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Vilnis SipolsDiplomatic Battles Before World War II
EASTERN PACT NEGOTIATED. TREATY OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE USSR AND FRANCE
Soviet Initiative Towards a Regional Pact
The talks which began late in 1933, on the Soviet government’s initiative, for concluding a regional pact to safeguard the security of the nations of Eastern and Central Europe, occupy a special place in the history of the Soviet efforts for peace and against aggression. "The Soviet Union is interested in strengthening peace everywhere”, Izvestia wrote on January 29, 1934, "for, with international relations strained as they are, an armed clash between the Great Powers, wherever it may break out, would tend to escalate into a world war. More particularly the USSR is interested in the maintenance of peace in Eastern Europe."
The Soviet government did a lot towards strengthening peace on the Soviet borders. It had concluded non– aggression treaties with many nations. That meant that all of them recognised peaceful coexistence as basic to their relations with the USSR. The signing of agreements about the definition of aggression and a number of other measures went far towards promoting the cause of peace.
However, at a time when certain powers were already heading for aggression, measures of that kind were not enough to keep the peace. The aggressors were in no mood to reckon with any treaties or any standards of international relations. They were intent on using force to carry out their plans and were preparing for war. It was senseless to try and admonish them by any peace offers or appeals for peaceful coexistence.
There had to be a different kind of action, the action that could ensure peace and security in spite of the aggressors’ plans. Aggressors based their policies on the use of force,”108” and they did not reckon with the interests of other nations unless these had a requisite force behind them. Nazi Germany, using her economic potential, was quickly building up the strength of her war machine as well, developing into the mightiest state of capitalist Europe. With her predatory foreign policy, she became a formidable threat to many 50nations of Europe. What made matters still worse was the emergence of a bloc of aggressor powers, comprising Germany, Japan, Italy and some oilier countries.
The only way to keep the peace in Europe was for all the nations facing the danger of aggression to rally together in order to counter the aggressors with a still greater, overwhelming force. That could be achieved by the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral treaties of mutual assistance by the states under a threat of attack, and by setting up an effective system of collective security in Europe.
That was the course to take if war was to be prevented. The Soviet proposal for concluding a regional pact met in equal measure the interests of peoples of the USSR and of the other countries of Europe. That is exactly why it had fetched widespread response at the time, being for long in the limelight of European diplomacy and public opinion.
The Soviet government found that with German imperialism on course for aggression once again, it was a matter of particular importance for the USSR and France to establish close co-operation in action to keep the peace.
During his visit to Paris, Litvinov pointed out in a statement to the French press on July 7, 1933: "Neither our political, nor our economic interests clash with the interests of France in any point of the globe, and, therefore, there are no obstacles, in our view, to our closer co-operation, both political and economic.” The People’s Commissar stated with satisfaction that the Soviet Union’s peace policy was winning more and more understanding in France.”109”
In a conversation with the prominent French politician Edouard Herriot, who was in the Soviet Union in August and September 1933, Litvinov spoke about the firm determination and desire of the USSR to "seek closer contact with France".”110” The Soviet government proposed a gentleman’s agreement about an exchange of information as a step towards it.
The French people felt deeply concerned over their destiny. The grave danger hanging over France was clearly sensed by her most far-sighted politicians as well.
Besides, the French system of alliances with Poland and some other states of Central and Eastern Europe was gradually losing its earlier import because as the alignment of forces in Europe changed, so did their foreign policy orientation. The French government’s attempts to come 51to terms with Nazi Germany, notably at the expense of the small nations of Central and Eastern Europe, also greatly undermined relations of those countries with France and their confidence in her.
At the same time, the rapid economic growth of the USSR and the enhancement of its defence capability led to it being considered in France as a possible partner in opposing the danger of Nazi aggression. In the context of a deep economic crisis, the interests of the French business community in increased trading links with the USSR was likewise a matter of no mean importance.
However, there were quite a few personalities in France’s ruling circles who were in favour of co-operation with Nazi Germany. Foreign Minister J. Paul-Boncour admitted in a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador V. S. Dovgalevsky on November 22, 1933, that "there are influential political, commercial and industrial circles in France seeking an accommodation with Germany”. He remarked that but for his opposition, "Daladier would already be conducting direct negotiations with Germany.” “111”
The French government, having overcome the waverings due to the fierce resistance of reactionary elements which wanted no trucks with the Soviet Union, finally arrived at the conclusion that there had to be co-operation with the USSR in action against Nazi aggression. With Germany having left the League of Nations and walked out of the Disarmament Conference, Paul-Boncour, talking to the Soviet Ambassador Dovgalevsky, pointed out, referring to appropriate statements by certain Soviet diplomats, that the question of supplementing the 1932 Soviet-French non– aggression pact with a pact of mutual assistance might come up, indeed, in due course. In a conversation with Litvinov in Paris on October 31, J. Paul-Boncour "mentioned several times mutual assistance as complementing the non– aggression pact”. It was he, too, who raised the question of the USSR joining the League of Nations.”112”
On November 29, 1933, the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs informed the French government that the USSR was willing to consider concluding a treaty of mutual assistance with France and joining the League of Nations. The instruction to the Soviet Ambassador in France was: "You may open your conversations with Boncour on these grounds. Communicate the results.” On the following 52day Dovgalevsky informed Paul-Boncour about it. Litvinov said in those days: "We have set firm course towards a closer relationship with France." “113” Shortly afterwards Dovgalevsky was summoned to Moscow to be given circumstantial instructions regarding subsequent negotiations with the French government.
While welcoming the French proposals in principle, the Soviet government still considered it more reasonable for safeguarding peace in Europe to conclude not a bilateral Soviet-French treaty but a multilateral agreement on collective security with other nations concerned taking part.
On December 19–20, 1933, the Soviet government drafted the following proposals to be communicated to the French government:
“1) The USSR is willing to join the League of Nations on certain conditions.
2) The USSR does not object to a regional agreement being concluded within the framework of the League of Nations about mutual defence against aggression from Germany.
3) The USSR is willing to see this agreement joined by Belgium, France, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland or by some of these countries, with France and Poland in without fail.
4) Negotiations to specify the commitments under a future convention on mutual defence can begin upon the submission of a draft agreement by ... France.
5) Regardless of the obligations under the agreement on mutual defence, the parties to the agreement must undertake to render each other diplomatic, moral and, as far as possible, material aid also in the event of an armed attack not envisaged by the agreement itself..." “114”
The document just quoted contained a brief and concise account of the overriding positions of principle which informed of the struggle the Soviet state had launched against the growing danger of another world war. For this reason it is necessary to take a closer look at some of them.
