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  Vilnis Sipols

Diplomatic Battles Before World War II

Chapter IV

ON THE THRESHOLD OF WAR  NAZI ACTS OF AGGRESSION. POSITIONS OF THE USSR AND WESTERN POWERS

The spring of 1939 proved to be the last one before the war. A certain calm which was in evidence during the winter months was coming to an end. That was the calm before the storm. The Nazi Reich was heading for war.

By March the Nazi plans of aggression began to materialize. Here is how they were set out on March 13 by Ribbentrop’s adviser Peter Kleist who had helped him work out those plans. The decision was to occupy the whole of Czechoslovakia whereupon Germany would be holding Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia in her grip and would have created a military threat to Poland. The annexation of Memel would enable Germany to "strike root, solid and firm, in the Baltic as well”. Whereas in earlier times, the idea was to involve Poland in war against the USSR, now Germany’s intentions had changed. "It is obvious,” Kleist said, "that Poland must first be territorially divided (with the regions once belonging to Germany being detached and a West Ukrainian state formed under a German protectorate) and politically organised (with Polish state leaders reliable from the German point of view being appointed) . . . .” All those measures were to strengthen Germany’s rear whereupon the idea was to launch an "action against the West”. Somewhat later he specified that the rout of Poland would be followed by a "Western phase" which was to have ended in the defeat of France and Britain. After that, the "great and decisive clash with the Soviet Union .and the smashing of the Soviets would become possible." “1”

German Aggressors in Prague

Hitler’s troops entered Prague on March 15, 1939. Czechoslovakia was liquidated as an independent slate by German Nazism. Although Britain and France, while foisting the terms of the Munich deal on Czechoslovakia, had promised her their guarantees of aid, they gave her none in those tragic days.

The British government had precise information about the coming events four days in advance. Yet it feigned ignorance. It was only on March 14 that Halifax, faced by increasingly alarming news reaching London called a conference to consider the line Britain was going to take. It was agreed, his assistant Oliver Harvey wrote later on in his account of that meeting, that "we must make no empty threats since we were not going to fight for Czechoslovakia. . . . We should not, however, regard ourselves as in any way guaranteeing Czechoslovakia".”2”

Chamberlain unofficially informed the Fuhrer that he "quite sympathized with Germany’s move" in seizing Czechoslovakia, "even though he was unable to say so in public".”3”

 

That was also the position of the United States. Assistant Secretary of State A. Berle pointed out in his diaries on March 17 that Roosevelt "was not particularly bothered" by Germany’s seizure of Czechoslovakia: "Like many Englishmen, /he/ may have calculated that a German advance to the East would at least afford relief" to Britain and France.”4”

It was the Soviet government alone that proceeded from a position of principle in its reaction to the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia.

A detailed account of Soviet foreign policy in the prevailing circumstances was given in the Report by the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) to the 18th Party Congress which was presented by Stalin on March 10, 1939. He criticised both the aggressors and the policy of encouraging aggression which was pursued by the Western powers. The Report contained a serious warning that the big and dangerous political gamble started by the partisans of nonintervention policy might well end in a serious failure for them. It pointed out that it was necessary to "show caution and not to allow our country to be involved in conflicts by the instigators of war who are used to having somebody else pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them".

The Report contained a clear and well-defined account of the fundamentals of Soviet foreign policy:

“1. We stand for peace and for the consolidation of business contacts with all nations, we stand and we shall stand by this principle as long as these nations abide by the same type of relationship with the Soviet Union and as long as they refrain from infringing the interests of our country.

2. We stand for peaceful, close and good-neighbourly relations with all neighbouring countries having a common border with the USSR...

