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  Vilnis Sipols

Diplomatic Battles Before World War II

Chapter II

NAZI AGGRESSORS AND THEIR BACKERS GERMAN AND ITALIAN FASCISTS ON THE OFFENSIVE

Britain’s Bid for an Understanding with Germany

Early in 1935 the British government made yet another attempt to come to terms with the Nazi Reich and to reanimate the Four Power Pact. They realised perfectly well that the course of events in Germany and her rearmament, first and foremost, would lead her before long to attempting to redraw the map of Europe and, indeed, not only of Europe. Some serious thought was given in London to the ways of saving the British Empire from that danger.

The general line of British policy was to ward off the danger menacing the British Empire through an imperialist deal with the Nazi Reich, as stated earlier on, and channel the aggressive designs of the Nazis eastward, against the Soviet Union.

It was decided in London to begin negotiations with Germany, having first concerted the major issues with France. In mid-December 1934, the British government invited the French head of government Pierre Flandin and the French Foreign Minister Pierre Laval to London to negotiate the subsequent political course of the two countries.

At a meeting on January 14, 1935, the British cabinet debated its position on the coming Anglo-French negotiations. The British ministers proceeded from the assumption that the major objective of Britain and France was to achieve agreement with Germany, and, among other things, to bring her back into the League of Nations. To that end, they were prepared to acknowledge Germany’s equal rights in the arms field. London knew that France would not agree to Germany’s rearmament without some extra guarantees of her own security which would make it more difficult to reach an agreement with her, the more so since the British government held a negative position in the matter. It was 81decided that Britain must not reaffirm the commitments she had under the 1925 Treaty of Locarno, and that there was even less reason to agree to consultations of representatives of the General Staffs of Britain and France. It was necessary to avoid admitting that demilitarization of the Rhineland by Germany was a "vital British interest".”1”

London was prepared to agree to the establishment of German land forces of a total strength of 300,000 (21 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions) and an air force equal both to the British and the French, that is, with a total of 1,000 first-line aircraft.”2”

In order to have the French government accept those plans, London decided to offer it to conclude a pact of instant mutual aid in addition to the 1925 Treaty of Locarno between the parties to this treaty in the event of an air attack (the so-called Air Pact). This treaty was of interest to Britain herself, first and foremost. But it would have a certain sense for France as well because under the Treaty of Locarno the provision of assistance to a victim of aggression was bound up with the cumbersome procedure of the League of Nations while the Air Pact implied instant aid.

There were Anglo-French negotiations in London from February 1 to 3, 1935. The British government proposed finding common ground for the two countries to begin negotiations with Germany. London proceeded from the assumption that this could not be done without abrogating the military articles of the Treaty of Versailles limiting Germany’s armaments. It was prepared to grant the Nazi Reich the right to increase its armed strength. To “reassure” France, the British government expressed its readiness for an Air Pact to be concluded between the signatories of the Treaty of Locarno. “3”

The Anglo-French conference ended with a joint communique, being issued. With reference to the negotiations between France and Italy early in January in 1935, and subsequently to the negotiations between representatives of Britain and France in London, the British and French ministers came out for the “progress” thus achieved to be developed through "the direct and effective co-operation of Germany”. They spoke up for a "general settlement" consisting of the Eastern Pact and the Danubean Pact (non– intervention in the affairs of Austria), agreement on armaments to replace the military articles of the Treaty of Versailles 82limiting the arms forces oi Germany; and agreement on the return of Germany into the League of Nations, and, above all, the proposal lor concluding the Air Pact.”4”

It was realised in London that the decisions taken at the Anglo-French conference could not but cause concern in the Soviet Union. The Foreign Ol’hce even drew up a special memorandum on February 7 clearly demonstrating the foreign policy designs of the British ruling circles. It emphasised: "Russia is really afraid that Germany, in combination with Poland, is planning to expand in the East" and is, therefore, interested in co-operation with France. Since France is also concerned over her security, she is prepared to co-operate with Russia. However, the projected "general settlement" with Germany and the Air Pact were designed to give France the security she wanted.

Those who drew up the memorandum proceeded from the assumption that all that would be subverting Soviet-French co-operation and the forecasting of the subsequent course of events could be based on the following considerations: "If Germany and Poland had no plans for future penetration towards the East, they would not be so opposed to the Eastern Pact... The need of expansion will force Germany towards the East as being the only field open to her, and as long as the Bolshevist regime exists in Russia it is impossible for this expansion to take merely the form of peaceful penetration." “5”

This document clearly indicated the full meaning of the "general settlement" with Germany which the British and French ruling quarters had agreed on during their negotiations in London. That was the same old Four Power Pact in a new wrapping. The policy of the British government clearly revealed an intention to ensure "Western security" through an agreement with Germany and channel fascist aggression against the Soviet Union.

Indeed, the London communique could not but worry the Soviet government. Soviet Ambassador in London I. M. Maisky pointed out that the position held by London was to be explained by the fact that "there has been revived hope in the British government quarters in recent weeks for a possibility of finding common ground with Hitler."“6” Neither could one overlook some articles by Lord Lothian and other British advocates of the “appeasement” policy which appeared in the British press in those days. In view of that, the 83People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs stated that the "British concerned themselves only with security in the West without having any interest in the East or Southeast where they are prepared to give Hitler a free hand." “7”

Driven by their class hatred, the British reactionary quarters were prepared to put even their own interests at stake just to prevent the international positions of the USSR from being strengthened and keep it internationally isolated so as to make it easier for the fascist aggressors to attack it. Being aware of the British government’s readiness to meet Germany’s demand for armaments, Hitler decided to confront it with an accomplished fact just before the projected Anglo-German negotiations.

There was an announcement in Berlin on March 13, 1935, about the creation of a German Air Force and on March 10—about the introduction of conscription. In that way the Nazi Reich grossly violated the major provisions of the Versailles Peace Treaty and launched accelerated preparations for war. Nevertheless, the British government was still ready to negotiate with the ringleaders of the Nazi Reich. The matter was taken up at a British Cabinet meeting on March 18. It decided that in spite of the above-mentioned action by the German government there was no reason for abandoning the visit to Berlin by British representatives. “8”

The Soviet government considered it necessary to do everything possible to forestall the rearming of Germany and the preparations for, and launching of, another world war. The only way to do so was through joint action by all the nations under threat of aggression. The Soviet Union called for a conference of the states which had signed the Treaty of Versailles and other peace treaties, in which the USSR could also take part.

