Lenin's political testament: the reality of history and the myths of politics

Selected articles from the book “Lenin's political testament: the reality of history and the myths of politics” by Sakharov V.A.

PDF Download book

Origins Of Evaluations and Proposals of Notes on the National Question

Article that is not included in the translated book -" reality of history and the myths of politics"

A number of fundamental assessments and proposals formulated in the notes "On the Question of Nationalities" or "Autonomization" surprised the delegates of the 12th Congress. The delegates tried to explain to themselves and others the obvious contradiction between what they knew about Lenin's views on these problems and about his attitude towards individual political figures involved in this conflict, on the one hand, and what was written in Lenin's notes submitted to him, - on the other. A.S. Yenukidze, for example, was surprised by the criticism of G.K. Ordzhonikidze, and believed that it was the result of "one-sided incorrect information" that came to Lenin [1067].
A.I. Mikoyan spoke of a strange theory that demanded "to go too far" and go for the formal and actual introduction of inequality between peoples in order to achieve correct international ties between them.

Stalin pointed to Lenin's "forgetfulness" as the reason for the appearance of several reproaches in the notes. Considering how Stalin responded to Fotieva's letter, in which she informed him of the existence of Lenin's "article" ("he did not interfere in this matter") [1068], it can be assumed that Stalin doubted Lenin's authorship of it. All this suggests that many contemporaries, reading this "article", found themselves in a difficult position, and impossible not to believe in Lenin's authorship, and if you believe it, the question immediately arises of the reasons for such changes in Lenin's views. Looking for an answer, under these conditions, for people who were privy to the struggle that took place around Lenin, the question of authorship received the only possible and, as it seemed, natural explanation: illness and intrigue did their job.

If Lenin, without sinning against the truth, could not say that the process of the formation of the USSR passed him by, then the question arises: which of the leaders of the party could say that this problem had passed him by? Molotov and Kuibyshev were supporters of Stalin. Apparently, Rykov also stood in close positions. Tomsky's position is unknown, but as an opponent of Stalin, he did not declare himself at that time. In September-December 1922, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Bukharin, and Kalinin spoke out against Stalin's plan of "autonomization" and in support of the national deviationists in one way or another. However, they took an active part in the preparation of the unification of the Soviet republics and in the settlement of the conflict in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia.

Of the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), only Trotsky could say something like this about himself:

it was frankly ignored by Lenin in those cases when the discussion about the form of federation became most acute; he did not take an active part in the preparation of this question for the October and December (1922) Plenums of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), for the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR [1069].

An analysis of the text of the notes more than once prompted us to think about the closeness of the positions of their author with the views of Trotsky. The motive, or pretext (conflict in the KKE) and the time of addressing the problems of the Union also coincide - after its formation. Both are trying to use the Georgian conflict in order to give it a fundamental importance, to cast doubt on the expediency of the formation of the USSR.

Of course, what has been said is not enough to point to Trotsky as the author (or co-author) of these notes. Additional arguments are needed.

We think they are contained in a set of materials developed by a commission composed of N.P. Gorbunova, L.A. Fotieva and M.I. Glasser, created by Lenin at the end of January 1923 to study the materials of the Dzerzhinsky commission, but in fact engaged in the preparation of a political attack against Stalin.

Historians and publicists sometimes used these materials, but only as a carrier of political information and were not analyzed as a historical source. Meanwhile, such an analysis sheds light on the problem of interest to us.

The commission included Gorbunov, head of affairs of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, as well as two technical secretaries of the Leninist secretariat (hereinafter we will call it the commission of the Council of People's Commissars). It is believed, however, that Lenin endowed her with enormous powers - to give her assessments of the decisions of the highest state and party bodies, including the Central Committee and its bodies, the Politburo, the Organizing Bureau, and the Secretariat. But there are no direct instructions from Lenin on this score.

It is unbelievable that Lenin put a group of technical workers of his apparatus above the highest party bodies, handed over to their judgment a complex of the most complex political problems that caused discussion in the leadership of the RCP (b) and national party organizations, as well as an acute conflict in the Communist Party of Georgia. In addition, the members themselves, fulfilling Lenin's instructions and turning to the Politburo for materials, did not call themselves a "commission".

For the first time, the commission announced itself in two notes that differ in addressee and signatures: a note dated January 25 is addressed to Stalin (has an address - “comrade Stalin”) and signed by Fotieva and Gorbunov, and a note dated January 27, signed by Fotieva, Glasser and Gorbunov, is addressed to otherwise:

"To the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP comrade Stalin."

The text of both notes is the same:

“On the instructions of Comrade Lenin, personally handed over by Comrade Fotieva, we ask for your order to provide us for the required period of time with all the materials of the Georgian Commission available in the secretariat of the Central Committee for detailed study with the obligation to keep them in the strictest confidence” [1070].

