Lenin's political testament: the reality of history and the myths of politics

Selected articles from the book “Lenin's political testament: the reality of history and the myths of politics” by Sakharov V.A.

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Strengthening The Dictatory Of The Proletariat Is The Main Condition For The Victory Of The Revolution

During 1921-1922 hopes were fading for the prospect of a proletarian revolution soon beginning in the developed capitalist countries of Europe. Questions about the prospects for the socialist revolution in Russia, about the possibility of its development, relying on internal forces, by the end of 1922 acquired even greater relevance than before. The development of the proletarian revolution in European countries was hampered by the fact that the victors in the First World War could use the fruits of their victory to alleviate internal social problems at the expense of the countries they defeated. On the other hand, they had enough opportunities to, if necessary, by force prevent the development of the revolutionary process in Germany. Although the population of the colonial and semi-colonial countries of the East, although “in recent years has been drawn with extraordinary speed into the “struggle for their liberation,” they cannot really help the Russian socialist revolution in the foreseeable future, since their forces and capabilities, Lenin believed, “do not go decisively in comparison" "with the forces of the capitalist countries" [1635].
It is not surprising that in his last letters, notes and articles, Lenin again turned to the question of what must be done to ensure the victory of the Russian revolution, which continues the struggle "alone", in the conditions of a capitalist encirclement. Success depended on whether it would be possible to ensure the necessary socio-economic development of the country.

The possibilities for the development of the country were limited by the level of its productive forces, which had significantly decreased as a result of the imperialist and civil wars, as well as by the changes in agriculture that had taken place as a result of the revolution: the elimination of landownership led to the emergence in the countryside of a huge mass of "small and smallest" peasant farms and, as result in a decrease in labor productivity.

This analysis led Lenin to raise the question of the prospects for the Russian revolution and the tasks of the revolutionaries.

“Thus, at the present moment we are faced with the question: will we be able to hold out with our small and minute peasant production, with our fragmentation, until the Western European capitalist countries complete their development towards socialism?” Which, according to Lenin, would not have happened soon [1636].

There were only two means in the hands of the Bolsheviks to use the internal resources of the country: correct policy and good organization. It was precisely these points that Lenin pointed out when he formulated the fundamental principles of the tactics that are "prescribed" by this state of affairs:

1) to exploit the contradictions between the imperialist states, as well as between them and the peoples and countries of the East exploited by them;

2) to ensure the strengthening of the power of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the preservation of the confidence of the peasantry in it and its ability to lead the peasantry;

3) at the expense of marginal savings, to provide financing for the restoration of enterprises and new construction in industry [1637].

Lenin attached particular importance to the solution of the problem of financing industry, since thanks to the development of "large machine industry" and the electrification of the country, the Soviet government should have been able to "build a state in which the workers would retain their leadership over the peasants, the confidence of the peasants in relation to themselves." Then "we'll be able to hold on for sure. And besides, we will be able to maintain ourselves not at the level of a small-peasant country, not at the level of this general limitation, but at a level that is steadily rising forward, and forward towards large-scale machine industry. Thus, Lenin actually proposed putting on the agenda the question of preparing for the start of the implementation of programs for the technical reconstruction of industry, followed by agriculture. In this development, the Soviet republics could cross the line when the fate of the socialist revolution in them would be determined mainly not by the backwardness inherited from the past, but by a new, higher level of economic and cultural development.

In solving this problem, according to Lenin, the most important role was to be played by the party and state apparatus, which exercised power in the country and management of the national economy. The task of strengthening them as the main instrument of socialist transformation follows from the tactics proposed by Lenin. Lenin proposed a mechanism that was supposed to prepare the party and state apparatuses for the solution of these tasks - close cooperation between the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the Party, the merging of the Central Control Commission with the RCT.

Historians overlook an important turn in Lenin's views on the problem of reorganizing the Central Committee, ignoring the obvious fact that the original idea ofreforming the Central Committee was transformed into a project for reforming the Central Control Commission. And here was the result - Stalin, the Politburo, the Central Committee, and the Party Congress are blamed for the failure to fulfill the proposal, which Lenin himself refused.

