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Lunacharsky Articles and speeches on international politicsHistorical position and mutual relation of liberal and socialist democracy in Russia
Edition of the "Russian Social Democratic Labor Party" 1898.
Translated from German by G. Antonov (Pseudonym of A. V. Lunacharsky)
1898 - the year of the creation of the RSDLP. — Approx. site.
This article was written in the autumn of last year for the scientific journalism organ of the German Social Democracy Novoye Vremya and appeared in it in the spring of this year under a title different from Russian. I took the liberty of changing the title, mainly because of the difficulty of translating it. Antonov translated the German title of the article with the words: "The Historical Justification of the Russian Social-Democracy", whereas I wanted to express with the words "Historische Berechtigung" that the article aims to prove the viability and right to exist of our movement. “Law,” of course, in the sense that this movement is conditioned by the historical position and mutual relations of classes in contemporary Russia. Be that as it may, the Russian title differs from the German one in that, instead of a subjective moment, goals, it emphasizes the content of the article, objective data that determine the role and significance of Russian Social Democracy in the era we are living through.
I note with pleasure the coincidence of my view of the historical tasks of the Russian proletariat with the views of a talented author unknown to me of a pamphlet that has just appeared in print: Modern Russia.
There is reason to believe that this pamphlet is not only an expression of the author's individual views, but also a harbinger of the entry of our movement into a new phase. No. 2 of Rabochaya Gazeta and Manifesto of the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party lead to this conclusion. The newspaper and the Manifesto reveal a very large and extremely significant turn in the political consciousness and self-consciousness of the active elements of our party, which has just begun to take shape.
Author.
I.
The immediate goal of Russian Social-Democracy, which has been repeatedly formulated and substantiated in its press, is to give the nascent working-class movement as soon as possible the character of a fully conscious, organized struggle against absolutism. This task constitutes the focus of the practical strivings of Russian Social Democracy, but at least in so far as these strivings have found expression in the theoretical and journalistic works of its literary representatives.
“But,” the liberals and populists object to us, “you want to provoke a working-class movement in order to fight against absolutism and win such a state order, which is itself the most necessary and elementary condition for such a movement. But isn’t it, isn’t it strange and utopian to strive to achieve a new state system by means whose widespread use already presupposes the existence of this system?”
A certain amount of skepticism with regard to the practical tendencies of Russian Social Democracy seems to be widespread in the ranks of Western European workers' parties as well. This skepticism rests partly on considerations like the above, whose fathers are the most vulgar Russian liberals. But it is also based on a real fact of Russian reality, only this fact is misinterpreted. The tsarist government caresses and sweetens the capitalist bourgeoisie in every possible way. As a consequence, it has no need to oppose absolutism—and it is politically completely indifferent. And this stratum of the propertied classes is identified with the bourgeoisie in its entirety, and then the conclusion is drawn that in Russia there is still no antagonism at all between the propertied classes and absolutism, and therefore we cannot have grounds for a mass movement in favor of constitutional freedom. From this point of view, the aspirations and goals of the Russian Social Democracy must appear utopian, and its hopes empty fantasies.
In reality, however, the situation is different than it appears through the glasses of a stereotyped historical outlook on Russian life.
The patronizing policy of the tsarist government and the lack of rights of the people are a gold mine from which the capitalists draw their wealth. So far, at least, it is the remnants of the pre-capitalist era that guarantee a wide field of activity for their inclinations and appetites. But next to and under this layer of the bourgeoisie there are other, numerous and not without influence layers of it, whose interests are less and less compatible both with the customs and financial policy of the government, and with the lack of rights and uncultured masses of the people.
At the center and at the head of these social elements are representatives of the liberal professions: lawyers, doctors, scientists, teachers, writers, judges, various kinds of technicians, and finally, young students, etc. Moreover, even a part of the educated bureaucracy belongs, with its sympathies and with their aspirations, towards these progressive circles of the upper classes, which together constitute a significant part of the bourgeoisie and bear the general name of "intelligentsia". It is not without reason that the reactionary lackeys in the newspapers constantly denounce her as the "hydra of the revolution."
And in fact, the vital needs of the intelligentsia necessitate other conditions of existence than those to which our regime dooms them. Absolutism constrains and patronizes her in her professional activities; it even produces a relative overpopulation in the liberal professions, a surplus of "mental workers." By hindering the development of the press in every possible way, hindering the spread of schools and the establishment of all other humanitarian institutions, the government thereby narrows the field of activity of the intelligentsia to a great extent, limits the demand for its labor force and deprives it of the most necessary sources of its material existence. But, perhaps, the government of the intelligentsia indirectly harms the intelligentsia even more, oppressing the peasants with an unbearable burden of taxes and keeping them in serfdom in relation to the state. Incredible state taxes, in connection with attachment to the land and to the world, completely hand over the peasants into the hands of greedy and greedy petty rural authorities, usurers and kulaks. And since not only rural but also industrial workers are still being recruited from these ruined and deprived strata of the population, the bleak situation of the former has an oppressive and debilitating effect on the latter—it ensures the Russian capitalists a colossal, overwhelming preponderance of power over the workers. If we recall at the same time the customs policy of the Russian government, it will not be difficult to understand how the "social policy" of the government guarantees huge profits to capital and deprives the capitalists of personal interest in technical and cultural progress. They have too many crude, primitive ways of exploitation and self-enrichment to feel the need for such progress. Meanwhile, it is precisely in it that one of the most necessary conditions for the existence of “mental workers” lies.