Politburo documents do not give grounds to believe that it was perceived as a commission endowed by Lenin with broad political powers. For its part, the Politburo did not grant her any political rights. On February 1, 1923, the Politburo actually considered their application “on the issuance of the materials of the Georgian commission to them for study on the instructions of Comrade Lenin” and decided:

“Allow the Secretariat of the Central Committee to issue materials”, and “postpone the question of the report to Lenin until the conclusion of Prof. Foerster” [1071].

The name "commission" appears later, obviously, in the course of work, and is recorded in the heading of the archival file, in which the accumulated materials are collected ("Draft materials on the "Georgian issue" of the Commission of the Council of People's Commissars, created on behalf of V.I. Lenin as part of N.P. Gorbunova, L.A. Fotieva, M.I. Glyasser”) [1072].

Its political position and opportunities were determined not by the position of Lenin, but by the fact that it was a "commission of the Council of People's Commissars." In other words, the commission is not a party one. And this immediately clarifies a lot both in its composition and in its competence. It could not play an independent political role, since in the then existing system of power it was the Communist Party that used the state as the main instrument for implementing the dictatorship of the proletariat.

But its position as a commission of the Council of People's Commissars must also be clarified. The decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR to create such a commission is unknown to historians. The absence of an official status could mean one thing - Lenin was not going to attach any political independent significance to this commission and oppose it to any official party or state instance, in particular to the same commission of the Central Committee, with the materials of which it was supposed to familiarize itself. There remains only an auxiliary, purely technical role - to prepare the material in order to bring it to Lenin in a form convenient for him. This was also recognized by a member of the commission, M.I. Glasser in a letter to Bukharin, defining its tasks as follows:

“to familiarize themselves with the materials of the commission of comrade Dzerzhinsky” (our italics. - B.C.) [1073].

So, the task facing this commission of the Council of People's Commissars was to prepare the materials of the Dzerzhinsky commission for Lenin to familiarize himself with them. The boundaries of the "Georgian question", as it was understood then, were outlined quite clearly - by the conflict in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, caused by attempts by part of the Central Committee of the KKE to revise the decision of the October (1922) Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), their criticism of the style and methods of work of the secretary of the Regional Committee of the RCP (b) ) Ordzhonikidze, including the slap incident. We have the right to expect coverage of precisely these questions in the materials that the commission accumulated and analyzed. However, as we will see below, its actual work differed significantly from the task set before it was created.

The correspondence of the members of the commission, as well as draft versions of the documents that it prepared, make it possible to see the programmed work of its members, the political orientation of their efforts, and raise the question of the connection between the work of the commission and the notes “On the Question of Nationalities or “Autonomization””.

It is believed that Lenin led the work of this commission. Glyasser and Fotieva left a number of entries about this in the Diary of Duty Secretaries, but their stories are refuted by the entries of the doctors on duty [1074]. In a note dated February 5, Glasser reports a 20-minute conversation with Lenin. It is important because it contains Lenin's orders regarding the tasks and prerogatives of this commission. According to Glasser, Lenin, describing the commission's functions as "very uncertain", set tasks for the near future and warned that the commission should take into account the possibility of "expanding" the range of issues and the volume of work by attracting "additional materials."

The planning of the work and the determination of the timing of its completion, as well as the determination of the “form” that should be given to the prepared documents, was postponed for the future (“we will decide in the coming weeks”), but for now he ordered only “to be guided by the need to compile a general overview of all data on those issues which the commission has outlined, as well as on those questions that he will ask us during the work” [1075]. If we evaluate these attitudes from the standpoint of the traditional historiographic scheme, then politically they meant Lenin's desire to have freedom of maneuver in order to fully use the "Georgian incident" against Stalin. However, the doctors ruthlessly negate all of Glasser's efforts, stating that after dinner (that is, at the time Glasser points out) Lenin slept, "then he read in the evening" [1076].

Lenin really worked with the secretary that day, but in the morning. The morning work was recorded by Fotieva, who, however, does not write anything about the discussion of the “Georgian issue”.

This entry by Glasser, fabricated as a diary, is very important for understanding the history of the work of the so-called "Leninist commission" - it serves as the only evidence of Lenin's desire to significantly expand the tasks originally assigned to the "commission", and, apparently, is intended to explain the appearance among its materials of those that go far beyond the range of functions declared at the Politburo and recorded in its self-name.

This entry by Glasser largely devalues her testimony about Lenin's leadership of the work of the commission, contained in her letter to Bukharin dated January 11, 1924, that Lenin "already had his own preconceived opinion, literally supervised our work and was terribly worried that we would not be able to prove in his report what he needs and he will not have time to prepare his speech before the congress” (our italics. - B.C.) [1077].

As evidence of Lenin's leadership of the work of the commission, a recording of questions supposedly dictated by Lenin is used [1078]. But this document is not dated*, not signed, and nothing speaks in favor of its Lenin authorship. Confidence in authorship is based only on the authority of the workers of Lenin's secretariat, which, as we now understand, is clearly not enough to finally resolve this issue. The political orientation of the note is quite consonant with the notes "On the question of nationalities ...", which, at first glance, indicates that it belongs to Lenin. However, the first three questions deal with facts known to Lenin for a long time, and the fourth one points to an attempt to link Ordzhonikidze's assault with the suppression of political opponents. Such an attitude requires an explanation, since all the eyewitness accounts received by Lenin, as shown above, exclude such a connection.

