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  Transcripts from the Soviet Archives VOLUME I  1903-1926   

Informational report of Dzerzhinsky. September 12, 1924

A source: Transcripts of the meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) ‐VKP (b) 1923‐1938. Moscow. ROSSPEN. 2007. Volume 1 1923‐1926. P. 215‐250

Archive: RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 524. L. 1‐50 (uncorrected transcript); L. 51‐115 (copyrighted transcript); L. 116‐128 (verbatim report).

Informational report of Dzerzhinsky.

September 12, 1924 1

IV. GENERAL RESULTS FOR THE WHOLE METAL INDUSTRY

Production of products in thousands of pre‐war rubles by groups of plants

	1923/24	1924/25	% 1924/25 to 1923/24	Number of workers
				1923/24	1924/25	% 1924/25 to 1923/24
Metallurgy         of ferrous metals	78,349	115,643	148	89.265	96.305
Metallurgy of red metals	24,857	41,779	[170] 168	9,765	11,735
Mechanical engineering	62,890	95,113	[149] 151	77,011	85.305
Shipbuilding	6,231	6,923	[101] 111	6,210	6.013
Metal. products	9,337	11.666	125	4.787	5,574
Selmashstr.	13,410	29,686	221	7,004	13,872
Total	195,074	[300,710]   300,810	[154] 155	194,042	[218,810]   218,804	111%

The average output per worker in 1923‐24 was 1006 rubles.

Assumed in 1924/25 ‐ 1374 rubles.

This is the draft of the production program for the metal industry, developed by Glavmetal, but still in need of careful analysis both by the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council and the State Planning Committee and, finally, the Service Station.

Kamenev. In a table that breaks down total production by industry, the industrial recovery in 1923/24 indicates [28] 23 million out of 62, and the next ‐ 30 million out of 95. Why is there so much?

Kalinin. And for Volkhovstroy?

Smilga. Turbines, boilers, and their repair are ordered. Diesel engines, motors are ordered.

Dzerzhinsky. We now turn to the presentation of the draft financial plan presented by Glavmetall.

The financial plan of the metal industry for 1924/25

In 1923‐24, output at pre‐war prices was equal to 195,074,000 rubles, while in chervonnye [334,638,000] 339,638,000, i.e., the rise in price was [1.72] 1.74.

In 1924/25, the expected output in pre‐war rubles is [300,710,000] 300,810,000 rubles, in chervonnye it will be expressed in [454,703,000] 457,049,000 rubles, i.e., the rise in price will drop to 1.52, i.e., by [12] 13%.

The reduction in price in fact during 1924‐25 should be even more significant, since when drawing up the plan, they proceeded from the cost price already achieved and partly verified according to the reporting data of the South, and did not take into account the forthcoming decline in prices for raw materials (ore) and fuel procured outside of metallots. and also, not taken into account the now raised campaign to increase labor productivity 9, which in the metal industry, as can be seen from the indicators, is especially low.

[I have a document ‐ correspondence with Comrade Chubar about Kr ... * (* Probably means Krivoy Rog) concession. Comrade Chubar replied that the Council of Peopleʹs Commissars of Ukraine and the PB are resolutely against this concession, that the ore this year will cost 8 kopecks. against the pre‐war 6‐7 kopecks, we take 10.5 kopecks in the calculation].

The plan was based on the price of the ultimate pig iron at 95 kopecks. against the current 1 rub. 25 kopecks, (i.e., 24%, reduction). At this base price, other metal products will be sold at the following prices:

	The current prices	We assume that in 1924/25	Rise             rate 1924/25 against 1913	Ratio of rise in   current prices
Pig iron	1 p. 25 r.	0 p. 95 r.	1.58	2.08
Foundry cast iron	1 p. 35 r.	1 p. 05 r.	1.61	2.07
Varietal	2 p. 50 k.	2 p. 00 k.	1.50	2.00
Roofing foundations. III p.	3 p. 60 k.	2 p. 90 r.	1.52	1.92
Nails	4 p. 50 k.	3 p. 75 k.	1.95	2.36
Rails	2 p. 12 r.	2 p. 00 k.	1.70	1.90
Rolled wire	2 p. 50 k.	2 p. 00 k.	1.59	2.00
Drawn wire	3 p. 85 r.	Zr. 15 r.	‐	‐

Of the production in [4551 457 million rubles. about 57 million rubles will remain in the internal turnover between metal trusts, the rest of the products for 400 million rubles. it is supposed to be sold.

It should be added that the price in the Urals could actually be much cheaper, because there the cost of pig iron, with the corresponding expected load, is 85 kopecks. But it is clear that we cannot set one price for the Urals and another for the South at the same time. That would mean killing the South.

This decline that we have is a huge decline. And this will give the Urals the opportunity to rise somewhat themselves, for the Urals must prepare for a fierce struggle ‐ competition with the South. So here, so to speak, the difference in his favor is temporary and necessary in order for him to strengthen himself.

With proper lending to consumers from the metal industry and the metal industry from banks, as well as ensuring payments from state customers (NKPS, Voenved, GUVP), the sale of these products in 400 million rubles. can be considered quite well‐off, and with further achievements in reducing prices, the planned production will certainly be insufficient if the countryʹs demand for metal is taken into account. According to the special work of the SEU VSNKh, very careful, painstaking, and thorough, the market capacity in 1924/25 for metal products, not counting the orders of the NKPS and Voenved, was determined at 267 million chervonny rubles, and together with these orders over 406 million rubles. (orders from NKPS for 118 million rubles and Voenveda for 21 million rubles). According to the work of Glavmetall and the convention of syndicates, the market capacity without NKPS and Voenved is estimated at 342 million chervonny rubles.

Glavmetall presents the following financial plan figures for 1924/25 compared to 1923/24 for the entire metal industry:

	General estimated			In cash
	Consumption	Coming	Deficit	Consumption	Coming	Deficit
1923/24 g.	389314	343549	45765	389314	343549	45765
1924/25 g.	566273	519040	47233	524690	473082	51608

The sources for covering this deficit should be:

1.  Subsidies ‐ a subsidy in the amount of 42 million rubles, requested by Glavmetal, against the SNK target of 34 million rubles.

2.  Further transformation of illiquid parts of the circulating fund into liquid ones.

3.  Long‐term lending.

4.  Not fully repayable advances under long‐term contracts.

Budgetary financing of the metal industry

	1922‐1923 g.
	Lesion	For conservation	To replenish funds	Capital expenses	TOTAL
1. Metallurgy	9261	1954	571	11588	23374 1)
2. General mechanical engineering	1021	567	274	8229	10091 2)
3. Shipbuilding	456	‐	‐	fourteen	470
4. Hardware	‐	4	240	29	273
5. Selmash	1000	667	‐	1000	2667
Total	11738	3192	1085	20860	36875

Notes:

1)  Including in the Urals ‐ 8769 t. Rubles.

Including in the South ‐ 11,637 thousand rubles.

2)  Including for Gomza ‐ 5992 thousand rubles.

To the total amount of subsidies, 36,875 must be added: 724 ‐ State funds and 170 tons. various. In total for 1922/23 ‐ 37,764 tons of ind. *. (* so, in the document) rub.

	1923‐1924 g.
	Lesion	For conservation	To replenish funds	Capital n. expenses	TOTAL
1. Metallurgy	1949	2869	4927	7176	16911 1)
2.               General mechanical engineering	2737	491	2700	6210	12138 2)
3. Shipbuilding	80	209	‐	263	552
4. Hardware	46	‐	144	50	240
5. Selmash	‐	450	‐	1550	2000
Total	4812	4019	777 /	15239	З1841 3)

Notes:

1)  Including the Urals ‐ 8128 tons. and Yugostal ‐ 7360 tons.

2)  Including Gomza ‐ 6400 tons.

3)  Plus, the special purpose of 159 tons of rubles, but not taking into account the 2.2 million rubles specially released to the Putilov plant, as well as the STO‐Gomze released in September in excess of the plan of 1.1 million rubles.

	1924‐1925
	Lesion	For conservation	To replenish funds	Capital expenses	TOTAL
1. Metallurgy	670	2079	‐	6628	9377
				(13628)	(16377) 1)
2.General mechanical engineering	5709	1124	‐	9298	16131
				(9798)	(16631)
3. Shipbuilding	1172	296	1500	475	3443
			(2000)		(3943)
4. Hardware	‐	‐	‐	345	345
5. Selmash	‐	178	500	2525	3203
Total	7551	3677	2000	19271	32499
			(2500)	(26771)	(40499)
1. Reserve for special purposes					1501
Total					34000

Note:

1) Figures in brackets ‐ with an allocation of 42,000 tons.

Comparison of the current year with the future shows: 1) a decrease in the subsidy for conservation, 2) a decrease in subsidies for replenishment of working capital, 3) an increase in capital expenditures with a specific purpose, 4) over 3 years, subsidized financing of metallurgy is planned in decreasing order, and mechanical engineering ‐ ascending.