It is necessary to point out one more circumstance that vividly characterizes the contradiction between absolutism and the economic and cultural needs of the nation. By burdening the peasantry with excessive taxes, the government thereby deprives the zemstvos of the economic possibility of resolving their most pressing tasks and performing their most essential functions. There is a "surplus" of doctors, and at the same time there is not enough in the villages. Why? Yes, because the Zemstvos have no means to help grief. We have no funds either for the establishment of schools, or for the dissemination of elementary agronomic information, or for the introduction of any rational methods in agriculture. The need for all this is extremely urgent and generally recognized in the leading circles of the landowners, but the government leaves nothing for the Zemstvo in the pockets of the peasants.
Needless to say, on the basis of this antagonism between the economic interests of the intelligentsia and absolutism, an antagonism of an ideological and moral character has grown and is developing. The conscientious performance of professional functions is something taken for granted in the West and is regarded as a simple duty of everyone, but in our country this requires a certain amount of idealism, and sometimes civic courage: a decent professor, a humane doctor, a diligent teacher - in the eyes of the police and reactionaries people are suspicious. The founding of public institutions and enterprises, which in the West is an ordinary manifestation of individual and public initiative, is considered a cultural feat in Russia, because, in fact, a lot of patience and dedication are needed, to overcome all obstacles on the part of government bodies to any such institutions. On the other hand, each case of this kind becomes the germ of revolutionary ferment.
And yet the all-powerful government tolerates the intelligentsia and leaves them a relatively wide field of social activity. Why? The reader can find the answer to this in Kautsky's pamphlet Antagonism of Classes in 1789. But only everything said there about the social role and significance of the intelligentsia in France at the end of the last century is still much more applicable to modern Russia, corresponding to a much higher industrial development and a still much higher level of international capitalism, in the atmosphere of which Russian capitalism lives.
The intelligentsia became a necessary factor in social life; it fills all the pores of high society, it invades everywhere and—oh, irony! - State power, the bureaucracy itself cannot do without it. It is very important here that the official public bodies and the government itself quite often have to resort to the services of the best, most ideally minded elements of the intelligentsia. The unconditional necessity and significance of these elements for society and the state comes out especially clearly in times of famine or epidemics. Absolutism is as little free to get rid of them as it is of capitalism.
But the intelligentsia is by no means the only privileged social stratum whose interests are harmed by absolutism. Next to it stands a large, economically dominant class, which also feels far from at ease within the narrow confines of an absolute monarchy. This is a class of large landowners, in general coinciding with the landed nobility. While our large-scale industry has a huge national market protected against foreign competition by heavy duties, our backward agriculture has to fight hard against powerful rivals in the international market. These rivals are much better armed and based on a much higher national culture than the Russian landowners. These latter, therefore, have to experience, day by day, in their own skin the contradiction that has arisen between the new economic conditions for the existence of Russia - the result of capitalist development - and its backward culture and outdated legal relations. The big landowner has a personal interest in a much more rapid industrial development of Russia than is actually taking place; because only such development will free him from the need to scour the whole wide world with his goods. It is even more, or at least even more directly interested in the development of agricultural technology and means of communication, which give such a decisive advantage to its foreign competitors in the arena of the world economy. Rio absolutism and the lack of culture we have inherited from the pre-capitalist era, the economic and financial policy of the government, the arbitrariness of the bureaucracy and the lack of rights of the masses of the people—all this, like a Chinese wall, stands in the way of accelerating our industrial development and the rise of agriculture. Directly or indirectly, all these factors are delaying Russia's capitalist progress. Indirectly, because, thanks to them, the nation and the land are completely defenseless objects of unbridled exploitation, plunder and usurious extortion by capital. It is precisely in this way that the wealthy and enterprising representatives of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie are freed from the urgent need to actively promote the development of agriculture and even the progress of industry. They are rather personally interested in the continued existence of crude, backward forms of capitalism, in the preservation of barbaric but profitable methods of exploitation.
The difference in the economic position and interests of our landowners, on the one hand, and the capitalist elements of the bourgeoisie, on the other, is clearly reflected in the activities of our self-government bodies. But compared with the plutocratic thoughts, the zemstvos in their meetings, events and debates are progressive and even democratic. That is why the reactionaries shout that the Zemstvos are legal organizations for "undermining the foundations." Indeed, the zemstvos in their addresses and petitions repeatedly showed constitutional desires.
Thus, the mutual position of classes turns out to be just the opposite of what it was in France and Germany in the corresponding epochs. There, opposition against the monarchy flared up on the basis of the general antagonism of the popular masses, the intelligentsia, and the commercial and industrial classes against the privileged classes. In Russia, where there are no such strong estates, the soil on which the clash between capitalist development and absolutism is born is the general hatred of the landed nobility, the intelligentsia and the proletarian masses of the people for the economically dominant class of capitalists.
However, these remarks must be limited in the sense that class antagonism between peasants and landlords continues to exist and that some of the latter seek their salvation in the favors of the king. But the leading role in this estate still belongs mainly to its most far-sighted and progressive elements, imbued with the spirit of modern capitalism. They usually direct the zemstvos and direct the zemstvo policy towards the government and the people.
So, on closer examination, the assertion that we have no fundamental antagonism between the upper classes and the government turns out to be false. True, it is based on the fact that our industrialists and merchants still live in peace with the government and are in general politically indifferent. Meanwhile, it was precisely about the "industrial and commercial classes" that Marx wrote that "the real revolutionary movement in Germany began with their transition into the opposition." oneBut, in the first place, it is contrary to the most elementary ideas about the movement of society to assume that the present attitude of the ruling sections of the bourgeoisie towards the government will forever remain that way and not be influenced by new conditions. Namely, further, more and more intensifying manifestations of the needs and aspirations of the oppositional classes and estates hostile to the capitalist bourgeoisie must in the near future cause clashes between it and the government. It can even be said that the mixing of all capitalist elements into one indifferent conservative heap even now is far from being true.
