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Transcripts from the Soviet Archives VOLUME I 1903-1926Transcripts of the meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) December 1925
Source: Transcripts of the meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) ‐VKP (b) 1923‐1938. Moscow. ROSSPEN.
2007. Volume 1 1923‐1926. P. 425‐484
Archive: RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 534. L. 1‐103 (uncorrected transcript); D. 535. L. 1‐142 (transcript with copyright and editorial revision); L. 143‐160 (verbatim report).
December 10, 1925 1
Comrade Kamenev.
Kuibyshev *. (* The fragment of V.V. Kuibyshev’s speech marked with asterisks (* *) is not in the uncorrected transcript. Probably, the first part of Kuibyshevʹs speech was not stenographed.
First of all, why did we start studying the grain‐feed balance of CSO 2? A few words about the history of the issue. [The work of the CSB, for obvious reasons, has existed for a long time. The data of our survey work forced us to make an assumption about the incorrectness of the CSO activities in the field of a number of statistical works. This question was raised by me before the Chairman of the Council of Peopleʹs Commissars, Comrade Rykov.] Chairman of the Council of Peopleʹs Commissars, Comrade. Rykov decided to deliver a report on the activities of the CSO at a meeting of the Council of Peopleʹs Commissars. There, from the report itself and from the debate, it became clear that not all is well at the CSB. In accordance with this SNK [at meeting 23 / VI of this year] instructed the RCP to examine the activities of the CSO, and in his resolution indicated that it is necessary “to present a draft resolution that would cover the activities of the CSO from the point of view of social and political relations with our entire community, from the point of view of the internal structure, the correspondence of works and statistical data with reality and a draft of the measures to be taken in the field of organizing the entire statistical apparatus from top to bottom ” 3 .
Fulfilling the instructions of the Council of Peopleʹs Commissars, we examined the organizational structure of the CSB, studied the methods of its work, and on the basis of all this we are developing appropriate proposals. At the same time, we set ourselves the task of fulfilling another part of the instructions of the Council of Peopleʹs Commissars ‐ the compliance of work and statistical data with reality. [ There is no need to point out the particular importance of checking this part of the CSOʹs activities.] We decided to revise the estimated grain feed balance published by the CSO for 1925/26, as the largest work of the CSB 4, [making it possible to do the most important, in terms of influence states, findings.]
[This work lasted about two months.] To carry out this work, a special commission was created under the chairmanship of Comrade Yakovleva, in whose work a number of leading statisticians were involved. I will name Professor Chelintsev ‐ a major expert on agriculture and economic statistics, consisting, by the way, of a consultant to the CSO, Professor Rybnikov, an economist known [for his work on agricultural statistics and in particular on handicrafts], Professor Strumilin ‐ a party member, famous statistician comrade Groman. I will not point to a number of other important statisticians who worked in the commission. We have every opportunity to say that all measures have been taken for the most serious study of this issue.
The work of the commission lasted about two months. The Collegium of the NK RKI heard the report of this commission and, after a long debate and careful discussion, fully adopted the provisions of the commission for assessing the activities of the CSB in the field of grain‐feed balance 5. Everyone has a corresponding detailed resolution of the RCT board. Therefore, I will focus only on our most important conclusions in the field of assessing the grain feed balance of the CSO.
The first question is the assessment of the overall reliability of this grain‐feed balance. For its correct construction, it is necessary to determine the following basic quantities: sown area, harvest, then the number of farms and population. Checking the calculation of these basic quantities gives us the opportunity to judge the reliability of the balance itself.
Letʹs take the cultivated area. The practice of statistical work shows that the peasant, out of fear of a large tax, in most cases, somewhat reduces in his testimony in statistical surveys the area of his sowing. This phenomenon, of course, is quite natural, it is observed everywhere and, of course, must be taken into account when summing up certain results. How is this taken into account? It is necessary to make one or another allowance for the sown area, calculated as a result of statistical surveys.
What did the CSO do to determine the sowing area for
1925/26? Back in 1922, the CSB calculated approximate corrections to the readings, which were obtained as a result of a survey of the population. The amendments were distributed approximately as follows: 10‐15% for the consuming zone, 15‐20% for the producing zone, 26.7% for Belarus, etc. So, the CSO introduced these very amendments into the calculation of the sowing area for 1925/26. Is this correct? No, itʹs wrong.
First of all, the significant size of the amendments indicates that the issue of allowances is very important, and therefore requires the most serious attention.
At the same time, this case is also extremely complex. How far the peasants hide their sowing area depends on a variety of reasons. In 1923, the peasants were still living on the psychology of surplus appropriation; they were afraid that everything would be taken from them, leaving them only what was needed for their consumption. On the other hand, there has now been a very significant decline in agricultural production. tax. Should this affect the size of the amendments? Undoubtedly. Now there is no doubt less incentive for the peasantry to hide the area under crops. Was it possible to determine the size of the amendments every year? Of course, this is extremely difficult, but it can be determined; in each given year, it is possible, with the help of local observations in different places, to eventually derive one or another statistical average, which will give an idea of the size of the hidden crop. Did the CSB do so? No. CSO the same percentage of the premium, which, perhaps, was correct for 1923, was accepted in 1924, and even in 1925. It is quite obvious that this template is absolutely unacceptable in such an important matter. It was necessary to work hard to find other ways to calculate the increments, and then, in all likelihood, the results would have been somewhat different. One may think that now the concealment of the sowing area is carried out to an extent than in 1922, when the CSO made its observations. In any case, this first mistake undoubtedly shakes the planted area figures set by the CSO.
What methods were used to calculate the second component of the grain‐feed balance ‐ the yield? Itʹs the same statistical routine here; again, in 1923, on the basis of the estimates of the local statistical agencies, the CSO added half a point in relation to all the testimonies obtained in this or that region. The harvest was calculated in points, and if, for example, in a particular area, based on a survey of the population and observations, the harvest was determined at three points, then the CSO mechanically adds half a point, assuming incorrect readings from the population. The same was done when determining the harvest for 1925/26. In addition to the considerations already expressed, there is another major, eyecatching abnormality: these half points are added equally to low, medium, and high yields. Therefore, we get the following picture: where there is one point, CSO with the addition of another half point increases the yield by 50%; if you add half a point to two points, the yield increases by 25%, and with a yield of 4 points, the corresponding addition increases this yield by only 12%. Thus, if we take the areas where there was crop failure, then the CSO increases the yield by about 60‐80% and, undoubtedly, distorts the picture of the present state of affairs. Let us take some examples for illustration: in those places where, according to the autumn survey, the harvest was 18 poods, according to a point estimate with an allowance in the figures of the CSO, there is a harvest of 32 poods. In the provinces, where the average yield per tithe, according to the same survey, was 22 poods, the CSB shows 36 poods. Thus, here we have a deviation of 60 to 80%. Consequently, here, in the field of calculating the yield, the methodological error made leads to a great inaccuracy,
The third point is the population. The CSO calculates the population on the basis of the NKFin data on the collection of the agricultural tax. Is it possible to fully rely on these data of NKFin? On the one hand, there is an artificial division of farms, which the peasantry produces in order to get rid of the high tax rate; on the other hand, since the poor pay the tax to a lesser extent or are completely exempt from it, there is no doubt that when we come to such strata of the peasantry, the accuracy of the calculation of the population by the NKFin decreases. Thus, both in the field of calculating the area of crops, and in relation to calculating the yield and population, we do not have any correct methods of calculation that give a guarantee of the correctness of the conclusions. In order to present the picture even more clearly, it must be borne in mind that in such huge numbers, with which the CSB deals, when everything has to be multiplied, if not by hundreds, then by tens of millions, the slightest inaccuracy, ultimately, gives major errors and inaccuracies in the area of calculating the sown area, harvest, etc.; multiplied by a million times, they increase in such errors that make the entire grainfeed balance completely unreliable.
To illustrate, I will dwell on one more point that characterizes the work of the CSO in this area: we found that when distributing by acreage, only field crops were taken into account, and farmstead crops were not taken into account at all. According to the CSB, it turns out that non‐sown and low‐sown crops have increased significantly; on the other hand, according to the same information, the size of grain shortages on unseed and low‐sown peasant farms also increased. But here are some figures for you: if we take the consuming regions only for field crops, then there will be 2.4% without sowing, and if we take the farmstead land, except for field crops, then we get 1.5%, i.e., significantly less. In the producing regions, if we take only field crops, then there will be 5.1% of seedless crops, and if we take field and farmstead crops, then 2.6% are obtained without sowing, i.e., twice smaller.
The second main issue is the distribution of marketable grain by sowing groups. For characterization, we take the same sowing groups that the CSO also took, i.e., for example, in the consuming regions, the economy up to 2 dess <yatin> ‐ poor, from 2 to 4 ‐ middle peasants, from 4 to 6 ‐ well‐to‐do and over 6 ‐ rich. If the grain surpluses are properly distributed over these sowing groups, then a completely different picture is obtained.
What are the main reasons for this difference? First of all, the CSO already had the data of the spring survey of 1925 at its disposal, but they were not developed, and the CSO took the seed groups of the data from 1924. I will illustrate the resulting difference with several examples. Letʹs take groups of up to 2 dess <yatin>. In consuming regions, it turns out that in 1924 there were 58.6% of peasant farms up to 2 desyatins, and in 1925 ‐ 53%, i.e., 5.5% less; in the North Caucasus in 1924 there were 24.7% of such poor peasants, and according to the spring survey of 1925, their number was already 20%, i.e., 4% less. [There are, of course, other examples: if we take the Caucasus, then peasant farms over 16 dessyatins, according to 1924, were 4%, according to 1925. ‐ five%. Here, as you can see, the CSO, having made groupings according to the data of 1924, somewhat underestimated the share of farms with 16 dessiatines in this region. But there are very few such facts, and in most cases these mistakes tend to exaggerate stratification and diminish the role of the middle peasants.]
I repeat once again: each of the amendments that I make, at first glance, may seem insignificant, but in general calculations, the difference in the calculation of bundles by 4‐5% is only one term out of the total sum of many errors, which together, in the end, give a monstrous the difference between what really happened and what happened at the CSO.
Another important fact is the determination of the grain surplus. To determine the mass of marketable bread, i.e., bread thrown on the market, you need to know not only the total harvest, but also the consumption of the peasant himself, how much he spends on feeding the livestock, what reserves he leaves. This own consumption of the peasantry, thanks to its multimillion‐dollar mass, undoubtedly plays a very important role in the grain‐feed balance.
How did the CSB approach this issue? The CSO has introduced in the balance sheet the same nutritional standards for all segments of the population ‐ for the poor, for the middle peasants, and for the rich. Is it correct? Undoubtedly not, and undoubtedly this led to great mistakes. Can we say that the kulak and the poor man eat alike? Of course not. Everyone knows that the kulak consumes much more bread than the poor man. In most cases, the kulak eats better, often his family is larger, but the poor man is often malnourished. From the data of the budget survey of peasant farms, we can conclude that the food norms of the population deviate from the average by about 12% towards the rich and by 10% towards the poor. Thus, the poor consume 90%, the rich 112%, and the difference between the poor and the kulaks is 22%. CSO, having introduced in their calculations the same nutritional norms for all strata of the population, they completely did not take into account all these considerations. Again, this question is by no means unimportant. This difference of 22% is rather an understatement, and life observations say that it is even more significant; But even if we take this difference of 22%, then multiplied by the entire mass of grain that goes to feed the peasantry, it will already give large numbers, and ignoring it, of course, greatly distorts the overall picture.
What did the CSO get from this mistake, as a result of applying the same norms for all segments of the population? It is clear that this mistake belittled the poor manʹs surplus and exaggerated the rich manʹs surplus. In fact, the poor eat worse and throw their bread on the market in a larger amount than the CSB assumed. On the other hand, the rich eat better and throw less bread on the market. This mistake, which amounts to tens of millions of poods, is undoubtedly one of the main ones and acts in the direction of exaggerating the stratification, in the direction of exaggerating the surplus among the rich and reducing the surplus among the poor.
The same applies to livestock feeding. According to the CSB, it turns out that the poor and the rich feed the cattle in exactly the same way. Of course, here, too, this is a gross methodological error. If we take budget surveys of the peasant economy, it turns out that the deviation towards the rich man will be about 20% from the average rate of feeding livestock, which we take as 100, and towards the poor man will also be 20%. those. the share of marketable grain is again decreasing among the poor and exaggerated among the rich. This time the difference between the rich and the poor reaches 50% (80% of the average for the poor and 120% for the rich). In addition, the CSO made a major mistake in relation to livestock, adding only 3% to the number of livestock in 1924. whereas, according to the data of the CSB, the cattle has increased in 1925 in comparison with 1924 by 17 1 / 2.
These methodological errors [which may seem insignificant at first glance, in fact] give very large numbers. These figures for nutrition, feeding of livestock and livestock growth, all this taken together, multiplied by the millions of farms that we have, give a very large sum, which, being incorrectly distributed among groups, distorts the picture of the real state of affairs.
Another methodological error. It lies in the fact that the CSO did not take into account the stocks left by the peasants. The peasants, and to a greater extent the well‐to‐do than the poor, leave reserves both in order to fight the price policy of the state, and in order to insure themselves against a possible crop failure in the future, etc. According to the data of the budgets of peasant farms in 192324, which were developed by the Central Statistical Office at our insistence, there is a very significant difference in the calculation of the main elements of the grain‐feed balance, such as the norms of feeding, nutrition, etc., in comparison with the data that formed the basis for calculating the balance. In this case, we get such a picture that in the North Caucasus all the rich peasants, according to the supposed grain‐feed balance of the CSO, will sell 76 million poods. of bread, and if we take into account the remaining reserves according to the budget data of 1923‐24, then these rich people will throw into the market not 76.5 million, but 66 million poods. In Ukraine, if according to the grain‐fodder balance the rich will throw out 129.5 million poods, then taking into account these reserves, the size of the participation of the rich in the sale of bread will be expressed in the amount of 110.7 million poods. Thus, the neglect of stocks acts in the same direction ‐ in the direction of increasing the role of the kulaks in the sale of grain and in glossing over, in reducing the role of the middle peasant. The situation with forage is about the same.
How is this marketable bread distributed among those sowing groups that are displayed in the grain‐feed balance of the CSO? Of course, in this case, we could not undertake the task of drawing up the correct distribution of surplus commodity according to sowing groups. This is a work that requires special study, special development. The CSO could not do this work properly. Here we need a radical revision of all the basic elements of the grain‐feed balance, the instability and weak reliability of which we have established. We could provide some comparison of the data that points to incorrect conclusions regarding the distribution of the grain surplus. Based on the same budget studies of peasant farms, we took the actual marketability, i.e., the actual real sale of grain by peasants in different groups, and we got the following picture, which is not refuted by the employees of the CSO. The real sale of bread of those sowing groups that the CSO classifies as lowpower (there will be about 47% of them) and which appeared in the grain‐feed balance with a minus (i.e., they do not sell anything), is such that they throw out on the market from 2/5 to 1 / 2 of their gross grain harvest. [This table cannot change what is. These data on the grainfeed balance show that the picture presented by them is incorrect,] How large is the participation of low‐power and medium‐sized groups of the peasantry in the sale of grain, can be seen from the following table.
Farm groups
Real bread sales
Surplus balance
on grain‐feed
Low‐power
21.7%
‐
Average
48.6%
46%
Well‐to‐do
17.0%
29%
Rich
12.6%
25%
100%
100%
The middle strata of the population, which, according to the CSO, make up about 37% of all farms and throw 46% of all surpluses onto the market, according to our estimates, account for 48.6% of all real bread sales. The discrepancy here is insignificant, but it grows very much when we turn to the well‐to‐do and wealthy groups. If now Comrade. Popov says that the well‐to‐do and rich instead of 54% (and earlier the figure was 61%) will give 42% of all surplus grain, then the share of the middle peasantry is still a much larger figure than it was indicated in the grain‐feed balance of the CSO. All of this suggests that the CSB data on grain surpluses are incorrect. And since the conclusions are drawn from the grain‐feed balance that 61% of the funds allocated by the government and the state for grain procurement go to prosperous kulaks, since it was concluded that the funds, the ones we sell for export enrich mainly the rich population, insofar as accounting for the real sale of grain is extremely important, since this accounting proves that the lowpowered and middle strata of the peasantry, throwing away a significant part of their grain in the fall, participate in this state grain trade on a very significant scale and receive significant funds that the state gives for grain procurement. This table is presented in order to show that the method applied here immediately reveals the precariousness and inaccuracy of the figures given by the CSO. If we take into account the amendments that we have cited and the methodological correctness of which cannot be disputed, then it becomes obvious that the surplus on the grain‐feed balance of the CSB is distributed incorrectly. If the grain‐feed balance of the CSO was drawn up correctly,
Let us now take the question ‐ the relative participation of various groups in the purchase of manufactured goods. These figures cannot be put in a row with the figures for the grain‐feed balance, but the very comparison of these figures with the figures for the grain‐feed balance indicates that the balance is not well and the balance presented by the CSB is incorrect. North Caucasus, for example. There we have the following picture: farms up to two dessiatines have 24% of all purchases of manufactured goods, farms from 2 to 8 dessiatines have 45% of purchases of all manufactured goods, etc. Very striking data for other areas. In the North‐West region, farms with crops of up to 2 dessiatines give up to 75% of all purchases of manufactured goods, and 20% ‐ farms with 2 to 4 dessiatines of crops. These farms, marked by the CSO as lowcapacity and medium‐sized, account for 95% of all purchases of manufactured goods,
Since I do not have time to elaborate on the other two questions, I will limit myself to some examples. Here comrade. Kamenev asked me where was the document that the CSB was trying to carry out as a document characterizing the socio‐economic stratification of the village. I made inquiries; it was in the notes of Comrade. Popov, submitted to our commission, as well as in a note submitted by the Central Statistical Administration to the State Planning Commission, which refers to socio‐economic groups.
Socio‐economic groupings according to the CSO turn out to be such that in the consuming, for example, the region, the well‐to‐do farms with sowing from 4 to 6 acres fell. If we analyze these farms, which are included in the wealthy by the CSO grouping, it turns out that there are 3.9% horseless, 66% one‐horse, 27.9% two‐horse. The overwhelming majority of these farms are one‐horse. If we take into account cows (this aspect of the economy must also be taken into account), it turns out: single‐cow in this group 46%, two‐cow
39%; those. single‐ and double‐cowled 85%.
If we take the means of production by [types], then there are two threshers for every 100 farms in this group. If we take hired workers, it turns out that only 1.7% of farms employ workers. If we take the land lease, we have only 8% of [such] farms, renting land on average for one farm one tithe of arable land. All these signs indicate the complete impossibility of classifying all these farms as well‐todo. We take the same group in the consuming regions. There, a different number of dessiatines is taken for the wealthy, from 6 to 8 dessiatines and above. This group has 50% one‐horse farms, 2.3% horseless and 39% two‐horse farms. As for the implements of production, there are 6‐8 threshers per 100 farms. With the hiring of workers ‐ 2.6% of farms. With land lease ‐ 9%. Thus, among [4%] farms that the CSO classified as prosperous, apparently there are many such farms that should be removed from here.
Letʹs take Ukraine. Farms from 6 to 8 acres both in the steppe and in the forest‐steppe are classified as prosperous. The figures are as follows: without draft animals ‐ 24% of farms, with one head ‐ 41%, with two heads of draft animals ‐ 30%, three heads and more ‐ about 4% of farms. There are 1.6 threshers per 100 households. Here is an illustration of what the grouping that was produced by the CSO leads to. Here, the CSO did not take into account a number of other features, besides sowing, it did not take into account the rent, hiring of labor, the occupation of trades and the nature of these trades, which is known to be different in different groups. Whereas among the lower groups the occupation of trades is in the character of selling their labor power, in the higher groups it already has a capitalist, entrepreneurial character. All these data, which should have been taken into account, were not taken into account,
According to our preliminary data, which cannot in any way be passed off as completely accurate data, the picture should turn out to be different. In our resolution we give an approximate outline of how we believe it is necessary to reorganize the farms. We ourselves could not do this work completely, it is a long‐term work, and the work of statistical agencies. But our decree speaks of the elements that must be taken into account when grouping farms and how these groupings should be done.
I conclude my report with the decisions that were made on the report on the leadership of the CSB. In the course of the work, we became convinced that to a large extent the mistakes and incorrect work of the Statistical Office are explained by poor and insufficient leadership on the part of Comrade. Popov. In his speech, Comrade Popov at the Collegium of the RCP, both in his report and in his concluding remarks, this was clearly revealed. These speeches are enough to understand that Comrade. Popov, who was trying to become a politician (his speech was brightly political), failed to politically substantiate the correctness of his work, at the same time he showed himself to be a not very high statistician. [This opinion exists in all statistical circles.]
We ask the Politburo to pass the following resolution:
1) Agree with our conclusions about the work of the CSP in the field of grain feed balance and 2) change the leadership of the CSP.
Popov *. (* The speech of P.I. Popov was subjected to significant stylistic revisions, which is not fully reflected in all cases.)
There are two sides to the same question. [ Undoubtedly] On the one hand, there is a certain political touch in the formulation of this question, and on the other hand, the question is purely technical, because it includes purely technical considerations.
[It turns out as if] First of all, it should be noted that the CSO performs very important work, covering all aspects of the Unionʹs economy. Meanwhile, according to the report of Comrade Kuibysheva it seems as if the CSB, for some unknown reason, people gather, for some reason they are busy with numbers and, moreover, over the wrong numbers. And here he is, Comrade Kuibyshev approached the CSO figures, and the figures illuminated everything for him. I must inform you that the work of the CSO is being carried out according to a certain plan, for it is impossible [to create] just numbers, without any plan. The numbers are always obtained [by] as a result of a certain plan. [Moreover] Feature of statistical [methods]works lies in the fact that the program, organizational plan, and methods must necessarily be discussed and discussed at special commissions, meetings, conferences, congresses. Without this, no statistical operation is performed. So, how can one assume that the figures received by the CSO are obtained by unknown means and by what method. According to a specific method, budget data are collected and the grain‐feed balance is calculated, according to a specific method, a specific plan, dynamic processes in the peasant economy are studied. [Including compiled a certain economic study, which was used] In particular, the data from the development of the dynamic census were used by Comrade. Rykov in his last speech, 6 and he drew the conclusions that the CSB gave him.
CSO is a scientific institution working according to certain methods, programs, organizational plan, discussed collectively by specialists ‐ statisticians and economists. [There is no single person here who can] In the work of the CSB it is impossible for someone to do whatever he wants, as is often done in many institutions. I repeat. CSO is a scientific institution. So, this institution as a scientific institution had to be approached. If, Comrade Kuibyshev, you had the task to study the activities of the CSO, then you would have to organize a scientific examination. But what did you do? You have approached the CSO like a hundred other institutions. You have formed a departmental commission from your own employees. This commission was headed by Comrade Yakovlev, a talented person, for which I respect him greatly, but he does not have the technical knowledge that is necessary for an examination. Then next: who did you involve in the audit? Professors Rybnikov, Chelintsev ‐ economists of a certain economic bias, but not statisticians.
