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Transcripts from the Soviet Archives VOLUME XIII SECRET REVIEWS 1933
Special summary of the SPO OGPU on food difficulties in the city of Armavir. April 5, 1933
Archive: F. 2. Op. 11.D. 42.L. 122‐123. Certified copy
April 5, 1933, No. 145755
Top secret
Workers of industrial enterprises in Armavir are not included in the planned supply network. The supply of workers is based on the selfprocurement of cooperative organizations selling food.
Food difficulties are greatly exacerbated by the facts of self‐supply, squandering and theft of products that have become widespread in recent years (Armalit plant, Soyuzplodovosch, public catering trust, etc.)
A group of workers headed by director Kriventsov was arrested in Soyuzplodoovoschi. Members of the group systematically plundered food and goods, self‐supplied, and arbitrarily raised food prices to cover losses.
The bread ration for the workers of the enterprises has been reduced to 400 g. Bread is delivered irregularly, in connection with which the queues for it are set in the evening, besides, supervision over the baking of bread is set extremely unsatisfactory. In some cases, mice, stones, etc. are found in bread.
Public catering canteens are supplied with food irregularly due to the lack of self‐procurement, in connection with this, over the past decade, meals have sharply deteriorated.
Poor nutrition at the cotton factory reported 7 starvation deaths, 10 swollen workers; in addition, 40 cases of fainting during work were reported.
Typhus epidemic intensified in the city. In February, 150 cases of typhus were reported. From 1 to 5 March ‐ 120 cases.
At a number of enterprises, the turnover of the workforce has increased. Skilled workers often leave production. At the ʺArmalitʺ plant, due to unsatisfactory supplies, a high turnover of skilled workers was noted, which delays the repair of tractors.
At a cotton factory, the turnover systematically increases and reaches 60 people a day. The fulfillment of the production plan is in jeopardy. Production plan for the first quarter of this year completed by only 20%.
Head of the SPO OGPU Molchanov
Head of the 6th branch of the SPO OGPU
Korkin
Correct:
Help. Secretary of the OGPU SPO Svetlov
Dispatched:
1) Menzhinsky; 2) Berry; 3) Prokofiev; 4) Agranov; 5‐6) in the affairs of the SPO OGPU; 7) in the department.
F. 2. Op. 11.D. 42.L. 122‐123. Certified copy .
A note on the direct wire of the OGPU PP to the SKK on a sharp deterioration in the food supply of industrial workers. April 6, 1933
Archive: F. 2. Op. 11.D. 7.L. 372‐377. Certified copy
April 6, 1933, No. 50183 and 50184
Top secret
Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) t. Stalin
Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) t. Kaganovich
Moscow, deputy. OGPU chairman tt. Yagoda, Prokofiev, Agranov
In recent months, there has been a significant deterioration in the food supply of industrial workers in a number of cities in the region. With a reduction in the contingents of centralized supply, the import of food decreased accordingly (the import of flour, for example, from October of this year to February of this year in 14 cities decreased from 13,969 tons to 10,524 tons).
The supply‐cooperative organizations failed to ensure the fulfillment of the plan for self‐procurement, to establish public catering. Along with this, major shortcomings, abuse, predation are revealed in the work of ORSs, air defense systems, public catering trusts, mainly due to disorganization, lack of control, and contamination of the supply‐cooperative apparatus.
Until recently, a number of SDOs have had large financial indebtedness, as a result of which there have been cases of nonrepurchase of even those released in a centralized manner. The following facts are characteristic: in mines ‐ self‐procurement in all ore administrations, excluding the Boguraevo‐Gornyatskaya group, in February was completed from 3.2% to 53.6%. According to the Comintern ODS, the implementation of the plan was disrupted due to the receipt of permission for procurement only in midFebruary. Boguraevo‐Gornyatskiy ORS in January‐February did not buy out fish ‐ 135 centners, sugar ‐ 8 tons, vegetable oil ‐ 800 kg; meanwhile, in February ‐ early March, he bought wine for 90 thousand rubles. Prepared meat with the calculation of the sale of 3 rubles. 81 kopecks [per] kg was sold to them [for] 6 rubles. 50 kopecks Deputy
With the reduction of the contingents supplied by a number of mining administrations, there were serious shortcomings in terms of the shortage of food cards to persons entitled to receive. At the mine [named after] Petrovsky, the executive in charge of issuing the cards Ignatiev refused to whom he was entitled to and issued at his own discretion.
In Taganrog, as a result of contamination of the composition of procurers at factories No. 65, Trubostal, and Boiler, selfprocurement was actually disrupted.
ORS of plant No. 65 has a financial gap of 295 thousand rubles, discredited the mobilization of funds, not having bought an advance payment in due time. The apparatus of this ORS is excessively swollen, clogged. The turnover of most stores is equal to their monthly consumption. Losses for January‐February reach 70 thousand rubles. The stock of slow‐moving goods is 97,500 rubles. Waste and theft in the amount of 92 thousand rubles were revealed in shops. No action was taken against the embezzlers.
As of March 25, the OPC has overdue loans of 50 thousand rubles, unpaid accounts ‐ 120 thousand [rubles], share debt ‐ 100 thousand [rubles]. The contract correspondent of OPC is under the threat of arrest. Suppliers stopped shipping goods to OPC.
As a result of the criminally negligent attitude of the employees of the OPC, the ransom of the incoming is disrupted in a centralized manner. The winter season was disrupted for lack of funds, the spring one was under threat of failure. Fishing artels organized at the enterprises caught a large amount of fish, which the ORS, the air defense missile system left on the ice in the sea, were not transported until the entire catch was destroyed by the storm.
A sample survey revealed significant contamination of a number of
Taganrog enterprises, supply‐cooperative organizations and canteens. 155 people were arrested. In Rostov, 170 people have been arrested since January for stealing food.
