ANGLO-GERMAN IMPERIALIST PLOTTING

Vilnis Sipols

Diplomatic Battles Before World War II

ANGLO-GERMAN IMPERIALIST PLOTTING

British Outline of “General Settlement”

The British government considered that by having strengthened its bond with Poland and with some other states of Eastern Europe and having entered into negotiations with the USSR, it had sufficiently consolidated its position, and the time had now come for it once again to try and reach an amicable agreement with the Nazi Reich. The Polish Ambassador in London, E. Raczynski, wrote on June 8, 1939, after conferring with Chamberlain, that "the Premier means trying to reach agreement with Germany already from positions of ’strength rather than weakness’. He 233would consider it disastrous to slam the door leading to agreement with Germany".”85”

Back on May 3, Neville Chamberlain suggested at a Cabinet meeting that it was desirable to resume Anglo German economic negotiations which had been suspended following Germany’s take-over of Czechoslovakia. He went on to express his conviction that "Herr Hitler’s heart was in Eastern Europe”. Halifax, like Chamberlain, took the line that the only thing that Hitler was going to demand from Britain was a "free hand in Eastern Europe”. In that context, Halifax suggested that the British government might avoid fulfilling its guaranteed commitments in respect of Poland. He pointed out that the guarantees would stand only if "Polish independence was clearly threatened”, which gave Britain some right to exercise her own judgement on assistance to Poland. Chamberlain went along with Halifax in this issue.”86”

British politician H. Nicolson recorded in his memoirs a very characteristic dialogue between two Tories—members of the British Parliament—on that subject:

“I suppose we shall be able to get out of this beastly guaranteed business?"

“Oh, of course. Thank God, we have Neville."“87”

The idea now was for co-operation of Britain and France with Nazi Germany to be established at the expense of Poland. The U.S. Charge d’Affaires in France wrote to the State Department on June 24, 1939, that he had the impression that "a second Munich, this time at the expense of Poland, may be in the making”. "The influences”, he wrote, "which wore at work in France and England in last September are coming to life again."“88”

The attempts of the British ruling elements to come to terms with the Nazis were intensified particularly in the second half of July of 1939.

London decided to take advantage of the visit of Helmuth Wohlthat, a high-ranking official of the department headed by Goring, that was in charge of the four-year plan to prepare Germany’s economy for war. Discussions between Chamberlain’s closest adviser Horace Wilson and Wohlthat about Anglo-German co-operation took place on July 18 and 21, 1921. Wilson set out the foreign policy plans of Britain’s ruling top leadership. He stressed the particular importance of preventing "an armed clash which might 234develop far beyond . . . Eastern Europe, into a new fundamental struggle between the groups led by Britain and Germany".

That was an unequivocal indication that Britain would not object to German aggression in Eastern Europe provided Germany gave assurances that she would not encroach on the interests of the British Empire.

Wilson then proposed a "programme for German-British co-operation" which he had previously formulated in a special memorandum and had it approved by Chamberlain. The Programme provided for:

“a joint Anglo-German declaration not to use aggression; mutual declarations of non-interference by Germany in respect of the British Commonwealth of Nations and by Great Britain in respect of Greater Germany; the Colonial and/or Mandates question; a German-British declaration on a fundamental revision of the relevant provisions of the Versailles Treaty". ”89”

R. Hudson declared, in a conversation with Wohlthat, that London regarded East Europe as a "natural economic sphere of Germany" and that "there were much wider possibilities”. In that context, he mentioned Russia, China and the various colonial dependencies of European powers.”90”

On August 3, Wilson disclosed the British plans also to the German Ambassador in London. Dirksen wrote to Berlin afterward that the British government’s expectation as Wilson put it, was that "an Anglo-German agreement . . . would completely absolve the British Government from the commitments to which it was now pledged by the guarantees to Poland, Turkey, etc. . ."“91”

Many of the British government’s 1939 documents have been declassified, but it has been decided in London to keep secret until the Year 2000 and even 2039 some of the most important ones regarding British policy on Germany. Evidently, there is something in them that has to be withheld from the public.