The sixth question is formulated as if its author had no conversations about this story with Dzerzhinsky and Rykov after their return from Georgia. Only the fifth question - about the "line" of the Central Committee under Lenin and in his absence - seems natural, but in itself it cannot testify to the Leninist authorship of the note, since it is of a general nature.

If, nevertheless, we admit that these questions belong to Lenin, then one cannot avoid the conclusion that much has already been forgotten by him. The latter is not excluded, but in this case, the conclusions and proposals contained in the notes “On the Question of Nationalities ...” are depreciated. However, the documents dictated by Lenin in December 1922 - early February 1923 say that one should not overestimate the influence of the disease on one's intellectual abilities.

This circumstance is an argument against Lenin’s authorship of the note. Who is its author?

The materials of the commission of the Council of People's Commissars contain another very interesting note reflecting the internal work of the commission, its methods. In the Complete Works of V.I. Lenin, this note was published with some distortions [1079]. Like the first, it is not signed, dated, or registered. It is believed that Lenin's will is expressed in it. However, its content makes one doubt Lenin's authorship.

The note consists of three different blocks-grouping of actions. The first contains an attitude that cannot be assessed other than as intrigue or pressure on the Chairman of the Central Control Commission A.A. Soltz. It shows a disloyal attitude towards other members of the Central Committee. There is no reason to believe that Lenin, in order to influence the solution of an issue that he considered important and fundamental, had to resort to hints from Solts and, in addition, from "someone else."

The questions of the second block are related to paragraph 1 of the first block, devoted to the assault on Ordzhonikidze, and are surprising, since they record Lenin's ignorance of Stalin's attitude to this story ("Did Stalin know?" "Why didn't he react?").

It is difficult to understand these questions if they were raised by Lenin, since he knew the answers to them - they are in the decision of the Politburo to send a Dzerzhinsky commission to investigate the conflict in the Communist Party of Georgia.

As regards the third bloc, it is difficult to understand why the accusation of a deviation towards chauvinism and Menshevism testifies to the existence of this "sin" among the Great Powers. This idea finds no support in Lenin's works.

In addition, if we assume, as it is customary in traditional historiography, that Stalin is considered the main "great power" and accept on faith the thesis that this paragraph is directed against him, then the reproach of a tendency to Menshevism will have to be attributed to his account. The question arises, what does Stalin have to do with Menshevism?

We know nothing about whether Lenin ever reproached him for Menshevism or any inclination towards it. But it is well known who actively exploited the thesis that Stalin was a bad Bolshevik in 1917. This is Trotsky. All this makes one doubt Lenin's authorship of the note, in any case, its authorship cannot yet be considered proven.

How the installation for the work of members of the Commission of the Council of People's Commissars looks like a record stored in its working materials and drafts:

“Group [material] not so much in defense of the deviationists, but in accusation of the great powers” [1080].

It is extremely important for understanding what the group led by Gorbunov was really doing. The fact is that the note does not belong to Lenin since it is dated March 12, 1923 - a time when his condition excluded any possibility of giving any instructions due to the loss of the gift of speech. There is no indication in its text that it contains a record of instructions given earlier by Lenin.

It is fundamentally important to note the following: it is clear from the text that its author was little concerned about defending the views of the Georgian national deviationists. He was interested in something else - how to hurt Stalin, Ordzhonikidze and other so-called "great powers", in other words, supporters of the formation of the USSR as a federation with a strong center. This position is in complete harmony with the views of the author of the notes "On the question of nationalities or "autonomization"" but has no support in Lenin's documents. It is known that Lenin sharply condemned the Georgian national deviationists for the fact that after the October (1922) plenum they began to fight against the decisions of the plenum on the formation of the USSR [1081].

Thus, the instruction, which clearly is not of Lenin and at the same time is in complete harmony with the text of the notes on the national question, is guiding for the members of the commission. Moreover, it suggests that someone sent its work to prepare a "bomb for Stalin" after Lenin had lost all ability to work. It is clear that this note is a trace of political intrigue under the guise of Lenin's name.

What has been said, of course, does not mean that we deny the very fact of Lenin's work with the members of the commission and his guidance of their work. However, it must be admitted that we do not have reliable information about exactly how Lenin carried out this leadership, in what direction he oriented its members, and there is no reason to say that he directed their work to prepare a "bomb for Stalin." Is it possible to point to any politician closely associated with Lenin's secretaries who would not support the demands of Mdivani and his supporters regarding forms of a federation of the republics and, at the same time, would be interested in using their struggle against Stalin personally? Yes, it is possible.