First, in distinction from the French proposal for a bilateral Soviet-French pact, the Soviet Union was pressing for a wider agreement. The Soviet government considered some action to prevent war and to check the aggressors to be the major task in hand. The Soviet-French treaty about mutual aid in resisting aggression could play a tremendous 53part in tliis respect. But to conclude a multilateral agreement on collective security would have been a matter of far greater importance for ensuring a safe peace in Europe. Should Germany have nevertheless launched the war, she would have had to wage it against all the parties to the pact at once, that is, under extremely unfavourable circumstances.
Second, it is worth looking through the list of nations which were projected as parties to the regional agreement which has gone down in history as the draft Eastern Pact.”115” One condition of particular importance in the Soviet proposal was that France and Poland were to have been indispensable parties to this pact.
A word of comment on French participation. The USSR could have assumed contractual obligations regarding aid to the nations listed in its proposal only if France had assumed the same obligations. Otherwise, should France have stayed out in the event of the USSR entering the war against Germany because of her attack upon the Baltic countries, the Soviet Union would virtually have found itself alone in a state of war against the Nazi Reich, while the overriding concern of Soviet foreign policy at the time was to avoid such a war.
The reactionary circles of the Western powers, above all, those of Britain, strained every nerve in those years to provoke war between the USSR and Germany as well as the USSR and Japan. But the Soviet Union was cautious enough not to fall for that kind of provocation. Naturally, the Soviet Union could have come to the aid of a victim of aggression even without having a treaty of mutual assistance with it. It did actually lend such assistance on more than one occasion, as will yet be shown. This assistance has been always provided with due regard for the particular situation and by such means and methods as to keep the USSR from being involved in a war against aggressors in what would have been extremely dangerous and unfavourable circumstances for the USSR, without allies.
It would have been a different matter if France had joined the USSR in helping the victim of aggression, as envisaged in the Soviet proposal. In such a case, there would have boon enough ground for expecting lliat, faced by the prospect of a war against the USSR and France at once, Nazi Germany would not have ventured into acts of 54aggression against other parties to the pact. Besides, Germany would have had to reckon with the likelihood that Britain, as France’s ally under the Locarno Pact, might also have entered the war, following France. If such an attack had still taken place, the aggressor could have been curbed by the joint efforts of the USSR, France and other parties to the Eastern Pact.
The participation of Poland in the Pact was also a matter of tremendous importance, in point of principle, for the USSR. To begin with, that would have meant that Poland, once actively involved in all anti-Soviet actions of the imperialist camp, would become an ally of the USSR. Besides, it was precisely Poland’s participation in the pact that could have made Soviet participation in it really effective, because the Soviet Union had no common border with the Nazi Reich and could seriously consider joining a war against Germany only in close co-operation with Poland, which would have allowed the transit of Soviet troops through some of her territory towards the German borders. The main thing, however, was that a coalition involving the USSR, France and Poland would have virtually deterred the Nazi Reich from venturing into such a war. Also, the guarantee of Poland’s continued independence was a matter of great importance, in principle, for the security of the USSR, because as long as there was an independent Poland, Germany could have no convenient access to the Soviet border. Therefore, the USSR was prepared to make its utmost contribution towards safeguarding Poland’s independence and inviolability.
With such allies as France and Poland, the Soviet Union would have undertaken to provide assistance to the Baltic countries and other small nations as well. For example, once an ally of France, the USSR would not have objected to having these allied commitments extended to France’s allies—Czechoslovakia and Belgium (Poland was likewise in alliance with France). At the same time, the Soviet Union was most interested in having the reciprocal obligations of the parties to the Eastern Pact extended to the Baltic states as well. That was because, having captured the Baltic states, Nazi Germany would have obtained a vantagogronncl for a subsequent attack against the USSH.
Third, a word of comment about the League of Nations. The institution of the League of Nations was part and 55parcel of the Versailles system of peace treaties created by the Entente Powers and the U.S. as a result of their victory in World War I. It was one of the instruments in the hands of those nations by which to ensure the immutable territorial and political outcome of the victory they had won, and the dominant position of the Anglo-Franco-American imperialist alignment in the world. Along with that, ever since it was founded, the League of Nations had been one of the centres for organising foreign intervention against the Soviet state and other anti-Soviet acts. However, by 1933 the role of the League of Nations within the system of international relations had radically changed. The positions of France and Britain in the world grew weaker, and the League of Nations stopped being an instrument of their domination of other nations. Yet it could still play a certain positive role as one of the means to ensure collective security and to make its contribution towards the struggle against aggression and for the consolidation of peace and international security. For example, Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations stipulated that in the event of aggression by one of its members against any other, all the remaining members were under obligation to apply economic and military sanctions against the aggressor.”116”
On joining the League of Nations, the Soviet Union was anxious for it to become effective in strengthening peace and security. In the event of an attack against the USSR by any state whatsoever, all other members of the League of Nations were obliged to come to its aid. True, there was no particular reason to hope that the other members of the League would actually render assistance to the USSR. Simultaneously, the USSR came under obligation to render assistance to other members of the League of Nations should they have fallen victim to an act of aggression. The Soviet state was willing, on its part, to join the League of Nations’ collective action in providing assistance to a victim of aggression.
That was what made the Soviet Union’s accession to the League of Nations worthwhile and possible. The inability of that organisation to take any effective steps against the Japanese aggressors who had invaded Northeast China (Manchuria) in 1931, damaged its prestige. But the entry of the USSR into the League of Nations, prepared to make a tangible contribution towards action against aggression, 56could have given it a new lease of life. Therefore, many members of the League of Nations had a stake in Soviet participation.
The question of the USSR joining the League of Nations assumed added relevance because all the allied treaties of France, including the 1925 Treaty of Locarno, were based on the Covenant of the League of Nations. Under those treaties, France could not have lent assistance to the Soviet Union without violating, for instance, the Treaty of Locarno and without a decision by the Council of the League of Nations about the USSR being a victim of aggression. Therefore, for the USSR to join the League of Nations proved to be an indispensable precondition for the conclusion of a treaty of mutual assistance between the USSR and France, as well as of the collective security pact for Europe proposed by the Soviet Union.
Those were the circumstances behind the invitation to the Soviet Union from most of the members of the League of Nations in the autumn of the subsequent year to join that organisation. Once in the League of Nations the Soviet Union became its most consistent champion against aggression and for the maintenance of peace.
Fourth, there is yet another important point to note about the Soviet proposal. It stated that the parties to the agreement should back up one another also in the event of an attack by a state outside the agreement. This point clearly intimated the danger that was facing the Soviet Union at the time from Japan. When France proposed concluding a treaty of mutual assistance with the USSR, the Soviet government asked at once whether France meant mutual assistance in the Far East as well. However, all that the French government was prepared to do in announcing its readiness to conclude a treaty with the USSR was to act against German aggression alone. “117” The Soviet government was interested in having certain support, if not outright military assistance, provided in the event of a conflict in the Far East as well. It should be noted at the same time that the very fact of such a pact being concluded even without the abovementioned provision, would have been of no mean importance for the Soviet Union in the event of a conflict with Japan. For the pact would have been an extra guarantee of peace on the Soviet Western borders which would have enabled the Soviet government to reserve more strength and 57give more attention to action against the Far Eastern aggressor.
