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Vilnis SipolsDiplomatic Battles Before World War II
MUNICH SELLOUT
Chamberlain’s Visit to Berchtesgaden
The British ruling establishment was increasingly inclined to surrender the Sudetenland to Hitler Germany in the hope of reaching an accommodation between the British Empire and the Nazi Reich in that way. The Times of London openly suggested in a leading article on September 7 that the Czechoslovak government ought to think of turning the Sudetenland over to Germany.
A Conservative Party leader, Henry Channon, pointed out in his diary that the Times article had been produced in agreement between Halifax and the Times publisher, Geoffrey Dawson, and was definitely a "ballon d’essai" to see how the public would react, and to prepare them for the Runciman Report containing similar proposals.”135” Halifax said on September 11, 1938, that the annexation of the Sudetenland by Germany was the only hope to avoid war. He considered it desirable for a conference of four powers— Britain, France, Germany and Italy—to be called to settle the matter.”136”
The prospect of calling such a conference was discussed on the same day by the British Ambassador in Paris, Phipps, with the Secretary-General of the French Foreign Ministry, Alexis Leger. The French diplomat expressed his full agreement with the idea of calling such a conference, stressing that there was no point in the Soviet Union being invited to attend.”137” On September 13, the decision that this international conference was well worth-while was taken at a French Cabinet meeting. The news was immediately communicated to London. Bonnet considered that the object of the conference must be to decide on the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany and that it should be attended by the four Western powers.”138” That was the final abandonment of the struggle against aggression and of the allied 177treaties with the USSR and Czechoslovakia by the government of Daladier-Bonnet, and their surrender to the Nazi Reich.”139”
A conference of the British Premier with his "inner group”, called on Chamberlain’s initiative on September 13. with the international situation further strained because of acts of provocation by fascist agents throughout the Sudetenland, decided on the Premier making an urgent trip to Germany. ”14”° On the same day, the British Premier sent a letter to King George VI to inform him that the object of his journey would be "the establishment of an Anglo– German understanding" and the settlement of the Czechoslovak question. He emphasised that his intention was to sketch out to Hitler "the prospect of Germany and England as the two pillars of European peace and buttresses against Communism". ”141”
It was realised in Berlin, quite naturally, that the only thing Chamberlain’s visit could mean under the circumstances was Britain’s willingness to make serious concessions. Besides, the Nazis had succeeded in deciphering some foreign codes and were informed of the negotiations between London and Paris, on the one hand, and Prague on the other. For that reason, the Sudeten Germans came into the open (naturally, on instructions from Hitler) to demand the annexation of the Sudetenland to Germany, while Hitler was just “playing” with Chamberlain.”141”
H. Chamberlain, accompanied by H. Wilson and W. Strang, arrived in Berchtesgaden on September 15. The British Premier opened his conversations with Hitler by declaring his desire for an Anglo-German rapprochement and for an exchange of general views on the policies of both countries. Hitler, however, demonstrated a manifest reluctance to discuss problems of that kind at all. He reduced the entire negotiating process to consideration of one particular question that was of interest to him. Being aware of Chamberlain’s position, Hitler emphatically demanded that the Sudetenland should be turned over to Germany, threatening a world war otherwise. Besides, he demanded the abrogation of Czechoslovakia’s treaties of mutual assistance with other countries. Chamberlain accepted these demands, but said he had yet to get the official sanction of his government, and talk the matter over with the French government.”143”
The Berchtesgaden rendezvous gave Hitler an opportunity to draw the conclusion that there was no reason for him to J’oar any British opposition to his plans lor the takeover of the Sudeterdand. Moreover, shortly after that meeting the German Foreign Ministry representative at Hitler’s headquarters, Hewel, received information that "Hitler is further planning the capture of all Czechoslovakia. He is now quite sure that this objective can be achieved without any intervention by the British government.”144”
After informing Lord Halifax, Simon and Hoare about Ins talks with Hitler, Chamberlain said he thought Hitler’s demand for the annexation of the Sudetenland to Germany could be met. He stressed as the only important point that this had to be done "in an orderly manner”, that is, so as not to provoke an armed conflict. Chamberlain expressed the confidence that the settlement of the Sudeten question would open the way to Anglo-German understanding.”145”
It is the summit conference between Britain and France in London on September 18 that decided in favour of Hitler’s demand for the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. That embarrassed even some representatives of the British ruling establishment. "One of the extraordinary things to me is how we, with calculated cynicism, sign away the liberty of 9,000,000 people," ”146” said General Ironside in his Diaries. The French Charge d’Affaires in London, R. Cambon, admitted that the decisions taken by the British and the French were "the most painful possible experience for his government for many years." ”147”
On the following day, the British and French accomplices of the Nazi aggressors handed the Czechoslovak government their notes which amounted to a joint ultimatum from Germany, Britain and France demanding that the Sudeten region should be turned over to the Reich. At the same time, the British and French governments urged Czechoslovakia to agree to her treaties of mutual assistance with other nations being replaced by a common guarantee against unprovoked aggression, expressing their willingness to share in giving such a guarantee.”148”
President Roosevelt, having invited the British Ambassador for a top secret conversation on September 20, could not hut admit that Britain and France wanted Czechoslovakia to make "the most terrible remorseless sacrifice that had ever been demanded of a state”. At the same time 179Roosevolt declared that if the policy the British had embarked on proved successful, "who would be the first to cheer”. ”149” When, however, the Czechoslovak Charge d’Affaires asked the U.S. government on the same day to publish any statement whatsoever in support of Czechoslovakia, the request was left unheeded. ”15”
The USSR Ready to Resist Aggression
The position of the USSR was entirely different. On September 19, 1938, the Czechoslovak government asked the Soviet government to reply as soon as possible to these questions: a) will the USSR, in conformity with the Treaty, afford prompt and effective assistance if France remained loyal and afforded assistance as well?; b) will the USSR help Czechoslovakia as a member of the League of Nations?”151”
The following instructions were given to the Soviet Ambassador in Prague on September 20:
“1. You may give an affirmative answer on behalf of the Government of the Soviet Union to the question from Benes as to whether the USSR will render prompt and effective assistance if France remains loyal to her and affords assistance as well.