The lack of nutrition for workers in a number of key enterprises is exacerbated by significant wage delays. Sevkavugol Trust has a debt for the second half of February of about one and a half million rubles. In Taganrog, five factories since March 15 have wage arrears of over two million rubles.
In addition, the increase in prices on the market is seriously affected by the reduction in the supply from the village. Surrogates are widespread on the market. In Rostov, in this regard, on March 27, 22 people were poisoned (donuts were bought, which turned out to be from grains that emit hydrocyanic acid). 2 people were arrested, an investigation is underway.
Due to the food difficulties that occur among workers (especially multi‐family, unskilled workers), with the intensified provocation of hunger by the kulak‐White Guard elements, a sharp decline in production discipline and labor productivity is observed in places.
In a number of mines, the following statements from workers are recorded: “Our lava on March 20 gave 60 cars instead of 90. There is no point in working hard. The stomach let down. ʺ At mine No. 15 of the Boguraevskaya group, over 20 workers, not fulfilling the norms, declared that they were unable to work, citing [this] with a decline in strength.
Long absenteeism is noted in a number of enterprises. In Taganrog, in some enterprises (Trubostal, Krasny Gidropress) 15‐20% of workers do not go to work every day.
Facts of deliberate absenteeism are noted. At the mine [named after] Petrovsky, on March 15, the skate‐packer Savenkov and the cuttercutter Popov did not go to work, declaring after their dismissal: ʺWe were trying to get a payment.ʺ According to the Sevkavugol trust, in the first ten days of February, 590 absenteeism were counted, 503 people were dismissed, in the second ten days of March,
absenteeism ‐ 608, and 551 were dismissed.
In a number of cities (Krasnodar, Taganrog, Rostov, Shakhty, etc.), there are cases of swelling of individual workers. In Krasnodar, Taganrog, there were a number of cases when workers fell from exhaustion while working, and when they were sent to a hospital, they died. In Taganrog, 7 large enterprises in 7 large enterprises during the period from 10 to 14 March [in] the factory health posts asked for medical assistance due to malnutrition of 299 workers, incl. qualified ‐ 142.
Significant typhoid infections occur in a number of cities. In all cities, provocative rumors ʺabout widespread hungerʺ and ʺcorpses in the streetsʺ are spreading. A wandering element in cities, workersʹ settlements, kulak‐White Guard elements who have infiltrated production, are leading the vicious c.‐r. agitation. At individual enterprises, white element groups are revealed. At the mine ʺProletarian Dictatorshipʺ, the administration of which is listed on the board of shame, where the industrial financial plan has not been carried out over the past year and until recently, our bodies have arrested 58 kulaks, former whites, contractors, etc. this year alone. 174 people were dismissed.
In a number of mines, the groupingʹs contractors were opened. At the mine [named after] Petrovsky, one candidate ‐ r. a group led by the head of the accounting desk, a former butcher, along with Ph.D. engaged in agitation in fabricating documents for dismissed truants, disorganizers; another K.‐R. a group led by a White Guard, the former chairman of the Stansoviet, hid fugitive kulaks by giving them forged documents.
The main motives of Ph.D. production agitation:
“The communists themselves eat meat, the workers are strangled with hunger”, “There is nothing to eat, death is approaching”, “They will bring it to a strike, there is no other way out”, “They did not remember about bread under the Whites, we don’t have to endure, be silent, we still die, we must take butts to beat the heads of the leaders, until they are completely starved. ʺ
In large cities, a significant number of anonymous letters posted on the streets are found, sent by mail to the center, to the addresses of the local leadership, anonymous letters are often pogrom‐insurgent content.
The revival of the remnants of the former political parties, Trotskyist elements is noted. At the mine [named after] Petrovsky, an uncovered Socialist‐Revolutionary‐Menshevik group was agitating among the workers for aggressive actions. The members of the group opposed the timely payment of salaries.
In the combine shop RSM K.‐R. The Trotskyist group set itself the task of ʺorganized protection of its interestsʺ, having achieved the appointment of its candidate as a trade union leader at the Krasny Gidropress plant. K.‐r. a group of 17 people, led by a minus‐member Menshevik and a party member, a former white bandit, inciting a strike mood, took measures to communicate with the countryside and obtain weapons.
On the part of individual members of the party, cases of K.R. manifestations aimed at discrediting the leadership of the partyʹs policy. In addition, a significant K.‐R. some of the students are active.
Through our bodies, along with the strengthening of operational measures on the counter‐revolutionary element that has penetrated into the supply cooperative apparatus, in order to combat theft, is being examined in unfavorable places of this apparatus.
Evdokimov
F. 2. Op. 11.D. 7.L. 372‐377. Certified copy .
Special certificate of the SPO OGPU on wage arrears to workers in industrial enterprises, as of April 15, 1933.
Archive: F. 2. Op. 11.D. 34.L. 153‐154. Certified copy
April 17, 1933, No. 146389
Top secret
For NVK for 2 weeks (from 10 to 22 March) the debt increased from 23,598 thousand to 29,850 thousand rubles. At the Krasny Oktyabr plant, the debt as of March 22 was 677 thousand rubles. At the plant ʺBarricadesʺ workers were not paid 585 thousand rubles. The combine plant has not liquidated a debt in the amount of 544 thousand rubles. Wage arrears in the fishing industry ‐ 1,571 thousand rubles. and the cement industry ‐ 1,096 thousand rubles. Due to a long delay in wages, a Rybtrest worker Kazakov committed suicide. Kazakov did not receive a salary for 4 months. The case is under investigation.