It is well known that Trotsky, who had close contacts with Lenin's secretaries, precisely at this time (February-April 1923, during the preparation of the XII Congress of the RCP (b)) intensified his attacks on the positions occupied by Stalin and the majority of the Politburo and the Central Committee of the party, in defense of the Georgian national deviators (without lifting a finger to protect them at the XII Party Congress). Trotsky is therefore, if not the only, then the main contender for the role of the Author of this "article".

Among the materials of the commission there is a draft of a document called “Summary of the letter to the provincial committees and regional committees about the conflict in the Communist Party of Georgia”, which was based on the letter of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) to the provincial committees and regional committees about the conflict in the Communist Party of Georgia dated February 5, 1923 [1082] This is a typewritten text, also dated February 5, 1923 [1083] Obviously, this was the first document created by the commission. The next phase of her work is marked by the document "The main points of disagreement with the Zakkraykom, according to which the Central Committee of the KKE [ruzia] received the name "deviators"".

The text is typewritten, with handwritten corrections, not dated, not signed [1084]. The deferred documents testify that during February the commission collected materials. It received letters from supporters of Mdivani from the Communist Party of Georgia with accusations against Ordzhonikidze and on February 22 sent to him with a cover letter stating that Lenin instructed the members of the commission to “study all available materials on the Georgian issue for a report to him” with a request to give an answer on the merits the issues raised in them.

Ordzhonikidze categorically denied the allegations against him. “As for the incident with Kabakhidze,” he wrote, “I would suggest asking the Central Control Commission and Comrade Rykov, an eyewitness to this incident, — it will be more objective” [1085].

The commission requested Rykov, and as a result, his testimony appeared in its materials (which was discussed in the first part of the book). At the same time, a request was sent to the Central Control Commission to send all the materials on this conflict, to which an answer was received - a statement about a “slap in the face” of Kabakhidze was not received by the Central Control Commission [1086].

In the course of work, the commission prepared not one document, as it is believed, but a number of separate certificates, each of which has its own sheet numbering. At the same time, they constitute a single block of texts, which is indicated by the fact that the texts are preceded by a list of prepared documents, and signatures are only under the last of them [1087].

This allows references to be viewed as a single document. The first reference is titled “Summary of the Conflict in the Georgian Communist Party” (this name is taken as the name of a single document). In particular, it says that the members of the old Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia (i.e., the Mdivani group) relied in their work on the instructions of Lenin and Stalin and diverged from the policy pursued by Ordzhonikidze.

It is alleged that the old Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia resigned due to harassment by Ordzhonikidze, that the commission of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) under the chairmanship of Dzerzhinsky had its own opinion even before leaving Moscow, that the Central Committee of the RCP (b) approved the conclusion of the Dzerzhinsky commission, which did not resolve the conflict in the CP of Georgia, as a result of which the crisis escalated [1088].

The second reference, "A summary of the main disagreements, on which the group of the Central Committee of the KKE [Rusians] was called "deviators", and the decisions of the 1st Congress of Soviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" - is a list of the main disagreements between Ordzhonikidze and the old composition of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia.

At the same time, Stalin as the "culprit" of the aggravation of the conflict in the Communist Party of Georgia or the defender of the "erroneous actions" of Ordzhonikidze is not visible in them. It was alleged that the Zakkraykom and the new composition of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia are persecuting the workers of the old composition, which aggravates the situation in the party and the republic [1089].

In the next reference - "The fight against "deviations"" - it was stated that after the resignation of the old composition of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, the situation in the party, through the fault of the Zakkraykom and the new composition of the Central Committee, had significantly worsened, the squabble was growing [1090].

This conclusion is based on the statements of the members of the old composition of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, the opinion of the opposing side is ignored, which indicates the partiality of the members of the commission and the one-sided nature of their conclusions. In addition, they base all conclusions only on papers, not knowing the real situation on the spot. The following help is called:

““Some examples” of abuses of a truly Russian nature” (See V.I. Lenin’s article “On the Question of Nationalities or “Autonomization”).” It contains a number of minor facts objectively designed to justify the position and behavior of members of the old composition of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, ie the Mdivani group) [1091].

This is followed by references “Accusations of poor implementation of the land reform” and “Accusations of the weakness of the struggle against the Mensheviks”, followed by “Quotes from the speeches of the Zakkraykom group and members of the Dzerzhinsky Commission”, containing criticism of the position of the national deviationists in the field of nation-state construction, which give an idea of the intensity of the political struggle and the methods of its conduct [1092], this complex ends with a text called “On the Conclusions of the Dzerzhinsky Commission”, in which its work is given a negative assessment. At the end of it are the signatures of Fotieva, Gorbunov and Glasser. Below in the left corner of the sheet is the date - "3/III-1923" [1093].

This document of the commission reveals an interesting connection with the notes "On the question of nationalities or "autonomization"".

The idea of Ordzhonikidze's responsibility for all the problems in the Communist Party of Georgia, running like a red thread through the documents prepared by the commission, found its "classic" expression in the notes:

Ordzhonikidze gave a slap in the face, which means that the whole political line is wrong [1099].