Speaking at a meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR on December 29, 1933, Litvinov emphasised that "the maintenance of peace cannot depend on our efforts alone and demands co-operation and assistance from other nations”. Seeking, therefore, to establish and maintain friendly relations with all nations, the USSR was giving particular attention to strengthening the relations and socuring a maximum rapprochement with those of them which, like the Soviet Union, were interested in the preservation of peace and willing to oppose peace breakers. "The Soviet Union, on its part, is ready to accomplish this task because work in this direction is dictated by the interests of the working people of the whole world and by the security of all peoples, including, of course, the peoples of the Soviet Union. The peoples, like ours, who have provided the fullest possible evidence of their commitment to peace and their respect for the security of other nations, have also the fullest possible right to their own security." “118”
By its proposal for concluding a regional agreement on mutual defence against Nazi aggression, the Soviet government started a new stage of active struggle for peace and security in Europe. Soviet action against aggression, determined and guided by its positions of principle, won widespread recognition and support by the mass of the people in all European countries.
The proposals of the Soviet government were handed by the Soviet Ambassador in Paris Dovgalevsky to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs J. Paul-Boncour on December 28, 1933. Having looked them through, the French Minister could not help admitting that they had outstanding importance for the maintenance of peace. "We are undertaking a job of great importance with you, today we have begun making history with you," “119” he told the Soviet Ambassador.
It was not, however, without some hesitation that the French government accepted the proposal submitted by the Soviet government. In spite of the danger hanging over France, that country’s reactionary elements still bestially hated the Soviet state and would not hear of any co– operation with it. They hoped to come to terms with the Nazis.
It was not until April 20, 1934, that Louis Barthou (who 58succeded J. Paul-Boncour as Minister for Foreign Affairs in February) informed the Soviet government that he had been authorised to continue the negotiations. Barthou worked hard, as he usually did, to make the negotiations a success. He understood perfectly well what danger was facing France from Nazi Germany and saw the Soviet Union as the major ally in action to ward it off. At the same time he believed that, should France decline the Soviet proposal, the USSR could find itself forced to take steps to resume such relations with Germany as had existed between the two countries under the terms of the 1922 Treaty of Rapallo. And then Germany would reap the benefit France had rejected.
Late in April 1934 the Secretary General of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, A. Leger informed the Soviet Embassy in Paris about the outline (sketch) for the pact proposed by the Soviet Union to be formalised as a treaty. The idea behind that outline was to conclude a multilateral regional pact of mutual assistance (Eastern Pact) with the USSR, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Baltic states in it and France out. The parties to the pact were to have pledged non-aggression and mutual assistance in the event of aggression. However, only the neighbouring states were to have afforded mutual assistance under the French scheme.
Another idea was for the USSR and France to conclude a bilateral treaty of mutual assistance associated with the Eastern Pact as well as with the 1925 Pact of Locarno. Under that treaty, France would have afforded assistance to the Soviet Union, had it been attacked by any of the parties to the Eastern Pact; the Soviet Union would have come to France’s aid, had she been attacked by one of the Locarno nations. “12”° (Besides France, the parties to the Pact of Locarno were Germany, Britain, Italy and Belgium.)
The outline worked out by the French Foreign Ministry narrowed down the obligations France was to have assumed in accordance with the Soviet proposal; she was committing herself to giving assistance to the USSR only rather than to all the parties to the Eastern Pact. True, France was hound by allied obligations also with Poland and Czechoslovakia under the treaties she had earlier concluded. But in the event of a German attack on Baltic states, France could have stayed out. The Soviet Charge d’Affaires in 59France M. I. Rosenberg immediately drew A. Leger’s attention to that flaw in the scheme he had proposed. The Secretary General of the French Foreign Ministry replied that the French government could not assume any obligation regarding aid to the Baltic countries.
The draft treaty worked out by the French Foreign Ministry differed from the Soviet proposal also in that it provided for Germany to join the Pact as well. Naturally, such a modification could complicate the negotiations about the Pact right away, but, considering the importance which the French government attached (partly under the influence of Britain and Poland) to Germany being offered to join the Pact, the Soviet government did not object to its proposal being so amended.
In his conversations with Louis Barthou on June 4, 1934, Litvinov reverted to the issue of aid to the Baltic countries. The French Minister found the Soviet arguments convincing, but gave no final answer to them. The draft Eastern Pact was examined on June 5, 1934, at a French Cabinet meeting which approved it in principle. “121” But on the question of guarantees for the Baltic countries, it took up a negative stand. Barthou communicated this decision to the Soviet Foreign Minister on the following day.
The Soviet government continued, however, to insist on French guarantees being extended to the Baltic states and objected to the division of the parties to the Pact into neighbours and non-neighbours since no aid for the latter was envisaged. In the end, the French government recanted such a division but it still refused to commit itself to aiding the Baltic states. With the major issues regarding the conclusion of the Eastern Pact settled between the French and Soviet representatives, it was decided to start negotiations with the governments of other nations which were to join the Pact.
The outline-text of the Pact consisted of a treaty of regional mutual assistance, a treaty between the USSR and France as well as a General Act. It was envisaged that Poland, the USSR, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would be parties to the treaty of regional mutual assistance. Thie treaty, apart from committing the parties concerned to aid each other in the event of aggression, provided for their consultations with a view to preventing war or restoring peace. Under the Soviet-French 60Treaty, the USSR was to become a guarantor of the 192,> Pact of Locarno, on a par with Britain and Italy. France committed herself to assisting the USSR in the event of an attack against it by any of the parties to the Eastern Pact. Under the General Act, the Eastern Pact was to have come into effect once the USSR joined the League of Nations.
While informing the Soviet ambassadors in the countries concerned about the outline-text of the Pact, the Soviet Foreign People’s Commissar emphasised that it was not a draft but a mere outline handed to him by the French in Geneva. In his letter he noted, in particular, that it was worthwhile including a definition of aggression in the regional pact. The People’s Commissar took the view that Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Baltic countries, having signed the convention about the definition of aggression, "can hardly object to this amendment. Nor is France likely to oppose it, but Germany must be expected to resist it." “122”
First of all, France informed Czechoslovakia and Poland about the draft Eastern Pact. On June 6, 1934, the Soviet ambassadors brought the negotiations to the knowledge of the governments of the Baltic countries. On the following day, the proposal for concluding the Eastern Pact was passed on to the German government by the French Ambassador.