For VSK at the Yuzhno‐Pokrovsky mine of the AleksandroZavodskoy region, the debt is expressed in the amount of 230 thousand rubles. The workers have not received their wages for 5 months. Groups of workers come to the office every day and demand money. At the Lenskoye mine in Bodaibo, the indebtedness to the workers is 250 thousand rubles. Part of the workers cannot buy food rations. Among some workers, conversations were noted: ʺIf this continues, then we will have to run away from production, and so the workers do not have enough rations, and then they don’t give out unhappy wages.ʺ
According to the ZSK, the debt to the workers of the Locomotive Repair Plant. Rudzutaka (Omsk) on March 15 was 841 thousand rubles. Due to the delay in wages, absenteeism increased and labor productivity fell. In the first ten days of March, the plant produced 1 instead of 10 steam locomotives, instead of 200 freight cars ‐ 135.
In Bashkiria, the salary arrears of the Beloretsk group of factories reached 1,043,600 rubles, including 138,600 rubles for the Tirlyansky sheet‐rolling plant, 220 thousand rubles for the Steel‐wire plant, and 625 thousand rubles for the Metallurgical plant.
According to Tsvetmetzoloto, the salaries of many workers have not been issued since December, the debt as of March 1 is 736 thousand rubles.
At the Zinovievsky plant, workers, after working 2‐3 hours a day, leave, declaring that they are not able to work any longer, because severely emaciated.
According to the West [adnoy] region. wage arrears of workers in the amount of 17 million rubles have not been eliminated. For the plant ʺKr [asny] Profinternʺ ‐ 1 220 thousand rubles.
As of March 1, arrears in the Transcaucasus for the enterprises of Armenia amounted to 1,500 thousand rubles, of which 420 thousand rubles for the enterprises of the Peopleʹs Commissariat for Heavy Industry.
Over the last decade of February and March, 12 strikes with 720 participants were registered due to salary delays:
1.LVO ‐ 3 strikes ‐ 270 participants;
2. on NVK ‐ 3 strikes ‐ 80 participants;
3. VSK ‐ 3 strikes ‐ 220 participants;
4. in Central Asia ‐ 1 strike ‐ 60 participants;
5. in the Western region. ‐ 1 strike ‐ 50 participants;
6. across the DCK ‐ 1 strike ‐ 40 participants.
At the plant them. Egorov in Leningrad on March 26, 80 construction workers went on strike, due to non‐payment of wages for February and the first half of March. They started work after promising to pay the salary the next day. The initiator of the strike is the collective farmer Sokolov.
In Soyuzvodstroy in the Volkhov region on March 19, 90 workers did not go to work, on March 23 ‐ 100 workers. At the sawmill of the Beloberezhsky timber industry t [ovarishchest] va of the Bryansk region of the West [adnoy] region. 47 workers went on strike because of delayed wages. The initiators are a group of 5 workers who have recently arrived from the village. At the Hammer and Sickle plant in Kharkov, Ukrainian SSR, worker Kud, having gathered a group of workers on March 22, provoked them to a strike action: “How long will we sit hungry. We must quit work and take the director by the throat. ʺ As a result, 20 workers at the end of their work came to the administration demanding money. Kud appealed to these workers with an appeal not to start work. On March 25, workers were given their wages for February.
At the Nizhnetroitsk cloth factory in Bashkiria, worker Petrov declared in a group: “We are sheep, because the Bolsheviks will bend us wherever they want. We will be silent ‐ they will take us to the grave. Therefore, it is not too late, while there is still strength, to act in an organized manner for everyone and demand an improvement in their financial situation. Silence is enough. We give a reason to mock us. It is necessary to throw off the yoke of the Bolsheviks. ʺ
Head of SPO OGPU Molchanov
Head of the 6th branch of the SPO OGPU
Korkin
Correct: Assistant Secretary of the OGPU STR
Svetlov
Dispatched:
1) Menzhinsky; 2) Berry; 3) Prokofiev; 4) Agranov.
F. 2. Op. 11.D. 34.L. 153‐154. Certified copy .
Ukrainian SSR special certificate of SPO OGPU on shortcomings in food supply and public catering of industrial enterprises. May 11, 1933
Archive: F. 2. Op. 11.D. 42.L. 133‐135. Certified copy
May 11, 1933, No. 147948, Top secret
Donetsk region. Workers of mine No. 6 ʺKrasnaya Zvezdaʺ of the Budyonovsky R [udo] at [the board] did not receive any products in the first half of April. Similarly, the situation at mine No. 2/7 ʺLidievkaʺ r [udo] at the [board] of ʺKomsomolets Ukrainyʺ; at this mine, due to untimely delivery, bread is dispensed with great interruptions. There have been cases when workers descend into the mine without bread.
At mine No. 4/5 ʺProvidenceʺ in the dining room No. 44, portions have been reduced from 100 g to 300 g. the dining room replies: “What you give, then eat. There is nothing to pamper you, say thank you for giving you food at all. ʺ Head the dining room was prosecuted.
Kharkov region. The issuance of rationed products for April to workers at Kharkov enterprises was delayed until the end of April. Workers at a number of small metal factories ‐ ʺMekhanolitʺ, ʺPistonʺ, ʺRemmashtrestʺ ‐ were not given March rations until the middle of April. At the Kharkov Tractor Plant in March and the first half of April, there were almost no products from decentralized procurement. The quality of the meals deteriorated sharply. For squandering and systematic theft of highly scarce products ‐ sugar, butter, cereals, etc. ‐ 9 people were arrested. An investigation is underway.
Odessa region In April, workers of Odessa enterprises were given food rations for March at reduced rates due to the use of part of the products from workers rations for public catering. There are no products in the working canteens due to the failure to fulfill the plan of decentralized procurement by the Gorkoopharch trust. The products purchased by canteens on the market increase the cost of dinners, which, moreover, are of poor quality.
Kiev oblast. In Kiev, 240 tons of bread are sold daily at commercial prices. Market prices for bread fell from 10‐12 rubles. up to 5‐6 rubles. per kilo. A large influx of peasants from Umansky and Belotserkovsky districts was noted.