But then the question arises of itself: why should the joint action of the intelligentsia and influential landowning elements as opposition be of no importance, while the opposition of the exploiting sections of the bourgeoisie was of decisive importance in Germany. In Germany the commercial and industrial class fought against the nobility in the interests of the national development of capital; in Russia the advanced elements of the nobility and intelligentsia are also fighting for the national interests and needs of capitalist progress, but precisely againstnamed class, i.e., against the true social representative of capitalism. Of course, this is a rather peculiar phenomenon. But in any case it does not weaken the significance of the fact that in our country, as in the West, the driving force of the opposition against absolutism is capitalist development, and its goal is the removal of all obstacles to this development. If the commercial and industrial class is economically stronger and plays a large role in the economic life of the country, then this is to a certain extent balanced by the leading and organizing role in society, which falls to the lot of our liberal opposition elements - precisely thanks to capitalist development. As representatives of education, while performing the most important public and partly state functions, they are the head of the nation, which, at the current level of Russia's economic development, it also cannot do without it, like a separate individual without a brain. This position of our intelligentsia and big landowners makes it possible for them to find means to systematically undermine our political system, so to speak, from within.
Raising and strengthening public initiative and self-government at the expense of the bureaucracy, strengthening and ensuring "legality" to the detriment of administrative arbitrariness, and finally, the introduction of universal elementary education - these are the cardinal points around which the activity of our legal opposition revolves, on which its aspirations and demands are concentrated, and in which they are most pronounced. The reasons and forms in which these aspirations are expressed are very diverse. And every success in this field is tantamount, so to speak, to the in growth into the Russian national body of institutions, habits, attitudes and demands that are in fundamental contradiction to absolutism and practically deny its right to exist.
It goes without saying that the liberal aspirations of our upper classes can manifest themselves only with extreme difficulty, through great efforts, and that the government agencies try to put up obstacles and block their way at every step. But if some "statesmen" are hostile and unfriendly towards liberalism, then others of them adhere to the opposite policy. Russia's immediate transition from paternal economic isolation to industrial capitalism, which took place under the pressure of the incomparably more developed West, placed tsarist Russia in a position for which she was not at all prepared. A colossal discrepancy arose between the backward technical, cultural and socio-political means inherited from old Russia, and new, continuously growing national needs, interests and tasks. This is what compels the government to make concessions to impotent liberalism, despite its overwhelming power.
No matter how strong the government's fear of public initiative and public education, it still capitulates here too to the liberal elements, of course, with the greatest reluctance. The new economic conditions of existence and the complex struggle of interests, relations, and needs they engender serve as a more and more growing source of weakening the tsarist-bureaucratic omnipotence and strengthening the politically powerless society in relation to absolutism.
In a word, under the pressure of domestic and international capitalism, certain socio-political bacilli, cell elements of the Western state system, penetrate and take root in the Russian national organism. Measured by Western European standards, all the above progress seems completely devoid of political significance and far from being sufficient to cause the fall of absolutism in the near future. Indeed, under ordinary conditions, it would not have been able to bring about such a revolution if its action did not extend beyond the narrow boundaries of the upper classes. Keeping only these classes in mind, one could even rather say that the government's concessions rather weaken the opposition, lulling the discontent of some and making it difficult or slow to awaken it among other propertied classes.the political awakening of the proletariat is already in the grip of absolutism. This is precisely the revolutionary significance and center of gravity, from the formal, external side, of the politically completely innocent efforts of our liberalism to transform Russian reality in the spirit of their aspirations.
II.
Compared with the means at the disposal of the Western European proletariat, the elements of Russian life that contribute to its development are so insignificant that at first glance they may seem devoid of any significance. In reality, however, things are different. Only one must not lose sight of the fundamental difference between Russia and the West, both in the relations of the bourgeois classes to the existing socio-political system, and in their mutual political relations with the proletariat.
Whereas in the West modern bourgeois society operates on the basis of a socio-political system of its own creation, lives in its own state building, in Russia it still wears the fetters of a somewhat renewed, but still pre-capitalist state organization, and does not even dare to openly strive for the device is quite appropriate to his interests and tastes of the situation. Therefore, the Western European bourgeoisie, even the free-thinking or radical ones, is anti-revolutionary in all respects. At best, she agrees to fix it here and there, to pay for this or that. But above all, she is filled with concern for the prevention of a great upheaval. This spirit of hostility towards everything revolutionary is pervaded by all public institutions and all manifestations of the social self-activity of the upper classes in the West, starting with self-government bodies and charitable institutions and ending with the press and universities, with literature and science at the head. In Russia, however, where every step forward in the sphere of public initiative is in fundamental contradiction with the state order, the opposite phenomenon takes place: even the most moderate and cautious representatives of our liberalism are not free from "perverse tendencies." And the Russian proletariat, for its part, cannot, at the present stage of Russia's development, follow its own even the most moderate and cautious of the representatives of our liberalism are not free from "perverse tendencies." And the Russian proletariat, for its part, cannot, at the present stage of Russia's development, follow its own even the most moderate and cautious of the representatives of our liberalism are not free from "perverse tendencies." And the Russian proletariat, for its part, cannot, at the present stage of Russia's development, follow its owndirect practical aspirations beyond radical democratic liberalism. There is as yet no question of the conquest of political power by the proletariat for itself or of the reform of bourgeois society under the banner of socialism.