Active Soviet efforts for peace and security in Europe had led to a general improvement of Soviet-Czechoslovak as well as Soviet-Romanian relations by that time. In earlier years, the governments of Czechoslovakia and Romania, with such influential leaders as Benes and Titulescu, invariably held extremely anti-Soviet positions. With the independence of both countries threatened by the Nazi Reich, they had to revise their policies regarding the USSR which was the principal fighter against Hitler aggression. By an exchange of notes on June 9, 1934, the USSR established diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia and Romania.
On being proposed to conclude the Eastern Pact, the Czechoslovak government immediately announced that it accepted this proposal and was ready to join the Pact, even in the event of Germany opposing it.
Opponents of the Eastern Pact
Poland’s position was entirely different. In a conversation with Louis Barlhou in Geneva on June 4, 1934, Joseph Beck said he was skeptical of the chances of success for this Pact.”123” Litvinov cabled from Geneva on the same day to say that Beck was ”against the pacts we have proposed”. On Juno 27, he stated that "Poland is the main hindrance to Ihe realisation of a regional pact".”124”
The Soviet diplomacy did whatever it could to explain to the Polish government the immense importance which the Eastern Pact could have for her independence. Izvestia said on July 16, 1934, that the Eastern Pact offered Poland some real guarantees of the security of her borders which could not be regarded as sufficiently ensured by the Polish– German declaration of friendship and non-aggression. The paper expressed the hope that the Polish government "on reflection, will find this pact useful both for the Polish Republic and for universal peace".
The position of Finland regarding the Eastern Pact was also negative. As the German Minister in Finland W. Blticher pointed out, Finland was looking at the Eastern Pact very negatively and was, on the contrary, seeking a closer relationship with the countries hostile towards the Soviet Union.”125”
Right from the outset Nazi Germany set out to wreck the talks on the Eastern Pact. The German Foreign Minister von Neurath declared (if tentatively) on June 13 to Litvinov who was passing through Berlin that "the outline of the Pact is unacceptable to Germany".”126” German diplomacy was frantically active against the Pact, for it could have been an obstacle in the way of the Reich’s aggressive designs. The German Foreign Ministry was summoning, one after the other, the represent Lives of the countries which were projected as parties to the pact. German diplomats were just as active in this subversive business in the capitals of the countries concerned.
Barthou decided to inform Britain, too, about the plans for concluding the Pact. He passed the outline to the British on June 27. The position of Britain, which was an influential nation in Europe, was of great importance in the talks on the Pact. Had Britain supported the idea of concluding the Eastern Pact, that could have foreclosed the 62successful outcome of the negotiations, or the more so, if she became a party to the Pact as well. While giving instructions to the Soviet Embassy in Britain for discussions with British statesmen, Litvinov wrote on June 28, 1934, that "there is no means to keep bellicose Germany in check except by concluding pacts of mutual assistance".”127”
The plans for the conclusion of the Eastern Pact, however, did not conform to the basic foreign policy concept of Britain’s ruling quarters which dreamed of turning the fascist thrust eastward.”128” Therefore, the British government found itself among the opponents of the Pact right away. On June 13, 1934, the German Ambassador in London von Hoesch wrote about the results of his conversation with the British Foreign Secretary John Simon: "The inclusion of Russia in the European security combination is on the whole obviously not very congenial to him." “129”
The Soviet Embassy in London had every reason to report to Moscow, as it qualified the position of Britain, that it was one of "ill will" towards the Eastern Pact. "The Eastern Pact was to have strongly consolidated our international positions, ensured the security of our Western borders and made things easier for us in the Far East. That could not exactly delight the British government." “13”° The American Baltimore Sun noted on February 13, 1935, that there were some people in Britain who hated the USSR more than they loved peace... None of those people could admire the Eastern Pact which promised peace to communist Russia at least for 10 years. None of them would regret to see Germany, Poland and Japan attack the USSR together. They would be gladly selling war equipment to them for that purpose.
The London government did not like that the conclusion of the Eastern Pact would have strengthened the position of France, Britain’s ally. It preferred to see France dependent on Britain which offered the British government a reliable instrument of influencing all French foreign policy and, by the same token, virtually assured Britain her major role in resolving many European problems.
Barthou made a special visit to London early in July 1934 to compel a reversal of Britain’s unfavourable attitude towards the Eastern Pact. British diplomacy ultimately decided to meet the French ally half-way nominally, but in actual reality there was nothing but a semblance of British “support”. The sum and substance of British policy was this: it was to make public a statement of British support for the idea of the Eastern Pact with a view to preventing the possible conclusion of a bilateral French-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance (British diplomacy was particularly averse to such a treaty), but to do everything possible to make the successful completion of negotiations on the Eastern Pact impossible by all kinds of backstage tactics. First of all, British diplomacy called for Germany to be involved in an agreement between the USSR and France on mutual assistance, although there was no doubt (rather just because of that) that Germany would not accept that proposal.
Speaking in Parliament on July 13, the British Foreign Secretary John Simon declared that Britain supported the Eastern Pact.”131” At the same time, in private conversations British government officials made it clear to the German government that they had no sympathy at all, in actual fact, for the Eastern Pact. On July 19, Simon told the German Ambassador Hoesch that "the British Government had decided to support the Pact proposals in view of the threatened alternative of a formal Franco-Russian alliance, which Britain wished to avoid in all circumstances. . .” “132”
The U.S. government was also opposed to the conclusion of the Eastern Pact. As American historian Foster Rhea Dulles pointed out in this connection, the United States of America "hoped that if war broke out in Europe, it might somehow be channeled into a crusade against Communism and accomplish the purposes which Allied intervention had failed to achieve in 1918." “133”
Without giving an official answer for the time being to the proposal to join the Eastern Pact, Germany still did not make any secret of her negative attitude to it, seeking to frustrate the Pact plans.
The government of Poland, claiming that the pact could not be concluded without Germany, also stuck to its negative position.
The conclusion of the Eastern Pact was to meet the national interests of the Baltic countries. But it turned out that neither France, nor Britain wished to come to their aid in the event of German aggression. For instance, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Robert Vansittart told the Secretary-General of the Ministry 64for Foreign Affairs of Latvia V. Munters that he did not see the slightest prospect ahead for the British and French governments to assume any obligations regarding a guarantee of the status quo in the Baltic region. “134”
In those circumstances Latvia and Estonia took up what amounted to a wait-and-see position. Lithuania alone, under an immediate threat from Nazi Germany, was the only one of the Baltic countries to have unconditionally supported the Eastern Pact.
The new phase in the negotiations about the Eastern Pact began in the autumn of 1934. Hitler and Neurath, talking with the Polish Ambassador Lipski in Berlin on August 27, 1934, proposed secret Polish-German co-operation with the aim of preventing the conclusion of the Eastern Pact. At the same time the Nazis made clear the ground on which far-reaching Polish-German co-operation was possible. Hitler declared that if Poland’s outlet to the sea had been cut east of Eastern Prussia in Versailles in 1919, Poland and Germany would long since have been allies and Poland could be turning her eyes East.”135” A few days later Lipski communicated Poland’s consent to “undeclared” co– operation with the Nazi Reich with a view to scuttling the Pact.