For two decades of April, over 1,500 cases of diseases and swelling due to malnutrition were registered in 4 regions.
Across the Odessa region. 1405 cases were taken into account, of which:
for 16 enterprises in Odessa
766 cases
in Zinovievsk
305 cases
in Nikolaev
216 cases
in Kherson
70 cases
in Pervomaisk
48 cases
In the Chernihiv region. in Priluki 91 cases of swelling were recorded. 4 workers in a makhorka factory died of malnutrition.
In the Donetsk region. at Donbassnabstroy 18 cases of swelling were registered.
Here are some facts that illustrate the financial situation of the multifamily and low‐paid categories of workers at the plant. Rykov.
Turner Mashchenko, who has been working at the plant since 1925, has 3 dependents. From the March earnings 126 rubles. 66 kopecks after deductions received 94 rubles. 14 kopecks Due to the failure to receive a significant part of the food relying on the norm, Mashenko and his family ate exclusively on soup and tea. Sells household items. Over the past 4 months, I have sold a mid‐season coat, my wifeʹs dress, a wardrobe, etc.
Worker Babin has 5 dependents and received two ration cards. Earnings 80 rubles. per month. Babin sends the children to the canteens every day to ask for bread. Often he himself is engaged in begging. Babin states: ʺIf the children did not bring alms every day, the family would have long ago died of hunger.ʺ
The best drummer of the Solomchenko plant makes an average of 100 rubles. per month, has a dependent wife and 2
children. Swelling from malnutrition.
In April, according to incomplete data, due to food difficulties, 3 strikes with 88 participants were registered at enterprises in Donbass, and individual group actions of workers demanding improved supplies were noted.
A group of lamellar workers at mine No. 10 ʺProhodkaʺ in Petrovsky district [board] submitted a statement to the mine committee as follows: “We ask the mine committee to equate us with coal workers. If this is not done, we will submit everything for calculation, or let us all be transferred to the slaughterhouse. ʺ The statement was signed by 26 workers. The initiator was the woodworker Sokolov.
At mine No. 8 ʺChulkovkaʺ of the Budyonovsky district, a number of workersʹ dependents have been removed from the supply despite a significant number of reserve ration cards. On this basis, groups of workersʹ wives with children appeared in the mine and threatened, if they were not accepted for supply, to force their husbands to stop working in the mine.
Head of the SPO OGPU Molchanov, Head of the 6th branch of the
SPO OGPU Korkin
Correct: Assist. Secretary of the OGPU SPO Svetlov
Dispatched: 1) Menzhinsky; 2) Berry; 3) Prokofiev; 4) Agranov; 5‐6) in the case and in the department.
F. 2. Op. 11.D. 42.L. 133‐135. Certified copy .
OGPU memo on the situation in the oil industry. May 15, 1933
Archive: F. 2. Op. 11.D. 1365.L. 37‐45. Certified copy
May 15, 1933, No. 50279
Top secret
Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) t. Stalin
As a result of the undercover development, the OGPU was opened and liquidated K.‐R. sabotage sabotage and espionage organization in the oil industry, acting on the orders of Deterding. As of May 7, 1933, the OGPU arrested in Moscow, Baku, Grozny, IvanovoVoznesensk, Samara, 273 workers in the oil industry and the Oil Trade System, of which 30 were engineers, 26 other specialists, foremen and workers from the former kulaks and the White Guard element ‐ 217.
In terms of their social composition, members of the candidate ‐ r. organizations belong to former members of joint‐stock companies, large old‐timers of pre‐war oil firms ‐ former Nobel and others, former Mensheviks, officers of the Tsarist and White armies, active participants in the Civil War on the side of the Whites, and also kulaks.
K.‐r. the organization had a wide ʺlower ranksʺ consisting of kulak and White Guard elements who penetrated into the fields as foremen and workers and directly carried out acts of sabotage under the leadership of engineers‐members of the c. organizations. This circumstance sharply distinguishes the opened K.‐R. organization from liquidated in 1930, carrying out sabotage, mainly in planning organizations.
According to the testimony of the leaders of the organization Soroker and Neiman (arrested), as well as other members of the c. organizations, from Deterding direct instructions were received to focus sabotage and sabotage work directly on production to disrupt oil production (see Appendix No. 1).
Intentional damage to wells
It has been documented that during 1932 ‐ the period of extensive work by K.‐R. organizations in Grozneft and Azneft ‐ there is a sharp increase in drilling accidents. So, for example, in 1932, over 670 accidents took place in Grozneft, which led to a sharp reduction in the already insignificant pace of drilling operations: more than 70% of all deep wells in Grozneft are in a state of accidents or have been completely eliminated (see Appendix No. 2 ). According to Azneft, 118 wells were to be commissioned in 1932, in fact, only 67 wells were completed.
The pests, knowing that drilling into deep seams was being mastered for the first time in the oil industry of the Union, took all possible measures to make the existing development difficulties in every possible way deepen and disrupt the work. The testimonies of the leaders of the candidate ‐ r. organizations of Neiman and Soroker, members of the organization Pelevin, Protsikov (arrested) and a number of others, it was established that, on the instructions of Neumann and Soroker, sabotage groups of foremen and workers, formerly. kulaks carried out accidents on drilling rigs on a large scale by deliberately damaging various metal objects in the wells, which led to the stoppage of drilling operations, the need to ʺcatchʺ the thrown tool into the wells at a great depth, and sometimes to completely abandon the well (see Appendix No. 1, 2).
The PP of the OGPU for the JCC and the PP of the OGPU of Transcaucasia liquidated 6 sabotage groups in Grozny and Baku, which operated under the direct leadership in Grozny of a member of the Grozny k.‐r. the organization of chief engineer Brudnitsky and engineer [engineer] Heinshthorn, in Baku ‐ engineer [engineer] Azneft Arutyunyants and engineer [engineer] Wagenheim.