For example, V.I. Startsev reproached the Central Committee of the RCP(b) for not agreeing to increase the Central Committee to 50-100 people, but to only increase it to 40 members. In this, he sees the struggle of the Politburo, the Secretariat and the Orgburo "against those revolutionary measures for the restructuring of the party leadership", which Lenin proposed to take [1639]. Even more distorted is the question of the purpose of the reform proposed by Lenin. The versions offered sometimes have no support in Lenin's texts. So yes. Volkogonov said, that Lenin's plan was to expand democracy in the party and in the state [1640].

V.A. Kumanev and I.S. Kulikov wrote that Lenin in those days came to the conclusion that “the personal qualities of the leaders play a decisive role in the work of the collegiate body” (hence, until that time he did not know about this) and imposed on him the desire to make the Central Committee a “collective leader” (as if it was not one under Lenin!), to overcome the ambitions and personal rivalry of the members of the Politburo, "to balance the warring factions in the main link of power", etc. [1641]

Lenin, in principle, was satisfied with the existing system of higher party bodies, including the place of the Central Committee, the Politburo, the Orgburo and the Secretariat, therefore, speaking about their work, about the need to improve their activities, he never criticizes them and does not associate the problem with the party bureaucracy [1642].

On the contrary, he proposes to formalize those changes that occur in their work under the pressure of circumstances.

“The plenum of the Central Committee of our party has already revealed its desire to develop into a kind of supreme party conference ... current work on behalf of the Central Committee is carried out, as you know, by our Politburo, our Orgburo, our secretariat, etc. I think that we should finish the path we have thus entered. Such a development of the Central Committee was supposed to ensure an increase in “plannedness, expediency, the systematic nature of its organization and work, and in relation to communication with the truly broad masses through the best of our workers and peasants” [1643].

He was quite satisfied with the progress of the case and its direction, and therefore with those people who provided their work. It is clearly seen that Lenin was interested in the system. In principle, it suited him, he did not want it to be changed, he strived only for its improvement.

It is precisely in connection with its improvement, and not with its replacement, that Lenin raises the question of the stability and split of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) and of overcoming the potential danger of a split in the party as a result of an insufficiently flexible and balanced policy that is unable to ensure an alliance between the working class and the peasantry [1644].

No personification in posing this issue, no expectation of a split in the near future, while at the same time recognizing that the effect of reducing the risk of a split as a result of the measures, he proposed could manifest itself only after years needed to improve the work of the state apparatus. The fact that Lenin, speaking about the threat of instability and split, was not inclined to dramatize them, was evidenced by the fact that there was no indication of it in the article “Pages from a Diary”, in the notes “On Cooperation”, “On Our Revolution”, and also in the last article - ““Better fewer, but better”." Therefore, the context in which the propositions about the danger of instability and split are included - the reorganization of the Central Committee, the Central Control Commission and the RCI - suggests that the reduction of this danger was not the main goal of the reforms he proposed, but only their useful, but by-product.

Lenin put forward the idea of the need to reorganize the central organs of the party in such a way as to simultaneously solve a number of key tasks - to increase the efficiency of their own work, to provide them with the opportunity to lead the improvement of the work of the state apparatus. This, according to Lenin, would make it possible to strengthen the ties with the working masses through the development and implementation, through state bodies of a policy that meets their interests. This was a general idea, originally formulated in a letter dated December 23, 1922 ("to the congress") in the form of a proposal to expand the composition of the Central Committee to 50-100 people. Noting that one cannot count on a “quite favorable” course of events, Lenin assesses the proposed reform of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) precisely from the point of view of overcoming the dangers threatening from here:

“Such a reform would significantly increase the strength of our party and make it easier for us to fight among hostile states, which, in my opinion, can and should be greatly aggravated in the coming years” [1645].

This idea was further developed in the entry dated December 26. In it, Lenin proposed that the function of checking, "improving" and "recreating" the apparatus be removed from the jurisdiction of the RCT, which turned out to be "unable to cope with it" and transferred to the Central Committee of the RCP (b). And in order to carry out the increased volume of work, he proposed to expand the composition of the Central Committee at the expense of several dozen party members, mainly from among the "ordinary workers and peasants", giving them "the right to attend all meetings of the Politburo and read all the documents of the Central Committee" [1646]. The RCT should "be used only as an 'appendage' or as an assistant, under certain conditions, to these members of the Central Committee."

This right immediately put the new, politically inexperienced members of the Central Committee in an unusual, privileged position in relation to its other members, who attended meetings of the Politburo only if the issue under discussion required it. And Lenin did not propose to abolish this practice. This initial proposal by Lenin, without solving the problem in essence, led to confusion and destruction of the old system of work of the Central Committee and discrimination of other members of the Central Committee.