On September 8, 1934, Germany sent an official memorandum to the other projected parties to the Eastern Pact announcing that she did not intend to participate in a multilateral treaty providing for mutual assistance. The German government indicated that it preferred bilateral agreements. Still, considering it politically disadvantageous to turn down unconditionally the idea of concluding a multilateral treaty at all, it expressed its consent to the signing of a treaty that would contain nothing beyond obligations about nonaggression and consultations.”136”
The Polish government followed in the footsteps of the Nazi Reich. On September 27, 1934, it officially declared that it could not adhere to the Eastern Pact unless Germany was in it. Poland said also that she would not be a party to a pact together with Czechoslovakia and Lithuania.”137” That was a clear indication of the Polish rulers’ ill designs in respect of those two states.
The USSR Joins the League of Nations
Ever since it was founded, the League of Nations had been one of the centres for planning and plotting anti– Soviet acts of imperialist powers. Therefore, the Soviet Union had, quite naturally, maintained a negative stand with regard to the League until the early 1930s. However, by 1933 the international situation had materially changed. The Anglo-French imperialist alignment was coming under mounting pressure from Japan and Germany. London and Paris had to revise much of their policy towards the Soviet Union. That told on the League of Nations as well. Moreover, many members of the League found it desirable for the USSR to participate in that ogranisation so as to make it more effective in resisting aggression.
The question of the USSR joining the League of Nations was first brought up by the French government when it began to show interest late in October 1933, in co– operation with the USSR in the struggle against aggression from Germany.
The Soviet government found it possible to join the League of Nations, the more so since the aggressive powers— Japan and Germany—had left it. While handing the Eastern Pact proposal to J. Paul-Boncour on December 28, 1933, the Soviet Ambassador Dovgalevsky informed him about the Soviet consent in principle to join the League of Nations.
Setting out the Soviet Union’s position with regard to the League of Nations, Stalin said in a conversation with American journalist Walter Duranty: "In spite of the withdrawal of Germany and Japan from the League of Nations or, perhaps, just because of that, the League can become a certain brake to hold up military operations or impede them. If that is so, if the League can turn out to be something like a little hurdle to make things somewhat more difficult for war and somewhat easier for peace, then we are not against the League. Should that be the course of historical events, it cannot be ruled out that we may support the League of Nations in spite of its glaring shortcomings." “138”
The French government reverted to the question of the USSR joining the League of Nations in June 1934. The Soviet Union gave a positive reply. The French Foreign Minister was handed a statement by the Soviet government 66to the effect that the USSR had earlier linked its accession to the League with the conclusion of the Eastern Pact, but was now prepared to join the League subject to an appropriate invitation and a guarantee of a permanent seat in the Council. The USSR, it was pointed out, expected that this step "will facilitate the conclusion of pacts to strengthen peace".”139”
Most of the members of the League of Nations reacted positively to the Soviet Union’s accession to that international organisation. The British government also declared, not without some hesitation though, that it was ready to support the idea of the Soviet Union joining the League of Nations. However, the governments which held an extremely hostile position with regard to the USSR, reacted to that step of the Soviet Union unfavorably.
Poland’s position could not but call for vigilance. The Polish ruling establishment always was after an international isolation of the USSR so as to create a favourable setting for its anti-Soviet designs. With the USSR in the League of Nations (just as with the Eastern Pact concluded), the position of the Soviet Union would have changed appreciably. The plans for an international isolation of the USSR would also have been frustrated. There was a very painful reaction in Warsaw, besides, to the idea that on joining the League of Nations, the USSR was likewise to become a permanent member of the Council. The Polish leaders had for years pressed hard for Poland to be recognised as a Great Power and a dominant force in Eastern Europe. To this end, they strove to secure, notably, a permanent seat in the Council of the League of Nations. The Soviet Union’s accession to that organisation and the granting of a permanent seat to it in the Council, that is, the recognition of its immense role in international affairs, combined to strike at the great-power ambitions of the Polish government. On July 4, the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs reported from Geneva that the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs J. Beck was active behind the scenes conducting "virulent propaganda against our joining the League". “14”°
The position of Finland with regard to the Soviet Union’s accession to the League of Nations also proved to be unfriendly. The question of the USSR joining the League of Nations was taken as an excuse for yet another anti-Soviet campaign in the Finnish bourgeois press.
A negative stance was taken up also by certain countries whose ruling quarters, just because of their class hatred for the Soviet state, did not find it possible to establish even diplomatic relations with the USSR (Portugal, Switzerland).
On September 14, 1934, the Soviet People’s Commissar on his arrival in Geneva, concerted with the French representatives the outline invitation for the USSR to join the League of Nations and the Soviet government’s reply to this invitation.
On the following day, representatives of the 30 member countries of the League of Nations sent a message to the Soviet government pointing out that they, "considering that the task of maintenance and organisation of peace, which is the basic purpose of the League of Nations, demands the cooperation of all nations, hereby invite the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to join the League of Nations and to bring in its valuable co-operation.” “141”
The question of the USSR joining the League of Nations was examined at an Assembly session on September 18. There had to be a two-thirds majority for the admission and a unanimous vote for the election to Council membership. 39 members of the League voted for the admission of the USSR to the League, 3 against (the Netherlands, Portugal and Switzerland), and 7 abstained. There was not a single vote against the inclusion of the USSR in the Council, but 10 nations abstained.”142” So the USSR was admitted to the League of Nations and became a permanent member of its Council.
Speaking in the Assembly in connection with the Soviet Union’s accession to the League, the Soviet Foreign Commissar declared that unfortunately the League of Nations had no means at its disposal for the complete abolition of war. However, given the firm will and close co-operation of all its members, much can be done to prevent war. "The Soviet government has never stopped working to achieve this end ever since it came into existence”, he declared. "Henceforward it wants to join its efforts with those of other nations represented in the League.” The Soviet representative said that mere declarations were not enough to keep the peace, it took some more effective means to do so.”143”
The Soviet Union’s entry into the League of Nations substantially reinforced that international organisation and its potentialities for the maintenance of peace. The Soviet 68defence capability and economic resources materially increased the League’s potential powers and possibilities essential to the struggle against aggression. The Soviet government’s determination to do everything possible to check aggression and strengthen peace could increase the efficiency of the League of Nations and enhance its role in resolving the problems of war and peace.
The Deputy Secretary-General of the League of Nations Francis Paul Walters of Britain, admitted that Soviet participation in that international organisation was "an event of first-class importance in the political evolution of the post-war world".”144” Even bourgeois politicians and historians had to admit that the Soviet Union became the most active partisan of the policy of collective security in the League.”145” Once in the League of Nations, the Soviet Union became a full-fledged party to what was the major international organisation in those years, where it could play an active part, on a par with Britain, France and other countries, in resolving international problems, including the problems of peace and security. All that opened up further opportunities for the Soviet government to intensify the battle for peace and against aggression.