The initiated investigation established widespread sabotage activities of the ʺnizovkaʺ, which led to very serious consequences for the work of Grozneft.
This wellbore spoilage and outage is particularly widespread in deep drilling. So, it was established that a member of the candidate‐
r. sabotage organization drilling foreman Smoking on the direct instructions of the pest ‐ Art. Drilling Rationalization Engineer, Azneft Wagenheim, carried out 10 acts of sabotage in the Leninsky area of drilling No. 245 during two months of 1932, as a result of which the wells were not put into operation.
The members of the sabotage group are the drilling foreman Yakutovich and his assistant Melnik, on the instructions of Wagenheim in a number of deep‐drilling wells in the area named after Ordzhonikidze carried out 12 acts of sabotage in 1932, as a result of which only one of 16 wells started by drilling before 1932 was completed by drilling to the design depth.
Members of Ph.D. Organizations of foremen Tkachenko and Andreev, on the instructions of the wrecker engineer Dashevsky, committed a sabotage act in deep well No. 12 (Grozny district), which had been drilled for several years, as a result of which the well was out of order.
Member of Ph.D. In early 1932, the key‐keeper Khubetsov, on the instructions of engineer Gander, left the tool in well No. 2 Kharabizhi of the Malgobek area at a depth of 1521 m, as a result of which work on the well was still suspended due to the continuing fishing of the tool.
The investigation established a large number of acts of direct damage to wells by sabotage groups. In addition to the direct physical destruction of boreholes, the organization carried out Ph.D. sabotage work in the fields in the form of producing deliberately incorrect well designs that did not reach the design capacity and were buried in the rocks (see Appendix No. 1). The drilling rigs were supplied with obviously poor clay mud, which led to tool seizure, pipe breakage and accidents. Correct and accurate marking of drill pipes from different factories and different delivery times was torn off in operation, as a result of which the pipes in warehouses were mixed and in operation often broke during drilling in the well (see Appendix 1).
Harmful work in the field of kerosene quality
Harmful work of Ph.D. organizations in the field of deterioration of the quality of petroleum products, primarily kerosene, which was used for the needs of the tractor economy, pursued the immediate goal of disrupting the spring sowing campaign of 1933 by massively disabling tractors and disorganizing the countryʹs motor transport.
The sabotage in this area was expressed in the fact that the members of the organization under the flag of the need to increase the countryʹs kerosene resources in 1933 carried out the development in Grozny of the so‐called deteriorated in its qualities. ʺLightingʺ (boiling point 340 ° C) kerosene, which, when powered by tractors, leads to increased carbon deposits inside the engine, engine damage and their failure (see Appendix No. 1.2). According to Neftetorg, a total of over 110 thousand tons of lighting kerosene was produced, sent to supply tractors to the North Caucasus (almost completely), partly to the Urals, Siberia and other regions (see Appendix No. 2).
The testimony of the members of the Ph.D. organizations of Neiman, Murzanov, Bondarevsky (arrested) and others [ugikh] it is established that members of the candidate‐r. organizations working in the system of Neftetorg, Murzanov, Gurvich, Piotrovsky, Tversky (all arrested), deliberately sent lighting kerosene to the indicated areas to supply the tractor economy (see Appendix No. 1). During the shipment of kerosene, the documents did not indicate the name of the lighting kerosene, as a result of which consumers ‐ MTS and state farms ‐ accepted it as a full‐fledged tractor fuel (see Appendix No. 1).
The saboteurs from Neftetorg carried out their sabotage work without any particular difficulty, due to the fact that the communists ‐ the leaders of the Neftetorg were cut off from the operational activities of Neftetorg, which is confirmed by the testimony of the deputy. Head of the Office of Comrade Sirota, Comrade Sirota indicates that for two months ‐ January and February 1933 ‐ he did not know that Grozneft was supplying the Oil Company with deteriorated quality kerosene ‐ lighting, with a boiling end of 340 ° C, and therefore authorized its distribution for the tractor fleet (see
Appendix No. 1).
Wrecking on Baku kerosene
During the navigation of 1932, members of the organization Neman and Kupriyanov made an order through the Oil Sector to accept from Azneft the so‐called. ʺKerosene distillateʺ, which is a semifinished product of kerosene, to a large extent it is completely unsuitable in its pure form for tractors due to its high acidity. The distillate was brought to the Volga bases (Stalingrad, Saratov, Samara, etc.) and in 1933, a member of the organization Gurvich was sent to Siberia for the spring sowing campaign (supply of tractors).
Members of the organization Gurvich and Vyshetravsky deliberately did not conduct official tests of the quality of the distillate and its suitability for tractors, did not organize its mixing to correct the quality (see Appendix No. 2).
The use of distillate with high acidity in tractors leads to corrosion of the metal parts of the engine and its damage, failure, and therefore even more dangerous than the use of Grozny lighting kerosene (see Appendix No. 2). Neumann shows that the destructive act with the Baku distillate was carried out as a result of a special agreement that existed between Neman, Kupriyanov, Tverskoy, Gurvich, Vyshetravsky and other members of K.‐
R. organizations that worked in Azneft (see Appendix No. 1).
Wrecking in the field of car production
The sabotage in this area was expressed in the release of uncleaned autols. In order to deteriorate the quality of these autotols, the members of the organization carried out mixing cylinder distillates with crude and unleached engine oil distillates. This led to the increase in acidity and resin content in the autols, which made them unsuitable for tractors. Such autolas by members of the c. Soyuzneftetorg organizations were sent to tractor users. The use of autotols with high acidity and resin content in tractors led to rapid carbon formation in motors, corroded parts and led to rapid wear and tear and failure.
Head of Ph.D. organization Neumann shows that the release of deliberately low‐quality autolows was facilitated by the fact that the tractor users did not have a device for quality control and only in the process of work established their unsuitability (see Appendix No. 1).