3. We stand for supporting the peoples who have fallen victim to aggression and who are in battle for their national independence. .."“5”

The USSR strongly condemned Nazi aggression against Czechoslovakia and branded the aggressors. On March 18, the Soviet government sent a note to the government of Germany, pointing out that Germany’s action "cannot but be qualified arbitrary, violent and aggressive”. The Soviet government declared that it could not agree to Czechoslovakia being incorporated in the German Empire.”6”

By seizing Czechoslovakia, Germany did away with one of the possible allies of France and other opponents of the Reich in the event of war. It is worth recalling that Czechoslovakia could have fielded upwards of 30 well-armed divisions in case of war. Now, however, those arms could be used by the Nazis for an attack on other countries. Having surrounded Poland from three sides, the Nazi Reich obtained extremely good vantage ground for attacking her. The position of Romania had drastically worsened as well, notably because she had been supplied with war equipment by the Skoda factories.

 

London Changed Methods, Not Aims

Having moved into a position of advantage, by occupying Czechoslovakia, to go ahead with its aggression, the Nazi Reich started preparing to attack Poland. An immediate danger of German aggression faced Romania and many other European countries, too.

Meanwhile, the forces of the European countries, threatened by aggression, turned out to be disunited because of the subversive action by the aggressors and the policy of the Munich “appeasers”. London and Paris did whatever they could to channel German aggression against the USSR, having first put it into international isolation. But when it became clear in the spring of 1939 that the Nazi Reich preferred to deal with weaker opponents for the time being rather than with the USSR, it turned out that by trying to isolate the Soviet Union, Britain, France, Poland and some other countries had placed themselves in a position of still greater and more dangerous isolation.

The ruling circles of Britain and France finally had to admit that they would never secure "general settlement" with Germany by means of their earlier concessions and handouts.

Without giving up the earlier objectives of their policies, the British and French governments decided to take some steps towards strengthening their international positions. That was what brought about the Anglo-French guarantees for Poland and some other countries. To try and induce Hitler to change his plans and, eventually, accept the idea of a "general settlement”, that is, one of imperialist collusion with Britain and France, the British and French governments decided to scare the Nazis a bit by a possible Anglo-Franco-Soviet rapprochement.

Neither Chamberlain nor Daladier, however, had so much as contemplated any rapprochement, let alone co-operation, with the USSR in the struggle against aggression. That was nothing more than a diplomatic trick in a bid to divert the dangerous hurricane that was brewing in the centre of Europe, and turn it eastwards.

London and Paris saw their links with the countries of Eastern Europe and their contact with the USSR as the last resort they might turn to if the Western powers failed to come to terms with the Nazis and found themselves at war with Germany.

Besides, the British and French governments feared that should the Soviet Union, faced by the stance of Britain and France, have finally concluded that it was impossible to set up a collective front to safeguard peace, it would have to look for other ways to assure its own security. In particular, they were afraid that the USSR, once forced into 207isolation, might agree to some form of normalizing relations with Germany, for instance, by signing a non-aggression pact with her.”7” Now, Germany’s intention to reduce tensions in relations with the Soviet Union somehow was no longer much of a secret to the diplomatic services of the Western powers.

 

The ruling circles of Britain and France had to take into account, besides, the mounting demand of the mass of the people in their countries for steps to avert the danger of aggression and, in particular, to establish close co– operation with the USSR.

Soviet Initiative in Calling a Conference

The aggressive plans, being harbored by Germany, Japan and Italy, were, indisputably, a tremendous danger to the USSR. The oft-repeated statements by German Nazis and Japanese militarists that they considered the destruction of the Soviet state to be their overriding objective were well known.

The Soviet government, considering the mounting danger of war, was taking additional measures to build up national defences. The growing Soviet defence strength was,, undoubtedly, the major factor which had deterred the aggressors for a time from action against the USSR.

At the same time, the Soviet Union was prepared to make the utmost contribution towards action to avert aggression and keep the peace. Should Britain and France have displayed a real desire to co-operate with the USSR, that would have been fully reciprocated by the Soviet government to stem the tide of German aggression.

Naturally, the Soviet government could not fail to take into account the bitter experience of earlier years, above all, of the immediately preceding developments when the governments of Britain and France had openly set course towards an imperialist deal with Hitler and Mussolini, in Munich and afterwards. For the foreign policies of Britain and France in those years betrayed their reluctance to cooperate with the USSR in the struggle against aggression. It was clear that they had no objection to German and Japanese aggression, provided it was against the Soviet Union, not against them.