Distribution of the subsidy according to the target figure of 34 million and the required bank loan from the trusts (1924‐1925)

Name of trusts	Lesio n	Conservati on	Replenished. wor king capital	Capit al. costs.	TOTA L	Bankovs k. turnove r
Yugostal	670	1500	‐	1500	3670	45250
Ural	‐	311	‐	3478	3789	52800
North. Vyatsk. e nv.	‐	28	‐	‐	28	1350
Gozachugplav	‐	‐	‐	50	50	2800
Elektrostal	‐	‐	‐	100	100	480
Izhornod	‐	180			180	1800
Red October	‐	‐	‐	300	300	1750
	670	2019	‐	5428	8117
Gospromtsvet	‐	‐	‐	‐	‐	3500
Uralmed	‐	60	‐	1200	1260	‐
		60	‐	1200	1260

 

Gomzy	4522	360	‐	2878	7760	17600
Yuzhmashtrest	‐	194	‐	1000	1194	5020
Leninmashtrest	1187	327	‐	1300	2814	7000
Mosmashtrest	‐	243	‐	380	623	10210
State sewing machine	‐	‐	‐	40	40	, 1000
Zugaz	‐	‐	‐	3000	3000	‐
Tsupvos	‐	‐	‐	‐	‐	400
Maltz. comb.	‐	‐	‐	700	700	9890

 

	5709	1124	‐	9298	16131
Sudotrest	1172	296	1200	300	2968	2100
Sevmorzavod	‐	‐	300	175	475	1000
Sudostroy	‐	‐	‐	‐	‐	‐
	1172	296	1500	475	3443
Red Etna	‐	‐	‐	‐	‐	710
3‐d named after Lenin	‐	‐	‐	100	100	500
Tremass	‐	‐	‐	100	100	1150
Armatrest	‐	‐	‐	75	75	1000
Tochmeh	‐	‐	‐	‐	‐	1875
Optical h.‐d.	‐	‐	‐	‐	‐	175
Banner of labor	‐	‐	‐	‐	‐	900
3‐d them. Vl. Il.	‐	‐	‐	‐	‐	500
3‐d Ilyich	‐	‐	‐	‐	‐	800
Max Geltz	‐	‐	‐	50	50	‐
Mast. exact. approx.	‐	‐	‐	20	20	‐
				345	345
Ukrtrest	‐	178	500	1225	1903	15000
Sosa	‐	‐	‐	100	100
Pavlovsk. and Artinsk.	‐	‐	‐	100	100
Other	‐	‐	‐	1100	1100

Sami trusts and interested Ural Mountains and south seek grant to a much larger scale, namely Yugostal 10 .. ‐ 10 mln, Ural ‐ 10 million

        371       thousand,      Gomza      accordance      with       Glavmetallom,

Leninmashtrest ‐ 5 million YUMT 11 about 2 Mill.

As for the bank loan, the cited figure for the bank turnover is 220 million rubles. justify the trade data of the last period, which show that out of the total turnover of the metal industry in the amount of about 430 million rubles. (with sales between trusts) about 71‐72% will be sold for promissory notes. about 220 million (excluding planned customers for open accounts).

Glavmetalʹs study of consumers and their creditworthiness shows that lending will be broken down into the following headings:

1.	Short term 2‐4 months	RUB 92 million
2.	Long‐term (6‐9 m.) For bills accounting	RUB 100 million
3.	Podtovarnoe (6‐9 m.)	RUB 20 million
4.	Special industrial courts	6‐8 million rubles.
RUB 220 million

The calculation of debt (credit) made by Glavmetal gives:

1.  Debt under the first type of lending is 22 million rubles.

2.  For the second type of lending, debt 58 million rubles.

3.  For the third type of lending, the debt is 12 million rubles.

4.  For the fourth type of lending, the debt is 6‐8 million rubles.

Total: RUB 100 million

That is, the debt as of October 1, 1924 reaches approximately 30 million, and the additional debt, which should be during 1924‐25, will be expressed in 70 million rubles.

Thus, in order to fulfill the sales program, it is necessary, according to the Glavmetallʹs plan, for the metal industry to have, on October 1, 1925, a bank loan for 100 million rubles. These colossal requirements are hardly within the power of the state, and therefore the entire plan of Glavmetal requires even more severe verification by the Supreme Council of the National Economy, the State Planning Commission, and the Service Station.

I must say that wages, in comparison with those planned for the program last year, are actually 20 percent more this year. It is supposed to increase by 30 percent against the 1923‐24 program, and by 10‐12% against the existing one.

When drawing up the financial plan, Glavmetall determined the salary fund based on the level of recent months with an increase of 10‐12%. Thus, the average salary and employee working together is increased by 30% compared to software 1923/24 (against actual 1012%) in the future year, reaching a maximum value at the exact mechanics mills 70 ‐ 72 rubles. and in the automotive industry 80 rubles, ranging from 40 to 60 in mechanical engineering and going down to 19 and 29 in the Urals and the Urals.

Depending on this, the proportion of wages in the cost of goods was changed, in the plan of Glavmetall ‐ in the 1923/24 program, the salary was 25%, and in the 1924/25 program ‐ 29%.

I think that here the State Planning Commission, which will consider this program, should in no way agree that the share of wages should increase due to an increase in the cost of products, it should increase, but not due to an increase in the cost of products [the increase cannot be greater 25%.], But by increasing labor productivity.

On the other hand, wage charges have been reduced: in 1923‐24 they were equal to 30% or more, in the 1924‐25 program they were adopted from 18 to 20%.

Glavmetall gives the following table of the ratio of wages and labor productivity throughout the metal industry, with the stipulation that the calculations cannot claim to be accurate:

	Salary, % of pre‐war.	Productivity, % of pre‐war
1922/23 g.	45	28
1923/24 g	61	45
1924/25 g.	70	55

It seems to me that the salary figures are [certainly] exaggerated. I donʹt think they will have reached 61% of the pre‐war wages.

Kalinin. This is quite possible, especially with services.

Dzerzhinsky. There         is             only       cash       salary. As            regards                 labor productivity, the figures are undoubtedly exaggerated. I bet that 45% of this year is exaggerated, and I bet that when we look at the production plan for 1925/26, we will certainly outstrip 55% in our campaign to raise labor productivity.

Let me now turn to the report on the activities of the commission itself. And I make a reservation that although there are members of the commission here, I did not have time to agree on everything with them, so if there is any gag, it will be revealed during the report.

Report on the activities of the Politburo Commission on the metal industry

The commission was formed by the decision of the Politburo of March 20 in connection with the memorandum of comrade Rudzutaka on the uselessness of locomotive construction. The initial composition of the commission: Dzerzhinsky, Krzhizhanovsky, Rudzutak, Sokolnikov, Kuibyshev and Dogadov. Then the commission was replenished by Mantsev and Ilyin and, finally, by the resolution of the Politburo on June 3 ‐ Lepse, Sudakov, Tolokontsev, Chubar, Lobov and Sulimov 12.

The cumbersomeness of the commission, the employment of its members, and then the party congress 13 and vacations ‐ did not allow the commission itself to come to grips with and solve very complex and intricate problems of the metal industry, which, however, could not be resolved in such a short time compared to the task. The commission has not yet completed its work. What remains is the consideration of the production and financial program for 1924/25, which is now being considered by the State Planning Committee and only after this consideration can it be submitted to the commission.

Therefore, I must add and state that the Politburo resolution, which read: ʺTo oblige all members of the commission to devote maximum time, effort and energy to solve this problemʺ 14, unfortunately, remained only in the resolution.

The work of the commission was expressed in five plenary sessions and a series of conferences on partial issues under my and comrades Krzhizhanovsky, Mantsev and Ilyinʹs chairmanship.

The entire severity and complexity of solving the problems of the metal industry comes down to the following reasons: 1) the high cost of production and the need for huge working capital due to the capacity of factories that do not meet the real needs and resources of the country, and therefore the low load of factories; 2) nonpayments of the main government customers ‐ NKPS, Military and Naval departments; 3) resistance of the NKPS to steam locomotive construction and, at the same time, the impossibility of closing factories; 4) the absence in the country, due to a lack of funds, construction work, both communal and railway; 5) the insolvency of the population, which is in great need of metal products and can only buy when arranging a broad loan, and 6) insufficient lending to the metal industry and its consumers. In addition, the metal industry faces a number of questions, not yet permitted, both in the organization of production and labor, and in labor productivity. Until now, in the metal industry, due to all these reasons, the untimely payment of wages, which is paid, as a rule, with a huge delay, has not been eliminated, which causes disorganization in production itself and in all management and management of the metal industry.

Under such conditions, the elimination of which does not depend only on desire, the metal problem cannot be quickly resolved. The severity and complexity of the problem dictate, however, the need to focus all the Partyʹs attention on it and to direct the best party workers and specialists to work on metal to help and strengthen those already working. If it is necessary, and this is indisputable, to push the metal industry forward, to give it the opportunity to stand on strong legs, then it is necessary to give all departments a tough directive that they must unconditionally and unconditionally fulfill the obligations they have assumed or the obligations imposed on them by the party and the government in relation to the metal industry. in the first place, even to the detriment of their own current interests. For now, in relation to metal, almost all departments do not fulfill their obligations.

These organizational issues must be resolved immediately after the approval of the production program for 1924/25, which will most likely coincide with my return from vacation.

The main issues considered by the commission at its meetings;

1.  The production program of the metal industry for 1923/24 and its financing.

This program, according to the report of the State Planning Commission, was considered by the commission on April 22, and according to the commissionʹs report, it was approved by the STO on May 7, 1924 15, i.e., in the 8th month of the year (see my report to the Politburo on May 18, 1924) 16

2.  Permission to repair in 1923/24 at the VSNKh factories, in addition to the program approved by 7 / V, another 117 steam locomotives, already disassembled at the plant.

The Commission agreed, the STO approved on August 29. The approval came when all the locomotives had already been completed and handed over, but the money had not yet been received.

3.  Possibility of increasing railway tariffs to increase the income of the NKPS, as the main consumer of metal.

This question arose when considering the NKPS steam locomotive program, i.e. The NKPS indicated that he had nothing to pay with. The question was referred to the State Planning

Committee. Allowed as follows: from October 1, the passenger tariff increases by 7% (setting the payment per kilometer in the same amount as for a mile [this is a kind of trick]). With regard to the freight tariff, the State Planning Committee has worked out a regulation on an increase, with the exception of grain and fuel. It was considered in the STO, has already been reviewed and approved.

4.  Five‐year shipbuilding program developed by Glavmetal and TsUMor 17.

After many rather stormy meetings with representatives of all factories and departments [I was left alone at one meeting, where there were more than 100 people, and where only Mantsev supported me, everyone else was against it.], At a meeting of the commission, this program was unanimously rejected as not having any financial base. I must say that this unrealistic shipbuilding program, on the preparation and discussion of which a lot of time, effort and money was spent, was thoughtlessly published by Glavmetal. It whetted appetites in an unheard‐of way, since the brochure says where, who, how many ships will be received for the construction and the amount of money that is supposed to be given out for this construction to individual factories. [So, this is a repetition of the agricultural exhibition, it will cost not 120 million, but all 500 million.] But this program, formally calculated for 129 million rubles, would actually cost several hundred million rubles.