Soviet-French Protocol
In view of the negative position of the Nazi Reich and Poland, the Soviet government decided to press for the conclusion of the Eastern Pact without them, that is, with the countries willing to participate in it.
The French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou kept up his active stand in favour of the conclusion of the pact. It was not for nothing that he was one of the European statesmen the Nazi secret services decided to “remove”. The assassination of Barthou was entrusted to the Assistant German Military Attache in Paris Speidel. A detailed plan for the assassination, codenamed "Teuton Sword”, was worked out. The killing of Barthou in Marseilles on October 9, 1934, was a serious blow at the plans for concluding the Eastern Pact.
Laval, who became the French Foreign Minister, made some fundamental changes in the country’s foreign policy since he considered an understanding with Germany to be 69his main concern. Even at the Barthou funeral, Laval told the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Eduard Benes that there was no point in being in a hurry to develop a closer relationship with the USSR since it was more important to reach agreement with Germany.”146” The French Minister declared that "of all the French political leaders he, Laval, had done most for a rapprochement with the Germans,” and that he was "ready to reach agreement with Germany”.”147”
All that meant an end to the process of consolidation of Soviet-French relations which had been going on until then. Taking into account the prevailing mood in France, Laval kept saying that he would carry on Barthou’s policy, while working underhand towards “freezing” relations between the USSR and France. It was not for nothing that the French Foreign Minister should have been christened the "balancing Laval".
The most important task before Soviet diplomacy at the time was to forestall a German-French deal which meant, above all, that the Nazis would be getting a free hand in the East in return for Germany’s pledge not to attack France. The Soviet People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs proceeded from the assumption that, should the Eastern Pact be concluded, it would be, apart from everything else, a certain guarantee against an anti-Soviet collusion between France and Germany. Since there was no reason to expect the Pact to be signed soon, it was decided to offer to the French government to sign an accord about a "reciprocal commitment of the USSR and France to conclude no political agreements with Germany without prior mutual notification as well as about informing each other about all political negotiations with Germany".”148”
The Soviet government succeeded in having a Soviet French protocol signed on December 5, 1934, whereby both governments pledged themselves not to enter into any negotiations about any agreements that could damage the preparations for, and the conclusion of, the Eastern Pact. A few days later Czechoslovakia acceded to the Soviet-French protocol.
Treaty of Mutual Assistance Between the USSR and France
Once it had become finally clear from Hitler’s statements in March 1935 that Germany and Poland were opposed to the draft Eastern Pact, the Soviet government brought up on March 29, the question of concluding a trilateral Soviet French-Czechoslovak treaty of mutual assistance.”149” Paris, however, favored the conclusion of bilateral Soviet-French and Soviet-Czechoslovak treaties.
The difference between these proposals was essentially that the French one urged that France and the USSR should assume separate commitments in front of Czechoslovakia, while the Soviet proposal called for a joint commitment of the two powers. Such a joint guarantee by the two major powers of Europe would have been more substantial for Czechoslovakia. Another thing a trilateral treaty would mean for Czechoslovakia was that she was not obliged to afford assistance to the USSR single-handed, unless such assistance was provided by France. Czechoslovakia thought it impossible to conclude a treaty of mutual assistance with the USSR without such a reservation. A similar consideration was of no lesser significance for the USSR because it was also anxious to avoid being bound by a treaty obligation regarding assistance to Czechoslovakia without any guarantee that France would come to her aid.
However, the French government did not want to commit itself to concert its position regarding assistance to Czechoslovakia with the Soviet Union. It sought to retain full freedom of action in deciding whether or not to afford assistance to Czechoslovakia.
The Soviet government still considered it most reasonable to conclude the Eastern Pact in one form or another. On April 2, 1935, the Soviet People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs informed its Ambassador in France that the Soviet position "is to have a pact of mutual assistance in the East with Germany and Poland as parties to it and, should Germany refuse to participate, with, at least Poland and, in case of Poland’s disagreement, with France, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic countries as parties to it.. . As to Laval’s new proposal about a bilateral pact of mutual assistance, it is not clear to us what we can gain from it so that was yet to be cleared up.”150”
The Soviet Union still could not fail to attach major importance to the Eastern Pact safeguarding the Baltic states as well from German aggression. On this subject, the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs indicated that "the occupation of those countries by Germany would be the start of her attack on the USSR”. Therefore, France must lend assistance to the Soviet Union as soon as the German Armed Forces crossed their Eastern border. Should the Baltic countries be left without the guarantees of France and other parties to the Eastern Pact, and should the Soviet Union want to come "to the aid of those countries”, the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs stated, "we would be deprived of French assistance as well in the course of further hostilities and with Germany developing her offensive against our borders, because we would have been the first to go to war against Germany to defend the Baltic countries. We would, evidently, have to confront France and Britain in a major dispute on this account".”151”
On April 6, the Soviet Ambassador in Paris, V. P. Potemkin, made an appropriate statement to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs. However, the French government did not support the Soviet proposal for concluding the Eastern Pact without Germany and Poland. Besides, Laval told the Soviet Ambassador that Franco had never agreed to guarantee aid to the Baltic states. Therefore, the only option was to conclude bilateral agreements. On April 9, the French government officially announced that France was willing to conclude a treaty of mutual assistance with the USSR.”152”
In view of the worsening international situation and impossibility of a larger agreement, the Soviet government decided to sign a bilateral Soviet-French Treaty of Mutual Assistance. On April 10, the Soviet Ambassador in France Potemkin received appropriate instructions from Moscow. These called, in particular, for including a provision about the USSR and France affording immediate assistance to one another in case of aggression, without waiting for any decision by the Council of the League of Nations.”153”
In mid-April 1935 Litvinov and Laval held negotiations in Geneva to draft Hie treaty. But these negotiations showed that Laval could not be relied upon. His ambition to come to terms with the Nazis was only too obvious. Litvinov pointed out that Laval would be glad to see the 72Soviet-French pact "wrecked without him being personally reproached for it”. "But Laval himself would not want to stop the negotiations and renounce the pact unless the outlines of a collusion with Germany emerged. The best thing for Laval to do was to drag out the negotiations in the hope that Germany would make some attractive offer to France with assistance from Britain."