Nevertheless, the Soviet government still earnestly tried in the spring and summer of 1939 Lo come to terms with Britain and France on a collective peace-keeping front so as, by joint efforts, to curb the Nazi aggressors and prevent them starting war. There was a hope that the increasingly aggressive policy of the Nazis and the mounting pressure from the mass of the people in Britain and France, worried as they were by the threat of war, could eventually force a change in the position of the British and French governments. But, as this book will yet show, the British and French ruling circles had brought the negotiations just started with the USSR to a deadlock, having thus cleared the way for the Nazi Reich to trigger off the war.

That was demonstrated by the very opening of Soviet British contacts in March 1939.

Two days after the German troops had been moved into Czechoslovakia, it was learned in London that the Nazis were hard at work to establish their economic and political domination of Romania. The matter was treated as urgent at a British Cabinet meeting on March 18. There was the apprehension that this might lead to Germany establishing her domination of Europe and to German troops reaching the Mediterranean with the result that Britain might be reduced to the status of a second-rate power. Should the Romanian agricultural products and oil have fallen into Germany’s hands, Britain’s attempts to impose a blockade on the Reich in the event of war would have been futile. The British Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, Lord Chatfield, admitted that Britain was not in a position to prevent German domination of Romania. But with Poland and the USSR ready to take part in agreement, the situation would have been entirely different. In such a case, Britain should have joined forces with them in resisting German aggression. The government confined itself, however, to deciding to inquire about the position of the governments of the USSR, Poland, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Greece and Romania, and also to reach an understanding with France on eventual action.”8”

On the same day the British Ambassador in Moscow, W. Seeds, asked the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov, about the position the Soviet Union would take in the event of German aggression against Romania. The Soviet government decided to take the opportunity to 209raise the question of collective action to oppose aggression as a matter of the utmost gravity. A few hours later Seeds was in possession of the Soviet government’s proposal for the immediate international conference to be called by the USSR, Britain, France, Poland, Romania and Turkey.”9”

London Deemed Action Against Aggression “Premature”

Chamberlain and Halifax decided to turn down this proposal as inconsistent with the general tenor of their foreign policy without even so much as bringing it before the government. On March 19, Halifax told the Soviet Ambassador in London that to call the Soviet-proposed conference would be “premature”.”10” The said Soviet proposal was also communicated to the French government but there had been no reply whatsoever from France. The Soviet government could make only one conclusion, and that is that Britain and France were essentially carrying on their former policies. ”11”

Since it was still utterly impossible to fail to react to Nazi Germany’s acts of aggression altogether, Halifax submitted a proposal, formulated together with Chamberlain the day before, to a British Cabinet meeting on March 20 to publish a declaration by the governments of Britain, France, the USSR and Poland whereby they would "pledge to consult together" in the event of any danger to the political independence of any European state. Not even Halifax could fail to admit that the publication of such a declaration about consultations "was not a very heroic decision”. Chamberlain, on the contrary, considered that the draft had an advantage in the sense that it avoided "specific commitments" and left it open what would constitute a “threat” and what particular steps should be taken in the event of such a threat. The draft was approved by the members of the Cabinet. ”12”

After the Cabinet meeting Halifax brought the draft declaration to the knowledge of the French Ambassador in London, Corbin. The latter stated with ample ground that such a declaration would be interpreted by other nations to mean that in the event of fresh aggression the four powers would only talk rather than take any action.”13” Halifax 210found himself compelled to accept some corrections in the draft declaration.