[You havenʹt got together for two months.] The Commission worked for two months and met at least a dozen twice * (* So in the document). But Comrade Strumilin attended the meetings only once, and once Comrade Groman, the CSO employees were not members of the commission ‐ they spoke on the commission [were] as the accused. Thus, the commission could not comprehensively and objectively illuminate the activities of the CSB. When I came from abroad, I immediately saw that the work of the commission was going abnormally. Last year, when the RCI was interested in questions about grain products, I assembled an expanded CSO Board, inviting economists ‐ representatives from the NKFin and Peopleʹs Commissariat for Land and Comrade Yakovlev and his staff. At the meeting of the Collegium, a number of reports were made by the employees of the CSO on the methods that we use, on the materials, the degree of their completeness and accuracy. After the report, everyone was asked to speak out, to point out our mistakes, if any, we make. The RCT staff were silent, none of them spoke. This year, the Collegium should also meet and invite to its meeting all specialists who could comprehensively illuminate the issue, and here, at a meeting of the Politburo, we could then report the conclusion of the Collegium. Unfortunately, this was not done this year ‐ I was absent. If this had been done, then I am convinced that then it would not have happened, Comrade Kuibyshev, your report, and we would not hear all the accusations that are now being brought against the CSB. When I got acquainted with the work of the commission, came to the conclusion that it was necessary to appoint instead of Comrade. Yakovlev, whom I respect very much, another comrade who is more competent in matters of statistics [face]. But my request was not Comrade Kuibyshev is satisfied. You, Comrade Kuibyshev, wanted to dwell on technical issues here, but I think that here, in the Politburo, it is absolutely impossible to resolve technical issues. But since you, Comrade Kuibyshev, nevertheless, considered it necessary to talk about this, then I am forced to dwell on these technical issues.
First of all, I will focus on the first accusation concerning the correction factors for determining the sowing area. I argue that the RCT misrepresents the CSOʹs actions. The CSB annually revises the correction factors, but if they remain unchanged for some areas, it is because there was no data available to revise and change the adopted factors. So, in the Southeast, we make a correction in a certain amount of [0.5%] for the inaccuracy of the sowing area, and it turns out that this year in the Southeast a special measurement of the sown area was made by land surveyors, which gave almost the same correction factor as and we give. I repeat, every year we review the materials about the amendments, [and see] but we make sure that there is no data to change the coefficients, and you [and you are doing this] you assert the opposite, assert that we have frozen in times of the achieved indicators. Now I turn to the question of determining the yield. Your indication that during the autumn survey there is absolutely no mechanical selection [incorrect] of farms is inaccurate. There is a mechanical selection, [but, however, not accurate enough] * (* A fragment of PI Popovʹs speech, marked with asterisks (* *), is absent in both versions of the transcript and appears only in the transcript.) but in carrying it out with the same rigor as in the spring survey. The CSO does not insist on methodological and technical reasons. The assertion that mechanical sampling and an increased sampling rate can refine yield data is indicative of the commissionʹs unfamiliarity with the theory and practice of yield statistics. The inaccuracy of harvest data is a legacy of the period of appropriation and tax in kind, and not the result of the reasons indicated by the commission *. Until now, statistical science [of this question] and practice has not resolved [and could not resolve] the question of what is important in determining the size of the crop ‐ whether it is mechanical selection, or the correct selection of indications. [We even have a special note on this issue. There is a researcher who is specially working on this matter.] On the issue of determining the yield, the CSO has a Department of Scientific Methodology. In the note that was forwarded to you, the head of this department proves that all the adjustments that need to be made to correctly determine the crop are made by the CSO. Letʹs go further ‐ about the indiscriminate correction of points and the assessment [ coefficient]. I submit that the CSB is systematically working on this issue [on amendments] ... We had to reckon with the fact that the population did not give us the correct instructions, we willy‐nilly must operate with the materials that we manage to collect. We revise the amendments every year. You, Comrade Kuibyshev, you assert exactly the opposite, insisting that we have stagnation in this matter, that we are standing in one place. If [you had research fellows‐experts] you used the results of scientific expertise, and not the conclusion of your departmental commission, you would certainly not have come to this conclusion.
Then you talk about a 5% sample survey and make completely unfounded statements. (I cannot hear the explanations that Comrade Popov gave on this issue.) * The 5% sample provides ample material for characterizing the extreme groups for those large regions for which the calculation was made. This is the conclusion of the Department of Scientific Methodology of the CSO, which has more experience and scientific training in this matter than the RCT commission *.
Further [in question] Comrade Kuibyshev dwells on the consumption rates and feed requirements. Here we are accused of allegedly taking the consumption rates and feeding rates the same for all groups and did not know that we had budget survey data and nutritional data [by groups]. I must say that here too, Comrade Kuibyshev, as in his previous statements, is not accurate. [We made a reservation in our scheme] First, in No. 105 of the Bulletin we indicated that our calculus is only a scheme, but we took the same norms only in the initial approach, and then on October 9, i.e., 2 months ago, they brought in [then] to the State Planning Committee, estimates based on differentiated rates of feeding and consumption. You are all about this, Comrade Kuibyshev, you are silent, but meanwhile, I repeat, two months ago we did exactly what you are talking about, and the State Planning Commission, having heard [us, told us to wait with further generalizations], issued a resolution that so that we can continue our work.
Now about the surplus and stocks. Again, Comrade Kuibyshev, you are not only [giving information, but you are forcing them to accept] you are incorrectly covering the activities of the CSB, but you are distorting it. You assert that conclusions were drawn on the basis of the Central Statistical Bureauʹs figures that 61% of all surpluses are held by the kulaks. But who made such a conclusion? CSO? No, the CSB did not draw such a conclusion. Why do you ascribe ridiculous conclusions made by someone to the CSB?
Now about stocks. [Where do you see that we deliberately choose the method that Comrade Kuibyshev. We did not choose this method.] Why, Comrade Kuibyshev, you argue that the CSO made a grave and unacceptable mistake by refusing to determine the amount of stocks that the farms of each seeding group should extract from their crops and not dump into the market. We have chosen the following method. From the total production of grain for each group, we exclude all that amount of grain that is consumed by the population both for their own nutrition and for feeding livestock. [Remains] Then we subtract what is needed for seeding, [still remains] and as a result, we get a certain remainder, part of which can be sold, part of which can be turned into stock and part used to expand the economy. We have argued and assert that the ratio of these three parts depends on the conjuncture and price policy: under one policy, grain goes into stock in a larger share, under another policy, the peasant throws out more grain on the market, on the contrary, [less] more. We argue that there is no reason to separate stocks from the total balance, for stocks are entirely dependent on the state of the conjuncture. Is it possible to know the situation in advance? Who knows her? We said [hereʹs a value in three parts] to you: here is the amount of residues and surpluses after satisfying the usual needs of the rural population itself. These remnants should fall into three parts during the financial year. But in what proportion ‐ will depend on the conjuncture. The conjuncture is a very complex thing. So, everyone thought that in the fall, after a good harvest, bread would flow to us at cheap prices, but the situation turned out to be completely different: bread goes very poorly and at a price higher than we had expected. Who could have foreseen this? How could the CSB have foreseen this? It had no data for scientific foresight. Could the CSB dictate the policy that determines the conjuncture? You should have done this, not the CSO. [This approach is economic, not political.] You can blame the CSO for many things, but I tell you that the CSO did everything it could and gave everything it could give. Scientific expertise, which, unfortunately, did not exist, could tell you this.
* I turn to the question, which has acquired political significance, about which Groups the surplus is concentrated in. (* The fragment of the speech marked with asterisks (* *) was so significantly revised by the author that it is impossible to reflect this change. Initially it was: “I am now moving on to the questions ... that distinguish her policy, about whether the importance of the group has diminished to an indecent value I will tell you what is the essence of the issue here (shows the diagram) This group of farms ʺAʺ has surpluses here, but here there are disadvantages, up to two dessiatines of farms have surpluses: farms from two to four dozen have surpluses of 21%, from four to six dessiatines ‐ 29%, from six to eight dessiatines ‐ 2%, Here are the data of the CSO. Then Comrade Kuibyshev took the budget data from us and said: all this is nonsense that up to two dessiatines receive 20%. Thus, we have that more wealthy and wealthy peasants ...
What happened? Marketable bread is in the hands of the poor. Comrade Yakovlev said that 50% of this marketable grain is with the poor. Therefore, the poor man is the bread holder. Here are the conclusions to be drawn from the speech of Comrade Yakovleva. Why did this happen? Simply because there is insufficient familiarity with statistical materials. This is the second line ‐ what this group buys. Up to two dessiatines are bought by 41% and at the same time 31% are selling: as you can see, they buy more than they sell. From two to four dessiatines ‐ buys 29%; sells 32%. Here, on the contrary, he sells more and buys less. It turns out that when you compare further buying and selling, then this group has a sine. It is insufficient, but what groups have the last on‐farm surpluses? Obviously, the wealthy and the rich, not the poor. I think that we are miscalculating the poor group. They have five poods per head, but they need 12, seven is not enough. He collects oats, barley, and sells them, and buys bread for himself. Statistics have established that in the fall a poor man sells in order to buy later. The only question is what he sells. There are up to 50 million of this kind of on‐farm grain, but how much do we procure? 400‐500 million. This on‐farm grain does not go beyond the city market on a large scale. This is an on‐farm turnover. Here is the mistake of comrades Kuibyshev and Yakovlev, this does not mean that this marketable bread is of ordinary scale. This bread is alienated.
Rykov. How can this be proved?
Popov. He overturns your entire procurement of bread, overturns everything that we have in balance. You will see that 500 million bread passes. No. Alexey Ivanovich, this is on budget. And here is our balance sheet data. We said that it is not marketability that determines the surplus. You cannot think that someone who has nothing, that he will collect 5 poods at the time when he needs 12, and that such a poor man is some kind of supplier. We published the data in the ʺEconomic Lifeʺ 2 years ago. I repeat, I have to talk to you about technical issues, which the expertise will obviously tell you, whether it is a technical issue or not. You will make political conclusions, but this question is technical.
Moving on to the next question, are we glossing over the role of the middle peasant and who is undergoing enormous political dismemberment here. Here I take data on the North Caucasus (shows the diagram), here are our groupings, and this is what the RCT offers. We have agricultural crops, but crops have one meaning in the North, and in the South they have a completely different meaning. 2 tithes of the North are not equal to 2 tithes of the South. We unite groups for each district. They are sowing, but for crops we called them thin, small, medium, prosperous, rich. There is no longer a fist. Fists are found in all groups, but the fist cannot be opened based on the seed. This is what we say. When Comrade Kuibyshev says that 61% are in the kulak, we say that this is not true. The fist cannot be opened, it can only be judged by its power. Therefore, we take a different scale. See, what happens. Here, in the North Caucasus ...
Popov (explains the diagram). We do this. Here is the first group, these are small farms, medium‐sized farms from 6 to 10. Whereas in the North ... an average farm is from 2 to 4. From 10 to 16 ‐ well‐to‐do, over 16 ‐ we consider rich, i.e., multi‐sowing, multi‐livestock. Here, you see, it turns out like this: 13%, 40%, etc. Here you see 4 and 20. It turns out like this: small 12, middle 62, rich 15. Now letʹs take this area. Here the figures are as follows: ... I affirm that they unconsciously followed the wrong path, it is dangerous to average different capacities of the economy. There is a dangerous slope here. The kulaks are coming to us on the sly. There is danger here.
I ask you, are we doing the right thing with our five factions? Yes, thatʹs right, because it is necessary to dismember ... Is it right to act in order to force us to give such groups where the average peasant has from ... to ... tithes? If you need such an average peasant, then what is it? I tell you: such and such is called the middle peasant, such and such rich, etc. And you are pushing us ... to the middle peasant. And to fix your attention only on the sale of bread, without revealing what they are buying, you are thus making the wrong conclusion that the marketable bread is in the hands of the lowpowered. As for the fact that I “stand low”, and that all the statistical agencies say about it, I say to this: do what you do”. (RGASPI. F. 17.Op. 163. D. 534. L. 16‐19.))
What is the essence of the question? (shows the diagram). This diagram shows 4 series of figures, characterizing, based on the budgets ‐ 1923/24, on the one hand, gross alienation, on the other ‐ acquisition and, finally, pure alienation. In addition, data are given on surpluses, as they were given in Bulletin No. 105. These are the data.
Groups
Gross alienation of bread
Purchasing bread
Pure alienation of bread (excess)
Excess bread
as calculated by the CSO
budget survey 1923/24
CSB bulletin
No. 105
Farms with sowing: from 2 acres
21
41
from 2‐4 dessiatines
29
32
‐
fourteen
from 4‐6 dessiatines
19
fourteen
fifteen
25
from 6‐8 dessiatines
ten
6
17
19
from 8‐16 acres
fifteen
6
42
42
over 16 acres
6
1
26
Total
100
100
100
100
In the group of farms up to 2 dessiatines, there is no net surplus, there are only drawbacks, surpluses start from the group of farms from 2 to 4 dessiatines. In Bulletin No. 105, this group of farms contains 14% of all surpluses. In the group of farms 4‐6 dessiatines of surplus 25%, in the group of 6‐8 dessiatines ‐ 19% and in the group of 8 and more dessiatines ‐ 42%. But if we turn to the budget data, we can draw other conclusions, namely: farms up to 2 dessiatines alienate (and sell and give in exchange) 21% of all alienated grain, while there are shortcomings in the grain‐forage budget. On farms with 2‐4 dessiatines of alienation equal 29% of all sales, while in the Bulletin only 14%, from 4‐6 dessiatines ‐ 29%, from 6‐8 dessiatines ‐ 10% and over 8 dessiatines ‐ 21%. while Bulletin 105 in the last group indicated a surplus of 42%. These are the data of the CSO. And here is Comrade Kuibyshev took budget data from us and comparing them with the Bulletin, comes to the conclusion that Bulletin No. 105 distorts the role of the poor and that the latter, i.e., farms up to 2 dessiatines sell 21%, while according to the Bulletin they have disadvantages. At the same time, it turns out that the more prosperous and wealthy peasants sell significantly less than Bulletin No. 105 shows. So, according to Comrade Kuibyshev, marketable bread is in the hands of the poor and in a significant amount. And comrade. Yakovlev in Pravda marketable bread is in the hands of the poor and in a significant amount. And comrade. Yakovlev in Pravda marketable bread is in the hands of the poor and in a significant amount. And comrade. Yakovlev in Pravda7 even declares that in some regions 60% of marketable grain is supplied under‐powered. So, according to Kuibyshev and Yakovlev, the poor man is the bread holder. Why did they come to such conclusions? Simply because both of them are not sufficiently familiar with the nature of the statistical material. Pay attention to the acquisitions column (buy and receive in exchange for work). Which groups are buying? It turns out that 41% of all purchases fall on the farm up to 2 dessiatines, while 21% of all sales fall on them simultaneously. They buy more than they sell, for they have a flaw in the “pure alienation” column. 32% buy from 2‐4 dessiatines, and sell 29%, farms from 4‐6 dessiatines, on the contrary, sell more, buy less. After comparing purchases and sales, farms in this group already have a plus on the balance of 15%. Farms with larger sowing groups tend to sell more than they buy. They have very significant household surpluses in terms of the budget balance, groups over 8 dessiatines have even 68% of budget surpluses, and according to the Bulletin, only 42%. So, who can have net surpluses after paying off the on‐farm turnover (buying and selling farms of one group from the owners of other groups)? I think that Comrade Comrades Kuibyshev and Yakovlev misrepresent the situation of the poor groups. Indeed, farms up to 2 dessiatines receive 5 poods per capita from their farms, but they need, their consumption rate is 12 poods, and. Consequently. 7 poods is not enough. They have oats, barley, but do not have horses, and therefore they sell them, and buy bread for themselves or exchange for oats and barley. Statistics have long established that a poor man sells in autumn in order to buy later, in spring and summer. The only question is who he sells to, and the question is, whether it enters the market entirely as marketable grain for the city and for export, or does it mainly rotate within the boundaries of agriculture, without leaving it or going out in relatively small quantities. Up to 400 million of such grain, which circulates in the internal economic turnover, the state could procure in 1923‐25 ‐ 350‐450 million, which went entirely for the consumption of the city and for export, because the demand equals 500‐625 million poods. Thus, on‐farm turnover could only be served to a very weak extent by the state and its procurers. The turnover for the most part does not enter the largescale urban market. The circulation of grain on‐farm turnover takes place within the boundaries of agriculture. Here is the mistake ‐ and a major one, Comrade Kuibyshev and Yakovlev, their mistake,
Rykov. How can this be proved?
Popov. Comparison of three quantities: grain procurement, the need of the city and export in grain and the size of grain on‐farm turnover. Our balance sheet data on both the budget and the grain balance say one thing: net surpluses are found mainly on farms with a relatively large crop. It is necessary to distinguish between alienated grain, grain of intra‐farm turnover, and commodity grain. One cannot seriously think that someone who has nothing, someone who collects 5 poods per capita, who needs 12 poods a year, that such a poor man is a supplier of marketable grain for the city and for export. Two years ago, I published in the ʺEconomic Lifeʺ data that low‐sowing groups alienate grain, and therefore in vain Comrade Kuibyshev issues for the opening of his commission an indication of the alienation of grain by small‐sown groups. I have to talk to you about many technical issues, issues that scientific expertise should tell you, and on the basis of an expert assessment of technical issues you could draw political conclusions, but, unfortunately, technical issues did not receive an assessment of scientific expertise, but only an assessment of the departmental comrade commission Yakovleva, in my opinion, is not competent in matters of statistical methodology and statistical technique.
Now we turn to the next question, to the question of whether we are glossing over the role of the middle peasant and who is falling into a huge political mistake. Here are the data for the North Caucasus (shows the diagram). The scheme of distribution of surpluses and deficiencies by sowing groups, combined into socio‐economic ones ‐ with a five‐member breakdown of all farms into groups (A, according to the CSO method ‐ group B) and with a three‐member breakdown (using the RCT method ‐ group C). (Data for the North
Caucasus are taken.).
Sowing farm groups
AND.
B.
AT.
Without sowing
‐
‐
‐
Sowing up to 1 tithe
‐
‐
‐
ʺFrom 1 to 2 dessiatines
2
thirteen
thirteen
ʺFrom 2 to 3 dessiatines
five
ʺFrom 3 to 4 acres
6
ʺFrom 4 to 6 acres
fourteen
40
62
ʺFrom 6 to 8 acres
fourteen
ʺFrom 8 to 10 acres
12
ʺFrom 10 to 16 acres
24
24
ʺFrom 16 to 19 acres
8
23
fifteen
Over 19 dessiatines
fifteen
100
100
100
Here is column No. ... * (* Hereinafter, omissions and abbreviations of the document.) Gives a diagram of our grouping, but column No. ... is what the RCT offers. We are grouped by planting size, but one planting unit has a different weight depending on the area. Thus, 1 tithe of the North is not equal to 1 tithe of the South. Therefore, for a summary for the Union, it is necessary to combine the groups in such a way as to obtain conditionally similar farms, despite the difference in their size in terms of the number of acres sown. These farms are united into groups according to the size of sowing: since the size of sowing is one of the signs of capacity, then one can conventionally call low‐sowed low‐power, small, with an average sowing medium‐sized farm, more multi‐sowing ‐ prosperous and rich, i.e., apply power terminology to them.
But such a grouping by no means reveals kulaks. The rich and wellto‐do are not kulaks, kulaks are found in all groups, it is impossible to open a fist on the basis of only one seed. This is what we claim. When Comrade Kuibyshev claims that 61% of all surpluses are in the hands of the kulaks, and this is allegedly according to the CSB, we say that this is not true, this is not true. A fist cannot be opened based on one crop grouping. To distinguish the kulaks, one must judge by many signs and indicators, therefore, the grouping according to sowing in no case could dismember the farms on the basis of class.
Turning to digital data: there are 11 seed groups. In the Union, we combine all 11 groups into 5 groups: non‐sowing, low‐sowing, medium‐sized, with over‐average sowing and, finally, multisowing. In the first (low‐sowing) group, there is 13% of all net surpluses, in the second group, which is medium in size, 4‐8 decimal places ‐ 40%. The group has more multi‐sowing than the average ‐ 24% and, finally, in the multi‐sowing group ‐ from 16 and more than 23%. But what the RCT recommends is that it recommends combining all farms in this region into 3 groups of up to 4 dessiatin. Then from 4 to 19 dessiatins and, finally, over 19 dessiatines. Then it turns out that the middle peasant group has 62% of all surpluses, and the rich ‐ over 19 dessiatins ‐ only 15%. The weight of the rich group with such a grouping is almost only the weight of the poor, 4 dessiatines each, where there is 13% of all surplus. In that grouping, the RCI undoubtedly dominated well‐todo farms, farms with more multi‐sowing. I argue that, unconsciously or consciously, the RCI followed the wrong path of averaging farms of different economic capacity: this path is also dangerous. There is undoubtedly a dangerous bias here. Here populism is sneaking towards us on some side. There is danger here.
I ask you: is the CSO in its five‐member group doing the wrong thing ‐ and we answer: right, because it is necessary to dismember phenomena in order to know the nature of the economic mass, because only in this way can we reveal the nature of the entire mass. Therefore, is the RCT doing the right thing in recommending that we give such groups where, on average, farms from 4 to 20 dessiats are counted? We divide all farms into smaller groups, and thus we cannot be mistaken and the more objectively we can reveal groups of different economic power, including the middle peasant. The RCT is pushing us to such a grouping, in which groups of different powers will drown, and this creates a swollen artificial, far from life, middle peasant group. By fixing its attention only on the sale of bread, opening and suppressing purchases, the RCT comes to the wrong conclusion, that it is as if the marketable grain is found mainly in the poor. This is a dangerous bias because it distorts the role of poor groups in the economy and excludes the role of wealthy and wealthy groups. As for the qualifications of me as a scientist, on the part of Comrade Kuibyshev, then in this matter Comrade Kuibyshev is not competent, but I can only tell him: do what you do and do it quickly. *
Stalin. (Showing the diagram.) Comrade. Popov, here you have 42%. [I counted 62%.]
Popov. According to Bulletin No. 105, a group of farms over 6 dess ʺyatinsʺ gives 61%. Here I give a different grouping on the basis of the same Bulletin No. 105, but uniting farms over 8 dessiatin ‐ 42%. So, there is no contradiction.
Stalin. Another question. I understand the matter in such a way that at the first calculations the surplus turned out to be [ 60] 61% among the wealthy [ kulaks].
Popov. [This calculation is not accurate.] Your calculation is incorrect because we did not determine the surplus in the kulaks.