Litvinov found from his discussions with Laval that "one should not pin any serious hopes on the pact in the sense of real military aid in the event of war. Our security will still remain the exclusive concern of the Red Army. The pact has predominantly political significance for us, reducing the chances of war both from Germany and from Poland and Japan." “154”
The Treaty of Mutual Assistance between the USSR and France was signed on May 2, 1935. The preamble pointed out that the treaty had the aim of strengthening peace in Europe and that the two nations would work for an appropriate European agreement. They undertook to consult one another in the event of a danger of aggression against the USSR or France, and to lend one another immediate assistance in the event of an attack by any European state. The protocol to the treaty made it clear that the contracting parties were under obligation to afford assistance to one another subsequent to an appropriate recommendation from the Council of the League of Nations; if the Council still did not produce any recommendation, the obligation regarding assistance would nevertheless be fulfilled. The treaty was concluded for a term of five years. Both governments declared in the protocol that they considered it desirable to conclude a regional agreement containing the terms of mutual assistance to replace the Soviet-French treaty.”155”
The government of Czechoslovakia declared its desire to conclude a similar treaty with the USSR. The Treaty of Mutual Assistance between the USSR and Czechoslovakia was signed on May 16, 1935. It had a reservation, included upon the initiative of the Czechoslovak government, to the effect that the obligations of the USSR and Czechoslovakia to provide assistance to one another would remain valid only in case of assistance from France as well to the USSR and Czechoslovakia in the event of aggression.”156”
The conclusion of the treaties of mutual assistance with France and Czechoslovakia was a result of the Soviet 73Union’s vigorous and consistent struggle for peace and against aggression. The Soviet-French and the Soviet– Czechoslovak treaties of mutual assistance could have become a major factor for peace and security in Europe. What was required, however, for that to be so, was for all the parties to the treaties to fulfil the commitments they had assumed in good faith. These treaties could also have been the nucleus for other European nations threatened by Nazi aggression to rally round the USSR, France and Czechoslovakia. But the French government, under Laval, never thought of earnest co-operation with the USSR. Laval’s major preoccupation was to reach an accommodation with Germany. Being unable to avoid signing the treaty with the Soviet Union, since that was demanded by the largest sections of the French people, Laval saw it as, above all, a means of making Germany enter into an amicable agreement with France. Laval said he was signing the pact with the USSR to have more trump cards in playing for agreement with Berlin.”157” At the same time Laval feared lest the USSR, knowing about the intention of British and French reactionary elements to arrive at an understanding with the Nazi Reich, should find it necessary to work for normalizing relations with Germany. The desire to prevent the revival of " Rapallo" was one of the major reasons why Laval did not venture to break off negotiations with the USSR and agreed to sign the treaty.”158”
Laval affirmed on various occasions that he did not propose to turn the Pact with the USSR into an effective agreement, that is, supplement it with a military convention. For instance, he assured German diplomats that he had not thought of developing the pact with the USSR "into a closer alliance".”159” During his meeting with Goring in the latter half of May of 1935, Laval assured him that he was doing everything to lessen the significance of the treaty with the USSR. “16”°
Although the position of Czechoslovakia was particularly precarious, her ruling circles attached but limited importance to the treaty. In a letter of information to the Czechoslovak ministers abroad, E. Bones, explaining his government’s position regarding the treaty with the Soviet Union, wrote that should Russia be once more kept out of European affairs as she had been at the 1922 Genoa Conference, that could again automatically entail a German-Russian 74rapprochement. So it was necessary that co-operation with Russia should be maintained and that she should not be kept out.”161” The day before treaty was signed, Benes argued with the British Minister in Prague that the treaty changed nothing about the situation in Europe, but would keep Germany and Russia away from each other.”162”
The approach to the Eastern Pact after the conclusion of the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty and the Soviet-French treaty had to be different. The Soviet government considered that a multilateral treaty of a more limited substance, with Germany acceding to it, would have a certain sense as a complement to those treaties. On May 16, 1935, the governments of the USSR and France put forward their proposal for concluding the Eastern Pact containing obligations about nonaggression, consultations and refusal of aid to the aggressor. The Soviet government told the government of France that it considered it desirable for the treaty to be signed by the USSR, France, Poland, Germany, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic countries that would wish to joint it.”163”
The French government transmitted a memorandum to the government of Germany proposing that the Eastern Pact should be concluded on the foregoing terms.”164”
However, Laval once more showed himself as cunning as he was shortly afterwards. On June 25, 1935, the French Ambassador in Berlin Francois-Poncet, meeting the Secretary of State at the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs, von Billow, told him that in the event of an Eastern Pact being signed, even without the provision for mutual assistance, the Soviet-French treaty "would become invalid".”165” During his conversation with the German Ambassador in Paris von Koster on July 27, Laval said he attached major importance to a Franco-German understanding and was prepared to make certain concessions to bring it about. He emphasised the identity of views of the two countries on the struggle against Bolshevism. Pointing out that the Franc Soviet treaty had been concluded for a short term of five years, Laval stressed that this alone showed that France was not desirous of binding herself up with the USSR for too long. He declared that should Germany agree to co– operate and undertake, by concluding a multilateral pact, to refrain from attacking any of its signatories, France "would hand her paper back to Russia”,”166” that is, would abrogate her treaty with the USSR.
That is to say that right after the signing of the Soviet French treaty, the French foreign service entered into negotiations with the Nazis which meant, to all intents and purposes, that in the event of agreement with Germany, France was prepared to betray her ally and renounce the treaty she had just concluded with the USSR.
However, the German government decided to reject the Eastern Pact in its new form as well. It self-righteously declared that because of the conclusion of the Franco-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance, its earlier statements on the matter were null and void.
It was, beyond dispute, Hitler Germany that played the leading role in thwarting the plans for concluding the Eastern Pact. Not only did she refuse to be a party to it, but exerted pressure on other possible parties to the pact as well. And yet, should the governments of all other nations, projected as parties to the pact, have really shown themselves far-sighted enough and concerned about the security of their respective countries, they ought to have signed the Pact even without Germany in it. Much of the blame for the breakdown of the negotiations about the Eastern Pact lay, therefore, with the ruling circles of bourgeois-landlord Poland.
A large measure of responsibility for wrecking the conclusion of the Eastern Pact rested, besides, with the government of Britain whose policy hampered the effort to strengthen the security of Europe. Even the Polish diplomatic service referred to the "double-dealing of England" which, while paying lip-service to the idea of the Eastern Pact was, in reality, wholly appreciative of Poland’s negative stand.”167”
Although the Soviet-French treaty had been signed, Laval, who became the French head of government in June 1935 (along with retaining his post of Minister for Foreign Affairs), was deliberately sabotaging it.
Under the French Constitution, the treaty could have been endorsed and put into effect by the President of France without delay, but Laval had it referred to parliament notorious for its unwieldly multitier procedure. As long as Laval remained head of government, the Treaty of Mutual Assistance between the USSR and France never came into effect.
The matter was taken off the ground only after a new 76government (led by right-wing radical Albert Sarraut) was formed in France in January 1936, and the situation in Western Europe was once more strained because of the Nazi preparations for moving German forces into the demilitarized Rhineland. On February 27, 1936, the Chamber of Deputies of the French Parliament finally ratified the treaty by 353 votes to 164. The treaty came into effect on March 27, 1936.