Georges Bonnet, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, was still a committed advocate of an accommodation with Germany. He told the German Ambassador in Paris, J. Welczeck that "in spite of everything,” France "held fast to the idea of bringing back co-operation with Germany, to grow closer as time went on" and that lie would never deviate from the main lines of his policy.”92”

U.S. diplomatic representatives in the capitals of many European countries supported such plans wholly and entirely. The U. S. Ambassador in London, Joseph Kennedy, believed that The Poles should be left to themselves to make them accept an accommodation with Hitler which would "enable the Nazis to pursue Their objectives in the East”, leading to an armed conflict between the USSR and Germany "to the great benefit of the whole Western world".”93” The U.S. Ambassador in Berlin, Hugh Wilson, also found it The best way out if Germany ventured to "attack Russia, with the tacit consent" of the Western powers, "even with their approval".”94”

Britain’s and France’s policy on Poland changed considerably since the spring of 1939 when they had given her their guarantees in the belief that a German occupation of Poland would have substantially weakened their own positions. Now they pinned virtually all their hopes on a deal with the Nazi Reich in the expectation that, with Poland smashed, the German forces would keep advancing eastward, that is, against the USSR, rather than turn westward, that is, against them. So, the U.S. Charge d’Affaires in Paris wrote on June 24 that influential sources there considered that in the long run "France should abandon Central and Eastern Europe to Germany, trusting that eventually Germany will come into conflict with the Soviet Union.” “

Poland’s Grave-Diggers

The fact that Poland figured first in The plans of German aggression for the summer of 1939 was no secret to any other country. The available documents indicate that the Polish ruling circles, too, were aware of the Wehrmacht’s preparations for an attack on Poland. “96” Should They have built their policy on Poland’s real national interest, they ought to have made their utmost towards creating in Europe a powerful united front of nations anxious to prevent war and check The German aggressors. And There is no doubt that Poland, given her good will, could have played a role of no mean importance in pooling the efforts of the countries concerned, all The more so since she was already in alliance with France, Britain and Romania.

The Soviet Union repeatedly offered Poland its co– 236operation and assistance in opposing aggression. It is particularly worthwhile recalling in this context V. P. Potemkin’s mission to Warsaw in May 1939. In a conversation with J. Beck on May 10 he said that "the USSR would not refuse aid to Poland should she desire it".”97” However, on the following day the Polish Ambassador in Moscow, W. Grzybowski, called on Molotov and declared that Poland did not wish any Anglo-Franco-Soviet guarantees and "does riot consider it possible to conclude a pact of mutual assistance with the USSR".”98”

On May 25, 1939, the Soviet Ambassador in Poland, N. I. Sharonov, once more told J. Beck: "We, of course, would be ready to help, but in order to help tomorrow, we must be ready today, that is, we must know beforehand about the need to help."" But Beck left this statement unanswered.

The Polish rulers still nurtured the hope that they would somehow reach an understanding with the Nazi Reich and that German aggression, leaving Poland untouched, would turn against the USSR. That calculation accounted for Poland’s continued extremely unfriendly policy with respect to the USSR even in the context of 1939. Not only did the Polish government flatly refuse to accept Soviet aid in case of a German attack, but it was doing everything it could to prevent the successful completion of the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations. It expected that should Poland keep up an alliance with Britain and France, while the USSR would have no agreement with them, that would encourage the Nazis to attack the Soviet Union, rather than Poland. “10”°

J. Beck also intimated to the Nazis several times that he was looking forward to an early composition of the German-Polish differences, and said that Poland was willing to yield a good deal of ground to that end. Poland’s Vice– Minister for Foreign Affairs M. Arcizcewski declared to the German Ambassador in Warsaw, H. Moltko, in May that J. Beck "would be prepared to come to terms with Germany had there been any way to prevent that looking like a surrender”. Beck attached great importance to this, he went on to say, as evidenced by the "restraint Poland is exercising in respect of the negotiations about a pact between the West and the Soviet Union".”101”

The Polish rulers proceeded from the assumption that 237Germany’s first target was Danzig and they were prepared to meet the Nazi demand in this sense. The German government, striving as it did to strain relations with Poland, rather than normalise them, left such appeals unheeded. The more so since all of British subsequent offers of co– ordination convinced Germany that in the event of an attack on Poland, it would have no reason to fear any intervention by Britain and France. As has been established by documentary evidence, that is precisely the conclusion that Hitler had drawn from Wohlthat’s report about his conversations in London and other similar facts. For instance, Germany’s Air Attaché in Poland A. Gerstenberg on a visit to Berlin early in August 1939, said: "We shall be at war with Poland before this year is out. 1 know from a perfectly reliable source that Hitler had so decided. After Wohlthat’s visit to London, Hitler is convinced that Britain will remain neutral in the event of such a conflict." “102”

Speaking before Wehrmacht chiefs, Hitler declared: "I experienced those poor worms Daladier and Chamberlain in Munich. They will be too cowardly to attack. They won’t go beyond a blockade."“103” Anglo-French policy convinced the Nazis that they could attack Poland without fear of any full-scale military action by Britain and France.