soviet trade delegation in Prague. During that conversation Schnurre tried to touch also "the subject of an improvement of Soviet-German relations”. The German representative started making "assurances that Germany has no aggressive designs whatsoever in respect of the USSR" and asked what was to be done to dispel Soviet mistrust. However, Astakhov declared that the Soviet government had no "evidence about any fundamental change of German policy”. He remarked tersely that an improvement of the climate in relations between the two countries depended on the German government.”168”
On May 20, the German Ambassador in Moscow, von Schulenburg, raised with Molotov the question of resuming economic conversations. To that end he proposed a visit by J. Schnurre to Moscow. The Soviet government, however, did not consider it possible, in view of the strained political 258relations between the USSR and Germany, to conduct negotiations about increasing trade and economic links between the two countries. The People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs indicated as much to the German Ambassador He pointed out that economic conversations had begun several times with Germany during the recent period, but invariably proved inconclusive. That was what gave the Soviet government the reason to tell the German side that it had the impression that the German government meant to stage a kind of game instead of businesslike negotiations on trade and economic issues. For this sort of game the People’s Commissar said in his conversation with Schulenburg, Germany should look for another country as a partner, not the USSR which had no intention of joining in such a game.”167” Discouraged by that answer, Schulenburg called on Deputy People’s Commissar Potemkin straightaway and “complained” to him in confusion that he was at a loss about what he should report to his government. But Potemkin could not “comfort” the Ambassador either.”168”
That negative reply, although the Germans were prepared for it, could not but discourage them. The men in Berlin began planning further “moves” in confusion, but, fearful of yet another setback, they did not venture to make them. An outline letter to Schulenburg, prepared by Weizsacker, reflected the apprehension that yet another appeal to the USSR "risked inviting another refusal”. Tn the final text of the letter mailed to Moscow on May 27, Weizsacker pointed out that a further German approach could make Moscow burst into laughter. Therefore Schulenburg was told to exercise "complete restraint" for the time being.”169”
With Hitler’s approval it was decided to undertake a further sounding in Berlin. On May 30 Weizsacker pointed out in his conversation with Astakhov that Germany had taken off the agenda the "Ukrainian question" thereby removing a pretext for a war between the two countries. He said there was a chance of improving Soviet-German relations. "If the Soviet Government wants to talk on this subject,” he continued, "there is such an opportunity. If, however, it means to ’encircle’ Germany together with Britain and France and wants to act against Germany, we will get ready for it." ”17”°
After that conversation Weizsacker put down in his diary 259that the German government was "making advances" but the Russians were still "showing mistrust”. ”171”
On June 17, 1939, Schulenburg, coming to Berlin for more instructions, talked it over with Aslakhov in yet more definite terms.”172” Referring to Astakhov’s conversation with Weizsacker, Schulenburg asked why the Soviet government was not reacting to the questions Weizsacker had put. Yet he got no answer to his own question either. The Soviet government did not reply to the approaches of Nazi diplomats, while pressing on for an agreement with Britain and France. Schulenburg had to state in his report about this conversation that Astakhov had once more emphasised Moscow’s distrust in Germany’s policy.”173”
On his return to Moscow, Schulenburg called on the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs on June 29. He assured him that "the German government desires not only to normalise but even improve its relations with the USSR”. Schulenburg stressed that this statement, which he made on behalf of Ribbentrop, had Hitler’s approval. In the course of this conversation he referred, in particular, to the 1926 Soviet-German Treaty of Neutrality. The Soviet People’s Commissar ironically expressed his amazement at the fact that the German government still remembered that treaty; the Soviet government had quite a few doubts on this score. Considering the actual record of experience, the People’s Commissar pointed out, the validity of treaties could well be open to doubt. ”174”
On the following day, the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs cabled an urgent message to Schulenburg to tell him that "in the political field enough has been said until further instructions and that for the moment the talks should not be taken up again by us".”175” For a whole month the Germans no longer ventured to approach the Soviet government on these matters.