If we accept the traditional version of the primacy of the "Leninist article" in comparison with the documents developed by the "Leninist commission", then we will have to admit that the technical workers of the Council of People's Commissars who compiled it not only, without a twinge of conscience, appropriated Lenin's thoughts regarding Ordzhonikidze, formulated in the "article", but also persistently tried to convince him of the "sinister" role of Ordzhonikidze, already fully appreciated in the "article". Collecting dirt on him, they "bursted through the open door."

What for? This work acquires meaning only if the materials it collected preceded the appearance of the notes "On the Question of Nationalities" or "Autonomization"".

In the materials of the commission of the Council of People's Commissars, as well as in the notes on the national question, the very criticism of Ordzhonikidze is only a means and a way to "hook" the deeper layers of policy in the field of nation-state building and justify the need for its radical change.

If the members of the commission were indeed faced with the task of preparing a "bomb for Stalin"**, then one would have to admit that it was unable to fulfill this task. Its members did not find anything that could compromise Stalin, presenting him as a person who covered up the misbehavior of Ordzhonikidze, responsible for him. It turns out, on the contrary, that it was Stalin who proposed to take the most stringent organizational measures against Ordzhonikidze. Here is Zinoviev's story: “Sergo is 20% to blame.

The commission [of Dzerzhinsky. — B.C.] had the conclusion even before leaving Moscow. If not for the authority of the Central Committee, Makharadze would have had a majority in the party.

A compromise is planned (Zin[oviev] with Stalin). To their congress (II Congress of the KKE. - B.C.) they send two author[itetnye] comrades. Kuibyshev and Bukharin or Kamenev. Zinoviev, Trotsky, Bukharin, Kamenev do not agree with Ordzh[onikidze's] line (hesitates). The letter *** was sent with the majority of those abstaining.

Compromise [—] return some of the deviators.

Zinoviev [considers] - Ordzh[onikidze] must be left.

Stalin - you can send [him] to Turkestan for a year" [1100].

The proposal to send the offender to work in Turkestan in such cases was considered as a kind of party exile. No documentary data confirms the thesis that the Dzerzhinsky commission “had a conclusion” before leaving Moscow, although its members, of course, could have had their own opinion (since the conflict dragged on for a long time).

The thesis about the guilt of Ordzhonikidze by 20% also suggests that Zinoviev did not regard his guilt in this conflict as the main one. Zinoviev's admission is interesting that if it weren't for the authority of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), Makharadze would have had a majority in the KKE. The wording itself testifies to a certain regret of the author about the fact that the Central Committee has such authority among the Georgian communists and betrays in him a supporter of the Georgian national deviationists.

Could Lenin regret the involuntary recognition of the power of the authority of the Central Committee, reproach it with Stalin and support those who fought against the authority of the Central Committee of the party, which Lenin himself considered as the most important factor in maintaining the party's power in the country? More than doubtful.

Perhaps this note was not included in the final text of the prepared documents because it did not contain any serious compromising evidence against Stalin or Ordzhonikidze. In this regard, we note that in the notes “On the Question of Nationalities or “Autonomization”,” reproaches against Stalin and Ordzhonikidze also remained unelaborated, unreasoned.

But the most important thing is that the documents being prepared contain a number of political provisions that make it possible not only to question Lenin's authorship of the notes "On the Question of Nationalities ...", but to argue the assertion that Lenin was not their author.

The first typewritten version of the document being prepared (undated) [1101] ends with a very interesting conclusion:

“In conclusion, our commission comes to the conclusion that the comrades from the old composition of the Central Committee of Georgia incorrectly raise the issue and weaken their position when they say that they have no fundamental differences with the Zakkraykom group, but there are only tactical ones. Since Zakkraykom, in his striving to fight "deviationism," showed deviation towards great powerism, which seems to us sufficiently clear from the materials, the disagreements are political in nature and should be put forward at the upcoming congress of the Communist Party” (emphasis added. - V.S.) [1102].

That's where the technical secretaries, coupled with the manager of the Council of People's Commissars, have gone! We must appreciate this political gem. Its authors take responsibility for criticizing the work of the Dzerzhinsky commission, which studied this conflict on the spot and only confirmed the opinion of those who had dealt with this problem before. Political audacity, surprising for this commission with technical functions, is shown frequently. So, for example, the Zakkraykom, elected by the communist parties of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, uniting, and coordinating their activities, has already turned into a “group” among the members of the commission. Did they themselves think of this before or did they write under someone's dictation?

Who could stand behind the members of this "commission"? Apparently, a significant political figure stood behind the technical workers of the Leninist secretariat. Now we cannot name anyone specifically, but it is noteworthy that in the course of subsequent intra-party discussions, representatives of various opposition groups, including Trotsky, more than once resorted to this method - declaring the majority of the party opposing them a faction, and Party organs under the control of this majority are factional organs.

