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Transcripts from Soviet ArchivesVOLUME X -1930
I- Working Class
Memorandum INFO OGPU on the progress of the logging campaign in the Northern Territory (December 15, 1929)
January 4, 1930
No. 878972 Top secret
The deployment of logging in the Northern Territory is proceeding at a slow pace due to serious mistakes made by the main logging organizations.
There is a threat of disruption of the workpieces planned along the edge. Already, there has been a lack of fulfillment of the logging program.
Recruitment of the workforce
The organization of the recruitment of labor for logging operations is clearly unsatisfactory. Since the beginning of the campaign, recruitment areas have not been distributed among procurement organizations, which led to the lack of control, lack of planning and competition between procurement organizations. The recruitment was done hastily. Recruiters were recruited from a random element, resulting in a lot of contamination. The recruiters were not instructed, many did not know about the conditions of work in the organizations for which they recruited woodcutters (Komi region and Severodvinsk district). The unsatisfactory composition of recruiters and the lack of proper leadership both from the concerned economic agencies and the regional labor department in a number of cases led to a distortion of the class line during recruitment (refusals to hire poor people who do not have horses for logging ‐ the North Dvinsky District and the Komi Region). The contamination of the recruiting team had a negative impact on the implementation of the recruitment plan. In 5 districts of the Vologda Okrug, instead of 7091 people with 3492 horses scheduled for recruitment according to the plan, only 1740 loggers with 844 horses were recruited. In a number of cases, the work of recruiting was disrupted due to the drunkenness of the recruiters and their failure to appear at meetings of woodcutters convened by them for the purpose of mass recruitment.
Loggers leaving work
In fact, even 35% of recruited lumberjacks have not reached work recently. So, from the number of those recruited in the region as of December 1, in the amount of 124,358 people worked, 43,856 people, as of December 10, out of 147,715 recruited only 42,241 people worked. For 10 days in December, despite the increase in the number of recruits, the number of workers in the forest decreased. The main reasons for absenteeism are:
1) Lack of social and organizational and economic measures to consolidate the recruiting work carried out. There was no impact on the recruits. The khozorganis have relied entirely (and still rely) on chance. 2) Lack of preparation of the industrial farm and forest areas for the reception of lumberjacks and their everyday services. In the Nyandoma district and the Komi region, there are huts without windows and without bunks. Due to the lack of huts, lumberjacks are forced to spend the night in horse stalls. In the Volsk district, in one barrack there are up to 400 or more people. 1000 woodcutters are stationed in villages, 78 versts from the place of work. In the Arkhangelsk District, in huts with an area of 1 1/2 sq. soot. fits 15‐20 lumberjacks. There are no stoves in the huts on the Talishche River.
The supply of lumberjacks with food and basic necessities is completely unsettled.
Lumberjacks are forced to go for groceries 10‐12 miles away. Manufacturing awards are issued only at points located 20 kilometers from the place of work. There are no warm footcloths. The fact of obtaining childrenʹs boots for woodcutters is noted. All this happens when there is a sufficient number of required items in central databases, which, for formal reasons, do not send goods to forest areas (late receipt of invoices and orders, lack of information on prices, etc.).
Difficult living conditions cause lumberjacks to leave the forest. In the Arkhangelsk District, the number of employees for the period from December 1 to December 10 decreased by more than 1,000 people. In the Nyandoma district, 3500 people left their jobs during the same period. Lumberjack groups refuse to go to work until they have firm guarantees of a regular food supply.
Particularly noteworthy is the fact of non‐entry to work and the device of a brawl on the part of the members of the Yaroslavl shock brigade of youth (360 people), which arrived at the disposal of the 1st section of the TLO st. Obozerskaya. Some of the most hooligan drummers were arrested.
Anti‐Soviet element activity
Errors in organizing the logging campaign are widely used by the kulaks. 1 There is open campaigning aimed at disrupting the procurement (for refusing to recruit, for absenteeism, for leaving work, for making exorbitant demands in the area of payment and supply). The statements of the kulaks about the need to disrupt the blanks in order to create difficulties for the Soviet power are noted, and cases of individual processing of the poor and middle peasants by the kulaks at home are noted. It should be noted that in a number of cases, the removal of agitator‐kulaks from villages facilitates the exit of lumberjacks into the forest.
Clogging of the logging machine
There is a significant contamination of the lower logging apparatus by an alien anti‐Soviet (former policemen, former white officers, kulaks) and an element that has compromised itself at last yearʹs logging. The presence of an alien element in the apparatus led to the contamination of the alien element and the composition of ordinary lumberjacks. There were cases of the presence of up to 50% of disenfranchised kulaks 2 and former merchants in artels headed by elders‐kulaks.
The alien element continues to remain at work, despite the categorical instructions to withdraw from the party and Soviet leading organizations. Persons subject to removal in [1] and 2 categories 3 as a result of the purge (Komi region and Severo‐Dvinsky district) continue to remain at work.
Assistant Head of INFO OGPU Zaporozhets
Head of Division 2 Grosman
The memo is sent to:
1) Berry; 2) Messing; 3) Evdokimov; 4) Artuzov; 5) Prokofiev (EKU); 6) Agranov; 7) Tovstukha (for Comrade Stalin); 8) Kaganovich; 9) Molotov; 10) Ordzhonikidze; 11) Rykov; 12) Mikoyan; 13) Syrtsov; 14)
Uglanov; 15) Romanov; 16) Dogadov; 17) Maltsev; 18) In business; 19) In the department.
society was not closed before the kulak. He had the right to join agricultural cooperatives of all types (including collective farms) with one limitation: the kulaks could not act as founders of cooperatives and be elected to their boards. Under the conditions of the NEP, the growth of kulak farms took place. There were about 900 thousand of them in 1927 (3, 9% of the total number of peasant farms) ‐ this is the maximum number in the post‐revolutionary period. However, this process was under very strict control of the state, which pursued a policy of restricting the kulaks. In 1928‐1929. there was a rapid decline in the number of farms of the kulak type. This was the result of extraordinary measures in grain procurement, confiscation of grain reserves and part of the means of production from the kulaks. Many of them were convicted on speculation charges. The seizure of land surpluses carried out in 1928‐1929, the compulsory purchase of tractors and complex machines, the reduction and then the termination of lending and the supply of means of production, the strengthening of the tax press ‐ all this also undermined the economic and political positions of the kulak. The imposition of an individual taxation that seized the entire annual income, and often in excess of it, directly ruined these farms. The curtailment of production in them began, the sale of livestock and implements, agricultural machines. Kulak families moved to cities and went to industrial construction sites. The share of kulak farms in the RSFSR decreased from 3.9% in 1927 to 2.2% in 1929, in Ukraine ‐ from 3.8 to 1.4%. Farms of the kulak type in 1929 numbered less than 700 thousand. According to the decree of the Council of Peopleʹs Commissars of the USSR ʺOn the signs of kulak farms, to which the Code of Labor Laws should applyʺ dated May 21, 1929, the characteristics of kulak farms were as follows: systematic use of hired labor, with the exception of those cases when, according to the legislation on elections to councils, the use of hired labor did not entail deprivation of voting rights; the presence of a mill, a churn, a grinder, a grain, a wave heeder, wool, a grater, a potato, fruit or vegetable dryer or other industrial enterprises, the use of a mechanical engine, as well as if the farm had a water or windmill with two or more supplies; systematic leasing of complex agricultural machinery with a mechanical engine; renting out permanently or seasonally separate equipped premises for housing or businesses; engaging in trade, usury, commercial intermediation or other unearned income (including worshipers). The Council of Peopleʹs Commissars of the Union republics and the regional (regional) executive committees were given the right to modify these signs depending on local conditions. The Labor Code was fully applied to farms falling under at least one of these criteria, with an income of more than 300 rubles. per consumer, but not less than 1500 rubles. on the farm (SZ USSR. 1929. No. 34. Art. 301). From the middle of 1929, a ban was imposed on the admission of kulak families to collective farms, which further separated and opposed them to the entire peasantry. At the end of 1929, the policy of limiting the kulak developed into a policy of destroying it as a class. For the first time, JV Stalin publicly announced the policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class on December 27, 1929, in a speech at a scientific conference of Marxist agrarian workers. On January 11, 1930, Pravda published an editorial entitled ʺThe elimination of the kulaks as a class is becoming the order of the day,ʺ in which the call was made ʺto declare a life‐and‐death war on the kulak and eventually sweep him off the face of the earth.ʺ The development of specific measures and methods of this policy was entrusted to a special commission chaired by V.M. Molotov. January 30, 1930 The Politburo approved the decree of the Central Committee of the All‐Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks ʺOn measures to eliminate kulak farms in areas of complete collectivization.ʺ It instructed the kulaks to confiscate the means of production, livestock, household and residential buildings, and enterprises for processing agricultural products. products and seed stocks; economic property and buildings were transferred to the indivisible funds of collective farms as a contribution from the poor and farm laborers, part of the funds went to repay the debts of kulak farms to the state and cooperatives.
2. Deprived ‐ persons deprived of voting rights. The meaning of the deprivation of rights was the desire of the Soviet government to prevent persons ʺdangerousʺ for it from taking an active part in social and political life. The mechanism of deprivation of voting rights was determined by the Constitutions of 1918 and 1924. and concretized by the Instruction of the All‐Russian Central Executive Committee of November 4, 1926, which regulated the procedure for applying the articles of the Constitution to various categories of citizens. According to this document, the electoral rights were deprived of: persons resorting to hired labor for the purpose of making a profit; traders, resellers and intermediaries; farmers, who, along with farming, are engaged in the purchase and resale of livestock, agricultural and other products in the form of a trade (prasol dealers); faces, enslave the surrounding population through the systematic provision of agricultural machines, draft animals, etc., for use. or constantly engaged in supplying the population with credit (commodity or cash) on enslaving terms; lived or live on unearned income; former officers, landowners; officers and agents of the former police and gendarmerie convicted by the court; monks and clergymen of religious cults; insane; family members who are dependent on persons deprived of voting rights (SU. 1926. No75. Art. 577). In 1930, these rules were in full force. The category of “disenfranchised” almost entirely included such strata of the population as Nepmen, kulaks, clergymen, etc.
3 “Categoriesʺ of the kulaks ‐ it is more correct to call the ʺcategories of dispossessedʺ, because they were worked out at the beginning of 1930 already in the course of dispossession, and earlier, when the kulaks still existed as a class, there were no such categories. The criteria for the distribution of the dispossessed by category were determined in the decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) ʺOn measures to eliminate kulak farms in areas of complete collectivizationʺ of January 30, 1930 and the order of the OGPU ʺOn measures to eliminate the kulaks as a classʺ of February 2, 1930 (The tragedy of the Soviet village: Collectivization and dispossession. 1927‐1939.
Documents and materials. In 5 tg. M., 2000. T. 2. S. 126‐130, 163167). The dispossessed were divided into three categories. The first category is counterrevolutionary activists, cadres of operating counterrevolutionary and insurgent organizations and groups; the most double‐minded and active kulaks who oppose and frustrate the measures of the Party and the Soviet government for the socialist reconstruction of the economy and the organization of collective farms; kulaks fleeing from areas of permanent residence and going underground, especially blocking active White Guards and bandits; kulaks ‐ active White Guards, rebels, former bandits, former white officers, repatriates, former active punishers, etc., showing counter‐revolutionary activity, especially of an organized order; kulaks ‐ active members of church councils, all kinds of religious sectarian communities and groups, actively manifesting themselves; kulaks ‐ the richest, usurers, speculators destroying their farms, former landowners and large landowners. The second category is the richest kulaks, local kulak authorities, which are the stronghold of the kulak anti‐Soviet activists. The third category is the rest of the fists. In the expropriation of kulak property, this division into categories did not matter. And it concerned the further fate of the dispossessed. The heads of the kulak families of the first category were arrested, and the cases of their actions were transferred to the special structures of representatives of the PP of the OGPU, regional committees (regional committees) of the CPSU (b) and the prosecutorʹs office. The dispossessed of the second category, as well as families of kulaks of the first category, were moved to remote regions of the country (European North, Ural, Siberia, Far East, Kazakhstan, etc.) to a special settlement (special settlement). The dispossessed, attributed to the third category, although they were also expelled from their native villages and villages, were not sent to a special settlement and usually independently got a job in factories, factories, mines,
Extract from the message of the PP OGPU for Central Asia about a breakthrough in the irrigation system of Tashkent. January 6‐8, 1930
January 6‐8, 1930
No. 379404 Top secret
At 7 oʹclock in the morning on January 1. In Tashkent, a breakthrough occurred in the Ankhor branch of the Ankhor‐Kalkaua irrigation system.
The low‐lying parts of the old city of Tashkent were flooded with water. The flooding lasted until 9 pm.
To combat the flooding, city military units, members of the party, the Komsomol, police and citizens of the city were mobilized.
In order to facilitate flood control, the operation of the hydroelectric station was suspended, as a result of which the activity of industrial enterprises was reduced. On January 2, at 4 pm, after preparatory work, one turbine was started up at the station.
A special commission to determine the size of the loss found that 101 households, the mill of the industrial inspection of the regional executive committee, the comb factory of the labor exchange and the bridge were destroyed by the flood.
The number of victims is estimated at 501 people.
The total loss, excluding losses from downtime of industrial enterprises, is approximately estimated at 117,100 rubles. Loss from the damaged cooperative and state property ‐ about 86,000 rubles.
The chairman of the commission for assisting the victims is currently the deputy. prev. CEC Uz. SSR comrade Babenko.
The investigation establishes that the breakthrough was formed as a result of a sharp fluctuation in the amount of water consumed by the hydroelectric station. It should be noted that from the side of the Tashkent Regional Water Management Department, the station administration has repeatedly pointed out the inadmissibility of such a phenomenon.
A station technician was arrested in connection with the case (the technician went to meet his friends during his duty to celebrate the New Year).
An investigation is underway. We will report the results.
Assistant Head of INFO OGPU Gerasimov
Head of Division 2 Grosman
Dispatched:
1) Berry; 2) Messing; 3) Evdokimov; 4) Artuzov; 5) Prokofiev; 6) Blagonravov; 7) Bokiyu; 8) Tovstukha (for Stalin); 9) Kaganovich; 10) Molotov; 11) Rykov; 12) Maltsev; 13) Ordzhonikidze; 14) In business; 15) In the department.
INFO OGPU on the course of the reporting campaign of the Leningrad City Council. January 25, 1930
January 25, 1930
No. 379858 Top secret
The reporting campaign of the Leningrad City Council at industrial enterprises takes place with quite satisfactory attendance and significant activity of workers. The average attendance rate for reporting meetings is 73‐75%. However, due to a number of organizational shortcomings (tightness in the premises, late speakers, delayed reports, etc.), a significant departure of workers from meetings before their end was noted.
At the meeting of the Electrosila plant, out of 2,100 people who came to an end, only 400 people remained.
At the meeting of the 2nd district of the Krasny Putilovets plant, out of 2500 people, 800 people remained until the end of the meeting.
At the meeting of the 3rd district of the Baltzavod, out of 700 people who were present until the end, 200 people remained.
At the meeting of the 1st mechanical workshop of the plant. Lenin, out of 1200 people who appeared before the end of the meeting, 350 people remained.
At the meeting of the factory. Nogin, out of 1100 people, only 60 people remained until the end of the meeting.
In most cases, meeting speeches are businesslike. The work of the Leningrad City Council at all industrial enterprises was recognized as satisfactory.
At meetings of a number of industrial enterprises, speeches of certain anti‐Soviet‐minded persons with sharp criticism of the partyʹs policy in the countryside were noted. The following speeches in the debate are characteristic: “The Soviet government is mistaken in the matter of agricultural construction. Collectivization, now carried out by force, does not lead to an improvement in the economy. The workers will die of hunger sooner than they will build socialism. We need to feed the workers, then talk about the five‐year plan” (Lenin plant, Minzenberg plant, Kalinin plant, Sverdlov and Volodarsky plant, Skorokhod,
Electrosila plant).
“A peasant only works well when he knows that this is his property. Only ʺquittersʺ who do not want to work voluntarily go to collectives. The government supplied the poor with bread and implements several times, but they all survived. So, it will be with the state and collective farms (the factory ʺEqualityʺ, ʺPionerʺ, named after Sverdlov, ʺOktyabrskayaʺ),
At a meeting of the 1st and 6th districts of the Krasny Putilovets plant and the hydroelectric power station, the presidium received a number of anonymous notes: ʺVKP is All‐Union serfdom, the communists are forcibly forcing peasants to join collective farms.ʺ “The working class will not survive the five‐year plan. The five‐year plan ruins the cause of the revolution. It is impossible to achieve the fulfillment of unrealizable plans by terror,” and so on. There were also some protests against the closure of churches (factory ʺWorkerʺ, factory ʺKrasnogvardeetsʺ).
In the overwhelming majority of cases, anti‐Soviet actions were not successful among the workers. Only at the meeting of the State Reel
plant them. Volodarsky, by a majority of votes, the proposal to close the Smolensk Church and remove the bells was voted down.
Also noteworthy is the sharp anti‐Soviet action at the Electrosila plant, which the workers met with sympathy. One of the speakers in the debate said: “There are wolves in sheepʹs clothing in the Leningrad City Council. Lensovet is a bourgeois institution. The worker was herded into the basements, and the good houses are occupied by executives and large traders. Our orders are not being implemented. ʺ Part of the meeting applauded and extended the time for 5 minutes.
Assistant Head of INFO OGPU Gerasimov
Head of Department 2 Yakubovich
Dispatched: 1) Berry; 2) Messing; 3) Evdokimov; 4) Artuzov; 5)
Agranov; 6) Prokofiev; 7) Bokiyu; 8) Blagonravov; 9) Tovstukha (for Stalin); 10) Ordzhonikidze; 11) Kaganovich; 12) Molotov; 13)
Weinberg; 14) Maltsev; 15) In business; 16) In the department. Information from INFO OGPU about shortcomings during logging in the Northern Territory, Siberia, DVK, Nizhny Novgorod Territory and the Ural Region. January 31, 1930
January 31, 1930
No. 380328 Top secret
Logging plan progress
The available materials on the progress of logging continue to signal a serious threat of disruption to the implementation of logging plans in a number of regions of the Union. The necessary turning point in the course of logging has not yet come. In the Northern Territory, on January 10, the annual harvesting plan was fulfilled only in the amount of 30.8%. A ten‐day period from 1 to 10 January gave an increase in logging by 5.4%. As of January 1, in Sibkrai, industrial timber was harvested in the amount of 16.4% and firewood in the amount of 27.2% of the annual plan. In the Nizhny Novgorod Territory, as of January 1, commercial timber was harvested in the amount of 26.8% of the annual plan. The export of harvested firewood and timber reached 9.7% in the Northern Territory on January 10, in the Siberian Territory for the first quarter of the 1929‐30 financial year ‐ 6% of the annual plan. In Sibkrai, a very unfortunate situation has arisen with slipper blanks. On January 10, out of 400,000 slippers, to be prepared according to the plan, only 1654 slippers and 13763 half‐slippers were prepared. Slipper tulka harvested 67674 km.
Lack of tool
There is a significant shortage of tools in logging in Siberia and the Nizhny Novgorod region.
According to the Siblesotrest system, on January 10, there was a shortage of the following tools: longitudinal saws ‐ 625 pieces, transverse saws ‐ 650 pieces, logging and sleeper axes ‐ 9600 pieces, cleavers ‐ 1080, files ‐ 1800 pieces. Accounting for the existing tool and the need for it is not adjusted, as a result of which the tool was sent to forest areas that did not need it.
In the Nizhny Novgorod Territory, a lack of tools is noted in the logging of the Chuvash Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Vyatka, Sharya and Nolinsk Districts. There is a shortage of 6,000 cross‐cut saws on the workpieces of Sevvostles in the CASSR. Smolles bids for 4200 saws for the Vyatka Okr. only 25% satisfied.
Recruitment of the workforce
Despite the increase in the number of loggers in the forest over the recent period, their number does not exceed on average 50% of the total number of recruits. In the Northern Territory, the number of those who worked in the forest on January 10 amounted to 65.7% of the annual plan and 62.3% of the total number of all recruited for the same number. The number of equestrian lumberjacks equaled 52.3% of the annual plan and 58.4% of all harnessed ones. In the Siberian Territory, as of January 1, the number of working lumberjacks did not exceed 50% in Siblestrest, and 19% in the Comseverput of labor demand.
Deficiencies in the recruitment of labor for logging of the Siberian Territory in a number of cases are aggravated by the failure of economic agencies to comply with the resolution on the transfer of recruiting work to the organs of the Peopleʹs Commissariat of Labor. The economic bodies continue to conduct recruitment on their own, refusing the labor bodies with the release of the stipulated amounts for the maintenance of the recruiting apparatus. At the same time, there have been cases of unsatisfactory work of the labor bodies in recruiting the labor force.
In the Krasnoyarsk District, the transfer of recruiting functions to the labor department caused a negative attitude on the part of economic agencies. The economic agencies, despite the concluded agreement, refused to provide funds for the maintenance of the recruiting apparatus of the Okrotdel of Labor. The emergency troika of the Okrispolkom on logging decided to dissolve the recruiting bureau of the Labor Department, transferring their work to the emergency troikas at the RECs.
The Achinsk Labor Department recruits labor force for logging extremely unsatisfactorily. There is no connection with economic agencies, as a result of which there have been cases of recruitment for organizations that do not need labor. The recruiters did not know the conditions of work and pay in the organizations for which they were recruiting. The workers were given promises on a number of points that were not provided for in the draft contracts, as a result of which the lumberjacks subsequently left their jobs. The recruiters drew up ʺinflatedʺ lists of the recruited labor force.
Some facts have been noted when the workers of the grassroots state apparatus, because of grain procurements, actually disrupt logging: lumberjacks are prohibited from going into the forest before the delivery of grain, and lumberjacks who have begun work are removed for failure to deliver grain from logging.
At a meeting of the Medvedskoy village council of the Achinsk district, in connection with the arrival of a recruiter of labor for logging, it was decided: ʺDeparture from the village of Medvedskoy is prohibited until the delivery of bread.ʺ
The Kurbatovsky village council of the same district, in connection with the failure to fulfill the grain procurement plan, dismissed those who left for the removal of timber from work. Workers were also dismissed from work to build barracks for lumberjacks.
In the Kansk district, despite the urgent need of forestry organizations for guzhsil, forest farmers were removed from work to transport bread. Negative attitude towards logging of mobilized Komsomol members
The mobilization of Komsomol members in the Zuevsky District of the
Vyatka District is unsatisfactory. In a number of cells, the mobilized Komsomol members refuse to travel to procurement supplies. One of the Komsomol members of the Okrzdrav cell after the mobilization immediately surrendered his membership card, two Komsomol members of the cell of the match factory ʺKrasnaya Zvezdaʺ after the mobilization got drunk and started a row.
At Kozhzavod No. 3 of the Vyatka Okrug, some Komsomol members have a negative attitude towards mobilization for logging. The following conversations take place: “Whoever invented these blanks, let him ride them. The stock exchange is full of unemployed, you need to send them, here I am the first to refuse the trip. ʺ
The Komsomolsk brigade of the Krasnopresnensky District Committee of the Komsomol of the Moscow Region, mobilized for logging in Nizhny Krai, passing through the city of Vyatka, made a brawl at the station, refusing to pay for meals.
Excessive excesses of economic bodies and the grassroots apparatus
In a number of districts of the Sevkrai, individual workers of the economic agencies and the grassroots administration, seeking to increase the output of lumberjacks into the forest, use completely unacceptable measures of influence against the middle peasants 1 and even the poor 2 (declaring a boycott, threatening them with arrest in case of not leaving, recruiting through the police).
In the village of Ruchevskaya, Priozersk district of Sevkrai, along with the kulaks, a boycott was announced to the poor and middle peasants who did not leave for the forest. Among the 32 people sentenced for not leaving the country, there was one poor and 9 middle peasants.
At a meeting of the village council in the Priozersk region, foreman
Korotaev, a member of the All‐Union Communist Party, said: ʺThe poor and middle peasants who did not go to the forest ‐ we must put them on both shoulder blades together with our kulaks and send them where we should.ʺ After a corresponding remark from one of the members of the village council, Korotaev took his words back.
At a meeting in the village of Berezhno‐Dubrovo, Sevkraya, the foreman said: ʺWhoever wants to go to the forest must leave immediately, and whoever does not want to, must immediately be sent to the Correctional House.ʺ
In the Troitsk village council of Sevkrai, the policeman, at the suggestion of the recruiter, gathered all the recruits and said: ʺWhoever wants to go to the forest, get up to the right, whoever does not want to ‐ to the left.ʺ All stood to the right.
The shortcomings noted in our previous reports (379530, 378972, 378652, 377386, 376642) in the field of food and consumer services for the lumberjacks of the Sevkrai, which have not been eliminated so far, are also characteristic of the situation in the logging of Nizhny Krai, DVK, Siberia and the Ural region.
Assistant Head of INFO OGPU Gerasimov
Head of Division [2] Grosman
Dispatched:
1) Berry; 2) Messing; 3) Evdokimov; 4) Artuzov; 5) Prokofiev; .6)
Bokiyu; 7) Blagonravov; 8) Agranov; 9) Tovstukha (for Comrade Stalin); 10) Kaganovich; 11) Molotov; 12) Ordzhonikidze; 13) Rykov; 14) Mikoyan; 15) Syrtsov; 16) Uglanov; 17) Romanov; 18) Evreinov; 19) Lobov; 20) Maltsev; 21) In business; 22) In the department.
1. Middle peasants—In the structure of the peasantry of the 1920s. occupied an intermediate position between the kulaks and the poor (see notes ʺKulaksʺ and ʺPoor peopleʺ). The middle peasants made up the vast majority of the peasantry. According to data for 1927, 62.7% of peasant farms belonged to the category of middle peasants. Middle peasants also accounted for more than half of the population of the USSR as a whole. According to the data of the 1926 All‐Union Census, the population of the USSR was about 148 million people, of which 81 million, or 54.7%, were classified as middle peasants. To be considered a middle peasant, it was necessary not to possess any of the numerous ʺkulak characteristicsʺ, i.e., practically in terms of its economic position and level of material well‐being, it does not rise much above the poor and farm laborers. Middle farms are, most often, small‐scale, consumer, with a tendency towards a very slow and unstable growth of production, dependent on many factors (natural, demographic, etc.). In the middle peasant farms, manual and horse‐manual labor undividedly dominated. Unlike horseless poor peasants and farm laborers, middle peasant families had a minimum number of draft animals (usually one or two horses), which allowed them to carry out the entire cycle of necessary agricultural work in a fairly acceptable amount. The middle peasant mass of the village was heterogeneous, differentiation was traced in the material and everyday situation (there were the concepts of ʺstrong middle peasantʺ, ʺlow‐power middle peasantʺ, etc.).
population. Horselessness was characteristic of the poor and
agricultural laborers. And without a horse in those conditions, it was impossible to conduct normal agriculture. Even with land, they could not manage on their own and, as a rule, were dependent on the wealthy strata of the village. This situation was difficult to change alone; for them, i.e., for the poor peasant masses, objectively the way out was to unite. Among them there were people susceptible to antikolkhoz sentiments, including openly prokulak (ʺpodkulachnikiʺ), but such were a clear minority.