Stalin. The calculation, which gave the result of 61% surplus in the kulaks of 8 and more dessiatines, turned out to be inaccurate. You yourself admitted it. Further refinement gave 54% for this group. This was proved by Comrade Kuibyshev. This turned out to be inaccurate. You now consider the most accurate figure of 42%. Here you have, according to the calculations of the CSO, 42% from 8 to 10 dessiatines throughout the district. Was 61% all over Russia?
Popov. Yes, all over Russia. But 61% turned out because the farms of groups of more than 6 dessiatines were united? Are farms of groups over 8 dessiatines united here? and they give 42%. There are no contradictions here.
Stalin. And is this figure (pointing to the diagram) also all over
Russia?
Popov. Yes, also throughout Russia. [However, I probably wonʹt.]
Yakovlev *. (* There are four versions of the transcript of Ya.M. Yakovlevʹs speech (two are copyrighted). When published, the texts of the transcript and transcripts were compared with the copyright. The original version of the transcript of the speech (without editing) is published as addendum 2.) [ Previously total] I respond to the refutation of Comrade. Popov. First of all, technical issues. Here it must be said that one has to hear with the greatest surprise the refutation of Comrade. Popov, that CSB employees did not participate in the commission or participated as accused. Of course, it is not. In our work, even before the arrival of Comrade. Popov was attended by all senior officials of the CSO. Moreover, a subcommittee chaired by the deputy governor of the CSO ‐ comrade V. Pashkovsky, who in the absence of Comrade. Popov acted as a manager of the CSB.
Comrade Popov declares: firstly, the amendment to the sown area has not been the same in recent years; second, the half‐point amendment was not adopted indiscriminately; third, the 5% sample provides an accurate and solid basis for calculating the share of the extreme group.
Statement by Comrade Popova contradicts what was established by the CSB itself in the subcommittee, which was allocated by our commission chaired by the acting CSB Governor
Comrade Pashkovsky, [was developed] which adopted a number of proposals made by representatives of the CSB.
I am reading excerpts from the minutes of this subcommittee, which worked in the composition of the chairman Pashkovsky (from the CSO) and members ‐ Schmemann (from the CSO), and from the RCP professors comrade Rybnikov and Chelintsev and comrade. Tsylko.
On the issue of the size of the amendment to the sown area from Protocol No. 1, we read: “The size of the amendments was determined according to the amendments that were introduced by some provincial bureau in their calculations of the sown area. The amendments were applied the same for all years (from 1922‐1925). ʺ
Under this protocol is the signature of Pashkovsky, as chairman, and Kharlampovichʹs secretary, an employee of the CSB, and
Comrade Popov now refutes the fact established by the CSB itself. Apparently, Comrade Popov does not know what is going on at the CSB.
On the second question ‐ about an increase of half a point ‐ I read from Minutes No. 2: “The CSB adds 0.5 points to the points reported from the localities. Since 1924, the amendment is the same in all regions. ʺ
For some reason, this is Comrade. Popov now refutes, although this fact, as you can see, is recognized by the CSO itself.
I proceed to the third protocol. Comrade Popov states that 5% of the sample is sufficient to identify the extreme groups. What does the 3rd protocol, signed by the chairman, comrade Pashkovsky and the secretary comrade Damascus?
ʺ5% of the sample of the spring survey is insufficient to firmly substantiate the per‐group calculations of the grain‐feed balance, especially for the extreme members of the group.ʺ
Thus, the third, last factual refutation of Comrade. Popova contradicts what was established by the CSB itself. This example alone shows how wrong the statement of Comrade Popov, as if representatives of the CSB participated in the work of the commission as accused. You see that technical statistical issues were worked out by a specially designated subcommittee, whose chairman was Comrade Pashkovsky, as the actual head of the CSB in the absence of comrade Popov.
And further, comrade. Popov objects to our thinking about stocks.
We have heard his ideas that stocks are the result of market conditions, etc., many times, and we do not argue about the fact that market conditions affect the size of stocks. But the question is (this was also established by the old budget surveys) that the accumulation of stocks is a natural phenomenon, and mainly for powerful farms. When we asked the CSB for the 1923/24 budgets to calculate the approximate size of the accumulation of reserves for the year, we were given 150 million ‐ an underestimated figure, according to the State Planning Committee, which calculates the size of reserves at about 300 million poods for this year. We took pre‐war budgets and checked these data. It turns out that all pre‐war data, without exception, indicate that powerful groups leave a margin that must be taken into account in any conjuncture. A certain accumulation, moreover, mainly in the most powerful layers, must be taken into account, and a certain amount of grain must be discarded from the surplus. And the CSBʹs grain‐feed balance did not do this.
One more final remark regarding the substance of the conclusions reached by the commission.
We examined all the individual elements of the balance sheet and found that at the time of compiling the balance sheet, the CSO did not have the data that were absolutely necessary for compiling it (the balance, which was supposed to provide material for judging the distribution of the 1925/26 crop by groups, was compiled at the moment, when:
1) there was still no data on the very distribution of farms by groups in 1925, 2) data on fluctuations in feeding and consumption by groups were not developed, 3) when it was a priori known that the spring survey data provided insufficiently accurate material for calculating the share of extreme groups, 4) when for all the main elements ‐ the size of the crop, the amount of costs for seeds, etc. ‐ it was known that their general inaccuracy increases extremely when we deal with poor or rich farms).
On the basis of such a balance, with all its elements inaccurate, the only thing that allows the balance to be established is the fact that the size of the surplus increases with the size of the economy. But everyone knows this even without any grain and feed balance. And I could not give a balance to the data, sufficiently verified, about the exact size and proportions of surplus distribution among the main groups.
But besides this, the very method of drawing up a balance cannot be considered correct. The CSO calculated on the basis of very inaccurate data the gross collection by group ‐ from this collection the CSO subtracted the very inaccurately calculated expenditures for consumption, feeding and seeds and thus obtained surpluses. How unsuitable such a method is for calculating the actual marketable grain by groups is shown by the budget records of peasant farms produced by the Central Statistical Bureau itself. We asked the CSB to give, and the CSB gave us, on the basis of budget data, calculations of the purchase and sale of bread by groups. And what happened? It turned out, firstly, that the lowpower ones sell from 1/2 to 1/3 of their gross harvest, while according to the grain‐feed balance of the CSO they are shown only with deficiencies in breads, and the rich layers sell much less bread that is shown in the balance sheet of the CSB ... This is because the poor sells in the fall and buys in the spring, while the richer peasants put a certain part of their grain in reserve. In order to judge the real role of individual groups in the sale of grain, one must go not by the method of the Central Statistical Bureau, but by recording the purchase and sale of grain in the peasant farm and calculating the remnants of grain in the peasant farm at the end of the year. Only in this way can we get a real grain‐feed balance by groups.
Comrade Popov here put forward the idea against us that the poor man buys bread and buys more than he sells. But this is exactly what we wrote in our theses and this is what we are putting forward against the method of drawing up the balance sheet used by the CSB. Considerations Comrade Popov regarding the fact that the poor man does not sell for the city, that his corrupt bread is included only in the intra‐peasant circulation, are not substantiated on any serious grounds. After all, it is in the autumn that the poor sells from 1/3 to 1/2 of his gross harvest, and the intra‐peasant turnover has its maximum development in the spring, when the peasants, who do not have enough grain until the fall, i.e., in the majority, the poor are beginning to buy bread. And moreover, the balance, which is calculated on the basis of imprecise elements, and in this way,
We worked for over a month in the absence of comrade Popova in full agreement with all the main employees of the CSB. Comrade When Popov returned to Moscow, he began by declaring himself a defender of Marxism, trying to translate the issue of imperfect balance into a political plane. What is this politics and what is this Marxism? We can show this by the example of the grouping that the CSB applied to the southern steppe Ukraine. In the southern steppe Ukraine, the CSO classifies farms as poor peasants up to 2 dessiatines, middle peasants ‐ farms from 2 to 6 dessiatines, and well‐to‐do farms with sowing from 6 to 10 dessiatines; all farms with sowing more than 10 dessiatines are classified by the CSO as rich. Thus, in southern‐steppe Ukraine, according to the CSO grouping, it turns out: 4.7% of seedless, 13.3% of all farms ‐ poor, 46.9% of average, 17.9% of well‐to‐do and 17.2% of rich. Wealthy and wealthy together according to the CSB grouping, 35.1%, i.e., more than one third of all farms.
Since the CSO and its defenders are trying to cover up the mistakes of the CSO made by them in constructing the alleged grain‐feed balance with quotes from Vladimir Ilyich, [ recall] it should be remembered that in his work on the Development of Capitalism in Russia, Vladimir Ilyich counted 39 in the Dnieper district of the former Taurida province, 9% of the poor, 41.7% of the middle peasants and 18.4% of the wealthy 8. Thus, according to the current CSO grouping, we have in southern steppe Ukraine twice as many prosperous and wealthy people than Lenin counted in the Dnieper district of southern steppe Ukraine almost 30 years ago.
The full extent of the complete economic senselessness of such a doubling of the well‐to‐do and the rich after the October Revolution can be revealed by a simple comparison of the grouping of farms by sowing in 1917 and 1925 in southern‐steppe Ukraine.
[Distribution of farms in% by groups of sown area.
Groups
1917
1925
Seedless
15.4
4.7
Up to 2 acres
17.4
13.3
2 to 4
16.6
25.9 ʹ
4 to 6
13.1
21.0
6 to 9
12.8
17.9
9 to 15
12.9
13.8
15 and more
11.8
4.4
(Thus) Since 1917, the group of farms with sowing of more than 15 dessyatins has decreased almost three times. The middle peasant groups have grown along the entire line; and on the balance sheet of the CSO compared to the 90s. last century, the proportion of the well‐to‐do has doubled. This kind of incongruity, which can be objectively characterized only as the fact of a very strange oblivion by the CSO of the fact that the October Revolution took place in 1917, is explained primarily by the wrong method of grouping.
Let us turn to the consideration of what are those farms that the Central Statistical Administration in this area classified as prosperous, i.e., farms with sowing from 6 to 10 acres. [We will characterize them in terms of their means of production, trade, social relations, income, some elements of marketability.]
On farms with sowing from 6 to 8 dessyatins ‐ 24.1% without draft animals, 41.1% with one head of draft cattle, 30.9% with two heads of draft animals, 3.9% with three or more heads draft animals. On farms with sowing from 8‐10 dess ʺyatinsʺ ‐ 14.9% without working livestock, 37.6% with one head of working cattle, 39% with two heads of working cattle, 8.5% with three and more heads of working cattle ... In other words, the share of farms without draft animals, with one or two heads of draft animals in farms with sowing from 6 to 10 dessyatins falls significantly more than 90% of all farms.
Let us also recall what Vladimir Ilyich wrote about the average economy of the Dneprovsky district: ʺThere are 2‐3 draft animals here each * (* Ya. A. Yakovlev made a mistake when quoting. Leninʹs work indicates the figureʺ 3.2 “.) pieces per yard, while 4 pieces are required for a full “tax”. Therefore, the economy of the middle peasant is in an unstable position, and to cultivate his land he has to resort to conjugation” 9. Although now, in connection with the plowing of the fields, this rate of livestock has undoubtedly decreased, nevertheless, it is still completely, of course, unreasonable to classify as prosperous farms those farms among which farms without draft animals and with one head of draft animals make up the majority, as the CSO ...
Single‐barns and barn‐barns make up 80% ‐ 4‐5 farms with sowing from 6 to 8 dessiatines and 69.7% of farms with sowing from 8 to 10 dessiatines. There are 86.7 plows per 100 farms with sowing from 6 to 9 dessiatines, i.e., not all farms even have one plow and only 17.6% of farms have reapers. Thus, we see that the property characteristics of these farms did not give the CSB any grounds for classifying them as prosperous.
[Let us now turn to fishing. Data on the percentage of income from fisheries to the conditionally net income from agriculture show a significant predominance of income from agriculture over income from agriculture in farms with sowing from 2 dessiatines (131%) and a very significant presence of fishing income in farms from 2 to 3 dessiatines (38%). Further, the value of commercial income falls to 12 dessiatines * (* So in the document) on farms with sowing from 10 to 16 dessiatines and then rises again in farms over 16 dessiatines ‐ reaching 17.5%. These fisheries data allow us to separate the poor group on the basis of insufficient agricultural income to cover the needs of the family. On the other hand, farms are made with sowing more than 16 acres, in which, as we have shown by the example of the consumer strip, the new increase in fishing income is explained by the capitalist nature of the industries in this group (industrial and commercial enterprises). The fact that on farms with sowing from 6 to 8 dessiatines and further on farms with sowing from 8 to 16 dessiatines, fishing incomes play a minimal role, indirectly indicates that in this group, fishing does not yet play the role that it begins. play in a higher group...]
Let us now turn to social relations. Unfortunately, according to Ukrainian data, which we mainly have to use here, there is no accounting for this share of farms with hired workers. Therefore, we are forced here to use exclusively the data of the budgets of 1923/24 on how much agricultural products were given and received for work per farm.
In the lower seed groups, we see either the predominance of pay for work over return for work or an almost complete balancing of return and pay. On farms with sowing from 6 to 8 dessiatins, one farm gives 37 rubles for work, and receives 13.4 rubles for work. When we move on to the next group with sowing from 8 to 16 dessiatines, we see here that one farm gives 70.9 rubles for work, and receives 17.3 rubles for work. Comparison of what is given and what is received for work by one farm in both of these groups allows us to notice an undoubted increase in hiring when approaching farms with sowing of about 16 acres, which gives reason to assume the presence of farms that widely use hired labor in the group. approximately, with the sowing approaching 16 tithes.
In farms with sowing from 6 to 10 ten except average. Thus, we see that both the means of production of this group and social relations did not give the CSO any grounds for enrolling farms with sowing from 6 to 10 dessiatines into a special group of prosperous farms from the average.
Letʹs turn to the income data for verification. The conditionally net income from agriculture is equal to 357.3 rubles in the group with sowing from 6 to 8 dessiatins. on the farm, i.e., this is the ordinary income of an average farm, which does not differ significantly from the same income in medium farms in other regions. Only the farms with sowing of more than 16 dessiatines are decisively distinguished by the size of their income, here the income per farm is 939 rubles. The group of farms with sowing from 8 to 16 dessiatines has a conditionally net income per farm of 560.4 rubles, which again gives reason to assume a transition to really rich farms, somewhere around 14‐16 dessiatines.
[Analysis of gross income again confirms these considerations. The ratio of gross income from all agriculture and income from grain highlights the extreme flanks. They reach 191.1% in farms with sowing up to 2 dessyatins, 159.3% ‐ in farms with sowing from 2 to 4 dessiatins, and further decreases, again rising only in farms over 16 dessyatins, which indicates the higher type of farms of these latter, since, in addition to high incomes from grain products, they also have relatively higher incomes than those of the middle peasants in non‐grain farming. The ratio of gross income from all livestock raising to income from grain again makes it possible to single out the flanks, and especially the poor flanks, where ... plays an important role. This ratio reaches 103.2% on farms with sowing up to 2 dessiatines, then steadily declining.]
Finally, let us turn to the data characterizing the marketability of various sowing groups. In farms with sowing from 6 to 8 dessiatines, the ratio of sale to purchase of grain and agricultural products is 203.5%, while in farms over 16 dessiatines it is 454.6%. Farms with sowing of more than 16 dess ʺyatinʺ in relation to sale to purchase clearly stand out from all other middle peasant farms. It is interesting that in farms with sowing from 8 to 16 dessiatines this ratio is only 286.4%, which again confirms that the bulk of them are closer to farms with sowing from 6 to 8 dessiatines than to farms with more than 16 tithes.
If we turn to the size of the sale of agricultural products per farm in rubles to verify this relationship, we will see confirmation of this. The size of the alienation of agricultural products per farm in rubles in farms with sowing from 6 to 8 dessiatines equals 179.8 rubles, while one farm with sowing more than 16 dessiatines alienates agricultural products by 631.4 rubles. This, again, clearly distinguishes the group sown over 16 dessiatines. A group with a sowing of 8 to 16 dessiatines alienates an average of 317.9 rubles per farm. In other words, the farms of this group for the most part are closer to farms with sowing from 6 to 8 dessiatines than to farms with sowing more than 16 dessiatines.
I think thatʹs enough. We involved in the characterization of those farms that the CSO classified as prosperous, the data that spring surveys (the size of the means of production), dynamic survey data (rent) and budgets (income, marketability) can give us. We see that all these data equally indicate that, firstly, farms with sowing from 6 to 10 dess ʺyatinʺ in this area, no doubt, are, as a rule, typically middle peasant farms; secondly, since it can be judged by the totality of the above characteristics, rich farms start somewhere between 10 and 16 dessiatines, ‐ about 14 dessiatines. Although, in terms of means of production, farms are from 10 to 16 dessiatines, [all] as a rule should be attributed to middle peasant farms, [they have only 19.1% of farms with 3 or more horses] but according to other criteria, as we have seen (in terms of income, returns, and pay for work), some of them [may] have to be [really] classified as rich farms.
Since our task is not to mark exactly the boundaries separating one group from another ‐ yes, given the current state of statistical materials, it is almost impossible ‐ I restrict myself here to the above considerations. They explain enough how, using the wrong method of grouping, the CSO came to such nonsense as doubling the number of the well‐to‐do in comparison with the 90s, while the October Revolution three times reduced the share of farms with sowing more than 15 dessiatines.
[The approximate ratio of groups with such a method of grouping in this area would be as follows: households up to 3 dessiatines are poor ‐ their 30.9%; middle peasant farms with sowing from 3 to 14 dess ʺyatin “‐ there are slightly fewer of them, 64.7%; rich over 14 dess <yatin> ‐ there are slightly more than 4.7%.]
We carried out a similar analysis in all the other districts, and for all of them, without any exception, we established the incorrectness of the grouping method used by the CSO. It is impossible to judge any social groups in the village by the CSO groups simply because these groups do not represent any social strata. Undoubtedly, one of the sources of the CSOʹs error is that the CSB divided farms into groups of sown area without taking into account the capacity of farms, social relations, i.e., rent and hire, income, trade, and marketability. It is very significant that in all areas with a predominance of field cultivation, those farms that the CSO calls average turn out to be very close to the statistical average for the district: for example, in the production strip, the average crop per farm is 3.4 dessiatines,
From this it is clear that the problem with the CSO was not that the CSO was grouping according to sowing, but that it was doing this grouping very badly, violating in the rudest way the Marxist methods of grouping.
From this you see that, firstly, the calculation itself is extremely inaccurate, in view of the fact that there is not a single sufficiently accurate and durable element necessary for this calculation; secondly, the very method of drawing up the balance without taking into account the actual purchase and sale of bread is extremely controversial; thirdly, the wrong method of grouping made it completely impossible to use the grain‐fodder balance to judge the role of individual social strata in the countryside and the distribution of surpluses between them, the ratio of individual strata is distorted, the national economic role of the middle peasant is obscured and obscured.
One more note. The inaccuracy of the method of grouping CSOs, in particular, is revealed during the analysis of what the different kinds of groups, adopted by the CSOs in Siberia, are. Here, when examining the detailed characteristics of farms, those that the CSO classified as well‐to‐do, it turns out that a very significant part of them are, by all basic characteristics, rich, exploitative farms. Then again about what Comrade Popov at the RCI board and that he repeated in a somewhat softened form at the Politburo: as if the kulak cannot be identified by agricultural characteristics, as if the kulak in the countryside grows only from trade, credit, etc. This is an old populist delusion. The Narodniks have repeatedly argued that a kulak does not grow out of agriculture as such. From all the Marxist works on the agrarian question and from all the works of Lenin, we know that, given a certain capacity of the means of production, exploitative relations such as hiring, rent, etc. are inextricably linked with these means of production. The economy is so powerful in terms of the means of production that it systematically converts surplus into capital, and is the most widespread type of exploiting economy.
Finally, in conclusion, one last thing. If we wanted to judge the real weight of the individual strata of the countryside in production and on the market, then we would need to have a balance not only of grain, but also of all agricultural products.
We still have too widespread an exaggerated idea of the overwhelming, predominant role of grain farming in our agriculture. It was especially important to find out, because the balance of the peasant balance for all agricultural products, i.e., grain, and non‐grain, and livestock, becomes active in much lower sowing groups than is the case with grain products.
We carried out work on the budgets of 1923‐24 to find out how much agricultural products one farm of different sowing groups buys and sells. And these data fully confirmed what is known from the prewar material. Taking into account all s.‐kh. the national economic significance of the middle peasant group becomes especially clear.
[Therefore, we consider it necessary to set the CSB the task of moving to work on compiling a balance of all agricultural products. For one thing ‐ grain products, all kinds of conclusions about the national economic significance of individual groups are inevitably insufficiently substantiated.]
Popov. I have already stated that the grain‐feed balance [according to our method], of course, did not and could not determine the marketability. Comrade Yakovlev says that [our] method is wrong. The method is correct, but the balance by this method did not determine the marketability and could not determine. We [ say] affirm that [these] figures for the grain‐feed balance do not provide data for judging marketability. Well‐known conclusions can be drawn from the figures [s], but not all. [By marketability, of course] Marketable grain is the bread that circulates in the markets, but the peculiarity of our peasant economy is that a lot of grain is circulated in addition to the usual market ‐ this is bread of intra‐farm turnover. It has conditional marketability. But this is not all the marketable grain that circulates in the markets, from which grain is drawn for the city, industry, and export. We must distinguish this. Then the data on the grain‐feed balance did not set themselves the task of differentiating peasant farms. [We] CSO since 1920 has been carrying out special work on the study of dynamic processes in the peasant economy and the class structure of the countryside. Balance data can be used in terms of [economic characteristics] characteristics of economic phenomena in agriculture, but [We do not raise the question of the kulak by this balance] there is no data on the issue of the allocation of the kulak and its role. I am very sorry that you do not [have any judgment] have the conclusion of a scientific examination on this issue, then you would know that it is really impossible to give exhaustive material on the stratification of the countryside and the definition of the entire kulaks based on the figures for the grain‐feed balance [we could not give]. [And now we have these] Instead of an expert opinion, you have the wrong statements of Comrade. Yakovleva. With regard to the statement of Comrade. Yakovlev, that as if medium‐sized farms are medium‐sized statistical farms in regions ‐ this and that is not true. In our note, we [directly] state that [per consuming area, the average percentage (reads)] in the consuming zone, the farms that we classified as prosperous (sowing from 4 to 6 dessiatines), not “entirely with 1 head of draft animals,” as the RCT claims, but 27.4% of farms with two heads and 2.3 ‐ and more heads (see ʺThe National Economy of the USSR in Figuresʺ 10) *.