Thus, the historical ground has not yet been prepared for a fundamental political antagonism between our proletariat and the liberal bourgeoisie; on the contrary, their mutual historical position imposes a common goal on them and compels them to vigorous, constant mutual assistance. Thus, unlike its older brothers in the West, the Russian proletariat finds in the circle of the representatives of bourgeois society themselves a point of support and support for its revolutionary development. After all, it itself is only just being born into the world and is essentially imbued with a revolutionary spirit in almost all of its vital manifestations. No matter how politically innocent, at first glance, the social activity of our liberals, nevertheless, in its tendencies, it is hostile to the existing system and undermines the modern state order. That's why such a politically innocent, the field of activity of Russian liberals, as public education and enlightenment, serves as a source of various impulses for revolutionary fermentation. By their activity in this and similar fields, our liberals are day by day illustrating with facts the irreconcilable contradiction that exists between absolutism and the needs of the people. By acquainting the people with the outrageous facts of our life, they open their eyes to the incompatibility of tsarist absolutism with their interests and show it to them in all its disgusting nakedness.
In this way, non-political, completely legal, educational culturalism becomes an inexhaustible source of political ferment - first in intellectual circles, and then among the masses of the people. There are already facts of direct conflicts between the people and the authorities due to the closure of schools and libraries or difficulties in establishing them.
But the progress of elementary education is, after all, one of the conditions and one of the bridges for establishing an intellectual connection between the lower classes and the intelligent, ideological bourgeoisie. Thanks to this progress, the circle of readers of the free-thinking press is expanding and democratizing every day, which is beginning to penetrate more and more into factories and even into remote villages.
In the press, the reader from the people finds a whole reservoir of discontent accumulated in bourgeois opposition circles and "wrong" aspirations and desires widespread among them. Newspapers bring reports and information about the life of nations that have gone ahead, a description of their state and public institutions - and all this is accompanied by critical notes on domestic orders. In a word, newspapers give literate readers impetus, if not to the violent overthrow of the regime, then at least to the inquisitive search for means for such an overthrow.
But the intelligentsia cannot stop at the very beginning of its revolutionary popular enlightenment activity. Circumstances do not allow it to confine itself to preparatory work in the field of revolutionizing the masses; they force the democratic section of the intelligentsia to go much further than mere education and enlightenment of the people. And above all it is pushed in the atom direction by the political weakness of Russian liberalism.
The fact that it is completely impossible for Russian liberalism to achieve domination without the support of the lower classes is by no means a special new phenomenon in history. Of the France of the old regime, Kautsky says: "It became clearer and clearer that only the peasants and poor townspeople, that is, the people, could put an end to the rule of the court and the privileged classes." But this “lever” began to move only after the upper classes had already forced absolutism to capitulate, and the people entered the historical arena, not as a conscious force guided by a clear goal, but as an elementary force, pushed forward from the outside by extraordinary events. . Russian liberalism, on the other hand, has not yet been able to find sufficient support among the propertied masses to force the government to embark on the path of serious political concessions.
But all the more chances for success is a planned, conscious revolutionary movement among the people. Such a movement would increase the forces of liberalism to an extraordinary degree, and not only directly but also indirectly, since it would inevitably bring to life the dormant antagonism between the government and the capitalists, give rise to various conflicts between them and thus push the “industrial and merchant classes" into the camp of the liberal opposition.
The political impotence of Russian liberalism is rooted in two closely related circumstances: firstly, in the absence of "historical estates" with hereditary means of self-defense against the crown and unprivileged classes, and secondly, in the relative solidarity of tsarism with the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie. As is well known, in France the edifice of absolutism was thrown out of stable balance precisely by the stubborn opposition of the privileged classes, and it was they who, by their struggle against the government, aroused revolutionary passions not only in the proletariat, but also in the bourgeoisie itself. In Russia, there is no such historical engine. The pre-capitalist era did not bequeath to us any privileged class with a historically consolidated position and sufficient means of self-defense against the crown and the bourgeoisie. And the latest evolution, for its part, has contributed in no small way to an even greater weakening of the strength of the resistance of the nobility, dividing it into two antagonistic camps: the advanced and the more or less reactionary. But the reactionary wing of the nobility consists of elements that are culturally inferior and are going to meet ruin; they try to stretch their existence with crumbs and handouts from the royal table. These elements are incapable of pursuing a consistently reactionary policy; in general, they vacillate between the opposite poles of class desires and liberal influences. The leadership of the class of large landowners, in general, still belongs to persons who lean towards economic, cultural and political progress.
Our capitalist bourgeoisie, therefore, has nothing to fear from any "historical" rivals. The absence of historical brakes in our country, similar to those that capitalism encountered in the West at the beginning of its life, made it easier for our state power to turn the state and its policies into an instrument of enhanced capitalist development. The Russian autocrats found themselves in a very enviable position, from a monarchist point of view: they had the opportunity to carry out relatively broad reforms in favor of the capitalist class, which was still in its cradle, without the risk of running into stubborn opposition from reactionary elements and without fear of giving rise to complex, difficult to resolve conflicts between the privileged "third estate". And as a result of this, that even the industrial bourgeoisie does not feel bad under the tutelage of absolutism: while deriving huge profits from the socio-political barbarism that has been preserved in Russian life, at the same time it does not sensitively experience the abominations of this barbarism on its own back. And since the government, in its policy of pleasing the capitalist bourgeoisie, has not yet lost its elasticity, the capitalists can, for the time being, calmly remain in their loyal devotion and remain aloof from all liberalism.
Thus, the historical position of the upper estates and classes prevents energetic , legal opposition, both reactionary and progressive, from appearing on the stage in our country. This circumstance serves as one of the strongest motive forces that pushes the free-thinking part of our bourgeoisie and intelligent landowners onto the path of spreading public education and democratizing self-government bodies.