5.  Shipbuilding program for 1924/25 and the end of 1923/24

The issue was worked out in a special subcommittee chaired by Comrade Ilyin.

Since the shipyards are in dire straits, we have drawn up a program for one‐year 1924/25 [in order to preserve these factories for at least one year.]

The commission mainly adopted the report of Comrade Ilyina, having outlined the minimum shipbuilding program for 1924/25 at 18,947 thousand rubles, and admitted that of which 15,000 thousand rubles. must release the state in the form of either direct appropriations or loans. The Commission recognized the need to preserve shipyards in the following areas:

a)  North ‐ in Leningrad *. (* I personally raise the question of the Leningrad shipyards, the question of their concentration in one factory. It will be painful, but otherwise we will not get out of this situation. orders, the Leningrad group will have to be concentrated in one plant.] (documents note).

b)  South ‐ in Nikolaev and Sevastopol.

c)   Kolomenskoye and Sormovskoye factories for river shipbuilding.

In addition, the Commission decided to apply through the State Planning Commission to the STO with a proposal to allocate the necessary loans to shipyards this year to prevent complete disruption of work at these plants. Comrade Commission Ilyina calculated these necessary loans in the amount of up to 5 million rubles, the STO allocated, however, by a decree of August 29, only 1.4 million rubles. Leningrad Sudotrest 18 on account of the 1924/25 subsidy, so that the money would be issued by September 15 and that the payment of wages to the Sudotrest workers was ensured by September 7 (Narkomfin paid 350,000 on September 6‐8).

With regard to the entire shipbuilding program, SNK and STO released 5 million rubles. for commercial shipbuilding, defining (STO decree on September 10, 19) as an indicative and preliminary program for 1924/25 of commercial shipbuilding and ship repair at the VSNKh factories in the amount of 10.5 million rubles, including the sum allocated by the SNK 5 million rubles the military shipbuilding program has not yet been reviewed.

Here I must digress somewhat from the report and report on the situation with the shipyards in Leningrad and Nikolaev. The situation in Nikolaev is such that for a long period of time work was going on there on the military vessels ʺCorfuʺ and ʺChervonna Ukraineʺ. And although the Maritime Department did not receive funds for this work, it managed this work in such a way that this year the Maritime Departmentʹs debt reached 2,033 thousand rubles.

As for the Leningrad factories, due to the fact that the work has practically stopped almost completely, they have to be maintained without having the funds for this. All the funds at their disposal went to pay wages. Now they have to disband more than 4,000 workers, both at the Putilov shipyard and at the Baltic shipyard, which, with the reduction of the naval shipbuilding program, was transferred to us from the military group to the Sudotrest group with large debts. (The naval shipbuilding program was increased at the beginning of the year due to German events) 20. Here we have to decide the question of how to be.

You have had and read a number of telegrams on this issue. [ Glavmetall submitted a request to report to the Politburo for further direction the following proposal: “To recognize it as impossible, etc. (Is reading).]

[I must add to this that] It turns out, according to the report of Glavmetall, the allocated 5 million rubles. for the program approved by the STO in the amount of 10.5 million rubles. are not real, because in order to use this money, preparatory work will have to be carried out until March, the workers will have to be dismissed or kept out of work until March. [This is reasonable and absolutely correct. The work that can be provided, with which the workers can be occupied, is completion, this is a simpler job that does not require drawings.

As for the issue of the merchant fleet, this issue was examined by a special commission of the STO, which spoke out against a five‐year program of 350 million tons (they defended 700 million tons). They donʹt even have a plan for one steamer.]

It is impossible now to start building a merchant fleet according to any program, for there is no real plan even for one steamer ‐ drawings and all preliminary preparations. And the situation of the Leningradskie and Nikolayevsk plants really [in this respect is more terrible] turned out to be hopeless. For them, the existence of the plant is their whole life, and they have clung to everything that was possible so that the plant continued to work and exist.

What Glavmetal is now proposing, in terms of its value expression, coincides with what was proposed by the High Government Commission. We offered to give another 5 million this year. Now Glavmetall is asking, in addition to the 1.4 million allocated to Sudotrest, another 2,033 thousand in connection with Morvedʹs debt for the Nikolaev plant, i.e., only 3 million 433 thousand rubles. instead of 5 million. We asked for the entire shipbuilding program for 1924/25 ‐ 18 947 thousand, Glavmetal is now asking 18 965 thousand [ Therefore, out of 19 million it was assumed that the state should pay 15 million; we asked for 15 and 5‐20 million; 2 million out of 8 could be carved out of consumer households. In general, our program coincides with the program offered by Glavmetall.]

Today this issue must be resolved. It is necessary to decide whether to close these factories, or really urgently through the State Planning Committee to revise the decision of the STO of September 10.

Now I turn to the steam locomotive program.

6. Locomotive building program for 1924/25

This question, which met with tremendous resistance from the NKPS, was previously worked out in a subcommittee chaired by Comrade Ilyin. Report Comrade Ilyin was approved by the commission, and the program of the new steam locomotive building was defined in 161 steam locomotives, i.e., the same number as in 1923/24, with the condition, however, that their structure should be concentrated in no more than 6 factories. The cost of this order is 12 million 709 thousand rubles.

Here I must dwell on the steam locomotive program, because here very interesting data were discovered in the work of

Comrade Ilyin. It turns out that according to the program planned by the State Planning Committee, not the entire State Planning Committee, but its Transport Section, the steam locomotive program was built on the assumption that we would reach the prewar cargo turnover in 1941. Comrade Ilyin proved with absolute clarity that such a pessimistic prospect is not justified on anything, that the calculation taken by the State Planning Committee of the annual increase in freight turnover instead of 425 million poodversts ‐ the actual increase for 1922/23 compared to 1921/22 ‐ 166 million ‐ artificially understated, and that such calculations cannot be assumed. According to Comrade Ilyin, the pre‐war cargo turnover could have been accepted by 1930, but due to the caution of Comrade Ilyin moved this freight turnover to 1931/32. When calculating the required number of steam locomotives, Ilyin accepted the most optimistic assumptions about the use of these steam locomotives, namely in connection with their power, accepted their work 20% higher than the pre‐war and thus assumed that the pre‐war number of steam locomotives determining the number of steam locomotives, we will reach only in 1934 / 35 g. And it turned out that with such a very moderate calculation, by 1934/35 a total of 6,000 steam locomotives would have to be built, starting from 1931/32. Therefore, if no steam locomotives were built before this year, then the steam locomotives were exhausted by 1928/29, and it would have been necessary to start building in 1931/32. In the first year, it would have been necessary to build 1130 steam locomotives, in the second ‐ 1180; in the 3rd ‐ 1200; in the 4th ‐ 1230; in the 5th ‐ 1250. It is absolutely clear that such a program would mean the destruction of our transport by 1930/31, [when it was difficult for them to produce 100 steam locomotives].

In our commission, except for the NKPS, which proposed a program of 20‐50 steam locomotives ...

Pravdin. We donʹt need one!

Dzerzhinsky. And in 1928, maybe you wonʹt need railways?! [This was considered by the High Government Commission, where Krasovsky was present, who was silent all the time, as he took water into his mouth, because Ilyin had his wings.

Then the steam locomotive repair program for 1924/25. As I said, we offered to actually stop the repair, and instead of 329 units we left 53.]

7.     locomotive program for 1924‐25, the

It was considered expedient to reduce the repair of steam locomotives at the VSNKh factories as much as possible, leading the line to a complete halt. Therefore, only those 53 steam locomotives that are at the factories were left for repair. The Podolsk steam locomotive repair plant was deemed appropriate to transfer to the NKPS. In 1923‐24, the VSNKh factories repaired 329 steam locomotives. The cost of repairing 53 steam locomotives is 1,484 thousand rubles.

8.     The car‐repair program for 1924‐25, the

The Commission adopted a program of 900 budgetary passenger carriages, i.e., 4‐axle cars of the 3rd class, against 625 passenger cars and 1582 freight cars in 1923/24. The cost of repairing 900 cars is 9 million rubles.

9.     Works 1922/23, additional equipment, etc.

In addition, for the completion of work in 1923/24 and various additional equipment for steam locomotives, for the end of the ferry of the Ryazan‐Ural railway, for the boilers ‐ the commission adopted a program in the amount of 8,880 thousand rubles.

In total, the program for items 6, 7, 8 and 9 was approved for the amount of RUB 33,171,800. against 35 million in 1923/24, according to the plan approved by the STO on May 7, 1924.

10.  Program of NKPS requirements for metal products in 1924/25

On August 15, the commission received from the NKPS estimates, in which the requirements of the NKPS for metal products for the railways for 1924/25, according to the long‐term plan for the restoration of the transport economy, were determined at 23 674 thousand poods. in the amount of 114,800,000 rubles, and, however, based on the total control figure of expenditures according to the NKPS estimate, determined by the SNK at 790 million rubles, railway orders were limited by the NKPS to 17,220,600 poods. in the amount of 79,866,000 rubles.

At a meeting of the same commission on September 1, representatives of the NKPS, this figure was reduced to 56 million rubles. with the motivation that the cost estimate of 790 million is exaggerated, that there will not be an income of 780 million provided for by the target figure, and that therefore the cost estimate for metal products should be lowered.

I will show you below what estimates and what revenue can be expected for next year.

The commission could not agree with this and recognized that the amount of 79,866 thousand proposed by the NKPS itself on August 15 should be considered as the minimum, and the order for rails in no way could be lower than 1923/24.

[We have heard many times that we will not be able to use the new steam locomotives due to the weakness of the rails and sleepers, but the rails and sleepers have withstood many tests. Locomotives with these rails and sleepers are quite usable.]

In addition, the minimum demand for metal products from Tsurek and Tsumor is set at 3,889,703 rubles.