(* According to the data of a few provinces, developed in 1924, similar figures give% of farms:)
1st head
With 2 heads
3 or more
Consuming provinces
73,7
21.4
0.9
Produce <n> build <advert>
64.9
21.8
2.2
Producers of the undefended
71.0
19.6
1.0
Southeast
18,7
44.6
32.4
Siberia
0.3
9.2
90.5
The producing region is not entirely with one head of working cattle, as the RCT claims, but 31.0% of farms with two heads of working cattle and 9.4% with three or more heads. In the South‐East, with two heads ‐ 45.2%, with three heads ‐ 19.4%, and with four or more heads ‐ 11.3%. Ukraine also has 36.7% of the wealthy in our scheme with 2 heads of cattle and 5.4% with 3 or more. With the 1st head, not “the majority of farms”, as the RCT claims, but only 41.7%. those. 2/5 of farms and the same number with 2, 3 or more heads ‐ 41.1% **.
But, of course, this is not the only characterization of wealthy farms. The number of draft animals is determined by the size of the farm and its other resources ‐ inventory, labor, income.
In order to substantiate our scheme with other indicators, we will present several average characteristics of the ʺwell‐offʺ group and compare them with the average for the district.
Areas
Wealthy households
seeding per capita
% of renting households
% of
households
with hired
workers
for 1 farm
draft
animals
plows
Consuming band
Group average
0.65
8.1
1.7
1,2
0.98
District average
0.33
4,3
1.6
0.7
0.58
Productive
strip (not
suffering)
Group average
0.83
19.7
0.3
1.13
0.52
District average
0.64
11.2
0.1
0.7
0.26
Southeast
Group average
1.63
14.8
1.9
2.18
0.58
District average
0.99
6.4
1.0
7.90
0.26
Siberia
Group average
1.41
26.4
17.5
4,3
1.0
District average
0.60
11.1
3.4
2.0
0.5
All the average characteristics of the groups that we qualify as wellto‐do (the economically stronger group is qualified by us as “rich farms”) are significantly higher than the regional averages, which proves the correctness of our conditional qualification.
[Why are you still bringing charges.] So, I repeat, the CSB, when compiling the grain‐feed balance, did not set itself the task of [providing information on surplus] to distort the circulated grain within the economic [market] circulation and did not study the marketability. The grain‐feed balance, giving a comparison of two values: the size of production and the size of consumption, presented a net surplus, not a surplus of marketable grain. [There is no study of marketability, this will be another question.]
Strumilin. I did not take part directly in the work of the commission about which Comrade Yakovlev. I have already read only the conclusions of the commission. But we at Gosplan were interested in the discussed work of the CSO from the very beginning because we thought about the possibility of using it to adjust the “control figures” of the State Planning Commission. But, not wanting to get into a mess, we asked the CSB to report to us first of all on the methods of this work. We knew then only the first published version. The CSB presented the report in the second, revised version. This was after the article by Comrade Stetsky in Pravda 11. Article by Comrade Stetsky criticized the first balance from the point of view of the fact that this balance, which was published in the ʺBulletin of the CSBʺ and in the ʺEconomic Reviewʺ 12, is completely unsatisfactory from the point of view of social groupings. And the second version of the CSB, with its amendments, went to meet these objections. In the first variant, we did not see social groupings; we considered them as purely statistical groupings by cultivated areas. In such groupings, one cannot say that say, a group from 2 to 4 dessiatines is middle peasants or poor peasants, none of these economic terms can be applied to it. But the second option clearly laid claim to such economic characteristics. We had a chance to get acquainted with the method of both the first and second options, according to the first option, the upper group embraced 61%, according to the second ‐ 52% of the grain surplus. The first work turned out to be statistically unsatisfactory just because it was done according to normative estimates, while for such a grouping, even for sown areas, it was absolutely necessary to use budgetary materials. These materials were not completely used. The conclusions turned out to be incorrect and, of course, economists, not statisticians, having mastered them, could have come to economics, according to P.I. Popov, to very ʺridiculousʺ conclusions.
Now about the second work that was presented to us. It was not a grouping according to sown areas, but was a grouping by social groups ‐ the balance said: rich ‐ prosperous ‐ middle peasants ‐ poor, etc., and this was achieved extremely unsatisfactorily, because it was achieved only by combinations of different groups by cultivated areas ... From the analysis of the balance, it turned out that in one district they took for the middle group ‐ a group from 2 to 4 dessiatines, in another ‐ from 4 to 6, etc. One would think that these groups are economically equivalent in different areas. But it turned out that this is also not true ‐ they were average for a given region and did not correspond to anything economically in another region. The ʺmiddle peasantsʺ in one district with a low level of well‐being could be poorer than the ʺpoorʺ in another district, and so on. As a result, therefore, as a result, all over the country the poor merged with the middle peasants, the middle peasants with the wealthy, etc. From this point of view, this work, again, was completely unsatisfactory. It seems to me that in addition to what has already been said by Comrade. Yakovlev, it is possible to add very little. One can only say that no serious Marxist statistician would have published such a work. This is my opinion, and not only mine, but also of all those with whom we discussed this work in the State Planning Commission. We found it necessary to redo this work, indicating which defects need to be corrected. I think that only when this work is done will we get a more or less correct reflection of reality.
Chairman. Comrade has the floor. Stalin.
Stalin. It is absolutely correct that statistics should be objective, like any scientific discipline. There should be maximum objectivity. Now I cannot figure out all the mistakes that the RCT talks about, but looking from a distance, the RCT considerations seem to be generally correct. In any case, one thing is clear to me, I have no doubt that the balance sheet that was published and the statistical conclusions that were made, in particular for the group of the well‐to‐do and the rich, were changed three times at the CSB. This is clear to me. The first information related to the fact that the wealthy group has 61% of the grain surplus. This was published in all the newspapers. I don’t remember anywhere there was a reservation that this data could not be trusted. But we all proceeded from these figures as from scientific data. Now it turns out that our CSO was operating with incorrect data. This figure of 61% was then amended by the CSO twice (54% and 42%). Here comrade. Popov stated that the figure was inaccurate. Science should not operate with imprecise numbers. You can speak as many speeches about science as you like, but if science operates with inaccurate numbers, then this is no longer science. In our management of the economy, the planning elements are of quite serious importance and, of course, we must operate with the correct numbers. In this case, this was not the case. Publishing inaccurate numbers was a big mistake. we must operate with the correct numbers. In this case, this was not the case. Publishing inaccurate numbers was a big mistake.
Then this figure ‐ 61% of the surplus in 14% of the population ‐ was replaced by the figure of 54%, which the RCT reported, and which was not refuted by Comrade. Popov. Still, 61% and 54% of the surplus for the wealthy group is a big difference.
Now Comrade. Popov gives the third figure ‐ 42%. I asked on purpose: this applies to one of the districts or to the entire Union. He does not know this and referred to Bulletin No. 105. I just looked through Bulletin No. 105, and it turned out that the CSB figure refers to the entire Union (excluding Turkestan).
I respect science, the citadel of science in the person of the Central Statistical Office, but the three different figures presented to us by the CSO, and the interval between which is 19%, these figures speak not for the CSO, but against it. The conclusion from this that that the CSB is too free, is not permissible to take liberties with the numbers in spite of the demands of science, contrary to the interests of science [that are offered to us as something a would serve as a guiding principle for planning authorities, to prevent manipulation of these three different figures ‐ which means to prevent an enormous inaccuracy prevent big mistake. The conclusion is that, obviously, the Central Statistical Office is being too lax, even if some errors of the RCT are allowed. This is the main conclusion].
Yakovlev. I want to [give] one information that eliminates any possibility of assuming that the CSB allegedly did not give a group balance by class groups (this is from the report of Comrades Popov and Khryashcheva ʺOn the Foundations of the Grouping of Peasant Farmsʺ to the RCI commission). [ Comrade Popov on November 23 filed a report in which he speaks about the appointment of the balance. He says the following:]
“The transition from specific seed groups to unification and construction of class characteristics can and should be done.
For the present, it is all the more necessary to schematize groupings, forming social classes from them. This is necessary in order to concentrate the characteristic features of the groups of the proletarianized more vividly, semi‐proletarianized, middle, prosperous, and wealthy peasantry. We did this in 1924 with the groups of 1923, taking into account the sizes of the agricultural economy of the North, Central Russia, Southeast and Siberia of different scales, for our conclusions about the economic significance of various groups and their specific weight. This unification is, of course, conditional, but not only suitable, but also the only reasonable method in this area. ʺ [Here I have given you this statement by Comrade Popov of November 23.]
Popov. All statistical figures are, of course, relative. The statistics are arbitrary, and the theory tells us about it. Even accounting entries are conditional. [For accounting is also not an exact science.] You know what balances are and their degree of accuracy.
The goal that we can set in statistical study is to provide material that approximates reality. We have 23 million peasant farms, is it possible to [process] collect accurate, indisputable data on these farms? Is it possible to think that we can give exact figures by determining the size of the surplus from 23 million farms? Of course [we take them in their roughest form] our data is approximate. But then we process them, refine them, and bring them closer to reality. In addition, the grain‐feed balance is not a strictly statistical operation, but it is a calculus, albeit based on statistical data. Comrade Stalin forgets this, assuming that the calculation of balance is a purely statistical operation, and yet it is only a calculation. Letʹs take the control figures of the State Planning Commission. Do the key figures fully reflect reality? [ Are these the current numbers?] Of course not. The control figures [are] also not a statistical operation, like the grain‐feed balance. Comrade Stalin thinks that there is some kind of statistics that gives the most accurate figures, that it is possible, like on a pharmaceutical scale, to weigh economic phenomena. There are no such statistics. [This is a convention] Statistics are arbitrary, but in the order of systematic statistical work, we can determine the degree of convention. Always in our publications, we define the degree of accuracy and convention. In particular, Bulletin 105 says:
“The given calculation ‐ calculation by groups ‐ may be exaggerating somewhat the redundancy of large farms, since produced on the assumption of the same rate of grain consumption for food per capita and per head of cattle; the calculation was made for large areas with a corresponding change in the norms” 13.
[As you can see, we cited a certain reservation] So, when we printed the data on the group balance in Bulletin No. 105, we accompanied it with certain reservations about the accuracy and convention of the balance data. Then two months ago we submitted a revised calculation to the State Planning Committee. [And what is in the State Planning Commission?] Comrade. Strumilin here [as if] wants to absolve himself of responsibility for having approved the method of our work. In the resolution of the section chaired by
Comrade Strumilin says: ʺTo take note of the report and ask the CSB to continue working on clarifying the calculation.ʺ
So, the method of work of calculating the balance by groups was approved.
Then I read the resolution of the section: “As for the consumption norms, then, apparently, everything that could be taken into account was taken into account.” Further, the resolution of the section reads the following: ʺIn order to draw any conclusions about the stratification of the village, the calculation must be supplemented by taking into account the following groups: 1) industrial crops, 2) animal husbandry, 3) commercial income.ʺ According to the resolution of the section, we present the work in groups.
The RCT proposes to divide the seed groups into three parts, instead of the 5 we have proposed. [In my opinion] In our opinion, it is necessary to have five groups, and not three, because only in this case can we identify clearly and accurately the relationship of groups. [You will not receive this data. You will receive a description of economic groups. We have these characteristics for each group, and each characteristic is a conditional grouping of groups.]
How can you allow a farm with 100 rubles income, combined with a farm with 500 rubles income? The distance between these farms is huge. These farms are not homogeneous, and the RCT proposes to do just that.
Rykov. [I wanted to say that here] Com. Popov did not answer the two questions I asked him. First, is the Gorny region included in the table for the North Caucasus? Comrade Mikoyan said that your conclusions were drawn in such a way that you added the breeders with the farmers and got the average. Your pastoralists are enrolled in the poor only because they are not engaged in farming. And the second question: how has it been proved that the bread that the poor man sells is sold in some special way within the village? We have cooperation and government procurers. By what law of nature or statistics does this very poor man take his bread not to the cooperatives, not to our procurement agencies, but to some other place? [Before] At least 20% alienate [this] bread is lower, poor groups. Why should they sell this bread to someone else and not to us? We must agree on a commodity policy that if a poor man sells his bread, then we must buy it from him and must give him more for it.] conduct so that the poor have an advantage over other sellers in the sale of their grain to government agencies and cooperatives. Why do we buy bread from a kulak? Donʹt you think we can buy it from the poor man? The tablet, which was presented by you, according to which the lower groups only buy and not sell grain ‐ if it contains neither the characteristics of the stratification of the peasantry, [nor the elements of marketable grain and its sale,] nor the characteristics of how much grain is sold by which group of peasants ‐ then its practical meaning is completely different. The meaning of the sign is falling, [and the actions of the statistical office are endlessly confused,] but, unfortunately, after it has already managed to confuse many people. [When we listened to your report, we heard wild things. If the poor man sells this 20% of the grain, then he sells it in the fall, and then our price policy should be to keep prices more profitable for the peasant in the fall, so that the poor get more. If the kulak is holding back, then it is obvious that the policy of price reduction must adapt to this middle peasant.]
Thirdly, you said that in calculating the number of households you are basing the figure of the Narkomfin, which is exaggerated, because the organs of the Peopleʹs Commissariat of Finance seek to collect more taxes and therefore increase the number of households. But can taxes be taken from non‐existent households? If it were possible to build a financial policy on taking taxes from households that do not exist in nature, then our financial situation would be much better. This interpretation is incorrect. According to the Peopleʹs Commissariat of Finance, there should be fewer households than in reality, because our tax policy is based on a progressive taxation, while large households have more crops and pay more from each tithe. If where it is possible to connect two courtyards into one payment unit, then it is beneficial for NKFin to do this. Our tax policy and a number of other conditions determine the division of the yards, which affects the relative decrease in the growth of multi‐sowing groups. It occurs as a result of the fact that wealthy groups, fleeing from heavy taxation, go to the
division. [Therefore, talking about well‐to‐do groups is largely the result of our policy, based on the progressive nature of peasant taxation, which forces large multi‐sowing groups to disintegrate, etc.] They miscalculated the calculation of the harvest again, with the distribution of marketable grain we got into the most uncomfortable position. This leads to the following conclusion: something needs to be done to stop enduring again every year everything that happened this year. Since the statistical calculations that determine the harvest, the amount of marketable grain, etc., are of absolutely exceptional importance for us, are of exceptional importance for our entire policy, it is necessary to make changes in the CSO that would not put us in such a position. The work of the CSB cannot be considered satisfactory. This report is listened to in the Politburo, although the Council of Peopleʹs Commissars should have listened to it, because it is connected with major political issues. The Politburo must instruct the Council of Peopleʹs Commissars to take all measures that would ensure the party from the mistakes that we have now,
Kamenev. I think that if we want to state here an undeniable fact that the CSO changed its figures in relation to the harvest and the surplus, then, of course, this can be done. This fact is irrefutable. First 61%, then 54%, then 42%. In any case, we have before us the fact that the CSO in calculating the yield, commodity surpluses, their distribution between individual sowing groups, for six months has changed its numbers. If the Central Committee should state this and draw organizational conclusions from this, i.e., remove comrade Popov, then this can be done without such a long report.
In July there was a figure of 61, in October 52, now, apparently, they also fluctuate around this figure. Popov says that he does not know [about the districts] to which territory his figure of 42% belongs.
Stalin. The Bulletin is clear.
Kamenev. No, it is not clear in the Bulletin. Iʹll prove it now.
[ Stalin. He referred to the 105th bulletin. Kamenev. It is impossible at the meeting itself ...
Stalin. I ask for the floor.
Kamenev. I repeat, there is no need for a report to draw these conclusions. If we criticize ‐ and we have accepted the position that it is necessary to criticize the survey that the RCP made, then, first of all, we must know that we did not find any indication in which official document the CSB was criticized. It is not visible which official statement of the CSB is criticized.] First of all, it is clear from this document which official document of the CSB is being criticized. I I know only one thing: the official document, printed, published, and reported to government agencies ‐ these are the data that are contained in Bulletin No. 105, to which Cde. Popov. This document applies to July 21st. It is called like this: ʺEstimated grain‐feed balance for 1924/25, based on the data sown areas.ʺ You cannot refer to the Bulletin, which refers to July 21st. This Bulletin contains a figure of 61%. I ask myself: well, is there really an attempt in this Bulletin to classify the peasantry and stratify the peasantry? In the resolution of the Council of Peopleʹs Commissars of July 28, here I have protocol No. 112, paragraph 3, here it says: “We listened to the report of Comrade. Popov about the harvest. Resolved: take note of the report ʺ 14... I ask, is there an attempt in this Bulletin to group the peasantry according to the class principle? Is this work socio‐economic or purely statistical work? That is why I asked Strumilin to confirm that this work is purely statistical. On page 71 we see that the entire table is based on a division by crops, it is called: ʺThe weight of individual crop groups in the total population and in the production of grain.ʺ The comments given to this table do not mention in a word either the poor man, nor the kulak, nor the well‐to‐do, but it is said: the entire USSR, without Kyrgyzstan, Turkestan, is divided according to the size of sowing. It is said: those who sow one tithe have so much bread, those who sow two tithes have so much, etc. From this, of course, any politician can draw certain conclusions. And the politician who would say: I take a seed group and declare this or that seed group as fists, wealthy, poor, etc. ‐ would make a gross mistake. But the CSB does not make any division into kulaks, into middle peasants in its only printed report, issued on July 21, at all. I can read this table and comments to it.
I ask: what is the criticism of RCL directed against? If it is directed against statistical methods, then, of course, mistakes were made here, and these mistakes must be corrected. If the calculations are wrong, Comrade. Popov needs to be removed. But there is also another grain‐feed balance, printed in the control figures of the State Planning Commission. Well, is this control balance checked by the RCT? Checked with the balance sheet of the CSO or not? Is it matched or not? We know perfectly well that the very size of the harvest taken by the State Planning Committee, in comparison with the CSO, differs by half a billion poods of grain. After all, everyone knows that the CSO determined the initial figure of 4,200 million poods, and they were 4,700 million poods. Then they approached the definition of commodity surpluses using a different definition of consumption: the CSO took less consumption, subtracted less from the total amount of the crop The State Planning Commission deducted a large amount of consumption from the larger amount of the gross harvest. The same commodity surpluses are obtained. But the grain‐feed balance cannot be the same. If we have two balances: one drawn up by the CSO and bad in its methods, the other, drawn up by the State Planning Committee, exceeding the gross harvest by 500 million in accounting, how could it be possible, while working through the work of the CSB, not to compare these figures and check who is right? We and after the report of Comrade Kuibyshev, we do not know what yield figure the basis of our work should be not compare these numbers and check who is right? We and after the report of Comrade Kuibyshev, we do not know what yield figure the basis of our work should be do not compare these numbers and check who is right? We and after the report of Comrade Kuibyshev, we do not know what yield figure the basis of our work should be.
Well, [they] at the CSB made a whole series of errors in their calculations, they should be beaten for that. [ Statistical methods were wrong.] But I am now going to read the end of the RCT conclusion, [I came across the following] conclusions: “In most of the CSB departments, such statistical work has been planned and is being carried out, which will be done in the future!! ...” (reads). They made a number of mistakes that need to be corrected. It is indicated that they themselves are beginning to correct. This is within the scope of testing their statistical methods. [But if you take the average figure ... The question of how scientific ... the work of this scientific institution, the CSO, is another question, a question that was not even touched upon.] But there is another question that is at the center of the entire RCT report ‐ this is the following question: how should these seed groups be distributed among the rest of the social categories? I ask: where did the CSB do this work, where is it published? How can the CSB be accused of something that is not its task? Of course, you can set the CSO a problem: after you have divided the peasantry into sowing groups, give us a characterization of these sowing groups according to their socio‐economic power. Then it is necessary, in addition to these sowing groups, to take into account the issue of mechanization, rent, hiring labor, etc. Then we would receive data from the CSB that interests us as politicians. If you want, Comrade Yakovlev, to blame those who drew conclusions in this direction, then it was necessary to say so: from these statistical figures, which have not yet been criticized, the wrong conclusions were drawn in the direction of the stratification of the peasantry. So, it should have been said. But this should not be attributed to either the CSB or Comrade. Popov. [They were Kamenev and Golendo.] If you want to criticize Kamenev, say so.
Why attribute to the CSB those crimes that he did not commit, and those political acts that he did not commit, because in these statistics there is not the slightest hint of a breakdown into kulaks, middle peasants, poor peasants, etc. Has anyone made such an attempt? I take the form, the figures that have been brought to the general political arena. I took them out after I was told that these figures had been reported to the Council of Peopleʹs Commissars and taken into account. It was July 29, 15, and on August 27 I wrote an article in Pravda, which says: ʺPreliminary figures that need elaboration and clarification ... (reads)ʺ 16 ...
This is what the first announcement was. I could not see that socio‐
economic class characteristics were given here [which
Comrade Yakovlev]. If [here] in my article it was said that 14% of the kulaks or the wealthy have 61% of the grain surplus, then this accusation could be brought. But this indication [not available] in the article no. Now 14% say ‐ without their social‐class characteristics ‐ they give not 61%, but 54%. Letʹs accept this amendment. Further, they say that 12% ‐ also without a social‐class characteristic, give not 54, but 42%. Letʹs accept this too. But, in any case, does this reveal any wrong characterization of the stratification of the countryside, if we state that such and such a percentage of peasants have grain in such and such a percentage? In my opinion, this cannot be done. And above all else, this issue is not properly tied to the CSB. The CSO has nothing to do with it. And anyway, whoʹs got to do with it? Where, finally, are there the documents that enable critics to present this accusation, where are the documents that say that such and such a sowing group is such and such a class within the peasantry? These documents do not exist in print. In the State Planning Commission, the CSO was introduced as an attempt to break down the groups, which are called low‐power, medium, etc., but only according to the size of the sown area. This clause must not be forgotten. Well, these attempts are attempts to define classes within the peasantry. This is not the case. If this were so, then we can admit that it is not Marxists who are sitting there, since they determine the class within the peasantry by one sown area. If such an accusation were proven, I would vote not only for the removal from the CSB of Comrade. Popov, but even for overclocking the entire CSO. What does the CSB say? The CSB definitely states that ʺthe calculation of net surplus and remainder makes it impossible to judge ...ʺ (Reads).
You need to know what we are criticizing. What are we criticizing? Are the tasks that the CSO faced ‐ to divide the bread between the sowing groups and say that such and such a group has so much bread, such and such a group has so much, etc., or are we ascribing another task to the CSO ‐ to give a class stratification of the peasantry, and the CSB made a mistake. What are you criticizing? The CSB report says: ʺThe grain‐feed balance of the CSB, in which the groupings of farms are given exclusively by the sown areaʺ ... You said yourself! Why are you pestering? You yourself wrote ‐ ʺexclusively for the sown area.ʺ There are no other documents.
Yakovlev. There is such a document.
Kamenev. Itʹs a shame you didnʹt bring him earlier.
Yakovlev. Iʹll bring him in now.
Kamenev. [If so, then the CSO is completely wrong. Whatʹs next?] Well, then weʹll talk. The RCT decree says: ʺTo recognize as impossible on the basis of ...ʺ (reads) 17.