The soundings were resumed late in July when Britain’s consent to start military conversations with the USSR became known in Berlin. On July 24 J. Schnurre, with reference to Ribbentrop, told G. A. Astakhov "about the need to improve political relations between the USSR and Germany”. He expressed his disappointment over the fact that "the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs left unanswered all German overtures with the view of talking this subject over".”176” In a subsequent conversation with 260Astakhov on July 26, Schnurre repeated these remarks.”177”
On August 3, 1939, G. A. Astakhov was invited to see Ribbentrop. The German Minister declared that there were no unresolvable issues between the USSR and Germany "all over the land from the Black Sea to the Baltic. Agreement on all of these issues can be achieved if the Soviet government shares these underlying principles”. In an effort to put up some pressure, Ribbentrop did not conceal that Germany was conducting secret negotiations with Britain and France. At the same time Ribbentrop resorted once more to unequivocal threats. "If you have different prospects”, he said, "if, for instance, you consider that the best way to adjust relations with us is by inviting Anglo-French Missions to Moscow, that is, of course, up to you. As far as we are concerned, we do not pay any attention to all the hue and cry against us from the camp of so-called West European democracies. We are strong enough to look at their threats with contempt and derision. We are sure of our strength; there is no war which we could not win." ”178”
On the same day, German Ambassador Schulenburg put the same questions to Molotov. After pointing out that normalization of Soviet-German relations would meet the desire of the Soviet government, the People’s Commissar declared straight away that it was not through the Soviet government’s fault that these relations had deteriorated, and pinpointed the Anti-Comintern Pact as the root cause behind bad German-Soviet relations. The People’s Commissar went on to cite examples of anti-Soviet foreign policy of the Third Reich; support for, and encouragement of Japanese aggression against the USSR and the Munich Agreement. How could all that be reconciled with the Ambassador’s assurances that Germany had no hostile designs against the USSR? He then made it clear that the Soviet government did not trust the peaceful assurances of the Nazis regarding Poland. A peaceful settlement of the Polish question, he said, depends, above all, on the German side.”179”
Schulenburg’s conclusions from that conversation were disappointing once again. In his dispatch to Berlin on August 4, he stated that the Soviet government "was determined to conclude an agreement with Britain and France." ”18”° Three days later Schulenburg wrote that in Moscow "at every word and at every step one can sense the great 261distrust towards us. That this is so, we have known for a long time.” The unfortunate part of it is that the mistrust is very easily kindled, "and can only be allayed slowly and with difficulty.” ”181”
Weizsacker stated on August B that the Germans were making increasingly hard efforts to reach an agreement, but Moscow left those feelers unheeded. ”182”
There is enough documentary evidence to indicate that the Soviet government saw through the insidious designs of the Nazis. For instance, on August 8, 1939, G. A. Astakhov reported to Moscow that Nazi chiefs were not, naturally, going "to respect appropriate eventual commitments in earnest and for a long time. I think only that in the foreseeable future, they find possible a certain measure of agreement. . . As to the way things may shape up in the future, everything would depend, of course, not on these commitments, but on a new environment that would be created.” G. A. Astakhov pointed out that the Germans were "obviously worried by our conversations with Anglo-French military men, and they are not stinting any arguments and promises of the largest possible order so as to forestall an eventual military agreement. For this sake, they are not prepared, as far as I can see, to make such declarations and gestures as could have seemed ruled out altogether several years back".”183”
Even Western students and political journalists have had to recognise the extreme complexity of the Soviet Union’s position in view of the reluctance of the Western powers to co-operate with it in the defence of peace in Europe. Here is, for instance, an excerpt from a book by British historian L. Mosley about the opening stages of the Second World War. Speaking of the natural rise of suspicion in the USSR regarding the motives behind Britain’s and France’s policies, he wrote that the Soviet leaders realised that they "could trust neither side. They feared that at any moment the procrastinating representatives of the democracies and the tempting talkers in Berlin would reveal themselves as tricksters and turn to each other once again as they had at Munich, leaving the Russians more isolated than ever. It was a time for caution." ”184”
Without ever reacting to the advances by German diplomats, the Soviet government persistently strove for the success of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations. But in the 262middle of August it became perfectly obvious to the Soviet government that it was altogether impossible to come to terms with the governments of Britain and France about the conclusion of an effective treaty of mutual assistance.
So there was a kind of vicious circle: Britain and France wanted an accommodation with Germany, but she balked at it; German strove to get a treaty of non-aggression signed with the USSR, but the Soviet government turned down the German offers; the USSR was seeking a treaty of mutual assistance with Britain and France, but they shied away from it.