Thus, the entire order of the NKPS of the metal industry, if we include here the need for electrical materials determined by the NKPS itself in the amount of 1,840 thousand rubles, will be determined for 1924/25 at 118,767,503 rubles.

In 1923/24, the entire order, according to the plan approved by the STO on May 7, was determined at the amount of 104 million rubles.

This year, a proposal was agreed with the NKPS, in the event of a reduction in the cost of metal products, accordingly, increase the order so that orders for the metal industry are given for the entire amount of money provided for by the plan.

11. Tractor construction.

I forgot to point out regarding tractors. At one of its meetings, the military‐industrial complex accepted a proposal to enter the service station through the State Planning Commission to prohibit the import of tractors from abroad. I must say that here we have suffered a [complete] defeat, in connection [ with the need for a quick import (50 brought tractors have found great approval among the population)] with poor crops in the South‐East and the need for quick help. The service station allowed the import of 1000 tractors from abroad. Our tractor building program, which has not yet been considered by the service station, envisages about 2,600 tractors worth from 7 to 12 million rubles.

12.  Target prices for metal, fuel, and ore.

The commission on this issue, which attaches major importance, elected a special subcommittee chaired by Comrade Mantseva, who gave the directive to clarify the prices for Donetsk coal and ore, as determining the price of pig iron and all metal products, in order to fix them as planned, so that they were either at the level of the actual cost price, or the cost that could be achieved in short term based on expansion and rationalization of production and increase in consumption. The Commission believed that the issue of lowering prices for metal, by making ore and coal cheaper, was so important that it found it possible that the deficit, which could temporarily occur from lower prices for ore and coal, would be covered by state subsidies. These prices, after the report of the commission comrade. Mantsev, outlined by the commission ‐ for ore at 9 kopecks. [specially developed and adopted] is determined by the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the National Economy at 17.5 kopecks. 16 are planned and 19 are commercial.

This issue must still be considered in the State Planning Committee, and only then the prices for metal and metal products will be finally established.

In the draft production program for 1924/25, Glavmetall assumes the price of cast iron at 95 kopecks, instead of the current 1 ruble. 25 kopecks, i.e., with a decrease of 24%.

13.  Oil pipeline from Grozny to the Black Sea.

Having heard the detailed report of the mining director, the commission decided to support the carefully worked out and wellgrounded proposal of comrade Kossiora from Grozneft, who, for all other things, can give a large load to metal plants. STO on August 28, according to the report of the State Planning Commission, recognized the construction of the oil pipeline as economically feasible and desirable and recognized the possibility of an immediate order for the metal industry of pipes and equipment in the sizes and according to the plan, which should be developed by the State Planning Commission. The construction of the oil pipeline is designed for a 4‐year period and the estimated costs are up to 25 million, with the consumption of iron and pipes up to 2.7 million poods, including the construction of the plants planned in the program, iron and pipes will be required up to 8‐9 million poods. 14. Revealing the market capacity for metal products.

On behalf of the Commission, the apparatus of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, under the leadership of

Comrade Sokolovsky (I must recommend this Sokolovsky here: he is a former Menshevik, but now working on lowering prices and calculating very successfully [much better than any Bolshevik]. The entire campaign that was carried out in this area owes much to this Sokolovsky) there is a lot of work in this area, which has not been done by anyone yet. The commission heard an extensive report by Comrade Sokolovsky on September 1. The commission postponed its judgment by the time of hearing the production and financial plan for 1924/25.

The main findings and data of this work are as follows:

Demand for metal for 1924/25 state industry:

1.	Oil	about	35.2	RUB million
2.	Coal	‐	9.8	‐
3.	Mining	‐	7.8	‐
4.	Sugar	‐	9.0	‐
five.	Textile	‐	22.0	‐
6.	Electrotechnical	‐	4.5	‐
7.	Metal	‐	11.5	‐
8.	GUVP	‐	1.8	‐
nine.	Chemical	‐	3.6	‐
ten.	Paper	‐	0.8	‐
eleven.	Silicate	‐	1.8	‐
12.	Peat	‐	0.8	‐
thirteen.	Leather	‐	0.45	‐
fourteen.	Food	‐	1.25	‐
fifteen.	Various	‐	6.5	‐
	Total		117	RUB million
sixteen.	Import		fifteen	RUB   million	Import of products that we cannot manufacture
	Total		132	RUB million

Of the 117 million rubles, the share of domestic production, about 10% will fall on the share of orders transferred to local industry, i.e., orders for the industrial group for the main metal industry will be expressed in a total of about 105 million rubles.

Broad market need:

17.	Through cooperation of all kinds	about	58	RUB million
eighteen.	Through Gubtorgi	‐	12	‐
19.	Through the private market	‐	fifteen	‐
20.	Komkhoz	‐	fifteen	‐
21.	S.‐household. cars	‐	48	‐
	Total	‐	148	RUB million

Of these 148 million rubles. the share of the main metal industry will account for 109‐110 million rubles, the local industry ‐ 26‐27 million rubles. and abroad (import of agricultural implements) ‐ 12 million rubles.

If we add to this the consumption of NKPS in the amount of 118.7 million rubles, for shipbuilding about 10 million and the need of Voenved and Morved in the amount of about 11 million rubles, then the entire volume of consumption of metal and products in 1924/25 is determined in the amount of about 419.7 million rubles, of which the share falling on the main metal industry will be determined at 354.7 million rubles.

I have to say about the methods of this work. It was primarily a consumer questionnaire. Then the convening of meetings for each industry with a check on the calculation data. It was a [ bloody] huge, painstaking work that began in late April and was not completed until September 1.

Thus, the calculated demand must be added up to 10%, taking into account the necessary margin for the incompleteness of the considered applications and the inevitable expansion of sales with the upcoming decrease in metal prices. Thus, all consumption in the share of the main metal industry can be determined at 389 million rubles.

A distinctive feature characterizing the market capacity of the main metal industry in the period 1922 / 23‐1924 / 25 is a firmly expressed tendency towards a steady increase in the role of the consumer market due to the decline in the role of the main planned consumer and while maintaining a stable role of industrial consumption.

At a time when the proportion of planned consumption, according to the estimates of Comrade. Sokolovsky, falls over these three years from 53% to 35%, and the share of industry remains almost at the same level (29‐32%) during this time, at the same time the share of the consumer market increases from 15 to 30%. (I must say that these data differ somewhat from those included by Glavmetal in the program of the metal industry, but I am presenting here the work of Comrade Sokolovsky.) The role of cooperation in the sale of metal products and iron, which was absolutely insignificant in 1922‐23, now occupies quite a a prominent position in the turnover of the broad market, and in 1924/25 a significant increase in turnover with cooperation is expected.

The implementation of the entire planned consumption plan should require some state support in terms of lending to the main consumers of the metal industry: cooperatives in the amount of about 7 million rubles, agriculture about 18 million rubles, utilities about 11 million rubles, industrial consumers about 35 million rubles, and a total of about 69 million rubles, of which 35 million rubles. refers to a long‐term loan, and 34 million to a short‐term loan.

Here are the main findings and conclusions of this work. They are still to be discussed both in the press and in the State Planning Committee when considering the production program for 1924/25. The representative of the State Planning Commission, engineer Hartman, recognizing the accounting method as correct, believes that demand will be greater and a sharp jump in the growth of demand may result due to the depletion of those hidden reserves, of which the military industry, and transport, and the whole industry in general, have additionally satisfied their needs up to the present time.

Further, in my report, I must mention about the dispute that has flared up between trusts and districts over government subsidies. In this respect, I must say that I personally have not observed or seen the state approach either from the localities or from the trusts. I am talking about the dispute that Comrade Clearing first started and is now being continued by Comrade Medvedev and [ which has now been postponed] the Central Committee of the CP (b) U 21... Bitter experience, practice showed me that representatives of trusts want to tear up instead of establishing their own business, and the regions are covering them. For example, why can the Urals now operate relatively so cheaply? Because he drove colossal money into logging, contrary to the program that was approved here. And the Urals sent telegrams month after month: ʺWage arrears are so many million.ʺ [Because he drove this money there.] What is happening in the

South? How much money [was] spent on the equipment of the [obsolete]plant Yuzovka, equipped the unintended program, and at the same time from there and from there constant telegrams about non‐payment of wages. And who allowed the Makeyevka plant to start up? Of course, they assured us that they would not demand money from us, and then two weeks later a telegram comes ‐ wage arrears, send money, [and no devils] otherwise, etc. The same is in Gomza ‐ give money for motor ships and locomotives, which are not provided for by any program. Allied trusts are self‐governed, and they have no government. I, wishing to take this dispute of places into the mainstream, held that any division of subsidies would be made after a preliminary meeting in the Glavmetal of the places themselves. However, in practice, places were reluctant to accept this proposal because they all want to go to the state treasury together, albeit separately.

Now in the most difficult situation of all trusts, except Sudotrest, Gomza. A subsidy of 6.4 million rubles was determined for her this year. All paid. The moratorium debt for the last year was also paid to her, but by August 1 her debt was up to 6 million. And on top of all she had to give 1.1 million rubles. And despite all this, Gomza is in the most difficult situation. It is clear that this is a colossal problem to be solved. And our commission has not done much yet. We have not yet approached the factories completely.

Of the questions put before the commission ‐ apart from the main production program for 1924/25 ‐ a number of questions have not been resolved and considered, such as:

1.  Rationalization of production. (This should be linked to raising labor productivity.)

2.  Concentration and preservation.

3.  The use and sale of depreciation funds both in the metal industry itself and in other industries. 4. Organizational issues, such as:

a)  governing bodies of the metal industry;

b)  organs and apparatus of trade;

c)   clarification of the rights and obligations of the boards of trusts and plant management.

5. Finally, measures to ensure timely payment of wages.

[Revision of the 2nd group of issues that are outlined ‐ concentration and conservation, this our commission should have kept for itself. The State Planning Commission will work on the production program, while our commission will take trust after trust in order to find, with the help of a more correct approach, a more planned organization of our economy. This is a huge question.