Here I think that Comrade Popov is right when he protests against the fact that he is forced to enter into one group completely different sown areas in order to get a grouping of middle peasants, poor peasants, and kulaks, and he quite rightly asks: whom do you want to be classified as kulaks and on what grounds? Why canʹt I give a group from 2 to 3 dessiatines, from 3 to 4, etc., but have to combine groups from 2 to 20 dessiatines and give reassuring data about the fist and the middle peasant. Comrade Popov is right that such criticism from the RCI prompts the CSB to do the wrong job. You say that [this is not good] from [this] figures of the CSB there can be a darkening of the role of the middle peasant. I donʹt know if Comrade Popov, when [ spent] conducted his statistical work, about the middle peasants or kulaks. You reproach him with the fact that this balance obscures the national economic and political situation and the role of the middle peasant in this economy. How can this table obscure this situation?
Yakovlev. Not this one.
Kamenev. What is it?
Yakovlev. There is another table.
Kamenev. So not this one.
Yakovlev. It has been published.
Kamenev. You are hinting, obviously, at the table that was compiled at the CSO and which is now being developed at the State Planning Committee, about which Comrade Strumilin. There [division made] there is a designation of groups: low‐power, medium, rich, etc. We must ask ourselves: is this a division along social lines, or is this what Comrade Popov, i.e., that these groupings are specifically designated as area‐based groupings. Well, [Comrade Strumilin, as you write and understand the word ʺrichʺ. Think] what do you think that Comrade. Popov [or someone else social] wealth determines only the sown area, you think that he does not know that, when characterizing the social status of the rich, it is necessary to take into account rent, hired labor, implements, etc., and not only the sown area. [Here I named these conditions only for the sown area, as for rent, hired labor, cars, etc., I did not take this into account. Can it be said after this that there is an attempt to describe the stratification of the peasantry? I think not. They may be wrong here too, and probably wrong. This does not provide any data to say that this is not a stratification of the peasantry, this is a grouping according to the sown area, and this whole story is called a sowing grouping in grain production. I know that before todayʹs meeting it could be assumed that the CSB believes that 14% of the total peasant population has 50% of the grain. Can we say about 14% if the kulaks have 50‐60%? This cannot be said, this is not, so I think one must distinguish.] The CSO has done work on seeding divisions. He is now being criticized from the point of view of the class division of the countryside. This is wrong, and therefore the entire middle part of this RCT ruling is irrelevant.
I will dwell on [ how it is done] for a moment more what RCT offers us. After all, the RCI commission has finally established who should be considered a poor person, a middle peasant, or a fist. Until now, none of us could give such an answer, and we could not exactly answer the notes submitted at party meetings. Now we already know this, because quite independently of the work of the CSB, several pages here are devoted to the precise establishment of the attribute of who is a poor peasant, an average peasant, and a kulak. [ The difference between the CSB and the RFL is that the CSB has already adopted 16% for the North Caucasus, while the methods remain the same.] I believe that the Central Committee would make a big mistake if, on the basis of the position of Comrade. Yakovlev would set such a line. You said very well that you cannot judge only by the sowing group, you need to take data on rent, labor recruitment, etc. But you yourself took the trait only by the seed group. I think that we cannot accept this part [written] of the report. [This is not only a criticism of the CSB, but if we accept it, we will once and for all ... from the middle peasant] If this is applied as a directive for the CSB, then this is a push towards glossing over the ongoing process, the meaning [of this paper] of this report, since it is not only a criticism of the methods, [since the matter is aimed at ensuring that the calculated groups of the peasantry, precisely in the middle part, about which, on the basis of the data of the Central Statistical Office, one can judge which part of them approaches the poor ...] is reduced to glossing over the division of the peasantry, and in particular, to obscuring those processes that are among the middle peasants.
[This must not be done, because when we remove Popov, we put the CSB in such conditions that it will always try to apply the data it receives to these numbers. I think we can make a big mistake here. If we restrict ourselves to the fact that this figure was good, that you changed it, that errors indicate that the work was wrong ‐ this is possible.] But in no case should this be taken as a directive for the future work of the CSB.
Stalin *. (* The text of JV Stalinʹs speech in the copy of the transcript with the copyright is missing. Reconciliation was made with a copy of Stalinʹs speech preserved in his personal fund. (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 1105. L. 126‐129.))
Comrade Kamenev is right that it is impossible to adjust the figures, otherwise all our planning, all our calculations [of the State Planning Commission] will be in vain. Moreover, I am in favor of trying to adjust the numbers to equate to a criminal offense. Without this, we cannot achieve objective figures.
Why didnʹt the RCT undertake a survey of the findings of the State Planning Commission? I don’t know. It must be because the Council of Peopleʹs Commissars did not instruct him to do this. As far as I know, the RCI worked on the instructions of the Council of Peopleʹs Commissars.
In one comrade. Kamenev is wrong to say that crop groups do not affect social groups. This is not true. Grouping certainly affects. This is one of the decisive factors of the question, and this is true not only as a general position, but also judging by the way our party reacted to these figures. I remember the speeches of a number of comrades who believed that by the guise of the well‐to‐do they meant kulaks. A number of comrades thought so, I can name, for example, Comrade. Trotsky. [ The fact that we have a well‐to‐do is a kulak, you published this in one of your speeches in Pravda. It turns out that the fist was growing ...]
Trotsky. Nothing like this. I said the opposite, I said that even if we take this 14% for kulaks, if we forget about technical agriculture and all other conditions, then next year the share of kulaks in the market will be less than 61%, and not more.
Stalin. I am not saying it as a reproach, you have a number of reservations in your speech, I think, in the Business Club 18, but I want to say that you, and all of us, and a number of other comrades, from the figures of the CSB, came to the conclusion that the fist has grown enormously. You know the article by Comrade Golendo 19, and I will not expand on this. The recalculation of crop groupings into socio‐economic groupings was carried out ‐ of course, incorrectly ‐ by many. [I can point to a number of comrades who believe that if the well‐to‐do has a surplus percentage, it turns out to be something like a fist. In the North Caucasus, for example, Comrade. The compatriot thought so too. A number of party members understood that the grouping according to crops is an allusion to the corresponding socio‐economic grouping. Popov does not deny the same thing ... This is also a hint of recalculation of sowing groups into socio‐economic groups, we take everything into account and want to create clarity.]
Why did I refer to Bulletin 105? Because he was referred to by Comrade Popov. I asked: these three tables ‐ the first ‐ 61% of the surplus among the wealthy, the second ‐ 52% and the third ‐ 42%, does this concern the USSR as a whole or any particular region? He said that he didn’t know, and referred to Bulletin No. 105. [ Then Comrade. Popov considered peasant farms to be prosperous from 6 dess ʺyatins ʺ and over 10 dess ʺyatinsʺ of sowing, and now, on the basis of the 3rd table, peasant farms are classified from 8 and above dessyatins, and 42% are obtained.
Now he reported to us, here I have a new table, it says in brackets: see bulletin No. 105.
Voice. How is it: across the country or in individual regions?
Stalin. The bulletin says that across the country, if all groups are counted not from 6, but from 8, then 42% will turn out. I referred to this because this table is referenced by Comrade Popov. Comrade Popov says: I don’t remember whether this concerns the whole of Russia, or one region, he doesn’t know.
Voice. This is by combining methods.
Stalin. Letʹs say itʹs a concatenation method, but I want numbers. Statistics is the science of numbers. I had every right to do this, I was convinced by Comrade. Popov, who said: see Bulletin No. 105.] I looked at the Bulletin, and it turned out that the matter concerns the Union as a whole.
What is the conclusion? We consider the criticism given by the RCT commission, criticism of the CSB accounting method. Itʹs clear to me. The CSO made gross mistakes, and Comrade. Popov is wrong. Rykov. The question is whether we accept the RCTʹs conclusions that mistakes were made by the CSO and whether we accept the RCTʹs proposal that the leadership of the CSB should be changed in order to avoid these mistakes in the future. There is no need to review and approve any new RCT tables.
The second is Comrade. Kamenev said that no one tried to interpret these figures [in terms of] as figures of the class stratification of the peasantry, and if anyone tried to do this, it would be wrong. I am reading excerpts from the report of Comrade Kamenev at the plenum of MK 20:
ʺIn other words, we must clearly see that the harvest, which in itself is a tremendous contribution to the national economy, is used more by the well‐to‐do elements of the countryside than by the middle and poor.ʺ
“I must say that, unfortunately, not everyone has an exact understanding of the meaning of the figures given. Incredible as it may seem, I had to face an attempt to hide, gloss over these figures in our press. ʺ
“I am sure that the comrades acted with the best of intentions. But, as you know, hell is paved with wonderful intentions. I am sure that these comrades considered themselves genuine Leninists. But, of course, one cannot imagine anything more hostile, alien, contrary to Leninʹs policy, Leninʹs tactics, Leninʹs practice of leadership, than such an attempt to gloss over the figures of the stratification of the peasantry. The very possibility of such a fact in our communist environment amazed me so much that I took the first opportunity to publish these figures in our newspapers. I added to these figures: these figures must be firmly memorized. ʺ
Kamenev. What kind?
Rykov. Hush up the numbers that you give above. I am now going to read the passage of your brochure where you cite them. These are the same CSB figures that are now being criticized:
“When we say: the peasantry will throw 1200 million poods on the market. bread ‐ do not think that all 22 million peasant households will throw it away. 37% of the peasants will also need bread this year and will buy it on the side. What group of the peasantry is this? One that has sown up to 2 acres. It is opposed by another group of the peasantry, constituting only 14%; it has 33% of gross collection and 61% of all commodity surpluses, i.e., out of 1200 million poods that will be thrown into the city market, about 700 million will not be thrown out by the peasantry in general, but only 14% of the peasantry with crops over 6 dessyatins of land. Finally, the middle group is 49%, which has only 39% of all bread put on the market. These five figures: 37% of the peasantry, which not only will not sell grain, but will buy it, 49%, (* Both quotations are taken from Comrade Kamenevʹs brochure ʺOur Achievements, Difficulties and Prospectsʺ, pp. 24‐25 (Note of the verbatim record)).
[All these tablets are laid out, smeared over, and you say that there are no such attempts to gloss over the figures of the stratification of the peasantry.] You said about these figures that an attempt to gloss over them is an attempt to gloss over the figures of the stratification of the peasantry.
[Then the second. Only those figures that were announced at the beginning are given: 61% of such and such a group of the peasantry; such and such a group will buy, not sell, and 49% of the peasants will have 39% of all grain thrown onto the market. An attempt to gloss over the figures is an attempt to gloss over the figures of the stratification of the peasantry. What interpretation can be derived from the figures that have been given? These are five figures ‐ 37%, who will not only sell, but buy. This is Kamenevʹs mistake, they will buy and sell, and buy, perhaps, more than they sell.] Your brochure also says that 37% of the peasants will buy grain, but it turns out that they will sell at least 20% of all the grain sold by the peasants, but they will also buy. But they will buy in the summer and at the end of winter, they have been selling until now. This table was misleading. It says the opposite of what was reported today. I do not reproach you that you are only one of us who made these wrong conclusions, not only you, but many. Indication of Comrade Kamenevʹs opinion that no one in the press ever drew conclusions from these tablets about the class stratification of the peasantry is completely wrong. This is proved by quotations from the brochure comrade. Kamenev ʺOur achievements, difficulties and prospects.ʺ
Yakovlev. I will answer the question of Comrade Kamenev as to where this document was published. If by way of formal publication, in ʺEconomic Lifeʺ No. 204 of October 1, the head of the relevant department of the CSB, comrade. Dubenetsky (nonpartisan) cites this grouping, and he cites the groups not by sown area, as it was in Bulletin No. 105, but in this way: seedless, underpowered, average, prosperous and rich. From the table he cites, it can be seen that 40% of all surplus grain is in the middle peasant, not in such and such a sowing group, but in the middle peasant, the remaining 54% (well‐to‐do and rich) [are combined into one rich group] of bread is concentrated in the wealthy and rich. In the official document, printed, the sowing groupings were turned into class groupings. [I take] In the affairs of the commission, we have the minutes of the State Planning Committee section, where the same balance is being examined for [other] class groups. [Comrade Dubinetskiy proves at this meeting the class grouping. Maybe this was a personal statement by Comrade Dubinetskiy, I will check it. But I have the following three statements, from different heads of the CSB.] That this was not a personal speech by Comrade Dubinetsky, is proved at least by the following statements by the heads of the CSB. Here is the statement:
“Let us also shed light on the question of which groups and strata of the peasantry could provide the procurers with the greatest amount of grain. The answer to this is given in the following table, which shows the distribution of the population, gross and net harvest of grain, surplus and shortage of grain by groups of farms of various capacities. The table shows that 46% of all surplus grain is held by the middle peasants, and the remaining 54% belong to well‐to‐do and wealthy farms, accounting for 12% of the total mass of households and 14% of the total rural population. ʺ (From an article by Comrade Dubenetsky, published in No. 216 of 22 / X‐25,
ʺEconomic Lifeʺ ‐ ʺHarvest of 1925ʺ)
“The basis for the unification into these larger groups was taken from the features that are set forth in the work of A.N. Khryashcheva on Classes and Groups in the Peasantry, published for last yearʹs Congress of Soviets. (From the note by Comrade Dubenetsky, published in No. 226 of 3 / X ‐ this year ʺEconomic Lifeʺ ‐ to the article ʺHarvest of 1925ʺ)
“Despite all the conventionality of uniting specific sowing groups into classes (small, low‐powered, medium‐sized, well‐to‐do, and rich), this basis ‐ sowing groups ‐ still gives the greatest guarantee of the rationality of group building. The Commission is well aware of exactly how the CSO made the transition from sowing to class groups in different areas. This was clearly published two years ago. ʺ (From the report of Comrade Khryashcheva at the Collegium of the NK RCI 26 / XI ‐ ʺOn the groupings adopted in the grain‐feed balanceʺ.)
Then remember that statement by Comrade Popov, which I quoted earlier, that it is necessary to form social classes from seed groups, and that this was done by the CSO.
This shows how groundless Comrade Kamenev that the balance of the CSO was not drawn up according to class groups. Finally, one final reference:
“The above calculations of some elements of the grain‐fodder balance were made by the CSO for sowing groups; recounting them into social groups was made at the insistence of the secretary comrade. Kamenev ʺ. (From the CSB report on the calculation of the grain‐feed balance.)
We did not examine the question of how it was carried out and what role was played here by the secretary comrade. Kamenev.
Kamenev. Very small.
Yakovlev. But we have 5‐6 documents that all say one thing. We are dealing with an attempt to give the distribution of surpluses and shortcomings according to class groups, and Khryascheva speaks not of groups, but of classes in the countryside. From this point of view, we [ approached how the distribution of classes in the CSO was made] and had to check what the “classes” represented in the balance were. We found that there are no classes other than confusion here. Comrade Popov did not refute the main thing that he took the statistical average for the districts, calculated the average sowing in the districts and called this economy average. The statistical average is taken, this farm is called a ʺclassʺ and then all farms above this are called either well‐to‐do or rich. When, what Marxist [could draw such conclusions on the basis of such signs] carried out such a grouping? We do not dispute that it is advisable to group according to seed groups. The whole question is how to group. It is necessary to group in such a way that if you want to form classes from seed groups, then take into account the hiring of labor, rent, means of production, gross income, etc. The whole trouble is with the CSB that, having all the data that we also used, having received them from the CSB or developed the raw materials of the CSB (we had 15 people working on the calculations for several weeks), nevertheless, the average statistical took it for an average economy ...
Last question. In this regard, Comrade Popov formulated his political point of view as follows. These are his words at the RCI Collegium, where he said the following: the initial, principled point of view of the commission that revised the balance sheet is ʺan obsolete old‐peopleʹs idea about the middle peasant, which has long been archived.ʺ This announcement largely sheds light on the approach taken by the CSO. This is what he wrote, it is not just said. The initial principled point of view, which we are accused of, is the obsolete old peopleʹs idea of the middle peasant, which has long been handed over to the archives. Of course, having such a principled starting point of view that the idea of the middle peasant is an old peopleʹs idea handed over to the archives, the CSO gave us such groupings that cannot be justified from any point of view and which must be given justice to the CSO. are quite consistent with the political views of Comrade. Popov.
Finally, the last question * (* Further, to the end, the text of the speech was so significantly revised by the author that it is impossible to reflect this correction.), ‐ this is a question about the direction of development in the given conditions and at this time. We were convinced on the basis of materials on the evolution of farms in a number of provinces and on the basis of a comparison of the distribution of farms by sowing groups in 1924‐25 that this issue requires more clarity. The impact of the nationalization of the land, of the entire totality of the policy of the soviet power in the conditions of the general rise of the national economy, gives in a number of regions an exceptional uniqueness of evolution. We have regions in which, judging by the data we have on crops and livestock, in the poor groups there is a predominance of the rise to the upper groups over the descent into the lower groups. If we consider the fate of the poor groups from 1924 to 1925, we see the following. Some of these farms are moved to cities, turning into seedless, a relatively much larger part passes into the higher sowing groups. In the poor part, the transition to the higher groups prevails over the transition to the lower groups. At the same time, their share in the population falls from 1924 to 1925. At the same time, in these areas, there is either a stable state, or a very insignificant increase in the share of multi‐sowing rich farms with a simultaneous increase in their livestock capacity. These are the regions: the consuming strip, the Right Bank of Ukraine.
Another type of evolution is given to us by areas of extensive grain farming, like the North Caucasus and steppe Ukraine, for example. In the poor strata, the transition to the higher groups also significantly prevails over the transition to the lower ones. From 1924 to 1925 there was a very noticeable reduction in the share of low‐sown farms. But at the same time, at the other pole, the share and means of production of the most powerful strata grows relatively very quickly. Here the differentiation is characterized not by the fact that on the one hand the poor grow up, and on the other ‐ the rich, but by the fact that with the reduction of the role of the poor, with the transition of some of them to the middle peasants, a powerful multi‐sown part of the village grows especially rapidly.
Finally, we have regions where the evolution from 1924 to 1925 gives the most common examples of differentiation: such is, for example, Siberia, where, on the one hand, there is an increase in the proportion and number of seedless and poor farms, and on the other hand, a serious increase farms are powerful, multi‐sowing, with large means of production.
I cite these considerations in order to emphasize the need to exercise extreme caution in all attempts to judge the ratio of individual classes and groups in the countryside only on the basis of data for the year, without taking into account the specific uniqueness of evolution by region. In any case, on the basis of such kind of pieces of paper as the grain‐feed balance of the CSO ‐ imprecise in all its main elements, controversial in the method of its construction, incorrect in the grouping adopted in it ‐ it is impossible to draw any conclusions that are sufficiently serious and informed about what is happening in the village.
Rudzutak. I find it difficult to comment on the discussion regarding statistical methods, since I am not familiar with this case. I must nevertheless state that on the basis of these statistics of the grainfeed balance, we have drawn up a number of our most important decisions: about our grain export plan, regarding the procurement plan, the delivery of goods, etc. It must be said that the inner content of these figures, as they are presented to us now, of course, should have shed a slightly different light on all our work [if they had been presented at such a meeting as today. We did not consider these figures; we did not consider them as a proposal from the CSB.] We considered these figures as commodity surpluses, we proceeded from them when we made our procurement plan. [... Further, if our numbers were correct, then the procurement policy should have taken on a slightly different color.] Therefore, regardless of what methods there were, how the CSB made its calculations ‐ right or wrong, that every year the same percentage of amendments, the same percentage of livestock feeding, etc. etc., ‐ but the most characteristic feature of these figures is that they were not given the real content that Comrade Popov. [ If the content of these figures were real, then we would build our construction plan in a slightly different context.] Therefore, I believe that, setting aside all methods, it can be considered proven that our autumn grain procurement campaign was built on the wrong numbers. We were first told that the figures cited give the figures for marketable grain surpluses, we assumed that this was marketable bread, and that is how we built our plan. Today we hear something completely different. Today we hear that this is not marketable bread, that there is some other convention, that a whole series of turns of the village itself is needed here, etc. How is it proven that the bread sold by the poor in the fall does not reach the market? But, in any case, it turns out that something. what we took in the fall for marketable bread is today declared non‐marketable. Thus, our entire practical grain procurement plan was based essentially on incorrect statistical data, and at the same time was, of course, a number of erroneous decisions were made based on these data. As for the political harm that these figures have brought, I think there is no need to talk about it ‐ it is clear to everyone. That this table was accepted as the class stratification of the village is also clear to everyone. At any workersʹ meeting, most of the notes concerning village issues refer precisely to this question: the surplus grain would not have fallen to the kulaks, and, thanks to this, we would not have fallen into dependence on the kulaks. Therefore, I think that regardless of all the methods, calculations, etc., which were argued today, it can be considered established that the incorrect presentation of the internal content of these figures, the incorrect understanding of this marketability when discussing the grain procurement plan, the export‐import plan, led to a whole series of mistakes in grain export and import policy. These errors occurred due to the fact that the incorrectness of these figures was not timely reported. Comrade Popov did not say anything about this, at least I did not hear anything from him about it. I have not heard such a statement from our communists from the CSO, and this issue was debated at almost all meetings.
Therefore, regardless of the CSOʹs methods of work, it seems to me that it can be considered fully proven that in our export‐import and grain‐export campaigns mistakes were made solely due to the great inaccuracy of these figures. This can be stated.
Chairman. Comrade has the floor. Trotsky.
Trotsky. I would not dwell on the wrong quote, because if you answer all the wrong quotes, then there will not be enough working day, but I stop here because it has a close relationship to the essence of the issue under discussion. I don’t know who read what report in Pravda, I have not seen any report in Pravda. I think that if you refer to an unpublished report, then you need to take the idea in full, even if it is more complicated than the question that is currently being examined. The idea of my report was directed precisely against the, as they say, the panic mood that was created here and there in connection with these figures on the distribution of grain surpluses. I spoke in my report on the following topic: what determines the social share of the stratification of the peasantry, to what extent this stratification affects the general character of our development, and I argued that that it is impossible to take the question of differentiation regardless of the growth of industry, transport, credit, foreign and domestic trade. It is necessary to take these two rates in relation, this is the first thing. And secondly, one cannot deceive oneself with the paradoxically large percentage of kulak surpluses, even if it is correct: this percentage is characteristic of the initial stage of this economic process. The idea that I developed was this: even if we assume that 14% of the peasants actually provide 61% of the grain surplus in a given year, how much will fall to their share next year? This question, which was not raised here at all, was raised by me in my report. This is a very serious question. It is necessary to take into account not only the stratification statistics, but also the dynamics. If next year the same 14% of peasants will give 65%, and then ‐ 75%, then this will be a process that is clearly threatening. I argued that if the figure for 61% is correct ‐ about which I expressed my strong doubt in my report ‐ this does not mean at all that next year the same group will give 65%. On the contrary, according to all data, there will be a decrease: say, 55% or less. How did I prove this? [Iʹm with Comrade. Popov phoned on this issue and met his support.] We are going through a rather rapid revival of agricultural marketability. Throwing away the surplus grain that part of the peasantry, which is placed in more favorable conditions, is in a more favorable position, i.e., kulak and prosperous minority. In the next period, the middle peasant also begins to throw out more correctly, less than the fist, but there is more of the middle peasant. The percentage of marketability will move from the fist to the middle peasant. Let us make the following assumption: the kulak throws out, say, 1000 poods, and the middle peasant throws out only 5 poods on the market. (I take, of course, completely arbitrary [and fantastic] numbers); next year the kulak, suppose, will throw out not a thousand poods, but 2 thousand poods, ‐ twice as much, and the average peasant 200 poods. Is the differentiation intensified or not? Certainly. The kulak threw out 995 poods of surplus last year. more than the middle peasant, and this year it is 1800 poods more. Differentiation has increased. Has the percentage of participation of the entire kulak group in the market increased or not? The percentage of participation of the kulak has decreased because there are much more middle peasants. Therefore, the thought that I argued there was that even if the CSB figures are correct ‐ which I expressed great doubt ‐ they do not mean a growing number of kulaksʹ participation in the market, but characterize only the initial stage of marketability. [I called this the paradox of all calculus.] This was my main point. I said this: even if these figures are correct, does this mean that the rate of differentiation and the growth of the share of the kulak economy will increase in the next few years? At the same time, I leave aside our fiscal policy, and the main question is whether we can counter the differentiation of the peasantry with a sufficiently rapid growth of industry. I argued that these figures should not be ʺscaredʺ by the CSB, because they, even if correct, characterize the initial stage of marketability. In order to illustrate my idea more vividly, I took the least favorable data for me, namely the figures of the CSB, which were then first published by Comrade Kamenev is against me. Kamenev. Against you?