2. You may give a similar affirmative answer to the other question, too. ..." ”152”
The Soviet Ambassador in Prague, Alexandrovsky, immediately passed this reply to the Czechoslovak government. France was informed about it as well. So in those difficult and dangerous conditions for Czechoslovakia, the Soviet government once more officially reaffirmed that the USSR would fulfil its obligations under the pact providing for assistance to her in the event of an attack by Germany. In accordance with this decision, Litvinov, speaking before the Assembly of the League of Nations on September 21, 1938, restated the Soviet government’s position on resistance to aggression. He stressed that measures outlined by the Covenant of the League of Nations had to be taken against the aggressor resolutely, consistently and without hesitation, and in that case the aggressor would not be tempted and "peace will be preserved by peaceful means”. Litvinov, in his speech, exposed the disgraceful policy of 180abetting aggression, to the extent of getting "directives and ultimatums at the cost of the vital interests of any particular slate”. The head of The Soviet delegation read out the statements which the Soviet government had passed to the government of France on September 2 and to that of Czechoslovakia on September 20.
However, London and Paris were still deaf to the Soviet proposals. How absurd that has been most strikingly shown in the memoirs of Winston Churchill. "The Soviet offer was in effect ignored,” he wrote. ".. .They were treated with an indifference—not to say disdain. . . Events took their course as if Soviet Russia did not exist. For this we afterwards paid dearly." ”153”
In fulfilment of the emergency instructions of their respective governments, the British and French Ministers in Czechoslovakia emphatically declared to the Czechoslovak government in the night of September 21 that should it fail to accept the Anglo-French proposals, the French government "will not honour its treaty" with Czechoslovakia. "If the Czechs join forces with the Russians,” they emphasised, "the war can become a crusade against the Bolsheviks. Then, it will be very difficult for the governments of England and Franco to stay out." ”154”
Submitting to Anglo-French pressure, the Czechoslovak government gave up by consenting to Hitler’s Berchtesgaden demands.
Litvinov repeatedly confirmed the Soviet readiness to afford assistance to Czechoslovakia also in his conversations with foreign diplomats and politicians.
For example, Litvinov conferred in Geneva with Lord Privy Seal de la Warr and Deputy Foreign Secretary Butler in the Assembly of the League of Nations in Geneva.
Butler cabled to the Foreign Office quoting Litvinov as having said that "if French came to the assistance of the Czechs Russians would take action”. He said that "he had for long been hoping for conversations between Great Britain, France and Russia, and he would like to suggest to us in this informal conversation that a meeting of the three Powers mentioned, together with Romania and any other small Power ... should take place preferably in Paris, and so show Germans that we mean business." ”155”
Chamberlain was almost horrified by the comments of the People’s Commissar in his conversation with de la Warr 181and Butler. He saw them as a "great danger" (!?) since to follow them through would have meant, in his opinion, "to strengthen Bolshevism in the whole world".”156”
For the next few days the British government was almost continuously in session to consider the increasingly involved situation, but Chamberlain and Halifax did not even mention Litvinov’s proposal, thus withholding it from the Cabinet members. De la Warr, who attended all these sittings, also kept silent.
Although the Soviet government was not in a position to know about Chamberlain’s reaction to the People’s Commissar’s offer, it gave a perfectly correct assessment of the situation as it had shaped up and of the possible prospect ahead. On September 23, the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, in reply to the report from the People’s Commissar about his conversation with de la Warr and Butler, wrote it was doubtful that France and Britain could agree to a conference with Soviet involvement because they had so far been ignoring the Soviet Union.”157”
Even many Western politicians and historians had to admit that the Soviet stand on assistance to Czechoslovakia was impeccable. For instance, a prominent British Conservative Party leader L. S. Amery pointed out that "Russia’s attitude throughout the crisis was perfectly clear”. The Soviet Union, he wrote, "consistently backed the conception of collective security." ”158” American historian Arthur H. Furnia also admitted in his study The Diplomacy of Appeasement that unlike Britain and France, "the Soviet Union actually showed a ... willingness to render military assistance to Czechoslovakia." ”159”
The Soviet government held an adamant and determined position also because Polish aggressors were acting hand in glove with those of Hitler Germany against Czechoslovakia.
Back on April 17, 1938, Stomonyakov stated that " Poland is coming into the open as an actual party to the aggressor bloc. In a hurry not to be too late she presented her ultimatum to Lithuania right after the AnschluB and enforced the establishment of diplomatic and all other relations with Lithuania which she ... regards as nothing but (lie beginning of her gradual colonization of Lithuania. Poland is playing an active role in the German plans to resolve the Czechoslovak question. She is openly stirring up the Teszin question... Poland, as is now obvious to 182everybody, is closely bound up with Germany and will go on following in her footsteps." ”160”
On May 25, 1938, Daladier informed the Soviet Ambassador in Paris, Surits, that his sounding of Poland’s position in the event of German aggression against Czechoslovakia had produced the most negative result possible. Not only was there no reason to count on support from Poland, Daladier said, but "there is none to feel sure that Poland will not strike in the back.”161”
J. Beck informed the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, Lipski, on September 19, 1938, that within two days Poland would have considerable forces brought up to the Czechoslovak border, and that he was prepared to contact Hitler or Goring personally about co-ordinating the action by Germany and Poland against Czechoslovakia.”162” On the following day Lipski said as much to Hitler, stressing that Poland "would not shrink from resorting to force" to have her demand met. Hitler assured Lipski that in that case the Third Reich would take Poland’s side.”163”
On September 21, the Polish rulers presented an ultimatum to the Czechoslovak government demanding that some areas of Czechoslovakia should be turned over to Poland, and also denounced the 1925 Polish-Czechoslovak arbitration treaty.”164” In the meantime, Polish forces continued to be massed close to the Czechoslovak border. The Polish military attaché in Paris informed the French General Staff that if German troops should attack Czechoslovakia, Polish troops at once would seize the whole of Slovakia which would then be split between Poland and Hungary.”165”
On September 22, the Czechoslovak government, reporting the immediate danger of an attack from Poland, turned to the USSR for support. In response, the Soviet government passed a statement to the Polish government on the very next day to the effect that if Polish troops invaded Czechoslovakia, the USSR would consider that to be an act of aggression arid would denounce her treaty of non– aggression with Poland.”166” The Czechoslovak Minister in Moscow, Fierlinger, was immediately informed of that statement.”167” That is to say, the Soviet Union once more confirmed its resolute stand in defence of Czechoslovakia.