Now regarding the 3rd group of questions. We know that 100 million rubles. recorded as depreciation amounts. If they existed in nature, if depreciation amounts were really deducted, we would have a colossal basis for the revival of the metal industry, because we have a threat that our factories and plants are destroyed, the machines wear out on them and we will not be able to produce anything.

With regard to clarifying the rights and obligations of the boards of trusts and plant administrations. We have already made some reorganization in relation to Glavmetal. But it is still insufficient. Instead of a commercial eyewash, we wanted to give a production bias, so that Sudakov, as a production worker himself, would also receive production workers to help him. We changed the board of Glavmetall. They were attracted there: from Leningrad ‐ Febel, from Moscow ‐ Khrennikov, from the Urals ‐ Glazenblat and, finally, Gluzman.]

I will dwell on the 5th point of not considered issues ‐ on measures to ensure timely payment of wages. This question is now the most pressing and fundamental. But it can be solved now only on condition that the NKPS, Voenved and NKF fulfill their obligations. When they don’t pay, the metal industry does not have the opportunity to pay on time, and we flounder, tied hand and foot, in pursuit of debtors day after day, month after month. Meanwhile, the metal cannot exist without these legal payments, and as a result, money is paid with a huge loss of energy, money, and time. Under such conditions, the state gains nothing, and our work turns into a madhouse. This is certainly true. See how Comrade Sudakov spends his day, when he has to agree, beg for money, to be received. Meanwhile, if the NKF and NKPS learned the inevitability of payments, then they would fulfill their obligations in a timely manner, using all the energy they spend on not paying, to streamline their economy, to manage it in such a way that there are funds for payments for metal ... They would then release our energy for the same, i.e., to ensure that we with all our energy tackle the streamlining of the metal industry. And now, taking advantage of our tradition of squeezing out money for wages, some heads of metal trusts do not pay money for wages, illegally expand production, arbitrarily and put us in danger of strikes, referring to the fact that the NKPS does not pay. But here, in the center, we are powerless, because the NKPS really does not pay, and all our energy is spent on paying money. This must be done first of all. This depends entirely on the NKF and the NKPS. The income of the NKPS is growing. Here are some comparative data on the income of the NKPS last year and the present:

Revenue and subsidies for all transport for 1922/23 and 1923/24

(in millions of chervoni rubles)

Months	1923‐1924 g.			1922‐1923 g.			More and less (+ and ‐)
	Revenue	Subsidy	Total	Revenue	Subsidy 1)	Total
October	17.72	15.87	33.59	44.88	7.00	51.88	+18.29
November	16.76	11.44	28.20	48.59	6.45	55.04	+26.84
December	21.93	9.37	31.30	44.50	6.05	50.55	+19.25
January	27.81	20.62	48.43	43.27	6.00	49.27	+0.84
February	31.18	15.75	46.93	43.47	4.50	47.97	+1.04
March	41.77	17.15	58.92	51.92	3.00	54.92	‐4.00
April	39.08	19.08	58.16	56.12	4,00	60.12	+1.96
May	39.48	7.16	46.64	55.91	2.00	57.91	+11.27
June	37.68	10.61	48.29	53.08	1.50	54.58	+6.29
July	38.82	11.46	50.28	54.97	‐	54.97	+4.69
August	38.93	13.19	52.12	57.15	‐	57.15	+5.03
Total for 11 months	351.16	151.70	502.86	553.86	40.50	594.36	+91.50
September	33.18	5.78	38.96	63.30 2)	‐	63.30	24.33
Total for the year	384.34	157.48	541.82	617.16	40.50	657.66	+115.84

Notes: 1) In addition to the specified subsidy, 10 million rubles were allocated for special purposes (payment for fuel and metals). and 6 million rubles. working capital, of which 3 million rubles. bank loan.

2) Estimated figures are indicated. Revenue for the first five days amounted to 11,135,944 rubles.

Thus, we see that NKPS received 157 million rubles last year. from the state subsidies, this year 50.5 million rubles. Its revenue increased by 61%, i.e., by 233 million rubles, and his entire income increased by 126 million rubles, not counting the increase in working capital and a bank loan.

And if we compare with this calculation of the income of the NKSP the permanent debt of the NKPS for metal, which has to constantly spend all our efforts and time, both ours and the highest state and party institutions, in spite of the fact that the metal by the resolution of the congress should now become the focus of attention 22, we have to admit that the Peopleʹs Commissariat for Railways does not want to fulfill and be guided by party directives. Indeed, here:

NKPS debt data to metal.

According to centralized orders 1923/24 for

February 1, 1924 RUB 1,578,343

May 1, 1924 RUB 3,296,742

June 23, 1924 7 058 984 rubles.

September 5, 1924 5 250 250 rubles.

For decentralized orders for

May 15, 1924 2,825,000 rubles.

August 1, 1924 5,362,675 rubles.

The debt of the NKPS of the metal industry as of September 5 was more than 10 million rubles.

Under such conditions, it is impossible to ensure the slightest degree of correct management in metal. I write about the current financial situation of the metal industry, about its wage arrears and banks in a special report, which is attached hereto. Here I must note one thing that NKPS and NKF forgot about. The party congress said: after fuel and transport, it was the turn for metal. As we have seen, transport received 157 million subsidies last year, fuel received 60.5 million. We do not apply for such subsidies, although now the political and economic significance of reviving the metal industry is no less important than the task of reviving fuel and transport was important in the past. “Everything for transport”, “everything for Donbass”. I am not asking now ‐ ʺeverything for metalʺ ‐ I am asking:

1)  ensure timely payment to us for orders from state consumers;

2)  provide orders for our factories from the NKPS and Voenveda, including locomotive and shipbuilding;

3)  increase the subsidy from 34 to 42 million rubles. and

4)  provide a bank loan with the possibility of transferring production to a wide market.

In conclusion, I make the following proposals: first, to recognize as unconditional and necessary the full and timely payment by consumers of their obligations to the metal industry. To oblige them to make this payment first.

Then I would ask to approve the shipbuilding program, having previously submitted our proposals for urgent consideration by the State Planning Commission, with a directive that the factories should be preserved and should get work in the near future. Then I would ask you to submit to the State Planning Committee our proposals for increasing subsidies for the metal industry from 34 million to 42 million. I believe that these requirements are very modest, especially if we take into account the great sacrifices that the state made in relation to fuel and transport. When transport takes a departmental point of view and forgets about the subsidies that the state gave it, then such a situation is completely impossible. It is also impossible that the NKPS says that it will not receive revenue of 780 million and requires a reduction in the program. This is directly impossible, because how can we go back? But then what the NKPS is saying now means that we will have to go back, not forward. If we take the growth of this year to determine the 1924/25 revenue, then it would be necessary to add 360 million, and that would be almost a billion. [Pavlovsky tells me that the steam locomotives that are working now cannot be 100% used, because there are no well‐equipped bridges for them, and if there were bridges, then 100% would be used. So, it is absolutely impossible to reduce these costs.] Of course, 780 million in revenue is not an exaggerated assumption.

The state in which we have lived until now is the constant untimely payment of wages, when, as a result, we could not take up the main work. This state must end. Until now, I could not familiarize myself with every plant, trust, I could not analyze those business executives‐directors who work for us. I still don’t know the directors of factories, because we are only doing that: where to get the salary, where to count it, how to count it from the NKPS, NKF, etc.

And it would seem to me that it is necessary at all costs to force the Peopleʹs Commissariat of Railways to pay every penny to the metal industry, just as he pays to his workers. And say to the metal industry: everyone will pay you, but you must pay your wages on time by all means, and then there will be no excuse that NKPS, NKF, etc. do not pay.

Now, what is the wage situation? We owed 5 million by August 1, and by the end of September we will be in debt for 13,665,000. And then I must say that the Central Committee of the Union 23 should go to the length of postponing our payment deadline. Indeed, in the old days the capitalists always had 2 weeks of constant credit from the workers.

[ Kalinin. The capitalists still have it.]

Dzerzhinsky. [But we do not have this, and in September we have to pay an advance according to the contract. A] The Central Committee of the Union could meet us halfway [so that it would not be considered a debt, and then we would be able to get out of this situation], we must at all costs do away with the debt. Do you remember January 1923, this memorable January in the life of transport, when you gave 40 million to cover the debt 24? We paid off [with wages], and since then we could already draw a certain line on the railways. And from the moment when the metal says: I have paid off with the workers ‐ this will be the day of the beginning of the revival of metal. And our business executives do not understand this. Now we need to arrange things so that it is better to let the production go to hell, but you pay your wages. If you stick to this, then it will be for the best, and our business executives instead arranged a method of squeezing money out of the state from salaries.

Chairman Kamenev.

There is a proposal: the report of Comrade. Dzerzhinsky on the preliminary plan of the production program for the metal industry and the report of the Higher Government Commission to take into account. Return to the production program after viewing it in the service station. To take into account and discuss at one of the Politburo meetings before the plenum of the Central Committee the question of presenting a report on the metal industry at the plenum.