Harmfulness in the standards for petroleum products
Members of Ph.D. organizations have carried out such standards for the quality of motor fuel and gasoline, under which oil products, even formally meeting the standard, are essentially unsuitable. So, for example, in the standard for motor fuel there is no definition of the required coke content, which made it possible to deliver other petroleum products under the guise of motor fuel (see Appendix No. 2).
In the standard for cracked gasoline, the boiling point is set at 225 ° C, which impairs the operation of machines and causes increased fuel consumption (see Appendix No. 2), etc. Indeed, even these defective standards were not always met (see Appendix No. 2). On these issues, the members of the candidate‐r. organizations Neiman, Murzanov, Kupriyanov show that the implementation of wrecking standards was possible due to the fact that the head of the standard commission of the Oil Sector Davydov was a member of the candidate‐r. organizations (see Appendix No. 1). It is especially necessary to emphasize that the cited acts of sabotage in terms of quality represent only a part of all sabotage work carried out in this area.
Wrecking in the Oil Trade System
The most important site of the complex. of the organizationʹs sabotage work was the Oil Trade system. The sabotage in the Neftetorg system was carried out by the cell of the c. organization in Neftetorg, headed by a member of the candidate ‐ r. organization Gurvich. K.‐r. the cell had an extensive network of participants in the peripheral office of Neftetorg. Currently installed and eliminated K.‐R. cells in the branches of Neftetorg in Yaroslavl, in Ivanovo‐Voznesensk, on the Middle Volga and in other areas. The destructive work carried out in the Neftetorg system was expressed in the deliberately incorrect delivery of oil products, deliberate deterioration of the quality of oil products through unsatisfactory storage, etc.
Time of occurrence to.‐r. organization
K.‐r. a sabotage organization in the oil industry arose in 1931 under the directives of Deterding Kogan, the former owner of the Petrol oil company in Baku, now living in Berlin.
Links with the British Embassy
Contact with Kogan was established by Neman through the secretary of the British Embassy in Moscow, Bolton, known to the OGPU as an active worker of British intelligence on the territory of the Union. K.‐r. the organization had an extensive network of participants in all major bodies of the oil industry and distribution system: the oil sector of the NKTP, Neftetorg, the Neftezavody Trust, Azneft, Grozneft, Mainft, Embaneft, Vostokneft, Nefteexport and the Research Institute of the Oil Industry.
Financing
K.‐r. the organization was widely financed by Deterding, who sent large sums of money to its leaders for distribution among the members of the candidate‐r. work. On Deterdingʹs assignments, the organization carried out on a large scale economic, political and military espionage, with its immediate task of penetrating the most secret areas of the oil industry and the supply of oil products to the army and navy. The investigation continues.
Deputy OGPU Chairman Prokofiev
Head of ECU OGPU Mironov
F. 2. Op. 11.D. 1365.L. 37‐45. Certified copy.
A special summary of the OGPU STR on the delay in wages to workers, as of May 5, 1933 May 17, 1933
Archive: F. 2. Op. 11.D. 37.L. 334‐337. Certified copy
May 17, 1933, No. 147743
Top secret
Ukrainian SSR
In the Donetsk region. in April the debt to the workers was 30 million rubles, of which: for coal ‐ 12 million rubles; [for] metal ‐ 8 million rubles; [for] construction ‐ 10 million rubles.
In the Dnepropetrovsk region. indebtedness ‐ 15 million rubles, of which the enterprises of the city of Dnepropetrovsk ‐ 6 million rubles.
In the Odessa region. the debt, which amounted to 13 million 207 thousand rubles as of April 1, increased to 25 million 325 thousand rubles by April 17, for enterprises in Odessa ‐ 12 million rubles. The Odessa machine‐tool plant is in a particularly difficult situation, where the workersʹ debts for the second half of February in the amount of 344 thousand rubles have not been liquidated, and the plant named after October Revolution, where workers were not paid wages for February and March in the amount of 350 thousand rubles.
Debts at the Nikolaev Plant named after Marty ‐ 624 thousand rubles. and at the Zinovievsky plant ʺKrasnaya Zvezdaʺ ‐ 748 thousand rubles.
Western region
Partially reduced debt in the region from 17 million as of March 1 to 12 million rubles. on April 10 to April 21 increased again. The amount of debt overdue for more than 15 days increased in April from 6 million rubles. up to 7 million rubles. At the Zhizdrinsky, Karachevsky scuttle plant, the Kommunar transport plant, the Kamensk stationery factory, etc., the wages were not paid in full for 2‐3 months. For 8 factories of the Dyatkovo district, the debt as of
April 21 was 722 thousand rubles.
CChO
As of April, the regionʹs debt was 22 million 166 thousand rubles. At the Locomotive Repair Plant. Dzerzhinsky, the debt in the amount of up to 800 thousand rubles was not liquidated, in April the debt was repaid by 50%; at aircraft factories No. 16 and 18, the debt is 400 thousand rubles.
Delay in wages was also noted in Moscow ‐ “SVARZ” factory, 2nd watch factory, MCh‐4 Metrostroy; in Leningrad ‐ head [od] named after Marty, im. Kirov and them. Rykov; for NPO ‐ Melange Combine, PM, Torfmash, Metal Plant, Vtorovskiye Peat Razrabotki, Znamya Truda f [abri] ka Znamya Truda, Krasny Plywoodnik,
Smychka timber mill.
Overstocking of finished goods and non‐payment of invoices to customers
In Leningrad, 900 workers of the Shoe Factory ʺUdarnikʺ were delayed their wages for the first half of March. The reason for the delay is the overstocking of finished products by 400 thousand rubles. At the Lenpromet plant, workers owed 72 thousand rubles. The warehouses have stocked products worth 75 thousand rubles.