Memorandum INFO OGPU on workers in the textile industry for 1929 5 February 1930
I. General data on the strike movement
In 1929, there was a significant decrease in the strike movement in the textile industry of the Union (66 strikes with 5134 participants with a loss of 3140 man‐days versus 123 strikes with 21005 participants with a loss of 26311 man‐days in 1928).
The number of strikes among textile workers in the reporting year was 7.6% of the total number of strikes in all industries; number of participants ‐ 6.6%; the number of lost man‐days ‐ 2.5% (in 1928 this percentage [the ratio is many times higher: by the number of strikes ‐ 13.1%, participants ‐ 20.8%, lost man‐days ‐ 17.2%).
The average number of participants per strike was 79; the average number of lost man‐days was 50 (in 1928 the average number of participants was 170 and 216 lost man‐days).
On average, in 1929, there were 4‐6 strikes per month; the largest number of strikes took place in February (13 strikes).
The largest number of strikes was observed in the Ivanovo industrial region (23 strikes with 3320 participants); the second place was taken by Moscow and the Moscow region (19 strikes) and the third ‐ Leningrad (11 strikes). In 1928, the first place in the number of strikes was occupied by the Moscow region.
The main reasons for the strikes were: deficiencies in tariffication in setting norms and rates (17 strikes); abnormalities in the transition to a compacted job and poor working conditions largely due to the poor quality of raw materials (23 strikes). 3 strikes were caused by dissatisfaction with food difficulties (Ivanovo industrial region).
In the first quarter of the reporting year, a number of strikes arose in connection with a reduction in wages under a new collective agreement.
Sharp dissatisfaction, which in some cases took serious forms, was caused by the miscalculations of the workers (Sekhskaya factory, Shuisky district; Zarya socialism factory, Yaroslavl district and some others).
At the Sekhskaya factory, when paying salaries in January of this year. In December, the majority of workers received less than 20‐30 rubles. An investigation by a specially created commission found that the culprit was a number of socially alien elements working in the accounting office (the settlement clerk was a bereaved, the son of a large kulak, the senior accountant was a former policeman, etc.).
At the Zarya Sotsializma factory, when paying wages for December of this year, a significant group of weavers lost 30 rubles each; for a group of drummers (120 people), the salary instead of the 5th grade was calculated according to the 4th grade. The calculation aroused sharp discontent among the workers. Steps were taken to investigate the reasons for the shortage of workers.
Analysis of the strike movement in textiles shows that often the dissatisfaction of workers was caused by insufficient clarification on the part of grassroots organizations of the essence of the events and campaigns carried out (“armchair” nature of the study and lack of sufficient technical training).
Taking advantage of the shortcomings of mass work and production ʺproblemsʺ, the anti‐Soviet element in enterprises with its activities deepened the discontent of the workers, contributing to the development of discontent into conflicts and strikes.
II. Sealing work
The shortcomings of mass work were revealed during the transition to compacted work (work on an increased number of machines and sides). The lack of an in‐depth study of compaction measures was noted in a number of cases and often resulted in disruption of meetings to discuss the issue of compaction, rejection of proposals to switch to an increased number of machines, submission of applications demanding calculation, and a drop in labor productivity.
At the factory. Frunze (Moscow), the question of compaction was poorly worked out by the factory committee and the party cell. At a workshop meeting of one shift of water ladies, the proposal for a seal was rejected. At the Drezna factory (Orekhovo‐Zuevsky district), meetings on the issue of compaction were disrupted, the issue was not clarified. Discontent was noted mainly among workers associated with the countryside.
In factories named after Vagzhanov and ʺProletarka” (Tver district), the issue of consolidation was not raised at any meeting.
At the Izmailovskaya and Rumyantsevskaya factories (Syzran District), the workers were not at all prepared for compaction. The event was held by the administration not only without elaborating on the issue with the trade union activist, but also without discussing it at the production meeting.
Workersʹ dissatisfaction with the transition to a dense work was intensified due to the shortage and entry into processing of low‐quality raw materials, auxiliary materials, the abolition of auxiliary labor, errors in the establishment of prices and accounting for production, the lack of discipline of the administration, etc.
At the Malo‐Kokhomskaya factory (town of Kokhma, Ivanovo industrial region), in May, when switching to dense work, a group of workers from the makhalok department went on strike due to the cancellation of auxiliary work and downtime due to production problems. On August 8, the morning shift of the same department called a representative of the factory committee and, threatening to abandon the dense work, demanded that measures be taken to eliminate the shortcomings.
Petty sabotage was reported by individuals to cause downtime.
At the Danilovskaya Worsted Factory. Kalinin (Moscow), 3 shifts of workers (up to 100 people) went on strike, dissatisfied with the abolition of subsidiary labor and the transfer of individual workers to low‐paid jobs. On this basis, 100 workers who voluntarily signed up for compacted work, abandoned it. In August, 2 groups of workers left production (23 and 30 people).
At the Leningrad factory. Nogin, where the compaction was carried out administratively, on September 30 the workers of the weaving department did not work for 40 minutes. In June, due to an increase in rags due to a poor mixture of raw materials, a group of women workers sent a delegation to the director, demanding that the compaction be canceled or other yarns should be loaded and the machines reduced. Many female workers fell from overwork at the machines: due to the fact that the yarn was often torn, the female workers had to run around the waterways all the time.
At the textile factory ʺNeva” (Leningrad), during compacted work, a scrap was obtained and downtime was noted due to worn‐out machines, a decrease in the speed of rotation of motors, and the lack of discipline of the administration. It is characteristic that when asked by the secretary of the collective why the output is falling, the head. production answered: ʺI do not know.ʺ
The earnings of certain groups of workers after the compaction of work in connection with the above abnormalities in a number of cases sharply decreased (from 20 to 40 rubles per month). The workers demanded that the difference be paid to them or the rates increased.
At the Glukhovskaya Manufactory (Moscow District), the earnings of a group of submachine gunners fell from 88 rubles. up to 50 rubles. The submachine gunners demanded that the difference be paid for underdevelopment. The request was granted. But even after that, the administration did not settle the issue of prices (the prices for the machine gunners were set incorrectly).
At the weaving factory No. 3 (Orekhovo‐Zuevsky district), a group of weavers (100 people), after switching to compacted work, dropped their wages to 30‐40 rubles. per month.
Particular attention is drawn to the tense mood of the workers of the Yartsevskaya textile factory (Smolensk District, Western Region), where workers in the main departments (weaving and spinning) from the second half of this year saw a systematic decrease in wages after switching to an increased number of machines.
So, in July, the salary of a weaver on 4 looms was 3 rubles. 84 kopecks per day, in November ‐ 3 rubles. 01 kopecks; the spinnerʹs salary in July was 3 rubles. 13 kopecks, in November ‐ 2 rubles. 89 kopecks in a day.
In December, in the weaving department, for groups of workers who switched to 6 looms, earnings for certain types of work were significantly lower than those of those working on 4 looms (for example, by 10 rubles for braiding).
The discontent of the workers was exacerbated in connection with the arbitrariness of the administration: the weavers who did not work out the norms due to poor equipment, worn out looms, etc., were transferred by the head of the weaving department to the reserve or to peat extraction.
On the grounds of lower wages after the consolidation at the Kommunisticheskiy avant‐garde factory (Vladimirsky district), 1,400 workers were on strike in Italy. In September, a group of workers from this factory filed an application with the local labor department demanding that the compacted work be canceled.
In some cases, groups of workers demanded the abolition of the compaction of work, linking this demand with insufficient food supplies.
At the factory. Nogina (Leningrad) On September 30, a group of workers did not work; at a delegate meeting, convened in connection with the termination of work, the workers demanded the abolition of the seal, pointing to the insufficient supply of food and, in connection with this, the painful condition of the workers.
III. Reduction
During 1929, due to the compaction of work and the lack of raw materials in the main textile regions of the Union, significant groups of workers were reduced, in total over 19,000 people (in the Moscow region ‐ about 10,000 people, the Ivanovo industrial region ‐ up to 7,000 people and in Leningrad ‐ up to 2000 people).
With the reduction, the same shortcomings were noted as with the consolidation, mainly insufficient mass explanation by the grassroots organizations of the reasons for the reduction. In some cases, abnormalities during layoffs were caused by weak leadership from the highest trade union and party bodies.
In the Serpukhov District, the reduction was entirely left to grassroots organizations and factory administrations.
Ivanovsky seized the Union of Textile Workers only during the reduction (November 21) issued a directive on the exact determination of the number of those being laid off.
The lack of leadership resulted in a number of mistakes and distortions of the class line during the reduction. In a number of cases, the well‐todo and kulaks were left in production, and those with many families and no means of subsistence were fired.
In the Serpukhov district (Moscow region) at the factory. Nogin noted 8 cases of leaving at work with a well‐to‐do economy; at the factory ʺRed Uzbekistanʺ 6 such cases were noted.
At the Dolmatov factory (Ivtekstil, IPO), a locksmith with a family of 5 people and only 2 tithes of land was reduced, while three workers from the same Vinogradov family, who have 3 tithes of land, were left in production, and one receives a disability pension; when the workers announced this at the factory, they were told that “Vinogradova is an activist” (this worker protested against the closure of the church and is hostile to party members).
An employee who has 3 tithes of land and a two‐story house did not get into the lists of those to be cut (ibid.).
In connection with the wrong reduction, there was a massive filing of applications from workers demanding a revision of the lists of those to be reduced.
At the Naro‐Fominsk factory (Moscow region), 429 workers filed applications indicating incorrect redundancies (137 people were taken back to the factory).
The Kohom Factories (IPO) received 150 applications. The discontent of the workers was caused by the delay in the analysis of the submitted applications.
Noteworthy are the facts when wealthy peasants, in order to stay in production, obtained false information from their village councils about the capacity of their farms (IPO).
In the Seredsky district, the village council issued false information to wealthy peasants. According to false information from the village councils, many disenfranchised were restored to their rights and taken back to factories (Upper and Lower Seredsky factories, Teykovskaya, Shuiskaya, Krasny Duliapinets, named after Shagov).
Facts were also noted when workers associated with the countryside resorted to fictitious divorces and divisions (the Teikovo factory and the Zarya socialism factory, IPO).
The obvious inadequacy of explanatory work during the reduction is characterized by the following facts.
When conducting a sample survey (commissioned by the Central Statistical Administration and the All‐Union Central Council of Trade Unions) at a number of enterprises in the Ivanovo industrial region, the majority of the surveyed workers, mainly associated with the countryside, had the impression that the census was intended to reveal the capacity of their farms for dismissal from factories. In view of this, groups of workers gave inaccurate information about their farm, family size, etc. (Bolshaya Dmitrovskaya Manufactory and some others).
It was noted that a group of workers from the Krasny Profintern factory entered the clubʹs premises at night, where the questionnaires were kept, broke into the closet and destroyed over 400 completed questionnaires.
It should be noted that in some cases workers associated with the countryside, in order to stay in production, liquidated their farms and transferred them to collectives.
At the Rodnikovskaya factory, workers who have a farm in the village. Skrylovo (Rodnikovsky District), made a list of those wishing to break with the peasantry and transfer their land to the collective. In a statement filed in the factory, these workers asked to consider them as proletarians who had severed ties with the land.
At the Teikovo factory, a group of workers of 7 people who have prosperous agriculture in the village. Wrens gave their land to the community. An apprentice of this factory (a former merchant), who has a good house and outbuildings, declared at the factory that ʺhe is liquidating the farm and asks to leave it at the factory.ʺ
IV. Renewal of collective agreements 2
For a number of textile factories (Ivanovo, Moscow Oblast, Leningrad), the directive deadlines, both for checking the fulfillment of old collective agreements and for concluding new collective agreements, were not met.
In Ivanovo Oblast, the campaign to check old collective agreements instead of the November 1 deadline set by the II Plenum of the Regional Trade Union Council had not been carried out by December 1. The same was noted in many factories in the Moscow region.
In a number of cases, the inspection revealed a violation of a large number of clauses of the old agreement.
In Leningrad, at the Vereteno textile factory, the number of unfulfilled clauses of the old collective agreement was so significant that it was decided not to bring the issue to a meeting of workers, so as not to cause sharp discontent among them.
The main shortcomings in the collective agreement campaign were: 1) insufficient explanatory and preparatory work on the part of the factory organizations and 2) untimely sending of guidance materials.
Due to insufficient explanatory work (at the factory of the Yamskaya Manufactory ‐ IPO ‐ until the beginning of December, not a single meeting was convened to discuss the collective agreement) and a number of organizational inconsistencies (poor notification of the day of the meeting, sending unprepared speakers), there was little activity of workers at meetings and low attendance at meetings. In a number of cases, due to the absence of workers, meetings were disrupted.
At the factory. Zinoviev (IPO), two meetings were disrupted. At the BIVM calico factory, out of 400 people, only 10 appeared: none of the workers knew about the meeting.
At the ʺEqualityʺ factory (Leningrad), meetings to discuss a new collective agreement were disrupted in all shops because of the small number of people present; 110 out of 400 people came to the closed party meeting of this factory, and by the time the resolution was voted, only 43 people remained.
At the factory. Dzerzhinsky (IPO), speakers spoke at meetings without having industrial financial plans in hand.
The most relevant issue at the meetings to discuss the new collective agreement was the issue of food difficulties. Demands were made to improve the planned supply of workers. In a number of cases, individuals have made proposals for higher wages or lower prices for essential products.
At the Krasnye Tkachi factory (Yaroslavl District), in almost all workshops, workers required to conclude the tariff part of the contract not for one year, but for 6 months due to the rapid rise in market prices.
In a number of cases, workers were strongly displeased by the clause in the new collective agreement on the reduction of wages for marriage.
At the conference of the Kohom Factory (IPO), this item was failed.
At the Leningrad factories. Anisimov and ʺRabochyʺ clause on nonpayment of marriage caused sharp protests: the workers demanded to improve the quality of raw materials.
V. Disadvantages of socialist competition
Along with significant achievements in the course of socialist competition in some textile enterprises (Moscow Industrial Region, IPO, Leningrad), serious shortcomings were revealed due to weak leadership on the part of factory organizations and administration.
The lack of mass explanatory work led to a passive attitude of workers towards socialist competition in a number of enterprises. At some large factories, the number of people involved in socialist competition until the end of last year was extremely negligible.
At the factory. Krasin (IPO) out of 1,700 workers in the socialist competition by January 1930, only 103 people participated. By this time, not a single contract was concluded between the individual workshops of the factory.
At the Krasnoe Znamya factory (Leningrad), out of 5,000 workers by the end of the year, 700 people took part in the socialist competition.
At the factory. Rudzutaka (Moscow District) of 2036 workers in September‐October only 68 people took part in the socialist competition.
At the cloth factory. Sklyansky (the same district), where there are 1,500 workers, in the last months of the n. G. Social competition was almost not held.
Attention is drawn to the weak participation in socialist competition in individual factories of party members and Komsomol members.
At the factory. Nogin (IPO) out of 500 party members, 140 people entered the socialist competition, out of 400 Komsomol members ‐ 140 people.
At the Pioner factory (IPO), by the end of this year, 34 party members and 14 Komsomol members entered the socialist competition (1200 workers at the factory),
In a number of cases, the participation of workers in shock brigades is extremely insignificant.
At the factory. Sverdlov (Leningrad), out of 2600 workers until recently, only 34 people take part in shock brigades.
At the Vereteno factory (Leningrad), where there are 3,000 workers, 13 shock brigades are organized, in which 370 workers participate.
Due to the lack of assistance from factories and instructions from the technical staff, as well as various shortcomings in production, the work of shock brigades in some factories is weak, output is falling, and the percentage of rejects is increasing. In some cases, brigades fall apart.
By January 30, 1930, at the Malaya Red Factory (IPO), the production of shock brigades had dropped from 102% to 93‐90%.
At the weaving factory ʺProletarka” (Tverskoy district), the shock brigade collapsed due to the fact that the trade‐union organizations did not support it in its work.
The following fact testifies to the passive attitude of factory organizations to the work of shock brigades.
A meeting of shock workers was organized at the Victory of the Proletariat Factory (Orekhovo‐Zuevsky District). None of the members of the factory committee knew about the convening of the meeting. The chairman of the factory committee did not appear at the meeting. When the secretary of the factory committee informed the chairman of the regional department of the Union of Textile Workers that the workers were waiting for him, he replied: ʺOkay, go ahead, see it out somehow, so that the workersʹ brigades would not be offended.ʺ Among the workers, conversations were noted: ʺWe are accused of not going to meetings, while they themselves do not attend meetings, we are deceived at every step.ʺ
Shock brigades were not created at the Leader of the Proletariat factory until December.
Vi. Prodzones
Due to interruptions in the supply of food and consumer goods (in the Ivanovo region in the districts: Yaroslavsky, Shuisky, Aleksandrovsky, Kineshemsky, Vladimirsky and in some districts of the Moscow region), speeches at meetings and conferences, as well as group conversations about the lack of supply, were noted, moreover, the speakers demand an increase in the food ration rate (a number of IPO factories).
At the reporting meeting of the City Council of the Bleaching Factory. Zinoviev, a number of workers pointed out the need to increase food norms. The speakers declared: ʺThe lack of food and goods is causing massive discontent among the workers; it is necessary to make broader explanations about the reasons for the interruptions in supply.ʺ
In some cases, the speakers associate the supply interruptions with the five‐year plan and the partyʹs policy in the countryside.
On December 24, at the Krasny Perekop factory, a worker in a group said: ʺThey are forcing them to compete, to condense, but they do not give bread, the five‐year plan will drive the workers into the grave.ʺ
At the Krasnoye Echo factory (Aleksandrovsky District), a worker said to a group of women workers: “It has become difficult to live, there is nothing in the cooperative, but we have lived through one year of this ill‐fated five‐year plan.
At the factory. Radishchev (Leningrad), one worker said in a group that ʺit would be better if the peasants were allowed to develop freely without any collective and state farms, then there would be no famine.ʺ
At the Guryev Cloth Factory (SVO), there was talk in a group of workers that ʺthe peasants are being squeezed, their grain is taken from them, the tax in kind is taken, and as a result they will have to starve.ʺ
Insufficient supplies, coupled with significant price increases in the private market, have raised concerns among workers that real wages will be maintained. Discontent is also caused by shortcomings in the work of cooperatives (poor organization of supplies, late arrival of seasonal goods, mismanagement and inactivity); in a number of speeches the workers point to the need to cleanse the cooperative apparatus.
“We need to take our CCC by the sides, otherwise there’s nothing. The board of the Central Regional Committee does not care about the workers: it sells potatoes at a higher price than the peasants, and the bread ration is small” (Parizhskaya Kommuna factory, IPO).
“Whoever works in EPO drags everything for himself. The EPO board should be kicked out every three months, then, perhaps, they will steal less” (Vasilievskaya factory, IPO).
Vii. Activities of the anti‐Soviet element
A survey of groups of workers at individual enterprises in the main industries (metalworkers, miners, textile workers) found that workers in the textile industry had the greatest connection with the countryside.
We present the data of a survey of a group of workers in the weaving department of the N.‐Seredskaya factory (IPO). At this factory, out of the surveyed group [c] of 197 people, 112 people have a connection with agriculture (85 middle peasants, 14 well‐to‐do and 13 poor). In addition, 85 people from the surveyed group have real estate (houses and farms) in the city.
The presence of a wealthy kulak stratum among the workers in a number of textile factories and the weakness of the factories created fertile ground for the activities of anti‐Soviet groups and individuals.
During regular campaigns (renegotiating collective agreements, mobilizing workers in the countryside for collectivization, reporting campaigns by city councils, etc.), a number of facts of anti‐Soviet agitation, disruptions of meetings at individual enterprises, distribution of leaflets and anonymous letters were noted.
In its activities, the anti‐Soviet element at enterprises used the shortcomings of grassroots mass work, as well as the experienced food difficulties, the presence of which the anti‐Soviet element explains by the wrong party policy in the countryside.
The grouping at the Vyshnevolotsk manufactory (Tver district) deserves attention. Under the influence of the agitation of this group, a group of 200 workers quit their jobs four times over two months (February and April).
Anti‐Soviet people showed great activity in connection with the transition to a packed job.
At the Bolshaya Dmitrovskaya Manufactory (IPO), the aggravation of the conflict in connection with the transition to a seven‐hour working day and the intensified work was facilitated by the activities of a group of persons led by a worker ‐ a wealthy peasant woman.
On February 14, under the influence of the agitation of individual members of the group, 25 people went on strike, demanding the abolition of the packed work (neither the factory nor the collective of the CPSU (b) knew about the strike). After the decision of the workersʹ conference (February 23), they switched to a seven‐hour working day, and in connection with the compaction started according to this decision on February 27, under the influence of the agitation of the above group, the machines left 400 female workers out of 600 working in the weaving department. The group forcibly removed the workers from work and beat three workers (including 2 members of the CPSU
(b)) who resisted. The strike lasted 6 hours.
The conflict in this factory in connection with the transition to a sevenhour working day and compacted work lasted for several months.
The revival of the activity of anti‐Soviet elements in connection with the compaction of work in recent months was noted at the Yartsevskaya textile factory (Smolensk district).
Anti‐Soviet people linked their agitation with food difficulties: ʺWe, the workers, and our children are starving, before the work of the workers was paid higher, and we lived better.ʺ There was a call for ʺorganized protection of their interests.ʺ In order to exacerbate workersʹ discontent, provocative rumors were spread about spending a large sum on renovating the factory directorʹs apartment ʺby tightening the working day.ʺ On January 2, 1930, a statement was submitted to the shop wall newspaper, signed by a group of 15 weavers, which reads: “The workers are taken to the hospital every day, the transition will make the workers sick and humpbacked, the heavy oppression must be removed from the workers, this is not freedom, but serfdom ... If you do not pay attention to our statement, we will go on strike and shout: ʺDown with this government!ʺ ʺ
The director of the factory was planted a note threatening with murder: “Leave, otherwise we’ll use you”.
The activity of anti‐Soviet elements was revealed in connection with the reduction.
In the factories of the Ivanovo‐Voznesensk region, anti‐Soviet people (some of them are kulaks and the well‐to‐do), in connection with the layoffs, called for ʺto organize so as not to be crushed.ʺ
At the Teikovo factory, rumors spread that in the Ivanovo factories, in protest against the layoffs, workers went on strike and staged a demonstration.
At the Drezny factory (Moscow), under the influence of speeches by anti‐Soviet people, a working conference was violently and extremely disorganized (1000 workers were present). Those who opposed the reduction were greeted with applause. The resolution on the reduction was voted three times (the first time no one voted for it, the second ‐
150 people and the third ‐ 400 people).
During the collective agreement campaign, in some cases, under the influence of the agitation of anti‐Soviet persons, certain points of the collective agreement were rejected by meetings.
At the conference of the Kohom manufactory, as mentioned above, the clause on the reduction of the payment for marriage was rejected.
At the factory. Markov Vigontresta (Moscow), under the influence of the agitation of an anti‐Soviet worker, the clause on the inclusion of tram and utility bills in the salary fund was failed.
Speeches of anti‐Soviet individuals were noted during the subscription campaign for the 3rd Industrialization Loan 3 and during the socialist competition.
At the Novo‐Noginsk Factory (Moscow District), a member of the church council campaigned against signing up for the 3rd Industrialization Loan.
At Kuntsevo Factory No. 14 (in the same district), a worker with a wellto‐do farm, a member of the church council, resisted socialist competition. In order to oppose the work of the Komsomol shock brigade, he organized a group of workers, which set itself the task of reducing labor productivity.
In some cases, anti‐Soviet people linked their actions against socialist competition with interruptions in the supply of food.
At the Bolshaya Dmitrovskaya Manufactory (IPO) on December 27, an employee, when visiting a delegation of Moscow workers, said: ʺBefore organizing shock brigades, destroy the queues and increase the rate of food distribution.ʺ The performance was supported by individual workers.
At the Krasny Profintern (IPO) factory at a conference on socialist competition, a worker who spoke said: ʺIt is impossible to compete at the present time, since workers are dying of hunger, we need to take the head by the throat.ʺ The speech from the part of the factory organization was not met with resistance.
Under the influence of the agitation of anti‐Soviet elements, the fact of persecution of a public worker took place.
At the Proletarka weaving factory (Tver District), a group of workers and apprentices persecuted the leader, worker Sizov, who had increased labor productivity. Sizov was intimidated, leaving him threatening anonymous letters on the machine. The factory committee did not pay attention to Sizovʹs complaints, based on the information of the master associated with the former director of the Black Hundreds 4. Since Sizov continued to set an example, increasing productivity, his machine was broken and a note was attached: ʺI broke the machine, I urge others to do the same.ʺ
In the reporting year, a significant number of sabotage actions were noted in a number of enterprises by anti‐Soviet people.
At the factory of the Prokhorov Trekhgornaya Manufactory (Moscow), two youth shock brigades were organized in the dyeing and finishing shop.
These brigades increased the output by 10‐15%, after which, before starting work, it was discovered that machines No. 6 and No. 3 (on which the demonstration crews work) had a falling tape cut off, the pledged goods were mixed up and the seams on it were ripped open. Three female workers who are most behind in labor productivity are suspected of sabotage. These workers, even before the sabotage, threatened the shock workers with reprisals.
SVK. At the Rumyantsev factory in the Syzran District, a plug was found in the feed pipeline, preventing water from entering a large boiler.
Assistant Head of INFO OGPU Zaporozhets
Head of Division 2 Grosman
Dispatched: 1) Berry; 2) Messing; 3) Evdokimov; 4) Artuzov; 5) Prokofiev; 6) Bokiyu; 7) Blagonravov; 8) Tovstukha (for Stalin); 9) Molotov; 10) Ordzhonikidze; 11) Kaganovich; 12) Bulatov (organizer of the Central Committee); 13) Maltsev; 14) In business; 15) In the department (3 copies).
1. The Italian strike is a type of collective protest where workers are present in production but do not work. It was first used in Italy at the beginning of the 20th century.
2. Collective agreement ‐ an agreement concluded by representatives of workers and employees (usually represented by trade unions) and the employer. The document provided for the terms of employment for individual enterprises, institutions or farms. It was the basis for concluding personal employment contracts. Collective agreements were subject to mandatory registration with the bodies of the Peopleʹs Commissariat of Labor, which was supposed to monitor the compliance of agreements with the current labor legislation. Violation of the collective agreement by the employers was punishable under the Criminal Code with a large fine or imprisonment for up to 1 year. Campaigns to renegotiate collective bargaining agreements were usually carried out annually.