December 29, 1922, Lenin continued to develop this scheme. This time, from a general formulation of the question, he proceeded to the development of a specific problem - "how to combine these specialists (from the RCT. - BC) in verification, who have sufficient knowledge, and these new members of the Central Committee." New members of the Central Committee "will from year to year take a course in public administration with the help of highly qualified specialists" from the RFL, which will allow "successfully" to solve the problem of "improving our apparatus, which was no good at all." This is all the more justified because, in his opinion, the RKI in its development

“resulted in ... a transitional state from a special people's commissariat to a special function of members of the Central Committee; from an institution that audits everything and everything, to a collection of numerically small, but first-class auditors” [1647].

Therefore, Lenin plans the joint use (as assistants, or "appendage") of the members of the RKI with a new and special contingent of members of the Central Committee.

After December 29, the development of this theme was suspended for about ten days. We can only speculate about the reasons. Perhaps Lenin was dissatisfied with what was happening. A number of unanswered questions arose. Why will the new members of the Central Committee not yet known to anyone have better personal and business qualities than other members of the Central Committee? Why are they guaranteed against bureaucratization? How many party members who possessed all these remarkable qualities remained “at the bottom”, “at the bench”, “at the plow” during the five years of the revolution? Why didn't they come out before? And how to find them? It is impossible to make a mistake, since the fate of the revolution will depend to a large extent on them. Will they strengthen this party headquarters by constituting a majority in the Central Committee? Is not that a fact. Will they weaken it? Not ruled out. In addition, it is known that in itself, work at the bench or the plow does not guarantee against hesitation in the direction of opportunism. The history of the Bolshevik Party knows many examples of this. In the old composition of the Central Committee there were people who showed themselves as economic organizers, propagandists, and theoreticians. In the new composition, their share will sharply decrease, and in the main political organ of the party, a completely different category of party members will have to gain a dominant position - those who during the years of the revolution did not prove themselves to be organizers, who had neither experience in economic, ideological work, nor proper theoretical and often general education. How will their predominance in the Central Committee affect the development of policy, the quality of decisions made, and the level of organization of the work of the Central Committee? Will the party, the country, the revolution benefit from this? Will the Central Committee's ties with the masses not be strengthened by reducing the efficiency and quality of work of this body, which immediately deprives the planned reform of any sense?

The variant proposed by Lenin, removing some problems, put in their place a host of others, led the Central Committee of the Party away from some conflicts and confronted others, no less complex, in the place of some groupings, threatened to bring new ones. We do not know whether Lenin asked himself these or similar questions and how he answered them. On the other hand, it is known that in the future, while developing this problem, he no longer returned to the idea ofgranting the new members of the Central Committee a privileged position. This fact allows us to assert that Lenin was dissatisfied with his original project.

In the first ten days of January 1923, Lenin dictated the plan of the article "What shall we do with the Workers' and Peasants' Committee?", in which the first serious turn in the outlined scheme was made. Now he proposed that

members of the Central Committee from workers and peasants are not to be placed in a privileged position in the Politburo and the Central Committee of the party, but should be placed under the tutelage of the Secretariat of the Central Committee (and, therefore, Stalin as general secretary) for "organizing the training of new members of the Central Committee in all the details of management", which already by itself should provide "greater streamlined Politburo meetings" [1648].

This partially removed the previous contradiction: the new members of the Central Committee, if they constitute a special part of the Central Committee, then only in the sense that they are given to the training of the main part of the members of the Central Committee and its apparatus. This proposal strengthened the position and authority of the Secretariat and Stalin as general secretary in the Central Committee of the party.

In the original version of the article on the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (“What shall we do with the Rabkrin?”), Lenin clarified his position regarding the size of the Central Committee and the position of its new members from workers and peasants:

“Several dozen (from 50 to 75 people) workers and peasants are elected to The Central Committee of the party in addition to other members of the Central Committee” (our italics. - V.S.).

What follows is an important correction of the previously formulated sentence:

"The new members of the Central Committee are completely equal in rights with other members of the Central Committee."