Trotsky. Yes, against me, you do it so often that you could forget once. This is how it really was. The train of thought of my report does not fit either into the framework of the resolution of the RFCI, or into the considerations developed by Comrade Kamenev. I think, nevertheless, that my idea was correct, and the numbers served only for illustration.
Comrade Stalin said here that the figures of the PSU misled a number of comrades, and as an example he called himself, me, and comrade. Golendo, which I first hear about.
Rykov. This is a historical person.
Trotsky. Historical figures now appear so quickly that you do not have time to remember them. [ There was also talk about Comrade Bogushevsky, of whom I had not heard.] In any case, the articles of Comrade. I have not read Golendo, now I will try to remember his name, the views of Comrade I don’t know Stalin’s answer to this question, since, as far as I know, he didn’t express them. As for my own views, I expressed them, they are transcribed, and their meaning is the opposite of what was attributed to me here. In the debate, I was accused of softening differentiation, of being too optimistic about the dynamics of differentiation, i.e., in exactly the opposite sin. For verification, I communicated my views to Comrade Strumilin before the report, and he agreed with them. Comrade Strumilin, do you remember that?
Strumilin. Yes I remember.
Trotsky. That is how the debate developed in practice, that was the real idea of the report.
Molotov. First of all, about the Central Statistics Office. [Obviously what needs to be emphasized now] What is the CSB charged with? CSO, as can be seen from the report, has two groups of errors. The first group concerns how, by what methods the CSB considered on certain issues related to the grain‐feed balance. It seems to me that here to go into details, in individual amendments that are introduced by the commission comrade. Yakovlev and RCT as a whole is impossible. But the objections made by Comrade Popov, these amendments are not rejected. Comrade Strumilin also spoke here that there are big mistakes in the methods of the CSO. Does this matter for the conclusions of the Politburo? Yes, it does matter. Because more correct calculations of the RCT give a different grain and feed balance and a different distribution of grain surpluses between the sowing groups of peasants, which is reflected in the economic conclusions.
The second group of CSO errors concerns the figures themselves, which the CSO gave three times as conclusions from its work. And now the CSB does not say for sure whether its numbers are final or not. Enough has been said about this here. But it should be noted that both the CSO and Comrade Popov, purely political mistakes are visible. Comrade Yakovlev said here that the leading officials of the Central Statistical Board published data that already speak of the division of the peasantry into social groups, to which the sowing groups were equated. Then, the data that were given by the CSO to the state bodies and to the RCT commission itself ‐ they say that the CSO has slipped from the sowing groups to social divisions. But in particular it seems to me erroneous what affects Comrade. Popov in his report at todayʹs meeting of the Politburo: here he spoke about the political side of the matter and emphasized the importance for our policy of the fact that the CSB figures show that the grain surplus is at the top of the village. He explained that it was necessary to indicate this, because from the point of view of the grain price policy, it was important for us to show that when we lower prices, we lower them at the kulak, at the rich peasantry. He also said that otherwise there would be a bad political effect in relation to the lowpowered since the policy of lowering grain prices would then hit them. The impression is that Comrade Popov, as it were, adjusted his figures to these political conclusions. It turns out that the CSB figures are not only statistical conclusions, but that they are spoiled by purely political conclusions. Comrade Popov wants to prove, he needs to prove that most of the grain surplus is in the hands of the well‐to‐do stratum. This is the mistake. But over the years we have pursued not only a policy of lowering prices. At the moment we are pursuing a policy of lowering prices, but we had a moment when we were pursuing a policy of increasing prices. Who are we working for then? In your opinion, it turns out that we are working for the well‐to‐do kulak strata of the countryside. There is political confusion here. And here it is especially characteristic that Comrade. Popov does not notice the role of the middle peasant in the village. You, comrade. Popov, politics: defend the poor and lay siege to the well‐to‐do kulak group, which means not seeing the facts, in particular, the results of the October Revolution in the countryside. Your statistics conclusions are brought under the policy, and this leads to errors in statistics, and therefore your numbers change so often. Today some numbers, tomorrow ‐ others.
More about the grain‐feed balance and the breakdown of the village into social groups. The main issue here is bread prices. How to approach the question of grain prices is of tremendous importance. Is it true that 61% of the grain surplus is with the wellto‐do kulak strata or not? The grain price policy must be proof that our alliance with the middle peasant is strong and is being implemented in practice. If we do not understand this, then we are confusing our policy. Either a narrow‐poor policy, or a kulak‐rich policy ‐ such a statement is incorrect. Meanwhile, our policy is the proletariat and the poor together, plus an alliance with the middle peasant. It seems to me wrong that what I read from
Comrade. Trotsky about his report in ʺEconomic Lifeʺ.
Trotsky. There was in the report, it seems, it was said that we are exporting 1 billion poods. grain forage, and in general all nonsense.
Molotov. Namely, that 14% of the kulak elite in the countryside has 61% of surplus grain.
Rykov. The term ʺkulak eliteʺ was in the article.
Trotsky. Why didnʹt you tell me this then, but saved it for discussion about the CSB?
Molotov. [I donʹt attach any importance to this.] I didnʹt save anything. My task is to show the following: the dynamics of the social development of the village is of great importance for us, and not only a comparison with the next year, but also a comparison with the past. But not only that. A number of comrades said that this year 61% of the surplus was found in 14% of the well‐to‐do kulak population of the village. If the situation is such that 61% is at the well‐to‐do kulak elite of the countryside, then what kind of policy do we get in the field of grain prices? Ambiguities must not be allowed here — confusion in the party and wrong orientation among the working masses. The question is, what policy do we adhere to in the grain issue? The current figures ‐ 61%, since they are given as socio‐economic figures ‐ are incorrect, erroneous. This mistake was helped by both the CSO and Comrade. Popov in particular. Comrade Golendo who said bluntly that in the sowing groups there are three social groups: underpowered, middle peasants and well‐to‐do. He directly says that there are three layers in the countryside, and from this he draws political and economic conclusions, he says that 61% have a well‐to‐do kulak layer in the countryside. From this it follows that our policy of grain prices is evidently a policy for the well‐to‐do kulak section of the countryside. Remember that Comrade In a speech at a meeting in the STO Kamenev had to amend his report at the MC, which was published in Pravda and in Economic Life. there is a policy for the well‐to‐do kulak part of the village. Remember that Comrade In a speech at a meeting in the STO Kamenev had to amend his report at the MC, which was published in Pravda and in Economic Life.
Comrade Kamenev said in the STO: please, do not count 14% as the kulak part of the village, which is 3‐4%. Why was this amendment required? Because the initial data, as they were interpreted, lead to incorrect political conclusions. These tendencies were also discovered by Comrade. Popov, and CSO. They were reflected in the first report of Comrade. Kamenev. It seems to me proven that on the basis of the statistical errors of the CSB and on the basis that the CSB approached its work from the wrong political angle, harmful confusion was created, which contributed to the misleading of some comrades.
Kamenev. What is balance? We all understand that this is the balance of grain surpluses for individual groups [as I understand it as it is written], i.e., annual turnover total. But these surpluses do not include 500 million poods. bread remaining within the peasant circulation. Anyone interested in this matter knows that it is written everywhere and everywhere. [500 million of domestic peasant turnover is excluded from the grain surplus. This is understood by all who are interested in the substance.] Half a billion poods of grain does not go to the city market, and in excess of these 500 million there are about a million poods of grain, which will be moved from the countryside in its entirety to the city market. Within this, government purchases, exports, and private purchases can be made to supply urban centers. How can one forget the elementary truth that the poor sell in autumn and buy in spring? But this, of course, is not reflected in the annual results. Now with regard to prices. I was not there when the prices were set. The prices were set by the Politburo at about 1 ruble, according to a telegram from Comrade Mikoyan 21. They said: here is the guideline figure of about one ruble, stick to it. [The CSB also took part in this.] The CSB figures did not play a role in this.
[The middle peasant is the central figure of the village, now letʹs turn to what he has. It seems to me that the price of 1 rub. was installed by telegram comrade. Mikoyan.]
The CSO figures were changed three times. This guideline price is about 1 rub. however, it did not change, despite the fact that the CSB figures changed relative to 61%, 54%, etc. What does the last Politburo decision on this matter say? Try to bring prices to the guideline price of 1 ruble. 22 The point was that in cases where the price exceeded this guideline price, the price should be brought down to 1 ruble. Until now, this figure has not raised any doubts as a marginal norm. What does the CSB figures have to do with it? The CSB figures change, but the directive price remains the same, and no one raises the question of changing it. Why didnʹt anyone do this? From the figures that I published, the figures of the CSO, I concluded that since bread is distributed in this way, we pay 1 ruble. 60 kopecks, then it is necessary to adjust by all measures to 1 ruble. But there was no panic in front of the fist.
The second comment concerns the question of the numbers themselves. Comrade Trotsky says that I published these figures against him. I assure you that I did not publish these figures against him.
Trotsky. I am not saying that it was published against me on purpose.
Kamenev. I don’t know, maybe I was mistaken, but reading your articles, I didn’t see that you in any way participated in the campaign to gloss over the stratification of the village that was. Even if you wanted to say it, you couldnʹt do it, because it contradicts all your latest statements. I want to say that I have not announced these figures against anyone. We must be aware of it. The figures were reported to the Council of Peopleʹs Commissars on July 28 at a meeting chaired by Comrade Rykov. Nobody paid attention to these figures. SNK adopted the report of Comrade Popov, for information, no one said a single word against this. I may have made a mistake that I took these figures as they were printed in the CSB Bulletin No. 105, but there were no other figures. These were the first numbers. I said that these are preliminary figures that need to be worked out. But to say that 14% of peasant households, regardless of whether they are kulaks or not, have 61% of all surpluses, based on the figures from the Central Statistical Bureau, this could be said. [Six months later, you say: not 61%, but 54%. And in December, when 250‐270 million have already been purchased, 12% of peasant households ‐ 42% of all grain. This is politically significant. We will now remove Popov, swear, etc.
Voice. 42 and 61 are a big difference.
Kamenev. Regardless of this difference ‐ 42 in 12 peasant households is of great importance. If there were no exact data, but only 14 and 61, this should have been said.] After all, the distribution of grain is one of the main factors of our economic year. And since I was the first to perform, I gave these figures. [ Comrade Rykov is trying to prove that I made a recount, that this is not a stratification of the countryside.
Rykov. This is the figure of class division.
Kamenev. It’s a pity that in all your previous conversations you said that Golendo made a recount, that I didn’t pull him down and used these figures.] Comrade Rykov quotes my [data] articles. I am very grateful to him for that. But he did not cite a single place where I said that 14% are fists; it is all the worse to quote in such a way that you know perfectly well my unpublished article, where it is precisely indicated that to judge the kulak and the middle peasant only by crops is absolute political illiteracy. Of course, the crops are determined. But with the nationalization of the land, with the equalization of the land, which we have produced, to speak of socioeconomic groups, without mentioning either rent, or hired labor, or mechanization, etc. ‐ this is complete illiteracy. It turns out that either I have forgotten the ABC of Marxism, or you are doing wrong, attributing something to me. I didnʹt think so. I will read to you from my article: ʺComrades act from the best intentions ...ʺ (reads) 23.
On this I stand and will stand. Why were the amendments needed? Because, to my great surprise, when I quoted data on 14% of peasant households, these figures frightened comrade. Molotov, and he said they were kulaks. In order to explain
Comrade. Molotov, that the 14% taken for the sown areas do not yet represent the kulaks, and that the kulak in our country is determined not by sowing, but by capital, etc., that is why there were amendments. I said this to calm Comrade. Molotov.
Molotov. Thank you for the comfort ...
Kamenev. I see only one thing that you have not calmed down and will continue to insist on what is not.
Farther. Comrade Yakovlev spoke about Dubenetsky, I donʹt know who he is.
Voice. Head of department, non‐partisan.
Shkiryatov. Comrade Popov does not like to host communists.
Kamenev. So, this very Dubenetsky gave exactly the table about which Comrade. Popov, that it is middle peasant, well‐to‐do, rich, etc. represent the characteristic only for crops. Comrade Yakovlev, of course, knew this. But the difference is how to quote. Comrade Yakovlev cited Dubenetskyʹs article, but did not cite Dubenetskyʹs notes to this article.
Yakovlev. Read the note to the end.
Kamenev. I read: ʺThe real table of the wealthy, etc.ʺ (Is reading).
It is clear that it is confirmed here that these groups are taken on the basis of sowing. It is a mistake to stratify the peasantry according to crops. We have been talking about this here for 4 hours. Do you really want to teach this? If people do not understand that it is not by the size of the crop, but by a number of other signs ‐ rent, hired labor, cars, etc. ‐ it is necessary to determine the class stratification, if we have gathered for this only to establish this, ‐ we have chosen a strange place. [We are examining the question of whether the CSB gave its figures for crops or machines, for hired labor, etc.] I do not see that the CSB gave its figures as figures for the stratification of the peasantry by all indications. [ When a person gives a note, there is no need to quote the document without reading that note too.
Yakovlev. Read the note to the end.
Kamenev. I also want to say about this.] Comrade. Yakovlev also said that the work of the CSO, quoted by Dubenetsky, was carried out at the insistence of my secretary. Of course, my secretary has nothing to do with it. Itʹs about me, not the secretary. When I received these numbers ‐ 14 and 61, I immediately called Comrade. Popov and asked: after all, these are the average figures for the entire Union, is it possible to give by regions, is it possible to take not only sowing characteristics, but others; you give a figure ‐ from 8 to 10 dessiatines have so much bread, is it possible to calculate how many livestock this group has, how many cars, etc.? I asked the CSO for this. I thought that the Central Statistical Board would do it and that only then would we have figures on the stratification of the
peasantry. The CSB did not do this. [But this attempt was made. Work must be done on the basis of districts and by all indications so that the stratification of the peasantry can be seen. Of course, we can say ‐ here a man said that from 8‐10 dessiatines is so much bread, etc. Do you think ‐ this method is wrong, but you are taking groups ‐ middle peasants, wealthy, poor, etc.] But what grounds [you] RCT was in that report, which was submitted to the Politburo, to apply the same categories of crops? [you took the same groups.] After all, you have not presented any parallel tables that would show the actual bundle. Leaving here today, after the RCT report, will we have an idea and idea of the stratification of the village along all the necessary grounds? No, [we have] the RCT did not give us such data [and we have no idea about it].
The CSO, which determined that 14% of the population had 61% of the grain surplus, now, six months later, came and said that 12% had 42% of the grain surplus. Maybe theyʹll fix it later. [If we publish tomorrow and say ‐ pay attention ‐ 12% of the peasant population has 42% of grain surpluses ...
Voroshilov. The CSB should say that we had a year or two ago.
Kamenev. This will not change the fact that 12% of the peasant population has 42% of the surplus of grain circulated on the market.
Yakovlev. This is not true.
Kamenev. Give your figures.] But I ask myself, what are we leaving with after all this gimmick about the stratification of the peasantry. Do you give anything, do you give a certain picture? You only want a fake attempt, based on the figures from the CSO, to conclude that the CSO or Dubenetsky [which, by the way, I donʹt know at all] gave out the numbers of division by crops for class division. If we accept the second part of the note, we will put the CSO in a very bad position, a difficult position for its work. The directives of the RFL boil down to the fact that the CSB is given such instructions that would force the CSB to give figures, reassuring figures that speak of the great role of the middle peasants. I join Comrade. Stalin, that the tactics of adjusting the numbers to this is completely wrong, but you are doing just that, you are giving just such a directive. Comrade Popov made mistakes and was mistaken many times, we can say that he cannot manage this matter, you can remove him from this job, but if you are now removing in this situation and on the basis of this report, then you are putting the CSB in such a position, in such an environment that they will tremble for each digit and will rate each digit from this point of view: [what role the middle peasant should play] a political directive given in advance about the poor, the middle, etc. I think that [this policy] by doing this we will spoil a measurement instrument that will not be correct, I think that with such a [wrong] spoiled instrument we can get into a big problem, and the RCT by its decree spoils this very instrument. My proposal agrees with the proposal of Comrade Rykov, as far as I understood him, who does not propose to approve all the proposals of the RFL, but only proposes to state that the CSB has changed its figures three times in the issue of the results of the grain balance; accept methodological criticism if you are confident that the methodological criticism is correct, and limit yourself to that.
Popov. On the question of whether it is possible to open a kulak on the basis of a sowing grouping, in a note submitted to the commission by Comrade Yakovlev by me and by the employee of the Central Statistical Bureau of Comrade. Cartilaginous, it was written:
“The exploitative farms in the countryside constitute a few, which must be fished out from all groups, mainly, of course, from the rich. To distinguish a purely exploitative type of farms, other methods of grouping and other, more individualized features are needed than we do in the formation of mass conventionally homogeneous aggregates. ʺ
“Exploitation arising from the production essence of the economy is its necessary function, which puts it in the ranks of the exploiting ones. Exploitation, which is of a random nature, should be attributed only to elements that form an exploitative type in the future or do not form at all. In a word, in order to declare a group of farms exploitative, it is not enough to have one economic feature, but a whole set of them, and only on the basis of the nature of the combination of various elements and functions of an economy can it be declared exploitative. ʺ
In addition, I must inform you that on the basis of the work of the
RCI commission ‐ not the current one, but chaired by
Comrade Kritsman ‐ with specialists, as well as on the basis of the conference. The CSO adopted a special method of developing dynamic census data in order to clarify the class structure of peasant farms. Farms there are divided into several types: purely agricultural, purely commercial, and mixed. Then each is subdivided into 2 subgroups: farms with the hiring of term workers and without hiring, and this, in turn, into farms: a) with the owners of commercial and industrial establishments [etc. b) with trades and only workers, c) in trades, only handicraft artisans. This is how pure types are divided. In addition, mixed types stand out. Then further, each of these subgroups is further divided by the size of the gross income from agricultural products, livestock raising and income from trades. We also wanted to divide the values into instruments and means of production according to their sum, but this turned out to be impossible. As you can see, the PSU undertook a special processing of the material to study the class structure of peasant farms, but Comrade Yakovlev [counts only] claims that the CSO is supposedly studying the class structure by sowing groups. Then I must answer one objection ‐ this is about the development of onfarm turnover. When I analyzed the question of the grain‐fodder balance for 1912/13, I pointed out that before the war about 300 million circulated on the on‐farm market, other economists estimate this amount at 400 million. Rudzutaka, that supposedly on the basis of our group calculations, a transportation plan for the railways was determined, this, of course, is not true. The plan was discussed in the State Planning Committee with the participation of all departments, and we only gave our opinion, but I declare that we did not provide data on the surplus by group. In this way, the size of the blanks and transportation was determined, and not on the basis of the plate placed in No. 105 of the Bulletin.
I must say a few words about the speech of Comrade Molotov. I have been engaged in scientific and statistical activities for 27 years and I can assure you that I have never done what you said. You can blame me for anything, but to say that I adjusted the numbers is wrong. I never adjusted the numbers. After all, I publish the figures for general information and answer to scientific criticism. Or do you want to say that I did not do it myself, but someone prompted me: someone adjusted it for someone else. Is that what you mean? You shouldnʹt say that. I believe that you need to respect the work of others, and you had no right to tell me this, i.e., throw such an accusation. As for all the other objections, I believe that the assessment of the work that the CSO is doing should be assessed by scientific expertise. I ask the Politburo to appoint a scientific examination of the work of the CSO.
Rykov. I didnʹt tell you that.
Popov. It was not you who told me, but I, when I was with you on the eve of the meeting at the RCI, told you that I would be removed and that I received this information from the RCI. I think that the CSB, having worked for about 8 years, has the right to ask the Politburo to appoint a scientific expertise. I ask you to approach the work of the CSO with the correct method, the method of scientific expertise.
Kuibyshev. I want to say what we consider the most important of the results of the study of the grain‐feed balance and what we said about this in our decree. Our most important task, arising from the instructions of the Council of Peopleʹs Commissars, was to establish the correspondence of the conclusions of the CSO with the reality in the field of a general assessment of our harvest, our grain‐feed balance. We needed to check their compliance with reality. Comrade Kamenev demands that we work out a new grainfeed balance. Our duty, perhaps a very unpleasant duty, is to criticize and outline the ways of the correct solution of the issue, to find certain mistakes and indicate how to get rid of them. But it is impossible to demand from us that we decide this or that issue for this or that department. We were instructed by the Council of Peopleʹs Commissars to establish the consistency of the conclusions of the CSO with reality: can the grain‐feed balance be put in the basis of certain measures of our economic policy? The first thing we noticed was the instability of the grain‐feed balance in general. We said that it cannot be a source on the basis of which one can make certain practical decisions.
It seems to me that Comrade Popov did not refute the instructions that we gave him. Methodological and even arithmetic mistakes that were made by the CSO in calculating the main elements of the balance in the direction of incorrect exaggeration of the surplus of grain among the wealthy peasantry and the understatement of marketable grain among the middle peasants, and partly the poor peasants, make the CSOʹs group grain‐fodder balance shaky and unreliable. We stated this first of all.
Our second conclusion is the incorrect distribution of grain by sowing groups of farms. We are told that 61% of bread is 14% [ of the population] of the upper strata of the peasantry. Is it right or not? We say it is wrong. When is now Comrade Popov says that 14% of farms have 42% of grain, we say that this is also wrong?