In the Central Black Earth District, workers of the Machine Plant are not paid wages for two months. In the warehouses of the plant there is a significant amount of finished products, semi‐finished products ‐ 50 pcs. gullers, mill hoists, etc.
At NPO Metal Plant No. 4, about 10 enterprises owe about 700 thousand rubles. A number of enterprises did not pay over 400 thousand rubles to Torfmash.
In the Western region. the amount owed to the Lyudinovskiy machine‐building plant for one shipped product alone is 1 million 500 thousand rubles; for ferrous metallurgy enterprises ‐ 650 thousand rubles. Despite the fact that the plant has more than a million arbitration awards and notaries, the debtors do not pay the debt. Due to the delay in wages for the last ten days of March and the first half of April, according to incomplete data, 6 strikes with 280 participants were registered: Moscow region ‐ 2 strikes, West [adnaya] region. ‐ 2, LVO ‐ 1, SKK ‐ 1. Three collective applications were submitted demanding the immediate payment of wages, and individual group performances of workers were noted.
In Leningrad, 420 workers have not been paid wages for the construction of the Southern Waterworks since February 15. On April 3, a group of workers filed a collective application with a request to issue 5 rubles each. for dinners; the administration issued 50 kopecks each. Those responsible for the delay in wages were brought to justice.
At the Duminichi Cast Iron Foundry, West [adnoy] region. On April 20, 50 workers of the second shift of the foundry at the end of the work gathered at the entrance and demanded to call representatives of the factory committee and plant management. When the representatives who arrived announced that there was no money, some workers shouted: ʺIf you don’t pay your paychecks tomorrow, then the day after tomorrow we will not go to work, consider our act as you wish, let it be an Italian strike — it makes no difference to us.ʺ
At the Znamya Truda factory in the NGO, a group of workers ‐ 8 people ‐ came to the administration and submitted an application with the following content: “We hereby declare that, due to the delay in wages for transporting firewood from the shore to the stoker and to the warehouses, we, the carters, do not we can. Fast action is needed to get the money back, or we and our families are doomed to starvation, the consequences of which you know. Therefore, we ask you to put firewood in the stoker of your horses, because we and our horses are hungry, we cannot work. ʺ
In the Builder Trust in Moscow, workers are delayed in March wages in the amount of up to 35 thousand rubles. Due to the delay in wages, 244 workers left the construction site and 115 absenteeism were registered.
A / c leaflet
At the Yartsevskaya textile factory in the Western region. On April 11, a leaflet signed by the ʺCouncil of the underground workersʺ was discovered. “Comrades workers and women workers of the Yartsevo factory, what do you expect from the Yartsevo opportunists? You donʹt get paid, but you work. We call on you to a general strike on April 16 in case of non‐payment of wages. ʺ
Head of SPO OGPU Molchanov
Head of the 6th branch of the SPO
Korkin
Dispatched:
1) Menzhinsky; 2) Berry; 3) Prokofiev; 4) Agranov; 5) Rudzutaku; 6)
Shvernik; 7) in the department.
F. 2. Op. 11.D. 37.L. 334‐337. Certified copy .
Special reference of SPO OGPU on shortcomings in food supply and public catering of industrial enterprises of the Ukrainian SSR. May 23, 1933
Archive: F. 2. Op. 11.D. 42.L. 142‐144. Certified copy
May 23, 1933, No. 148854
Top secret
On z [avo] de im. Kovalya (Stalin district) until April 30, no food cards were issued for 1,525 dependents. When the workers turned to the social welfare sector of the plant for an explanation, the employee of this sector Sosnin said: ʺWhy hurry so, we will give it out after May 1, but you will survive these days ‐ you will not die.ʺ After the measures taken, over 1000 food cards were issued.
At Stalinʹs z [avo] the May food cards were not re‐registered by the OPC, and the workers were asked to stamp them at the house administration. Since there were no seals in almost any house, working groups went to shop organizations, seeking the abolition of stamps. The issue was resolved by the City Council after the workers asked for assistance. In the Vinnitsa region. in the first ten days of May, there were sharp interruptions in the supply of workers with grain.
Disadvantages of catering
In the Odessa region. On z [avo] de im. During the October Revolution, due to the consumption of food on May Day and insufficient delivery of food by Koopharchem (no more than 30%), the quality of meals deteriorated sharply. There was a threat of disruption to public catering in May. Decentralized procurement is completely unsatisfactory.
On z [avo] de im. Starostina (ibid.), Due to the consumption of food on May Day, OPC buys food on the market. The calorie content of the meals decreased to 150 [kcal]. There are tendencies among workers to leave the plant.
In the Dnepropetrovsk region, due to the lack of outfits for May at the factories. Petrovsky, Lenin, Molotov, Voroshilov and the DZMO, the quality of meals has deteriorated. From April 14 to April 24, about 100 thousand dishes were prepared at the DZMO kitchen factory, from which over 17 thousand rubles were received. net profit (45% against 3% set by the government). The head of the ORS Stepanov was dismissed.
In the Kharkov region at the ʺHammer and Sickleʺ plant, without prior notice to the workers, coupons for bread for lunch were introduced. A stampede began in the queues for coupons. There were shouts: “As they want, they mock us. Pests and parasites have invaded and do not allow us to live. ʺ An order was given to cancel the coupon system.
At the KhTsZ, due to the lack of lunch coupons, the worker of the stamping shop called on to quit his job. Groups of workers categorically demanded the immediate issuance of coupons. Discontent was eliminated after all workers were satisfied with coupons.
In the Donetsk region. at the metal plant them. Ilyich in Mariupol, breakfasts are delivered to the workshops with a great delay; with the cost of breakfast 63 kopecks, checks are issued only at 45 kopecks, as a result of which workers are forced to buy two checks at 45 kopecks. or skip breakfast. In the plantʹs canteens, dishes and cutlery are washed in a dirty bucket. Employees of the public catering apparatus at the plant were brought to justice.