On March 21, the British government proposed that Britain, France, the USSR and Poland should join in producing a declaration to say that, in the event of any action constituting a threat to the political independence of any European nation, they pledged themselves to consult together immediately about steps to be taken for common resistance to such action.”14”

The publication of such a declaration could not have been anything like a serious means to counter aggression. But since even that declaration could have been at least some step forward towards creating a peace-keeping front, the Soviet government took but a day to give its consent.”15” A few days later, however, British Assistant Foreign Secretary Cadogan told the Soviet Ambassador that "the Poles quite categorically, and Romanians somewhat less decisively have announced that they will not join any combination (be it in form of declaration or any other form) that will also include the USSR".”16”

Because of their class hatred of the USSR, the Polish ruling circles did not wish to co-operate with it even in the face of a mortal danger to Poland. In the hope of somehow coming to an understanding with the Nazis, they did not want to commit themselves to any declaration and prevented its publication. On March 25, Beck instructed Lipski, the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, to assure Ribbentrop that Poland would, as always, oppose the USSR taking part in European affairs.”17” In that way, Poland’s rulers were taking the line of outright betrayal of the national interests and of the Polish people.

At the talks of Chamberlain and Halifax with French President Lebrun and Bonnet in London on March 21 and 22 it was decided to intensify co-operation between the General Staffs of the two countries. The main thing the talks revealed was Britain’s reluctance to afford real aid even to the French: she intended to send just a few divisions to France and even that not immediately after the outbreak of hostilities. Besides, it was decided that in any event, even if fascist Germany attacked Poland, the strategy of Britain and France would be defensive, not offensive.”18”

The Nazi Reich was increasingly insolent and arrogant. Back on March 21, Ribbentrop had started a diplomatic 211build-up to the war against Poland. In a peremptory tone he demanded that the Polish government should consent to Danzig being annexed to Germany and to an extra– territorial Autobahn being laid through Polish territory into Eastern Prussia. With a view to creating a "conflict situation" between Germany and Poland, these proposals were framed in such a way as to prevent them from being accepted by the Polish government in any circumstances. On March 22, the Nazis captured Klajpeda. Klajpeda’s status was guaranteed by Britain and France, but they did not budge to aid Lithuania. On March 23, the Nazis struck again by forcing a fettering economic agreement on Romania.

The statement made by the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs to the British Secretary for Overseas Trade, Robert Hudson, who arrived in Moscow on March 23, 1939, was of great importance under the circumstances. Proceeding From the fact of an aggressive bloc in existence, the People’s Commissar emphasised, one should not deny the need for meetings, conferences and agreements between nonaggressive states. In particular, the Soviet government had always been willing to co-operate with Great Britain and to consider and discuss any concrete proposals.”19”

Hudson did not even mention that statement in his report to the British government about his trip to Moscow. Instead, he pronounced himself against an extension of relations with the USSR.”20”

Apart from that appeal to Britain, the Soviet government found it necessary to establish contact with its Western neighbours, facing a threatened German attack, for the purpose of resisting aggression. On March 28, 1939, it forwarded a statement to the governments of Latvia and Estonia saying that the USSR was interested in preventing the aggressors’ domination of the Baltic states, for that would run counter both to the interests of the people of those countries and to the vital interests of the Soviet state. The Soviet government declared that it could not stand by looking indifferently at Germany establishing domination of the Baltic area and was prepared to prove that if need be.”21” The Soviet government was likewise anxious for the independence of Poland and Romania to be preserved, notably, because for Germany to have overrun them would have given the Nazi troops an opportunity of reaching the Western borders of the USSR.

The Soviet government considered it desirable to establish direct contact and co-operation with those countries themselves in opposing aggression. On March 29, 11)31), Litvinov told the Romanian Minister in Moscow, N. Dianu, that the USSR could not "react with indifference to an aggressor nation’s domination of Romania or to the possibility for her lo obtain strongpoints in the vicinity of our frontier or in the Black Sea ports." ”22” On the same day Litvinov, replying to a question from the French Charge d’ Affaires in Moscow, J. Payart, about whether or not the USSR was ready to co-operate with Poland, told him: "We consider it very important to co-operate with Poland and we have always offered her as much." ”23”

Since Poland refused to co-operate with the USSR, the British and French governments were wondering whom they could regard as their more important ally in Eastern Europe, Poland or the USSR. Chamberlain and Halifax considered that Poland and Romania which hated the Soviet Union mattered more to Britain than the USSR.”24” British historian Aster wrote: "The Soviet Union, after a brief diplomatic appearance, was being nudged back into its isolation.” ”25”