Instead of seizing on outdated prerogatives and estate institutions, invalid, even downright worthless, as a support and instrument in the struggle against the throne, the more far-sighted representatives of the nobility prefer to take part in the development of the forces of the people, working together with the bourgeois intelligentsia on the further development of self-government institutions in a democratic sense and over the spread of education among the masses.
It must not be assumed, however, that the entire mass of liberals is clearly aware of the political meaning of their activity.
But no matter how subjective the "people-loving" aspirations of his comrades may appear to one or another of them, this does not change the objective importance of the fact that the lack of reliable political support among the propertied masses forces their most educated, in various spheres of public life, the most active representatives to seek such a point of support among the masses .
But the path along which the liberal elements are moving towards this goal is too long and therefore not to the taste of the younger and more radical part of the intelligentsia. The means used by the liberals and the immediate tangible results they have achieved contain, it is true, revolutionary force, but only in a latent state, from which it still needs to be turned into living energy. It is as if the semi-proletarians and proletarians of the intelligentsia, the student youth and, in general, the most temperamental and most democratic elements of the intelligentsia are destined for this historical role.
Absolutism is doubly unbearable to these elements of the upper classes: on the one hand, by its barbarity it develops idealism in them and brings it to a high degree of tension; on the other hand, at the same time, it blocks all paths for this idealism to manifest itself in legal forms. For these relatively broad circles of the bourgeoisie, the path of so-called peaceful, organic progress is directly impossible.
And the liberal elements are far from fascinated by their quiet, mole-like work of undermining and undermining the foundations. And they feel disgusting under the pressure of the heavy hand of the bureaucracy and would like to get rid of it as soon as possible, the better. But liberal landowners and well-paid editors of "respectable" newspapers are inclined to resonate that it is impossible to break through a wall with your forehead. To which the radical-democratic intelligentsia declares to them: “We will never be satisfied and do not want to be satisfied with your tortoise progress. Your humility is immoral. Its source is cowardice and selfish fear for your personal interests. Our slogan says: a fearless, merciless war with those in power, a war not on the stomach, but to the death. And since our forces are not enough, we will call the oppressed working masses to the revolutionary arena and teach them to fight the social system that oppresses them and arm them for this struggle!
For its part, the bare reality that strikes the eye points the revolutionary intelligentsia to the industrial proletariat as a class of the people that promises the greatest success to the cause of organizing the people's revolutionary movement.
This class lives in large masses precisely in the centers of intellectual and social life, where the most important government organs are located, and where a decisive attack against absolutism must be launched. While the peasantry, in its barbaric ignorance and traditional fidelity and devotion to the throne, meekly endure all the abominations and baseness of their oppressors, the urban proletariat boldly raises its head against its exploiters, fights against them and shows an unquenchable thirst for education and knowledge. In a word, the revolutionary intelligentsia meets in the big cities the class of the people most susceptible to its intellectual influence, easily imbued with revolutionary ideas and capable of revolutionary struggle.
III.
The Russian proletariat is still very young and the process of its isolation from the rural population is still far from being completed. Our proletariat is the direct product of the forcible dispossession of the peasants from the land, begun on a large scale by their "liberation" and continued by the entire social and economic policy of the government.
The greater part of the proletariat still belongs to the peasant class, i.e., it bears the burden of taxes that weighs heavily on peasant land, although it does not derive any benefit from it. Standing in economic relations on urban soil, this part of our working class, legally, nevertheless, is connected with the peasantry, which is far from being free even in a purely civil sense, since it is serf dependent on the state,
In addition to these strata, belonging to the peasant class, mainly due to state coercion, our cities are overflowing with real peasant masses leading an intermediate existence: they are half farmers and at the same time are engaged in urban crafts. These masses are recruited from peasants who are ruined and expropriated in the most painful way by the combined efforts of the bureaucracy, greedy landowners and predatory kulaks. From them our working reserve army is recruited, more numerous than in the countries that stand at the head of capitalist progress. Its pressure on the position of an active workers' army is also incomparably stronger than in these countries. In Western Europe, the mass of the unemployed consists mainly of persons temporarily or permanently thrown out of the active industrial army. They are the direct product of the progressive movement of large-scale industry, its technical progress and fluctuations in sales. The colossal surplus of “workers” in Russia is not so much the result of the action of independent, internal forces inherent in industrial capitalism, but rather the result of fiscal oppression, the conditions for the emancipation of the peasants and their powerless position. It goes without saying that the wandering masses of a hungry people, without rights, without needs, must act in a much more pacifying and weakening way on the workers employed in production than the unemployed, who, in their past, in their spiritual and cultural development, belong to industrial proletariat. A significant part of our proletariat has one more foot in the swamp, in which the huge peasant masses are suffocating, indeed, our entire working class is experiencing the effect of the primitive conditions of life of the peasant population. The lack of culture, the economic and political savagery of the countryside, which in many respects surpasses that of the towns, the ruin and impoverishment of the peasants—all this oppresses the industrial working population as well, and provides the entrepreneurs with a preponderance of forces far superior to their own. This harmful effect of the backward conditions of existence of the peasants on the position of the working class is further enhanced by the fact that Russian industry has almost exclusively an internal market, which consists mainly of peasants, who are rapidly impoverishing; and they are not replaced by another class of farmers more adapted to the new economic conditions. The process of formation of such a class is greatly slowed down by the absolutist regime and its policies.