Now it remains to discuss the issue of shipbuilding. I would like to remind the comrades of how this question stood. Contrary to the proposal of the Politburo commission, 5 million rubles were introduced for shipbuilding into the budget of the next year. At the plenum of the Central Committee of the dispute arose, not to direct whether these 5 million on military shipbuilding in addition to the military budget, which was intended for them 25. The plenum did not resolve this issue, but referred it to the Politburo. This question was dealt with in the STO, and the STO decided, and the Politburo confirmed that these 5 million should be left for commercial shipbuilding 26... And the military department was told that out of the amounts determined to him, 4.5 million according to Morved would remain for military shipbuilding, because it turned out that if these 5 million commercial were transferred to the military department, then the construction would take place not for 9.5 million, but for the same 4.5 million

The rest of the military department would have taken for other needs. Thus, it was decided that 5 million should go to commercial shipbuilding. Then we gave the task, is it possible to increase this amount at the expense of the construction organizations themselves, i.e., if such and such an organization wants to build ships and allocates 3 million for this, then we give an additional 1 million out of 5 million, and if another organization gives 4 million, then we give 2 million, etc. And so, it was done. The State Planning Commission developed and presented a program, from which it was clear that, for example, the Oil Syndicate was going to build for 3 million. We said: OK, we are adding another 3 million out of 5 million ‐ build! Dobroflot decided to build. We also added to it. And then the combined funds of the organizations and ours amounted to a total amount of 10 million for commercial shipbuilding. This does not concern the military department with its 4.5 million. Then, of course, the question arose whether the appropriation would cover all shipyards. In order for the program not to remain on paper, it was decided in the service station that, within 2 months from November 1, contracts should be concluded between all organizations, customers, and factories. And at the same time, it was clear that factories were not closed, but were getting jobs. Now, if it turns out that all the work has been done in vain, then someone must be brought to justice. Why then did Gosplan work for 3 months? We sat in the service station and argued for hours whether to give such and such an organization 200 thousand rubles out of 10 million, and now they tell us that all is in vain, that only in March we will be able to start building. Why donʹt we say this earlier? And in conclusion Comrade Zalutsky sends a telegram that they suspect that we want to transfer this money to Nikolaev.

Dzerzhinsky. Well, these are Siamese twins in     the sense of suspicion.

Kamenev. Comrade Dzerzhinsky spoke here that as a result our resolution is unrealistic and that it should be canceled. But Iʹm still afraid to do it right away. After all, the State Planning Commission reported with the same categoricalness, in the presence of Comrade Sudakov, in the presence of a representative of the Central Committee of Metalworkers and the Central Committee of Vodniks, that 10 million are provided by the factories, that they will not have to be closed and that things will go. Well, we, of course, assumed that after a while they would come and ask for another thousand or two. But to get such a situation that in two days the whole program went down the drain ‐ itʹs impossible. Everything must be checked here. If things go on like this, then the hole will not last for a month and a half, but what will happen is that [him ʺSvetlanaʺ, etc.] will have to build military ships, then maintain them, and so on.

Smilga. [Thatʹs not the point. The point is as follows.] I think that Comrade. Dzerzhinsky is mistaken, [with this, because we have created this work on the development of the shipbuilding plan t <akim> o <brazom> ‐ on the one hand, the customers, on the other hand, representatives of the Sudotrest. We brought them together at the State Planning Committee and examined specifically the issue of this or that order ‐whether this or that plant is able to fulfill this or that order. The question is whether the order that all these ships will be completed by October 1 of this year will be fulfilled. If a person receives 1.5 million from us, has his own 3.5 million, then for 5 million he builds 5 ships and builds them benefits, as required by the conditions. What will change by March for this commercial shipbuilding? The question may be that if you have not coordinated the metalworking program with metal mining if you do not have metal for this.] In the State Planning Committee, the question was held with the participation of Glavmetal and customers. If he is right, then one should be surprised at the policy of Glavmetal and the ignorance of the industrial section of the State Planning Committee. Iʹm investigating this case. Maybe the point is that the metalworking program is not coordinated with the metallurgy program.

Sudakov. All the time I was involved in solving shipbuilding issues. I must say the following: when the issue was discussed in the State Planning Committee, both in the Industrial Section and in the Military Section, I put the discussion of this issue on the plane that if the Industrial Section takes the path of issuing 5 million for civil shipbuilding, then we will be able to employ 5 thousand workers. a person only from the moment we receive contracts. This is the first thing. Secondly, we can start fulfilling these contracts, having advance        amounts,              and        for these      amounts               we          can         start work. Thirdly, I pointed out that a number of technical preparations are needed, because the existing plazas and slipways are worn out and need to be refurbished. Some part of the amount must be spent on this restoration.

I indicated, from a technical point of view, that we will start work if the customers now establish the type of ships that should be built. But         these      types     of            vessels have      not         been identified. Consequently, it is clear from this that we will not start work before March and will not hire the workers [Maybe I will take them before January 15th. I will not be able to employ workers at my new job before March.] for the following reasons: I do not have a specific type of ships; no contracts have been concluded. I insisted on the obligatory conclusion of the contract in November and talked about it for 3 months. At one of the meetings of the Military Section, the question was raised, what if 5 million rubles. will be given to Mork, then they agree to give military orders. We could arrange these orders before the final signing of contracts for the civilian fleet. The destroyers Belli and Pryamislavl are on the ladle of the Putilov plant, while the Parisian Commune and Svetlana are at the Baltic plant in Leningrad.

In the annual program of the Revolutionary Military Council, both the NKFin and the State Planning Commission, the courts appear and categorically insists on their completion.

When these questions were raised, I replied that I would not talk about either the Paris Commune or Svetlana until the government confirmed that I was entitled to their work. But for the work already being done on ʺCorfuʺ and ʺChervonna Ukraineʺ, an outfit must be given and a contract concluded.

A situation is created here that if we wait for the final start of work on civil shipbuilding by March, then we get a gap.

What should I do at this time? I must then turn to the STO with a request to release the amounts that I will pay with the workers, which I am in a memo addressed to the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, Comrade Dzerzhinsky and write.

Comrade Dzerzhinsky said here that we are facing such a moment that we need to leave the Baltic plant in Leningrad, because it has 15% load now, and even if we get another load, it will not increase by more than 40%. Then the Nikolaev and Sevastopol plants in the South cannot be closed either. The Sevastopol plant, just like in Kronstadt, is the base of the entire city. Hence the conclusion that either we need to look for a load, be it military or civilian shipbuilding, or we will come in with a proposal to issue 1 million 400 thousand rubles each. to pay off losses.

It must be definitely said that you cannot babysit the Putilov shipyard longer, just as you cannot play with the Nevsky Shipyard, which takes 100 thousand rubles every month, and for the following months until January ‐ from 120 to 150 thousand rubles. Therefore, in the Leningrad group it is necessary to take the path of closing the Nevsky plant.

If we take a course on the path of civil shipbuilding, then we get a breakthrough until March, to which the workers must be calculated. From a production point of view, this cannot be done. From a financial point of view, this will have to be done. But then the workers will be scattered, we may end up in the same situation as when we received an order from Comrade Dzerzhinsky for steam locomotives, and had to fulfill a one‐year order in 6 months, and yet there was a delay, because there was no qualified force.

We have very few shipbuilding workers, almost no specialists. And when we raise the issue of civil shipbuilding, then, of course, the issue of preserving factories, on the one hand, and maintaining qualified forces, on the other, should be raised.

Today it is necessary to express itself definitely what point of view the Politburo adheres to in relation to the Leningrad group: does it agree to the closure of factories, and mainly to the closure of the Putilov shipyard, due to the impossibility of urgently deploying civil shipbuilding, or to decide that the workers can be occupied by the fact that send them to complete the construction of the navy. But we must not forget that we will have to proceed with the completion, which is 65% ready, because these 65% were completed earlier, i.e., in 1916 How to get started without inspecting all the mechanisms that are installed there?

In general, the question stands like this: either it is necessary to give us the opportunity to proceed with military completion, or to give the opportunity to calculate the number of workers indicated in our report.

Kamenev. How many workers do you have at the Nevsky plant?

Sudakov. A total of 7.5 thousand, 4.5 thousand in Leningrad should be calculated if there is no military load.

Kamenev. What are they doing there now, not only at Nevsky, but also at other factories?

Sudakov. The destroyers were being repaired. Then they work on the destruction of ships. Then two tankers. There are several jobs for Volkhovstroy and some are for public utilities. But all this categorically ends by January, and now, given these jobs, there are surpluses of several thousand workers. In the southern group, without an outfit, we continue the work of ʺChervonnaya Ukrainaʺ and ʺCorfuʺ. There are about 6 thousand.

Kamenev. How long has this illegal work with Chervonnaya

Ukraina and Corfu been going on?

Sudakov. Second year.

         [ Chairman          Kamenev. Zalutskyʹs          telegram          says          the

following (reads). How could he know this?

Sudakov. I told him.

Kamenev. Hereʹs the picture. Comrade Sudakov accepted the program at the service station, and the impression was left that he was satisfied with the orders, and we thought that the issue of shipbuilding was resolved, and Comrade Sudakov went and immediately informs Zalutsky that this was not the case, but that. Comrade Sudakov, you just had to come and say that you were mistaken, and not pass it on to Zalutsky so that he would then send telegrams here.]

Kamenev. How do you now propose in the future? Should these orders for merchant shipbuilding be left as it is decided, and assume that they will begin by March, and continue to build military ships until March?

Sudakov. Yes, I think that these amounts will be allocated for military shipbuilding.

Kamenev. It turns out that in addition to the 10 million that were allocated for shipbuilding, 7 million will have to be allocated. Well, if you cancel all commercial shipbuilding and say ‐ get 5 million and start working at Svetlana ‐ will that satisfy you? And then it turns out that he received 10 million, and then he came and said: give another 7 million.

Dzerzhinsky. Of course, Comrade Kamenev is absolutely right. And not only comrade. Sudakov, and the psychology of others is as follows. [But, okay, 10 million have passed, then letʹs have more.] Comrade. Sudakov, after 10.5 million passed in the service station, was with me, and was, in general, satisfied, he only said that it was wrong that commercial shipbuilding was considered separately from military, that the military should have been considered in conjunction with commercial ... And then he said that he hoped to receive orders for 8 million from the military department. This was really a mistake. It was necessary to consider the entire shipbuilding program as a whole. As you know, the military department is going to give only about 3 million.

Today Comrade Sudakov and Comrade Zvibel (a member of Glavmetall and Sevzapromburo 27) came to me and presented a new shipbuilding plan, which I reported here. [I am a hot‐tempered person, but in relation to specialists I rarely allow myself to flare up.] When I read this plan, I flared up and said that it was a crime against the Republic, and indicated that throwing 2 million 633 thousand plus about 10 million ‐ only 11 million 648 thousand for military construction, when, as I pointed out myself Comrade Sudakov, each released vessel will require additional permanent allocations. ‐ this is unthinkable.