3. 3rd Industrialization Loan ‐ the decision to place the Third Industrialization Loan in the amount of 750 million rubles. with a tenyear maturity was adopted by the Central Executive Committee and the SNKSSSR on July 24, 1929. The proceeds from the sale of the loan were used for capital construction of industry and for the industrialization of agriculture and other sectors of the USSR national economy. 10% of the amount was allocated for the needs of local economic and cultural construction. The loan was provided for a period until December 1939 (SZ USSR. 1929. No. 49. Art. 442).
4. Black Hundreds ‐ members and adherents of extreme right‐wing parties and organizations in Russia in 1905‐1917. (ʺUnion of the Russian peopleʺ, ʺUnion of Michael the Archangelʺ, etc.). They acted under the slogans of monarchism, anti‐Semitism and great‐power chauvinism. After the February Revolution of 1917. Black Hundred organizations were banned.
Information from the INFO OGPU on the main negative aspects of the metal industry enterprises in Ukraine, Nizhny Novgorod Territory, Moscow, Leningrad and the Ural Region (based on materials for 1929 and January 1930). February 15, 1930
February 15, 1930
# 381431 Top secret
UKRAINE
Conflicts and phenomena of a negative nature, caused to a large extent by the weak work of trade‐union organizations, took place in a number of enterprises of the metal industry in Ukraine (the plant named after Marty ‐ Odessa), them. Petrovsky ‐ Dnepropetrovsk, Steam locomotive and GEZ number 1 ‐ Kharkov, Krasnoznamenny ‐ Kiev, Kramatorsky ‐ with. Kramatorskaya, Stalinsky ‐ Stapino, plant them. ʺOctober revolutionʺ ‐ Lugansk district, them. Voroshilov ‐ Artyomovskiy env.).
In 1929, 20 strikes with a total number of participants of up to 1000 people were registered at metal factories of Ukraine.
A number of strikes were associated with a reduction in wages during re‐tariffication. At some factories, 2‐3 strikes were recorded (Stalinsky, Voroshilov and October Revolution),
1. Kharkov steam locomotive plant (5444 workers). In June 1929, in connection with the re‐tariffication and a decrease in the existing wages, a group of workers in the blacksmith and tractor shops stopped work, in the heat shop some of the workers categorically demanded payment. In October, the discontent of the foundry workers intensified in connection with the reduction in prices, for some work up to 50%, individuals campaigned for the strike.
It is characteristic that the workers in a number of cases with their statements and complaints addressed directly to the administration, bypassing the trade union organizers.
During the renegotiation of collective agreements, speeches of individuals demanding higher wages were met with support among certain groups of workers (assembly shop).
When the plant was summoned to socialist competition, Moscow workers noted speeches: ʺ... You should not accept the calls, since Moscow workers get white bread, and we get black bread.ʺ
At a production meeting on September 30, the speaker on the transition to a 7‐hour working day was not allowed to finish his report and, under the influence of anti‐Soviet speeches, the meeting proceeded to discuss the issue of production difficulties.
2. Zavod them. Petrovsky (18056 workers, Dnepropetrovsk). In the foundry of the plant, when discussing the appeal‐summons of workers of other enterprises to socialist competition, individual workers, opposing the point where it is indicated that ʺthe situation of the workers has improved,ʺ demanded to exclude this point of appeal. The speakers stated: ʺHow can you say that the situation has improved when there are also shortcomings in the supply of workers.ʺ Most of the workers supported those who opposed this point, the question remained open and the controversial point was adopted only at the second conversation after a comprehensive explanation.
A weak explanation of the essence of socialist competition was used by anti‐Soviet individuals in their agitation ‐ ʺcompetition and the fiveyear plan will strangle the workers and peasants.ʺ In a group of workers, one worker (of the peasants) shouted: ʺDown with the fiveyear plan!ʺ and did not meet with resistance from the workers.
In connection with the collective agreement campaign, certain antiSoviet individuals (a former Petliurite) campaigned in the rolling shop for a decrease in labor productivity in order to achieve an increase in wages.
3. GEZ No. 1 (4400 workers, Kharkov). Shortcomings in the work of the TNB caused strong discontent among the workers. A number of conflicts took place in connection with the reduction of prices for parts up to 50%. In the automaton workshop, despite the high intensity, for a number of months, due to low prices, the workers were not able to work out their rates. Only after repeated statements did TNB raise prices. It is characteristic that, in spite of the decision made by the workers back in 1928 to dismiss one appraiser, the latter continued to work until the end of 1929.
During the collective agreement campaign, two meetings were disrupted.
4. Plant them. Marty (1040 workers, Odessa). At the conference on the discussion of the new collective agreement on December 3, 1929, where there were a number of harsh speeches pointing to low wages and high prices, the representative of the ISPS was interrupted by shouts of ʺenoughʺ. A group of workers (20 people) demonstratively left the meeting. The collective agreement was approved with great difficulty. This year, anti‐Soviet activity has intensified at the plant.
In the roofing shop of the plant on February 5, at a conversation on the issue of deducting 1/4 of earnings for collectivization, exclamations were heard: ʺYou are robbing us, taking off your last shirt, robbing the peasants.ʺ There were calls to beat the chairman of the workshop bureau who was conducting the conversation.
In the blacksmith shop, there was an agitation for the strike. One antiSoviet worker in a group of workers pointed out that ʺthe difficulties experienced in connection with the five‐year plan can only be eliminated by means of terror against the Communists.ʺ In the red corner of this workshop, posters and slogans about the five‐year plan were torn down and a portrait of Lenin was torn.
5. Red Banner Plant (1361 worker, Kiev). An anti‐Soviet group of persons (former monarchists and a number of former merchants) actively manifests itself at the plant. This group is systematically campaigning for the need to allow free trade, pointing out the ʺwrong policy of the party in the countryside,ʺ spreading provocative rumors in connection with food difficulties.
Dissatisfaction with the food difficulties gripped large groups of workers in January 1930. The statements of individual workers, former Red Guards were noted: ʺLet our hands dry up when we took up a rifle for the Soviet government in order to live up to such a situation.ʺ
6. Stalinʹs plant (16496 workers, Stalin). In July 1929, two groups of workers went on strike at the plant in connection with non‐compliance with the clause of the wage agreement.
In the blast‐furnace shop, when a new collective agreement was being discussed, under the influence of speeches by individuals, significant groups of workers disrupted the meeting by demonstrative departure.
Until the end of last year, trade‐union organizations did not pay serious attention to socialist competition. There was only one competing group (15 people) in the blast‐furnace shop until December of this year. The question was not popularized in the wall newspaper. Out of 1600 people, 175 people came to one of the workshop production meetings. The interest shown by the old cadre workers in socialist competition was not used in time by either the trade union bureau or the cultural commission.
The factory committee did not pay attention to a number of abnormalities: untimely issue and poor quality of overalls; the tariffication of some workers at the highest level, while workers are paid below this level; issuance of orders to workers at the end of work, etc.
7. Kramatorsk plant (8971 workers, st. Kramatorskaya). At the factory, 65% of the workers are from the surrounding villages. Some of them have well‐to‐do households. In some shops, kulak and anti‐Soviet agitation was noted: “The Soviet government has brought it to the point that the peasants do not know what to do; let there be another power, but not the Soviet one”. “The Soviet government crushed the kulaks, and now everyone in a row; fools peasants, they would give up plowing. ʺ
8. Plant them. Voroshilov (3000 workers, Artyomovsk district). At the plant in July, workers in the bolt shop (200 people) went on strike 2 times (July 13 and 15) due to a sharp decrease in wages ‐ up to 30 rubles. (workers were unable to fulfill the quota due to difficult working conditions). It is characteristic that the head of the MEP gave an order to establish a running‐in over 25% only when he learned that 100 workers had declared their calculations and intend to leave for Dneprostroy. Among the workers, there was talk: “Why was it not possible to increase before?! They start to add when we make a fuss. ʺ
NIZHEGORODSKY REGION
Among the enterprises of the region, Krasnoye Sormovo and Izhevsk plants are distinguished by the presence of negative aspects.
1. Plant ʺKrasnoe Sormovoʺ (15,000 workers). Due to a number of abnormalities in April last year, the factory committee was re‐elected ahead of schedule. But in the work of the new factory committee, until recently, a number of significant shortcomings were noted. Due to insufficient explanatory work on the new collective agreement, meetings were disrupted in 12 out of 27 workshops; the draft of a new collective agreement on the second day after its consideration by the party cell was put up for discussion at a meeting of workers without sufficient explanation in the shops. A number of speakers on the new collective agreement turned out to be completely unprepared.
The anti‐Soviet element exploited the shortcomings of mass work. In the diesel shop, the group was very active, collecting 90 signatures under the demand to remove the head of the TNB from work, against whom unfounded accusations were made.
In one of the shops, the former maximalist 1 tried to disrupt the technical supervision meeting to discuss the issue of checking the old collective agreement.
The unsatisfactory work of the factory committee was also revealed during the socialist competition. Until December 1929, an insignificant part of the workers was involved in socialist competition. In the copper foundry, only two shock brigades of 7 people were organized; in the lamppost, 2 out of 10 artels were involved in socialist competition. The shock brigades arose spontaneously; indicators of achievement were not posted; intrashop and brigade contracts were not concluded.
During the recruitment of workers in the account of 25,000, a significant number of socially alien and compromised persons fell into the ranks of volunteers. When the lists were reviewed at shop meetings, out of 200, only 79 people were approved. Among those mobilized was a former member of the All‐Union Communist Party who disagreed with the partyʹs policy in the countryside.
During the mobilization in the countryside, the activity of anti‐Soviet elements, agitating against the collective farms, intensified: ʺCollective farms are being built at the expense of idlers, the wealthy will not go to collective farms,ʺ etc.
The discontent of workers at the plant is caused by a number of shortcomings in the work of NTB. It is characteristic that in 1928, due to the incorrect establishment of prices under the new collective agreement at the plant, 5 strikes took place in a short time.
2. Izhevsk factories (16,000 workers). The workers and the administration of the factories have a significant number of socially alien and antiSoviet elements.
Anti‐Soviet elements were especially active during the new collective agreement campaign. The activity of the anti‐Soviet element took place in a number of shops (instrumental, mechanical, saw‐cutting, etc.).
In the tool shop, an anti‐Soviet worker who disrupted on November 2 a meeting on working off the industrialization day, opposed the inclusion in the collective agreement of a clause on the removal of a socially alien element from the factory, arguing that old production workers could also fall into this category. In the sawmill shop, the former maximalist demanded to postpone the meeting, saying: ʺWe are hungry, it is useless to sit here, in our opinion nothing will happen.ʺ After leaving the meeting, he took 60 workers with him.
In connection with shortcomings in the work of the TNB‐OET (there are many former white officers in the TNB), in July 1929, discontent was noted, which covered over 5,000 workers in auxiliary shops. The discontent was caused by non‐payment of bonuses. The reason for the non‐payment was not explained.
In view of the weak attention paid to socialist competition, the number of shock brigades was insignificant until December of this year. The created ones soon disintegrated due to the weak leadership of the headquarters (6 out of 12 brigades remained in the bayonet workshop, 3 out of 5 brigades in the cold rolling workshop).
Due to insufficient preparatory work, by November 20, instead of 28 workshops, only 3 were transferred to continuous production.
In a hammer‐lathe workshop, one worker was fired for absenteeism, breakdown of machine tools, damage to parts and drunkenness. This worker appealed against his dismissal through the RKK. At a meeting of the RKK, the shop commissioner spoke in defense of this worker and the worker was left in production.
In a steel workshop, the administration ordered the dismissal of two workers for drunkenness while working. The Party cell stood up for them, insisting on confining themselves to only a reprimand. The administration was forced to agree.
LENIGRAD REGION
For the metal industry of the Leningrad region. in 1929, 17 strikes were registered with 1558 participants, 7 of which were motivated by dissatisfaction with wages.
In a number of enterprises in the metal industry, trade‐union organizations in 1929 failed to sufficiently mobilize the activity of the working masses around socialist competition.
Machine‐building plant ʺKrasny Putilovetsʺ. In November 1929, there was marked dissatisfaction among day laborers of the railway shop with their low wages compared to the piece workers of the same shop. The workers demanded that they equal their wages with pieceworkers, threatening to stop their work if they were not satisfied. At the same time, the discontent of the workers of the artels of the shop was noted with the delay and systematic calculations (up to 10‐12 rubles).
In 1929 the socialist competition was weak. During the socialist competition, the factory committee relied exclusively on a narrow circle of activists. The headquarters of the competition was constructed without the involvement of ordinary workers.
Contracts between individual shops and workshops were concluded by professional workers without prior discussion of contracts at workersʹ meetings. The workers did not read the contracts even after they were signed, and as a result, the competition actually failed (1‐2 mechanical workshops, carpentry and joinery workshops).
The lack of explanatory work led to a lack of understanding by individual groups of the work tasks of socialist competition, refusal to compete and even a decrease in the norms of development that existed before the start of the competition. The reporting campaign of the Leningrad City Council (1930) passed through a number of workshops with low activity. At the meeting of the 2nd district of the plant, out of 2500 people, only 800 people remained until the end. During the reporting meetings, the Presidium received a number of anonymous notes of an anti‐Soviet nature: ʺThe All‐Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks is serfdom, the communists force the peasants to join collective farmsʺ; ʺThe working class will not stand the five‐year plan,ʺ and others.
Transport and Mechanical Plant named after Egorova. In 1929, trade union work at the enterprise was insufficiently developed. In the first half of 1929 workers ʹmeetings were not convened for 2ʹ / 2 ‐ 3 months or more, the attendance of the meetings did not exceed 40‐50%.
At the plant, there were facts of rough treatment of the administrative staff to the workers, the facts of providing the best works by the foremen to their “favorites”.
For rough treatment (expelled workers from the office), a group of workers beat the assistant director of the plant. The workers threatened with reprisals and took out a number of workers from the administrative technical staff in a wheelbarrow.
The facts of hiring non‐union members directly by the administration in addition to the labor exchange were registered; the trade union organization did not show any opposition to this.
The socialist competition was poorly developed. Many workers did not know about the goals, tasks of competition and the role of workers in it. On the part of the administrative staff, the socialist competition was met with indifference. A conversation in a group of plant engineers is typical: ʺSince they offer to engage in competition, then you need to say something on this issue, but still nothing will come of it.ʺ
When subscribing to the 3rd industrialization loan, there were isolated facts of refusal of party workers to subscribe to the loan. Of particular note is the fact of beating by a woodworker (foreman, member of the CPSU (b)) of a loan officer.
Reinforcement Plant ʺZnamya Trudaʺ. During 1929, two pre‐submission committees were replaced. On the part of individual trade union workers, anti‐moral actions were noted that aroused sharp discontent among the workers and were used by anti‐Soviet and Trotskyist elements.
A number of trade union meetings were held with a turnout of no more than 30% of all workers.
The revision of norms and prices carried out at the enterprise without any participation of trade organizations, due to a number of major mistakes, caused a sharp discontent among the workers. For a number of works, the prices were sharply reduced for no reason.
On the part of a number of masters, there were facts of providing work to ʺfavoritesʺ.
Anti‐Soviet groups at Leningrad enterprises
Anti‐Soviet groups have actively shown themselves in a number of Leningrad enterprises lately. In individual enterprises, the activities of the groupings were successful, they managed to disrupt a number of economic and political campaigns. At the Vulkan plant, a group consisting mainly of former people (former noblemen, white officers) campaigned among the workers against all the partyʹs measures: “The peasants are forcibly taken away grain, they are not carrying red carts, but peasant tears”; ʺThe Soviet government squeezed the workers, it became impossible to live.ʺ
The group thwarted the industrialization day. At a flying rally on the events in India 2, members of the group shouted: “We must protest not against violence in India, but in Russia” (the group has been liquidated).
At the plant them. Voroshilov and the State Optical Plant, anti‐Soviet groups for a short time thwarted a number of campaigns (elections to the FZK, subscription to a loan). The grouping at the Optical Plant has been eliminated.
Dissatisfaction with food difficulties
On the basis of food difficulties in individual enterprises in January of this year. the negative attitude to the increase in the cooperative share was noted.
At the Krasny Sudostroitel plant, during the discussion on January 28 of the issue of increasing the cooperative share, shouts were heard from the localities: ʺRobbery, ... looting!ʺ At the meeting of the ʺProletarskyʺ plant, shouts were heard: ʺDown with ... out, there are no goods, ... you are lying ...!ʺ The majority rejected the proposal to increase the share.
In the metal‐rolling shop of the Proletarskiy Zavod, the speech (before the start of work) of one worker against increasing the share (“we must not allow such mockery, there is no benefit to us and they sell only posters”) was greeted with applause. The speech was supported by one member of the CPSU (b), who declared: ʺIf we increase the share, nothing will come of it, since our rulers do not know how to put things right.ʺ
MOSCOW
The lack of mass work of trade union organizations of a number of metal plants in Moscow affected the conduct of socialist competition.
In the second half of 1929, in a number of enterprises, social competition was not developed sufficiently; the number of shock brigades was insignificant; a number of contracts concluded between enterprises have not been fulfilled.
The contract for socialist competition with the Volga region, concluded by the Krasny Shtomovshchik plant, is weak. The workers are not at all informed about the progress of the competition. Zavkom and the cell did not take measures to deepen the socialist competition.
At the plant ʺBoretsʺ of Mashinotrest, the competition met with opposition from administrative and technical workers. When a team of locksmiths called a planning and distribution bureau to socialist competition, an engineer, a member of the All‐Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, said: ʺThe challenge is harmful for us, this locksmiths protect their selfish interests, they want to earn more.ʺ As a result, the call of the locksmith team was not accepted.
At the SVARZ plant in the carpentry workshop of the brigades, until October 1929, there was no social competition and no preparation for the competition was carried out, despite the fact that in September a production meeting gave a directive to launch the competition.
At the Press plant, the competition was weak in October. The production commission did not meet in the printing‐translation shop for four months. The workersʹ proposals to improve production were not carried out. In particular, for 6 months the proposal of one worker about a new method of translation for printing presses, which would save 30‐50% of time, was not implemented. His second proposal on the point of the printed sheet is also inhibited.
Plant ʺHammer and Sickleʺ Machinotrest. On the basis of dissatisfaction with the working conditions and the reduction of prices at the enterprise, individual conflicts and strikes were registered (a group of workers of the shaped department, bolt and rolling shops).
The reporting campaign of the Moscow and district councils in 1929, due to the lack of training on the part of the professional and party organizations, is proceeding weakly. A number of reporting meetings were disrupted. Attendance at meetings across a number of shops is negligible. Out of 500 workers, only 125 people were present at the meeting of workers in the construction shop. The Trotskyist who spoke in the debate made a proposal to recognize the work of the Moscow Soviet in terms of the policy of collecting rent and the implementation of tariff reform incorrect. The offer was rejected.
URAL REGION
In 1929, 13 strikes were registered in the metal industry enterprises of the Urals, with a total of 1335 participants. 7 strikes were caused by a reduction in wages, 3 strikes were caused by poor working conditions.
At the Botkinsky and N [Izhna] ‐Tagil plants in a relatively short period of time, 3 strikes were registered at each plant.
N [Izhne] ‐Tagil Metallurgical Plant. During 1929, there were three strikes at the plant with 100 participants.
The wage reform carried out in early 1929 took the trade union by surprise. In a number of cases, professional workers were unable to answer the most important questions of the workers.
The trade union organization failed to ensure timely recalculation of workersʹ earnings in connection with the reform. The timing of the recalculation was postponed several times. The workers of the blastfurnace, high‐grade rolling and forwarding shops, who received a reduction in wages in connection with the reform, submitted an application for a revision of prices directly to the administration, bypassing the trade‐union organizations. Meetings were called for a number of workshops without the knowledge of trade organizations. Particularly sharp discontent of the workers was noted in the open‐hearth shop: despite the fact that their real wages were not supposed to decrease, they, after calculating at the new rates, did not receive 13‐16 rubles each. A group of workers (32 people) filed an application demanding an increase in prices and grade, threatening to leave the factory.
In 1929, separate facts of sabotage were registered at the plant. In May 1929 there was an attempt to cause a power plant accident.
Botkin plant. At the beginning of 1929, there was a long‐term dissatisfaction of workers with existing norms and rates at the enterprise, as well as untimely payment of wages. Workers of the smallsection section of the rolling shop, on behalf of 120 people, filed an application for an increase in prices, threatening to strike if their demand was not satisfied. The strike mood on this basis was also noted among the workers of the steel and blacksmith shops. In 1929, the enterprise registered 3 strikes, 98 participants.
It should be noted that from 1926 to the beginning of 1929 there were several sharp conflicts at the plant, in some cases escalating into strikes. Conflicts and strikes were deliberately provoked by the head of the MAE, a former Kolchak resident who was trying to create a difficult situation at the plant for the party organization and administration.
When signing up for the 2nd Industrialization Loan, some workers at meetings opposed the loan. There have been cases of beating of the commissioners who signed up for the loan. One member of the Young Communist League distributing the loan was seriously wounded.
Assistant Head of INFO OGPU Gerasimov
Head of Division 2 Grosman
Dispatched:
1) Berry; 2) Messing; 3) Evdokimov; 4) Prokofiev; 5) Bokiyu; 6) Blagonravov; 7) Tovstukha (for Stalin); 8) Molotov; 9) Kaganovich; 10) Ordzhonikidze; 11) Kaminsky (Central Committee); 12) Maltsev; 13) In business; 14) In the department; 15) In the department; 16) In the department.
1 Former maximalist ‐ apparently, we are talking about a member of the Socialist‐Revolutionary party of maximalists. In 1919 the party split up and some of its members joined the RCP (b).
2 Events in India ‐ this refers to the protest actions (strikes, demonstrations, etc.) of the Indian proletariat in 1928‐1930, aimed at raising wages, improving working and living conditions.
Information from INFO OGPU on the progress of logging in the Northern and Nizhny Novgorod regions and the Middle Volga region. February 17, 1930
February 17, 1930
Top secret
1. Fulfillment of the plan of procurement and removal
Across the Sevkrai on January 20 with. 35.8% of the annual and 56.8% of the schedule were fulfilled. On the Nizhny Novgorod Territory on January 20 with. In terms of commercial timber, 35.5% was fulfilled, and 47.8% of the annual plan for firewood. The most lagging behind are the following timber industry enterprises.
North edge. Vinogradovsky timber industry enterprise (Arkhangelsk district) fulfilled 8.8% of the schedule. Karpogorskiy ‐ 11.5%; Arkhangelsky ‐ 12.6%; TLO Northern Railway e. (Nyandomsky environs) ‐ 16.6%; Volgoles (Vologda environs) ‐ 7.5%; TLO Northern Railway etc. ‐ 12%; Sevvostles — 18.6%; Onegles — 12.3%; TLO Northern Railway d. (Severo‐Dvinsky okrug.) ‐ 10.5%; Sevvostles ‐ 11.4%; Kotlassk ‐ 17.3%.
Nizhny Novgorod Territory. GOMZ procurements: 15.7% for
firewood, 6.5% of the annual plan for industrial wood.
Middle Volga region Cheremshanskiy leshoz fulfilled 32% as of February 1; B. Kuvaysky forestry enterprise fulfilled 8% of the annual target for industrial timber and 7% for firewood.
The situation with the harvesting of export timber in the forestry and ʺMoskvotopʺ is bad: by February 1, 26.4% of industrial timber was harvested, and 23.15% of the annual plan for firewood.
The situation is even worse with the export of firewood and harvested timber. In Sevkrai, 9.7% of the annual and 11.6% of the calendar plan were exported; in the Nizhny Novgorod Territory for firewood ‐ 15.8%, for industrial wood ‐ 15% of the annual plan.
For a number of forestry enterprises of the Middle Volga region. (Promzinsky, Labinsky, Sredles, B. Kuvaysky, etc.) the percentage of firewood and logging is not more than 10% of the annual plan.
The main reason for the failure to fulfill the plan is the lack of labor and horse‐drawn power. In January, 156,727 lumberjacks and 131,269 carters were recruited in Sevkrai, and 97,637 lumberjacks and 76,726 carters went to work. At St. Main forestry site (SVO) instead of 1800 workers and the same number of horses, only 700 workers and 400 horses worked daily in the forest.
A number of shortcomings, perversions and excesses in the recruitment process, production shortcomings, poor supply of food and unsatisfactory living conditions affect the success of the recruitment of labor and the exit of lumberjacks to work.
II. Labor recruitment gaps
In the process of recruiting labor for logging, a number of serious shortcomings were still noted: a) the conclusion of personal contracts, clearly unrealizable promises of high pay, etc. (Muromsky, Nolinsky, CASSR, Vyatsky and other districts of the Nizhny Novgorod Territory; Endinsky, Vizinsky, etc. districts of the NK), b) competition between individual procurement organizations (Murom, Sharya, Vyatka and other districts of NK), c) excesses and distortions of the class line.
Excessive excesses from the side of grass‐roots procurement organizations
In the Troitsk village council of the Arkhangelsk env. After the meeting, the recruiter of the TLO invited all the peasants to leave for the forest within two days. The policeman was immediately instructed to drive all the peasants into the forest by the specified date.
At a meeting in the village of Ermolino (Nyandomsky okr., UK), the recruiting officer suggested that all the peasants leave for the forest within three days, forcing them: “Otherwise, you will be considered enemies of the USSR and the government will not supply you with manufactured goods, since you are tearing down our five‐year plan” (the same was noted for Shurminsky and Alatyrsky timber industry enterprises of the NK).
Perversion of the class line
Nizevsky uchlespromkhoz (Vyatsky okr., NK) distributed 3000 rubles. advance payment to prosperous peasants (some of them received 100 rubles), but the latter did not go out to logging.
The logging organization ʺVolgo‐Okalesʺ (Muromsky okr., NK) signed an employment contract with a kulak artel, promising it the best payment terms.
The administration of the Feklinsky forest cartel (Vyatsky okr., NK) advanced funds for the kulak farms. One of the kulaks received 800 rubles. advance payment. After a while, the same kulak was sent to recruit workers and received 300 rubles. business trip, but did not deliver a single worker to the workpieces.
It should be emphasized that the recruitment of labor in a number of cases takes place without proper assistance from local Soviet, party and Komsomol organizations (Vizingsky, Shoikatsky districts, Komi region, etc.).
A number of cases of non‐fulfillment of contracts for the delivery of horse‐drawn labor by collective farms and state farms (B. Slobodsky, Korsunsky, Cheremshansky and other collective farms of the Middle
Volga region) were also noted.
III. Production flaws and weakness of socialist competition
The tractors available at the timber industry enterprises are often not used due to the lack of sleds, road problems, etc. As before, in a number of districts the supply of woodcutters with tools has not been established.
Despite major shortcomings of a production nature, socialist competition is not developed, production meetings are almost never gathered.