Thus, the industrial proletariat in Russia is vitally interested in the radical elimination of the oppression and injustices that weigh on the rural population. But his direct enemy and exploiter is still the entrepreneur, whose interests and needs are concentrated mainly on his relationship with the industrial capitalist. These relationships are just as antagonistic as they are in the West; they manifest themselves with the same sharpness and clarity as in the old capitalist countries. In terms of their technical basis and size, Russian large-scale industrial enterprises stand at the height of modern capitalist industry. And in small enterprises, the opposition between the interests of the worker and the entrepreneur is aggravated under the influence of competition with large industrial establishments. The antagonism of these classes is not obscured either by the general hatred of the privileged classes, or by the guilds and other similar institutions inherited from the Middle Ages. If such elements of the pre-capitalist era exist in Russia, they are so pathetic that they are insensitive even to the urban proletariat. The truly privileged class in Russia is precisely the industrial bourgeoisie, leading not an illusory, but a very real existence, enjoying life and making excellent profits.
These two classes stand opposite each other like two warring camps, separated by a social abyss over which no bourgeois ideology, even the most eloquent and most radical, can bridge. Hence it goes without saying that the massivethe revolutionary movement of the proletariat can develop and gain strength only directly on the soil of this antagonism and the conflicts that it spontaneously generates. In order for the revolutionary intelligentsia to fully fulfill its historical mission in the sphere of revolutionizing the proletariat, it must consequently build its program of action on the basis of the antagonism of the working class towards the entrepreneurs. There is no other choice: one must either take the point of view of the class interests of the proletariat in principle, with all revolutionary passion and full seriousness, or else remain, as before, in an isolated position, and consequently, politically impotent.
Part of the intelligentsia, however small, has already made a decision: but this is only the beginning. There can hardly be any doubt that the number of people from the democratic intelligentsia who will embark on this path will constantly grow. Not to mention the need for our democratic intelligentsia to enlist the support of the broad masses of the population, because most of our free-thinking bourgeoisie is itself “anti-capitalist” and smashes capitalism in every possible way. There is a lot of comic stuff going on here. I doubt that there are many liberals in Russia who would not be offended if they were called liberals and not socialists. In any case, one thing is certain: not only the radical elements of the intelligentsia, but also our liberal society, that is, the majority of free-thinking people, is hostile to the capitalist bourgeoisie.
In terms of its technical means, the large-scale industry of Russia is quite modern, but its foundation is a backward socio-economic system. The social soil from which it takes its nourishing material, the atmosphere with which it breathes, is barbaric and comes closest to the atmosphere known in the West as the era of primitive accumulation. The capitalist strata still feel very well in this atmosphere. But the proletariat is extremely interested in putting an end to this combination of barbarism and modern civilization as soon as possible. For their part, the progressive part of the nobility and people of free professions refer to the “merchants” as the embodiment of privileged shameless profit and the national bearer of Eastern barbarism. That's why, the action of the revolutionary proletariat against the class of entrepreneurs can by no means arouse the hostile attitude of the free-thinking bourgeoisie. Its attitude to the movement of the proletariat can be decisively influenced only by its general direction and character, its practical aims and tactics.
Only two extremes could have an unfavorable effect on the relations of an educated society towards the labor movement. First, if this movement had not gone out of the rut of private clashes between workers and individual employers. This would deprive him of any political interest and would cause indifference to him in outside social circles. But perhaps the other extreme would be even worse. I have in mind the case if our working-class movement, carried away by the Bakunin and Blanquistthe practical goal of an anarchist or communist revolution. In practice, it would then have expressed itself in disorderly, frivolously called strikes, accompanied by violence and attempts on the lives of capitalists and government officials, and the forces of the proletariat would thus have been wasted, uselessly, both for the liberation struggle against absolutism, and for the interests of the proletariat itself. proletarian class in the narrow sense.
As for the first extreme, we are insured against it by our tsarist regime. And to protect our labor movement from the influence of Bakuninists and Blanquists is the direct duty of the Social-Democratic elements ruling in it.
The historical views of the Social Democracy on the social conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat provide the guiding thread for the elaboration of a program of action which in principle would be wholly based on the class interests of the proletariat and at the same time would not go beyond the real conditions of the stage of bourgeois-capitalist development reached by Russia. Our proletariat begins its historical career in an immature, yet emerging bourgeois society, the contradictions and sufferings of which are not the result of decay, regression, not even the result of full development, but rather the pains of childbirth and childhood illnesses. And, of course, the workers and peasants suffer the most from them. Therefore, the immediate goal of the revolutionary vanguard of our proletariat is not the destruction of this society, but, on the contrary, the conquest for him of the most favorable conditions for existence and development. The more energetically and consciously the revolutionaries from the working class pursue this goal, the more service they will render to the special interests of their class.
The main evil of the Russian capitalism lies in the fact that, while standing with one foot on the heights of modern capitalist production, it still bogs down the other in the swamp of the recently dead era of barbarism and lack of culture. The socio-political soil on which it grows, the cultural atmosphere that surrounds it, are overflowing with coarse, historically alien elements. Hence the greater part of social misfortunes, the most burning sufferings of the Russian people, whose life is characterized primarily by the colossal discrepancy between the needs, interests and tasks generated in it by capitalism, on the one hand, and the means for satisfying and solving them, on the other. The main problem of the classes that suffer the most from this lies precisely in the elimination of this internal contradiction in our national life. And the first, absolutely necessary step towards resolving it is the overthrow of absolutism, which does not give scope for social independent initiative and self-help.