Soviet-French Military Co-operation as a Point at Issue
The conclusion of treaties of mutual assistance usually brought with it the establishment of close contact between the General Staffs of the countries concerned. That was what France always did. While exchanging notes with the British government on April 1, 1936, reaffirming Britain’s obligation to assist France in the event of a German attack on her, French diplomacy compelled a provision about negotiations to be started forthwith between the General Staffs of the two countries.”168” On military co-operation with the USSR, however, France took a different line.
Immediately after the signing of the Soviet-French Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the Soviet government, seizing the opportunity offered by Laval’s arrival in Moscow, raised the question of military co-operation. Laval cabled from Moscow on May 16, 1935, that the Soviet government, in view of possible aggression, proposed "considering now the technical arrangements to give the pact its full effect".”169” The Soviet military attaché in France informed the French General Staff late in May that the Soviet General Staff was ready for "contacts to be established with the French General Staff". “17”°
The General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces began planning action with a view to lending military assistance to France in the event of her being attacked by Germany. “171” In June 1935 the Soviet Ambassador in France Potemkin took the matter up with the French War Minister Jean Fabry. However, as the latter admitted, Laval "did not relish the brutal automatism of a military convention".”172”
The Deputy Chief of the French General Staff, General Loizeau attended a military exercise in the Ukraine in the autumn of 1935 at the invitation of the General Staff of the 77Red Army. He came to the conclusion that Soviet service’* men had a high morale and great stamina and that the Soviet forces wore capable of holding back enemy forces in the event of a conflict and even in the opening stages of war.”173”
In spite of general Loizeau’s favourable evaluation, the French General Staff looked upon the Soviet-French treaty as a purely diplomatic document without ever considering it right and proper to complement it with a military convention. As the French historian M. Mourin pointed out, the French General Staff proceeded from the following considerations: "If the French forces remained orientated, following the concepts of the government’s general policy, only towards defensive action behind the Maginot Line, military accords with the Soviet Union would be of little use, taking into account the absence of a common frontier between Russia and Germany and the refusal of Poland and Romania, confirmed in September 1935, to accord Soviet troops the right of passage through their territory." “174”
Instead of taking steps towards an understanding with the Polish and Romanian governments, the French authorities decided to shelve the issue of military co-operation with the USSR. The Chief of the French General Staff, General Gamelin, arranged with the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs that the methods of French-Russian military co-operation "will not be discussed".”175”
Objectively, France should have been even more interested than the USSR in making the treaty really effective by having it supplemented with agreement on military co– operation, for the Soviet Union had no common border with Germany. So it was more probable for the Soviet-French treaty to come into play when the Nazi Reich attacked France’ (Germany had a common border with her and had invaded! her territory more than once) or any of the weaker European countries with whom France was linked by allied commitments, that is, Czechoslovakia or Poland. Once at war with Germany, in consequence, France would, naturally, be interested in getting assistance from the USSR. But while a German attack on the USSR was impossible without German forces having to pass through the territory of East European countries, it was just as impossible for the Soviet Union to lend effective assistance to France without Soviet forces having to pass through the territory of certain 78countries of Eastern Europe. Therefore, the question of how the USSR could afford assistance to France did arise several times.
Early in 1937 the Soviet military attaché in France was asked by the French General Staff about the form and amount of aid the USSR could provide in case of a German attack on France or Czechoslovakia. On February 17, 1937, the Soviet Ambassador and the Soviet military attaché in Paris communicated the answer from the Soviet General Staff to the Chief of the French General Staff and then to the Prime Minister of France:
“There can be two versions of Soviet military aid.
1. If Poland, which was in alliance with France, and Romania, which was in alliance with France and Czechoslovakia, fulfil their duty and give consent to the passage of Soviet troops through their territory under a decision taken at their own discretion or in compliance with a decision by the Council of the League of Nations, the USSR will have an opportunity of providing its aid and support by all the services...
2. Should Poland and Romania object, for unclear reasons, to the USSR affording assistance to France and Czechoslovakia, or should they refuse to permit the transit of Soviet troops through their territory, assistance from the USSR in such a case would inevitably be limited.
The USSR will be in a position to dispatch its troops by sea into the territory of France and its Air Force units to Czechoslovakia and France.
The size of this assistance should be stipulated under a special agreement between the states concerned.
In both cases, the USSR would offer naval assistance.
The USSR will be able to supply France and Czechoslovakia with petrol, fuel oil, lubricants, manganese, foodstuffs, armaments, engines, tanks, aircraft, etc."
The Soviet General Staff put the following questions on its part:
“1. What aid could France afford to the USSR in the event of an attack by Germany?
In what way should the size of this aid be fixed?
2. What arms could France deliver to the USSR?"“176” There was, however, no reply to these counter-questions.
This document shows that the Soviet government was determined to have the closest possible co-operation with 79France in resisting possible aggression by Nazi Germany, in particular, the Soviet Union was prepared to conduct negotiations with France lo draw up specific terms for the provision of mutual assistance. Unfortunately, the government of France did not support this initiative in spite of the nation’s vital interests.
On handing this document, the Soviet government officially raised the "cardinal question" about effective Soviet French military co-operation as early as 1937, which arose subsequently (in August 1939) during the Soviet– British French military negotiations in Moscow. Effective Soviet involvement in war against the Nazi aggressors was possible only in case of a positive solution to the issue of Soviet troop transit through the territory of the countries lying between the USSR and Germany. [79•* And it was sheer hypocrisy on the part of military representatives of Britain and France to pretend in 1939 that for Soviet military representatives to have raised such a question was something unforeseen which they had no possibility to prepare for in advance.
In the course of the Soviet-French negotiations about the Eastern Pact and the conclusion of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance between the USSR and France, the governments of all the nations concerned carefully analysed all the issues fundamental to curbing the aggressors which cropped up again in 1939 right before the outbreak of war. Of course, it would have been far better for peace in Europe, if the ruling circles of the Western powers had realised in good time, back in the mid-1930s, the full gravity of the danger the aggressors posed to all nations of Europe. In the national interest of their countries, they should have got down to setting up a dependable common front to safeguard peace together with the Soviet Union instead of working out their insidious plans for a collusion with Germany so as to set her against the USSR. The Soviet Union was determined to do its best to safeguard peace.
Notes
[79•*] The importance of the position of Poland and Romania was indisputably realised in Britain and France. This was to be seen from the memorandum compiled for the British government on November 12, 1937, by the Chiefs of Staff of Britain’s Naval, Air and Land Forces. It stated that intervention of Russia on the side of France and Britain can quickly become a real danger for Germany only in case Poland maintains a friendly position and shows desire for co-operation. (I. Colvin, The Chamberlain Cabinet, London, 1971, p. 60).