Incontestable evidence that Britain and France did not want to co-operate with the Soviet Union was provided by the British government’s documents about Anglo– Franco-Soviet conversations which have recently been declassified (although not in their totality) and made available to researchers. None of the pronouncements of Chamberlain, Halifax and any other British Ministers at Cabinet meetings or in the Foreign Policy Committee, nor the memoranda submitted for their consideration contained any statements or documents to attest to a desire to conclude an effective treaty with the USSR about mutual assistance in opposing Nazi aggression. On the contrary, as shown earlier on, these documents prove beyond dispute that the British ruling quarters pursued entirely different objectives in the conversations with the USSR.
Right until mid-August 1939, that is, so long as the slightest hope remained for the conclusion of an Anglo-French-Soviet agreement, the Soviet government left all German approaches unanswered. Yet because of the breakdown of the Three-Power talks, it was no longer possible to ignore the German overtures.
Since the Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks were clearly inconclusive, the Soviet government faced, in point of fact, the following alternative:
either to watch passively how Germany was overrunning or otherwise bringing into submission all the East European countries bordering on the USSR, occupying advantageous strategic vantage grounds for a subsequent attack on the USSR, and that at a time when any armed conflict breaking out near Soviet frontiers could erupt into full scale hostilities;
or, taking advantage of Germany’s indisposition to go to 263war against the USSR at the time, to do everything possible under the circumstances for limiting the spread of German aggression so as to safeguard to the utmost the interests of the USSR as well as those of other nations and peoples of Eastern Europe, and to avert the possibility of spontaneous unpremeditated hostilities between Germany and the USSR.
Meanwhile, German diplomacy grew increasingly active.
On August 14, 1939, Schulenburg got instructions from Ribbentrop to call on the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs on an urgent mission to make a statement that Britain and France were trying again to drive the Soviet Union into war against Germany. In 1914 this policy had serious consequences for Russia. It is the compelling interest of both countries to avoid for all future time the destruction of Germany and Russia in the interests of Western powers. By drawing such a prospect of Germany’s war against the USSR, the German government expressed its willingness to conclude a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. On the following day, the German Ambassador read out this statement to Molotov. Reporting to Berlin about it, Schulenburg pointed out that although the People’s Commissar had welcomed Germany’s intention to improve relations with the USSR, he still gave no straight reply to the questions asked, including the one about a possible arrival of Ribbentrop in Moscow.”185”
Berlin grew manifestly impatient. On August 17 Schulenburg called on the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs once again to confirm that Germany was prepared to conclude a non-aggression pact and ready to guarantee the Baltic States jointly with the USSR, also the German government promised to exercise influence on Japan for normalizing Japanese-Soviet relations. Schulenburg reported that Germany’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Ribbentrop was prepared to come to Moscow on August 18 or on any subsequent day.”186” Hitler declared that he was prepared to come to Moscow personally if need be.”187”
The reply given to the German Ambassador was that Soviet-German relations should be improved through a series of practical steps, while the coming of the German Minister was impossible without preliminary thorough arrangements. Moreover, the People’s Commissar again referred to Germany’s anti-Soviet foreign policy down the years.”188”
On instructions from Ribbentrop, Schulenburg, conferring with Molotov on August 19, once more insisted on the immediate visit by the German Minister to Moscow, only to be refused once again. ”189”
Non-Aggression Pact Signed
On August 20, 1939, Hitler addressed a message to Stalin to say that a "crisis may arise any day" and it might involve the Soviet Union unless it agreed to sign a non– aggression treaty with Germany. "1 therefore again propose”, the message said, "that you receive my Foreign Minister on Tuesday, August 22, but, at the latest on Wednesday, August 23. The Reich Foreign Minister has the fullest powers to draw up and sign the non-aggression pact." “19”°
It was impossible to decline the German overtures any longer. For it was necessary to forestall the outbreak of war across the Soviet Western border, when Soviet forces in the Far East were already engaged in fierce fighting against the Japanese aggressors in the area of the Khalkin-Gol River, that is there was a serious danger of war breaking out in the West and in the East at once, with the USSR having to fight it without any allies. In no way overestimating the value of the treaties signed with Germany, the Soviet government still found it necessary to accept the German offer this time.