Referring to the policy of the Soviet Union, British historian John Wheeler-Bennett wrote: "She look every opportunity to prove her willingness to fulfil her obligations to 183France and to Czechoslovakia: again and again this was emphasised in London, in Paris, in Prague, in Geneva and also in Berlin, to the acute embarrassment of the British and French governments. According to all available evidence, the conduct of Russia was exemplary throughout the Czech crisis. She even went beyond the letter of her bond, threatening to denounce her non-aggression treaty with Poland, if that state joined in an attack on Czechoslovakia." ”168”
All that was taking place at a time when the situation was most dangerous for the Soviet Union itself since the Polish government was harbouring the idea of a joint crusade by German and Polish forces against the USSR. The Polish Ambassador in Paris, Lukasiewicz, told Bullitt on September 25 that "a war of religion between fascism and Bolshevism was about to begin" and that in the event of the Soviet Union lending assistance to Czechoslovakia, Poland was prepared to go to war against the USSR shoulder to shoulder with Germany. The Polish government was confident, Lukasiewicz declared, that "within three months the Russian Armies would be in complete rout and Russia would no longer preserve even the semblance of a state".”169”
Romania, too, took up a stand to favour the aggressors. Informing the Italian government about Romania’s position, the Romanian Minister in Rome, Zamfirescu, told the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Ciano, that Romania had objected, continued to object and would be objecting to Soviet troops passing through her territory to render assistance to Czechoslovakia. As regards the deterioration of relations between Poland and the USSR over Czechoslovakia, the Romanian Minister said that "Romania would side with Warsaw and in any event the alliance with Poland would take precedence over any pledge to Prague." ”17”° That meant that in case of an armed conflict breaking out because of the German and Polish aggression against Czechoslovakia, with the Soviet Union involved, Romania could, in spite of her alliance with Czechoslovakia, side with the aggressors.”171”
Japan also kept up a threatening posture with respect to the USSR. On September 26 Goring informed the British Ambassador in Berlin, Henderson, that in the event of a German-Soviet conflict, Japan had pledged herself to attack the USSR.”172” The Soviet embassy in Japan also communicated to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on 184September 21 that Japanese newspapers went altogether along with the Nazis over the Czechoslovak question. Some were calling for the Anti-Comintern Pact to be transformed into a military agreement of Germany, Italy and Japan. ”173”
Yet all that notwithstanding, the Soviet Union was still prepared to fulfil its treaty obligations to Czechoslovakia. The necessary military measures in preparation for such a contingency had been taken well in advance.
On September 21, some Soviet military units were put on alert in the face of a sharply exacerbated crisis. At the same time, other measures were taken to reinforce the units stationed in the western borderland military districts and enhance their combat preparedness. Altogether, the units on the alert comprised 1 armoured corps, 30 infantry divisions, 10 cavalry divisions, 7 armoured brigades, 1 motorized infantry brigade and 12 air brigades, etc. 548 combat aircraft were on hand to be flown to Czechoslovakia. ”174”
On September 25, 1938, the People’s Commissariat of Defence instructed the Soviet Air Attaché in France, Vasilchenko, to communicate the following to the Chief of the French General Staff, General Gamelin:
“Our Command has so far taken the following preliminary measures:
1. 30 infantry divisions have been moved into areas in the direct proximity of the western border. So have cavalry divisions.
2. The units concerned have been adequately reinforced with reservists.
3. Our technical forces—Air Force and armoured units are in full fighting trim.” ”175”
This information was passed to the French General Staff on the following day. It was also communicated to the British government in the course of the Anglo-French negotiations then in progress.
A further 17 infantry divisions, 22 armoured and 3 motorised infantry brigades were put on the alert in the closing days of September. A total of up to 330,000 men had been called up for service in the Soviet Armed Forces additionally. ”176”
The facts just cited indicate that the position of all the major parties involved in the events under review became quite clear. The Nazi aggressors were acting with 185increasing impudence day by day. The Polish ruling circles acted in alliance with them. The position of Britain and France, on the other hand, was increasingly defeatist. Not only did they refuse all support for Czechoslovakia, but, on the contrary, they were helping the Nazi Reich annex the Sudetenland and did it so as not to provoke a general war in Europe involving the Western powers as well. It was the Soviet Union alone which stuck to its firm and consistent position and emphatically declared its readiness to fulfil its obligations under the treaty with Czechoslovakia and lend her effective assistance.
Hitler Mocks His “Appeasers”
On September 22, Chamberlain, in company of Wilson and Strang arrived in Bad-Godesberg, for yet another meeting with Hitler. The British Premier, with a satisfied air, informed Hitler that he had succeeded in obtaining the consent for the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany not only from the British government, but from the French and Czechoslovak governments as well.
Hitler decided, however, to harden his demand so as to take one more step forward towards the liquidation of the Czechoslovak state. “177” Quite unexpectedly for Chamberlain, Hitler struck a blow at him that he had prepared well in advance. He mockingly uttered: "1 am very sorry but now this is no longer enough for us”. In a take-it-or-leave-it tone, he demanded that the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany should be started at once, that is, on September 26, and finished by September 28.”178” At the same time, he now strongly insisted on some areas of Czechoslovakia being turned over to Poland and Hungary. Finally, he declared that there were no more conditions for the existence of the Czechoslovak state. Should his demands be declined, Hitler threatened, there would be war.”179”
In his report on this visit to Bad-Godesberg, Chamberlain had to admit at a British Cabinet meeting that Hitler’s latest demands had been a "considerable shock to him". “18”° In spite of the increasingly brazen demands from the Nazis, the British Premier never gave up his attempts at reaching agreement with them on the annexation of the Sudetenland by Germany being carried out "in an orderly 186 manner" so as not to spark off a war. As he was about to leave Bad-Godesberg, Chamberlain assured Hitler that he would do everything possible to have his demands complied with.”181”
Projected Conference of Aggressors and Their Patrons
Britain and France once more considered calling a conference of the Western powers and the Nazi Reich to decide on the "peaceful transfer" of the Sudetenland to Germany, that is, on the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. Bonnet declared at a French government meeting on September 27 that agreement with Germany had to be sought "at any cost".