And it is now clear to me that the work that we carried out to build the merchant fleet was wasted, and Glavmetal is entirely to blame for this. [He hoped it would take several months to complete these orders, and the orders are still unknown. It was the policy of giving the filkin a letter.]

I affirm that we must now put the question firmly. We must decide: keep the Nikolaev and Baltic plants, and close the Putilov shipyard and Nevsky. Sevastopol cannot be closed ‐ there is a sea and military port, and, besides, in Sevastopol it is the only proletarian base. And the plant is small there. The Putilov shipyard and the Nevsky plant must be closed because there is no need to think that we could deploy the program in the near future. [I scolded Zvibel and told him that if you knock it out of the state, if the St. Petersburg organization knocks it out of the state, it will be an irreparable blow to the entire metal industry as a whole. And when I summed up our conversation, I will report to the Politburo and give my point of view, and here there will be a final decision. My point of view is precisely this: do not close the Nikolaev, Sevastopol and Baltic plants.] To consider the entire set of issues arising from this provision, we will need to form a small commission, [and it is precisely because of this that we also have a discrepancy in the party‐Soviet organizations, and then, due to the fact that a bogey is being made from the Leningrad industry. After all, no one will think that I am against Leningrad, but I make a definite proposal that the Putilov shipyard and the Nevsky plant should be closed.]  For urgent permission, we must ask the State Planning Committee to consider the military shipbuilding program as soon as possible and, in aggregate, refer all these issues to the Central Committee.

Chairman Kamenev. There is a proposal to close the debate. 3 speakers signed up. Maybe give them 3 minutes to speak? No objections.

Kalinin. I still think that shipyards will have to be loaded with the completion of military ships. For 5 months we have no way out, and then I still strongly doubt that after these 5 months the construction of civil ships will begin. After all, it is necessary to prepare the material, there are no drawings yet, there is still no agreement on the type of ships, and not only by March, but it will be good if they are ready for next autumn. And the factories need to be loaded now, and the only loading that can be done is warships. I completely agree with you that this is a new expense. But on the other hand, it will be possible to propose to the military department that it sell [that flaw] the old junk that it has, instead of the new ones built. Kamenev. But in 5 months they will not build military ships.

Kalinin. Iʹm not suggesting that. And then I point out that the work will still start no earlier than a year later. After all, you need to know that we did not have large commercial shipbuilding before. Therefore, there is no way out: while they are ready, we will have to allocate 3‐4 million of these 5 million for the construction of warships this year. And they will not spend more.

Then, I think that it is impossible to close two factories at once. It’s right that you need to close Nevsky. He is very old, and you still have to break him. But the Putilov shipyard is a new plant, it has been operating since wartime, it is some 15 years old. This is our newest shipyard. So, it will be necessary to wait for the Putilov shipyard. If Volkhovstroy has already taken out the exhibition, it’s ridiculous not to endure one shipyard. Therefore, it is necessary, before having a decision on the Putilov shipyard, to send a special commission there to inspect and determine what price this plant has.

Sudakov. Regarding the fact that I was mistaken, I agree that I was mistaken, but only that in the [State Planning Commission] STO during the discussion of this case I did not insist more decisively on my word and did not say what I said here, namely that earlier In December, there will be no projects such as ships, or even later, and we will not start work earlier than February‐March. Then, I really assumed that from the military budget of 5 million, 1.5 million would be transferred to the repair of military ships, and the rest, i.e., 3.5 million, will go to factories. [ After that, it turned out that much more could be done.]

We pointed out that in order to complete the work, 9 million are needed. This is the same as with the summary of

Comrade. Dzerzhinsky, and with our memorandum. But although they propose to close the Putilov shipyard, I am only afraid of one thing, that if the burden of the naval department falls ‐ the current repair of destroyers, then we will be able to do all the work for the naval department.

Hence the situation that the Putilov shipyard should either be closed or left for repair work by the Naval Department. If they do not agree to this, and the Putilov shipyard is closed, then 850 thousand should be issued immediately and 500 will be required annually for conservation, i.e., 1 million rubles the maintenance of this shipyard is needed annually.

Maximov *. (* Maksimovʹs speech underwent significant stylistic changes, which were not taken into account.) For me it is quite clear that, at the time of the preliminary and even final discussion of the issue of shipbuilding, the State Planning Commission. The SRT and the Politburo were misled by Glavmetal ‐ unacceptable and unforgivable. There is no doubt that Glavmetal and the specialists of the State Planning Commission knew, and it is incredible to admit that they did not know that all our shipyards, with minor exceptions, are adapted to military shipbuilding. Consequently, agreeing with the proposal to transfer factories to commercial shipbuilding, they should have also been well aware that the transfer requires a certain period of time and that it must be foreseen in advance in order to prevent interruptions in the work of the factories, which has now turned out on the example of Leningrad factories, according to the telegram Comrade Zalutsky.

Unfortunately, Comrade Zalutsky in his telegram, in addition to just indignation, admits a parochial and demagogic assumption in relation to the Nikolaev factories. What was known about the nature and productive capacity of our shipyards in general can also be shown and proven in particular by the example of the Nikolaev plant. For the next year, in order to achieve at least a relative profitability, we planned the load of the Nikolaev plants at 45%. This is in the presence of approved STO 10.5 million rubles. for commercial shipbuilding at the expense of customers. Then it did not work that the factories, distributing the indicated 45%, were loaded with 5260 thousand rubles. due to military orders and only 1139 thousand rubles. ‐ due to commercial shipbuilding. This was also known, but no action was taken to implement it.

It is clear to everyone, even an ignorant person, that if factories are transferred to commercial shipbuilding, then, first of all, the following should be established and provided for: 1) what commercial shipbuilding, from a general economic and technical point of view, is necessary for the Soviet state; 2) what measures, funds and time frame are required for the transition to commercial shipbuilding; and 3) how and what to occupy the workers of the shipyards in order to avoid interruption in work, which, as it is now quite clear, can be very long. All of the above, apparently, was not clear at one time was only for those who are directly in charge of this matter.

Regarding Comrade Dzerzhinsky, that I and Comrade. Zalutsky ʺSiamese twinsʺ and that we each demand more for ourselves; I can say the following: I substantiate my demand and telegram with the proportional production weight and importance of our industry in comparison with the rest: but Comrade. Zalutsky. perhaps not guided by this. In addition, I can assure the Politburo that if the state does not have the funds for shipbuilding, I will not be a greater patriot than Comrade. Zalutsky. and I agree to the closure of the Nikolaev factories.

Now a few words to assess the issue of shipbuilding from the point of view of general economic, technical, and political. I am deeply convinced that commercial shipbuilding in our country, both in the interests of economic and political, should and will develop, but not in the way it is supposed now. In my opinion, in the current conditions, the question of the development of our shipbuilding is not seriously enough. Partial prefabricated orders for various trifles cannot be called commercial shipbuilding. For commercial shipbuilding, you need to have at least the most preliminary and elementary plan: the types of modern river and ocean vessels and the immediate prospects for the re‐equipment and development of shipyards. Military shipbuilding should be continued only if 1) our military relations require it; 2) material resources allow; 3) our technology ensures the technical modernity of ships; 4) military science and technology still allow a significant use of naval vessels for defense.

To such an extent, the issue of military shipbuilding was certainly not prepared, and therefore the possibility is not excluded that we, completing or building up military ships now, will not waste significant funds in vain. The military ships, the completion of which is now in question, were built up during the pre‐war and military periods, and at that time they were the last achievement of military technology in Russian conditions. Now, if these vessels are given only finishing from the point of view of modern achievements, modern world science and technology, then they will certainly turn out to be outdated. Fewer mistakes can be made in commercial shipbuilding, and therefore the service station did the right thing by allocating funds specifically for commercial shipbuilding, however, unfortunately, this question was technically unprepared.

What is the solution now? The question will certainly have to be returned for revision. It is necessary to instruct the Government Commission on the materials of the relevant authorities to review the issue of the shipbuilding plan, determine the procedure and terms for the transition to commercial shipbuilding, provide loans and temporarily support the factories with military orders. There is no other way out now. The factories can only be loaded with the completion of the construction of warships, otherwise, 3‐5 months before the transition to commercial shipbuilding, workers will have to be kept in order to preserve even the most important factories as shipbuilding laboratories.

The conclusion is as follows: 1) urgently develop and implement a program to reduce the number of factories, based on economic and technical features, 2) provide the remaining factories with orders for the current and subsequent years according to the corresponding long‐term plan of commercial and military shipbuilding, 3) until the transition to commercial shipbuilding load the most important factories with work to complete the construction of warships according to preliminary assignments.

These are the main activities that should be carried out. In the future, the uncertain position of the shipyards is intolerable.

Kamenev. Perhaps it is much more expedient than to finish building warships, which are useless in comparison with world technology, to pay workersʹ salaries without giving them jobs yet? The point of view of comrade. Sudakov, of course, is clear: he wants to keep all the factories and load them with both military and commercial orders. But it would be much better if Comrade Sudakov told us this earlier. What are we being offered now, to reconsider and give the military department 5 million? A commission must be elected.

Molotov. It is clear that we cannot resolve this issue now ‐ transfer money to military or commercial shipbuilding. It is also clear that it would be wrong to give it all to commercial shipbuilding. But at the same time, based on the interests and the need to build commercial ships, it will be necessary to find out how, without stopping the work of factories for military orders, factories can gradually adapt to commercial orders.

Smilga. I am against the commission. She wonʹt give anything now. If it is needed to analyze the Leningrad case, then it can be done. But it should be noted that Glavmetal did what it had no right to do. I must say that we have a second dubious figure ‐ 3 million rubles. on tractors. These tractors will cost 3‐4 times more than foreign ones. And there is no need to create commissions for shipbuilding. If the salary has not been paid, then it must be paid, but it is impossible to decide piece by piece. It is difficult to typeset the entire program differently.