The men in London, however, preferred to negotiate with the aggressor rather than oppose aggression. On March 25 and 26, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, John Simon, and the Lord Privy Seal, Anthony Eden, made a visit to Berlin for conversations with Hitler, Neurath and Ribbentrop. The conversations showed that the Nazi Reich leaders were in no way disposed to accept most of the proposals put forward by Britain and France on February 3, that is, they did not want to be bound by any commitments which could have subsequently hindered the implementation of their aggressive designs. Hitler announced that he 84intended to create a 550,000-strong army, that his Air Force had already achieved parity with Britain and claimed the right to have a Navy equivalent to 35 per cent of the British Navy. Führer reacted positively to the offer to conclude the Air 1’act, expressing willingness to continue negotiations on this subject with the British government. It was also agreed that bilateral Anglo-German naval talks were to be started before long.”9”

The Berlin conversations provided striking evidence of the aggressive designs of the Nazis. The hopes of the British ruling circles to use the conversations for laying the ground for agreement between the four Western powers on all issues in dispute were dashed. In spite of the fact that the policy of the Nazis was increasingly aggressive, the British government went ahead with its policy of collusion with the aggressors in the hope of turning their aggression eastwards.

The Berlin visit by John Simon and Anthony Eden suggested the possibility of their visiting also Warsaw and Moscow. The Soviet government favored the idea.”10” However, what created a predicament in London was the puzzle over the question of who of the British ministers was to go to Moscow. The matter was examined at a British Cabinet meeting on March 6. It was decided the visit to Moscow was to be made by Lord Privy Seal Anthony Eden. “11”

While discussing the matter with Soviet Ambassador Maisky, John Simon did not conceal that far from everybody in Britain was sympathetic about the idea of a visit by a British Minister to Moscow; there were influential groups opposed to such a move.”12”

Stalin, Molotov and Litvinov conferred with Anthony Eden on March 28 and 29. The Soviet representatives at these talks declared that, considering the aggressive aspirations of the Nazi Reich, the USSR found it necessary to continue pressing for the conclusion of the Eastern Pact. At the same time Eden’s attention was drawn to the fact that the British government’s policy of conniving at the rearmament of Germany could have dangerous consequences for Britain herself. The Soviet Union, the representatives of the USSR declared, had not the slightest doubt as to the aggressive nature of the Nazi Reich because its foreign policy was guided by two basic ideas—that of revenge and that of establishing their own domination of Europe. 85However, it would have been still too early to say in what particular direction Germany would be striking first. "Hitler, while pushing his plan for Eastern expansion into the foreground at the present time, wants to have the Western nations rise to the bait and get them to sanction his armaments. When these armaments attain the level Hitler wanted them to, the guns might well start firing in an entirely different direction."“13”

Intense preparations got under way in London in the meantime for an Anglo-Franco-Italian conference in Stresa which was to be called because of Germany’s violation of the military articles of the Treaty of Versailles. The British government’s position at the conference was thoroughly examined at a Cabinet meeting on April 8, 1935. The general view of the members of the Cabinet was, as stated in the Minutes of the Cabinet meeting, that should France and Italy propose an end to negotiations with Germany and a tough line in the policy of the three nations towards her, Britain "should not agree to it”. Therefore, Britain’s position was: "We should not agree to make a complete breach with Germany and to take no action accept to threaten her. . . We should make clear that we should like to make more propositions to Germany.” Britain could not agree to the conference ending with a declaration to say that Britain "would not stand a breach of the peace anywhere. .. We ought not to accept further commitments. . . Having established contact with Germany we ought to keep it.” To cut it off "would be an obvious mistake”. “14”

The conference at Stresa raised the question of applying sanctions against Germany but the British representatives spoke out against them.”15” The powers attending the conference limited themselves to expressing their regret over Germany’s violation of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. John Simon declared that the British representatives "could not at Stresa enter into a new commitment".”16”

With the conference over, some Western commentators referred to a "Stresa Front”. Yet that was nothing but a smoke screen to cover up the retreat of Britain and France in the face of German imperialism which was regaining its power.

The Council of the League of Nations went into session immediately after the conference. It produced a resolution based on the conference decisions which was not surprising 86because its participants called the tune in the Council. But the British representatives did their utmost to emasculate them. John Simon vaingloriously cabled from Geneva: "1 succeeded in considerably attenuating the terms of the resolution agreed at Stresa." “17”

Largely through the efforts of the British government, the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations was limited to deploring any unilateral breach of international commitments, noting that this could put the League of Nations in peril. The Council’s decision was not, naturally, sufficient to raise a dependable barrier in the way of the Nazi Reich’s aggressive policy.

Meanwhile, London was pressing for negotiations about the balance of the naval forces of Britain and Germany. Any agreement on that subject meant that Britain would be legalizing the Nazi Reich’s infringement of the respective articles of the Treaty of Versailles. The building up of the German naval forces spelled danger to many nations with navies not as large as that of the British Empire. That applied, for example, to France, the USSR, and other countries. To prove that Germany must have a Navy equivalent to 35 per cent of the British one, Neurath made it quite clear that only in that case would Germany have the possibility to dominate the Baltic,”18” that is intimated in no uncertain terms that the proposed deal was anti-Soviet. While neglecting the rightful interests of many nations, Britain was unilaterally prepared to grant Germany the right to a sweeping build-up of her Navy.

A German delegation led by Ribbentrop arrived in London for the talks. It was extremely truculent. The main topic to negotiate was the size of the prospective German Navy. However, Ribbentrop opened with a statement of Hitler’s intention to build a Navy 35 per cent the size of the British one. He said he was prepared to start negotiations only if the British officially consented to that demand right away.”19” The rulers of the proud British Empire were quite disconcerted. Their protests were turned down out of hand, and London gave in. The preliminary condition laid down by the Nazis was accepted. On .Tune 6, John Simon declared that "His Majesty’s Government intended to recognise the Reich Chancellor’s decision as the basis of future Naval discussions.”20” So there was practically nothing left to negotiate.

The Anglo-German naval agreement was signed on June 18, 1935. Germany was granted the right to enlarge her Navy by more than five times. The Nazi Reich now had the opportunity of expanding its Navy so that, although not in a position to rival Britain on the seas, it still could he, as Churchill put it, the "master of the Baltic". “21”

The effect that agreement had on the subsequent course of events in the Baltic and, more particularly, on the policies of the Baltic states, can be seen from a report by the German legation in Estonia in 1935: "This agreement is viewed as recognition of Germany’s hegemony on the Baltic which has led to a higher evaluation of Germany as a power factor. There has since been appreciable change in the position of the leading personalities relative to Ger- many."“22” The German Minister W. Bliicher in Helsinki appraised the influence of the treaty on Finland in a similar way. “23”

The British government’s policy of encouraging fascist aggression against the East posed a tremendous danger to world peace, and to Britain. Winston Churchill, one of the few Conservatives who took a more sober view of the trend of developments in Europe, pointed out in his conversation with the Soviet Ambassador to Britain on June 14, 1935, that Hitler Germany was a huge war machine with half a dozen gangsters in control. Nobody knew what they would do tomorrow and where they would strike at. He conceded that the USSR might not be Germany’s first target, because that would he rather dangerous for herself. "Other directions,” he said, "are more probable.” While criticising those British leaders who hoped to secure Britain’s interests by giving Germany a free hand in the East, Churchill said that their designs boiled down to this: "Germany has to fight somewhere, and she has to expand her possessions into some direction—so let her better carve out an empire for herself at the expense of the states situated in Eastern, Southeastern and Central Europe! Let her comfort herself with the Balkans or the Ukraine, but leave Britain and France in peace." “24”