On September 28, Chamberlain informed Hitler that he was prepared to come to Germany for the third time to discuss the terms of the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany. He pointed out that if the Chancellor so wished, representatives of France and Italy could likewise take part in the negotiations. At the same time, the British Premier expressed his conviction, that is to say, he was actually assuring Hitler, that in this way the Nazi Reich could get its demands met forthwith without war.”182” The U.S. President, on receiving a telegram from the U.S. Ambassador in London, Kennedy, about Chamberlain’s proposal, sent the following message to the British Premier on September 28: "Good man!”. Kennedy, on his part, told Halifax that he was "entirely in sympathy with, and a warm admirer of everything" Chamberlain was doing.”183” So Britain and the U.S. were acting in full harmony.
Following agreement to call a conference of the four powers—Britain, France, Germany and Italy—Halifax informed about this the Czechoslovak Minister in London who, naturally, could not conceal a feeling of surprise.
“But this is a conference to discuss the fate of my country? . . . Are we not being invited to take part?"
“This is a conference of the Great Powers only."
“Then I take it that the Soviet Union is also being invited. After all, Russia has a treaty with my country, too."
“We had no lime to invite the Russians,” the British Lord cut off with irritation.”184”
Winston Churchill gave a very striking description of the 187position of the USSR and Britain in talking with the Soviet Ambassador in London on September 29. "Today Churchill, in a conversation with me,” Maisky wrote, "spoke with great respect and satisfaction of the conduct of the USSR in the present crisis. In particular, he put a very high value on Litvinov’s speech in the Assembly, and on your Note to Poland. The USSR, Churchill said, is doing its international duty, while Britain and France are surrendering to the aggressors. For this reason, the sympathy towards the USSR is fast rising.. .” As to the position of the British government, Churchill criticised it in very strong terms, pointing out that it was leading to the inevitable outbreak of war. Chamberlain’s resolve to "ignore and push away" the USSR, according to Churchill, was "not only absurd but criminal”, and the Anglo-French plan for the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia was outrageous. “185”
The West German historian Niedhardt, who had thoroughly studied British Public Record Office documents about the Chamberlain government’s policy towards the USSR, slated that it was "downright ignoring and isolation of the Soviet Union".”186”
The Munich Deal
The conference of Britain, France, Germany and Italy was hold in Munich on September 29 and 30. It ended with the alienation of a largo strip of Czechoslovak territory all along the German-Czechoslovak border and its incorporation in the Reich.
Chamberlain and Daladier arrived in Munich, well prepared to surrender. They did not even try to oppose the demands made by Hitler (technically, those had been presented by Mussolini). On the contrary, Chamberlain and Daladier tried hard to outdo each other in paying compliments about something like a generosity of that offer. Hitler boasted later on that Czechoslovakia had been offered to him in Munich on a platter by her friends.”187”
The representatives of Czechoslovakia were told about the outcome of the Munich deal by the Four Powers as something like a verdict not subject to appeal. The first announcement was made by Horace Wilson even before the 188conference was over. On entering the "waiting room”, where Czechoslovak representatives, summoned to Munich, had spent hours waiting for this verdict in excitement, he decided to make them happy:
“It is almost over. You will be glad to know that we have reached agreement on practically everything."
“And what is to be our fate?"
“It is not as bad as it might have been."
And Wilson pointed to a strip on the map painted with red ink covering almost half the territory of Czechoslovakia, from the North, West and South, and including almost the whole of the country’s defence line.
“But this is outrageous! It is cruel and it is criminally stupid!"
“I am sorry. It is no use arguing." ”188”
That was how Chamberlain and Daladicr struck a deal with the aggressors in Munich, shamelessly letting Czechoslovakia down and helping the fascist aggressors carve her up.
Naturally, the Four Powers did not have the slightest legal ground for arrogating the right to make any decision on that carve-up. Since the deal was a gross violation of the sovereign rights of the Czechoslovak state and was imposed on Czechoslovakia under threat of force, it was illegal.
Roosevelt sent a message of congratulation to Chamberlain through his Ambassador in London Kennedy. Although Kennedy had also totally supported the policy of connivance with German aggression, he did realise that it would eventually do its makers no honour. He showed a certain measure of caution, therefore. On receiving the cable, he read it out to Chamberlain at 10 Downing Street, instead of handing it to him. "I had a feeling that cable would haunt Roosevelt someday, so I kept it." ”189”
With the Four-Power talks in Munich over, Chamberlain offered to confer with Hitler eye-lo-eye. Hitler consented. The British Premier attached paramount importance to that chat. For he saw the Munich deal about the carve-up of Czechoslovakia more as a means to achieve his own ends than anything else. His object was an understanding between the British Empire and the Nazi Reich on all problems of interest to both sides so as to turn German aggression from West to East. Britain’s ruling circles hoped that 189with Hitler’s pressing demand on the Sudetenland gratified, the situation was most propitious for an effort to take the bull by the horns. ”190”
In the course of that conversation with Hitler, Chamberlain gave a fairly transparent account of his own foreign policy programme. Finding it necessary to demonstrate his negative attitude to the USSR, the British Premier pointed out that Hitler did not have to fear any longer that Czechoslovakia would be used as a springboard for "Russian aggression”. He went on to stress that neither did Hitler have to fear that Britain would pursue a policy of military and economic encirclement of Germany in Southeast Europe. What preoccupied him most was an improvement of Anglo-German relations. And he offered Hitler to sign an Anglo-German declaration of non-aggression in recompense for all that Britain had already done for the German aggressors and promised to do later on.