Kamenev. Thus, we accept: to suspend the execution of the STO resolution of September 10 on the allocation of 10 million 500 thousand for commercial shipbuilding and the Politburo resolution of 5 million for commercial shipbuilding. Consider the whole issue of shipbuilding orders for both military and commercial ships in aggregate.

Smilga. It is necessary to disperse the entire metal section that worked on this issue. This is outright swindle.

Kamenev. Now regarding the election of the commission.

Kuibyshev. I propose to refer this to the High Government Commission.

Kalinin. At the same time, it should be noted that the appropriation is calculated for the military ships already under construction, and not new ones.

Dzerzhinsky. I suggest the term of work is a week, with a report to the Politburo.

Kamenev. Deputy to the High Government Commission instead of Comrade Dzerzhinsky is proposed to Comrade Kuibyshev. And it is also proposed to introduce comrade. Pyatakov.

No objections? Received.

Glavmetallʹs petition for a vacation this year for the Nikolaev plant is         2              million rubles. transfer to            the High      Government Commission. Approved.

Kuibyshev. Instead of a week, I ask for a deadline of 10 days to be able to get acquainted with the work.

Kamenev. No objections. The total term of the State Planning Commission for the consideration of the production program of the metal industry is proposed for a month. No objections? Received.

Report comrade. Dzerzhinsky to multiply and distribute to members of the Central Committee, Central Control Commission, and gubernia committees.

The meeting is closed on 28.

1                     RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 524. L. 1‐50 (uncorrected transcript); L. 51115 (copyrighted transcript); L. 116‐128 (verbatim report). For a list of those present at the meeting, see appendix 1.

2                     The Higher Government Commission (VPK) is a commission of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on the metal industry. Created by the decision of the Politburo on March 20, 1924. With the formation of the military‐industrial complex, all work on the development of measures in the field of the development of metallurgy and mechanical engineering was concentrated in

it. F.E. Dzerzhinsky. (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3.D. 428. L. 4.)

3                     Glavmetall ‐ Main Directorate of the State Metal Industry of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR, branch industrial main board. It was formed on October 26, 1921 on the basis of the metal department of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the RSFSR and the main board of precision mechanics plants. After the dissolution of the Higher Government Commission for the Metal Industry (November 1924), he was in charge of this industry. By a decision of the Politburo of

November 13, 1924, F.E. Dzerzhinsky. (RGASPI. F. 17.Op. 3. D. 474. L.

5.)

4                     F.E. Dzerzhinsky made an inaccuracy. We are talking about the launch of three blast furnaces: blast furnace No. 1 at Yuzovka, blast furnace No. 1 of the Yekaterinoslavsky plant named after G.I. Petrovsky (former Bryansk metallurgical plant) and Kramatorsk blast furnace No. 3 of the Donugol trust.

5                     Chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR K.G. Maximov.

6                     This is a Politburo resolution of July 3, 1924 on the significance and role of Leningrad industry. (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 447. L. 3.) See also note 21.

7                     GOMZ ‐ State Association of Machine‐Building Plants, created in 1918, was under the jurisdiction of the Department of Metals of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the RSFSR. It included: Kolomensky, Mytishchi machine‐building, Sormovsky, Bryansk steam locomotive, Tverskoy, Rybinsk car‐building plants, six plants of the Prioksky district, a tool plant in Moscow, etc. In 1923, GOMZ was recognized as a union of all‐union significance and transferred to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR.

8                     TsUG AZ ‐ Central Administration of State Automobile Plants, was established in 1921 and was directly subordinate to Glavmetal. The department was an independent organization with the rights of a legal entity. In 1923 it was transferred to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR.

9                     The campaign to increase labor productivity began in April 1924, when at a number of the largest enterprises in Leningrad ʺKrasny Putilovetsʺ, ʺRussian Dieselʺ, ʺEconomizerʺ, ʺKrasny Vyborzhetsʺ, ʺSevkabelʺ and others. workers in the struggle to increase productivity. (Economic life of the USSR. Chronicle of events and facts 1917‐1965. Book. 1. M., 1967. S. 130.)

10                  Yugostal is the State Southern Metallurgical Trust of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR, established in 1921. The trust included metallurgical plants, coal mines, coke plants located in the territory of Ukraine, the North Caucasus and Crimea.

11                  YMT ‐ Southern Machine‐Building Trust of the SNKh of the Ukrainian SSR, created in 1922.

12                  Decisions of the Politburo of March 20, May 8, June 3, 1924 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 428. Sheet 4; D. 436. L. 7, D. 441 L. 4.)

13                  We are talking about the XIII Congress of the RCP (b), held in Moscow on May 23‐31, 1924.

14                  From the decision of the Politburo of June 19, 1924 on the issue ʺReport of the Commission on the metal industry.ʺ (RGASPI. F. 17.Op. 3. D. 444. L. 5.)

On May 15, 1924, a meeting of the STO USSR was held, at which the report of the Commission on the metal industry was discussed. STO approved the steam locomotive building program proposed by the Commission, and determined the amount of budgetary allocations for payment of these orders according to the NKPS estimate; adopted for 192324 an indicative production program for metalworking and ferrous metallurgy; the size of the budgetary allocations for the metal industry for this year was determined in the total amount of 32 million chervonny rubles. STO also approved an additional increase in bank credit for the metal industry for April‐September 1924 in the amount of 10 million rubles, provided for by the decision of the military‐industrial complex. (Khromov S.S. F.E. Dzerzhinsky at the head of the metal industry. M., 1966. S. 86.)

16                  This is a memorandum by F.E. Dzerzhinsky in the Politburo on May 18, 1924 ʺOn the work of the Commission on the metal industry, in accordance with the PB decree of March 20ʺ. (RGASPI. F. 76. Op. 2. D. 356. L. 92‐98.)

17                  TSUMor ‐ The Central Department of Maritime Transport was created in 1923 as part of the NKPS of the USSR to manage water transport.

18                  Sudotrest ‐ State Shipbuilding Trust, a state association of shipbuilding enterprises, created in 1922 in the NKPS system.

19                  September 10, 1924 STO accepted the version of the State Planning Commission and approved the shipbuilding program for 1924/25 in the amount of 10.5 million rubles.

20                  In connection with the preparations for an armed uprising in Germany in the fall of 1923, the Politburo adopted a number of decisions on all‐round assistance to the German Communist Party, including ʺmobilizing the republicʹs combat forcesʺ and expanding ʺwork on the construction and repair of the navy.ʺ (Politburo of the RCP (b) ‐VKP (b) and the Comintern. 1919‐1943. Documents. M., 2004. S. 167, 171.)

21We are talking about the demands of the leadership of Ukraine to increase state subsidies for the metallurgical industry of this republic. The plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, held on July 7‐9, 1924, adopted a resolution in which doubts were expressed about the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) to support Leningrad industry, adopted the day before, on July 3. In the opinion of the Ukrainian Central Committee, this decree did not contribute to the correct solution of the question of the development of metallurgy. Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine E.I. Quiring sent this resolution with an accompanying letter to a number of members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). Queering objected to the support of the Leningrad industry, which, in his opinion, was carried out at the expense of the metallurgy of Ukraine. The position of the Ukrainian leadership provoked objections from the chairman of the Supreme Economic Council F.E. Dzerzhinsky. He sent his note to the Central Committee of the RCP (b), in which he argued that no infringement of the interests of the metallurgy of Ukraine as a result of the decision to help Leningrad occurred. (Khromov S.S. F.E. Dzerzhinsky at the head of the metal industry. S. 113‐123.)

22  The resolution of the XIII Congress of the RCP (b) on the Central Committeeʹs report said: “In the area of raising state industry, the most important task of the coming period is to raise metallurgy. After the deal with fuel has been secured, transport has been raised, and the monetary reform has been shifted, there is a queue for the metal. Establishing the production of means of production within the Union means creating a really solid foundation for a socialist economy and, to a large extent, freeing oneself from the need to transfer large orders abroad. The Congress instructs the Central Committee to pay serious attention to this problem. ʺ (Thirteenth Congress of the RCP (b). Verbatim report. M., 1963. S. 601602.)

23  This is the Central Committee of the Metalworkersʹ Trade Union.

24Due to high prices for metal and fuel, railroad transport was in short supply in the 1922‐23 financial year. Rail tariffs were high, and wages for railroad workers were low compared to workers in other industries. A critical situation developed by the end of 1922 ‐ the beginning of 1923, when the debt of the Peopleʹs Commissariat for Railways sharply increased. The state was forced to provide him with a large subsidy. (Khromov SS FE Dzerzhinsky at the head of the metal industry. P. 49.) On January 4, 1923, the Politburo made a decision: “In changing the decision of the Financial Committee, to approve an allocation for the wages of railway workers for January in the amount of 190 trillion rubles. and to pay off debts to railway workers ‐ only 50 trillion rubles. To instruct the Financial Committee to enter accordingly into the emission plan for January 23. an increase of 40 trillion. ʺ (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3.D. 328. L. 2.)

On August 25 , 1924, the plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on the report of L.D. Trotsky, on the work of the Politburo commission on the army and budget, approved an estimate for the Military Department (NKVoenmore and GUVP) in the amount of 395 million rubles, and also made the following decision: “Instruct the Politburo to consider the possibility of 5 (five) million rubles allocated for shipbuilding according to the estimate the metal department of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, turn to military shipbuilding ... ʺ. (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2.D. 134. L. 4‐4 rev.)

On August 26, 1924, according to the report of the State Planning Commission, the following decision was made by the STO: “a) To recognize that the 5 (five) million rubles allocated by the SNK on August 13 for shipbuilding in 1924‐25 must be fully used for the needs of the commercial fleet; b) Instruct the State Planning Committee to submit a specific plan for the distribution of these 5 (five) million rubles between departments and economic agencies within a week. ʺ On September 4, 1924, this decision was approved by the Politburo (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 461. L. 4, 9).

27                  The North‐West Industrial Bureau was created in 1921 to organize and manage the regionʹs industry. It was located in Leningrad.

28                  Decision of the Politburo on the information report on the metal industry, September 12, 1924, see appendix 1.