In the Grivensky uchlespromkhoz (Komi region), it was supposed to introduce tractor blanks. However, until now, no preparatory work has been carried out: a garage, an office, workshops and living quarters for tractor drivers have not been built. The ordered 300 tractor sleighs are not ready (the same was noted for the Endinsky, Noshulsky Uchlespromkhozes of the Komi Region and the Vologda Region). Logging in the Tundra forest areas (SC) is poor. Normal production of small (3 /4 to the / m instead of 3‐4 k / m). Socialist competition has not been developed, despite the presence of Komsomol brigades in the polling stations.
IV. Supply shortages
The supply of lumberjacks with food, fodder, overalls and other essential goods is still unsatisfactory (systematic interruptions in the supply of baked bread, meat, fats, oats, flour, felt boots, mittens, etc.). Sugar, tea, makhorka, kerosene and matches were lacking in some logging points.
Cases of supplying logging areas with products of poor quality and inadequate goods were noted.
In the logging area of the Menza village council of the Shuisky environs. (SK) instead of leather gloves, they sent a batch of kid gloves.
In the Basalevsky forest area of the Murashkinsky district (NK), workers are often given raw bread. In barrack No. 4 in January there was absolutely no bread for two days. Barrack No. 2 received rotten meat and rotten potatoes.
When inspecting a number of warehouses of the Nizhny Novgorod Territory, supplying logging with food, significant deposits and damage to products and goods intended for loggers were found.
180 bags (12,515 kg) of rye flour, 18,884 kg of millet, 16332 kg of rye, 11 barrels (160 kg) of fish, etc. were spoiled at the warehouse of the Kologrivsky Production Association.
16232 kg of rye, 12575 kg of fodder oats, 16478 kg of millet, 2406 kg of fish were spoiled in the warehouses of the Manturovsky timber industry enterprise.
In the warehouses of Smollessoyuz, products and goods stored since last year for the needs of logging were found: 30 boxes of makhorka, 500 poods. wheat flour and 4000 meters of manufactory. Flour and manufactory are not suitable for consumption.
V. Housing and living conditions
In the majority of logging areas, the number of log cabins is insufficient for logging. The barracks are overcrowded, uncomfortable (no stoves, tables, enough bunks, etc.), dirt. In most cases, there is no medical assistance. There have been isolated cases of epidemic diseases (scarlet fever, etc.).
Veterinary care has also not been established: there are almost no special veterinary posts at logging sites. In Sevkrai, there were cases when sick horses had to be driven 20‐30 versts to the local veterinary paramedic.
Cultural and educational work has not been launched. In a number of cases (Nyandomsky okr., Komi region of the North Caucasus), the red corners of the forest areas have been turned into storage rooms or used for housing.
Activities of the anti‐Soviet element
In recent years, the activity of the kulak and anti‐Soviet elements in the countryside and in the logging areas has increased significantly.
Along with agitation against entering logging, agitation for the presentation of lucrative demands intensified, using organizational shortcomings, supply interruptions and poor living conditions.
Some facts of beating of collective farmers lumberjacks with their fists were noted.
In with. Vizinga and in the village of Korshunovskaya (Komi region) at a meeting on the issue of logging, a well‐to‐do peasant Belyaev spoke out against going into the forest: “Nobody needs to go out to logging. They pay very little there, and then you canʹt get out of taxes. All the same, this power will not exist for long, there will be a new revolution,” and so on. Those present agreed with his speech, and no one came out to logging.
In the village of Osovaya (Vologda District), the kulak Klimov twice disrupted a meeting to recruit workers.
On January 6, a meeting was held among the lumberjacks of the Izhemsky forest area (Arkhangelsk) about not leaving the forest during the Christmas holidays. By a majority of votes, it was decided not to leave. After the meeting, thanks to the agitation of the kulaks, all the lumberjacks went home.
In the Karbinsky forest area of the Seligarsky district (NK), in early January, kulaks beat up poor people and farm laborers ‐ members of a logging artel.
As a result of kulak agitation in the Vetluzhsky District (NK), there is a sale of horses in order to avoid logging.
Assistant Head of INFO OGPU Gerasimov
Head of Division 2 Grosman
Dispatched:
1) Berry; 2) Messing; 3) Evdokimov; 4) Artuzov; 5) Prokofiev; 6)
Bokiyu; 7) Blagonravov; 8) Agranov; 9) Tovstukha (for Comrade Stalin); 10) Kaganovich; 11) Molotov; 12) Ordzhonikidze; 13) Rykov; 14) Mikoyan; 15) Syrtsov; 16) Uglanov; 17) Romanov; 18) Lobov; 19) Maltsev; 20) In business; 21) In the department; 22) In the department.
INFO OGPU on the main points of a negative nature in the deployment of the shock movement (in Nizhny Krai, SVK, Ukrainian SSR). March 4, 1930
March 4, 1930
No. 382394 Top secret
Along with the exceptionally wide and intensive deployment of the shock movement (the transition to shock work of entire shops and enterprises), significant shortcomings are observed in a number of enterprises, hampering the further quantitative and, in fact, qualitative growth of the shock movement.
These main brakes should include: clearly insufficient leadership of the shock movement by the lower party and trade union bodies of a number of enterprises; lack of assistance, and in some cases direct opposition to the shock movement by the administrative staff; ASEʹs agitation against shock workers.
Deficiencies of a production nature (interruptions in raw materials, auxiliary material, equipment deterioration, organizational ʺproblemsʺ, etc.) also negatively affect the growth and success of the shock movement.
1. Insufficient leadership of the shock movement
For a number of enterprises, the deployment of the shock movement is taking place spontaneously.
Due to the lack of sufficient leadership, the work of shock workers in a number of cases does not give the desired production effect; the obligations assumed under the contracts are not being fulfilled, and the shock brigades for individual enterprises are falling apart.
At the Izhevsk factories (Nizhny Krai), in the drilling and turning shop, shock brigades were created without the knowledge of the trade union shop organizations. The teams are left to their own devices in their work. There is no leadership from the administration and the shop headquarters. In a steel workshop, due to lack of management, there are chronic furnace downtime.
At the Omutninsky metal plant (Vyatka), shock brigades were created in June last year, but due to the lack of leadership until February 1930, they did not fulfill their obligations.
At the Krasnoye Sormovo plant (Nizhny Krai), the production commissions are not assembled in the woodworking shop. Competition contracts have not been reviewed since October 1929. The joinerʹs strike team collapsed. The first to leave the brigade was the secretary of the Komsomol cell.
At the Sredne‐Volzhsky plant (Samara), the workersʹ sharp discontent was caused by the slogan posted by the shop in the lathe shop: ʺWhoever does not join the shock brigades, that tailman 1, putting his own interests above public interests.ʺ It should be noted that no clarification was made about the creation of shock brigades, and the workers did not know who to declare to join the brigades.
At the ʺEngine of the Revolutionʺ plant (Nizhny Krai), due to poor clarification, the issue of socialist competition in the 2nd machine shop was voted twice. Only 2‐3 out of 150 people voted for.
2. Counteraction of the administrative staff
At a number of enterprises, the administrative and technical staff not only does not provide the necessary assistance to the shock workers, but often opposes the creation and [work of] shock brigades.
At one of the meetings of the production commission, the head of production at the workshop of Izhevsk factories (Nizhny Krai) persistently discouraged workers from creating shock brigades and teamwork carried out by brigades, arguing that this was inexpedient and unprofitable for the workers.
In the shaped shop of the Krasnoye Sormovo plant, a group of workers (18 people) with extensive production experience organized 2 communes. The administration is preventing a number of workers from joining the commune, claiming that this would weaken the work of other artels.
At the plant ʺMetallist” (Nizhny Novgorod region), the plant management dismissed the shock brigade organized in the grinding shop. The reason for the disbandment was not explained to the drummers.
The head of gutta No. 2 of the Krasny Gigant State Glass Plant (Kuznetsky Okr., SVO) openly ignores the shock brigades, systematically does not attend production meetings, saying that he has nothing to do there, since socialist competition is “childʹs play”.
In the hydrotechnical department of “Dneprostroy” head. mechanical workshop deliberately caused abnormal relations between the workers and the shock Komsomol brigade in order to disrupt the work.
At the Omutninsky Metallurgical Plant (Vyatka Okr.), The technologist, when he asked workers how he thinks to create shock brigades, answered: ʺThis is a childish game, and I am an adult and I stopped playing long ago.ʺ
One strike brigade in January made a call to the technical staff to take over the shock brigades, but the call has not been considered until recently.
The following fact, which took place at the Izhevsk plants, testifies to the passive attitude of the technical staff to socialist competition.
Over the entire period of socialist competition, the rationalization bureau received more than 3000 proposals from the workers; no more than half of them were considered.
3. Weak participation of party members
At some enterprises, the participation of party members in the shock movement is weak.
At the Melstroy plant in the woodworking shop thanks to the agitation of a group of party members on February 18, most of the workers refused to work as a ʺcommuneʺ. Some of the party members stated: “We have no faith in collective labor. We, party members, cannot yet work as a commune ourselves. ʺ
At plant No. 42 (Samara), only 8 party members work in the shock brigades of the rolling shop. Labor discipline among party membersshock workers is weak. In other workshops (mechanical, 7th), the majority of Party members do not stand out from the general mass of workers, and often even lag behind them in work.
4. Activities of anti‐Soviet elements
The anti‐Soviet element in enterprises is doing everything to resist the movement.
At the Dvigatel revolutsii plant (Nizhny Krai), an expelled from the party (a former member of the White armies) at a meeting of the 2nd mechanical workshop opposed the cost reduction, pointing out that ʺthis measure is not real.ʺ
“If the workers, rolling up their sleeves, are forced to work hard, they will soon be forced to carry machines on their shoulders. I declare on behalf of those sitting here that the workers will not do this. ʺ Individual workers supported the protest.
At Dneprostroy, under the influence of agitation by an anti‐Soviet quarry, a meeting called to sign an agreement on socialist competition was disrupted.
At Ovchinno‐Shubny Zavod No. 3 (Vyatka Okr.), Workers, under the influence of the agitation of an anti‐Soviet group, refuse to take part in socialist competition.
Under the influence of the agitation of the anti‐Soviet group, the workers of the ash shop of the Leather Plant No. 2 (Vyatka okr.) Do not enter into competition.
Assistant Head of INFO OGPU Gerasimov
Head of Division 2 Grosman
Dispatched:
1) Berry; 2) Messing; 3) Evdokimov; 4) Olsky; 5) Prokofiev; 6) Bokiyu; 7) Kaganovich; 8) Blagonravov; 9) Shvernik; 10) Malenkov; 11)
In business; 12) In the department.
1. Ponytail ‐ here: an unconscious element that puts its own interests above public ones.
INFO OGPU on shortcomings in the formulation of labor protection at industrial enterprises of Ukraine for 1929 at the beginning of 1930 April 9, 1930
April 9, 1930
No. 383577 Top secret
The state of labor protection and safety measures at state‐owned enterprises of Ukraine should be considered unsatisfactory.
Data from the last three years show that the number of accidents at a number of enterprises is still high.
1927 g.
1928 g.
First half of 1930
Plant them. Petrovsky
10777
11889
5210
Plant them. Dzerzhinsky
6731
9262
3507
Stalin factory
3017
3559
1019
Makeevsky plant
2010
3845
1911
It is noteworthy that the number of fatal accidents at Ukrainian enterprises increased in 1928‐29. against 1927‐28 by 4.3% (1927‐1928 ‐ 580 people, 1928‐1929 ‐ 606 people).
Turning to the analysis of the causes of accidents, it should be noted that a significant percentage of accidents occur exclusively through the fault of the administrative and technical personnel, who do not pay due attention to labor protection and safety.
It is characteristic that from the funds allocated for labor protection by a number of enterprises, only small amounts are spent (for mine No. 4 of the Budyonnovsky mine administration, out of 24,000 rubles, only 700 rubles were spent, for mine No. 5 out of 14,000 rubles ‐ 920 rubles, at a metal plant of the 47,000 rubles allocated for labor protection, only 23,194 rubles have been spent in the name of Artem, and yet, until recently, ventilation has not been arranged in the shops.At the Rykovsky Metallurgical Plant in 1928‐1929 425,000 rubles were spent from the 950,000 rubles allocated for safety measures , for 5 months of 1929‐1930 200,000 rubles were allocated, no more than 72,000 rubles were spent).
In addition, the administration does not fulfill the clauses of the collective agreements concerning labor protection.
Along with the negligent attitude of the administration towards labor protection, the inactivity of the labor protection and safety commissions themselves should be noted. When giving instructions to the administration, in most cases they do not follow the implementation of these instructions, rarely convene meetings, etc.
Negligence of the administration
For a number of enterprises, despite a significant number of accidents, no measures are taken to improve labor protection and safety measures. The decisions of the labor protection commissions are not enforced. The instructions of the workers are ignored.
The most striking facts of the criminally negligent attitude of administrative and technical personnel to labor protection were noted at the plant. Petrovsky (Dnepropetrovsk), both in 1929 and at the beginning of 1930.
On May 26, 1929, several workers were seriously injured from the collapse of the roof of the Bessemerovsky workshop. The investigation found that the collapse occurred due to the negligence of the shop manager and the responsible worker for safety: up to 20,000 thousand poods of coal dust accumulated on the roof of the shop. The workers repeatedly warned the administration about the possibility of a disaster, but the administration did not take action.
On May 30, 1929, a worker was killed by an electric shock during excavation work near the central power station, who accidentally bumped into an electric mains cable. The chief and assistant of the electrical department did not indicate to the workers where the central cable should pass.
On February 27, 1930, in blast furnace No. 1, 13 workers were poisoned by gas that penetrated through the cracks of the hatch covering the opening of the gas storage, 9 of them died. The poisoning was due to the fault of the blast furnace shop technician and the capital construction department. The manufacturer of the works was not given instructions regarding the insulation of the underground gas pipeline hatch; the hatch roof did not cover the hole tightly and let gas through. There were no hazard warnings. The administration, aware of the possibility of gas leaks, allowed workers to work. (Two safety engineers arrested).
On February 27, 1930 two workers were seriously wounded and two were lightly wounded by the collapse of the roof of the open‐hearth furnace No. 7 under construction. The collapse occurred due to an oversight of the technical staff. (The foreman and foremen were brought to justice).
In the lathe shop, machine tools are cleaned by hand, which causes workers to suffer from eczema. The Labor Protection Commission decided to mechanize the cleaning of machine tools. However, this decision was not implemented by the administration.
Similar facts were noted for a number of other Ukrainian enterprises.
A number of accidents took place at the mines of the Uvarinsky mine of the Sorokinsky mining administration (Lugansk district). In May 1929, three woodworkers were killed by a blockage at mine No. 2. Despite this, the mining administration did not improve the state of safety, and in August 1929 there was a new blockage in mine No. 7 (wounded the woodworkers). The workers were not allowed to work due to the lack of backlog.
On October 29, 1929, at mine No. 1 of the Petrovsky Ore Administration on the 4th western longwall, a cutter was killed by a collapsed rock. The workers declared: “Until our comrade was killed, until then we did not see any engineers or technicians in the mine. They searched for woods for fastening for hours, everyone ran to the mine and the wood was delivered to all the faces. ʺ
At mine No. 5/6 (in September 1929) of the Rykovsky mine (Stalinʹs district), 3 workers were wounded, one of them suffered a broken leg during the ascent. The culprit is the technician, to whom the workers have repeatedly told about the poor condition of the cage. The question of repairing the cage was repeatedly raised at production meetings, but the administration did not take any measures.
At the Krasny Profintern mine (Rykovsky mining administration, Artyomovsky district), on August 12, 1929, a cutter was seriously wounded by a collapsed rock. The collapse was due to insufficient fastening, due to the negligence of the technician.
At the mine. Karl Marx (Rykovskiy Mine Administration) on February 3, 1930, a gas explosion occurred; 8 workers were killed and three were seriously injured.
On February 4, 1930, a second gas explosion took place: three workers were severely burned.
The investigation established that the explosion occurred due to the negligence of the administrative and technical personnel towards their duties. It was not taken into account that there was a fire earlier at the site of the explosion, after the fire, despite the workersʹ suggestions to concretize the affected area, nothing was done. Head ventilation from January 1 until February 3, did not make a single gas measurement and did not instruct the foreman on ventilation of the igniter (4 people were arrested).
At the Rykovsky Metallurgical Plant, gas seeps out of the gas pipeline in many places in the blast furnace shop. Gas also penetrates into other shops. Workers often get drunk. To the technicianʹs question: ʺWhy is the gas coming out?ʺ, The gasman replied: ʺThere is nothing to be done, the workers are already used to it.ʺ The engineer of the blast‐furnace shop on safety measures almost does not look into the blast‐furnace shop (information for March 1930).
Among the shortcomings of labor protection at enterprises, a significant place is occupied by the administrationʹs failure to comply with the points of collective agreements on the good quality and timely issuance of overalls, safety shoes, etc.
Metallurgical plant. Artyom. On September 13, 1929, workers were to be given 418 pairs of boots and 1000 pairs of boots. The boots have not been issued to the workers until now, and the boots were issued with a two‐month delay.
Budennovskoe Ore Administration. At mine No. 5, overalls are issued out of time and incompletely. There were cases when overalls were issued with a delay of six months.
At mine 13/18, from April 1, 1929, tarpaulin jackets and shirts are not issued to workers.
At the plant them. Marx, the boots issued to the workers of the transport department become unusable within two weeks. The workers have repeatedly stated this to the administration and the labor protection commission. No action has been taken so far.
In the same workshop, the workers serving the yard, according to the collective agreement, must be issued special. boots. The administration does not issue boots to workers. The workers filed a collective application asking for the boots. Currently, on this basis, there are a number of cases when workers refuse to go to work in the yard due to lack of shoes.
Shortcomings in the work of labor protection commissions
At a significant number of enterprises, labor protection and safety commissions do almost no work. The members of the commission rarely look into the shops and mines, the statements of the workers indicating the shortcomings of labor protection are not considered for a long time; there have been cases when workers, without waiting for a response from the commissions, file complaints directly with labor departments.
At the metal plant them. Artem, all the work of the labor protection commission over the past year was reduced to considering the issues of sending workers to rest homes and resorts. The commission did not deal with the main work on labor protection.
At the Stalin metal plant, workers, cutters and loaders, a year ago submitted to the commission an application for the issue of overalls, but their application was not considered.
At the plant them. Petrovsky, a number of cases were noted when workers, without receiving an answer to their applications to the labor protection commission, turned directly to the labor department.
At the Bolshevik plant, workers working in hazardous shops
repeatedly raised the issue before the labor protection commission on granting them additional leave. Having failed to achieve results, the workers filed an application with the labor department.
The commission does not carry out any work, of all the points on labor protection provided for by the collective agreement, the administration has completed less than 25%.
Workersʹ statements about irregular working conditions, a number of practical proposals are not considered for a long time.
At the Makeyevsky metal plant, labor protection commissions do not work in a large number of shops. The representative of the commission of the boiler shop comes to the shop only to draw up acts at the time of conflicts or accidents. The commission does not work in the blastfurnace shop for 6 months.
Since May 1929, the commission has not been working in the Budyonnovsk mine administration at mine No. 5 / s. At the time of checking the implementation of the collective agreement on labor protection, the commission did not have any materials.
Assistant Head of INFO OGPU Gerasimov
Head of Division 2 Grosman
1) Berry; 2) Messing; 3) Evdokimov; 4) Olsky; 5) Artuzov; 6) Prokofiev; 7) Bokiyu; 8) Blagonravov; 9) Zaporozhets; 10) Head of
INFO PP Wiesel; 11) Head of the 5th department of INFO; 12) Tovstukha (for Stalin); 13) Molotov; 14) Kaganovich; 15) Ordzhonikidze; 16) Kaminsky; 17) Malenkov; 18) Kuibyshev; 19) Uglanov; 20) Shvernik; 21) In business; 22) In the department.
INFO OGPU on the reasons for the excess at the Novorossiysk cement plant ʺProletaryʺ. April 13, 1930
April 13, 1930
No. 383739 Top secret
In addition to No. 383021 dated March 20 p. On the mass excesses at the Proletary cement plant (Novorossiysk, SKK), we give the following information about the reasons for the kurtosis:
On March 17, the son of a cement plant worker tried to enter the plantʹs territory, but since the boy did not have a special pass, the policeman (Klenov) did not allow him to enter the plant.
At the workerʹs request to let his son pass (he was carrying lunch to his sister working in the laboratory of the plant), the policeman pointed a rifle at the boy.
This aroused the discontent of the worker, who reproached the policeman ʺAre you, comrade, appointed to scare children with a rifle?ʺ
Policeman Klenov, seeing an insult in this instruction, tried to call another policeman to arrest the worker, but seeing that the latter was leaving home, without warning shot the worker twice and killed him with the second shot.
The workers who had gathered at the place of the murder tried to arrange lynching over the policeman (Klenov) and beat other policemen.
The explanatory work of the representatives of the party and tradeunion organizers succeeded in bringing peace to the workers.
The next day (March 18), a large crowd of workers gathered at the apartment of the murdered man, numerous hostile attacks on the police were noted in the crowd, individual elements carried out anti‐Soviet agitation in the crowd, but this campaign was not successful.
All the time before the trial and at the trial (April 3), there were widespread opinions among the workers about the need to apply capital punishment to policeman Klenov.
Agitation (during the trial) of a relative of the murdered man for organizing a lynch against the defendant had no success.
The courtʹs verdict against Klenov ‐ 10 years of strict isolation with subsequent expulsion for 5 years was met by the workers with satisfaction.
Assistant Head of INFO OGPU Gerasimova Head of Division 2
Grosman
Dispatched:
1) Berry; 2) Messing; 3) Evdokimov; 4) Tovstukha (for Stalin); 5) Molotov; 6) Kaganovich; 7) Malenkov; 8) Olsky; 9) Agranov; 10) Zaporozhets; 11) In business; 12) In the department.
INFO OGPU on the attitude of workers to the latest decisions of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) on the collective farm movement. April 16, 1930 April 16, 1930
No. 383839 Top secret
The positive attitude of the bulk of the workers
The decisions of the Central Committee of the Party on combating distortions in collective farm construction and on benefits for collective farmers are widely discussed by the workers. The bulk of the workers regard the decrees as necessary and timely measures aimed at correcting the mistakes that took place during collectivization, and as an incentive to consolidate and further grow the collective farm movement.
Lack of explanatory work and agitation of the anti‐Soviet element
In a number of industrial enterprises, until recently, sufficient work has not been done to explain to the workers the essence and significance of the latest decisions of the Party.
Using this circumstance, kulak and anti‐Soviet elements in their agitation among the workers portray the partyʹs decisions as proof of the incorrectness of the entire policy of collectivization and dispossession, as ʺthe retreat of Soviet power under the threat of intervention and under the onslaught of insurgent peasants who do not want to go to collective farms.ʺ
At the same time, rumors are spreading about the complete and widespread collapse of collective farms, about the inevitability of war and peasant uprisings in the spring.
“Too late, Stalin realized himself to correct mistakes. The village will not forgive you for this. Spring is coming and the air will smell of gunpowder” (Makeevsky metal plant, Stalin district).
“The partyʹs policy has turned the entire people against itself, and now they no longer trust it. Soviet power is giving way because the peasants are opposed to it and do not want to go to the collective farm. The party got scared and is now going back, but itʹs too late” (Kiev Brewery). “The Soviet government was afraid of the pope’s speech. Another such pressure is to open churches and introduce private trade. ʺ Rumors are spreading about mass demonstrations of women and about the suppression of the uprising by the armed forces of the GPU (Rostov Gorboyni).
ʺThe Soviet government got scared of the crusade, now it opens the market and dissolves the collectives.ʺ “The churches that were closed will also be restored, since the Pope is going to go to war against the USSR” (Stalinʹs Metal Works, Novo‐Chaikino mine).
ʺOur government is leading us to ruinʺ (Mechanical Plant No. 7, Leningrad).
“The war must necessarily be in the spring of this year; peasant uprisings will break out. Soviet power cannot resist” (Chemical plant, Moscow district).
ʺIn the spring, the peasants will start uprisingsʺ (Factory ʺProletarkaʺ, Tver district).
Misunderstanding and misinterpretation by some of the working decisions of the Central Committee
As a result of insufficient explanatory work and under the influence of the agitation of the anti‐Soviet element, there is a misinterpretation by some of the workers of the essence and significance of the latest decisions of the Central Committee and an incorrect explanation of the reasons for the adoption of these decisions by the party. Among the groups of workers who have their own agriculture, especially among the seasonal workers, the opinion is quite widespread that, prior to the last decisions, the entire party was pursuing a wrong line in matters of collectivization. There are indications that ʺthe decree on benefits for collective farmers is too lateʺ, that ʺthe peasantry has already been ruined, and now the center wants to maintain its authority, for which it blames everything on the lower classes, which allegedly perverted the Partyʹs directive.ʺ
“Earlier they had a wrong attitude when carrying out collectivization of agriculture. It was necessary to build really demonstrative collective farms, and not give exaggerated figures” (Slutskaya Factory, Leningrad).
“Now that the peasants have been ruined and destroyed their livestock, they began to look for those responsible for the excesses of the Partyʹs policy in the countryside. Who is to blame, no matter how the whole party as a whole is ʺ(Leningrad plantʺ Promet “)?
“When the peasants were finally robbed, they were herded like sheep into a collective, then they only conceived to write that the lower ranks were incorrectly carrying out the directives of the Central Committee in life” (Plant “Krasny Khimik” of the Artyomovsk district).
ʺThe Party is to blame for everything.ʺ “The decree was published too late, now you cannot restore what was before” (Krasnoye Znamya plant, Rostov).
“If there was a resolution earlier, there would be no bungling. The workers sent to the village had a directive ‐ press and press, this led to the weakening. Wherever anything happens, the switchman is guilty, but in fact it is the fault of the region and the center” (Rostov paper mill).
“The Party approached the issues of collectivization incorrectly; it was in vain that they took everything from the peasants. Stalin has now approached correctly ʺ(Saratov,ʺ Employee of the Revolution ʺplant).
“The party took the wrong line, it knew that peasants were forcibly driven to collective farms, even chickens were taken away. Now they grabbed, but itʹs too late, the cattle have already been destroyed” (Astrakhan plant named after Lenin).
“The point is not in excesses, but in the fact that the whole policy is changing. It is a shame to say that they started dispossession of kulaks early, and they are giving up under the guise of correcting excesses” (Traktorstroy, Stalingrad).
By these groups of workers, the latest party decisions are often regarded as ʺretreat under pressure from the peasants.ʺ
“The decree was passed only because the peasants went too harshly against the POPs and communes, right up to the uprising. The party decided that it was now not profitable to argue with the peasants and softened its tone. There are smart people in the center. Noticing that they had missed the mark, they struck a retreat” (plant named after Lenin, Dnepropetrovsk district).
“The local authorities wanted to immediately liquidate the kulak and organize collectives, while the higher authorities watched what would come of it, without giving precise instructions. Now, when the higher authorities saw that the population was rebelling, that the peasants would not go so soon to the POPs, the Central Committee issued a new directive” (Petrovsky plant).