It was in the evening of August 21, following the inconclusive last session of the conversations between the British, French, and Soviet military missions, that the Soviet government finally agreed to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs coming to Moscow on August 23.
But that did not mean that the Soviet government had given up all further attempts to get an agreement concluded with Britain and France. On the following morning, foreign news agency reporters in Moscow were told that Ribbentrop’s arrival for the conclusion of the non-aggression pact was not inconsistent with the continuation of negotiations between the British, French, and Soviet military delegations with a view to organising resistance to aggression. On the contrary, the conclusion of the non-aggression pact was quite compatible with the conclusion of a triple alliance between France, Britain and the USSR, These acts 265did not cancel each other out at all. The Anglo-Franco– Soviet pact, supplemented with a military agreement, had the aim of checking Germany, if she persisted in her aggressive designs. For the USSR and Germany to have concluded a non-aggression pact would have meant reducing the tension between the two countries. “191”
Ribbentrop arrived in Moscow on August 23 to sign the non-aggression pact.
One cannot help noting in this context a difference of principle between the approach of the governments of Britain and France, on the one hand, and that of Germany, on the other, to negotiations with the USSR. The German government unequivocally declared through its Ambassador in Moscow that it wished to conclude a non-aggression treaty with the USSR. The German head of government addressed a special message to Stalin on this matter. There was the German Foreign Minister in Moscow. These facts could not but point to Germany’s true desire to conclude a treaty with the USSR without any delay. But all that was in sharp contrast to the attitude of London and Paris to the negotiations with the Soviet Union. While the Soviet government had spent months on end for inconclusive negotiations with Britain and France, it took but one day to draw up the text of the Soviet-German Treaty of Nonaggression and sign it.
The Treaty, signed in the small hours of August 24, contained the commitments of non-aggression (Article I) and a statement on refusing assistance to a power attacking one of the contracting parties (Article II). Both parties undertook to inform one another on matters involving their common interests (Article III) and to stay out of any group of powers, directly or indirectly spearheaded against the other party. The Treaty was concluded for a term of 10 years.
The Soviet government’s decision to conclude this treaty was an enforced, but the only right one, too, under the circumstances of the day because there had been no chance of ever creating an Anglo-Franco-Soviet coalition.
Conferring with the French Ambassador on August 23, 1939, Molotov emphasised that the Soviet government had decided to conclude the treaty with Germany only after it had definitely found that it could achieve nothing positive through the Anglo-Franco-Soviet conversations.”192”
In an interview for Izvestia, People’s Commissar for Defence Voroshilov also pointed out that the USSR had concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany because the "military conversations with France and Britain have reached a deadlock because of insurmountable differences." “193”
Even the French military attache in the USSR, Palasse admitted that throughout the Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks, the Soviet government showed its sincere interest in the conclusion of the Three-Power agreement and that to sign a treaty with Germany was the only right step for it to take under the circumstances. Writing on August 27 about the position of the Soviet government, he said: "1 still believe that fearful of the excessive strengthening of Germany, it would have preferred an agreement with France and with Britain, should it have proved possible at all.” “194”
The Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars and Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Molotov, declared at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR a few days later that since the negotiations with Britain and France showed there was no grooving for expecting to conclude a mutual assistance pact with them, the Soviet government could not fail to consider other ways of removing the danger of war between Germany and the USSR. "Our duty”, he stressed, "is to think of the interests of the Soviet people and of the interests of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The more so since we are firmly convinced that the interests of the USSR coincide with the basic interests of the people of other countries." “195”
The German government, while concluding the treaty of non-aggression with the USSR, pledged itself not to encroach on Soviet land. At the same time, it was to relinquish its plans of alienation of the Soviet Ukraine and to create a vassal "Ukrainian state" as, equally, the plans for its domination of the Baltic states including the idea of turning them into a springboard from which to attack the USSR.
By signing the non-aggression pact with Germany, the Soviet government contributed towards peace-keeping in the Far Eastern border areas of the USSR. The conclusion of the treaty caused confusion among the governing quarters of Japan which counted on Germany as their main ally in a war against the USSR. "The news of the conclusion of the non-aggression pact between the USSR and 267Germany has produced a staggering impression over there, causing obvious disarray, particularly among the militarists and the fascist camp”,”196” said a message from the Soviet Embassy in Japan. The Hiranuma government, which was building its policy on anti-Soviet collaboration with Germany fell. Japan had to reconsider her plans and to refrain from invading the Soviet Far East for a while.