It was recognised at a conference which Halifax had with the senior staff of the Foreign Office on March 25, that since a war on two fronts was Germany’s Achilles’ heel, it was necessary to cut Poland off from Germany and draw her into co-operation with Britain and France. Halifax pointed out that in the event of Poland staying neutral, Germany could attack Romania or Western powers. Therefore, he considered it necessary to agree with Poland on mutual assistance and to get her committed to come to Romania’s aid in the event of her being attacked by Ger- many. ”26”

Chamberlain approved this plan and at a meeting of the Foreign Policy Committee on March 27, urged co-operation with Poland. The British Premier could not fail to note on that occasion that the new plan "left Soviet Russia out of the picture”. Even Samuel Hoare, having qualified his statement by saying that no one could accuse him of any predilections in favour of the Soviet Union, stressed that it was very important to bring in to the common front as many countries as possible. Halifax was strongly supported by Chamberlain. "If we had to make a choice between Poland and Soviet Russia,” he declared, "it seemed clear that Poland would give the greater value”. He said, furthermore, that French Foreign Minister Bonnet "had no love for Soviet Russia" either and that "France seemed little interested in Russia”. The British lord pointed out that Poland had "some 50 divisions and might be expected to make a useful contribution”, whereas the Soviet Army’s "offensive value was small".”27”

Two days later the matter came before a British Cabinet meeting. Halifax addressed it with arguments to prove that Poland was the "key to the situation”. In spite of the serious doubts expressed by Home Secretary Samuel Hoare and Secretary for Public Health Elliot to the effect that it was undesirable lo exclude the Soviet Union from the group of countries invited to co-operate, the Cabinet approved the course suggested by Chamberlain and Halifax.”28”

Anglo-French Guarantees

On March 29, London received information about the proposals which Ribbentrop had restated to Lipski on March 21 about an “adjustment” of Gorman-Polish relations. That information threw the British government into confusion because it feared a German-Polish collusion as most dangerous to the Western powers. In early March the British government had invited Beck to visit London. But on March 18 it received "absolutely reliable" information from the Secretary-General of the French Foreign Ministry, A. Leger, that Beck was going to propose an alliance in London but on the understanding that the offer would be found unacceptable (throughout the 1920s and 1930s the British government flatly refused to assume any commitment regarding aid to the countries of Eastern Europe). Beck would then return to Poland and announce that his proposal had been rejected after which lie would say that "there had been two alternatives for Poland, viz. to lean on Great Britain or Germany, and that now it was clear that she must lean on Germany.” Beck was prepared to find a way out "even at the cost of being the vassal (perhaps the chief vassal) of the new Napoleon".”29” The British were alerted also by the information they had about the Nazis planning some pressure tactics to apply against Poland in 214a matter of days. It was feared in London that this could bring Poland’s politics under Berlin’s control all the faster, which would virtually put her into the opposite camp.”30”

During the discussion of the matter at a British Cabinet meeting on March 30, Halifax proposed to make a clear declaration of Britain’s intention to support Poland if Poland was attacked by Germany. Chamberlain hacked it up. He pointed out that Czechoslovakia’s resources had already been used by Germany, if Poland’s resources fell into the Reich’s hands, too, that would entail very grave consequences for Britain. The Minister of Co-ordination of Defence admitted that in the event of Nazi acts of aggression Poland would hold out no more than two or three months. Nevertheless, Germany would suffer heavy casualties as well, he went on to say. It was pointed out at the meeting that unless the British government took up a firm stand in good time in the face of a threat to Poland, Britain’s prestige throughout the world would be badly damaged.”31”

To sum up, the British ruling quarters were thinking of nothing beyond using Polish cannon fodder for a time. They did not even contemplate any real assistance to Poland to save her from being defeated. But, in fact, Germany’s seizure of Poland could have been averted! The Soviet Union, being, unlike Britain, profoundly interested in preventing Poland from being destroyed, was ready and willing to throw the full weight of its power on the scales of war for the sake of preserving her independence and inviolability. But the issue of Britain’s co-operation with the USSR was not even raised at the British Cabinet meeting.