This outlines in general terms the next stage and the direction of the tactics of our movement. His historical mission falls to his lot to deliberately serve as a lever pushing all the enemies of absolutism to an organized attack against him. It must strive to ensure that their scattered petty skirmishes with it turn into a general revolutionary campaign against tsarist autocracy. At the same time, the vanguard of the proletariat must act systematically as the vanguard of democracy in general. This role, however, falls to the Social Democracy in the West as well, especially where bourgeois liberalism withered prematurely and stopped halfway through. But the inclusion in the program of Western social democracy of the so-called bourgeois-democratic tasks has a completely different fundamental significance and other practical goals than in Russia with its absolutism and immature capitalism. In Western Europe, these demands have lost their bourgeois character and have become in fact purely proletarian, directed against a well-established bourgeois society. In Russia, however, their aim is not to destroy the emerging bourgeois society, but rather to overthrow its enemy and oppressor. They are not directly striving to win political power for the proletariat, but only to achieve elementary civil rights. Beneath the red veneer of radical socialist postulates hides the nation's modest desire to protect the individual from administrative arbitrariness and limit tsarist power. In a word, our war under the banner of democracy does not lead directly to the rule of the proletariat, but to a system in which its struggle for this rule will only become possible.
From this follows of itself the fundamental difference in the tactics of the Social Democracy in relation to liberalism in our country and in the West. Even in free states, the attitude towards the bourgeoisie as a solid, equally reactionary mass would run counter to reality. But the well-known tactical slogan of the German Social Democracy has, nevertheless, a real historical lining in its foundation, because, although in a somewhat one-sided and exaggerated form, it nevertheless expresses the actual hostility of all elements of the bourgeoisie against the revolutionary proletariat and brings to consciousness the tactics that flow from this. the latter with respect to all these elements. In Russia, however, where the historical bud has not yet matured for such a hostile attitude of the entire bourgeoisie towards the proletariat, such tactics would be in sharp contradiction to the real situation of these classes and their mutual relations arising from it. It would artificially contribute to isolating our working-class movement at a time when it still needs allies and external help. In the West, the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat can, of course, advance alone, even against the combined forces of all the bourgeois classes, but only within certain limits. This is possible for him because he is dealing with the proletariat, already raised to the level of high culture by the previous bourgeois progress, which at the same time placed it in legal conditions that give it the means to achieve its intended goal on its own. But in Russia, where the proletariat is still only in the process of separating itself from the masses of the people who have lived in slavery and ignorance for centuries, it itself still stands, for the most part, at too low a stage of cultural development to be able—already in the iron grip of absolutism—to rise up. to the role of a conscious revolutionary force, without direct or indirect help from the bourgeoisie. Tactics that have historical justification in the West would be utopian and reactionary in our country. Utopian because it would leave without attention one of the most important factors in the steady growth of this movement; reactionary because it would weaken the immediate practical significance of this movement and prevent the establishment of intellectual interaction between the educated classes and the masses of the people.
Meanwhile, such an influence in itself has an enormous progressive significance in modern Russia, since the palest liberalism of any intellectual is still much higher than the uncultured worldview of these masses.
To base our tactics on a fundamentally hostile attitude towards all strata of the bourgeoisie is indifferent, would mean committing a fatal mistake in assessing the current position of the proletariat and its internal forces with respect to independent political development at the present moment. I am very far from the idea of weakening the class character of our movement and diluting it with water. That the popular movement in Russia can assume significant dimensions only on the basis of the class interests of the proletariat is beyond doubt. But the fact of the matter is that these interests embrace both the interests of the oppressed masses of the peasantry and the enlightened bourgeoisie, and even the national interests of Russia's capitalist progress in general. Once convinced of this, the revolutionary pioneers of our working class will, in their agitation and propaganda, emphasize its nationwide historical mission in modern Russia and carry it into the consciousness of both this class itself and all those bourgeois strata who suffer in every possible way from the barbarism of the popular masses and domination of absolutism. Even purely economic clashes between workers and employers provide quite a few reasons and clues for such agitation. And still more occasions will be given in it by direct conflicts with the government over strikes and on the basis of the aspirations of the workers for education and organization. Once our working-class movement consciously follows this path, it will become the revolutionary bearer of the cultural and political aspirations of the Russian nation, it will acquire the warm sympathy of the democratic intelligentsia, it will acquire an enormous attraction towards it—in a word, the proletariat will become, instead of the peasantry, the center of ideal interests, aspirations and hopes. And this will give him the opportunity to acquire influence on the legal organs of public amateur activity, on the Zemstvos, Dumas, the press, learned societies and on various societies of a cultural and educational nature. Whatever the immediate practical, tangible results of this, it would be important that in Russia the exploited, degraded class was able to gain influence and push forward the official legal public institutions, thanks to its own planned activity. Until now, the "peasant question" has not ceased to be the subject of discussion of these institutions, the peasantry had, as it were, the privilege of being a special object of their concern and love for the people. But at the same time, it plays the role of a passive, helpless being, evoking only a feeling of compassion. With the acquisition of influence by the proletariat in these spheres, the love of the people of the opposition bourgeoisie will acquire new ground and a substantially different character. The impulses will come from among the militant revolutionary popular class and will become a favorable ground for constant influence and a kind of alliance between the organized vanguard of this class and the advanced, free-thinking circles of the bourgeoisie.
Let's summarize the above.
We have three social strata in Russia, the most important as elements of the movement:
1) Free-thinking sections of the landowning class. These circles are devoid of political significance because they belong to a class of exploiters, which is at the same time a privileged class, which, however, never had an independent position in relation to the crown, and can even less so now that it is in complete decline; inspiring the rural masses partly with hatred, partly with fear, the landed nobility does not have the value of a serious opponent in the eyes of the capitalist bourgeoisie,
2) Representatives of the liberal professions and student youth, the intelligent bourgeoisie, the "intelligentsia" in general. It is politically weak, firstly, because it does not have a serious point of support in the economically ruling masses of the bourgeoisie, and secondly, because it itself breaks up into different layers, the highest of which come into contact and even merge with the capitalists and the nobility, the lower ones sink to the level of the proletariat and part of them are almost in its ranks. They are unable to fight absolutism on their own, not only because of their relative small number and isolation from the economic life of the nation, but also because they do not represent a homogeneous mass and can act as one.
