From Ordzhoniikidze

Bolshevik leadership Correspondence. 1912-1927
Collection of documents 1996.
Compiled by: A.V.Kvashonkin, L.P.Kosheleva, L.A.Rogovaya, O.V.Khlevnyuk.
Stalin Correspondences

Telegram to G. K. Ordzhonikidze to I. V. Stalin

May 12, 1922

Moscow Central Committee of the RCP, comrade. Stalin 1 .

Tashkent 12/V-22

Cipher

The situation [in] Bukhara can be characterized by an almost general uprising. [In] Eastern Bukhara, according to local data, it acquires an organized character under the leadership of Enver. The helplessness, lack of authority of the current government, its complete lack of efficiency and the looting of our units deprived of supplies and uniforms contributed to the expansion of the uprising. To save the situation, the immediate elimination of Enver is necessary, which is being prepared. The campaign [to] Eastern Bukhara will take place [in] incredibly difficult conditions (extremely rugged terrain, tropical malaria, lack of transport and apartments, ignorance of the terrain, the flight of the population from the area of occupation, the example of the city of Karshi). The general belief is that Enver will evade a decisive battle and run away. According to the command for the Bukhara operation, the available forces are not enough - two rifle brigades and two cavalry brigades, the shortage of cavalry is over 50%. Kakurin demands another rifle brigade, which the front, for lack of reserves, cannot give, regiments without a convoy. Parts of the first cavalry brigade are laid out, the Red Army soldiers demand to be removed from the front. The rifle brigade that had just arrived from Moscow and the 10th cavalry regiment were raw material, without a single horse and wagon.

Second. With the most favorable outcome of the operation against Enver, the Bukhara issue remains unresolved unless the following measures are carried out as soon as possible. First. Immediate reorganization of power by creating a national democratic government.

Provide Bukhara with the opportunity to sell goods abroad through our ports, with the exception of those consumed by Russia. Without this measure, complete economic collapse and the final departure from us of those commercial and industrial groups that are vitally interested in maintaining the closest ties with Russia are inevitable.

Third. Dissolution of the Communist Party and Komsomol. The composition of the party and the Komsomol, according to the statement of the secretary of the Central Executive Committee and a number of responsible comrades, is overwhelmingly worthless. This measure should be carried out by means of re-registration, leaving in the Party a small group of the most reliable comrades (now there are 14,000 people in the Party). Assign to this group the main task of propaganda, agitation and education. Left communists, consisting mainly of former emir officials and Persians, who have their own separate illegal organization and are objectively and obviously counterrevolutionary, are declared outside the party, leaving individual private comrades in it.

Fourth. For the actual leadership of the government of Bukhara, it is necessary to have a completely separate plenipotentiary. Tov. Kozhevnikov is not suitable for this purpose.

Fifth. The main core of the government will be made up of groups headed by [with] Feizulla Khodjaev.

Sixth. The maintenance of the army, with the exception of food, which is supplied by the Accounting Government, is to be taken over by allocating one million gold rubles for this. Not to require the Bukhara government to use our Alpari signs and strive [to] maintain the exchange rate of the Bukhara ruble.

Seventh. The declaration of martial law [in] Bukhara is inexpedient, because it is practically impossible.

Eighth. To carry out all of the above, temporarily send Comrade Bukhara. Eliav, who enjoys great confidence among the people of Bukhara. Tov. Sokolov and Peters to withdraw. More about Turkestan. I'm going to leave on the fourteenth. On arrival [in] Bukhara, where we will meet Feyzulla 2 , whom, [when] he was [in] Bukhara, we did not manage to see, he was [at] a junction 3 .

RTSHIDNI; F. 85. Op. 23. D. 46. L. 1-6. Autograph.

Notes:

1 On the letterhead: "RSFSR Member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Separate Caucasian Army."

2 F. Khodzhaev.

3 In a telegram addressed to Ordzhonikidze dated May 13, 1922, Stalin wrote: “I received the cipher, you do not report anything about a change in the composition of the Turkburo and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Turkfront. Provide additional information, if any, have accumulated during this time [...] ”(RTSKHIDNI. F. 558. On. 1. D. 2327. L. 1).