Was the advice addressed to Lenin to change the assessment of the differences and to introduce the question to the Party Congress? Apparently not. If he was the author of the notes “On the Question of Nationalities...”, then why does he need to prove that the disagreements between the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and the national deviationists are of a fundamental nature?

The author of the notes has already brought the personal conflict between Ordzhonikidze and Kabakhidze to a fundamental level:

“If it came to the point that Ordzhonikidze could go too far to use physical violence ... then you can imagine what a swamp we flew into. Apparently, this whole idea of "autonomization" was fundamentally wrong and untimely" [1103].

Here this idea is repeated more than once****, although it is not formulated so definitely. Moreover, notes begin with her: The author decides to fight against the supporters of "autonomization" precisely at the stage of preparing the party congress, which, in principle, could return to this issue and revise it during the preparation of the II Congress of Soviets, at which it was planned to adopt the constitution of the USSR*****.

If we take on faith the Lenin's authorship of these notes, then we will have to admit that the members of the commission rewrote for Lenin the provisions formulated by him as their own. Why convince Lenin of what he himself convinces others?

It is also important to note that in their confrontation with the Central Committee of the party, the members of the commission take a much more militant and radical position than Mdivani, Makharadze and other Georgian national deviationists. This is the only way to understand their instructions on how to fight against the decisions adopted by the Central Committee of the RCP(b), i.e. refuse formal recognition of the decisions of the October and December (1922) Plenums of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) and openly attack them. In practice, they propose to start an escalation of the political struggle not only within the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks, but also in the party.

They suggest that the national deviators should discard as now harmful the disguise of their true position by talking about limiting differences to tactical approaches to solving the problem, and that they should build up their pressure on the Central Committee.

It is time to remember that in October 1922 Mdivani wrote to Kavtaradze about the need to use precisely this method of disguising his intentions. This letter was at the disposal of the commission, and its members, of course, knew it. It turns out that the members of the commission suggested that Lenin use the same method in the struggle against the Central Committee that Mdivani and his supporters used in their struggle against the Central Committee and Lenin! If we take into account that Lenin knew this letter from Mdivani, then the question is inevitable, was this advice intended for Lenin?

The assertion that “Zakkraykom, in its desire to fight “deviationism”, showed deviation towards great power” (highlighted by us. - B.C.) [1104], also echoes the well-known position of the notes “On the question of nationalities, or about “autonomization””:

the one who “disdainfully hurls accusations of “social-nationalism” (while he himself is a real and true not only “social-nationalist”, but also a rude Great Russian bullshit), he ... in essence, violates the interests of proletarian class solidarity” [1105].

At first glance, there is nothing surprising in this. Simply, the members of the commission, who knew Lenin's notes, repeated the position formulated in them, giving it a more precise formulation.

The answer is simple, but the question is not so simple. Why are Lenin's technical secretaries, together with Gorbunov, telling Lenin about this as something new for him, as about a conclusion made by them on the basis of the material studied (which Lenin did not know and only expected to get acquainted with it in their processing).

Why are they proving to Lenin that the fighters against deviationism are themselves deviationists, if Lenin dictated this to them long ago? If they borrowed this proposition from Lenin's article, then we would have the right to expect that they would somehow indicate that their conclusion is only a confirmation of the conclusion made by Lenin. But from the context it is clear that the members of the commission do not remind Lenin of his conclusion, they convince Lenin of the correctness of their conclusion. This means that this council of the commission appeared before the notes on the national question were created. And it was not intended for Lenin. No less significant is the fact that the members of the commission, if we take seriously the Lenin's authorship of the notes "On the Question of Nationalities ..." and the time of their creation (December 30-31, 1922), are pounding on the open door.

In connection with the assessment of the work of the Dzerzhinsky commission, members of the commission of the Council of People's Commissars set the task of "correcting incorrect and biased judgments" [1106].

In the notes "On the question of nationalities ..." this provision is also available and looks like this: "To investigate or investigate again all the materials of the Dzerzhinsky commission with a view to correcting that huge mass of inaccuracies and biased judgments that undoubtedly exist there" [1107].

And again, the question: why convince Lenin of what he had been convinced for a long time, what he himself tried to convince others of, what was the basis of his alleged directives to the members of the commission? It would be understandable if all these assessments and advice were contained in a document addressed to anyone, but not to Lenin. Tell him his own conclusions, made one or two months earlier, as the original conclusions of the members of the commission? It's hard, or rather, impossible to believe. The members of the commission could use the provisions contained in the notes as they pleased, with one exception, namely: they would not prove to Lenin what he had already proved. Otherwise, what was their help, what was the meaning of their work? If the coincidence between the "earlier" notes "On the question of nationalities ..." and the "later" documents of the commission were single, one could assume that it was accidental. But there are many such coincidences, and they concern only fundamental issues, those that carry the greatest political burden in the notes. Those on which Lenin, on the one hand, and the author of the notes, on the other, occupied different positions.