It is the trends Winston Churchill was so critical of that dominated Britain’s foreign policy. British journalist and historian Tan Colvin pointed out that the men in charge of British foreign policy were after an understanding with Germany and that was basic to the nation’s foreign policy. The 88British ruling circles presented the policy of abetting fascist aggression eastward to ensure "Western security" as the “appeasement” of Germany. It gained wide currency in Britain in 1935, Colvin stated.”25”

Subsequently Britain had to pay dearly for that policy of aiding and abetting the resurgence of the German Navy. “26”

Along with naval discussions, Britain opened negotiations with the Nazi Reich about the conclusion of an Air Pact between the Locarno powers. On May 24, 1935, John Simon instructed British Ambassador in Berlin Eric Phipps to find out whether Hitler was prepared to start negotiations with a view to concluding that pact.”27” Since the German Air Force was still materially weaker than that of Britain, France and their allies and, besides, to have concluded such an agreement would have been tantamount to Britain and France recognising Germany’s right to have an Air Force (she was banned from doing so by the Treaty of Versailles), the Nazi Reich found the signing of the Air Pact to be of much benefit to it. It gave an affirmative answer immediately and submitted its own proposals. “28”

Britain’s interest in a Western Air Pact was due to the fact that the information she had obtained about the rapid growth of the German Air Force caused her to fear that in a few years she might well face a German air invasion. Under the Air Pact, France, Italy and Belgium were to have come out at her side in such a case. Besides it was hoped in London that the signing of the Western Air Pact would be a big stride forward towards concluding a "general settlement" with Germany.

The major point of Air Pact for France in the military sense was that it guaranteed her instant aid from Britain in case of a German attack,”29” whereas under the Locarno Pact Britain was obliged to aid her only after the appropriate decision by the League of Nations. But still there was a great deal of apprehension in Paris. It was the German Land Force, rather than the Air Force, that posed the main danger to France. She was interested also in concluding the Eastern and Danubian pacts. It was believed in Paris, and not without good reason, that in the event of a Western Air Pact being signed along with the signing of the Anglo– German naval agreement, Britain would lose all interest in other problems of paramount importance to the security of France. All that complicated and dragged out the talks.

The facts just cited provide striking evidence of British diplomatic activity in pursuit of wide-ranging agreement with Germany. But the contradictions in Western Europe had grown so sharp as to make agreement between them extremely difficult and even impossible, as the subsequent events showed.

Italy Attacks Ethiopia

Fascist Italy set course for aggression to join Japan and Germany in this club in the mid-1930s. She had, potentially, less strength than the two other major aggressors. But by its very essence, Italian fascism was no less aggressive. The leader of Italian fascism, Mussolini, openly extolled war as mankind’s natural state.

Italy picked Ethiopia, an independent, but militarily weak African state as a target for her expansionist ambitions. Mussolini proclaimed his aim to be the destruction of the Ethiopian Armed Forces and the full conquest of Ethiopia. In December 1934, the Italians provoked an armed clash between Italian and Ethiopian troops at the Wal Wal Fort. That was the forerunner of an impending storm.

While preparing to attack Ethiopia Mussolini decided to get France neutralized by concluding an imperialist deal with her to divide their spheres of influence in Africa. That deal was struck by Laval and Mussolini in Rome on January 7, 1935. Laval agreed to turn over to Italy some of the French colonial territories bordering on Italian colonies in Africa, in exchange for the Italian fascists’ promise to maintain friendly relations and consult France in international affairs.   [89•*  He promised to Mussolini not to interfere with his designs on Ethiopia.”30”

According to the information obtained by the Soviet Ambassador to France, V. P. Potemkin, from the French Ambassador to Italy, Charles Chambrun, Laval had told 90Mussolini that France had no political interests in Ethiopia and that she would not object to the Italians reaching agreement with Ethiopia to establish Italy’s virtual protectorate over that country.”31”

During the conference at Stresa in April 1935, the British representatives, in their turn, also made it quite clear to the Italians that they would not stand in the way of their capturing Ethiopia, although the British government had enough forces and resources to forestall the Italian aggression. For example, it could have prevented the shipment of Italian troops through the Suez Canal. That alone would have thwarted Italy’s aggressive plans.

An inter-departmental committee, which was set up to identify the course for the British government to follow, issued a report on June 18, 1935, pointing out that Italy’s action did not affect such vital interests of Britain in and round Ethiopia "as would make it essential for His Majesty’s Government to resist an Italian conquest of Ethiopia”. “32” With this verdict to go by, the British government also started conniving at Italian aggression.

The Italian intelligence service obtained all of its secret information about the policy of the British government through the British Embassy in Rome. For five prewar years, the British Embassy in Rome was a "sieve through which official secrets filtered to Mussolini and Hitler".”33” Therefore, Mussolini knew very well that the British government expressed no particular concern over his plans to bring Ethiopia under Italian domination.

Having virtually made sure of the consent of France and Britain, Italy began concentrating her forces near the Ethiopian frontiers. Ethiopia appealed to the League of Nations for help. Although the Soviet Union had no diplomatic relations with Ethiopia at the time, the Soviet delegation consistently spoke up in the League of Nations for faithful observance of the terms of its Covenant related to the provision of aid to a victim of aggression. The People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Litvinov declared at a session of the Council of the League of Nations on September 5 that the Council bad no right to disregard the conflict, thereby giving Italy a "free hand”. That would amount to a violation of their commitments by members of the League and a breach of the Covenant of that international organisation, while strict observance of the Covenant was 91essential to the stability of the entire edifice of international peace and security. The People’s Commissar called on the Council to spare no effort and no resources in order to avert an armed conflict and fulfil the obligations which were the "League’s raison d’être". “34”

Speaking in the Assembly of the League of Nations on September 14, Litvinov set forth, in particular, the Soviet Union’s attitude to the colonial policy of the imperialist powers in general. The Soviet government, he declared, is opposed, as a matter of principle, to the system of colonies and to the imperialist policy of spheres of influence. He stressed that the Soviet government attached paramount importance to whether or not the League of Nations would actually become an instrument of peace. That instrument of peace, he pointed out, might well come in handy in the future too. Litvinov called on the members of the League to pledge themselves to allow no more encroachments on its Covenant as an instrument of peace, but use it in all cases of aggression, from whatever quarter.”35” In a telegram to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov emphasised that "the very fact of the League applying serious sanctions against Italy will be a formidable warning for Germany as well".”36”

The Soviet government’s appeal for effective action to be taken to make fascist Italy’s aggression against Ethiopia impossible was not supported, however, by other members of the League of Nations, notably by Britain and France.