On March 31, 1939, the British government published a statement to announce its readiness to afford assistance to Poland in the event of aggression against her. The Anglo-Polish Communique, issued at the end of Beck’s visit to London, pointed out that Britain and Poland had achieved agreement on mutual assistance "in the event of any threat, direct or indirect, to the independence of either".”32”

The British informed Beck about their plan to conclude an agreement involving Britain, France, Poland and Romania. However, the Polish government rejected the offer. Ever since 1021 Poland had been in alliance with Romania against the USSR. She did not want to extend her commitments to cover a case of conflict between Germany and Romania.”33” The government of Romania, too, took up a 215negative stand on this offer, having informed Berlin about it.”34”

Anglo-French guarantees were soon given also to Romania and Greece, and somewhat later to Turkey.

While offering these guarantees to Poland and other of the above-mentioned countries, the British and French governments presented them as disinterested concern for their fate. The consideration of the issue of guarantees at a meeting of the British government’s Foreign Policy Committee is noteworthy. "The Prime Minister recalled,” the verbatim report of the committee meeting said, "that our general policy towards Germany was directed not to protecting individual states which might be threatened by Germany but to prevent German domination of the continent resulting in Germany becoming so powerful as to be able to menace our security. German domination of Poland or Romania would increase her military strength and it was for this reason that we had given guarantees to those countries. German domination of Denmark would not increase Germany’s military strength and this therefore was not a case in which we should be bound to intervene forcibly to restore the status quo.” ”35”

This means that Britain had no interests on her mind beyond her own. Poland, Romania and Denmark and other countries interested her only in the sense of their potential military, strategic or economic importance for British imperialism. Not even British bourgeois historians can fail to admit that the British Cabinet cared just as little for Poland as for the Sudetenland.”36”

The French government proceeded from a similar position. The German embassy in Paris reported to Berlin ( April 20, 1939) that the position of France was determined not by her sympathy for Poland (it had been destroyed by the co-operation of the Polish ruling element with the Nazis in earlier years) but "only by an intention to bar the way to a German onslaught".”37”

The French General Staff also considered that it was necessary to counter German aggressive designs with regard to the countries of Eastern Europe because otherwise France might find her positions undermined. Poland with her army and geographical position was recognised to be "too important for France to neglect”. As to Romania, the seizure of her oil resources by Germany was considered very 216dangerous in France. The conclusion made in France was that with Poland and Romania captured, Germany would turn her military machine against France, and she would have to go to war alone, virtually without allies. “

However, the importance of the Anglo-French guarantees for Poland, Romania and some other countries was very relative. This was indicated to Chamberlain by Britain’s former Prime Minister Lloyd George back on March 30. He declared that any real resistance to Germany in the East can he organised only with the participation of the USSR; the unilateral British guarantees to Poland were "an irresponsible gamble".”39” Lloyd George spoke in the same vein in the House of Commons debate on April 3. Similar views were stated in the debate by some oilier MPs as well.

The Soviet embassy in Britain also wrote on the occasion: "What can, indeed, Britain (or even Britain and France, put together) really do for Poland and Romania in the event of a German attack against them? Very little. Before a British blockade of Germany becomes a formidable threat to her, Poland and Romania will have ceased to exist."”"

Poland’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Beck arrived in London on April 3. The British proposed transforming their unilateral commitments into a bilateral treaty of mutual assistance and that was accepted. The preliminary Anglo-Polish treaty of mutual assistance was signed on April 6. Poland, however, had not agreed to afford assistance to Romania in the event of a German attack against her. Beck also declined the offer to come to agreement with the USSR on its lending material aid to Poland in case of war. Moreover he did not conceal his extremely hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union.