Equal in rights, but do not stand above others and do not control them! This provision actually means the final renunciation of their privileged position and the completion of the revision of the original scheme in one of its most important points. The special function of the members of the Central Committee, about which Lenin spoke on December 29, remains assigned to a special group of members of the Central Committee who did not have any advantages over others:

they are tasked with “long and hard work to study and improve our state apparatus. These members of the Central Committee are considered to be temporarily assigned to the People's Commissariat of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, all of whose employees "receive the task of helping them in this" [1649].

The special status of this group of members of the Central Committee is now emphasized not by the expansion of their rights in comparison with other members of the Central Committee, but, on the contrary, by the establishment of restrictions for them. The condition is set that these members of the Central Committee must be replaced in a few years. There were never such conditions for other members of the Central Committee; the question of their stay on the Central Committee was decided strictly individually, based on completely different criteria. Consequently, the "new" members of the Central Committee are turning from a privileged part of it into a discriminated part in some respects.

However, the variant with the infringement and restriction of the rights of members of the Central Committee could not be accepted, as well as the variant with the expansion of rights. Work on the first version of the article continued until January 13, 1923, therefore, until that time, Lenin failed to find a satisfactory solution to the problem: the new members of the Central Committee with their specific tasks, functions and, consequently, rights did not fit into the existing mechanism of the work of the Central Committee and in the framework of the Party Rules. The result was the destruction of the established system of leadership of the party, which Lenin did not want. He sought to strengthen it. Lenin was dissatisfied with the original version of the article on the RCT (“What should we do with the Rabkrin?”), as evidenced by the very fact of stopping work on it and starting to develop a fundamentally new scheme for implementing his idea. He was now trying to solve the set tasks not by reorganizing the Central Committee of the Party, but by reorganizing the Central Control Commission of the RCP(b).

In all the texts preceding the article "How do we reorganize the Workers' Committee," which was a revision of its original version ("What shall we do with the Workers' Committee?"), it refers only to the new members of the Central Committee and there is not a word about the Central Control Commission. Ten days later, on January 23, Lenin finished dictating the article "How do we reorganize the Rabkrin", which dealt only with the reorganization of the Central Control Commission. There was no longer a word about the reorganization of the Central Committee, about the expansion of its composition.

For some reason, the literature does not attach due importance to this turn of Lenin's thought, and, speaking of the reform he proposed, historians pile up quotation upon quotation from different works, in which, in fact, completely different reforms are proposed. Lenin found a version of the reform of the central organs of the party that satisfied him, which was reflected in the title of the article prepared for publication: the uncertainty in the very formulation of the question (what to do with the RCT?) disappeared from it and a subtitle appeared, speaking of the completion of work on the problem, - “Proposal to the XII Congress parties."

In the article "How do we reorganize the Rabkrin" there is a proposal to increase the Central Control Commission by 75-100 people with the same functions that were previously assumed for the new members of the Central Committee. The same range of tasks that they have to solve. The same rights to attend meetings of the Politburo and get acquainted with the documents. The same condition of their regular change. The same social environment from which they must be recruited. The same calculation is that this measure will ensure the strengthening of the stability of the Party Central Committee. The same connection between the party bodies and the employees of the NC of the RCT, the same consequences for the RCT - an increase in its authority and capacity [1650].

In the article “Better fewer, but better” Lenin continued the development of this problem, detailing the scheme of work of the Central Control Commission—RKI [1651].

With the transfer of the task of organizing the work of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectors from the Central Committee to the Central Control Commission, there was no need to replenish the Central Committee of the Party with workers and peasants up to 50-100 members. And we see that Lenin did not return to this proposal in his last articles.

Lenin's proposal to give the Central Control Commission the right to control the raising of questions and their discussion in the Central Committee of the RCP (b), the Politburo of the Central Committee, for any party functionary [1652] in the literature is sometimes interpreted as establishing control over the Central Committee and the Politburo, limiting their rights. But it's not so. Control over the preparation of questions for discussion and over the course of their discussion did not mean limiting the right of the Politburo to form the agenda, the right to adopt solutions. This was the main thing. Defining the tasks and functions of the members of the Central Control Commission who are present at a meeting of the Politburo, Lenin does not say a word about granting them a deliberative or even a decisive vote.