Along with this, they noted the indications that the decisions of the Central Committee would entail a massive disintegration of collective farms, since the existing collective farms were ʺcreated by force.ʺ
“The decree has significantly worsened the working conditions for involving peasants in POPs. The peasants will not want to collectivize now” (plant named after Lenin, Dnepropetrovsk district).
“The collective farms have all collapsed. The peasants are leaving the collective farms, the reason for which was the forced collectivization, and most importantly ‐ an explanation recently about voluntary entry into the collective farms” (Kharkov, Tinyakov factory).
ʺNow all the collective farms will disintegrate, because from the decree it is clear that it is impossible to force people to go to the collective farm, and until now collective farms were formed only by forceʺ (Kiev Red Banner Plant).
Some of the workers with agriculture, immediately after the publication of the Central Committee resolution, announced their withdrawal from the collective farms. Certain groups of workers were the first to leave the collective farms; with their departure, a number of collective farms collapsed.
Moscow region. Moscow district. In the Noginsk region, out of 847 farms that left the collective farm in five days (March 20‐25), 77% are workers in local factories.
In the Communist region, workers of the Krasnaya Polyana factory were the first to leave the collective farm: the collective farm in the village of Rybaki, with the workers leaving it, collapsed.
In the Podolsk region, with. Pokrov, 42 applications have been submitted to leave the collective farm. Most of the applicants are workers from local factories, Podolsk and Klimovsk.
In the Reutov district, at the Savvinskaya factory, not a single worker remained, collective farm (65% of the factory workers are associated with the peasantry). The workers have applied to give up the land.
Assistant Head of INFO OGPU Gerasimova Head of Division 2
Grosman
Dispatched:
1) Berry; 2) Messing; 3) Evdokimov; 4) Tovstukha (for Stalin); 5) Molotov; 6) Kaganovich; 7) Ordzhonikidze; 8) Malenkov; 9) Kaminsky
‐ the Central Committee; 10) Shvernik; 11) Olsky; 12) Artuzov; 13) Zaporozhets; 14) Prokofiev; 15) Agranov; 16) Blagonravov; 17) Bokiyu; 18) 1st Sep. ‐ Agayants; 19) 5th Division ‐ Dubinin; 20) PP MPO
‐ Wiesel; 21) In business; 22‐23) In the department.
Information from the INFO OGPU on the material and living conditions and moods of workers in the fishing industry of the Vladivostok District, brought to Vladivostok in the manner of industrial colonization. May 5, 1930
May 5, 1930
No. 384246 Top secret
Housing and living conditions
Working fishermen, recruited through industrial colonization and seasonal workers arriving in Vladivostok, find themselves in extremely difficult living conditions. The economic organizations were not prepared to receive the recruited workers, and the fishermen who arrived in early March (over 2,000 people) were housed extremely crowded, in dirty, damp, unequipped dormitories.
Regarding the hostel of fishermen on Leninskaya st. there is an act on the impending collapse of the ceiling.
In the AKO hostel, clothes get wet and rot from dampness. The ASO hostel is overcrowded, dirty, and has no kitchen.
But even these ʺdwellingsʺ were not enough to accommodate workers. Due to the lack of space in hostels, 140 people settled in heating houses.
It should be borne in mind that according to the plan for the delivery of labor, 23,000 workers are to arrive via ASO alone.
Abnormalities in pricing and uniforms are causing discontent among workers in temporary jobs.
AKO fishermen, who were employed as temporary salt loading jobs prior to being transferred to the fisheries, complained about prices, the distribution of workwear (160 pairs of old rubber boots were issued for 500 people, which quickly ripped off) and the delay in daily subsistence payments. The workers of the DRGT are extremely dissatisfied with the bread ration. On the question of the salary, it is said that it is significantly lower than the one promised by the recruiter.
Dirty personnel and degrading activities of declassed and anti‐Soviet elements
Major shortcomings occurred in the recruitment of labor. In a number of cases, seasonal workers were given unrealistic promises regarding wages, working conditions, etc. The main goal of recruiting is the pursuit of quantity. As a result, the fishing mass included a significant number of socially alien persons (kulaks, disenfranchised), as well as a declassified and criminal element.
Among the Kerch fishermen, which represent a significant group in the first batch of fishermen, only 25% are members of trade unions, while the rest are small artisans, disenfranchised and simply a declassified element. In this group, several people made a row on the way to Vladivostok. We occupied the cars that were not intended for them. The train was stopped, some of the hooligans were arrested by the OGPU.
Before reaching the station. Blagoveshchensk, an unknown citizen was thrown off the train at full speed, accidentally getting into a carriage of fishermen. The culprits have not been identified.
Visitors from Moscow, Astrakhan and Siberia are accommodated in the ASO hostel. Muscovites are largely a declassified element. On the way, a group of 10 Muscovites terrorized the entire train, got drunk every day and rowed at the stations, smashed the buffets. On the way from Baikal, they were followed by a trolley with special security to prevent excesses.
The seasonal workers who arrived from Transbaikalia are mostly kulaks (many of them arrived by gravity).
Placed in Vladivostok hostels, awaiting departure to the fishery, the fishermen are left to their own devices. The weakness of the work of the trade union organizers, the lack of explanatory work and cult services lead to the fact that kulaks and hooligans, without encountering obstacles to their corrupting work, solder fishermen, agitate for refusing to work, demand changes in the conditions and amounts of wages, spread provocative rumors, etc. Scandals, fights, stabbing due to drunkenness are common occurrences in hostels.
At one meeting of fishermen on the issue of the contract, the kulaks managed to ensure that the salary was issued not through the Savings Bank and at the end of the season, as previously agreed, but twice a month and on hand.
On March 23, the kulaks disrupted the landing of a party of 300 people on the steamer ʺErivanʺ, which was leaving for the fields.
In connection with the receipt of a letter from a home by one fisherman, in which he was informed that those who had gone fishing had been excluded from the list of eaters, there were rumors that the families of these fishermen had been removed from the supply. This greatly excited the fishermen. No clarifications have been made on this matter.
On March 22, in the hostel of the DRT, the fight between the fishermen became so large that the police had to be called, but the fishermen closed the barracks and did not let the police in. The excess was eliminated by the UR forces.
On the night of March 21, two Trans‐Baikal fishermen raped a fisherwoman, she tried to hang herself, but was pulled out of the loop by a Komsomol fisherman. During the second interrogation, the fisherwoman, apparently terrorized by the bandits, stated that her first testimony was not true, that the rapists she named were not to blame, and asked to be released from arrest.
It should be noted that the Komsomol and Party members among the fishermen are not actively fighting unhealthy phenomena, which is largely due to the fragmentation and disorganization of the Party and Komsomol forces. Until now, not a single party or Komsomol cell has been created among the fishermen.
At a stormy meeting on March 20, where the disorganizers managed to subjugate the masses, the party and Komsomol sections were afraid to hold a meeting of the faction during the break, which was requested by the representative of the city committee.
Among the workers of the DGRT there is a group of active anti‐Soviet persons from kulaks and declassed elements, organizing agitation with the aim of decomposing the fishermen and disrupting the Putin (13 people ‐ the leaders of the group ‐ have been arrested.
Measures have been taken to screen out the unusable element from the arriving seasonal workers. A special commission was created, which included representatives from the fishermen and from the economic authorities to clean the personnel of the fishermen.
Assistant Head of INFO OGPU Gerasimov
Head of Division 2 Grosman
Dispatched:
Menzhinsky; 2) Berry; 3) Messing; 4) Evdokimov; 5) Tovstukha (for
Stalin); 6) Molotov; 7) Kaganovich; 8) Kaminsky; 9) Malenkov; 10) Ordzhonikidze; 11) Rykov; 12) Syrtsov; 13) Uglanov; 14) Shvernik; 15‐22) OGPU; 23) In business; 24‐25) In the department. INFO OGPU on the shortcomings of the re‐election campaign of factory committees for the Union of Metalworkers at industrial enterprises of the Ural region. May 28, 1930
May 28, 1930
No. 384928 Top secret
Shortcomings of preparatory work and facts of passivity of workers
The preparatory work in almost all enterprises was very weak, in most cases being limited to the formal side. Notices of meetings were often made only on the day of the meeting (Alapaevsky plant, Nadezhdinsky plant). The reports were poorly worked out and far from everywhere. In some places, the plant committees simply printed a report and hung it on the walls, without subjecting it to discussion at meetings (N [izhne] ‐Tagil plant, V [erkhne] ‐Turinsky plant). In order to secure the presence of workers at the meeting, some factory committees used coercive measures.
At the N [Izhna] ‐Salda plant, the workers were told that ʺthe trade union charter will be applied to those who did not appear.ʺ The result was 90% turnout. However, the meeting was held with the complete passivity of the workers.
The weakness of the preparatory work led to the passivity of workers in a number of enterprises during the re‐election ‐ failure to attend meetings, passivity at meetings, etc. In total, over 50 facts of disruption of meetings were registered: at the Kushvinsky, N [izhne] ‐Saldinsky, V [erkhne] ‐Saldinsky, Pavlovsky, Aminsky, Miass, Motovilikhinsky, N
[izhne] ‐Tagil, Simsk, Nadezhdinsky plants.
On the part of certain groups of workers, passivity during the reelection was motivated by the fact that: “Choose, do not elect to a trade union, but there is still no benefit, our proposals are not being implemented” (blast‐furnace shop of the Nadezhda plant). “All the same, they will decide without us and do it in their own way” (Pavlovsky plant).
Along with this, at some enterprises the workers explained their passivity by food difficulties.
“We work until we drop, but there is nothing to eat. But they treat us to various re‐elections and meetings” (worker of the Nadezhdinsky plant, has a connection with the countryside). ʺWe must first of all feed the workers, and then ask them and drive them every day to meetings.ʺ (N. Turinsky plant).
It should be noted that for a number of enterprises, major shortcomings that took place at the beginning of the campaign for re‐election of factory committees were eliminated with the help of workersʹ teams allocated by the regional committee. In their large and successful work, the brigades did not always meet with appropriate support from the factory committees.
At the Zlatoust plant, the opinion of the brigadiers about the need to cancel the re‐elections in order to carry out the reporting campaign a second time (since the reporting campaign carried out by the plant committee was clearly unsatisfactory), was met with a negative attitude from the workers of the plant committees, who said that these meetings allegedly detach workers from the implementation of the industrial financial plan.
The course of the reporting and re‐election meetings
The speeches of the workers at most enterprises concerned mainly shortcomings in the work of the plant committees in the area of fulfilling the industrial financial plan. The weakness of the fight against negative phenomena in production was noted: truancy, violations of labor discipline (Zlatoust mechanical plant, Kusinsky, Aminsky, Minyarsky plants), lack of leadership in socialist competition and shock work (Kusinsky, V [erhne] ‐Turinsky, Lysvensky, N [Izhne] ‐Tagilsky factories), weakness, and in some places a complete lack of cultural work (N [Izhne] ‐Tagil, Kaslinsky, Lysvensky, Zlatoust metal works). In some cases, it was pointed out that self‐criticism was clamped down (N. Shaitansky plant).
A number of trade union and party organizations reacted extremely inattentively to the compilation of lists of candidates for the new composition of factory committees. As a result, many of the nominations recommended by local organizations were rejected by workersʹ meetings.
The approach of some plant committees to the selection of candidates is illustrated by the following example: the head of the cultural department of the Nadezhdinsky plant committee, meeting a worker of blast‐furnace shop No. 2 on the street, told him: “Two candidates are needed from your shop. Write down who you know, otherwise I have no time, I have to go to the meeting as soon as possible” (Nadezhdinsky plant).
Due to the lack of proper elaboration of candidates, a number of alien elements (former White Guards, former prison warden, embezzler, anti‐Soviet people, etc.) got into the lists proposed by party cells and factory committees. In most cases, workers rejected such candidates.
At the Vysokogorsk plant, the meeting nominated two former active White Guards. At the N [Izhna] ‐Salda plant, the meeting rejected the candidacy of the former prison warden. A member of the church council has been assigned to the drying shop of the Simsky plant.
Sometimes the frivolous attitude of the factory committees to reelections provoked an organized protest from the workers.
In the rolling and turning shop of the Nadezhdinsky plant, the workers did not go to the meeting in protest against the nominated anti‐Soviet drunkard and truant.
At the Motovilikha plant, a member of the plant committee tried to vote not on a personal list, but only on the number of candidates, since he did not have a list. The workers refused to vote.
In some enterprises, unwanted persons have passed.
At the Kasli plant, the factory committee was expelled from the party for speculation. At the V [erkhne] Turin plant, one expelled from the party for systematic drunkenness and absenteeism and one dispossessed (former officer) was elected to the plant committee. In the steam‐power shop of the Kushva plant, the elected chairman of the shop bureau said: ʺIf they pay little, I wonʹt work.ʺ
Activities of anti‐Soviet elements
The anti‐Soviet element manifested itself during the re‐election campaign mainly through agitation in groups of workers against participation in the re‐election, using dissatisfaction with food difficulties. Along with this, several speeches of anti‐Soviet elements were noted at pre‐election meetings.
In connection with the proposal to deduct one dayʹs earnings for the construction of a squadron in response to the Popeʹs ʺcrusadeʺ, at the N [Izhna] ‐Tagil plant there was a speech: ʺHow long will such violence continue? .. What do we care about the crusade when we ourselves will we be there soon? .. We workday and night, and those who brought this challenge are not workers, they only rob the workers and get money for this, but we workday and night and sit on the same rye bread” ... (N [Izhne] ‐Tagil plant).
At a meeting of the Lysvensky plant, the speech of the former SocialistRevolutionary: ʺThe factory committee does not pay attention to the health of the workersʺ provoked replies: ʺThere are no resorts for the workers, but there are fat‐faced workers and the administrationʺ (Lysvensky plant).
At the N [Izhna] ‐Sapda plant, a former large grain merchant spoke out: “We were starved to death, there is no flour, there is no meat either, even if we die of hunger. We have nothing
to choose a new factory committee, we have been drawing up various orders and resolutions for the 13th year already, but we are still living in hunger” (N [izhne] ‐Saldinsky plant).
Head of INFO OGPU Zaporozhets
Head of Division 2 Grosman
Dispatched:
1) Menzhinsky; 2) Berry; 3) Messing; 4) Evdokimov; 5) Tovstukhe (for Comrade Stapin); 6) Molotov; 7) Kaganovich; 8) Ordzhonikidze; 9)
Shvernik; 10) Kaminsky; 11) Malenkov; 12‐19) To the OGPU; 20) In business; 21‐23) In the department.
INFO OGPU on the negative aspects in the course of the reduction of workers in the textile industry of the Ministry of Defense and IPO. As of June 8, 1930
June 14, 1930
No. 385235 Top secret
The reduction of workers in the textile industry in a number of enterprises was carried out without sufficient preparatory and explanatory work on the part of trade organizations. As a result, there were a number of facts of incorrect layoffs and, in some enterprises, a massive submission of applications for reinstatement at work.
These abnormalities during the reduction were widely used by the antiSoviet element, under the influence of the agitation of which unhealthy moods were noted among certain groups of workers (Seredskie factories, the Kutuzov factory, Shuya factories, the Dzerzhinsky factory ‐ IPO; Vysokovskaya, Trekhgornaya, Sobolevo‐Shchelkovskaya ‐ Moscow region).
At the Krasny Perekop factory (Yaroslavl okr., IPO), there was an attempted suicide of one redundant worker. At the Yuzhskaya factory (Kineshemsky okr., IPO) one worker (whose wife was laid off) tried to beat the assistant manager of the factory.
Despite the intensified agitation of the anti‐Soviet element and a number of shortcomings in the course of the reduction, there were no particularly sharp manifestations of discontent both on the part of the downsized and on the part of the bulk of the workers in the textile industry.
1. Lack of preparatory and explanatory work
In a number of factories, during the reduction, the weakness of preparatory and explanatory work on the part of trade organizations and the administration was noted. In some cases, workers found out about layoffs only when lists of those to be cut were posted. When compiling the lists to be reduced, there were a number of shortcomings. The lists were sometimes compiled without any participation of the factory committee; in a number of cases, property status was determined using questionnaires completed 2‐3 years ago; the lists included persons who had not worked at the factory for a long time, the deceased, young women workers were included in the list of those being cut by age, etc.
At a number of factories, the administration for a long period did not have data on the size and procedure for reduction, did not know the conditions for transferring the reduced to other factories (in some cases, the issue of placing workers in other factories was not considered at all and in fact was entirely dependent on the discretion of foremen and timekeepers).
Certain groups of workers refused to move to other enterprises, demanding that the issue be discussed at general meetings.
Moscow region At the Weaving Factory No. 3 of the 3rd KhBT (Orekhovo‐Zuevsky District), there was no explanatory work to reduce the number of workers among the workers. The workers learned about the layoffs only after the list of those to be made redundant was posted. From May 16, groups of workers went to the director, the FZK and the cell, complaining about the wrong reduction. Having failed to get a satisfactory answer from the director, the workers turned to the secretary of the cell, who said: ʺGo to the factory, this is not my business, I am only examining Party affairs.ʺ The chairman of the factory committee, in turn, sent the workers to the administration, saying: ʺThis is not my business, go to the administration or submit an application to the RKK.ʺ
At the Weaving Factory No. 1 (the same district), the reduction was carried out in a ʺcabinet orderʺ. The property status of workers was drawn up according to cards filled in 3‐4 years ago; during this time, the property status of many workers changed, and therefore a number of needy workers were included in the number of those laid off.
At Trekhgornaya Manufactory (Moscow), the question of the size and procedure for reduction was not finally clarified by mid‐May. The lists were not prepared, the transfer of some workers to other enterprises was carried out unscheduled (in some cases at the discretion of foremen and timekeepers).
The workers were summoned directly from their apartments to hand over the transfer summons. There was also no sufficient agreement with the enterprises to which the laid off workers were transferred.
In this regard, out of those sent on May 14 to other enterprises (factorykitchen, Trumpark, etc.) 99 people, up to 70%, returned back. A group of returnees (20‐25 people), showing sharp discontent, demanded to convene a meeting, while shouts were noted: ʺYou are mocking us, chasing us, this is violence.ʺ
IPO. At the Seredi factories, workersʹ meetings were not convened in connection with the layoffs. Reduced lists were compiled by only one head of personnel.
The FZK and the party collective, even during the layoffs, did not know the technique, the timing of the downsizing and the list of those to be reduced. Instead of an explanation in early May, only brief information was provided on the reasons for the reduction. Absolutely no preparatory work was carried out for the transfer of those being cut from the V [Verkhne] Seredskaya factory to the Nizhnyaya one.
Deficiencies in training and insufficient explanatory work were also noted at the Glukhovsky manufactory, the Liver, the Serp and the Molot, and them. Frunze, the factory. Vagzhanov, ʺProletarkaʺ, Vyshnevolotskaya manufactory, Ozersk factories ‐ Moscow region; at the Shuisky factories, Yamskaya factory, Teikovskaya, ʺIII
Internationalʺ, the factory. Zinoviev and others ‐ IPO.
2. Incorrect contraction
The weak participation of factories in the preparation and implementation of redundancies led to a number of errors in the reduction and transfer of workers to other factories.
In some factories, workers were included in the lists of redundancies without taking into account the degree of need, production experience, and qualifications.
In a number of cases, those who were financially insecure, the poor, widows, etc. quit, while those who were financially secure, and in some cases even socially alienated, remained at work.
Some facts of arbitrariness on the part of the factory administration were noted. At the Sosnevskaya Manufactory (IPO), female workers were fired for failure to comply with the clearly unbearable requirements of the administration. At the ʺProletarkaʺ (MO) factory, workers who were absent due to illness were included in the lists of those to be made redundant.
At the Vperyod factory of the 2nd KhBT (Kolomna okr.), A number of poor people, multi‐family, with a long production experience, and so on were among the dismissed. Thus, a weaver with 20 years of experience in production, who fulfills the norm by 111‐116% and has a family of 4 people, was reduced, and a worker with 25 years of experience with a family of 9 people was reduced.
At the Vyshnevolotsk manufactory (Tver okr.), The fact of the reduction of the Komsomol member, member of the FZK and an active social activist was noted.
On April 30, at the Sosnevskaya Manufactory (Ivanovo settlement), the group of weavers (45 people) was reduced, among them were old female workers (20‐25 years of experience), widows who had no means of subsistence, etc. One employee was laid off because she had 4 complaints for not removing the stump, while she could not leave the car unattended.
At the 8 Marta factory (Ivanovo, IPO), 20 old female production workers, many needy women, widows were among those dismissed; some of them were cut for non‐fulfillment of industrial assignments. The reduced were denied the issuance of the one‐and‐ahalf‐month severance pay due to them.
At the factory ʺIII Internationalʺ (Aleksandrovsky okr.), A group of 12 people was not included in the list of those to be reduced, including those who were serving sentences for criminal offenses: a former police officer, a former priest, a weaver who disrupted in December of this year a meeting on the question of the implementation of the third loan of industrialization, and a number of those noticed in theft, at the same time, workers were fired, who had not had a single comment during their entire work at the factory.
The facts of incorrect reduction were also noted at the Krasny Profintern factory, IPO, Dreznenskaya and Weaving factories No. 3 in the Orekhovo‐Zuevsky okr., At the factory. Sverdlov Moscow okr. and a number of others.
Improper layoffs have led to massive applications for reinstatement in a number of factories. A significant percentage of those who applied were reinstated at work.
At the Drezny factory (Orekhovo‐Zuevsky okr.) 986 people were to be laid off, of which 809 people filed applications for the wrong reduction. As of May 22, 371 applications were considered, 149 people were left at work.
At the Vysokovskaya factory (Tverskoy HBT, Klinsky District, Moskovsky District), out of 1048 people slated for redundancy, 286 filed applications for an incorrect reduction, 151 people were reinstated. In addition, 60 applications were submitted to the labor inspector, 7 people were reinstated.
At three factories of the Shuysky env. (IPO) 109 people out of 207 who filed applications for wrong redundancy were reinstated.
In the Kineshma factories (IPO) 50% of those laid off were reinstated.
Restoration of incorrectly downsized workers at work was also noted in a number of other factories (Weaving factories No. 1 and No. 2 ‐ Orekhovo‐Zuevsky okr., International factory No. 1 ‐ Moskovsky okr., Serp and Molot factory ‐ Kolomensky okr., Krasny Profintern factory ʺ,
Factory named after Korolev, Shuiskie factories, etc. ‐ IPO).
3. Activities of an anti‐Soviet and socially alien element
Certain anti‐Soviet, socially alien individuals and groups, both before and during the layoffs, significantly intensified their activities in order to aggravate the general discontent of workers with the layoffs and shutdowns of factories.
In addition to agitation in groups of workers and the spread of provocative rumors, there were also open speeches at meetings, threats against trade union workers, calls for strikes, etc.
Here are the most typical facts:
At Trekhgornaya Manufactory (Moscow) on May 15, at a meeting in the weaving shop on the issue of reductions, there were sharp statements by individual Trotskyists.
A former active member of the Trotskyist group made a demand to switch from six machines to four: “We were strangled with these 6 machines, if there is no yarn, let them switch to 3‐4 machines again. We are silent, but we must fight and get our way. We have been intimidated for 12 years. We must, as one, stand for each other. ʺ The performance was greeted with loud applause.
The party that advocated the reduction was not allowed to speak.
Before the adoption of the resolution, the piecer (active Trotskyist) made a proposal: ʺTo consider that the reduction is carried out as a result of rationalizationʺ (so that the workers demanded a three‐month severance pay). However, the meeting adopted a resolution proposed by the presidium.
In a private conversation with the secretary of the Komsomol cell, the said piecer said: ʺIf Lev Davydovich was there, he would have helped us in our difficulties.ʺ
Anti‐Soviet protests were noted at the Dedovskoy factory (Moscow suburb): “Are the workers not being strangled now?! We need a tsar and drive out the Soviet government. They are forcibly driven into collective farms, but we will not go to collective farms, we will go to the communists with a pitchfork. ʺ
Drezno factory (Moscow region, Orekhovo‐Zuevsky district). The laborer to be laid off threatened to ʺgo to the factory and kill one of our defenders.ʺ
At the same factory, there was a threat to the address of the FZK employee and the administration from another laborer (economic department), scheduled to be laid off (the said worker had a criminal record of hooliganism).
Big Ivanovo‐Voznesenskaya Manufactory (IPO). A group of anti‐Soviet people led by a former member of the All‐Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (City Council member) campaigned among the workers for demanding that the administration be paid 100 percent for workers during the stoppage of the enterprise and to increase the payment for marriage, and urged workers not to go to meetings. One of the antiSoviet workers (a former policeman) campaigned for the convening of a conference of all workers of the Ivanovo textile enterprises.
Big Dmitrovskaya Manufactory (IPO). The anti‐Soviet element was strenuously agitating against the proposed measures, calling for ʺrallying and opposing the rulersʺ, ʺreckoning with the communists.ʺ There were calls for a strike: “You are all afraid of something, it’s time for us to unite and oppose the rulers.” ʺWhy are these meetings and plans tormenting the workers, only violence.ʺ ʺWe must put an end to all this, stop the mockery of the workers.ʺ “The government sends all the best of goods and products abroad, and from there they donʹt give us anything, there is no cotton, the factories will soon shut down. Then weʹll reckon with the communists. ʺ ʺWe have to stop the factory if they donʹt raise wages.ʺ
4. Unhealthy attitudes among certain groups of workers
In connection with shortcomings in the course of downsizing, especially due to the lack of sufficient explanatory work and under the influence of the agitation of the anti‐Soviet element, unhealthy sentiments were recorded among certain groups of workers in a number of enterprises.
There were protests against the five‐year plan, dispossession of kulaks, socialist competition, etc., indications were recorded that the recently made transition to compacted work and three shifts was inexpedient, since ʺas a result, workers are now being laid offʺ; there were isolated facts of a decrease in the intensity of labor on the part of certain groups of workers.
Seredskie mills (IPO.) At a meeting of workers of a spinning mill
(attended by 400 people), a reel worker made the following statement:
“For 13 years our comrades have had a lot of mistakes and shortcomings, there are also abuses. Under Nicholas everything was, and now what has become, the herring is gone. Couldnʹt the communists have taken into account that there was not enough cotton, where did they have their heads?! They stop the factory for May Day, we will go for a walk and get money, and in order to stop for Christmas or Easter for two or three days, the workers would agree without payment, but for some reason such holidays interfere with comrades. Now both the church and the priests ‐ everything has become superfluous and everything interferes. The peasantry has nothing to breathe from the tax: if you get two or three cows, they consider it a fist, but what kind of fist is he when he has worked out by his own labor? It would be necessary to make sure that the peasants untie their hands, otherwise taxes are not fought only with a cat and a dog. You shouldnʹt be dispossessed either. ʺ
A significant part of the workers greeted the workerʹs speech with applause and left the meeting with him when the speaker made a speech in return.