The British Foreign Secretary, Samuel Hoare, assured the Assembly that the British government maintained its loyalty to the League of Nations and to the principles of collective security. He declared that Great Britain was ready to fulfil her obligations under the Covenant of the League but qualified this statement by saying that all the measures to be taken had to be collective.”37” Even British historians admitted that the. speech did contain "a great deal of bluff, not to say duplicity”, because no one in London set any particular store by the League of Nations, let alone by its application of sanctions.”38” Henry Channon also pointed out in his diaries: "Britain has asked the League for sanctions which, she knows, will never be given, and we have saved our face.” “39”

The French Foreign Minister, Laval turned out to be the best assistant of the Italian aggressors. Litvinov pointed out 92that Laval was defending Italy’s interests in the League better than the Italians themselves did it. Laval’s position, the People’s Commissar reported to Moscow, will have to effect of "playing down the League’s prestige and encouraging Mussolini’s aggressiveness".”40”

When it became obvious that France and a number of capitalist countries would hardly agree to take an effective part in action against the Italian aggressors, somebody in the West began to “prompt” the Soviet Union that it could just as well come out against Italy single-handed. Naturally, the USSR could not fling itself into such a venture. The Soviet Union was prepared to play its part in good faith in collective sanctions. Should, however, the USSR have started to oppose the Italian aggressors alone, it could have found itself in an extremely precarious situation.

No sooner had the Assembly of the League of Nations risen on October 3, 1935, than Italy attacked Ethiopia. The Soviet Union lost no time in speaking out in support of the victim of the aggression and for collective action by members of the League of Nations to curb it. Pravda in a leading article "War in East Africa" on October 5, underlined the tremendous danger of a new "devastating world imperialist shambles”. Having denounced Italy’s intention to turn Ethiopia into her colony by means of war, Pravda pointed out: "The position of the Soviet Union is well known—it is one of consistent defence of the peace and freedom of the nations. Our proletarian state is opposed to the imperialist ambitions of Italian fascism."

The Council of the League of Nations met for an emergency session at short notice. On October 7, the Council found Italy guilty of aggression. It decided also on economic and financial sanctions to be applied against Italy, particularly on an embargo on the export of war equipment to Italy.

As to the military sanctions, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Britain and France, Samuel Hoare and Pierre Laval agreed that they would oppose military sanctions.”41”

Soviet diplomacy vigorously insisted in the League of Nations on the need for the strict fulfilment of the provisions of the Covenant concerning action to control aggression. Speaking at the emergency session of the Council of the League of Nations on October 10, the Soviet representative V. P. Potemkin declared that "the USSR considers 93it to be its duty to reaffirm its readiness to fulfil all obligations, together with the other members of the League of Nations, which its Covenant imposes on all of them without exception.” He emphasised that the unity of action by the members of the League was the surest means of curbing the Italian aggression against Ethiopia. Such unity of action could serve as a gage, Potemkin stressed, of the early achievement of collective security which could forestall "further attempts from whatever quarter to break the general peace”. He called for "collective and determined" action. “42” The USSR consistently carried out all the decisions of the League of Nations concerning sanctions.

The Soviet government’s official position was set out also in the note issued on November 22 by the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in reply to the note from the Italian Embassy in Moscow objecting to the decisions taken by the League of Nations. The government of the USSR pointed out that "while consistently abiding by the policy of peace, it considered it necessary for the obligations it has had assumed under the Covenant of the League of Nations to be faithfully carried out. It could not agree, the note said, that Ethiopia "must be an exception and that she must not enjoy all those rights which have been granted by the League of Nations to the rest of its members ... A different line of conduct would amount to repudiating the fundamental principles of the League of Nations, renouncing collective organisation of security, encouraging aggression and rejecting the possibility of demonstrating international solidarity in maintaining and strengthening world peace, which is the bedrock principle of the policy of the Soviet Government." “43”

The so-called oil sanctions against Italy were of particular significance in action against Italian aggression. She had no oil resources of her own and to have cut off oil supplies for Italy would have virtually made it impossible for the Italian aggression to continue. The USSR and some other petroleum-exporting countries were prepared to stop exporting petroleum products to Italy. But for the oil sanctions to be effective, they had to be applied by all petroleum-exporting countries. The position of the United States was of particular importance under the circumstances. However, the U.S. government refused to cut off oil exports to Italy. And so did France.”44”

Since Britain could have played an enormous role in opposing the Italian aggression, the Soviet government tried to come to terms with the British government about that. On instructions from Moscow, the Soviet Ambassador in London 1. M. Maisky met the British Foreign Secretary Samuel Hoare on November 6, 1935. The Ambassador told him that Italy was a relatively weak aggressor. Other prospective aggressors were stronger and more dangerous. "We consider it extremely important,” he stressed, "for Italy to be used as an example to teach a lesson to all possible aggressors in general." “45”

The matter was thoroughly examined at a British Cabinet meeting on December 2. Some of its members expressed the apprehension lest the application of effective (oil or any other) sanctions against Italy should have caused the fascist regime in that country to collapse altogether with the result that Mussolini "would probably disappear from Italian politics and there might be a Communist Government in Italy and a complete alteration in the whole European situation”. Therefore, the British Foreign Secretary Samuel Hoare went out of his way to prove that it was necessary to postpone the application of oil sanctions while pressing, in co-operation with Laval for "peace negotiations" to be opened as soon as possible. Hoare’s proposals were approved by the Cabinet.”46”

The so-called Hoare-Laval agreement, whereby France and Britain expressed their consent to one-third of the territory of Ethiopia being annexed by Italy, was concluded on December 8, 1935. When the agreement came before the British Cabinet meeting later in the day, it was pointed out that it was extremely advantageous to the aggressor—Italy, and virtually unacceptable to the victim of the aggression, that is, Ethiopia. Nevertheless, the agreement was unanimously approved by the British government and it was decided to exercise "strong pressure" on Ethiopia to make her comply with the demands contained in the Hoare Laval agreement.”47”

Emperor Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia was ready to betray the interests of his people. On February 19, 1936, he sent a top secret message through the British military attaché in Ethiopia to the British government to announce his readiness, first, to open negotiations with the Italian government, and second, "to tie Ethiopia to England either in 95the form of a protectorate or in the form of a mandate".”48” The latter proposal turned out, however, to be unacceptable to Britain since the incorporation of Ethiopia in the British Empire under the circumstances of the day would have automatically put Britain into a state of war against Italy.

The Hoare-Laval agreement was so odious that it was kept top secret, yet its substance leaked into the press, touching off a storm of indignation in Britain and outside. Samuel Hoare had to step down as Foreign Secretary but that did not mean any change in the British government’s policies. Britain and France went on favouring the Italian aggressors.