Consequently, its functions remained within the limits determined by the Charter of the Party, the power of the Central Committee was not diminished. Only what was required was achieved - an increase in the efficiency of the work of the Politburo, which means that the position of the Central Committee was not weakened but strengthened. At the same time, there was an increase in the political strength and capabilities of the Central Control Commission, but not at the expense of the prerogatives of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). This ensured the strengthening of the entire system of central organs of the party and its position in the political system of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In the course of developing plans for the reorganization of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission in connection with the reorganization of the RCT, Lenin came to the fundamentally important problem of interaction between party and state bodies [1653]. Nevertheless, in historiography this most important aspect of Lenin's last works did not attract due attention, apparently because the thoughts expressed by Lenin contradicted the views adopted later in the CPSU. Everything was limited to a particular case - the merger of the Central Control Commission and the RKI, attention was concentrated on solving very important practical problems: the fight against bureaucracy, the democratization of inner-party life, and so on. This approach not only narrowed the problem, but grossly distorted Lenin's position.

Lenin regarded the reorganization of the Central Control Commission and the RCT as merely another step in the solution of a more general task—the creation of a system of power and administration that would meet the needs of the socialist revolution. Completing the development of this problem, in the article “Better fewer, But Better,” Lenin substantiated his vision of the main direction in the development of the political system of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The reorganization of the Central Control Commission-RCI was supposed to prepare a solution to a more fundamental task - the further integration of the party and the state, which he considered both as a goal and as a way to replace the existing which remained from the old system to a new state apparatus and thereby create the prerequisites for further steps in this direction.

For Marxists, such a formulation of the question was not unexpected. True, the founders of Marxism did not give any detailed study of this issue, but the general guidelines were quite definite. The task of using the state by the Communist Party for the purpose of realizing the program of the proletarian revolution was already set forth in the Manifesto of the Communist Party. It also formulated the idea that in the process of establishing the political domination of the proletariat and carrying out a program for the transformation of society on the basis of public ownership of the means of production, the state undergoes a certain evolution up to the point of disappearance. Developing this idea, F. Engels formulated the position that the socialist state is no longer a state in the former sense of the word. Thus, the "party-state" system was conceived not as static, but as dynamic, constant, and rapidly changing primarily due to its "state" component. Based on this understanding of the essence of the relationship between the party and the state in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Bolsheviks built a new state from the very beginning. In notes dated December 26, 1922, Lenin noted that during the five years of the revolution, the Bolsheviks

“created a new type of state (our italics. - BC), in which the workers are ahead of the peasants against the bourgeoisie” [1654].

The Bolsheviks adopted and put into practice* the idea of a definite coalescence of all organizations of the proletariat. Practical experience corrected the initial ideas, caused discussions, in the center of which was the problem of finding appropriate organizational forms and methods of work, the interaction of the main institutions of the political system of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The struggle on these questions reached its greatest acuteness in the course of the "discussion about the trade unions."

In the process of developing his plan for the reorganization of the Central Committee—Central Control Commission—RCI, Lenin outlined in detail his views on the problem of interaction between the party and the state in the socialist revolution. Already in the dictation of December 29, 1922, it was said that the RKI

"as a result of its development resulted in a transitional state from a special people's commissariat to a special function of members of the Central Committee"(our italics. - BC) [1655].

Needless to say, the evolution of the RCI could have such a "result" only if a certain integration of the relevant parts of the party and state apparatuses had actually already taken place. In terms of the article "What should we do with the Workers' Peasants' Committee?" Lenin already proposes to extend to the NK RKI the experience of subordinating the NKID to the Central Committee of the Party, including the selection of personnel for it [1656]. In the article "How do we reorganize the Rabkrin" this topic is developed. Lenin, in the experience of state building during the Civil War, singled out the saturation of the most important institutions of power with reliable party cadres as the main lesson. He offered to rely on this experience, starting the reorganization of the state apparatus [1657].

In the article “Better fewer, but better” " he summarized his views on this issue. It speaks not only of the admissibility and expediency, but also of the need for a certain connection, a merger of the party and the state. How serious Lenin attached to this question is shown by the fact that he devotes a whole section of this article to it. In view of the fundamental importance of the provisions formulated by Lenin and the frequent distortions of Lenin's views on this issue, let us quote at length:

“How can Party institutions be combined with Soviet ones? Is there anything unacceptable here?