3) The third element of the movement is the class of industrial workers. By their numbers and concentration in the cities, by their role in national production and their elemental strength, this class is, of course, capable of a revolutionary struggle against the tsarist regime. But for now, he still lacks political knowledge and experience and any legal basis for collective activity. It can acquire both with the help of the aforementioned strata of the population, who, in turn, can only find in the working-class movement a powerful lever for waging war against absolutism on a broad, national scale. While the younger and more democratic part of the intelligentsia will directly devote their knowledge and strength to the service of the working class, the “solid”, upper circles of educated society can act indirectly in the same direction, especially in the field of disseminating public education and educational means. Weak politically, these elements, however, set the tone and enjoy influence in the spheres of the so-called. "public initiative". True, they are quite narrow, but they are expanding more and more rapidly, and even within their present framework it is possible to do the more for the benefit of the socio-political development of the proletariat, the stronger the conscious pressure from below, the more energetically and systematically the demands of the proletariat for education and for social influence. The representatives of the emerging social democratic movement must take care that this pressure is as strong as possible and that it manifests itself in the most reasonable ways.
Those who dispute the viability of this movement usually refer to the example of Western Europe, where social democracy arose only on the basis of a constitutional state. They judge the phenomena and demands of Russian life from the point of view of a bygone era. They believe that if during the reign of absolutism in France, Belgium, etc., more than a hundred years ago there was no ground for the movement of the proletariat, then it may not be in Russia at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th. in. Representatives of such views forget that in those days not only a constitution was lacking for the emergence of the labor movement, but also other equally essential conditions. First of all, there was no modern industrial worker, with independent interests. We must not lose sight of the fact that, although the antagonism between the exploited masses and the bourgeoisie was manifested,class antagonism, hostility to the clergy and the nobility and the oppression of the guild organization. Both the exploiters and the exploited belonged to the "oppressed estate", which is not the case in modern Russia. But the next moment is even more important.
“The bourgeois thinkers of France (no longer philosophers, but economists and politicians) expressed their love for the people, and not only in relation to the priests and the nobility, but also to the rich in general, they became more and more hostile. Even anti-capitalist doctrines have begun to find sympathy." Thus says Kautsky (The Struggle of Classes in 1789). But what means could the representatives of such doctrines in the past, and even at the beginning of our century, have at their disposal to spread their views among the masses of the people? In calm, peaceful times, almost none. There was a complete lack of modern means of communication, education and propaganda. Public schools, libraries and reading rooms, public lectures, widely distributed newspapers and, not to forget the most important thing, railways, steamships, telegraph and modern postal communications, - all these levers of intellectual and political development of the masses are new phenomena for Western Europe as well. They did not exist at the time of the French Revolution, and in ordinary times the masses of the people remained alien to the influence of the intelligentsia and did not receive any impulses from the ideological and political ferment in the upper classes.
Even 50 years ago, we read in K. Marx's Revolution and Counter-Revolution, political title in Austria was available only to persons who had the means to pay for the transportation of smuggled literature into the country. They belonged mainly to the commercial and industrial classes." In Russia, these gentlemen have the most insignificant interest in "political knowledge", but the working class is all the more thirsty for it. About three-quarters of the illegal literature imported into Russia and printed within its borders is intended for and read to the proletariat.
What the Communist Manifesto says about Germany in the 1940s is even more true of contemporary Russia. The capitalist organization has since made incredible progress, both in terms of geographical distribution and in terms of the degree of its development. Even in Russia capitalism stands at an incomparably higher level than in Germany on the eve of the last revolution. Everything that was achieved by capitalism in the West through gradual, centuries-old development fell like a ripe fruit into the hands of Russian capitalism and serves from the very beginning as a lever in its forward movement. And as a result of this, it turns out that the struggle against absolutism can and should be waged in our country with the means and forces characteristic of modern Western societies.
This of itself eliminates the reproach leveled against Russian Social-Democracy that its striving to evoke an independent political movement of the proletariat in autocratic Russia contains an internal, insoluble contradiction. This contradiction is only apparent, since capitalism, by bringing the social, economic, cultural and technical conditions of the existence of the Russian nation closer to those of Western Europe, thereby creates, already on the basis of absolutism, the most necessary prerequisites and factors for the political movement of the working class. To ignore this point is to make a double mistake. In the first place, the whole significance for the political development of the proletariat of all other historical forces of the movement called into being by capitalism is thus reduced to naught. Secondly, the colossal difference between the contemporary tasks of the proletariat in our country and in the West is completely overlooked. The struggle against the whole of bourgeois society requires, of course, incomparably more strength, political maturity and organization than the struggle for its interests, even if it is carried out from the special point of view of the proletariat.
As the title of the article shows, its goal is to prove the right of the existence of social democracy in modern Russia. But it seems to me that at the same time it proves the historical necessity of its existence. The issue now is not whether the movement of the proletariat in Russia should be evoked or not. Reality itself answered this question in the affirmative. The movement has emerged and will continue to grow.
So under the pressure of the elemental force of antagonism between the worker and employers, and under the influence of the revolutionary intelligentsia, which, for its part, is impelled by elemental forces to arouse the revolutionary movement in the proletariat. But it goes without saying that the historical significance of this movement, its immediate and distant influence, will be the stronger, the more clearly its representatives realize the close connection between the class interests of our proletariat and the interests of the bourgeois-capitalist development of Russia, and the better they are able to give this connection a proper expression. This task is only within the power of the Social-Democrats. Therefore, we can say without exaggeration that its existence in autocratic Russia is not only possible, but also necessary, both from the point of view of the interests of the working class,
P. Axelrod.