So did the United States, albeit in a different form. On August 31, 1935, the House of Representatives and the Senate of the U.S. Congress adopted a joint resolution to ban arms sales to belligerent nations. That started the notorious neutrality legislation which was to play so negative a role on the eve of the war. The position taken up by the United States was virtually playing into the aggressor’s hands. Italy was making all types of weapons herself. The victim of the aggression—Ethiopia, having no munitions industry at all, had to buy weapons and ammunition abroad. The American market, however, was now closed to her.

The half-and-half sanctions announced by the League of Nations could not deter the aggressors. In spite of Ethiopia’s stiff resistance, Italian troops, resorting to the most bestial methods of warfare up to and including the use of poison gases, succeeded in defeating the Ethiopians. With Ethiopia annexed, Mussolini pompously proclaimed Italy an empire in May 1936.

Reporting to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs about his conversation on the matter with D. Lloyd George, I. M. Maisky wrote that Lloyd George cursed Prime Minister S. Baldwin and his ministers in the strongest terms he could find, insisting that should a policy of sanctions against Italy have been applied consistently from the very outset, Ethiopia would have remained intact and "a formidable precedent could have been created for any future aggressor, including Germany”.”49”

The defeat of Ethiopia by Italy was a direct consequence of the policy of connivance at aggression pursued by Britain, France and the United States and a result of their imperialist collusion with the Italian aggressors. It was hoped 96in London and Paris that in case of an amicable agreement with Italy at Ethiopia’s expense, the conclusion of a Four Power Pact could have been tried again.

The Soviet Union was the only one of the Great Powers to speak up consistently in support of Ethiopia’s just national liberation war. Britain and France, having failed to intervene in behalf of Ethiopia, left the League of Nations itself in sorry plight. From then on this organisation ceased to play any more or less essential role in international affairs. Small nations of Europe, which had earlier counted on the League of Nations supporting them in case of aggression against them, were coming round to the conclusion that it was not to be relied on. The plans for developing the League of Nations into an effective instrument of collective security were hit hard. At the same time, the aggressive powers came to the conclusion that they did not have to be afraid of that organisation any longer. All that did irreparable damage to the cause of peace.

* * *

Notes

[89•*]   Laval hoped that in virtue of that agreement with Italy, France would he in a position to transfer 18 divisions from the Italian to the German frontier, and that additional show of force on the Rhino would deter Hitler from taking any action in the West and set his steps upon a Drang nach Osten (F. Birkenhead, Halifax. The Life of Lord Halifax, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1966. p. 343).

German Troops Moved into Rhineland

Nazi Germany followed Italy in striking out at peace and the security of the nations. She decided to make short shrift of the provision of the 1925 Treaty of Locarno whereby Germany had pledged herself to have no troops on the left bank of the Rhine and inside a 50-km strip along the right bank (these restrictions were imposed by the Peace Treaty of Versailles). For Germany the whole point of that action was, above all, that by building military fortifications in that region, she would have made extremely difficult an invasion by French forces, should France have decided to come to the aid of her allies in Central and Eastern Europe in case of German aggression against them. At the same time it was a kind of test for Hitler to see how Britain and France would behave in similar circumstances at a later date.”50”

The French Ambassador in Berlin Andre Francois-Poncet stated on February 4, 1930, that the Nazis were increasingly vocal and their claims increasingly defiant. What was emerging into the foreground with growing evidence was their fanaticism, the spirit of domination, the persistent striving for revenge and the theories of racial superiority.

Plans for establishing German hegemony in the Danubian region were being hatched and colonialist demands made.”51”

The British government, too, realised the whole complexity of the situation. On January 17, 1936, the new British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden submitted a circumstantial memorandum "The German Danger" to the government containing a wealth of indisputable evidence of the Nazi Reich’s aggressive designs. However, Eden’s idea was not to oppose the danger of aggression from Germany, but "to consider whether it is still possible to come to some modus vivendi . . . with Hitler’s Germany".”52”

The Foreign Office Central Department Chief, William Strang urged in a memorandum he had prepared on the subject that some far-reaching concessions should be made to Germany so as to "deprive her of an excuse" for acts of violence. He considered it possible to agree to Germany establishing her economic domination of Central and Southeast Europe. The Foreign Office economic adviser, F. Ashton-Gwatkin called for giving her financial support to the same end along with allowing her an access to sources of raw materials, and perhaps, even returning some of her former colonies to her; giving Germany a free hand in developing her economic relations with the countries of Central and Southeast Europe; and economic co-operation of Britain and Germany, for instance, in the exploitation of the natural resources of Russia.”53”

The question of a possible occupation of the demilitarized Rhineland by German troops became one of particular relevance at the time. The matter was considered by the British government back in January 1935 when it was decided that "demilitarization of the Rhineland was not a vital British interest".”54” At the same time, as Foreign Office records indicate, it was realised perfectly well in London that as a result of that action "the Russians, Poles and Czechs will find their alliances with France materially depreciated”. But that did not worry the British ruling circles too much. On the contrary, they showed a clear interest in having those alliances scrapped to make it easier for the Nazis to expand eastwards.

Once informed, on March 5, 1936, about the occupation of the Rhineland the Nazis had planned to begin in a matter of days, the British government re-examined the issue in detail. All opposition to that action was out of the question. 98Anthony Eden urged the immediate resumption of negotiations with Germany. He called lor talks to he opened with her about an Air Pact before proceeding to discuss the abolition, of the demilitarized Rliiuelaiid zone and other problems. “55” On the following day Anthony Eden invited German Ambassador L. Hoesch and, declaring himself for Anglo-Franco-German co-operation, proposed the conclusion of an Air Pact as the first question to take up. On hearing such an offer, the Nazis felt themselves definitely assured that there was no reason to fear any opposition from London and Paris to the Reich’s action in respect of the Rhineland. The “reply” to that offer had been framed by the Nazi Reich in advance.

The demilitarized Rhineland zone was occupied by Germany on March 7, 1935. The German government demagogically declared that it was not under obligation to honour the terms of the 1925 Treaty of Locarno because of France’s ratification of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance with the USSR.

To soften the reaction of other nations, the Nazis came forward with a statement of their "commitment to peace”. They expressed their readiness to conclude a non– aggression treaty with France and Belgium instead of the Pact of Locarno and also to consider bringing Germany back into the League of Nations.

The violation of the existing treaties by the Nazi Reicli and the consolidation of its strategic positions constituted an immense danger to the cause of peace and security in Europe. The Soviet Union, guiding itself consistently as it did by the interests of peace in its foreign policy, lost no time in roundly condemning the aggressive action by the Nazi chieftains. A leading article in Izvestia on March 14, 1936, stressed that the USSR "is opposed to the violation of the Treaty of Locarno by Germany, which cannot but increase the danger of war".