Hitler did not balk at it, and the declaration was signed there and then. That was, in point of fact, an agreement between Britain and Germany on non-aggression and consultations. The Nazi Chancellor found it possible somewhat to sugar the pill of the Munich sellout for the British Premier because it was very important for him to strengthen Chamberlain’s hand. "You don’t refuse a thirsty man a glass of lemonade,” Mussolini remarked on the occasion.”191”
By signing the declaration Nazi Germany did not mean to stick to it, however. On the contrary, right there in Munich the Nazis went on discussing with Mussolini the idea of a German-Italian-Japanese alliance to prepare for war against Britain and France. As the conference ended, Ribbentrop declared that Chamberlain "has today signed the death warrant of the British Empire and left it to us to fill in the date".”192”
What preoccupied the ruling circles of Britain and France most about the Munich deal was to make it as anti-Soviet as possible. This can be seen quite well from the earlier references to the British Cabinet debates on the major foreign policy issues. As much can be seen from some of the diplomatic documents of the United States, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and other countries at the time. On October 4, 1938, the French Ambassador in Moscow, Coulondre, pointed out that the Munich agreement "is particularly menacing to the Soviet Union".”193” Lord Lothian, appointed as 190British Ambassador to the United States shortly afterwards, said that because of Munich the political circles of London believed that Hitler, with Czechoslovakia captured, would inarch on the Ukraine. Everybody was waiting for that to happen, he emphasised.”194”
The anti-Soviet lining of the Four-Power Munich deal has not been passed over by some Western historians either. British historian Wheeler-Bennett pointed out that at the time of Munich in the ruling circles of Britain "there was a secret hope that if the tide of German expansion could be turned eastward, it would dissipate its force on the steps of Russia in a struggle which would exhaust both combatants".”195”
The same was evidenced by a well-known American columnist Walter Lippmann. He wrote that Britain’s Munich policy was rooted "in a last vain hope that Germany and Russia would fight and exhaust one another".”196”
West German historian B. Celovsky admitted that throughout the pre-Munich period the Soviet government had tried to compel a change in the "appeasement policy" so as to create a united front against the aggressors. "Chamberlain and Bonnett did all they could to keep the Soviet Union out. For ideological reasons and for considerations prompted by power politics they were against cooperation with the Soviets”. It was not "the principles of democracy and law, but anti-Bolshevism that the governments of France and Great Britain guided themselves by in their foreign policies."“197” Even Lord Halifax’s biographer Birkenhead had to admit that it was extremely important to deal with the Soviet Union openly as an ally, and "it must be counted a glaring error that more realistic efforts were not made to secure this end".”198”
The Soviet Union clearly saw the danger arising from the Munich deal of the four imperialist powers. The Soviet press pointed out that within a short space of time Ethiopia, Spain, China, Austria and Czechoslovakia had fallen victim to fascist invaders. Along with denouncing the aggressors’ action, the press criticised the policy of abetting aggression, which was pursued in London and Paris, and which led to the Munich deal to carve up Czechoslovakia. "The surrender of the so-called democratic countries to the aggressor”, Izvestia wrote, "having ostensibly put off the outbreak of war, is actually bringing it nearer.” ”199”
In summing up the latest course of events, the Soviet head of government V. M. Molotov slated in his report on November 6 that "German imperialism has sliced off more of Czechoslovakia than it could itself have counted on. Some of the spoils went to Poland, as the ally of German fascism in the carve-up of Czechoslovakia.” Only the Soviet Union, he said, has demonstrated its loyalty to the treaties and international commitments it had entered into, and its willingness to oppose aggression. "Only the Soviet Union, the socialist country, has unshakably stood and does stand for lighting fascist aggression and for defending peace, freedom and independence of the peoples from fascist attack." ”20”°
The Munich deal fundamentally changed the situation in Central Europe. Having captured Austria and then some of Czechoslovakia, Hitler Germany substantially strengthened her positions.
Czechoslovakia was sacrificed to the Nazis in Munich. She was forced into accepting an illegal decision whereby she lost much of her territory including economically most important areas, and a considerable proportion of her population. Because of the mixed population of the regions annexed to Germany, 1,161,610 Czechs and Slovaks found themselves under the rule of the Nazi Reich.”201” The newly drawn frontiers cut and disrupted the country’s major transport arteries. Czechoslovakia was deprived of her natural borders and frontier fortifications and found herself utterly defenseless in the face of the fascist aggressor.”202” Half a year later all this was exploited by the Nazi Reich for the complete liquidation of the Czechoslovak state.
The strategic and political positions of France and Britain also turned out to be greatly weakened because of the Munich deal. The Anglo-French hegemony in Europe, which rested on the Treaty of Versailles, was finally done away with. And so was, in point of fact, the system of military alliances France had concluded with other nations of Europe. The League of Nations was buried. The Soviet French Treaty of Mutual Assistance in action against aggression as a means to ensure peace and security in Europe was virtually invalidated. Nazi Germany got the best opportunities for continued expansionism, and, for aggression against Britain and France in particular. French Ambassador in Warsaw Leon Noel admitted in his recollections that "the Munich accords and the betrayal of 192Czechoslovakia arising therefrom represent one of the most pitiful, shameful and humiliating episodes of the policy conducted in the name of France during the period between the two world wars, which led to the most destructive catastrophe in our history.” ”203”
The Munich deal brought nearer the outbreak of the Second World War.
“APPEASEMENT” POLICY GOING BANKRUPT
Will the Nazis March on the Ukraine?
The reactionary ruling circles of Britain and France expected that following the Munich sellout, Germany’s aggressive ambitions would be turned eastwards, ultimately against the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union did, in fact, find itself in a very precarious position. By the joint efforts of Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler and Mussolini, the USSR had virtually been forced into a state of total international isolation. The governments of Britain and France, hoping to push Germany into a war against the Soviet Union, stressed openly that they wanted no trucks with the USSR. After Munich, the Foreign Office cut off all contact with the Soviet embassy in London. Britain seriously considered breaking off her trade treaty with the Soviet Union. French Foreign Minister Bonnet intended to denounce the treaties of mutual assistance with the USSR and Poland.204
French Ambassador Coulondre and British Ambassador Chilston were recalled from Moscow in October 1938 and November 1938 respectively, whereupon the French and British embassies in Moscow were in charge of Charges d’Affaires for several months.
As the Soviet Embassy in London pointed out, political circles in Britain as well as the press set about discussing, right after Munich, the prospect of Hitler "going eastwards and having the Ukraine as his primary major target”. There is no doubt, the Soviet embassy pointed out, that a whole series of influential personalities (including some members of the Cabinet) "directly intimated to Hitler about this 193eastern venture, promising at least, favourable neutrality to him..."“205” The British News Chronicle said that the “die-hards” were seeking to make Russia and Germany take one another by the throat.