All this gives us the right to make an assumption (so far only an assumption) that this manuscript preceded the appearance of the notes "On the Question of Nationalities or "Autonomization"" or that they were created almost simultaneously - in the period not earlier than February-March 1923. Therefore, the time Lenin's work on the notes, as well as the very fact of his authorship, are legendary.

We have the right to assume that the members of the commission of the Council of People's Commissars were involved in the process of creating notes, the author of which Lenin was not. That the positions formulated by the members of the commission or written down by them from other people's words later acquired the form of "Lenin's" notes "On the question of nationalities or "autonomization"". If we take into account that some working notes of the members of the commission of the Council of People's Commissars date from the time when Lenin had already lost all ability to work, then this assumption develops into confidence. Who is the commission for? Clearly not for Lenin. For what? Above, one document of the commission dated March 12 [1108] was analyzed.

The fact that the commission of the Council of People's Commissars may have continued to work at the end of March 1923 is evidenced by the correspondence between the member of the commission, the technical secretary of the Politburo Glassser and Trotsky at the meeting of the Politburo on March 26, 1923, which was deposited in the fund of the Lenin Secretariat, regarding the protocol recording of Trotsky's speech at this meeting.

When asked to clarify the wording of his statement, Trotsky replied that after Ordzhonikidze's speech, his doubts about the correctness of his policy "intensified a hundred times" [1109].

Glasser's note and Trotsky's reply are autographs on a notebook sheet, undated[1110].

This correspondence is a document related to the office work of the Politburo, therefore, the very fact of its being in the materials of the Lenin secretariat among those documents that entered it after Lenin had lost all efficiency ****** requires an explanation.

They can say: he was deposited there by accident.

Glasser brought and forgot. In principle, this is not excluded, but in this case it is impossible to accept such an explanation for the simple reason that Ordzhonikidze, about whose speech Trotsky writes, was not present at the meeting of the Politburo.

Members of the Politburo Zinoviev, Kamenev, Stalin, Trotsky, Tomsky, Rykov, candidates Molotov and Bukharin, as well as invited members of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) Rudzutak, Dzerzhinsky, N.I. Smirnov and Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR Tsyurupa [1111].

Having considered Trotsky's proposal "to recall Comrade Ordzhonikidze", the Politburo decided to reject it by five votes against two, who supported Trotsky[1112]. Ordzhonikidze was in Tiflis that day, where Stalin sent a telegram with information that the Plenum of the Central Committee was scheduled for March 31, 1923 and the addressee needed to come to it[1113].

Thus, Trotsky could not listen to Ordzhonikidze's speech, therefore, this correspondence is a falsification of a later origin*******. In this case, it becomes clear why these Politburo documents ended up in the materials of the Commission of the Council of People's Commissars:

it was impossible to attach them to the documents of the Politburo, since forgery could be found in the archive of a functioning organization, and in the materials of the emerging fund of Lenin's secretariat - it was possible ********.

These facts, together with information about the state of Lenin's health on March 3-6, virtually exclude the possibility of Lenin's acquaintance with the documents prepared by the commission. Consequently, there is no reason to believe that he decided that the “bomb for Stalin” was already ready, that it was time to break off all relations with him and for this he turned to Trotsky for support, that at last the time had come to openly support the Mdivani group, etc., etc. And along with this, the history of the transfer to Trotsky, on the initiative of Lenin, of the notes “On the Question of Nationalities or “Autonomization””, as well as the sending of letters to Trotsky on March 5 and 6, 1923 for Trotsky and Mdivani, etc.

If the commission worked on the documents after Lenin completely ceased political activity, when he could not use them, then for whom were the certificates prepared by it intended?

Obviously, for someone who could implement these guidelines at the XII Party Congress and give battle to the supporters of the line on the formation of the USSR as a single state.

The names of the most active fighters who went the farthest in this struggle are known:

Mdivani, Rakovsky, Bukharin and others. In February 1923, in the process of preparing the XII Congress of the RCP (b), Trotsky joined them, openly speaking in support of the Georgian national deviationists.

Just at this time, the work of the commission of the Council of People's Commissars began, which continued until the end of March, i.e. practically until the eve of the congress - until the moment when the notes "On the Question of Nationalities ..." were "thrown" into political life by Fotieva, a member of this commission, and witnessed by Trotsky.

Didn't Gorbunov, Fotieva and Glyasser work for him under the cover of the legend about the preparation of materials for Lenin on the "Georgian conflict"? *********

* In the Complete Works of Lenin, the authors of the notes “tie” this document to the entry for February 1, 1923 of the Diary of Duty Secretaries (V. I. Lenin, Poln. sobr. soch. Vol. 45. P. 607). This date is not substantiated.

** The fact that such a task was set before them and solved by them is evidenced by the materials of the commission cited above, as well as by Glasser in his letter of repentance to Bukharin dated January 11, 1924.