The British and French guarantees, however, were not a sufficiently strong instrument of pressure on Germany. That was indicated by the fact that on April 3, Hitler released a directive for German troops to be prepared to attack Poland on September 1, 1931). On April 11, lie signed the notorious Operation WeiB, that is, the plan for the military rout of Poland.

As the situation continued to deteriorate, there was more action in Britain and France against the masterminds of the Munich sellout and for a reversal of the foreign policies of the two countries. An opinion poll in Britain held 217in April and early in May showed 87 per cent of the population of that country favored an alliance between Britain, France and the USSR. The sobering process in France went on even relatively faster than in Britain. And that was understandable because she found herself under a more immediate threat. Paris figured out that Germany and Italy combined could master 250 divisions against 120 French and British. Therefore it was found necessary in Paris to give more careful consideration to co-operation with the USSR. President of the Chamber of Deputies Herriot offered his good offices to Daladier to go to Moscow to conclude the treaty.”41”

The Chamberlain government, however, still considered it undesirable to assume any obligations in common with the USSR. But having offered its guarantees to Poland and Romania, it started pressing for the Soviet government to assume unilateral commitments to assist the countries of Eastern Europe if they were attacked.

So on April 11, Halifax, in a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador in London, referred to "the form in which the USSR could offer assistance to Romania in case of a German attack”. On April 4, Maisky, on instructions from the Soviet government, told Halifax that the USSR could not look at Romania’s fate with indifference and was prepared to join in providing assistance to her, but it wanted to know how the British government contemplated the forms of assistance to Romania from Britain and other powers concerned.”42” The chief of the British foreign service left the Soviet government’s quite natural and logical counter question unanswered.

British diplomacy continued to press for the USSR to assume unilateral commitments, disregarding the consequences. On April 15, the British Ambassador in Moscow, Seeds, on instructions from Halifax, officially raised with the Soviet government the question of whether it was agreeable to publish a declaration to the effect that any of the Soviet Union’s European neighbours could count on Soviet assistance in case of aggression should it find that assistance desirable.”43”

This proposal provided for the Soviet assistance to Poland and Romania, which had Anglo-French guarantees, as well as to other European neighbours of the USSR—Latvia, Estonia and Finland, which had no such guarantees. 218Therefore, the publication of such a declaration by the Soviet government could have left the Soviet Union with no option but to fight Germany alone, in the event of German aggression in the Baltic, while Britain and France would stay out.

An extremely dangerous situation would have arisen for the USSR even in the event of a German-Polish or German-Romanian conflict. Britain and France, in spite of their guarantees to Poland and Romania, could have virtually kept out of the war (as it did happen in September 1939). The Soviet Union, having spoken out for assistance to Poland or Romania, could, under such circumstances, find itself at war with Germany actually without any allies lo speak of.

Besides, the commitments about mutual assistance between Britain and France, on the one hand, and Poland, on the other, were of a mutual nature: in the event of an attack on Poland, she was to have been supported by Britain and France, and in the event of an aggressor’s attack on Britain or France, Poland was to have come to their assistance. But the Soviet guarantees to Poland were to have been of a unilateral character, to follow the British demand. For example, if Germany attacked the USSR, Poland was not under obligation to afford assistance to the Soviet Union. The Soviet government even had no guarantees that Poland under the circumstances would not join Germany in a war against the USSR.

Even Western diplomats themselves admitted in private that Britain’s position with respect to the USSR was unseemly. The U.S. Ambassador in Paris, Bullitt, pointed out that the British government’s policy with regard to the Soviet Union was "almost insulting".”44” Now even Ambassador Seeds could not fail to admit in his cable to the Foreign Office that the British inquiry created the impression that Britain had no serious intention of reaching agreement with the USSR.

The contacts established in March-April 1939, between the Soviet government, on the one hand, and the governments of Britain and France, on the other, about the ways to maintain peace in Europe showed once more the earnest aspiration of the Soviet Union for collective resistance to fascist aggression. The ruling circles of Britain and France, however, in fact, persisted in their Munich policy, reluctant to co-operate with the USSR.