We say that if we applied the methods [regardless of the sowing groups, then completely different results would be obtained], more perfect, if we did not make the mistakes that the CSO makes, then the distribution of bread by sowing groups would be different. We cannot say specifically what groups they will be and what results will be obtained, because for this it is necessary to carry out the annual work that the CSB does. [It is necessary to count everything, find out what mistakes were made, take into account the mistake of not taking into account the employment of labor by all groups of the population, hiring livestock, not taking into account farmstead land, not taking into account the participation of different groups in trade, not taking into account the expansion of the area, and therefore not taking into account the number of seeds, not taking into account middle peasants and lower groups, etc.
Therefore, I say that the sown area of 1924 was taken, which did not correspond to the picture of 1925. The data of the Central Statistical Bureau did not correspond that the group of non‐sown crops was decreasing, the group with sowing of up to 1 decimal place also decreased, i.e., all the inaccuracies that we now cannot be changed by millions of poods] It is necessary to recount everything, correct all the mistakes made, clarify the very source materials, etc. All those numerous errors and inaccuracies that were made by the Central Statistical Bureau in calculating the main elements of the grain‐feed balance and which were established by our commission, taken together, being extended to millions of farms, to millions of acres of sown area, etc., create that balance and those wrong conclusions. arising from the grain‐feed balance of the CSO, which were noted here. All these mistakes went in the direction of exaggerating the grain surpluses among the wealthy strata and reducing them among other groups of the peasantry. [These are the results of misapplication of methods. The third conclusion prompted us to insist on replacing the leadership of the CSB] The elimination of all these errors would probably lead to the fact that the well‐to‐do groups of the peasantry would give not 61%, not 52%, and not 42% of the surplus of grain to the market, as it appears according to different versions of the balance sheet of the CSB, but some, an even smaller figure. Incorrectness, unsteadiness of the grain‐feed balance in general, negligence in the work of the Central Statistical Bureau of compiling this balance, incorrect distribution of farms by sowing groups, all this gives a completely unusable grainfeed balance, unsuitable for economic conclusions in the sense of which strata of the population accumulate surpluses, what should be price policy, etc. This balance cannot provide any foundation for the economic regulation of the grain trade because it has been drawn up incorrectly. All this led us to the need to insist on replacing the leadership of the CSB.
Comrade Popov talks all the time about scientific expertise. I consider this to be superfluous, because large scientific forces, including the scientific forces of the PSU, worked to check the grainfeed balance of the PSU. Everyone agreed with our conclusions. After a meeting of the board of the RCP Comrade. Yakovlev invited Comrade Lositsky, a prominent statistician working at the CSO, who defended Comrade. Popov, we [from our attacks] at a meeting of the RCI board. He once again reviewed our work, his amendments were recorded and accepted by us, because [they do not break] they do not change our conclusions one iota. They all boil down to only a slight softening of expressions. All the prominent CSB specialists who were familiar with our conclusions said in the same way that they could not essentially object to the conclusions we were making. All this was the impetus for raising the question of replacing the leadership of the CSB. [Wobbly balance, wrong grouping, etc. There are absolutely no attempts to oppose socio‐economic groups.] Comrade Kamenev says that we are opposing the CSO groupings with our socio‐economic groups, which we also compose according to the size of the crop. We only give a characterization of the main groups of the peasantry — the poor, the kulak, and the middle peasant, on the basis of all the socio‐economic characteristics that should form the basis of these characteristics. You said yourself, comrade. Kamenev. that we should be thanked for this.
Kamenev. You did not understand the irony.
Kuibyshev. I think that Comrade Kamenev cannot change anything in this characterization.
Kamenev. It should have been done for a long time.
Kuibyshev. Why it was not done before, I do not know. You say that we not only gave a description of the groups, but also tried to make the very grouping according to the cultivated areas.
What does our decree say? It is said here that in order to compose socio‐economic groups, one cannot be limited to sowing, one must take into account the gross income, waste trades, hiring labor, rent, and a whole series of other signs. If all these signs are applied, what happens? Since the group construction of the grain‐fodder balance should characterize the distribution of surpluses and economic relations of the strata of the peasantry specified in clause 1, it is necessary that the groups adopted in the balance correspond to the main socio‐economic groups of the village.
“Since it can be judged on the basis of the material available in the CSO, the sowing groupings (giving only average indicators for the groups) satisfy the aforementioned characteristics of the poor peasant group in their mass of the economy, with sowing up to about 2 dessyatins in the consuming region, the Central Black Earth zone, Kuban, Siberia and forest‐steppe Ukraine; up to 3 dess <yatin> ‐ in South‐Steppe Ukraine, the Northeast and up to 4 dess <yatin> ‐ in the Southeast, in the production zone and in the North Caucasus, without the Kuban ʺ 24 those. we took all groups of the village for the consuming district and looked at where there is a greater number of leases, where there is a greater amount of labor force, where there are latrine trades, where the sale of labor is used, etc., and tried to estimate within what limits when grouping farms on sowing are all these socio‐economic characteristics. We analyzed the CSO groupings in terms of these features. We said: take the middle peasant group. They have a middle peasant group in the consuming region from 2 to 4 acres of crops. We say that if we take such characteristics as hired labor, rent, seasonal work, etc., where should we look for the middle peasant? We see that the limits are significantly expanded in comparison with what Comrade Popov. On farms from 6 to 8 acres of sowing of farms, employing labor force ‐ 1% in the group from 8 dessiatines rent is 2%, etc. Is it possible for a group of farms, of which only 1‐2% are renting and hiring labor, can they, according to the characteristics that were previously established, be attributed to the group of prosperous ones?
Kamenev. Have you tried counting across your categories?
Kuibyshev. This is the work of specially statistical bodies, which will require a lot of calculating work and a lot of time. We say that signs of the middle peasant should be looked for in a wider group than Comrade Popov. You, comrade. Kamenev, in one of his speeches at the service station they said that it was necessary to look for a kulak among 4% of farms. What we are saying is approximately the same. If we talk about looking for the middle peasant, then we must look for him not where Comrade is looking for. Popov, and in a larger group of farms for the consuming region, approximately within the sowing range from 2 to 6 dessiatines, etc. We are not saying that all farms from 2 to 6 in this area or 4 to 6 acres in more extensive areas are entirely middle peasants. We say that the middle peasant must be sought in the broader mass of the peasantry. The main feature of the middle peasant is that he, as a rule, we do not exploit ourselves and does not exploit anyone, does not systematically employ labor, etc. There is no opposition to the groupings of Comrade. Popov is gone. We say that grouping can only be based on such and such characteristics. The directive is given here. The 8th paragraph says the following: “8. Considering the conventionality of this approximate distribution of farms into groups, arising from the lack of materials and the impossibility, given the current state of these materials, to fully apply the principles of grouping established in this resolution, instruct the
CSB:
a) In order to obtain data sufficient for a firm and accurate distribution of farms into groups, according to both their capacity and social relations, to accelerate the development of dynamic data for 1925, which more fully characterize various economic groups; accelerate the development of dynamic data from previous years; data from the 1925 seed survey and the budgets for 1924/25, establishing unambiguous groupings for all three types of survey.
b) Revise the breakdown of the USSR territory into districts adopted in the grain‐fodder balance, eliminating the wrong unification by some groups of completely different in direction and type of peasant farms of different districts (Central Industrial Region and the rest of the consuming strip, Central Black Earth, North‐East and South East producing belt, steppe and forest‐steppe part of Ukraine, Kuban, steppes and foothills of the North Caucasus) ʺ 25.
I believe that the Politburo will not bind itself with anything by accepting our proposals. Those or other expressions that are in our decision and which give grounds to Comrade. Kamenevʹs wrong conclusion can be eliminated. But the thought was this. Their grouping is incorrect. Let us see what sowing groups of the peasantry must be taken by us in order to look there for the middle peasant, the kulak. We have pushed the boundaries. It turned out that within these boundaries, the real kulak wealthy elements are present in small numbers. I propose a resolution like this:
a) to agree basically with the conclusions of the Collegium of the NK RFKI USSR on the work of the Central Statistical Board on the grainfeed balance.
b) Recognize that the CSO and Comrade Popov, as his leader, made major mistakes in drawing up the grain‐feed balance, which made the balance insufficient for judging either the marketability, or the surplus and shortage of grain, or the economic relations of the main strata of the peasantry.
c) Agree with the decision of the RCI Board on the need to replace
Comrade Popov as head of the CSB by another comrade.
d) Instruct Comrade Rykov and Comrade Kuibyshev, within two weeks, to find an appropriate candidate and, with the conclusion of the Orgburo, submit it for approval by the Politburo.
e) To propose to the Council of Peopleʹs Commissars of the USSR to appoint an interim manager of the CSB Comrade Pashkovsky.
Regarding Comrade Popov, that he was never guided by any political considerations. The expression comrade. Molotov cannot be understood in such a way that Comrade Popov, contrary to his political conscience, under pressure from someone or for some other reason, falsified the numbers. Nobody is bringing this charge against him. This is not so primitive. Thatʹs what comrade. Popov said at the RCL board: ʺIn any work, the most important, the most essential, are two circumstances: the first is the method and the second is the initial basic fundamental points of view.ʺ
Methods comrade. Popovʹs were worthless, it seems to me that we have proved. They could not lead to any correct conclusions. As for the political point of view, the principled point of view, which guided him, it is sufficiently characterized by the quotation of Comrade Yakovlev from the note of Comrade Popov that the idea of the middle peasant is an old peopleʹs idea that has been archived. Further, in his report to the collegium, he characterizes the conclusions that were made ʺby some economists and politiciansʺ from the figures of the CSB. This is also very typical for political literacy, as well as for the political position of Comrade. Popova: “These conclusions, ‐ says Comrade. Popov, ‐ due to certain conditions, they were clothed in a political form, in a certain requirement of a very important politically character (demands for dispossession of the village,
He used this word ʺdispossession of the villageʺ more than once in his [opening and] concluding remarks at our meeting of the RCI board. Here is the political approach of Comrade. Popov, with whom he approached the group. Completely wrong methods and completely wrong approach, [... the Old Believer theory about the kulak and dispossession of the village. I think that we have a leadership that does not correspond to the fact that under this leadership the groupings were made correctly.] All this, taken together, speaks for the fact that under the given leadership of the CSO we will not have a reliable grainfeed balance, let alone the correct groupings of the peasantry.
Molotov. I am ready to throw out words from the transcript that can be interpreted by Comrade. Popov as an attack on him personally.
Popov. My proposal: to appoint a scientific expertise to study the data of the CSO and eliminate comrade Popov.
Chairman. Who is behind the proposal comrade Kuibyshev? (against Comrade Kamenev).
Stalin *. (* This paragraph in the transcript with the authorʹs and editorial revisions was entered by an unknown editor. There is also a note with this text (IV Stalinʹs autograph). (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 521. L. 9.)) The main directive to the employees of the CSO: keep in mind that the CSO is the most important scientific institution of the republic, the digital data of which are of paramount importance for the governing bodies of the republic, that the CSO is required to work accurately, objectively, scientific, free of political considerations, that any attempt to adjust the numbers prejudice will be considered a felony. Chairman. Accepted. The question is over.
Attachment 1
Resolution of the Collegium of the NK RCP of the USSR on the revision of the alleged grain‐feed balance of the Central Statistical Administration for 1925/26
To approve the following resolution of the RFCI Commission for the revision of the estimated grain feed balance of the Central Statistical Office for 1925/26:
I. The Commission states that the group grain‐feed balance, neither by the method of its construction, nor by the materials that formed its basis, can serve as a basis for judging either the surpluses and shortcomings, or the marketability, or the economic relations of the main strata of the peasantry, while at the same time it distorts and obscures the socio‐economic significance of the middle strata of the peasantry.
With regard to individual elements of the grain‐feed balance, the
Commission states:
1. Sown area.
The existing method of calculating the cultivated area is not accurate enough in relation to the total calculation of the cultivated area and distorts the ratio of the groups according to the cultivated area in relation to the surplus.
The CSO has been applying, since 1923, surcharges for sown areas of 10‐15% in the consuming zone, 15‐20% in the production zone, 20% in the North Caucasus, in Kyrgyzstan, Siberia and the Far Eastern District, 10% in Ukraine, 26.4 % in Belarus, 26.7% in the Kuban and 31.1% in Chechnya. The size of the allowances calculated on the basis of a comparison of the testimony of peasant farms in 1922 about their crops for the year of the survey and for the previous year and a number of other data were carried over to the following years without a new experimental test of the correction coefficient. Apart from the accuracy of the initial data of these allowances, their application unchanged since 1922 cannot be considered justified, because the concealment of cultivated areas, caused in the past by the severity of taxation, should have decreased as the agricultural tax fell.
Recognize the practice of premiums imperfect in relation to the average indicators, and the experience of applying them to the group balance ‐ requiring a radical revision.
2. Harvest.
To state the large discrepancies between the specific data on the size of the yield, collected according to the autumn survey, yields and the data of the point assessment with allowances (especially in the provinces with low yields ‐ the Central Black Earth Belt, the Volga region). To state the extreme delay in the timing of the verification of the size of the yield, obtained on the basis of specific data of the autumn survey, which makes it impossible to use them in the corresponding economic year.
The reason for the inaccuracy of the yield data is: a) the imperfect technique of collecting data from the autumn survey (there is no use of mechanical selection), a small percentage of the autumn sample (13%); b) the shortcomings of the practice of an indiscriminate increase of half a point to the data on yields of different heights obtained by the point system. The latter distorts the size of bad yields especially strongly. All this as a whole does not provide the CSO with a sufficiently accurate basis for calculating average yield indicators.
To state that the CSO currently does not have sufficient data on the fluctuations in yield by groups, without which a group calculation of the grain‐feed balance on real grounds is impossible.
To recognize it as necessary to improve the data on productivity: a) further improvement of the methodology for transferring points to poods and calculating amendments; b) improving the technique of the spring survey and increasing the percentage of farms covered by it; c) accelerating the collection of harvest data in the fall; d) instruct the CSB to continue work on clarifying the methods of accounting for extreme fluctuations in yield; e) recognize the need to accelerate the annual development of data on the size of yields by crops and groups based on the autumn survey and publish the results.
3. Population, number of farms and their distribution by sowing groups.
To state that the CSO, when determining the number of all farms and the entire population, is forced to use the data of the NKFin, the reliability of which decreases due to the undoubtedly taking place of the imaginary fragmentation of farms and due to the inevitability of a drop in the accuracy of the NKFin accounting with respect to farms exempted from tax.
In connection with the 1926 census 26 and the establishment of accurate data on the number of farms and the population based on it, instruct the Central Statistical Bureau to find ways to accurately record further changes in the number of farms from year to year, due to the emergence of new farms, evictions, fragmentation of farms, etc.
The Commission notes the inadequacy of the 5% spring sample, which provides a solid basis for calculating average values, but completely insufficient for a more or less accurate distribution of farms and the population by groups, and especially by extreme groups.
Recognize that clarification of data on the distribution of farms by sowing groups, as well as on family size, especially in extreme groups, cannot be achieved without increasing the percentage of the sample of farms covered by the spring survey and rigorous sampling.
The commission also notes that when calculating the distribution of farms by sown area, the farmstead area was not taken into account, which exaggerated the percentage of seedless and underpowered, as well as the size of their grain shortages.
The commission states that the grain‐feed balance, which calculated the surplus for 1925/26, was based on the data on the distribution of the cultivated area by groups obtained in the spring survey of 1924, since the data for 1925 were not developed. This aggravated the general inaccuracy and conventionality of all calculations.
4. Gross collection.
A. To state that the accounting of the total gross harvest is inaccurate, since the multiplication of insufficiently accurate indicators of sown areas, productivity, and population by each other can increase the inaccuracy of the results obtained.
B. The inaccuracy of the transitional data is especially reflected in the final estimates of the gross collection by groups.
To recognize the need to clarify the accounting of gross fees, both in the general balance sheet and, in particular, by groups, which can only be achieved by improving the accounting system for its elements and using the balance verification method.
5. Consumption.
A. a) When calculating consumption for 1925/26 in the group grainfodder balance, the CSO, having adopted for 1925/26 the same norms that were established in 1923/24, did not take into account the increase in consumption in accordance with the best harvest of the present of the year; b) in the group grain‐fodder balance presented to the higher organs, the same nutritional norms are adopted for all groups, which distorts the ratio of surpluses and shortcomings, exaggerating the shortcomings of the low‐powered and exaggerating the excess of the rich; c) that in further attempts to calculate consumption by groups, the CSO established the size of the decrease in consumption from the middle group to the lowest and the size of the increase in consumption from the middle group to the highest in a normative way; d) that the CSO, at the time of drawing up the balance, did not have developed data for calculating consumption by groups, without which the concrete construction of the group grain‐feed balance is impossible. Equally, the CSO did not have, when compiling the grain‐feed balance, data on average consumption rates, which are currently being developed.
B. When calculating feeding norms in the group grain‐feed balance: a) the increase in fodder norms in accordance with the current harvest was not taken into account; b) the increase in livestock over the past year and during the current year was not taken into account. The per capita expenditure on feeding livestock was increased only in accordance with the growth of the population (according to the CSB, the population growth since 1923‐24 was 3%; feeding, while according to incomplete CSO data, the number of feed units increased by about 17.5%); c) the entire husk is included in the feed expense, while a significant part of it has no fodder value and should be written off as a waste of no economic importance during processing; d) in the group grain‐feed balance, the same feeding rates were adopted for all groups, while according to the calculations made by the CSO after drawing up the balance, deviation of feed norms from average to lower and to higher groups reaches up to 20% and down 20%; e) that at the time of compiling the balance of the developed data, the CSO did not have either the average feed rates, or the fluctuations in the feeding rates by groups, suitable for calculating the feed costs of the current year, which are currently being developed.
B. With regard to the calculation of nutrition and feeding norms, propose to the CSO: (a) To accelerate the development of data on consumption and feeding statistics in order to make it possible to take them into account in the current yearʹs balance sheets; b) continue, based on materials for a number of years, the study of the effect of yield on nutrition and feeding norms; c) continue the development of norms for nutrition and feeding by groups; d) the grouping of farms in the development of food and feeding norms should be the same as in the development of dynamic censuses, spring survey data and budgets. Invite the CSB to develop this issue; e) continue and expedite critical comparison of nutritional and nutritional data collected for specific surveys with budget data.
D. Consumption expenditures in the CSO gross totals did not include the costs of moonshine and spray, which exaggerated the total surplus.
6. Stocks.
a) The CSO did not take into account the accumulation of stocks in the grain‐fodder balance, which was mandatory, since the surpluses calculated in the grain‐fodder balance served as the basis for judging commodity surpluses. The CSO did not set the task of accounting for the accumulation of reserves, considering the amount of reserves to be dependent on the corresponding situation.
b) Since the neglect of stocks, the size of which depends to a large extent on the state of the crop, distorts the ratio of surpluses of different regions and groups, especially in areas of multi‐sowing, extensive, grain crops with fluctuating yields, suggest that the CSB put such an account.
c) Suggest the CSB to continue the study on budget materials of the size of the residuals, which are transferred from year to year by groups, and their fluctuation depending on the harvest, in order to make it possible to use these data in compiling the grain feed balance. 7. Seeds.
a) When calculating the cost of seeds, the CSO did not have materials to take into account the difference in the increase in sown areas and the change in the proportion of crops in different groups, assuming an equal increase in the sown area for all groups. Recognizing the desirability of this kind of accounting and noting its difficulty, suggest that the CSB work out the question of the possibility of its application to the grain and fodder balance.
b) The seeding rate adopted in the group grain‐fodder balance does not give an accurate idea of the ratio of the economic consumption of seeds by groups, since the seeding rate is calculated according to the average rates for all groups of farms. To recognize it necessary that the CSB, according to the autumn survey, systematically and timely calculate the seeding sizes by groups, which the CSB has already put into the development program.
8. On balance sheet verification of the estimated balance.
In view of the unreliability of the source materials, which are the basis for calculating both the input and the expenditure part of the grain‐feed balance, the use of balance check to correct individual elements of the estimated balance, which is always practiced correcting the size of the estimated gross collection, cannot give any precise and clear criteria what and in what amount should be corrected in the estimated balance of 1925/26. Attaching great importance to the method of balance verification, the Commission proposes that the CSB should publish in the near future the grainfeed balances of recent years, both estimated and final.
9. About arithmetic error.
The commission states that an arithmetic error crept into the grainfodder balance presented to the higher institutions along the producing strip, which gave an exaggeration of shortcomings in the producing strip: 6.2 million poods in the seedless group, 50.2 million poods in the low‐powered group. and, on the other hand, the exaggeration of the surplus: among the average by 19.5 million poods, among the wealthy by 26.7 million poods. and from the rich by 10.2 million poods, which was revealed by the CSB during work to clarify the balance on the instructions of the Commission.
II. On the groupings adopted in the grain‐feed balance. 1. The main socio‐economic groups of the village are:
a) the poor (exploited farms);
b) rich (for the most part, exploiting farms) and
c) between them are medium‐sized farms (in their mass, as a rule, they do not exploit others, at the same time, in their bulk they are not exploited).
Only such a grouping, quite clearly distinguishing the main groups of the peasantry, can have practical political and economic significance.
2. The grain‐feed balance of the CSO, in which the grouping of farms is given exclusively according to the sown area without sufficient consideration of both the capacity of the economy, expressed in means of production, and especially without taking into account social relations, and also without sufficient consideration of the characteristics of the regions, in no way can to satisfy the task of characterizing the economic relations of the main above‐mentioned socio‐economic strata of the village and the distribution of grain surpluses between them.
When comparing the characteristics of the well‐to‐do group of farms given by the CSO in the report of com. Khryashcheva and Popova, with the statistical average for the districts, it is found that the CSO attributed to the well‐to‐do farms exceeding the power of the average statistical for the districts. The CSO, while attaching socioeconomic importance to its groups, at the same time identified the average statistical with the middle peasant groups, not taking into account the totality of the most important features of the main socio‐economic strata of the peasantry. This method of grouping in the grain‐fodder balance led to a discrepancy between it and the main socio‐economic strata of the village and made the same groups incomparable when compared between regions.
When identifying the main socio‐economic groups of peasant farms specified in clause 1, it is necessary to distinguish one group from another by a set of characteristics that should characterize: a) social relations (hiring, etc.); b) the ratio of forms of employment of labor (agriculture, non‐agricultural trades); and c) quantitative measurement of the capacity of farms by the most important elements (sowing, means of production, income, etc.).
3. The group of “rich” and “prosperous” in the CSO grouping included a significant share of farms in their mass, clearly middle peasants, both in terms of the capacity of farms in terms of means of production and their social characteristics. The exploitative economy must: a) make a significant use of hired labor; b) in modern conditions, widely rent land, mainly based on the use of hired labor; c) to have the means of production that allow the mass use of hiring and rent; d) have income from industries of a capitalist nature (owners of industrial and commercial enterprises, etc.); e) have surpluses converted into capital.