Japan found her position weakened in respect of China as well. On August 26, 1939, the Chinese Ambassador in Moscow, Yang Chieh said in a conversation with S. A. Lozovsky, Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, that he welcomed the conclusion of the Soviet-German pact of non-aggression because that treaty "will, no doubt, be a blow to Japan.” “197”
The Soviet Government did, naturally, realise that it was impossible to rely on the non-aggression pact with Germany providing safety from aggression. It was clear that as soon as Nazis found themselves strong enough to do so, they would bring all their forces into action against the USSR.”198”
When the Soviet-German non-aggression pact came up for ratification in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, it was stressed that it "cannot blunt our vigilance".”199”
The USSR Wanted Talks with Britain and France Continued
Even after the signing of the Soviet-German Treaty of Non-Aggression, the Soviet government was still interested in co-operating with Britain and France. As the French Ambassador, Naggiar communicated to the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow, L. Steinhardt on August 23, Molotov had told him that "the non-aggression pact with Germany is not inconsistent with an alliance of mutual assistance between Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union”. The Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars noted, however, the difficulties arising from Poland’s refusal to accept Soviet aid. “20”° Molotov also emphasised that the SovietFrench Treaty remained in force as it stood.”201”
The French military attache in Moscow, Palasse, cabled to Paris on the same day: "I still consider that for the USSR to have settled the matter by concluding an 268agreement with Germany was nothing but the best of the two evils, and, perhaps, a means of exercising pressure with a view to bringing about a sound and integrally well-welded coalition as soon as possible which, as it has always seemed to me, is an object of the Soviet leaders’ desire."“202” On August 24, the Foreign Office informed the British embassy in Washington about Molotov’s statement that " negotiations with France and Britain could be continued somewhat later, say in a week".”203”
However, the British and French military missions were ordered back to London and Paris. When they paid a courtesy call on Voroshilov on August 25, the latter told them: "Unfortunately, we have not succeeded in coming to agreement this time. But let us hope that on another occasion our work will be more successful." “204”
The matter came up again during the conversation the Soviet Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, S. A. Lozovsky, had with Yang Chieh, the Chinese Ambassador, on August 26. Replying to the Ambassador’s question as to whether the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations would continue, the Deputy People’s Commissar declared that "negotiations with Britain and France went on for five months, and the departure of the delegation is but an episode in these talks. Delegations come and go, but the issue of the battle for peace remains. This departure is not due in any way to the conclusion of the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany, but to a lack of agreement on a number of issues. Should Britain and France accept the proposals of the Soviet government, the possibility of a treaty being concluded with them cannot be ruled out.. . At the present time, the negotiations are being suspended, but their resumption depends on Britain and France".”205”
What was to be done further on was an issue that came up for debate at a French government meeting on August 24. Daladier expressed the view that negotiations with the Russians should be resumed. On the following day, one of his assistants, R. Genebrier suggested that a former French Air Minister Pierre Cot (who had consistently advocated co-operation with the USSR ever since 1933) should be sent to Moscow, in the hope that he could bring off the process of concluding an agreement. Doumenc also suggested that it was still possible to conclude an alliance 269with the USSR. Yet no positive decisions on the matter were taken by the French government.”206”
The Chamberlain government made feverish attempts in those days, however, to secure a last-minute agreement with the rulers of the Nazi Reich, having lost all interest in the negotiations with the Soviet Union. So the events in the closing week of August of 1939 finally confirmed that what London and Paris sought was not an agreement with the USSR, but yet another imperialist collusion with the Nazi Reich.
The course of events made it quite clear how far-sighted and correct the Soviet government’s policy was. Just as it feared, Britain and Prance did not offer the slightest aid to Poland after she had been attacked by the Nazi Reich. As long as there was a war going on in the Fast of Europe, the French forces were sitting it out behind the Maginot Line. That was the beginning of what came to be called the "phony war”. Had the USSR imprudently assumed any unilateral commitments at the time of the Anglo– Franco-Soviet talks while the British and French governments dodged all concrete obligations regarding active opposition to the aggressor in the West with fairly large forces, the Soviet Union could have found itself in a state of war with Germany without any true allies.