I am raising this question not on my own behalf, but on behalf of those whom I hinted at above, saying that we have bureaucrats not only in Soviet, but also in Party institutions. Why, in fact, not to combine both, if this is required by the interest of the case? Hasn't anyone ever noticed that in such a people's commissariat as the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, such a connection is extremely beneficial and has been practiced from the very beginning? Aren't the Politburo discussing issues from the Party point of view, many small and big questions about "moves" on our part in response to the "moves" of foreign states ... Isn't this flexible combination of the Soviet and the Party a source of extraordinary strength in our politics? I think that what has justified itself has become stronger in our foreign policy and has already become a custom in such a way that there is no doubt in this area that it will be at least as appropriate (and I think it will be much more appropriate) in relation to our entire state apparatus... Moreover, I think that such a connection is the only guarantee of successful work” (highlighted by us. - BC).

Lenin concludes these arguments with the following remark:

“I think that all doubts on this score come out of the dustiest corners of our apparatus and that they should be answered with only one thing - mockery” [1658].

The italicized text is the quintessence of Lenin's views. To see their essence more clearly, let's present a part of the selected text as a single sentence. It turns out that the flexible combination of the Soviet and the Party is a source of extraordinary strength in our politics; it has justified itself, established itself in our foreign policy and will be much more appropriate in relation to our entire state apparatus; in such a connection is the only guarantee of success.

At the same time, it can be seen from the above quotation that V.I. Lenin did not pose the question of merger, unification as a matter of principle, in accordance with which relations between the party and the state were to be restructured. For Lenin, this was a matter of expediency and tactics.

In the light of Lenin's intentions, the reorganization of the Central Control Commission-RKI, which he proposed, also looked different. It created the mechanism necessary for the implementation of plans for "union", "merger" of certain parts of the party and state apparatuses. In this case, through the reorganized Central Control Commission, there is a formal, and not only actual, subordination of the entire system of state inspection and control to the central leadership of the Bolshevik Party. The state body - RKI - not only in fact, but also formally turned into the eyes and hands of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the party, allowing control, purge, and reorganization of the entire state apparatus, identify promising cadres of managers, ensure their training and distribution. Finishing on March 2, 1923, his last article “Better fewer, but better”, V.I. Lenin dictated:

“Here are the lofty tasks I dream of for our Workers' and Peasants' Committee. That's why I plan for them to merge the most authoritative party elite with the "ordinary people's commissariat" [1659].

* In the article “Our Differences” (published in Pravda in January 1921), Stalin wrote: “No one disputes that trade unions and state bodies should and will penetrate each other mutually (“merging”)”( Stalin I. V. Op. V. 5. P. 4). Lenin could not have been unaware of it and did not object, although the term “merging” referred to a fundamentally important issue around which passions were seething. Somewhat later (1921), in a draft plan for the brochure “On the Political Strategy and Tactics of the Russian Communists,” Stalin formulated his vision of the integration of the party and the state in the following way : organs of the latter and inspiring their activity” (Stalin I.V.Op. T. 5. S. 71). Who knows, perhaps such a vision of this problem by Stalin played a role when Lenin thought about a policy that could take a key place in the political system of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Notes:

[1635] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 402-404.

[1636] Ibid. S. 402.

[1637] Ibid. pp. 403–405.

[1638] Ibid. pp. 404–406.

[1639] Startsev V.I. Political leaders of the Soviet state in 1922 - early 1923 // History of the USSR. 1988. No. 5. S. 118, 119.

[1640] Volkogonov D.A. Stalin. Political portrait. Book. 1. S. 150.

[1641] Kumanev V.A., Kulikova I.S. Confrontation: Krupskaya - Stalin. S. 20.

[1642] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 385, 386-387:

[1643] Ibid. S. 384.

[1644] Ibid. pp. 346–347, 387, 449–450.

[1645] Ibid. pp. 343, 344.

[1646] Ibid. pp. 347–348.

[1647] Ibid. pp. 354–355.

[1648] Ibid. S. 443.

[1649] Ibid. S. 445.

[1650] Ibid. pp. 343, 347, 348, 383–387, 445.

[1651] Ibid. pp. 393–394, 396, 405–406.

[1652] Ibid. pp. 348, 386, 387.

[1653] Ibid. pp. 343, 347–348, 354, 384–386, 391–398, 399–400, 445.

[1654] Ibid. S. 347.

[1655] Ibid. S. 354.

[1656] Ibid. pp. 442–443.

[1657] Ibid. S. 384.

[1658] Ibid. S. 398.

[1659] Ibid. S. 406.