The invasion of the demilitarized Rhineland by German troops was a serious test for France to pass. The French ruling elements did not want to resist Hitler’s venture, although they had every opportunity to do so. France was militarily the strongest state in Western Europe at the time. Germany, on the other hand, had just started to create her major armed forces. So it was by no accident at all that the German units entering the Rhineland should have got 99an order to withdraw to their starting positions forthwith in the face of any counter-measures by France.

The French government could also have resorted to collective sanctions, with reliance, among other things, on the Treaty of Mutual Assistance with the USSR. On March 7, 1936, the French Foreign Minister communicated to Soviet Ambassador Potemkin that, with German forces in the Rhineland zone, the French government called for the Council of the League of Nations to meet, and hoped that the USSR would give its full backing to France in it.”56” On March 9, 1936, the Ambassador, acting on instructions from the Soviet government, replied that France could rely, wholly and entirely, on support from the Soviet Union in the League of Nations.”57” French diplomats highly appreciated that expression of solidarity.”58”

A number of France’s allies among the small nations of Europe, such as Belgium or Czechoslovakia, also declared themselves ready to help her, since they realised that the matter at issue was, to all intents and purposes, one of their own fate.

France’s ruling circles understood perfectly well that her position was crucial at the moment to the subsequent external political orientation of all of those countries because in the event of a German victory in the impending conflict, they could defect into the victor’s camp. "The question now being decided,” said one of the documents of Quai d’Orsay, "is whether Europe will be German or not." “59” Representatives of the French ruling establishment, although they did make some threatening speeches, were hesitant in actual fact and did not make bold to take more or less drastic action by way of resisting the aggressors.

The British government found it necessary to discourage any military action by France against Germany.”60” It insisted on France taking no steps pending a conference of the Locarno powers and the consideration of the matter at issue in the Council of the League of Nations. The only thing that preoccupied London, rather that of fighting the aggressive policies of Germany, was that of sitting down again with Nazis at one table as soon as possible. An effort to find ways towards agreement with the Third Reich was launched by the British Cabinet Foreign Policy Committee consisting of the Premier and most influential ministers, which was set up at about that time. The British raised the 100question of concluding a new Pact of Locarno while dropping all reference to the demilitarization of the Rhineland. The members of the committee showed themselves to be keen, too, on the question of bringing Germany back into the League of Nations.”61” The problem of giving Germany back her former colonies was carefully studied.

The British Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Robert Cranborne took the matter up with the Soviet Ambassador. He pointed out that the British government "would like to restore the old Locarno without the demilitarized Rhineland”. Maisky objected to London’s intentions and declared that "the only worthy reply to Hitler would be by an all-round consolidation of collective security, including some measures of repression against Germany which the League of Nations would consider possible".”62”

One of the basic reasons behind such a position of the British ruling quarters was the fear that a policy aimed at resisting Hitler might crush fascism and establish Bolshevism.”63”

A conference of the Locarno powers (Britain, France, Italy and Belgium), without Germany, however, among them, opened in Paris on March 10, 1936. It produced no positive results whatsoever. It was decided to refer the matter to the Council of the League of Nations. The British representatives succeeded in getting the Council to meet in London this time, rather than in Geneva, and to have representatives of Germany invited to it. That was a clear effort to come to terms with the Nazi Reich rather than oppose its violation of the existing treaties.

As it considered, on March 11, the situations thus shaping up, the British government, on Anthony Eden’s motion, opposed all sanctions against Germany and urged the resumption of talks with her to achieve an under- standing. “64”

At a League of Nations session on March 14, the British government did all it could to prevent any sanctions being applied against the Nazi Reich. British diplomats argued that to have broken some treaties did not yet mean aggression. The Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, in London for the Council’s deliberations, cabled to Moscow his own observations of the mood in the British capital. He reported that "the British are trying to involve the French in the talks with Hitler as soon as possible." “65”

At a meeting of the Council on March 17, the People’s Commissar reaffirmed the readiness of the Soviet Union to express—together with the other Council member-countries their common disgust at Germany’s violation of her international commitments, condemn her action and join in using the "most effective means of preventing any similar violations in the future”. While denouncing Hitler’s Germany for having broken the treaties she had signed, the People’s Commissar criticised the policy of connivance at such moves. He opposed the collective surrender to the aggressor and the collective rewarding of the aggressor by taking decisions to suit and benefit him, and the decisions which, on the grounds of avoiding an imaginary danger of war today, would be creating the requisites for a real war tomorrow.”66”

The Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, V. M. Molotov also confirmed that "all the aid essential to France in case of a possible attack . . . would be offered by the Soviet Union.”67” The Soviet Union’s adamant stand on the matter arose from its persistent effort for peace and collective security. It was realised quite well in the Soviet Union that one could not work for peace without working to uphold the inviolability of international commitments. It was impossible to assure collective security without taking collective measures against the violations of the existing treaties.

Still British diplomacy managed to get the Council of the League of Nations to limit itself to stating the fact of Germany having broken her treaty obligations. No sanctions against her were applied, and that decision suited the Nazis perfectly well because their action remained unpunished. Reporting to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs about the views and moods in British government quarters, the Soviet Embassy in London pointed out that these could be summed up as attempts to keep Britain’s military commitments limited to France and Belgium and, eventually, to seek an accommodation with Germany. “68” While counting on the conclusion of a new pact with Germany to guarantee once again the so-called "Western security”, the British government was ready to leave the nations and peoples of Eastern and Central Europe at the mercy of the Nazis. That was the policy which, as we shall yet see, subsequently led to the Munich sell-out and then to war. France followed in Britain’s footsteps in treading the 102same path of danger to the cause of peace. The French Foreign Minister P. Flandin, setting out the basic principles of his country’s foreign policy in the circumstances that had emerged after March 7, 1936, declared: "We shall have to make the best terms with Germany we can get, and leave the rest of Europe to her fate." “69” A mere four years later that policy brought France to her defeat and disgraceful surrender.

The search of accommodation among the Western powers, and on the anti-Soviet grounds at that, had the support of the reactionary circles of the United States. For example, the U.S. Ambassador in Paris, Bullitt, urged "reconciliation between France and Germany" in opposition to the USSR.”70”

By the remilitarization of the Rhineland the Nazi Reich strengthened its strategic position for further acts of aggression. As a matter of urgency, the Nazis set about putting up the so-called Ziegfried Line along the German-French border. The Nazi Reich sought to reinforce its rear to launch aggressive action in Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time the Ziegfried Line was to serve as the starting point for a subsequent invasion of France.

France’s positions in Europe were badly undermined, and so was her allies’ confidence in her. The remilitarization of the Rhineland by the Nazis signified that in the event of the Nazi Reich attacking France’s allies in Central and Eastern Europe, she would now find it far more difficult to help them out by full-scale action on the Western Front. It was precisely at that time that the French ruling quarters definitely embraced the concept that in the event of the Third Reich attacking France’s allies, the French Army would stick to a defensive strategy, that is, sit it out behind the Maginot Line. The Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, Molotov, pointed out in an interview with the editor of the French Le Temps newspaper Chastenet on March 19, 1936: "The remilitarization of the Rhine Region lies, certainly, intensified the threat to the nations east of Germany, notably, the USSR. It would be wrong to fail to see that".”71” The Soviet-French Treaty of Mutual Assistance, even not in force as yet, was losing much of its significance as a military-strategic factor.