The complete impossibility of classifying the farms allocated by the Central Statistical Administration to the ʺprosperousʺ group as operating farms is revealed if we take into account that the farms classified by the Central Statistical Administration not as medium, but as prosperous, had from 4 to 6 acres in the consuming region, and from 6 acres in the producing up to 10, in the South‐East ‐ from 10 to 16, in Ukraine ‐ from 6 to 10. These farms in the consuming region almost entirely with one head of working cattle, do not employ, in the producing region ‐ mostly with one head of working cattle, in the South ‐ In the East, in conditions of extensive grain farming, requiring a large use of horse traction, on average 2.18 head of working cattle per farm with negligible hiring; in the Ukraine, the majority with one or two heads of working cattle, with a significant proportion of horseless people and a very small number of farms with three or more heads of working cattle.
And in the farms classified in the CSO grouping as ʺrichʺ: farms with approximately 10 to 12 dessiatines sown in the Chernozem region, from 10 to 14 in the northeastern part of the producing belt, from 10 to 20 in the southeastern part of the producing region, from 6 to 8 in the Central industrial region, from 6 to 10 in the rest of the industrial region, from 16 to 20 in the steppe part of the North Caucasus, from 10 to 14 in south‐steppe Ukraine, neither in terms of means of production, nor in social relations , nor in terms of income, in particular, bearing in mind the extensiveness, farms in the southeast of the producing belt, the steppe part of the North Caucasus and the south‐steppe Ukraine, according to the CSO, cannot be classified as exploitative farms.
4. It is necessary to refer to the poor peasants the farms, in their mass, exploited for hire and rent with insignificant means of production (horselessness and lack of cowardice). In these farms (with the exception, relatively to the entire group, of a few industrialists of the capitalist type), as a rule, agricultural income is insufficient to cover the needs of the family; the farm lives to a large extent by selling its labor power in agricultural production and outside agriculture. In a number of regions, fishing incomes prevail, as a rule, over agricultural ones and, as a consequence, the purchase prevails over the sale of the products of their agriculture.
At the same time, the commission notes the emerging trend of a decrease in the share of these farms in all districts, which indicates that a certain share of these farms in the context of a general rise in agriculture, and especially in harvest years, tends to rise and move to higher groups.
5. Between the two extreme groups is the middle peasant group, the bulk of whose farms, as a rule, do not exploit and are not exploited. The middle peasants, as an intermediate group, with one wing adhere to the poor, the other to the exploitative economy. On the one hand, these include farms, although they cover the lack of income from agriculture by means of fishing earnings, but at the same time receive the predominant part of their income from agriculture, selling more products than buying the size and level of agriculture). On the other hand, middle peasants include farms that use such plots of land and own such means of production that “provide, as a general rule, not only the meager maintenance of the family and the farm,27.
These farms are characterized by relatively small fluctuations in income per capita, which is explained by a drop in the relative value of income from intensive forms of livestock raising, non‐grain crops and trades, compared to income from grain crops, from lower sowing groups to higher sowing groups. On the whole, this group, in comparison with the “rich”, is characterized by a comparatively higher value of non‐grain crops and more intensive livestock raising.
The socio‐economic characteristics of the average type, according to the dynamics and the spring survey of 1924, and in the Ukraine in 1925, shows us that the middle peasant farms in an insignificant size (from 0.1 to 2.5%) use the hiring of term workers. A certain exception is Siberia, where the percentage of employers in the extreme upper group is slightly increased, which is explained by specific Siberian conditions. The lease ratio covers from 3 to 25% of farms, and such a percentage can in no way be qualified as an indicator of the massive spread of exploitative leasing, since lease in these farms, as a rule, is not a basis for employing hired labor.
6. In view of all this, it is impossible, on the basis of the groups adopted in the grain‐fodder balance, to judge the distribution of the surplus grain between the main socio‐economic strata of the countryside, which are established in paragraph 1. An attempt to judge the ratio of individual social groups on the basis of the grainfeed balance presented by the CSO distorts the ratio of groups and, in particular, obscures the national economic and political significance of the middle groups.
7. Since the group structure of the grain‐fodder balance should characterize the distribution of surpluses and economic relations of the strata of the peasantry specified in paragraph 1, it is necessary that the groups adopted in the balance correspond to the main socioeconomic groups of the village.
Since it can be judged on the basis of the material available in the CSO, the sowing groupings (giving only average indices for the groups) satisfy the aforementioned characteristics of the poor group in their bulk of the economy, with sowing up to about 2 dessiatines in the consuming region.
Central Black Earth belt, Kuban, Siberia, and forest‐steppe Ukraine, up to 3 desyatinsʺ in the southern steppe Ukraine, the North‐East and up to 4 desyatinsʺ in the southeast of the producing belt and in the North ʺernʺ Caucasus without the Kuban.
Since it can be judged on the basis of the same material, ‐ the characteristics of the middle peasant group are satisfied in their bulk by farms with sowing of about 2 to 8 dessiatines in the MoscowIndustrial Region, from 2 to 10 dessiatines in the rest of the consuming region, from 2 to 12 desyatin> in the Central Black Earth belt, from 3 to 14 desyatinʺ in the northeast of the Central Black Earth belt, from 4 to 20 desyatinʺ in the southeast of the producing region, from 4 to 20 desyatin> in the North <ernom> Caucasus without Kuban, from 2 to 12 desyatin> in Kuban, from 2 to 14 desyatin> in Siberia, from 2 to 10 desyatin> in forest‐steppe Ukraine, from 3 to 14 desyatin> in the southern steppe of Ukraine, which, despite the difference in cultivated areas, are usually typical middle peasant farms.
Farms with a sowing higher than in the previous group satisfy to the greatest extent the aggregate of characteristics that characterize exploiting farms, and here the bulk of exploiting farms in the countryside is found.
8. Considering the conventionality of this approximate distribution of farms into groups, arising from the lack of materials and the impossibility, given the current state of these materials, to fully apply the principles of grouping established in this resolution, instruct the CSB:
a) In order to obtain data sufficient for a firm and accurate distribution of farms into groups, according to both their capacity and social relations, to accelerate the development of dynamic data for 1925, which more fully characterize various economic groups; accelerate the development of dynamic data from previous years; data from the spring survey of 1925 and the budgets for 1924/25, establishing unambiguous groupings for all three types of survey.
b) Revise the breakdown of the USSR territory into districts adopted in the grain‐fodder balance, eliminating the wrong unification by some groups of completely different in direction and type of peasant farms of different districts (Central Industrial Region and the rest of the consuming strip, Central Black Earth, North‐East and South East producing belt, steppe and forest‐steppe part of Ukraine, Kuban, steppes, and foothills of the Northern Caucasus).
III. On the group balance of the purchase and sale of bread.
Since the group grain‐feed balance had the task of providing material on marketable bread by groups, the commission states that the CSOʹs grain‐feed balance cannot serve as a basis for judging the degree of participation of different socio‐economic strata of the peasantry and even different sowing groups in the purchase and sale of grain.
The commission states, on the basis of the CSBʹs calculations for the budgets of 1923‐24, that the farms classified by the CSB as ʺlowpowerʺ and according to the grain and feed balance are shown with a general lack of bread, despite the fact that their purchases exceed sales and that the total harvest they have insignificant, they sell in the amount of 2/5 to half or more of their gross tax.
Farms classified as ʺaverageʺ in the CSO grouping, shown in the grain‐feed balance for the consuming region with a shortage of grain, still sell up to 2/5 of their gross harvest, in other districts from 1/3 to half of the gross harvest. The upper groups, on the other hand, sold bread significantly less than those surpluses, which were calculated by their grain‐feed balance.
For example, applying to the gross harvest of 1925/26 those ratios of the sale of grain to the gross harvest, which are given by the budgets of 1923‐24, gives the following distribution of real sales (sales include exchange):
Farm groups
Real bread sales
Surplus on grain‐feed balance
Low‐power
[27.7123.756
‐
Average
[48.6] 47.8%
46%
Well‐to‐do
[17.0] 16.7%
29%
Rich
[12.6] 11.8%
25%
100%
100%
For all the inaccuracy of these calculations, arising from the incomplete coincidence of the groupings and from the relatively small number of farms covered by the budget study, they reveal the complete unsuitability of the CSO grain‐feed balance for calculating the marketability of different layers of the village in relation to grain. Although, in the final analysis, the purchase of bread from low‐powered breads exceeds the sale of breads, their significant participation in the sale is clearly obscured and glossed over by the method of calculating the grain‐feed balance adopted by the CSO, the participation of the middle strata in the sale of bread is also underestimated and obscured, and, on the contrary, grounds are given for a very significant exaggeration of the role of the upper layers in the sale of bread.
In accordance with this, recognizing the CSBʹs grain‐feed balance as unsuitable for calculating the commodity surpluses of various strata of the peasantry, the CSB propose, along with calculating net surpluses and shortcomings, to calculate the balance of the sale and purchase of grain by groups. To do this, clarify the work on monitoring the timing of the sale and purchase of bread in different groups and accelerate the development of budgets, taking into account the time of drawing up the grain‐feed balance, with the allocation of separate main crops.
IV. On the group balance of all agricultural products.
On the basis of budget data for 1923‐24, the commission states that the active trade balance in relation to all agricultural products, calculated on the basis of comparing all purchases and sales by group, starts with farms with significantly less sowing than is the case for grain alone. For example, in the consuming zone and in part producing (Central Chernozem, Nizhnevolzhsky and Ural districts), for the entire amount of agricultural products, the balance is active in farms with more than 2 dessi ...
In Siberia and Right‐Bank Ukraine, the balance for the entire amount of agricultural. part of the products is active in the farms of the poor, with sowing about 2 dessiatines, while for bread ‐ the balance becomes active in Siberia in farms over 4 dessiatines sown, and in Ukraine ‐ over 2 dessiatines.
Comparing the excess of sales of all agricultural products over purchases with the excess of sales of some breads over purchases by groups adopted by the CSO, the commission states that the role of middle peasant and partly low‐power farms in sales is much higher than it could be concluded for grain surpluses or shortcomings that do not correspond the national economic importance of the lower and middle strata of the peasantry.
To study and assess the role of the main strata of the peasantry, the sale and purchase of agricultural products and to assess the socioeconomic weight of these strata in agricultural production, it is necessary to compare, along with the grain‐feed balance, the overall balance of agricultural products.
V. About the balance of the purchase of manufactured goods and the sale of agricultural products.
Giving the sowing groups a socio‐economic content, it is necessary to weigh not only the balances of trade in terms of the amounts of purchase and sale of all agricultural enterprises. products, and even more so for one grain in different groups of the peasantry, but the ratio of their sales of agricultural. products and the purchase of industrial goods.
According to the budgets of 1923‐24, a comparison of the purchase of industrial goods and the sale of all agricultural products show: first, the correspondence between the total sales of agricultural products. products and income from trades with the consumption of manufactured goods; secondly, the predominant importance of poor and medium‐sized farms in the purchase of manufactured goods.
In view of this, in order to clarify the socio‐economic characteristics of groups of the peasantry, to propose to the Central Statistical Administration to develop a group balance for the purchase of manufactured goods and the sale of agricultural products. products and, accordingly, organize the timely collection and summary of the materials necessary for this.
Vi. About the budget of the CSB.
Since the commission had to find out in what direction and in what way the grounds for group calculations and the calculation of the balance in general could be corrected and improved, and how the work of the CSB should be arranged so that in the future such balance calculations would give well‐grounded conclusions, the commission states that according to most departments of the CSO (current statistics, budgets, nutrition, dynamics) are planned, and also such statistical work is being carried out, which in the future will undoubtedly provide the necessary materials, on the basis of which the reliability of balance calculations in general, and in particular group calculations, will be significantly increased, and the conclusions of such balances will be sufficiently substantiated. All this allows the commission to state that most of the statistical tasks outlined by it, aimed at improving the construction of the balance sheet, to a large extent already included in the CSO program and work plan. But their implementation depends to a large extent on the size of the allocation for statistical work.
In connection with the increase in the importance of planning and regulation issues in the entire national economic life, the work of the Central Statistical Administration is acquiring exceptional importance.
Noting the discrepancy between the funds allocated by the CSO and the tasks that the party and the Soviet government present to the CSO at present; at the same time, noting that in a number of provinces the former zemstvo expenditures on statistics significantly exceed the funds currently allocated for statistical work, while the work program of the CSO, in particular, in connection with the tasks set before the CSO by the commission, significantly broader than the programs of zemstvo and other previously existing statistical works, recognize the need for a radical revision of the budget of the Central Statistical Administration by a special commission of the USSR Council of Peopleʹs Commissars with a report within two weeks.
At the same time, the commission pays special attention to the need to improve the financial situation of the lower statistical apparatus and to provide the provincial central statistical bodies with the necessary staff of specialists.
Appendix 2
Extract from the minutes No. 94 of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) dated December 10, 1925
Listened:
1. About the work of the CSO in the field of grain‐feed balance.
Resolved * (* In the original minutes of the Politburo meeting, the draft resolution was written by V.V. Kuibyshev. (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 521. L. 7‐8.)):
1. a) Agree, basically, with the conclusions of the Board of the NK RFKI USSR on the work of the Central Statistical Administration on the grain‐feed balance.
b) Recognize that the CSO and Comrade Popov, as his leader, made major mistakes in drawing up the grain‐feed balance, which made the balance insufficient for judging either the marketability, or the surplus and shortage of grain, or the economic relations of the main strata of the peasantry.
c) Agree with the decision of the RCI board on the need to replace
Comrade Popov as head of the CSB by another comrade.
d) Instruct Comrade Rykov and Kuibyshev, within two weeks, should find an appropriate candidate and, with the conclusion of the Organizing Bureau, submit it to the Politburo for approval.
e) To propose to the Council of Peopleʹs Commissars of the USSR to appoint an interim manager of the CSB Comrade Pashkovsky.
f) Adopt the following basic directive to the employees of the CSO: keep in mind that the CSO is the most important scientific institution of the Republic, the digital data of which are of paramount importance for the governing bodies of the Republic, that the CSO is required to perform accurate, objective scientific, free from political considerations, that any trying to adjust the numbers to fit a preconceived notion will be considered a criminal offense.
1 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 534. L. 1‐103 (uncorrected transcript); D. 535. L. 1‐142 (transcript with copyright and editorial revision); L. 143‐160 (verbatim report). The meeting was attended by: members of the Politburo ‐ L.B. Kamenev and A.I. Rykov, I.V. Stalin, L.D. Trotsky; candidate members of the Politburo ‐ F.E. Dzerzhinsky, V.M. Molotov, Ya.E. Rudzutak; members of the Central Committee ‐ A.A. Andreev,
K.E. Voroshilov, L.B. Krasin, G.M. Krzhizhanovsky, N.A. Kubyak, G.L. Pyatakov, A.D. Tsyurupa; candidate members of the Central Committee ‐ I.M. Vareikis, S.I. Syrtsov; members of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission ‐ V.V. Kuibyshev, M.F. Shkiryatov,
N.M. Yanson, and also: Ya.A. Yakovlev, F.A. Tsylko, P.I. Popov, S.G. Strumilin.
2 CSB ‐ The Central Statistical Office was created by a decree of the Council of Peopleʹs Commissars of July 25, 1918 under the Council of Peopleʹs Commissars of the RSFSR. In 1923, the department was turned into an allunion body and headed the entire system of state statistics in the country.
3 June 23, 1925 at a meeting of the Council of Peopleʹs Commissars of the USSR, the question “On the state of statistics in the USSR. The plan of work of the Central Statistical Bureau for 1925‐26. On the organization of the all‐Union census. ʺ P.I. Popov. The following resolution was adopted: “a) Postpone the decision of the issue b) Instruct the NC RFL within a month to submit a draft resolution that would cover the activities of the CSB from the point of view of socio‐political, relations with our entire community, from the point of view of the internal structure, conformity of works and statistical data with reality, and a draft of those measures that need to be taken both in the field of organizing the entire statistical apparatus from top to bottom, and in relations with the republican and union peopleʹs commissariats. ʺ (State Archive of the Russian Federation.F. P‐5446. Op. 1.D. 12. L. 248.)
4 ʺEstimated grain feed balance for 1925‐26ʺ was published in the Bulletin of the Central Statistical Administration of the USSR No. 105 of July 21, 1925. The materials of the information department of the Central Committee of the All‐Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks retained a proof‐copy of this publication with corrections and notes. (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 87. D. 100. L. 214‐220.) See Appendix 1.
5 The meeting of the NK RCI Board was held on November 26, 1925. The Board made a decision: “1. The proposals made by the Agricultural Section should be approved in the main. 2) The final version of the proposals should be entrusted to the commission consisting of com. Kuibyshev, Yakovlev and Popov”. (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 87. D. 274. L. 141‐147.) For the final decision of the NK RFK USSR see Appendix 1.
6 Probably, we are talking about the speech of A.I. Rykov with the report ʺReport of the Central Committee of the RCP (b)ʺ at the XIV Moscow provincial party conference in December 1925. In the section ʺThe stratification of the countrysideʺ Rykov used data on the grain‐feed balance for 1925‐1926 (Pravda. 1925, 8, 9th December.)
7 This is an article by Ya.A. Yakovlev ʺOn the balance of the purchase and sale of breadʺ, in which he criticized the prepared by the Central Statistical Administration of the grain‐feed balance for 1925‐1926 and the methods of calculating the marketability of bread. Yakovlev argued that ʺlow‐power and medium‐sized consuming countries, shown with a deficit in the balance, participate so energetically in the real sale of bread that together they account for more than 2/3 of all real sales of bread in this region.ʺ (True. 1925, December 9, p. 3.)
8 This is about the work of V.I. Leninʹs Development of Capitalism in Russia, written in 1896‐1899. and published as a separate book in 1899 by
V.I. Poly. collection op. T. 3.M., 1967.P. 70.
9 Ibid. P. 70.
10 ʺThe national economy of the USSR in figuresʺ. Statistical Yearbook. Published by the Central Statistical Administration of the USSR since 1924
11 This is an article by A.I. Stetsky ʺIs the middle peasant the central figure in the village?ʺ (True. 1925, September 27).
12 ʺEconomic Reviewʺ ‐ a monthly magazine, published in Moscow from 1923 to 1930.
13 See the note to the summary table in Appendix 1.
14 This is a meeting of the Council of Peopleʹs Commissars of the USSR on July 28, 1925, at which the report of N.I. Popov on the state of the harvest. The meeting was attended by: AL. Sheinman (NKVnutorg), M.I. Frumkin (NKVT), A.B. Dressing gowns (NKPS). The resolution was adopted: “Take note of the report”. (GARF.F. P‐5446. Op. 1.D.13. L. 84.)
15 Probably, Kamenev was mistaken in the date, he meant the meeting of the Council of Peopleʹs Commissars of the USSR on July 28, 1925.
16 Kamenev is referring to his preface to the article ʺFundamentals and Prospects of the Grain Procurement Campaign of the 1925‐26 Economic Year (Review of Government Measures)ʺ published in Pravda on August 28, 1925.
17 See Appendix 1, section II ʺOn the groupings adopted in the grain‐feed balanceʺ, paragraph 6.
18 At the beginning of May 1922, at a number of meetings of senior officials of economic organizations, it was decided to create a center in Moscow that would unite the heads of trusts, syndicates, and trade enterprises. On May 16, 1922, the first founding meeting of such a center was held, which was named the Business Club. His activities were funded by contributions from businesses. The club is located on the street. Myasnitskaya. The Business Club gathered communist business executives who shared their experience, received the necessary information in a special reference, economic and scientific library at the club. The club organized reports, lectures, courses on the most important issues of economic life.
19 Probably, we are talking about an article by M.S. Golendoʹs ʺThe Harvest and the Problem of Bread Pricesʺ, published in the newspaper ʺPravdaʺ on August 30, 1925. It, in particular, said: ʺ... The bulk of all surplus (61%) is held by a small group of well‐to‐do peasantry, constituting only 12% of households and 14% of the population”.
20 Plenum of the MK RCP (b) was held on September 4, 5 and 7, 1925 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 16. D. 541. L. 165‐171.) September 4 with a report on the decisions of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) at the plenum, L.B. Kamenev. The report was subsequently published in the newspaper Pravda (September 17 and 18, 1925), as well as in a separate brochure: L. Kamenev. Our achievements, difficulties, and prospects. M.; L., 1925.
21On July 30, 1925, the Politburo adopted the following decision: “a) Recognizing the timely establishment of the directive prices for bread in the Ukraine and the North Caucasus, instruct the STO to establish those based on the existing world prices, taking into account the sales made and their compliance with the plan outlined for the appropriate time frame export. Prices are set for an indefinite period and are subject to change depending on the change in the above conditions, b) Instruct the service station to work out measures and give instructions to the places that ensure the achievement of the prescribed prices given to them and prevent their decrease, c) Take note of the message of Comrade Tsyurupa, etc. Sheinman that the price to be set in accordance with this decision of the BOP for the next period for wheat will not be lower than the ruble, d) Recognize, that the directive price should be set by NKVnutorg on the basis of this decision and the decisions already made by the STO and SNK. e) Along with the expansion of procurements, it is necessary, in all cases when it is possible in settlements with the peasants, that state and cooperative procurers keep prices slightly higher than private procurers since they fall below the directive prices. f) Instruct SRT and NKVnutorg, in the event of a significant drop in comparison with the established directive price, of local prices for bread, to take decisive measures in the form of increasing procurements, improving financing, etc. in order to bring price of bread closer to the established guideline price”. (RGASPI. F. 17.Op. 3. D. 513.
L. 5‐6.)
22 July 30, 1925, having considered the question of the directive prices for bread, the Politburo took note of the message that the price to be set ʺfor the next period for wheat will not be lower than the ruble.ʺ The guideline price was to be set by the Peopleʹs Commissariat for Internal Trade on the basis of this decision of the Politburo. On August 13, 1925, the Politburo made a decision: ʺTo instruct the Peopleʹs Commissariat of Internal Affairs, no later than three days, to submit to the Secretariat of the Central Committee a draft circular on grain prices, agreed with Comrade
Kamenev.ʺ (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3.D. 515. L. 7.)
23 From the report of L.B. Kamenev ʺOur achievements, difficulties and prospectsʺ at the plenum of the MK RCP (b) September 4, 1925 (ʺPravdaʺ. 1925. September 18. S. 3). For the full quote, see the speech of A.I. Rykov.
24 See Appendix 1, section II ʺOn groupings adopted in the grain‐feed balanceʺ, paragraph 7.
25 See Appendix 1, section II ʺOn groupings adopted in the grain‐feed balanceʺ, paragraph 8.
26 The decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of Peopleʹs Commissars of the USSR ʺOn the production of the all‐Union population census in 1926ʺ was adopted on September 3, 1926. The census was scheduled for December 1926.
27 This is about the work of V.I. Leninʹs “Abstracts for the Second Congress of the Communist International. An initial draft of the theses on the agrarian question”. (Lenin V.I. Poln., Collection of works. V. 41.M., 1970. S. 173.)