British historian Middlemas, who thoroughly studied the declassified documents of the British government referring to the prewar years, had to admit that there was "evidence ... to justify the Soviet charge that Britain planned to set Germany at war with Russia".”206”
The Soviet Ambassador to France, Surits, who held similar views, reported in a dispatch to Moscow on November 11, that the French ruling top leadership was " particularly enthusiastic about the Drang nach Osten version implying that Germany is to be given a free hand in the East. That, in the long run, naturally, meant giving her a free hand for action against the USSR".”207”
The U.S. Ambassador in Paris, Bullitt, referring to the post-Munich policies of Britain and France, said that they would like it to come to war in the East between the German Reich and Russia, a long and extenuating war between them. In that case, the Western Powers "could attack Germany and get her to surrender".208
When a Franco-German declaration on non-aggression was signed on December 6, 1938, as a result of the visit to Paris by Germany’s Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, Daladier and Bonnet became even more confident that the aggressor’s avid eyes would from now on be turned only eastwards. Back in Berlin, Ribbentrop was able to declare, with reference to the Soviet-French Treaty of Mutual Assistance, that the declaration signed in Paris finally " detached France from the USSR and prevents any last traces of risk of Russo-French collaboration." “209”
Having concluded this agreement with Germany, the French ruling circles went into raptures. Bonnet wrote, informing the French ambassadors about his talks with Ribbentrop, that "German policy is now more concerned with fighting Bolshevism. The Reich shows her will for expansion to the East". 1
To pay the ransom and push Germany into a “crusade” against the USSR, the British and French ruling quarters were prepared to leave all the nations of Eastern Europe at the mercy of German Nazis. The allied treaty with Poland, co-operation with the Little Entente and the Franco– 194Soviet pact, Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Potemkin pointed out as he conferred with the French Ambassador to the USSR Naggiar, on February 9, 1939, were "recognised already at the past stages of the foreign policy of France, something like an asset of history".”211” The Foreign Office also had information that France proposed to get rid of her commitments under the treaties with Poland, and, above all, with the USSR.”212” Such a course of the French and British ruling circles after Munich was still prompted by their hatred of communism whether in the shape of the Soviet state or in that of the revolutionary movement in their own countries. "England has groveled on its belly before Hitler because it is afraid of communism," “213” U.S. Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes pointed out in his Secret Diary. The British government even suggested Anglo-German military co-operation in the struggle against the Soviet Union.214
The Munich dealers were backed up in every way by the most reactionary representatives of the U.S. ruling establishment. As a former U.S. President Hoover argued in his speech on October 26, 1938, the West European nations should not have to fear Germany because the opportunities of the dictatorships lie in expansion eastward; so such expansion should not be interfered with.”215” The Soviet embassy in the United States noted in this connection that the reactionary sections of the Republican Party were still "dreaming of a closer relationship with fascist countries and nurturing the illusion and the hope that the European aggressors will act against us".”216” From as early as the summer of 1938, the United States was represented by no more than a Charge d’Affaires in Moscow, and Washington was in no hurry to appoint a new ambassador.
The British, French and American reaction in every way egged on the German, Japanese and other aggressors. The Western press carried no end of reports about the " weakness" of the Soviet Union in the military as well as economic respects.
Information was obtained in London to the effect that Germany had got down to a detailed study of the possibilities of "settlement of the Ukrainian question" and that Hitler had given orders to the German General Staff to start preparations for an attack on the USSR. The creation of a "Great Ukraine" which would have consisted of Soviet and Polish regions inhabited by Ukrainians, as well as of the Transcarpathian Ukraine, was viewed by the Nazis as the most important component of Gorman Eastern policy. The "Great Ukraine" by itself could exist in their opinion, "only if it unconditionally relied on Germany, which eventually must turn it into a German vassal".”217”
Hitler: with Poland or Against Poland?
The Nazis opened negotiations with Poland, in particular, on the "Ukrainian question”. Their hopes for success in negotiating a joint action against the USSR with the Polish government of the day were not unfounded. There lies already been a reference earlier on to German-Polish co-operation in March 1938 when, following the AnschluB of Austria, Poland was particularly anxious to capture Lithuania. The talks about co-operation, including military co-operation, for the "full dismemberment of Czechoslovakia" and its liquidation as a state began between Polish Ambassador Lipski and Goring back in the middle of June.”218”
On September 27 Beck directed the Ambassador in Berlin, Lipski to come to terms with Goring about Poland being informed in advance of the start of the German military actions against Czechoslovakia. "For your confidential information”, Beck wrote, "I add that we have at our disposal forces under arms capable of action. Relative to the development of the situation we could take prompt action following the outbreak of a German-Czech conflict." ”219”
Lipski met the State Secretary of German Ministry for Foreign Affairs Weizsacker to concert action by the two countries and agree on the "military demarcation line in the event of a Polish-Czech war”. Right after the Four– Power Munich deal, in the night of September 30, Poland addressed an ultimatum to Czechoslovakia for the immediate transfer of the Teszyn region and on the following day started to move her troops into that region.
The German and Polish aggressors concluded what amounted, in point of fact, to an anti-Soviet military alliance to come into force if, with the Soviet Union coming to Czechoslovakia’s aid in defence against Nazi Germany 196and Poland, they would find themselves at war against the USSR. On September 30, the Polish government asked the Nazis whether it could count on Germany’s benevolent reaction in case of an armed conflict between Poland and the USSR arising from an invasion of Czechoslovakia by Polish troops. On the following day, Lipski relayed to Warsaw the reply he got from von Ribbentrop: "In the event of a Polish-Soviet conflict, the government of Germany would take a more than benevolent position in respect of Poland.” Besides, he made it quite clear that the government of Germany would be helpful. ”22”° Goring also assured Lipski on October 1, that "in the event of complications with Russia Poland can count on most effective assistance from Germany".”221”
The "Ukrainian question" came under intense study in Poland right after Munich. The Biuletyn Polsko-Ukrainski, published by Polish elements close to Beck in the territory of the Western Ukraine, seized by Poland in 1920, carried an article on October 2, 1938, about the plans of Polish imperialists. It called for the Soviet Union to be divided into a number of independent state entities with Kiev, Tbilisi, and Samarkand as capitals.