While urging the French government to resign itself to the acts committed by the Nazi Reich, Britain expressed her willingness to assume certain obligations in relation to 103France. On April 1, the governments of Britain and France exchanged official letters whereby the British government declared that should the attempts at concluding a new agreement involving Germany, instead of Treaty of Locarno, prove fruitless, Britain would come to France’s aid in the event of a German attack on her. As the British-French military negotiations, which followed soon afterwards, showed, the British government had no serious intention, in fact, to lend any effective military assistance to France. Those commitments of Britain’s did no more than create the impression that France could rely on her support. In actual fact, there was no reason at all for France to count on any British aid to speak of.

Subversion Against the League of Nations

 With the danger of war growing, the Soviet government found it necessary to renew its attempts at rallying the forces of the nations which were the targets of German and Italian aggression. The Soviet Union was pressing for the consolidation of the League of Nations and for making it more effective in preventing war and keeping the peace. The Soviet Union proceeded in advancing its proposals from the assumption that the overall military and economic strength as well as the manpower resources of the non-aggressor nations were by far superior to any possible combination of aggressive powers at the time. It would have been enough for the non-aggressor nations to unite and to demonstrate the possibility for their joint action for peace, for the war danger to be averted and the security of all nations strengthened.

The Soviet government, attached special importance to co-operation with France and Britain in various areas, including the League of Nations. It is worth mentioning in (his context the negotiations which took place early in 19.°)fi, notably, during the visit of Litvinov and Marshal Tukhachevsky to London (for the funeral of King George V), as well as the Soviet Ambassador’s 104conversations with British statesmen in London. Soviet Ambassador in London, Maisky conferred with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden on this subject on January 11, 1936. Informing the British Ambassador in Moscow about it Anthony Eden wrote: "As to general policy, Mr. Maisky maintained that the essential thing was that His Majesty’s Government, the Soviet Government and the French Government should work together in leadership of the League. If they did that and if they used every opportunity to strengthen the League and if they remained firm, he believed that the German menace might be met at laid without war. . . That was why his Government attached such great importance to our close co-operation." “72”

Litvinov’s conversation with Anthony Eden on January 30 was even more important. The British Foreign Secretary wrote about it: "Mr. Litvinov emphasised his anxiety to do everything in his power to improve relations between our two countries. Was there not any further step that could be taken? If so, he would welcome it. I replied that I could think of nothing new. .. Mr. Litvinov . .. asked .. . was it not possible, for instance, to conceive of some agreement between Soviet Russia, France and the United Kingdom? I replied that I could not visualize how this could be possible." “73” On February 5 Maisky talked it over, besides, with British Secretary for War A. Duff Cooper.”74”

On April 2, 1936, the Soviet Ambassador informed the Foreign Office that in the opinion of the Soviet government, to save Europe, "it is extremely necessary to establish closer co-operation between the USSR, France and Great Britain in the battle for peace.” He pointed out that "only an urgent consolidation of collective security, ready to meet any further aggression by Germany with resolute action, could bring it home to Hitler that peace is more profitable, after all, than war".”75”

The Soviet government’s initiative was not supported by Britain’s ruling establishment. They sought agreement with the Nazi Reich rather than with the Soviet Union. The Foreign Office believed that they should by no means discuss Anglo-Franco-Soviet co-operation with Maisky, so as not to compromise the negotiations with Germany.”76” Even the West German historian A. Kuhn pointed out that "the British ambition to come to terms with anti-communist states hindered all intensification of Anglo-Soviet relations." “77”

The considerations which the British top leadership proceeded from in opposing the idea of co-operation with the Soviet Union could be summed up as follows.

Should insurmountable obstacles have been raised in the way of the German aggressors, that would have meant assuring peace not only for Britain but for the Soviet Union as well. But while the British Conservatives wanted peace for Britain, they, guided by their class considerations, by no means wanted to have the Soviet Union live in peace, going ahead with the construction of its new, socialist type of society.

If, with Britain, France, and the USSR in alliance, things would still have come to the point of war, Nazi Germany would have inevitably been defeated. But for the same class considerations, such a victory did not suit the British Conservatives either, since the Soviet Union would have been among the victor powers, that is to say, not only would it have continued to exist but it could even have strengthened its position in the world. Besides, it was taken into account in London that the war could have led to socialist revolutions breaking out in a number of capitalist countries.

This can well be seen from a statement made by British Premier Baldwin in 1936. He said that in the event of an armed conflict, Britain "might succeed in crushing Germany with the aid of Russia, but it would probably only result in Germany going Bolshevik".”78”

The rulers of the British Empire had worked out their own general strategic plan providing for an imperialist collusion between Great Britain and the Nazi Reich. In return for the Nazi pledge not to encroach on the British Empire London was ready to grant Nazi Germany the “right” to aggression eastwards in the hope of eventually pushing her into a war against the Soviet Union. It was expected in London that the security of the British Empire would thus be ensured, and the Soviet Union would be destroyed or, at any rate, weakened, and that Nazi Germany, Britain’s major imperialist rival, would be extenuated, too.

British Premier Baldwin said in 1936, setting out his views on the subject: "We all know the German desire, and he (Hitler) has come out with it in his book, to move East and if he should move East it should not break my heart... 106If there is any fighting in Europe to be done, T should like to see the Bolsheviks and the Nazis doing it." “79”

That course of the British Conservatives ran counter to the national interests of Britain and the British people. It was Fraught with the most serious consequences for Britain (it proved to be one of the essential causes behind the outbreak of the Second World War).

The British Ambassador in Moscow, Lord Chilston found it necessary to warn the Foreign Office that, in spite of all good will of the USSR and its desire for co-operation with Britain, this policy of London could eventually have unfavourable consequences for it. He wrote that the Soviet government’s policy was to secure collective action to deter Germany: but should it find that all of its attempts at safeguarding its own security in that way were to no avail, it could reverse its policy towards Germany and opt for the normalization of relations with her.”80”

Although there were serious difficulties to surmount— because of that policy of Britain’s ruling circles—in strengthening the security of Europe, the Soviet Union continued to do everything possible, on its part, to rally all the nations objectively interested in the maintenance of peace.