At a meeting of workers in a weaving factory on April 25 (400 people attended), there were sharp protests against the upcoming downsizing and stopping of textile factories, mainly from workers who have an economy in the countryside and are subject to dismissal.
“Where was the Soviet government before, why didnʹt they take care of the cotton? Didnʹt the party know that?! She knew before and simply wants to throw the peasants overboard as a worthless element, and leave the proletariat, which lives better than the peasant, to leave. We, the peasants, also want to work, who is to blame if not the authorities?
“Why did the party bring us to this?! The workers were constantly urged on, everything was not enough, three machines were piled on one worker, four were piled up, and now everything was cut short, and they want to go to the peasantry, drive him out of the factory where he worked all his life; and the proletarians are abandoned even by those who have a decent atmosphere and at home, while the peasant lives as in a stable. If the peasants are fired, then the proletariat will have nothing to do, the peasant will not earn him bread. ʺ
The meeting supported these speeches with applause and did not allow the workers to speak, who pointed out the need for layoffs. It was difficult to create a change in the mood of the workers.
Vysokovskaya factory (Moscow environs). On May 25, at a meeting of female workers (in the barracks), there were protests against the reduction, as well as against the introduction of payment for utilities. Individual shouts were heard: ʺThings will come to an insurrection.ʺ
Assistant Head of INFO OGPU Gerasimov
Head of Division 2 Grosman
Dispatched:
1) Menzhinsky; 2) Berry; 3) Messing; 4) Evdokimov; 5) Tovstukha (for Stalin); 6) Molotov; 7) Kaganovich; 8) Kaminsky; 9) Kovraisky; 10) Shvernik; 11) Ordzhonikidze; 12) Melnichansky; 13) Evreinov; 14) Kaul; 15) Olsky; 16) Artuzov; 17) Agranov; 18) Zaporozhets; 19) Prokofiev; 20) Bokiyu; 21) Blagonravov; 22) Beginning. I branch; 23) Beginning. 5 branches; 24) Velsky; 25) Wiesel; 26) In business; 27‐29) In the department.
INFO OGPU on shortcomings in the work of cooperation between industrial districts and cities of the Union (January‐June 1930). July 20, 193
July 20, 1930
No. 385754 Top secret
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Unsettled consumer accounting
2. Shortcomings in the organization of distribution
3. Spoilage of food and supply of poor‐quality food to the population
4. Unsatisfactory progress of procurements and mismanagement in the organization of suburban farms
5. Unsatisfactory organization of public catering
6. Littering of the personnel of the cooperative apparatus
7. Excesses
Applications:
No. 1. Information about abnormalities in the work of the cooperative ʺVasileostrovetsʺ ‐ mountains. Leningrad;
No. 2. Information on excesses due to supply disruptions (April‐July 1930).
An analysis of the reasons for the increase in supply disruptions to industrial districts and cities suggests that major shortcomings in the work of cooperative and procurement organizations play a significant role in aggravating food difficulties.
Lack of accounting for consumers, which leads to a significant overspending of products in some regions, and a sharp shortage of basic products in others; late delivery of groceries to stores and poor organization of distribution, as a result of which queues at stores are chronic; massive spoilage of products and the sale of substandard products; lack of initiative and indiscriminateness in the organization of procurement and in the use of local resources; facts of blatant mismanagement in the organization of suburban farms; poor catering, etc. — all these abnormalities, to one degree or another, are characteristic of cooperative organizations in most industrial districts and cities.
These shortcomings in the work of cooperative organizations cause strong discontent among significant groups of workers in the main industrial districts; these same shortcomings are in most cases the direct cause of a number of excesses on the basis of industrial difficulties (Ukraine, SKK, IPO, etc.).
1. Unsettled consumer accounting
In a number of cities and industrial districts of the Ivanovo industrial region, Sibkrai, the Urals, etc., significant shortcomings in the organization of consumer accounting were found ‐ there are a significant number of
persons who are not subject to supply in a planned manner, non‐labor elements, ʺdeadʺ souls, etc.; The categorization of consumers is also incorrect.
Along with this, facts of abnormalities and abuse were established when issuing food cards.
These circumstances, as well as non‐observance of the norms for the issuance of products, led to a significant overspending of products in a number of regions.
IPO. According to Iv.EPO, in Ivanovo as of May 184500 people were on the planned supply. According to the Statistics Bureau, only 168,000 people are to be supplied in a planned manner. Thus, in May, 237 tons of flour were over‐consumed (in April 151 tons). A similar situation, taking into account consumers in the Yaroslavl EPO (cards are spent uncontrollably. As of June 1, the CRC lacks 39,000 cards), Kovrovsky (in May, the CRC had 76 tons of flour overrun), Sudogodsky (in May, the CRC had an overrun of 384 centners in bread) and Yuriev‐ Polish CRK.
The number of consumers of Iv.EPO and other software was determined according to the address table, seasonal workers were counted 2 times (according to the information from the address desk and from the building organizations). There are many disenfranchised and deceased among the persons registered with the software.
The accounting of book books is so confusing that the Board of IEPO does not know how many books have been received from the printing house, how many have been issued to consumers and how many are in the Share Department. Issuance of cards takes place without receipt and expense reports. When checking, it turned out that a number of construction organizations issued more books than there are workers (in May, Ivstroy issued 8740 cards with 4500 seasonal workers). Often, during the transition from building to building, the cards are not taken away from the seasonal workers, and new ones are issued on another building. On June 8, an unemployed person was detained, who were found to have 39 bread cards.
The storage of collection books, cards and additional coupons is so poorly organized that anyone can get them. In June, a number of cases of theft of significant quantities of cards were noted (measures to regulate consumer accounting and other abnormalities are being taken).
The board of Yuryevo‐Polsky PO did not adhere to the norms for the issuance of products established by the Regional Trade Department. By order of the Board in January‐February this year. d. II category instead of 8 kg received 12 kg of flour, sugar instead of 250 gr. ‐ 400 gr. etc. Due to the systematic overspending of scarce products, by June 15, PO had almost no white flour at all.
Irkutsk. As of June, the Board of the Central Regional Committee submitted to the Okrtorgotdel an application for 97,000 people, while in fact only 83,000 people are subject to planned supply. At the same time, the Board demanded a subsidy in the amount of 253 tons of bread. The survey established that the Irkutsk Central Regional Committee has a surplus of grain in the amount of 249 ʹtons.
The order of the Sibraytorgotdel on the organization of shock brigades to check the contingent of consumers is ignored by the Board of the CRC. On June 3, a briefing meeting was convened at the Okrtorgotdel on the methods of work of the shock brigades, where the Central Regional Committee refused to send its representative, as a result the timely organization of the brigades was disrupted.
Mountains. Barnaul (Siberia). As a result of the unsettled accounting of the contingent of consumers, 20,000 poods were overspending in the first half of May. of bread. Local organizations, instead of starting to check the composition of shareholders, decided to reduce the bread norms for workers and their families.
Mountains. Minusinsk (Siberia). In total, the city has a working population of 12128 people (with families). The supply of the GorPO consisted of 20,000 people. When checking it, it turned out that among the ʺworkingʺ population there is a significant percentage (about 7000 people) of merchants, disenfranchised, admirals, etc. (those responsible for incorrect registration were brought to justice).
Ural. According to the statistics department, there are 51,000 eaters in Tagil. There are 63,000 eaters on the centralized supply of the CRC, which gives a significant overspending of scarce products. Instead of checking the contingent of consumers, the Central Dispatch Center reduced the norms for issuing products.
On the other hand, in a number of districts (Nizkrai, SVK, Siberia, etc.), a very tense situation has been created in food supply due to the increase in the number of workers ‐ due to the influx of seasonal workers ‐ in additional supply of products for which the supplying organizations refuse.
Nizhny. The tense situation with food supply, in addition to the systematic reduction of the delivery plan, was created due to a significant increase in the number of workers at the expense of seasonal workers (40,000 people). The center refused to issue products for seasonal workers (excluding new buildings), as a result of which the local software reduces the norms of products for the main cadres of workers at industrial enterprises.
Mountains. Syzran (SVK). Since April, the number of workers subject to planned supply has increased significantly due to seasonal and construction workers. However, the Kraysoyuz plan does not provide for their food supply. The deficit as of May 10 was expressed as follows: for rye flour ‐ 959.39 tons, for wheat flour ‐ 59.12 tons, for cereals ‐ 72 tons, etc.
2. Shortcomings in the organization of distribution
As a result of significant shortcomings in the organization of distribution (untimely delivery of products and goods to stores; multiple points of delivery: meat ‐ in one store, vegetables ‐ in another, bread ‐ in a third, etc.; lack of planning in attaching consumers to stores; insufficient service staff, etc.), queues at stores everywhere are chronic.
Mountains. Moscow. 6 and 7 November in a number of shops in Krasnopresnensky district instead of 6‐7 hours. In the morning, the bread was delivered at 12‐13 pm, and the bread received was 50% less than the need. On May 22, June 4 and 5, there was absolutely no black bread in store No. 1 (Sokolniki). On June 1 and 2, there was no black bread in store No. 8 (Sokolniki). Similar facts were noted for a number of stores in the Khamovnichesky and Bauman regions.
In June‐July, milk was delivered to stores with a significant delay in a number of stores in the Khamovnichesky, Krasnopresnensky, Baumansky and Zamoskvoretsky districts (at 10‐12 oʹclock instead of 7 oʹclock in the morning), which caused queues at the stores.
Mountains. Ivanovo. At the end of June, there were significant queues (from 400 to 700 people) in the city for sugar and kerosene. The queues are conditioned by the fact that sugar is sold only in Iv.GUM stores, and in Iv.EPO stores there is no sugar, kerosene is delivered only to the shops of the center, but it is not brought to the outskirts.
Mountains. Kanavino (Nizhkrai). To get rationed products and manufactured goods, you need to stand in several lines, since bread is issued in one store, meat in another, milk in a third, and vegetables in a fourth.
Tagil Central Recreation Center (Urals). Attaching consumers to stores is haphazard. 12,000 people are assigned to one store, 2,000 to another, 3,000 to a third, etc., as a result of which there are queues, crush and fights at a number of stores. To eliminate the abnormalities, the Board of the Central Regional Committee does not take any measures. Grozny (SKK). On March 13, there was no kerosene in the entire city. On March 14, from early morning, huge queues formed at the stores selling kerosene, stretching for several blocks. The reason is that private traders were forbidden to deliver kerosene for sale around the city, and the Central Dispatch Center not only did not establish delivery, but did not even supply the corresponding stores with kerosene.
Mountains. Bryansk. Despite the sufficient amount of kerosene in the oil warehouse, its release in June is extremely limited due to the fact that the Central Recreation Commission was unable to organize timely delivery to the stores. All oil shops had significant queues.
In July, due to the indiscriminate nature of the Board of the Central Committee of the Russian Federation, there was a strong crush when distributing shoes in store No. 21, as a result three women were seriously injured, one of them died.
3. Spoilage of food and supply of poor‐quality food to the population
In connection with poor transportation, the lack of appropriate storage facilities and the untimely sale of perishable products, the facts of spoilage of significant consignments of highly scarce products (meat, fish, vegetables) have become more frequent in recent years. A number of facts of supplying consumers with substandard products were also registered. The facts of supply of poor quality (poorly baked) bread are noted everywhere.
Moscow region In Moscow, in July, unbaked bread was systematically delivered from bakeries No. 101, 114 and 200.
Mountains. Kolomna. Despite the tense situation with meat, Kolomsoyuz in March sent 15 carcasses of pork meat, completely unfit for consumption, and 4 barrels of spoiled herring to the Kolomna Central Regional Commission.
Ozerskoe CDC received from MOSPO 2 wagons of spoiled meat, which the CDC used for processing into sausage.
Ukraine, Odessa. On May 22, at the Slobodka bazaar, a significant excess took place due to the distribution of poor‐quality fish, which affected up to 1000 people.
CCM. Novorossiysk. On April 26, the Novorossiysk Central Recycling Center delivered 3 boxes of rotten fish to the distributor of the Proletary cement plant. On June 28, in connection with the distribution of lowquality bread, there was a significant excess.
Grozny. Thanks to the negligence of the seller of the stall, 300 kg of meat deteriorated in June, which was then put‐on sale.
The potatoes intended for the Central Dispatch Center were on the way for over 2 weeks and deteriorated by 50%.
In Grozny and Maykop, due to the unsanitary state of bakeries, baked bread systematically contains various waste (glass, nails, cigarette butts, ropes, dead mice, etc.).
Rostov. At the factories ʺZhest‐Westenʺ, them. Voroshilov, ʺRed Bannerʺ, Brick‐tile plant, SKOF, them. Vorovskogo and others. During June, poor‐quality bread was almost always delivered.
Due to the lack of a sufficient number of refrigerators in January, the local EPOs were forced to begin to intensify the sale of existing meat reserves, even letting them go at a double rate. At the same time, without the corresponding applications from the EPO, Kraysoyuz opened an additional 5 wagons of beef and 2 ʹ/ 2 wagons of sausage meat. The resulting excess meat began to burn. A two‐week supply has accumulated at the sausage factory. The meat was lying in large piles without bedding in the yard and was spoiled.
Town of Mines. In June, about ІѴ2 wagons of lightly salted fish lay for a long time in the fish base of the Shakhty Central Regional Committee, and only when the fish began to deteriorate was it distributed to shops. In addition, due to careless storage, about 10,000 poods of potatoes have become unusable.
IPO. In the Vichugsky Central Reconstruction Center, due to the lack of appropriate storage facilities and untimely distribution of products to shops, in June 71 barrels of roach and a significant amount of onions, cereals, sugar and sausages were damaged.
Yakovlevsky EPO in April brought 60 poods of lightly salted fish and
24 kg of yeast to the dump.
In the warehouses of Yves. For 3 months EPO lay a significant consignment of beaten poultry, tomatoes, herring and other
products. As a result, all the poultry, 80 barrels of tomato, 80 boxes of pasta, a wagon of herring were damaged. Despite the spoilage, these products were taken to shops for sale in May.
Sudogodsky Central Recreation Center. Due to the lack of storage space for vegetables, 100 poods of carrots and beets rotted in February.
Smolensk. Due to poor salting (salting was carried out without the supervision of a specialist by day laborers, among whom there were many disenfranchised), 1,576 kg of corned beef were brought to the landfill in June. Out of about 5,000 poods of corned beef available in the warehouses of the Central Recreation Center, up to 40‐45% are considered unfit for consumption.
Ural. Ust‐Katavskiy TsRK (Zlatoust district). The frozen meat that arrived in June was piled up in a warehouse. When the meat went bad, they began to give it out to the population without any norm.
Siberia. In April, the Telbess CRK removed 577 kg of spoiled onions to the landfill, the Kemerovo CRK ‐ 2 wagons of onions, and 1196 poods of spoiled salted cabbage were found in the warehouse of the Krasnoyarsk CRC. Due to the fault of the Kansk Central Regional Committee 2 wagons of onions were frozen.
DCK. In May, the Central Regional Committee of the Suchanskiy mines burned 400 poods of spoiled meat; in the mountains. Imane (Khabarovsk Okrug), 200 poods of meat were spoiled in the ʺTrudʺ GorPO, which was then salted and put‐on sale.
On the basis of the sale of substandard products, cases of mass consumer poisoning have become more frequent.
Moscow region in the mountains. Ryazan in June, there were several cases of poisoning with milk and cheese curds.
Ukraine. On June 19, in Kiev, 50 children and a number of residents were poisoned in an orphanage (on Krasnoarmeyskaya Street) with food purchased in the Central Recreation Center.
In Sumy on June 21, 22 and 23, a significant number of cases of fish poisoning were registered. 6 people died (11 employees of the Central Regional Committee and a medical doctor were arrested).
On June 29, in Dnepropetrovsk, 37 children and a cleaning lady were poisoned by eating poor‐quality cottage cheese bought in the Central Recreation Center in children (on Poleva Street).
North Caucasus. In Taganrog, over 18 days of June, 147 cases of poisoning with poor‐quality products were registered.
4. Unsatisfactory progress of procurements and mismanagement in the organization of suburban farms
The procurement of basic foodstuffs in a number of regions is unsatisfactory. Significant abnormalities in the organization of suburban farms.
Sibkrai. Procurement of meat compared to last year is weak. On May 1, prepared:
April 1930
1929 g of Aprel.
Cattle ‐ heads
1435
36136
Sheeps
2182
63775
Pigs
712
991
Beef ‐ centners
1144
6654
The situation is similar with the procurement of oil and other agricultural products. As of May 1, butter was prepared in the amount of 32.9% of the monthly plan; instead of 33,000,000 eggs, only 4 million eggs were prepared according to the plan.
It should be noted that last year, despite the quite favorable circumstances for the procurement of meat and agricultural products, due to the inertia of the apparatus of procurement organizations and the negligence of the cooperation workers, the procurement was ruined.
At this time, despite the severity of the situation with food supply, procurement and cooperative organizations have done nothing to organize their pig breeding and other farms. In most of the canteens of the Central Recreation Center, leftovers from meals and other waste are not used at all for fattening operations.
North Caucasus. According to information as of June 1, the procurement of meat has almost ceased, the procurement of other agricultural products is weak.
In the organization of suburban farms of Rostov, Shakhtinsky and especially Novorossiysk Central Regional Commissions, there is an exceptional mismanagement. The cattle houses were not built until May. Most of the dairy cattle were kept outdoors. The pigsties are unequipped, cramped (in one pigsty there are up to 700 pigs), the cows are fed only with cake and straw. Due to the lack of veterinary supervision, livestock is infected with foot and mouth disease. The death of livestock is massive. On the Novorossiysk suburban economy, out of 800 cows, 300 remain. Chickens and pigs die in dozens.
Transcaucasia. The procurement of meat and agricultural products is unsatisfactory. Across Armenia by October 1 of this year It was supposed to procure 27,000 head of cattle and 60,000 small livestock. As of May 1, only 15% of the quarterly plan was prepared. The reasons are the inertness of the procurement apparatus and the great diversity of prices for cattle (each republic has its own prices).
A number of procurement organizations (Zaksoyuz, Zakselsoyuz, Soyuzmoloko, etc.) had not yet begun procurement until June 1.
5. Unsatisfactory organization of public catering
Special mention should be made of major abnormalities in the organization of public catering.
The extremely insufficient network of canteens and their insignificant capacity lead to the presence of long queues, causing absenteeism and downtime at enterprises; the poor quality of the meals, the unsanitary condition of a number of canteens, the use of substandard food for meals and, as a result, a number of facts of mass poisoning painfully affect the mood of the workers.
Leningrad. A queue (50‐100 people) is created in the canteen of the Krasnoye Znamya factory every day 15‐20 minutes before the beep, as there is often not enough lunch.
On June 19, at the State Card Factory, a group of workers in the machine shop did not start work for 15 minutes, demanding an improvement in the quality of meals.
Ural. The network of canteens is insufficient. Existing canteens are overloaded. The quality of the meals is poor. For 876 workers of the Match and Plywood Factory (Tyumen District) in May, only 120 meals were provided. 1200 people at the Shipyard were not provided with meals at all. The quality of meals is often so bad that workers refuse to receive meals (the Uralseparator plant, etc.).
NVK. In Stalingrad, Saratov, Astrakhan, and other cities, due to the insufficient number of canteens and low throughput capacity, workers quit their jobs 15‐20 minutes before the dial tone and stand in line for lunch for 1 hour or more. Despite this, a significant number of workers are left without meals every day.
The Astrakhan CDC in the pursuit of profit reduces the quality of meals. In the canteen of the Peasantʹs House, 350 meals are prepared from food for 300 meals. Canteen # 5 received 7,000 rubles in one month. arrived.
Western region On June 29, lunches for the workers of the machine shop of the Profintern plant (Bryansk district) were delivered 10 minutes after the end of the lunch break. On June 21, due to a delay in the delivery of breakfasts, 300 workers were late for work by 20 minutes. On June 24, no meals were delivered to the hammering shop.
6. Littering of the personnel of the cooperative apparatus
Among the workers in the cooperatives, there is still a significant percentage of socially alien and clearly hostile elements (disenfranchised, former merchants, kulaks, churchmen, former officers ‐ anti‐Soviet, etc.).
IPO. A group (10 people) of socially alien elements, many of them with a criminal past, have been identified in the Gusevsky CRK (Vladimirsky district). The audit of the Central Dispatch Center revealed theft in the amount of 70,000 rubles.
In Iv.EPO (Ivanovo) there are about 100 former traders, their relatives, disenfranchised. A number of former large traders work in the very board of Iv.EPO.
In the Yaroslavl Central Committee of the former anti‐Soviet and socially alien elements, there are up to 70 people (data as of June 15).
Ural. The Tavda cooperation (Irbit district) is littered with a number of socially alien people. Head a branch of the Tavda Central Regional Committee ‐ from a merchantʹs family, supplies the kulaks with scarce goods; the rationalizer‐planner of the Central Revolutionary Committee ‐ the son of a kulak, is associated with kulaks, priests and private traders; shop seller ‐ from kulaks, a former senior noncommissioned officer of the Kolchak army, while working in the cooperative der. Sayatkovo kept close ties with the kulaks, supplying them with scarce goods; cashier ‐ the daughter of a gendarme; head a dining room at the Karstunka pier ‐ a former police officer.
In Solikamsk CRK, the chairman of the board is the son of a merchant, in the past he was engaged in horse speculation. Head central warehouse number 1 ‐ a former Kolchak officer. Cleared from cooperation as former merchants, they continue to work until recently (summary for July 1930).
Siberia. Head Barnaul store number 40 and head. the grocery department was systematically “self‐supplied” with scarce goods, refusing to sell the latter to consumers. When inspecting the store in the last days of February, a number of goods were found under the counters that were left exclusively for self‐supply and for the supply of store employees (the head of the store was brought to justice).
Head shop of the Kansk Central Regional Committee (former assistant to the chief of counterintelligence) systematically supplied local speculators with scarce goods and made unauthorized markups on goods (brought to responsibility).
Head Omsk store TsRC # 21 systematically plundered scarce goods. Significant stocks of these goods were found in his apartment (information as of April 1930).
The still significant contamination of the personnel of cooperative organizations leads to a large number of thefts, abuse, etc.
According to far from complete data, from October 1, 1929 to March 10, 1930 in the main industrial districts (LVO‐AKSSR, Ukraine, IPO, Nizhkrai, SKK, Ural), 1617 cooperative workers were brought to trial on the materials of the OGPU bodies, including workers management boards and audit commissions ‐ 418; employees of warehouses and shops ‐ 828, accounting, technical, etc. ‐ 371.
The percentage of executives brought to responsibility is high (25% in relation to the total number of employees involved and 51% to employees of warehouses and shops).
It is characteristic that the IPO involved the entire management team (8 people) of one Workersʹ Coop; the entire board of the Central Regional Committee of the Leninsky Mine in Siberia was also involved.
Most of the employees are involved in 109 st. UK 1 (917 people).
7. Excesses
In total, in April‐July 1930, due to supply disruptions in cities and industrial districts, more than 20 major excesses were registered with a total number of participants up to 6,000 people, mainly women (Ukrainian SSR, SKK, IPO, Transcaucasia, Siberia, Central Asia, Bashkiria); Moreover, in 7 cases (the largest excesses) there are indications that the immediate cause of the kurtosis was shortcomings in the work of cooperative organizations.
Basically, excesses boil down to the fact that crowds in queues or, having gathered at the board of a cooperative, demand to improve food supply, eliminate abnormalities in the work of cooperation; in a number of cases, demands have been made to convene meetings to discuss supply issues. At the same time, intensified anti‐Soviet agitation is being conducted in the crowd, calls are heard to ʺsmashʺ the cooperatives, beat the communists, and so on. In some cases, there are smashes of co‐melters and beating of cooperative workers.
In most cases, excesses are eliminated by conducting explanatory work.
In a number of cases (Odessa, Novorossiysk, the Kaganovich mine of the Krivoy Rog district; Beloretsk ‐ Bashkiria; Melekess ‐ SVK; Central Asia) the excesses became serious (see Appendix No. 2).
Most of the excesses on the basis of industrial difficulties were registered in Ukraine (Odessa, Stalin district, Krivoy Rog, Artyomovsky district, Tiraspol, Berdyansk).
Appendix: Help on the cooperative ʺVasileostrovetsʺ and facts of excesses due to industrial difficulties.
Deputy Head of INFO OGPU
Gerasimova
Head of Division 2, INFO Grosman
Attachment 1
INFORMATION on abnormalities in the work of the cooperative ʺVasileostrovetsʺ mountains. Leningrad
In the shops, stalls and stalls of the Vasileostrovets cooperative for the period 1929 ‐ early 1930, there were significant abnormalities in the delivery of food, constant queues; in the queues, a large number of scandals and conflicts with cooperative workers were noted, which in most cases ended in police intervention.
The investigation carried out by Info PP LVO found that the queues were artificially created by the very same workers of the cooperation, who spread rumors among the population about the allegedly imminent cessation of the sale of scarce goods. At the same time, these cooperative workers sold scarce goods to the side, private traders.
On the other hand, tent sellers, spreading false rumors among buyers about the arrival of certain products in the tents, created long queues at the stores; in reality, the promised products were not provided, as a result ‐ massive complaints about cooperation, scandals, etc.
It is characteristic that the workers of the counter tried to use their days off on the days of large distribution of products to the population.
In addition, a number of major abuses and abnormalities were identified in the work of the tents and stalls of the cooperative located on the territory of the Andreevsky market. When selling goods to buyers, sellers practiced unauthorized capes on the cost of goods, weighing the buyer, artificially increasing weight by soaking products and a number of other manipulations.
As a result, the surplus from this kind of deception of buyers in some tents and stalls reached the amount of 500‐600 rubles. per month.
In order to hide the surplus shortly before the official inventory of the head. stalls and tents systematically carried out unofficial inventory of goods, after which the surplus was urgently sold without holding the received amounts through the cashier.
Sellers and managers tents were systematically supplied to the owners of private tents, small speculators and their acquaintances with scarce goods. The canteen ʺStock Exchangeʺ, owned by a private trader, operated exclusively on products sold illegally from cooperative tents. In a short period of time, 12 barrels of butter, 15 bags of sugar, 4 boxes of tea, 50 buckets of vegetable oil, etc. were sold to private traders.
The proceeds from the sale of scarce goods to private traders, from the sale of surplus, etc., were divided between the head. tents and sellers, or went to collective carousing and drinking. Drinks were made in the apartment of the head. stall number 8 with the participation of the market administration (market manager, central warehouse manager, etc.). It should be noted that drunkenness was also practiced in the shop during office hours; there were cases when, by the end of the working day, drunken salesmen made scandals in stores, harassed women, etc.
Attempts by individual cooperative workers to fight the existing abnormalities met with active resistance from a close‐knit group of salesmen and managers. tents. The workersʹ correspondents were harassed, giving various offensive names and titles, threatened, transferred to unfamiliar jobs, after which they were fired from their jobs “for non‐compliance”. A member of the CPSU (b) nominee Ionov, after systematic, over the course of several months, a group of sellers was harassed, grabbing on the street, on the way to the board of the cooperative (where Ionov was going to hand over the money), shouting: ʺThe communist was caught, he wanted to steal the money,ʺ ‐ brought to the board. As a result, Ionov went mad.