The question of a joint war of aggression by Germany and Poland against the USSR arose soon afterwards. Ribbentrop, speaking to Polish Ambassador Lipski on October 24, 1938, suggested "a general settlement of all possible points of friction between Germany and Poland . The suggestion implied the incorporation of Danzig (with economic privileges preserved in Danzig for Poland) to the Third Reich, the construction of a German extra-territorial autobahn and multiple track railroad through the Polish Corridor; the extension of the Polish-German Declaration of friendship and non-aggression to 25 years; the provision of guarantees by Germany relative to the Polish-German border. Ribbentrop suggested that, having thus reinforced Polish-German friendship, the two countries should conduct a "joint policy towards Russia on the basis of the Anti-Comintern Pact”. ”222”
Japanese imperialists, planning for a joint three-power war against the Soviet Union, were also extremely interested in German-Polish co-operation against the USSR.”223”
The Polish Ambassador in Moscow, Grzybowski, maintained in a conversation with Poland’s Vice-Minister for 197Foreign Affairs Szembeck that "Soviet Russia is getting progressively weaker" and "the Russian problem is looming”. Grzybowski declared that Poland "must have influence on this problem”, recalling that there had already been a historical precedent with Poland having "the final say in Russian affairs”. He also quoted Pilsudski’s words: "I shall march on Russia myself.” Grzybowski spoke up for the restoration of the Polish frontiers of 1772. Nazi Germany considered, not without reason, that—on a par with Italy and Japan—"Poland will be Germany’s natural ally in the future German-Russian conflict".”224”
The settlement of the German-Polish imperialist contradictions, connected with the realisation of their conspiracy against the USSR, proved far from simple, however. Nazi Germany, while urging the continued consolidation of German-Polish “friendship”, saw it as Poland’s full submission to German domination. Whereas the annexation of the Sudetenland by Germany was the first step towards the Nazis overrunning the whole of Czechoslovakia, the incorporation of Danzig was seen by the Nazis as a test of Poland’s readiness for co-operation with Germany as would mean voluntary surrender. The Soviet military intelligence officer, Richard Sorge reported to Moscow on October 3, 1938, that the "Polish question" was the next foreign policy problem for Germany, but Germany and Poland were expected to settle it "amicably because of their joint war against the USSR".”225” The Commissar of the League of Nations in Danzig C. Burckhardt also wrote on December 20 after his visit to Germany that the Ukraine was much of a talking point there: "Poland is being associated with such plans to a certain extent on the understanding, of course, that Warsaw will have to pay for it, that it will submit, that it will be ’reasonable’ and will follow the way of the Czechs." ”226”
One indicative statement was made by General Coestring, the German Military Attaché in the USSR, in a conversation with the Lithuanian military attaché: "Poland is a poor horse harnessed by Germany for a time. ... If Poland counts on Germany’s assistance in her war against the USSR, she must know anyway that German troops, once in the Corridor and Silesia, will stay there."“227”
The ruling circles of Poland were prepared to co-operate with Germany in the imperialist plunder of foreign lands, particularly in action against the Soviet state. At the same 198time they could not take delight in the prospect of Poland turning into a rightless vassal of Hitler Germany or of the Nazis capturing Polish lands. Still less so since it would have produced a storm of indignation among the Polish people. Nor did the Polish government like the idea of a German-controlled "Ukrainian state" being created because it feared that the Nazis would want to annex to it also the Ukrainian lands which formed part of Poland (that is, the lands alienated by Poland from the Soviet state in 1920). Thus, the Vice-Director of the Political Department of Poland’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs, T. Kobylanski, emphasised in a conversation with the German Embassy Counsellor in Poland, von Scheliah, on November 18, that if the Germans refrained from their idea of creating a "Great Ukraine”, "Poland would be willing subsequently to join Germany in a march on the Soviet Ukraine”. Otherwise, such action could turn out to be impossible, he pointed out.”228”
It was, therefore, the reverse side of the medal that began to show itself little by little as did the “price” which the Nazi Reich wanted Poland to pay for her part in plundering foreign lands. Yet quite a few individuals among the ruling circles of Poland were prepared to co-operate with the Nazis almost under any terms. J. Beck declared, for instance, to U.S. Ambassador Biddle that Poland "might have" to co-operate with Germany in creating a Ukrainian state at the expense of some of the territory of Poland, the USSR and Romania.”229”
Some pronouncements by Karszo-Siedlewski, a former Polish Embassy Counsellor in Moscow, who was appointed as Minister in Iran in December, were particularly noteworthy in this respect. Karszo-Siedlewski said in a conversation with von Cheliah on December 28, 1938, that in a few years Germany would be fighting the Soviet Union and "Poland will support . . . Germany in that war. It will be better for Poland to side with Germany quite definitely before the conflict breaks out since Poland’s territorial interests in the West and Poland’s political objectives in the East, above all in the Ukraine, can be secured only through a Polish-German agreement achieved well in advance". ”23”°
The Nazis missed no opportunity, in meeting Polish diplomats afterwards, to raise the question of anti-Soviet cooperation between the two countries. Hitler remarked in his 199conversation with Beck on January 5, 1939, that there was a full community of interests between Germany and Poland with regard to Russia.”231” As he answered a question from Ribbentrop on the following day whether or not the Polish government had forsworn Pilsudski’s claims against the Ukraine, Beck, reaffirming Poland’s aggressive designs, stressed that the Poles "had even been in Kiev, and that these aspirations were doubtless, still alive today."“232”
During his visit to Poland on January 26, 1939, Ribbentrop raised the matter again. Hitler’s Minister once more offered to Beck to establish collaboration between Germany and Poland with regard to the Soviet Union and also in creating the "Great Ukraine”. "Mr. Beck made no secret,” the transcript of that conversation said, "of the fact that Poland had aspirations directed toward the Soviet Ukraine and a connection with the Black Sea.” On hearing such a statement from the Polish Minister, Ribbentrop raised the question of Poland joining the Anti-Comintern Pact, so that she could find herself "in the same boat" with Germany. Beck promised him that "he would give further careful consideration" to this question. ”233” At the end of the visit, the German Ambassador in Warsaw, H. Moltke, declared, replying to the question about Poland’s position in the event of a clash between Germany and Russia: "The situation is quite clear. We know that Poland will be at our side in the event of a German-Russian conflict. That is quite definite."“234”
In case of a joint war with Germany against the USSR, Poland’s ruling quarters preferred to see German troops moved against the Soviet Union through the territory of other countries, rather than through Poland. The People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs pointed out on February 19, 1939, that Poland was dreaming of turning the Soviet Ukraine into her own sphere of influence. "She will, however, be ready to give up her dreams, in case of necessity, and would not object to Hitler passing through Romania on his way to Russia. . . . Nor would Poland object to Hitler marching through the Baltic states and Finland to leave her free to act against the Ukraine in time to coincide with the policy of Japan."“235”
However, while in the first few months following Munich the Nazis did consider joint action with Poland against the Soviet Union, that did not prevent them from 200circumstantially working out another version, that is, the plans of war against Poland as well as against Franco and Britain. By the end of December 1938, the further Nazi plans of aggression had been, in fact, finally clarified. It was decided to do away with Czechoslovakia in the spring of 193!) and then with Poland so as to act against France and Britain in the subsequent year, having collected enough strength and strengthened the rear.”236”
True, the German press went on discussing for a while the "Ukrainian question" but that was nothing short of misinformation designed to withhold the actual Nazi plans.