The Soviet government still considered the United States’ participation in the promotion of peace most important. The U.S. Charge d’Affaires in the USSR, L. Henderson, commenting on Molotov’s report to the Central Executive Committee in a dispatch to the Department of State on January 11, 1930, laid accent on the passage which referred to the need for closer relations between the Soviet Union and the United States which, as Molotov pointed out, "has enormous significance from the point of view of the preservation of general peace”. This statement and the conversation with the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, A. A. Troyanovsky, who had arrived in Moscow, had given enough reason to Henderson to tell the Department of State that the Soviet government was counting on U.S. aid in creating a system of collective security. On April 17, W. Bullitt reported to Washington about his conversation with Litvinov who had emphasised the importance of joint efforts by the U.S. and the USSR "in the interest of peace”. According to Bullitt, Litvinov was inclined to think that should a war break out in the West, that would be a war of Germany against France, and Japan would not attack the USSR 107alone, without Germany. Therefore, showing concern not only for its own country, but for general peace, the Soviet government offered the United States to share in a collective effort to strengthen the security of the peoples. Yet Washington showed no interest in these proposals. “81”

Speaking on July 1 and September 28, 1936, about action lo promote peace in the Assembly of the League of Nations, Litvinov, under instructions from the Soviet government, declared that the only way to safeguard peace was by setting up a system of collective security. He called for the League of Nations to be transformed into a bloc of states concerned with preserving peace and united for mutual defence and assistance. We demand, he said, "that this bloc should really organise mutual assistance, that it should draw up its action plan in good time so as not to be caught napping, and that war-making activity going on outside this bloc should be effectively countered by the organisation of collective resistance".”82”

Because not all the members of the League of Nations agreed to share in applying military sanctions against the aggressor, the Soviet government spoke up for the members of the League to conclude regional or bilateral pacts of mutual assistance. In case of the need for military sanctions to be applied, this could be done by the parties to the appropriate regional agreements and also—subject to their own desire—by other members of the League. These proposals of the Soviet government to strengthen the League of Nations were passed on to the League’s Secretary– General on August 30, 1936. The Soviet government strongly opposed the proposals of certain countries for the abrogation of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations which envisaged sanctions against an aggressor.

The steadfast effort of the USSR for peace and collective security contributed towards raising the Soviet Union’s international prestige. Some remarks by the former British Premier Lloyd George, in his conversation with the Soviet Ambassador on July 1, 1936, are most indicative in this respect. The international role of the USSR, Lloyd George said, is rising. The policies of Britain and France are becoming increasingly unclear, wavering and indefinite. That, naturally, is undermining the confidence, particularly, of the medium-sized and small nations, in London and Paris. "Meanwhile, the USSR has all along been pursuing a 108clearcut and definite policy of peace.” So is there anything surprising, indeed, he said, "if medium-sized and small nations are more and more taking the USSR as their guidepost and if they increasingly regard it as their own lead- er?" “83”

One of the top officials in the Secretariat of the League of Nations, F. Walters pointed out in his two-volume A History of the League of Nations that ever since it joined the League, the USSR had been its "convinced supporter”. The conduct of the USSR towards the aggressive powers was "more consistent with the Covenant than that of any other great power”, and that Soviet Union played the leading part in the League as it concerned security.”84”

The controversy which developed in the League at the time over the prospect of amending its Covenant showed, however, that the League was sliding down to utter impotence and collapse. This was due, in part, to the Western powers’ connivance at aggression. With reference to the matter, Maisky reported to Moscow that the major trend to be observed among the majority of Conservatives and the one shared by the British government was towards Britain’s “semi-isolation” in international affairs. It boiled down to a reform of the League of Nations “(pulling the League’s teeth out”), that is, to the formal or actual abrogation of Article 16 of the League Covenant.”85” Because of Britain’s and France’s short-sighted policies, the League of Nations found itself hamstrung and incapable of safeguarding peace.

The aggressor states were out to subvert the League of Nations. Italy followed Japan’s and Germany’s example by leaving the League in December 1937.

Nazi Germany was pressing the small nations of Europe to boycott the League’s action against the aggressors. The Nazis realised perfectly well that the consolidation of the League and the conclusion of regional pacts of mutual assistance would hamper their land-grabbing plans. Therefore, the German government wanted as many European countries as possible to declare neutrality in case of any armed conflict in Europe and refuse to participate in the application of sanctions provided for by the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Nazi Reich thus hoped to obtain an opportunity to swallow up the small nations of Europe one after the other, encountering no organised collective resistance from other states.

The Polish diplomatic service, with J. Beck at its head, lent active assistance to the Nazis in undermining the League of Nations and disuniting the countries of Eastern Europe in the face of aggression. In 1936 he put forward his idea of creating a belt of “neutral” states from the Baltic down to the Black Sea (incorporating the Baltic countries, Poland arid Romania). That proposal played into Berlin’s hands as it retarded the creation of a genuine system of collective security.

The British government, too, put forward some peace– endangering plans. For example, Chamberlain, addressing the British government’s Foreign Policy Committee on March 10, 1937, wondered whether Germany would agree to conclude non-aggression treaties with all of her Eastern neighbours. The USSR could also have concluded such treaties with them.   [109•*  Essentially, however, his suggestion was that this scheme would take the place of the Franco-Soviet pact.”86” Lord Privy Seal Lord Halifax noted there and then that he had proposed a scheme of that kind to the German Ambassador in London, Ribbentrop, back on February 11, 1937. “87”

In subverting the League of Nations, the British government still attached special importance to how to do away with the Soviet-French Treaty of Mutual Assistance that was so unpalatable to it. Naturally, that had nothing in common with the consolidation of peace and security in Europe. Britain’s ruling circles did achieve their aim in substance, if not in form. That was confirmed by a report from the U.S. Ambassador in Paris Bullitt to Washington about his conversation with the French head of government Camille Chautemps on December 4, 1937. Chautemps said during the meeting that he "would be quite ready to give the Germans all the assurances possible that France would never make a military alliance with the Soviet Union directed against Germany or indulge in military conversations with the Soviet Union." “88”

The Soviet government considered that one of the possible useful measures towards creating a broadly-based front of struggle against aggression was the publication of a joint declaration by a number of European countries 110anxious for peace to be preserved.”89” So, in a conversation with the U.S. Ambassador to the USSR, Davis, on March 2(5, 1937, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs stressed that it was not too late to stop the aggressors through resolute action by the peace-loving nations. The publication of a firm declaration by the non-aggressor nations of Europe that they were standing together for peace could have played an important part in keeping the peace, the People’s Commissar pointed out. If the U.S. were to join in such a declaration, that would contribute towards preserving peace not only in Europe but in the Ear East as well.”90” The People’s Commissar more than once urged the publication of such a declaration in his negotiations with representatives of other countries.

The U.S. did not support the Soviet proposal. At the same time it is worth noting that the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow, Davis, highly appreciated the contribution which the Soviet Union could make and did make towards strengthening peace. Reporting to Washington about the role of the Soviet military potential in the course of events in Europe, he wrote on June 28, 1937: "Russia’s might and strength . .. are of indisputable value in deterring Hitler. . . The Russian Red Army is one of the strongest factors for peace in Europe." “91”

Notes

[109•*]   By that time the USSR had non-aggression treaties with all of its Western neighbours, except Romania.