Among the buyers and workers of the cooperative, this group of sellers carried on daily anti‐Soviet and anti‐Semitic agitation. The shortage of products was explained to the buyer as a result of the wrong policy of the Soviet government in relation to private trade: ʺprivate trade must be supported in every possible way, but it must not be closed, rather it is necessary to close the cooperationʺ, ʺnothing, wait in line, but bring a share to the cooperativeʺ, etc.. P.
A number of facts of clearly pogrom agitation were noted.
PP OGPU in the Leningrad region. it was established that all the noted abnormalities, abuses, etc., were the result of the activities of an organized group of former traders, all members of the group were previously held accountable for various kinds of abuse (theft, speculation, etc.). The group was liquidated in early February 1930 ‐ 10 people were arrested.
Correct:
Assistant to the authorized officer of the 2nd branch of INFO
Pukirev
APPENDIX No. 2
REFERENCE INFORMATION on excesses due to supply disruptions (April‐July 1930)
1.USSR. Mountains. Odessa. On May 22, at the Slobodka bazaar, a large crowd of wives of workers and bazaar tradesmen (up to 1000 people in total) gathered at the shop of the Central House of Culture (CRC) because of the distribution of low‐quality fish; agitation was conducted in the crowd: ʺto go to the factories, to remove the workers there from work, and together with them go to the Executive Committee with a demand to improve supplies.ʺ
A portrait of Comrade Lenin and the slogan ʺGive me something to eatʺ appeared in the crowd.
The excess was eliminated on May 22 by explanatory work and the withdrawal of the initiators, but a tense mood was also observed on May 23, when a crowd of women (up to 500 people), gathered at Slobodka, demanded to arrange a meeting on food supply; after the explanatory work, the crowd dispersed.
The workersʹ meetings convened on May 24 in most of the enterprises were satisfactory; the workers condemned the women’s performance.
2. On July 7, over 500 people (mostly workersʹ wives) gathered in line at the “Slobodka”, near the vegetable shop of the Central Regional Center No. 7, to get potatoes by 6 oʹclock in the morning.
Since instead of 3 sites of potatoes, only one site was delivered to the store, a significant part of the queued potatoes did not receive.
In the excited crowd, calls were heard: “We need to stage a demonstration, why are we going to be silent? They are building a fiveyear plan, and we must die of hunger; we would have pogromed them and it would have become easier at once,” and so on.
After the delivery of an additional batch of potatoes, the crowd calmed down.
3. Mountains. Tiraspol, AMSSR. The Tiraspol CDC announced the forthcoming sale of fish on June 14; On June 14 at 6 oʹclock in the morning, when up to 850 people gathered at the shop of the Central Reconstruction Center (on the banks of the Dniester, opposite the Romanian border), who stood in line were told that the shareholders would not receive fish, since all the fish would be transferred to the public canteen. This caused a sharp outrage among consumers, who were not allowed to take out the fish from the store. During the excesses, shouts were heard from the crowd towards the Romanian border: ʺGo to save citizens from Soviet power.ʺ
4. Stalinʹs district. The board of the Khanzhenkovsky Central Dispatch Center decided, in view of the failure to fulfill the delivery plan, to issue food only for the first half of June, and issue for the second half of June after additional delivery of food.
Rumors circulated among the workers at the Kapitalnaya and Schmidt mines that there would be no additional dispensing of food for June. In this regard, on June 20, a crowd of workersʹ wives in the amount of 200250 people came to the chairman of the board and demanded the immediate distribution of food for the entire month.
In connection with the rumors spread in the crowd about the presence of large food supplies in the warehouses of the cooperative, the crowd demanded to inspect all the warehouses, for which it allocated several delegates from its composition.
When, at the end of the survey of the warehouses, the members of the commission (highlighted by the crowd) tried to inform the crowd about the results of the survey, shouts were heard from the crowd: ʺWe climbed into the car and already managed to sell ourselves to the communists, beat them!ʺ Under the influence of these appeals, some of those present tried to beat the commission members, who were forced to flee.
5. Krivoy Rog district. At the mine. Kaganovich On June 24, a group of workers (well‐known drunken hooligans) beat a bread seller in a stall of the Central Regional Committee for refusing to sell bread on credit (these workers did not have a small coin).
Soon 150 workers gathered around this group, but most of them behaved passively; individual party members and non‐party members who tried to stop the beating were also beaten by hooligans.
After the delivery of bargaining chips, missing food and outreach to the mine, the crowd dispersed.
On the same day, in the evening, about 120 workers gathered at the mine committee, demanding that a meeting be called with a report on workersʹ supply. After promising to call a meeting the next day, the crowd dispersed.
The meeting scheduled for June 25 attracted a significant number of workers and was held in a calm atmosphere; the workers who spoke in the debate, dissociating themselves from the hooligans, demanded a trial against them. In this spirit, a resolution was adopted
(unanimously). 5 instigators of the brawl were arrested.
Less significant excesses took place in Odessa (June 2 and 24), in Berdyansk (July 7), in the town of Rykov in the Artyomovsk District (June 15).
6. Crimea. On June 7, in the city of Kerch, in connection with an order, the fish that had arrived from the (Soyuzryby) fishery should be put on sale only after preliminary selection at the Rybtrest fishery, about 300 women in an extremely agitated state who stood in queues to receive fish went to the building of the City Council. After the explanatory work, the crowd dispersed.
7. On June 10, in the city of Feodosia, 40 women, wives of loaders, came to the City Council with a demand to give them food, otherwise threatening to deal with the chairman of the City Council. After the explanation and the promise to set up a special commission to examine the activities of the CCC, the women dispersed.
8. SKK, Novorossiysk. On June 28, in connection with the issuance of low‐quality bread and significant interruptions in the food supply of Novorossiysk, there was a significant excess. A crowd of 350 people, mostly women, having smashed two bread shops in the suburb of Methodievka, headed in groups of 20‐25 people towards the city center. On the way, the canteen and several bakeries were destroyed. The crowd was campaigning for the sending of the delegation to the Red Army camps and factories for the purpose of joint actions with the demand to improve food supply.
The crowd beat the deputy. chairman of the Central Committee, two agents Ugro and the captain of a foreign steamer.
After the promise of party and Soviet organizations to create a special commission with the participation of delegates from those gathered to settle supply issues, the crowd dispersed by 14 oʹclock.
The mood nevertheless remained tense throughout June 28 and 29. Groups of women gathered in a club on the Red‐Green Beam and demanded that a meeting be called, but ʺwithout the communists and women workers.ʺ
At the emergency plenum of the City Council on June 28, workers condemned the women’s protests, while pointing out the need to improve food supplies.
(As of July 1, the situation has improved due to the importation of food and the removal of provocative elements.)
9. IPO. Kolobovskaya factory of Shuisky district. On July 1, at a meeting for the election of delegates to the sponsored regiment, there were harsh statements by individual workers on food supply issues.
Under the influence of these speeches and the agitation of anti‐Soviet elements (about the allegedly imminent withdrawal from the planned supply of workers of enterprises located in rural areas), part of the 300 workers present at the meeting went to the building of the local EPO, where they demanded the immediate distribution of food and a general improvement in food supply.
At the statement of the EPO employee that flour will be issued only from July 10, shouts were heard from the crowd: ʺWe will stop the factory tomorrow, and both shifts will come for breadʺ ... ʺThe worker works like an ox, and you starve him.ʺ
The food supply meetings convened on July 2 were calm.
Yu Bashkiria, Beloretsk. The board of the Beloretsk Central Regional Committee decided, in view of the large overconsumption of flour (from January to May, flour was issued at higher rates) to issue flour immediately in July, without producing flour for the second half of June. In this regard, on July 3, a crowd (mostly women) of up to 400 people gathered near the Central Regional Committee and demanded that flour be given for June. Markov, a member of the Central Committeeʹs Board, who came out to explain, was immediately surrounded by a crowd; threats were heard at his address, and one of those present stabbed him in the face. Markov fired a shot into the air from a revolver and, breaking free from the crowd, disappeared. The crowd demanded that Markov be handed over.
After an appropriate explanation, the crowd dispersed.
(By order of the party mayor committee, flour will be issued for the second half of June.)
P. Melekess, Ulyanovsk District. On June 25, a crowd of about 100 people (among whom were workers from the local flax factory), having not received flour for June in the shop of the Central Regional Commission (due to the exhaustion of supplies), went to the Board of the Central Regional Commission. Members of the board Mursalimov and the chairman of the City Council Bozov, who were at that time in the Central Regional Committee, were beaten by the crowd. At the request of the crowd, Mursalimov was forced to go to the telephone exchange and demand the immediate delivery of flour from the district. After that, the crowd, led by one worker of a flax‐spinning factory, burst into the building of the district committee of the AllUnion Communist Party of Bolsheviks and demanded that the flour be issued within [3] hour, otherwise threatening with ʺreprisalsʺ.
On the square, the crowd was joined by about 300 peasants who arrived at the market. Moreover, one of them addressed the crowd with the following words:
“Comrades, peasants and workers, we, the peasants, have taken away all the grain, you, the workers, are not given it either, now you have revolted. Demand yours resolutely. The peasants also rebelled and will support us. ʺ
The excess was eliminated a few hours later (after the delivery of flour).
Among the identified initiators of the speech ‐ one shank and one who served a sentence in the ITD.
Dispatched:1) Menzhinsky; 2) Berry; 3) Messing; 4) Evdokimov; 5) Tovstukha (for Stalin); 6) Molotov; 7) Kaganovich; 8) Kaminsky; 9) Kovraisky; 10) Ordzhonikidze; 11) Rykov; 12) Syrtsov; 13) Mikoyan; 14) Shvernik; 15‐29) OGPU; 30) In business; 31‐34) In the department.
out by an official systematically or for reasons of selfish or other personal interest, or even if they did not entail, but obviously for the official could entail serious consequences, entails imprisonment with strict isolation for a period not less than six months ʺ. By officials we mean persons holding permanent or temporary positions in a state (Soviet) institution, enterprise, as well as in an organization or association, which is entrusted by law with certain duties, rights and powers in the implementation of economic, administrative, professional or other national tasks. Officials of trade unions for their official crimes (embezzlement, bribery, etc.), if they are brought to justice by the decisions of trade unions, are responsible as for official crimes ʺ(Criminal Code of the RSFSR. Mʺ 1930, pp. 46‐47) ...
Help INFO OGPU on interethnic antagonism at enterprises in
Central Asia. August 3, 1930
August 3, 1930
No. 385984 Top secret
Butter plant No. 4, Kaunchi, st. Kaufmazhskaya. At the creamery No. 4, where the administration of the factory, the factory committee and the party cell are entirely composed of Russians who do not speak Uzbek, the issue of rooting the composition of the factory workers is not given due attention. Only 28% of the total number of factory workers falls on workers of local nationalities (mainly Uzbeks), and only 15 of them are qualified (no higher than a stoker).
While the existing about 80 Uzbek workers with more than 5 years of experience are still working as unskilled laborers, the plant hires skilled work under the guise of ʺtrainedʺ Russians who have come from the village without any industrial experience.
Typical is the judgment of the administration and individual leaders of the party organization of the plant on the issue of promoting Uzbeks for qualified work and the indigenization of the composition of the plant workers. ʺThe retraining of nationals in our conditions is impossible.ʺ ʺIf we carry out the renovation of the plant, the plant will not fulfill the industrial financial planʺ, etc.
The Uzbek workers are not involved in social, cultural and educational work. Explanatory work is not carried out in Uzbek. When addressing any question to the administration, the Uzbek workers receive the answer: ʺWe do not understand Uzbek.ʺ
No educational work is being carried out among the workers of the plant. Drunkenness and gambling are widespread among the workers.
As a result of a significant aggravation of interethnic antagonism, the situation was used by an employee of the plant, the Uzbek Khodjaev (the son of a disenfranchised). Khodzhaev sent a telegram to Comrade Stalin with the following content: ʺWe ask an authoritative commission to check the situation of the workers ... Chauvinism develops every day ... To avoid losing the authority of the party and the Soviet government, we ask the commission not to slow down.ʺ
The telegram was signed by 24 Uzbek workers. When collecting signatures, Khodzhaevʹs confidants deceived the workers, telling them that the statement contained a request to provide the Uzbek workers with white bread.
State farm ʺKok‐Dolyaʺ, Kashka‐Darinsky district. A similar situation has arisen at the Kok‐Dolya state farm, where there is a sharp exacerbation of interethnic antagonism. The main reason for this is the provision of Russian workers with significant advantages in work and life in comparison with Uzbeks.
Despite the fact that Uzbek tractor drivers work much better and more conscientiously than Russian tractor drivers, in May of this year, the administration dismisses 60 Uzbek tractor workers from their jobs at the state farm. At present, out of 120 workers of Uzbek tractor drivers (all of them have graduated from the courses of tractor drivers), about 25 people remain on the state farm.
In June, 16 people of Uzbek tractor drivers are appointed by the administration of the state farm to the position of workers for receiving grain at a time when the state farm has work to repair machines, to which Russian workers, including unskilled workers, are appointed. On June 20, on this basis, a conflict occurred on the state farm. Uzbek workers protested against the appointment of only the Uzbek part of the workers to work for receiving grain. The conflict took on a protracted nature, and on June 21 a general meeting of workers of the state farm was convened to analyze the conflict. The Uzbek workers who spoke at the meeting talked about the unequal position of Russian workers and Uzbeks at the factory and demanded that Uzbeks “equalize” with Russian workers.
It should be noted that when choosing Uzbek candidates to the composition of public organizations, to the presidiums of assemblies, etc., a number of statements were noted that the Uzbek candidates were ʺelected for pro formaʺ.
Neither the party cell nor the worker is concerned with the issues of political education of the Uzbek part of the workers. The conflicts between Uzbeks and Russians are not being understood by anyone.
Deputy Head of INFO OGPU
Gerasimova Head of Division 2 Grosman
1) Menzhinsky; 2) Messing; 3) Tovstukha (for Stalin); 4) Molotov; 5) Kaganovich; 6) Kovraisky; 7) Rykov; 8) Ordzhonikidze; 9) Shvernik; 10) Olsky; 11) Kaul; 12) Agranov; 13) Artuzov; 14) Prokofiev; 15) Blagonravov; 16) Dyakov; 17) Chief 1 INFO; 18) Head of
5 INFO; 19) In business; 20‐21) In the department.
INFO OGPU on the housing crisis in Donbass. August 14, 1930
August 14, 1930
No. 386161 Top secret
The housing situation among Donbass miners remains tense. A significant proportion of the workers live in overcrowding. Newly arrived workers are forced to settle in premises that are completely unsuitable for living. The incidence is growing steadily from year to year, especially among children.
The administration and party and trade union organizations are not taking sufficient measures to improve housing conditions.
Unsatisfactory housing conditions make it extremely difficult to retain existing workers in the mines and to contract new workers.
Luhansk district. At mine No. 5 ʺPar [Izhskaya] Kommunaʺ, some workersʹ dormitories can accommodate 2‐3 people on one bed.
At mine No. 23 of the Sverdlovsk mine administration, newly arriving workers, due to the lack of apartments, live in a bathhouse and a smart one.
The situation is the same at the Tsentralnaya and Irmino mines.
Krivoy Rog district. At the Proletarsky mine, in dormitories and barracks, there are beds for 310 people, while the remaining 350 workers live in dryers, compressors, and baths. Some of them sleep on the ground in the open air.
Stalin district. Some of the workers of the Ivan mine live in clay sheds, arranged next to cesspools and near the foot of the dump mountains of mine rocks, where poisonous gases are continuously emitted.
Despite the fact that a significant part of the dwellings is in a dilapidated state, the administration of some enterprises does not pay due attention to the repair of dwellings.
Stalin district. In the colonies of the Sofia and Maria mines, in some barracks, the repair of floors took more than 2 months. Roofs are leaking in some barracks, but no repairs are being made.
Luhansk district. At mine No. 30 of the Revenets Mine Administration, the repair of the doors in the workersʹ apartments lasted over two weeks, and the workers had to sleep with the doors open.
The workersʹ dwellings are in an unsanitary condition.
Luhansk district. In some barracks at the Uralo‐Kavkaz mine, rooms are not cleaned for 2‐3 weeks. Despite the fact that some workers have to sleep on the floor due to the lack of beds, floors are rarely washed.
Krivoy Rog district. In barracks no. 317 there is constant dirt, cleaning is done irregularly. The accumulated garbage is not removed in a timely manner. Usually, the workers have to demand long and urgently that the service personnel start cleaning the barracks.
Due to the housing crisis and unsanitary conditions, there is a significant increase in various kinds of diseases among workers.
In the Stalin district, the growth of diseases is expressed in the following figures: Typhoid fever:
in 1926 ‐ 61 diseases in 1927 ‐ 449 diseases in 1928 ‐ 374 diseases in 1929 ‐ 781 diseases.
Childhood diseases:
1926 g.
1929 g.
Whooping cough
121
1079
Measles
460
1453
Diphtheria
19
129
The mortality rate among children has also increased.
The difficult housing situation is one of the main reasons for the high turnover of the workforce.
The arriving workers, having familiarized themselves with the living conditions, will soon apply for resignation. For the same reason, the contracting of workers is disrupted.
Stalin district. At the mine ʺN. Kalinino” filed an application for the resignation of 52 workers, motivating their resignation by the impossibility of working under the existing housing conditions.
“We work tirelessly, and we even have nowhere to rest. The barracks are dirty, bugs are seizing, and no one wants to worry about us. Why are we going to give ourselves up ?! ʺ
Krivoy Rog district. At the mine. Lenin receives applications from workers every day to leave because of unbearable living conditions.
At the mine. At a meeting convened by Kaganovich on the issue of contracting, a number of workers who spoke positively about contracting declared at the same time about the need to improve living conditions: “Let the administration first take care of the apartments, then it will be possible to talk about contracting. It is unlikely that anyone under such conditions will go to work again. ʺ
Luhansk district. “With the present food difficulties, with the increased requirements for labor productivity, it is still impossible to find yourself without an apartment and live‐in sheds. Better to sit at home completely. ʺ
Deputy Head of INFO OGPU
Gerasimova Head of Division 2 Grosman
Dispatched: 1) Menzhinsky; 2) Messing; 3) Molotov; 4) Kaganovich; 5) Nikolaeva; 6) Kovraisky; 7) Rykov; 8) Syrtsov; 9) Ordzhonikidze; 10)
Kuibyshev; 11) Shvernik; 12) Olsky; 13) Kaul; 14) Agranov; 15) Artuzov; 16) Prokofiev; 17) Molochnikov; 18) Blagonravov; 19) Head of the 5th department; 20) In the department; 21‐22) In the department. Special summary number 1 INFO OGPU on foreign workers working at the enterprises of the USSR, and the attitude of Russian workers towards them. August 25, 1930
August 25, 1930
No. 386330 Top secret
NVK. Stalingrad Tractor Plant. Among some of the American workers working at the plant, there is a negligent attitude towards production, ignoring the instructions of the Russian part of the administrative and technical personnel, violation of internal regulations and labor discipline, greed and facts of abnormal relations with Russian workers. American workersʹ attitudes toward manufacturing
American workers often disregard the instructions of Russian workers, foremen and engineers.
In a number of cases, jobs by American workers are unsatisfactory. Facts of damage to machine tools by American workers, the release of defects, etc. were noted.
Thermal shop of the plant. An American worker damaged the hardening shaft and machine to be tested. The machine has not been cleared of debris, etc.
In other workshops, 4 similar cases of damage to machine tools by American workers were noted.
Carpentry workshop of the plant. The head and block models are not manufactured correctly by American workers. Forming work is done inaccurately.
Mechanical assembly shop. The milling was melted by an American worker.
Foundry. The American cupola worker produces, instead of the norm of 240 pounds of casting, only 90 pounds of casting, and even then of poor quality.
A number of cases of violation of labor discipline by American workers and non‐compliance with house rules were noted.
Lunch time is delayed by the Americans up to 2 hours.
There have been a number of cases of drunk American workers entering work.
At the same time, on the part of the Americans, there is clearly a reckless mood: on July 26, a group of 50 American workers tried to organize a strike at the plant due to the lack of cigarettes.
It should be noted that earlier, when the Americans were supplied with cigarettes regularly and in sufficient quantities, cases of speculation with cigarettes were repeatedly noted (the Americans resold cigarettes to Russian workers).
Attitude of American and Russian workers
The facts of the negligent attitude of some American workers to work arouse criticism from the Russian workers: ʺAmericans do not know how to work.ʺ “We process the part in one day, but they still make the marriage for two days,” and so on.
The dissatisfaction of the Russian part of the workers is aggravated by the presentation of a number of privileges to the Americans. (A number of cases of obvious abuse by Americans of their position have been noted ‐ receiving products in a cooperative without queuing and distributing them right there to acquaintances, etc.).
On the part of the Russian workers, conversations are noted:
ʺWe are building factories for America, we ourselves are starving, but the same workers in a capitalist country do not know anything shortage ‐ they drink wine and laugh at us,ʺ and so on.
On July 21, on the territory of the plant, when disembarking from the tram, an American worker struck a Russian worker on the head with a stick (the American stepped on the Russianʹs foot, the Russian pushed the American aside with his hand).
Discontent of foreign workers (Czechs)
Ukraine, Mariupol okru g, plant them. Kuibyshev. A group of factory workers ‐ Czechs (19 people) on August 3 this year refused to start work, having learned about the disease of one of their comrades with typhoid fever. The Czechs motivated their refusal to work by an unsatisfactory supply of foodstuffs (non‐delivery of sugar for 10 days, lack of meat, etc.) and poor accommodation. Threatened with leaving home. The work was not performed during the half shift. The Czechs also refused the anti‐typhus vaccine and, not trusting the Russian doctors, demanded to send them a Czech doctor.
Negative moments in the mood of workers, miners of Donbass in connection with the arrival of German workers
Ukraine, Donbass. With the arrival of German workers at the mine, dissatisfaction with the allegedly privileged position of the Germans is noted among some of the Russian workers.
Rumors are spreading among the workers about the high wages of the German workers, the provision of better apartments for them, the provision of them out of turn and, moreover, completely with food, etc.
ʺThe Germans are being fed as if to slaughter, the Russians are being starved.ʺ
“Russian fools are exploited, and the Germans are paid 600 rubles. per monthʺ.
“The Germans are paid their salaries in gold and silver, therefore there is no silver bargaining chip” (Kadievsky, Bryansk and Alchevsky mines).
This talk is especially widespread among workersʹ wives.
At the mine. Stalin, Luhansk district, while checking the lava prepared for work by the German workers, three loaded cloaks were found, which, undoubtedly, would have caused an explosion in the mine if they had not been removed in time.
Head of INFO OGPU Zaporozhets Head of Division 2 Grosman
Dispatched:
1) Menzhinsky; 2) Messing; 3) Berry; 4) Evdokimov; 5) Poskrebyshev (for Stalin); 6) Molotov; 7) Kaganovich; 8) Nikolaeva; 9) Kovraisky; 10) Rykov; 11) Syrtsov; 12) Ordzhonikidze; 13) Kuibyshev; 14)
Shvernik; 15) Olsky; 16) Kaul; 17) Agranov; 18) Artuzov; 19) Prokofiev; 20) Molochnikov; 21) Blagonravov; 22) Head of department
1 of INFO; 23) Head of the 5th department of INFO; 24) In business; 25‐
26) In the department.
INFO about the responses of the workers of the plant. Petrovsky (Dnepropetrovsk) to visit the plant by the chairman of the All‐Russian Central Executive Committee G. I.
Petrovsky. August 29, 1930
August 29, 1930
No. 386461 Top secret
August 18 Comrade Petrovsky visited some of the shops of the plant. Petrovsky.
In conversations with Comrade. Petrovsky, the workers concerned most of all with interruptions in food and industrial supplies, and there were some harsh statements.
The fact that Comrade Petrovsky confined himself to talking with the workers in the shops, not having gathered the workers for a general meeting of the plant, and aroused the discontent of the workers. If some of the workers expressed dissatisfaction with what was not possible at the meeting to put before Comrade. Petrovsky in the entirety of the issue of food supply, the old production workers expressed regret that they could not tell Comrade. Petrovsky ʺabout our riots and what led to a breakthrough (in the implementation of industrial financial plans) at the plant.ʺ
The very fact of Comrade The workers linked Petrovsky to the plant with a breakthrough in the implementation of the industrial financial plan at the plant; individual statements are noted that the arrival of Comrade. Petrovsky is associated with increased military danger.
Here are the most typical statements of the workers.
In the rolling shop comrade. Petrovsky was surrounded by workers. An attempt by comrade. Petrovsky did not succeed in bringing the conversation to a production topic, because his questions were mainly diverted by conversations around workersʹ supplies. From the assembled group, replies were thrown: ʺTell me about bacon ... Let him try millet porridge and let him know that we are being fed herringʺ ... Party member machinist Kolupaev, personally familiar to Comrade. Petrovsky, spoke loudly, addressing Comrade. Petrovsky: “We live badly, comrade. Petrovsky, there is nothing to eat and the administration is pressing us hard. ʺ One worker, nicknamed ʺDzhigunʺ, who entered the plant 4 months ago (according to him, a former party member), said in a group of workers: to help us, but to adjust us, so that the industrial financial plan is fulfilled.
Some of the workers themselves, not wanting to speak on the topic of slavery, said among themselves that it would be advisable to put up for a conversation with Comrade. Petrovsky, the old worker Nikiforov, ʺwho is distinguished by his ability to speakʺ (Nikiforov is an old worker, drunkard, big boozer, in the past was under the influence of the Mensheviks).