In the meantime the Nazis got down to some specific action in preparation for an attack on Poland. At a conference which Ribbentrop had with Nazi generals on January 22, it was stated that the German-Polish declaration of 1934 would be observed only as long as it was found worthwhile. It was envisaged that steps would be taken to "strain relations with Poland to such an extent as to make nothing but a military solution of the issue possible." ”237”
The Attack on the USSR Postponed
As the subsequent events had shown, the expectations of reactionary elements in Britain, France and the United States for aggression to be turned towards the Soviet frontiers were found to have been built on quick-sand. The aggressors had a fairly good idea of the strength and might of the Red Army and could not venture into anti-Soviet gambling. Besides, Japan got bogged down deep in the war against China. Before that war was over, she could actually consider attacking the USSR only in the event of a Soviet-German conflict. Germany, on her part, did not consider herself to be prepared sufficiently enough in the military sense to venture into a war against the USSR.
At a conference with Keitel and Brauchitsch on November 16 Hitler set out his plan to sign a military alliance with Italy for a war against France and Britain. Italy would confront them in the Mediterranean and in North Africa, while German forces would attack France.”238” One of fascist “experts” on the problems of Eastern Europe, W. Markert had information that prior to November and 201December 1938, the Nazis had intended to hasten a "clash with Moscow and to that end get Poland to serve as an ally against the Soviet Union”. Ribbentrop and Rosenberg "were in favour of war against the Soviet Union by exploiting the Ukrainian question. The decisive change in the evaluation of the political situation and the chances for war in Eastern Europe came about somewhere around Christmas.” After his long sojourn in Obersalzberg, Hitler declared, referring to war against the USSR, that some time was still needed for its thorough preparation.”239”
The progressive change in the alignment of forces in Europe in favour of the aggressive powers and more particularly, the swelling tide of information that Germany was preparing to direct her blow not against the USSR, but against Poland, France and Britain, ultimately began to worry the Western powers.
However, in the Diaries of Oliver Harvey, personal secretary of the British Foreign Secretary, wo find the following anxious entry dating from as early as November 13, 1938: "Every scrap of information, secret and public, we get from Germany now shows that the German Government is laughing at us, despising us and intending to dispossess us morally and materially from our world position." “24”° On the following day Lord Halifax, addressing a meeting of the government’s Foreign Policy Committee, made a summary of confidential reports indicating that the Nazi Reich was "becoming increasingly anti-British and that their intention was to work for the disintegration of the British Empire and, if possible, for the domination of the world by the German nation." “241”
The First Secretary of the British Embassy in Berlin, I. Kirkpatrick, arrived in London in mid-December with some material to prove that the Nazis were planning aggression not only eastwards but westwards as well.
Chamberlain, however, still hoped for a success of the course he had mapped out. With reference to the proposed measures to strengthen Britain’s ability to resist German aggression, he declared at a Cabinet meeting that these proposals "did not tally with his impression of Hitler’s next move, which would be eastwards, in which case we might well not be involved at all.”242”
A Foreign Office memorandum submitted to the British government on January 19, 1939, summarized the available 202information about the Nazi plans which was obtained from various secret sources. In the introductory note to the memorandum Halifax pointed out that "hitherto it had been generally expected that Hitler’s designs would lead him (eastward, and more particularly that he was planning something in the Ukraine. More recently, we have been receiving reports showing that he has decided that the moment is propitious for dealing an overwhelming blow at the Western powers."“243” The Foreign Office had information at the lime that the Nazis intended to start large-scale armed action by smashing Poland.”244”
The French General Staff also arrived at the conclusion that Germany would rather launch an attack in the West than a war against the USSR.”245”
Nevertheless, the British Ambassador in Berlin, Henderson, told Hitler on March 2, 1939 (on his return from a trip to London) that Chamberlain and Halifax "are still thinking on lines of Munich”. Henderson expressed his readiness to start negotiations with Fiihrer on that basis.”246” The Nazi Chancellor, however, did not honour the Ambassador with a reply. He did not want any agreement with Britain, nor did he intend to concert any of his action with her. Still less so since Henderson’s offer clearly indicated that the British government did not mean to put up any resistance lo the Nazi Reich’s aggressive aspirations.
To sum up, by early 1939, the Nazi Reich, enjoying the benefit of the policy of abetting German aggression that was pursued by Britain, France and the United States, came to occupy the dominant position in Central Europe. The expectations of Chamberlain and his fellow thinkers that they could strike a deal with the Nazis so as to push them into an act of aggression eastwards, against the USSR, turned out to have been unfounded. The Nazis, while planning their further land-grabbing plans, preferred to have to deal with weaker opponents for the time being. They did not as yet make as bold as to confront the USSR.