*** Apparently, this refers to the letter of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) to the provincial party committees regarding the Georgian conflict, adopted on January 27, 1923 (RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 32. L. 5-6; F 17. Inventory 3. D. 341. L. 9-15), a summary of which was prepared for Lenin by members of his commission.

**** It also resounds in letters to Trotsky, Mdivani and others allegedly dictated by Lenin on March 5 and 6.

***** Of course, it is strange that he does not address the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR, which opened just on December 30th. But this, after all, is his, the Author's, business.

****** They are in the file, the materials of which are devoted to the situation in the Communist Party of Georgia in the first months of 1923 (RGASPI. F. 5. Inv. 1. D. 34) and are thematically related to the problems that members of this commission.

******* Attention is drawn to an interesting roll call with the "Letter to the Congress" - there doubts are the basis for the removal of Stalin from the post of general secretary, here, too, doubts entail a proposal to transfer Ordzhonikidze from the post of secretary of the Zakkraykom.

******** If we accept the version that Trotsky's political interests were reflected in the notes "On the question of nationalities or "autonomization"", then the fact of the presence of Dzerzhinsky among those criticized for the act of Ordzhonikidze - "guilty without fault" gets a natural explanation.

Trotsky, forced to "give" the NKPS to Dzerzhinsky, at that time had a negative attitude towards him. The clash over the issue of the Lomonosov commission also did not help to improve their relations. Politically, Dzerzhinsky at this time firmly stood on the positions of Lenin, supporting his views on the NEP.

********* In addition, some other documents may have been used in preparing the notes on the national question. The roll call of the assessments contained in N.N. Narimanov to Lenin dated February 19, 1922. From the letter it is clear that the moods and views expressed by the Author of the notes were widely used in the republics of Transcaucasia, and his own terminology was also used.

Narimanov, in particular, wrote: “I have oral and written reports on the situation and attitude of all the outlying autonomous republics towards us. All the reports speak of the colonial policy of Soviet Russia (our italics. - B.C.)." Narimanov wrote that the Cheka was terrorizing local workers, that the representatives of the Center themselves were "the first rude nationalists." “They only believe you,” Narimanov admits. And this situation was tolerated only as long as the war was going on.

Members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) were acquainted with this letter. There were no objections on the substance of Narimanov's assessments, and Kamenev wrote that Narimanov was three-quarters right (RGASPI. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 24503. L. 1-1 rev.). Note that there is not a word about Stalin and Ordzhonikidze.

The “Caucasian” origin (or “Caucasian” influence) of some provisions of the notes is indicated by the fact that the problem of unification of railway transport was topical for its Author. For all the republics, except for the Transcaucasian ones, it was no longer politically and economically topical.

Notes:

[1066] Ibid. S. 158.

[1067] Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Stenographer. report. S. 541.

[1068] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 9. S. 156.

[1069] RGASPI. F. 17. 2. D. 84. L. 1; D. 87. L. 1.

[1070] Ibid. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 32. L. 1, 3.

[1071] Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 332. L. 5.

[1072] Ibid. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 33.

[1073] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 9. S. 163.

[1074] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45, pp. 476-478, 480-481; Questions of the history of the CPSU. 1991. No. 9. S. 50; Centaur. 1991. October-December. pp. 100, 102.

[1075] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 480–481.

[1076] Centaur. 1991. October-December. pp. 100-101.

[1077] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 9. S. 162–163.

[1078] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 606-607.

[1079] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 32. L. 22v. -23; Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 607.

[1080] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 33. L. 96.

[1081] See: Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 54. S. 299-200.

[1082] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 32. L. 5–6.

[1083] Ibid. D. 33. L. 37–38.

[1084] Ibid. D. 32. L. 7–17.

[1085] Ibid. L. 46, 48, 50.

[1086] Ibid. L. 19–19 rev.

[1087] Ibid. L. 52, 73.

[1088] Ibid. L. 53–54.

[1089] Ibid. L. 55–57.

[1090] Ibid. L. 58-60.

[1091] Ibid. L. 61–62.

[1092] Ibid. L. 63–68.

[1093] Ibid. L. 69–73.

[1094] Buranov Yu.A. On the history of Lenin's "political testament" (1922-1923) // Issues of the history of the CPSU. 1991. No. 4. S. 55; Nenarokov A.P. Seventy years ago: the national question at the XII Congress of the RCP(b) // Domestic History. 1993. No. 6. S. 116.

[1095] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 33.

[1096] Ibid. L. 2, 3, 6–9.

[1097] Ibid. L. 106–109.

[1098] Ibid. L. 1.

[1099] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 356.

[1100] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 32. L. 42–42 rev.

[1101] Ibid. L. 39–50.

[1102] Ibid. L. 50.

[1103] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 356.

[1104] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 32. L. 50.

[1105] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 360.

[1106] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 33. L. 96.

[1107] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 361.

[1108] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 33. L. 96.

[1109] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 9. S. 153.

[1110] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 34. L. 2–2 rev.

[1111] Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 343. L.?

[1112] Ibid. L. 3.

[1113] Ibid. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2523. L. 1.