In the group of rollers of the rolling shop on the occasion of the arrival of Comrade Petrovsky worker Mamontov said: “Comrade. Petrovsky is highly respected among us. If another leader came, he would be in big trouble, since the workers are now furious. Even those workers who have a good attitude towards the Soviet regime are now embittered against everyone and are looking for someone to pour out their anger on. It is a pity that Comrade Petrovsky did not arrange a meeting at which we would tell him a lot about our riots and what led to the breakthrough at the plant. ʺ
In the blast‐furnace shop, in the mechanical workshop where old workers work, among the latter there was dissatisfaction with the fact that they did not manage to talk to Comrade. Petrovsky. Worker Kovtunenko said: “Since everyone who managed to talk to him scolded him for supplying workers, he decided that we had become self‐seekers and did not want to do business with us anymore. He is interested in production issues and we could tell him a lot. ʺ
In another group of workers in the same workshop, in a conversation about the arrival of Comrade. Petrovsky made the following remarks: ʺThey are talking intensively about the war, whether his arrival is connected with the possibilities of war, always before the war the leaders go around the places to check the loyalty of the population to the government.ʺ
During his stay comrade. Petrovsky on the 10th drive, worker Silkin, a former Menshevik, turning to him, asked: ʺWhy am I being persecuted when I speak about difficulties?ʺ
Worker of blast furnace No. 6 Golubev in a group of workers said: “We were not able to use the arrival of Comrade. Petrovsky. If we knew that he would be at the plant, we would prepare a statement from the entire shop asking to improve our situation. Here, at the plant, there is no one to tell his displeasure to. If you say that it is difficult to live, then they
begin to call you a selfish person and almost a counterrevolutionary. Our administrators and professional workers are turning into old proprietors who also did not want to hear any complaints. ʺ
In the Novotokarny shop among young workers there was a lot of talk about the stay of Comrade. Petrovsky in the shop. All expressed their satisfaction with having visited the workshop. On this occasion, some said: “He looked into our workshop because our workshop is a military one, and in case of war it will play a big role. At the plant, little is considered with us, we earn the least, but in the center they understand that we are doing a great job. ʺ
A conversation took place in a group of old workers: “Comrade. Petrovsky came to check how our plant works. There is nothing to boast about, our plant works worse than everyone else, and all this because there are no honest and loyal administrators. ʺ
Head of the Information Department of the OGPU Zaporozhets
Head of Division 2, INFO Grosman
Help is sent to:
1) Menzhinsky; 2) Messing; 3) Olsky; 4) Kaul; 5) Agranov; 6) In business; 7) In the department; 8) In the department.
INFO OGPU on the results of the audit of the mobilization of internal resources to eliminate the financial breakthrough. October 11, 1930
October 11, 1930
No. 387071 Top secret
Incoming materials from various industrial districts of the Union about massive cases of delayed payment of wages indicate that the reason for the delay in all cases is the lack of money in the local branches of the State Bank.
In a number of regions, the untimely payment of wages causes sharp discontent among workers, reaching in some enterprises to strikes, group departures from work, etc. In Central Asia, the lack of money in the bank to pay off cotton growers led to the suspension of the delivery of cotton by the population, etc.
In order to identify the real reason for the lack of cash in the bank and to eliminate the resulting financial breakthrough, the OGPU PP in Nizhny Krai checked the mobilization of internal resources by the local office of the State Bank and, as a result of this check, revealed a number of purely negative aspects that hinder the flow of funds to the bankʹs cash desk.
1. Reasons for a financial breakthrough
One of the main reasons that led to the formation of a financial breakthrough was the untimely drawing up of a cash plan by the local regional office of the State Bank.
Despite the fact that the board of the State Bank proposed to start drawing up a plan as early as July 18 of this year., the plan for AugustSeptember was drawn up by the local office only by August 15 of this year. g.
Having been late in drawing up the plan, the regional office did not provide control over the implementation of the plan by economic organizations, as a result of which refinancing was allowed in the amount of about 25 million rubles.
As of September 21, on the edge of the loan:
a) Consumer cooperation
For 1,900,000 rubles.
b) all other types of cooperation
For 2,500,000 rubles.
c) state trade
For 812,000 rubles.
d) industry
For 18,767,000 rubles.
e) state institutions
For 250,000 rubles.
TOTAL
For 24,229,000 rubles.
Another, no less significant reason for the financial breakthrough is the indiscipline and irresponsibility of the majority of economic organizations in the matter of submitting the money received to them to the State Bank and in terms of spending funds in an unplanned manner.
A random check of cash of cash registers of some trade enterprises carried out by PP NVK revealed the following abnormalities:
a) Pishchetrest from April 16 stopped the delivery of proceeds to the bank, and the daily balances in the cash desk of the trust reached 18,000 rubles.
b) The Mechanical Transport Trust reduced the delivery of money to the bank from 13 to 4 thousand rubles, leaving up to 18 thousand rubles in the cash desk of the trust every day.
c) NIH leaves 9 to 12 thousand rubles daily at the bankʹs cash desk.
d) NK TsRK leaves from 5 to 10 thousand rubles daily at the box office.
e) The administration of entertainment enterprises from July 12 to September 17 had receipts at the cashierʹs office of 23,000 rubles, but did not submit anything to the bank.
f) The Communications Department received money by checks from their post offices, and the offices instead of money handed in checks to the bank.
g) The pharmacy department systematically delayed the storeʹs revenue by paying salaries to its employees.
2. State of capital accumulation
Work on capital accumulation, especially in all types of cooperation, is proceeding extremely weakly. Examples are unit accumulation for the following major cooperative organizations.
1. NK TsRK, with the full possibility of one hundred percent collection of share funds, collected only 872700 rubles. from 1 309 000 rub. according to plan, i.e., only 65%.
2. The Krai Consumer Union collected 7,108,014 rubles. for 11,206,469 rubles. or 63%, lacking 4,100,000 rubles, while the consumer cooperation system was re‐credited by the bank for 1,942,000 rubles.
3. Krayzhivotnovodsoyuz ‐ the inflow of the share capital should be according to the plan 1,759,120 rubles, while 51,695 rubles were collected. or 2.9%. Indivisible funds were collected 37589 rubles. instead of 1,343,400 rubles. planned or 2% of the plan. Unfinished 3,500,000 rubles.
The work of collecting shares goes by gravity. Recently, due to financial difficulties, the NK TsRK has taken extreme measures, namely, it has banned the supply of scarce food products to shareholders who have not paid their shares. This measure had an impact on the inflow of share contributions, but at the same time, due to the delay in the payment of wages at enterprises, it caused discontent among some part of the working population.
The situation is even worse with the sale of manufactured goods by cooperative and state trade organizations. The verification established a whole series of facts of the deposits of acutely scarce goods in the warehouses of cooperatives and trade establishments, lying for several months. Even the heads of cooperative organizations themselves are not aware of the availability of some goods in warehouses.
Thus, the chairman of the Kraizhilsoyuz stated that due to the absence of alabaster, construction work was slowed down for a month, and the alabaster was searched for by special agents, while during a check at the warehouses of the Soyuztrans belonging to the Kraizhilsoyuz, 1 carriage of alabaster was found, stored since April 17, 1930, and 8 tons of alabaster stored since March 14, 1930
1. In Nizhaktorg, in a warehouse, 12 barrels were found piled high with crates. When they were opened, 600 items of copper dishes were found. The barrels arrived in the month of July, there are no documents to justify their arrival. Head the warehouse said that he did not know who owned these barrels.
2. In the same warehouse, unknown to whom (statement of the warehouse manager) teaspoons ‐ 7 boxes, table scales ‐ 45 pcs., Enameled cans ‐ 240 pcs., Teaspoons ‐ 2592 pcs.
In some cases, the stocks of goods discovered in warehouses in significant amounts exceed the monthly and even longer demand rate. Thus, the Kulebaksky Central Dispatch Center stored 16.3 tons of laundry soap in the warehouse (found by inspection), while the need for soap for the next two months is only 7 tons. In the ʺKrasny Ramenʺ artel, 1000 tons of the scarcest reinforcing iron were found, while the artelʹs demand is only 62 tons.
Many goods intended to be handed out to seasonal workers in peat mining and to be sent to rural areas, to grain procurement areas, lie motionless in warehouses.
In April 1930, 4 tons (340 p.) Of roach were received for logging. Until now, the vobla is not consumed and not overbooked (VTSRK).
In the distribution point of B. Batyrevsky RaIPO they have been unused since June. 430 kg of caramel booked to stimulate wool blanks.
In the Kagash point of Soyuzkhleb, there are 25,000 rubles of unsold goods intended to stimulate grain procurements.
Since March 2077 kg of unused sugar has been stored in the warehouses of the Raikoopsoyuz and the Raikolkhoz of the Alikovsky region, intended for contracting honey.
In total, the check established that in the distribution network of Nizhny Krai, according to the availability on September 20 of this year. g., there are unsold industrial goods worth 14 million rubles, most of which are in warehouses from 2 to 4 months.
The inspection carried out by the PP of the OGPU of Nizhny Krai forced the business executives to think, an example of which is the following document, signed by the manager of the office of the Metal Warehouse on September 29 this year. g.
“In connection with the discovery by the OGPU of roofing iron in the warehouses of Soyuztrans, owned by Metallosklad, I made an order to check the Siberian piers, it turned out that there were 3 wagons of iron on the Siberian piers, long awaited by the plant number 80” (I. Lyapin).
A similar situation with the sale of acutely scarce manufactured goods takes place in the city of Yaroslavl, Ivanovo industrial region.
A flying test, made by the PP of the Ivanovo industrial region, in the warehouses of the Yaroslavl trade organizations, revealed a large number of goods that were not sold for a year or more.
Since November 1929, 60,000 cans of canned meat have been stored in the warehouses of the Central Regional Committee, of which 40,000 cans have been booked by the Trade Department.
1980 pieces have been forgotten there since 1923. iron spoons and a large number of vents for stoves, hooks to window frames, shovels, etc., and since 1928 970 layering and boxes, very necessary for the village.
In the warehouses of the Yaroslavl base of Potrebsoyuz, a large number of birch logs necessary for textile factories were found, and for 50 thousand rubles. saddlery goods that have not been sent to logging for a year.
The same deposits are in the warehouses of the Yaroslavl base of Ivobltorg, Yarkoopintorg and Oblpotrebsoyuz.
The inspection revealed, in addition to manufactured goods, and deposits of ʺconsumer goodsʺ, such as: shoes, clothes, cigarettes, etc.
Unsold footwear worth 13 thousand rubles was found in the warehouses of Ivobltorg.
In the warehouses of the Central Recreation Center there are 4 thousand unused pairs of childrenʹs boots, 400 pairs of barnyard childrenʹs boots, 2 thousand pairs of childrenʹs galoshes, 3 thousand childrenʹs boots, 3 thousand cotton dresses for girls and 200 pieces. childrenʹs coats.
Head of INFO OGPU Zaporozhets
Assistant Chief of Storyteller Section 2
Dispatched:
1) Menzhinsky; 2) Berry; 3) Messing; 4) Evdokimov; 5) Poskrebyshev
(for Stalin); 6) Molotov; 7) Kaganovich; 8) Postyshev; 9) Nikolaeva (Central Committee); 10) Kovraisky; 11) Ordzhonikidze; 12) Shvernik; 13) Rykov; 14) Syrtsov; 15) Mikoyan; 16) Bryukhanov; 17) Kuibyshev; 18) Olsky; 19) Kaul; 20) Agranov; 21) Artuzov; 22) Prokofiev; 23) Bokiyu; 24) Blagonravov; 25) Velsky; 26) Wiesel; 27) Beginning. 1 dep. Info.; 28) 5th department Info.; 29) In business; 30‐32)
In the department.
INFO OGPU on the mood of American specialists at the Stalingrad
Tractor Plant named after Dzerzhinsky. October 18, 1930
October 18, 1930
# 387161 Top secret
The trial of the American workers Luys and Brown, who beat up the Negro worker Robinson, caused significant activity of the anti‐Soviet part of the American workers working at the plant.
Even before the trial, the American Committee (Glikman, Moriss, etc.), with the support of the American workers of Survain, Ross, Keme and others, tried in every possible way to diminish the political essence of the crime of Luys and Brown and to this end, forcing Luys to write a statement that he allegedly repent in a committed act, he reprimanded them ʺfor a drunken fight and hooliganism.ʺ Luys confessed in court that the statement was written by him under the influence and dictation of the American Committee, since the latter considered Luysʹs act ʺunworthy of the courtʹs attentionʺ (Chairman of the Baldwin Committee) ... ʺIf they so want to have Luysʹs statement in print, we do not mind.ʺ (he) ... ʺThis is not a trial, but a comedyʺ (Wilson).
The Americans, who appeared at the court session, behaved defiantly, shouting from their seats demanding the opening of the session. Their remark about the need to preserve order prompted a reply from their side: ʺYou give the impression of a spectacle, not a court.ʺ
The general meeting of Americans planned by the trade union organization of the plant regarding the trial was disrupted by the committee, and at the same time a collection of signatures was organized for a statement addressed to the court about the absence of corpus delicti in the fact of beating Robinson, listing the ʺgentlemanlyʺ qualities of the accused. Speaking on the second day of the trial, the committee secretary and defender of the accused, Moriss, with his speech: ʺI express the opinion of the entire American colony,ʺ summed up the sentiments of all anti‐Soviet Americans.
“Upon arrival in the Soviet Union (from the speech of Moriss), we found ourselves in conditions of industrial difficulties, without cultural entertainment, in conditions to which we were not used, which resulted in drunkenness and fights between Americans, one of which was Luysʹs fight with Robinson.
The Russian press made a lot of noise by distorting the fact, describing it as a manifestation of chauvinism. Luysʹs trial is Americaʹs trial. We were invited to provide technical assistance, not to force us to abandon our beliefs, our skills and faith in our government.
Luys should be released from prison and this farce should be stopped, it is enough that Luys was insulted in front of the whole country”.
Aggressive actions of the committee led to the fact that among the Americans, justifying the act of Luys and Brown, sentiments were noted: if the court sentenced Luys and Brown to ʺrefuse to work as the whole colony,ʺ ʺdemand to be sent to America,ʺ etc.
When asked to this group of Americans why they do not speak in defense of the accused, two of them replied: ʺWe will speak out yet, our last word will be after the verdict.ʺ
The release at the end of Luys and Brownʹs custody among the Americans sparked a number of judgments.
The anti‐Soviet part of the Americans (Baldwin, Moriss, Ross, Survain, Wilson, Glikman, Belder, etc.) consider the past trial ʺa toyʺ, ʺ... propaganda that the Soviet Union is so capable of and which it conducted so well.ʺ
The rest of the Americans (Leo, Rieschlig, Peleg, etc.) believe that it would be better if “the Soviet government would send them under escort in 3‐4 days ...” “Two hooligans are not worth such a time investment”, etc. P.
Pardoning Brown by anti‐Soviet Americans caused judgments: ʺIt would be necessary to press and Luys would be pardonedʺ (Glikman, Baldwin).
At the end of the process, the committee conducted an organized work among Americans to decompose labor discipline, encouraging truants and drunkards (Vask, McInton, Doyle, etc.), and presented various ultimatum demands to the administration, and the defiant behavior of some American subjects continues to manifest itself to this day. The existing partial production difficulties and shortcomings in the consumer services of the colony of the anti‐Soviet part of the Americans serve as a pretext for attacks and speeches against the administration, anti‐Soviet agitation, etc.
In the first days of September, a list was circulated among the
Americans with the requirements set by the committee:
a) we demand a more polite attitude towards our wives on the part of the so‐called Russian controllers;
b) we demand that all our wives be issued with passes immediately;
c) we demand a more human attitude towards us in general in
Stalingrad;
d) we demand to stop legal investigations against the Americans.
Committee secretary Moriss, taking advantage of the death of one American, agitates for the need to send the corpse to America in order to organize a mass demonstration there against the ʺinhuman treatment of Americans in the USSR.ʺ
After the death of the second American (2 people died in the colony), 2 leaflets were found on the territory of the colony with the following content: ʺWhoʹs next, isnʹt the price for Russian tractors too high?ʺ
The American Ben Peleg, who found the leaflet, believes that the author of the leaflets is the worker Wilson, a hard‐core truant. The same opinion is shared by the Russian American Kramarenko, since, according to him, Wilson and Sulen had called before: “We are beginning to die like flies. If we donʹt protest now, then many of us wonʹt see America.”
This appeal met with sympathy only among 7 people in America who work in a mechanical assembly shop who did not come to work the next day.
The same Wilson, through the wives of Americans who left for America, transmitted a letter published in the US press with the following content: “We need help. Some measures must be taken. This is starting to get serious as winter is approaching and we have women and children ... Almost all of us get drunk here on weekends because of the disgusting living conditions. The fights do not stop from the moment you get up until you go to bed ... I will describe a day in Russia. We rise about 4‐5 hours due to flies, which are in the millions here. The flies are very tame, they settle on your nose and wake you up. An alarm clock is not needed in Russia. You dress and shave with cold river water, which is almost black ... There are no such things as a heater. If you want hot water in the morning, you must go down from the 4th floor, chop wood, bring them in and light the stove. Your next business is a walk to an American restaurant, but there are enough Russians there. Become in the tail of a man in 300, sometimes an hour passes before you get disgusting eggs ... Itʹs already evening and it is possible to get camel meat for dinner, rotten eggs for breakfast and nothing for lunch ... ʺ.
In their treatment of Russian workers and employees, some Americans reach the level of hooliganism.
On the night of September 16‐17. At control gate No. 2, two Americans (Ing [Ener] Gardner and Young), being drunk, did not comply with the controllerʹs request to show the passes, and Gardner turned his visor back on the controllerʹs cap.
At control gate No. 1, Gardner showed his fist to the controllerʹs request for a pass ‐ ʺhere is my pass,ʺ and when the controller wanted to take Youngʹs pass, Gardner hit him on the arm, pushed him and hit another controller.
Two more controllers and one worker who came up were also beaten by Gardner and Young. With the help of a policeman who arrived in time, the Americans were detained and sent to the police, and on the way to the police, Gardner beat a policeman and a worker, and only with the help of six police officers and a group of workers who came up, the Americans were taken to the police.
At a general meeting of the American colony convened by trade union and party organizations on September 17 in connection with this incident (60 people were present), committee secretary Moriss said that ʺthey do not trustʺ the translator Becker put up by public organizations, offering to translate the report of the deputy executive secretary of the party organization Laptev to a member American Colony Committee to engineer Glickman.
Some of the Americans who spoke condemned the actions of the hooligans and demanded that they be brought to justice, since “they are putting a stain on the entire American colony” (Richlich et al.).
The indicated behavior of some American specialists is caused by the fact that among the Americans who arrived in Stalingrad there were many alien elements: fascists, freemasons, etc. The industrial American proletariat is almost absent.
The Americans include a significant number of emigrants from Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Russia, and there is an open hostile relationship between the Americanized emigrants and the Americans.
Emigrants are ignored and poisoned. The chairman of the Baldwin committee of the emigrant Kramarenko considers ʺa secret policeman and a spy.ʺ The same Baldwin dismissed the translator of the committee, Kozlova (the wife of an emigrant), because she refused to translate Baldwinʹs curses directed at the seller Vasilyev. The dismissal of Kozlova in the committee was motivated by the fact that ʺshe knows a lot.ʺ
Russian American Nikolai Koshkan, despite his qualifications in Engstroy machine tools, was removed from work by the committee in order to give a job to an American, and only after the intervention of the factory management Koshkan was allowed to work.
Assistant Head of INFO OGPU Gerasimov
Assistant Chief of Storyteller Section 2
Dispatched:
1) Menzhinsky; 2) Berry; 3) Messing; 4) Evdokimov; 5) Poskrebyshev (for Stalin); 8) Molotov; 7) Kaganovich; 8) Postyshev; 9) Kovraisky; 10) Nikolaeva (Central Committee); 11) Ordzhonikidze; 12) Rykov; 13) Syrtsov; 14) Shvernik; 15) Kaul; 16) Olsky; 17) Agranov; 18) Prokofiev; 19) Bokiyu; 20) Blagonravov; 21) 1st branch of INFO; 22) 5th branch of INFO; 23) PP MO Wiesel; 24) In business; 25‐26) In the department.
Help INFO OGPU about negative aspects in the mining industry of the SKK. November 24, 1930
November 24, 1930
Top secret
No. 387678
The explanatory campaign carried out in the mines of the SKK in early October about the tasks of the mining industry for a special quarter and the third year of the five‐year plan caused a significant labor upsurge among the broad masses of workers (the organization of shock brigades and communes, the self‐consolidation of workers in production, etc.).
However, the party, trade union and economic organizations in a number of mines failed to consolidate the achieved results and develop further work among the miners. Moreover, in a number of mines, clearly opportunistic sentiments are recorded on the part of certain leading party, trade union, and economic workers. As a result, the workers (including some party members) reneged on their obligations; a significant number of facts of self‐liquidation of communes and brigades, nullification of the results of self‐contraction of workers, etc. (mines ʺKrylenkoʺ, ʺOctober Revolutionʺ, ʺArtemʺ, ʺKrasnenkayaʺ).
As a consequence of these negative phenomena, the production program for the mines of Sevkavugol was fulfilled only by 75.9% in 20 days in October, that is, 76532 tons of coal were not delivered.
It should be especially emphasized the completely unsatisfactory work with newly arrived workers in relation to securing them at work, placing them in apartments, giving them advances, etc. Facts of the refusal of old miners to train newly arrived workers have been registered.
These abnormalities, as well as major shortcomings in the work of recruiting workers for the mines of the SKK, cause a significant turnover of the labor force, primarily due to the recently recruited workers.
Disadvantages of mass work
For a number of mines in which a production breakthrough was
already outlined at the beginning of the special quarter, no mass work was carried out to prevent and eliminate the breakthrough.
At the mines ʺKrylenkoʺ, ʺOktyabrskaya revolutionʺ, ʺArtemʺ and ʺKrasnenkayaʺ, despite the fact that coal production dropped sharply in the first five days of October, and by the 15th a breakthrough was clearly revealed, the broad working masses were not only mobilized to eliminate the breakout, but were not even sufficiently informed about the breakout. Neither the mine party and trade union organizations, nor production conferences paid any attention to the question of eliminating the breakthrough.
In a number of mines, some leading party members have been dismissed recently for inactivity and right‐wing opportunist sentiments.
At the Oktyabrskaya Revolution mine, the entire management team was dismissed. These workers stubbornly argued the impossibility of fulfilling the production program for ʺobjective reasonsʺ.
At the Artem mine, the chairman of the united mine committee, who defended the same point of view, was dismissed.
At the mine. Bukharin was dismissed from work by the head. mine
(party member), who considered the plan, scheduled for OctoberNovember, unfeasible. He deliberately started work on cleaning ledges, which led to the disruption of work (their completion did not exceed 40%).
At the mine. Petrovsky, the head. mine, the secretary of the party cell and the chairman of the mine committee, who, contrary to the arguments of the workers, argued the impossibility of fulfilling the production program for October‐November.
At the Krasnenkaya mine, the chairman of the mine committee, who has repeatedly spoken at workersʹ meetings against the planned production program, has been dismissed.
The chairman of the mine committee of the Krylenko mine has been dismissed. Under the influence of his actions against the planned production program, 13 shock brigades fell apart.
Also, indicative is the inability of a number of party and mine committees to achieve a turning point in the clearly minimalist sentiments of groups of engineering and technical personnel. In particular, nothing was done to eliminate such sentiments among the engineering and technical workers of the Artem mine by the ITS bureau, headed by a party member. The mood of the specialists of this mine is characterized by the following fact. After two specialists of the Artem mine were put on trial for obvious inactivity (daily disruption of production due to malfunctioning of the mechanisms), the mineʹs engineers demanded an immediate meeting of the engineering and technical section, at which they decided to ask the relevant organizations for mitigation of punishment for the specified specialists, moreover, during the discussion, they proved the impracticability of the production program for ʺobjective reasonsʺ. “The task is impracticable; you have to say it directly. Let us be silent ‐ they will jail all the engineers”.
The same sentiments of specialists take place at mine No. 4, ʺOctober
Revolutionʺ, etc.
Service shortcomings
The reception of new Komsomol workers and farm laborers arriving at the mines of the North Caucasus is completely unsatisfactory. Mine public organizations took almost no part in hiring new workers. New workers were not provided with housing, and many workers did not even have a permanent place to sleep during the week. Most of the newly arrived workers were not assigned to certain areas of work for weeks. As a result, there is a significant turnover of workers from among the new arrivals. In 20 days in October, 2,500 workers left the Sevkav‐Ugol mines, including up to 250 Komsomol members, 135 party members and candidates, many former miners and skilled workers.
For the 27 days of October, 826 people arrived at the mine administration number 1, 695 departed. Of the 344 Komsomol members who arrived during the period from September 1 to October 10 at the mines ʺArtemʺ and them. Bukharin, by October 10, only 44 people remained.
130 people arrived at the Oktyabrskaya Revolution mine from the districts of the former Donskoy District, including party members and Komsomol members. After 6 days, only 8 people remained from this group.
From the mine. Vorovsky, all the newly arrived workers left back, since upon arrival at the mine the workers did not receive either a place to sleep or an advance payment, and for 5 days they had to eat leftover food in the canteens.
Shortcomings in recruiting workers
Major shortcomings in the work of organizations recruiting labor for the coal industry are also one of the reasons for the significant turnover of the labor force.
Mine organizations stand aside from recruiting work. The recruitment is carried out by the Regional Labor Department through its recruiters, who pay little attention to the qualitative composition of the recruited workers. As a result, among the recruited there are a significant number of adolescents of 14‐15 years old, sick, old people and elements with an unclear past (who do not have any documents in their hands).
At the Artem mine, among the 240 newly recruited workers, there were 114 sick and old people over the age of 50, 96 adolescents aged 14‐15, the remaining 30 people were people ʺwithout specific occupationsʺ in the past and without no documents with you.
At the October Revolution mine, among the 162 recruited workers are 53 teenagers and 48 sick and old people.
In a number of cases, recruiters of the Labor Department give the recruited workers completely unrealistic promises about conditions and wages, housing conditions, supplies, etc.
When recruiting workers in the Ust‐Labinsk region, the recruiters promised that the recruits would ʺstudy for 4‐6 months in courses and work 3‐4 hours a day.ʺ
The workers who arrived from the Ukrainian districts were guaranteed by the recruiters: 5‐hour working day, 150 rubles of monthly wages, an apartment, 3 years of study after one year of work. On arrival at the mines, the workers did not have a place to sleep for two weeks, ate leftovers from the canteens, and did not receive an advance payment. The workers soon left for the Ukraine.
Assistant Head of INFO OGPU Gerasimov
Head of Division 2, INFO Grosman
Dispatched:
1) Menzhinsky; 2) Berry; 3) Messing; 4) Evdokimov; 5) Poskrebyshev (for Stalin); 6) Molotov; 7) Kaganovich; 8) Postyshev; 9) Nikolaeva; 10) Ordzhonikidze; 11) Shvernik; 12‐25) OGPU; 26) In business; 27‐30) In the department.
[1] . Fists ‐ the term ʺkulaksʺ is synonymous with the concept of ʺrural bourgeoisieʺ. The struggle against the kulaks as an exploiting class began already during the October Revolution of 1917 and the Civil War. Then dispossession was included among the means of this struggle, i.e., direct and forced expropriation (in whole or in part) of the means of production in kulak farms. However, even during the Civil War, and even more so during the NEP period, the road to the new
[2] . Poor people ‐ according to data for 1927, among peasant farms, 22.1% belonged to the category of poor peasants, 11.3% ‐ proletarian (farm laborers). Consequently, the poor and farm laborers (with family members) accounted for about 1/3 of the rural
[3] . Article 109 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR read: “Abuse of power or official position, ie such actions of an official that he could commit solely due to his official position and which, not being motivated by reasons of official necessity, resulted in a clear violation of the correct operation of an institution or enterprise, or caused him property damage, or entailed a violation of public order or protected by law rights or interests of individual citizens, or these actions were carried