ODP clean‐up activities
In Donbass, 76 people were arrested, 151 people were fired, 57 people were penalized, and 17 people were expelled from the party. At Grishinsky mining administration, 15 kulaks were removed from the working supply apparatus.
In the Odessa region. 281 people were dismissed from work in the
ORS, SAM and Rabkoop and Sarabkoop *, of which 64 people were arrested and prosecuted, in particular in Odessa Sarabkoop for theft, self‐supply, etc. ‐ 18 and suspended from work 146 people.
At z [avo] de [them.] 61 [communard] in Nikolaev, out of those brought to justice for systematic abuse and disruption of work supplies, 13 workers of the ORS were sentenced to capital punishment, 4 people were sentenced to imprisonment for 10 years, 5 people were sentenced to terms from one and a half to 4 years.
On z [avo] de im. During the January Uprising (in Odessa), a mouse was found in the food. The investigation established that the mouse was thrown into the borscht by the cook Nevidomsky, who confessed that he was forced to do this under the threat of beating two young workers of the machine shop of the plant. During his work at the kitchen factory, Nevidomsky showed himself as a hooligan and a thief. The perpetrators are brought to justice.
In the Kharkov region. 55 people were dismissed according to the OPC of large enterprises. Of these, 26 people were put on trial. 4 managers were prosecuted for the ORS and three canteens of Harnarpit, incl. party member for embezzlement up to 25 thousand rubles.
In the Dnepropetrovsk region. at the Azov‐Black Sea plant in Berdyansk, the method of selling products to the private market through dummies was widely practiced. With the money raised, drinking parties were arranged at the apartment of a party member Petrikov. The factory committee was disbanded, the ZRK board was brought to trial, 10 people were arrested.
At the Kamensk metallurgical plant [avo] de im. Dzerzhinsky by a group of workers of the ORS, headed by the deputy. director, member of the party
Averin, they squandered acutely scarce goods intended to supply workers; the meat was illegally sold at commercial prices. There was no product accounting. The question of Averin was brought to the bureau of the regional committee, the rest of the participants in the embezzlement were brought to trial.
Head of the SPO OGPU Molchanov
Pom. head of the 6th department of the OGPU
Korkin SPO
Pom. Secretary of the OGPU SPO Svetlov
Dispatched:
1) Menzhinsky; 2) Berry; 3) Agranov; 4) Prokofiev; 5) in the case; 6) in the department.
F. 2. Op. 11.D. 42.L. 142‐144. Certified copy .
ʹSo, in the doc.
Special message from the OGPU about the reasons for the lag in the construction of the Baikal‐Amur railway. highways. May 26, 1933
May 26, 1933, No. 50316
Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) t. Stalin
Construction of the Baikal‐Amur railway. The main line was accepted by the OGPU from the NKPS in December 1932.
Insufficient reversal to this day of the main work is caused by the following:
1) By the time of the transfer, the NKPS not only did not have the project of the main line but did not even have the materials that could be used as the basis for the project.
2) The staffing of engineering and technical staff and manpower was produced in completely insufficient sizes and of poor quality.
3) Preparatory work was carried out scattered along the entire length of the highway, as a result of which the effect of the work was extremely insignificant at a very substantial cost (about 30 million rubles).
The OGPU, having accepted construction in this state, met at the very beginning, in addition, with the following complications:
1) Transport difficulties on the Zabaikalskaya and Ussuriyskaya railways. extremely complicated the delivery of prisoners and the provision of construction with food, fodder, uniforms, building materials and equipment. The goods sent to the BAM in NovemberDecember 1932 began to arrive for construction only in the last days of April.
2) Great difficulties with the placement of prisoners, due to the impossibility of quickly deploying the construction of barracks, tk. no timber was prepared for the barracks.
3) Staffing was carried out mainly through new replenishment from the house. The prisoners arrived at the construction site completely exhausted and unable to work. In addition, due to the non‐
observance of sanitary rules by the domzaks, prisoners infected with typhus were included in the stages.
The OGPU, upon accepting the construction, took the following measures:
1) In order to ensure the normal development of work, immediately upon acceptance of construction, the NKPS was requested to accelerate the drafting of the head section project. However, despite the fact that the OGPU was provided by the design organization NKPS with significant assistance, the project of the head section with a length of 185 km was approved only on April 11, 1933, and only 90 [km] were allowed for construction, and new surveys were assigned for the rest of the length, and the project will be given only by July 1, 1933.
The absence of a final design made it impossible to start the main work in the first quarter.
2) With regard to the transfer of manpower, the following stages were organized according to the military schedule, as a result of which the presence of echelons on the way was reduced from 60 to 30 days and below. Meals were arranged on the way and at major stopping points.
By June 1, the construction will have 40 thousand people. At the same time, 600 specialists and personnel of the OGPU were sent to the disposal of the construction.
3) During the first quarter of 1933, the construction involved logging and the construction of dwellings, warehouses, baths.
As for the construction needs for 1933 in materials for centralized supply, mechanical equipment, this need is provided by a government decree normally, but the assignment and shipment is significantly behind the approved plan. The brake is mainly railway. transport, because the norm of cars allocated by the service station does not ensure timely delivery.
With regard to mechanized vehicles, it is necessary to additionally allocate in the second quarter of this year. and urgently send for construction: 50 pcs. cars, 50 pcs. crawler tractors, 100 pcs. wheeled tractors. The need for additional allocation of mechanized vehicles is also due to the fact that the issued orders for horses for the BAM cannot be realized, because Despite the order of the Government, the Zapsib executive committee categorically prohibited the export of horses from the region.
At present, construction within the limits of the plan approved for 1933 has at its disposal both the project and all the resources necessary for the deployment of the main work.
Deputy OGPU Chairman Prokofiev
F. 2. On. 11.D. 502.L. 90‐90 rev. Copy .