Lenin's political testament: the reality of history and the myths of politics

Selected articles from the book “Lenin's political testament: the reality of history and the myths of politics” by Sakharov V.A.

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Lenin, Stalin And Trotsky In The Discussion About The Monopoly Of Foreign Trade

In historiography and public consciousness, at the suggestion of Trotsky, the idea was firmly established that the discussion on the issue of maintaining the regime of the monopoly of foreign trade contributed, on the one hand, to the strengthening of Lenin’s political alienation from Stalin, Kamenev and Zinoviev, and on the other hand, to his political rapprochement with Trotsky and the establishment of between them is a political bloc directed against the majority of the Politburo and the Central Committee. This version conveys real events in a distorted form.

A sharp discussion about the fate of the monopoly of foreign trade and the improvement of the mechanisms and methods for its implementation was carried out in the leadership of the RCP (b) from the end of 1921, when this regime, established on April 22, 1918 [636], began to be criticized as a relic of the times of "war communism ". Lenin immediately advocated the inviolability of this monopoly. On March 3, 1922, he wrote to Kamenev:
“For quite a long time I thought about our conversation (with you, Stalin, and Zinoviev) about Vneshtorg and the line of Krasin and Sokolnikov. My conclusion is that Krasin is certainly right. We cannot now retreat further from the monopoly of foreign trade... Otherwise, foreigners will buy up and take out everything of value” [637].

As can be seen, disagreements in the Leninist group on this question were already evident even before the Eleventh Congress. They did not affect the political relations between Lenin and Stalin, Stalin became the general secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). This discussion, which gave rise to uncertainty in an important political issue, was known abroad and had a negative effect on the development of contacts with Germany - the only industrially developed capitalist state that politically recognized Soviet Russia and expressed readiness for broad economic cooperation with it (Rapallo Treaty of April 10, 1922, G.).

This circumstance gave the question of monopoly a new twist and additional poignancy. In an effort to remove obstacles to the development of foreign economic relations with Germany, on May 15, 1922, Lenin submitted to the Politburo a draft resolution confirming the monopoly of foreign trade [638], and on the same day he wrote to Stalin and M.I. Frumkin: “I think that all conversations, negotiations, and commissions, etc. should be formally banned. on weakening the monopoly of foreign trade” [639].

In a letter to Lenin, Stalin wrote:

“I have no objection to the formal prohibition of steps towards weakening the monopoly of foreign trade at this stage. I think, nevertheless, that weakening is becoming inevitable. [640]

Similar views were held by most members of the Politburo, including Kamenev, Zinoviev, Trotsky, People's Commissar for Finance G.Ya. Sokolnikov and N.I. Bukharin. Thus, three positions took shape in the Politburo. The discussion continued. Sokolnikov continued to insist on a revision of the foreign trade regime. By the autumn of 1922, this issue became even more acute due to the inability of state bodies to ensure the export of grain, which had a negative impact on the flow of foreign currency. At the insistence of Sokolnikov, the issue was submitted to the October (1922) Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), which on October 6, in the absence of Lenin, according to the report of Sokolnikov (M.I. Frumkin, P.A. Bogdanov and L.M. Karakhan took part in its preparation) considered the issue "On the regime of foreign trade". Unfortunately, the protocol did not record the course of the discussion; only a resolution is known that corresponded to the position of the majority of the Central Committee:

“a) Without declaring any changes in relation to the monopoly of foreign trade, to pass a number of separate resolutions of the CTO on the temporary permission of import and export for certain categories of goods or in application to certain borders.

b) Propose to the CTO to immediately begin the implementation of these measures, without postponing them until the development of a common list of goods to be imported or exported, as well as ports and borders through which import and export must be carried out. At the same time, the composition of the commission was determined to carry out this decision through the CTO (Sokolnikov, Frumkin, Pyatakov, Bogdanov, Lezhava). It was decided to discuss the list of goods allowed for import and export with local authorities [641].

On October 12, the chairman of the Centrosoyuz, L.M. Khinchuk sent Lenin a letter criticizing the decision of the Plenum. On the same day, People's Commissar for Foreign Trade L.B. Krasin spoke in the press against the decision of the Plenum, arguing his objections with the fear that the export of wealth would begin from the country, and so on. Lenin regarded the decision of the Plenum as an attempt to preserve the foreign trade monopoly regime. On the same day, he talked with Stalin about the measures that were to be taken to implement the decision of the Plenum, in particular on the opening of the Petrograd and Novorossiysk ports. Lenin believed that the desire of the peasants to sell grain abroad would push them to fight against the Soviet regime, and foreigners would take out all the surplus grain, while the stock in case of war was still small [642].

Obviously, Stalin did not agree with Lenin. He, like most members of the Central Committee, believed that the permission to trade not only through Foreign Trade, but also through other state organizations, as well as the improvement of the apparatus of Foreign Trade, do not destroy the regime of foreign trade monopoly. But the proposals of the supporters of the abolition of the monopoly—Bukharin and Sokolnikov—were rejected*. A situation of certain misunderstanding arose between Lenin and the majority of the Central Committee.

In a letter to Stalin (for the Politburo)* written on October 12–13, 1922, Lenin criticized Sokolnikov’s argument and the decision of the Plenum, which “establishes an apparently unimportant, partial reform ... But in reality this is a disruption of the monopoly of foreign trade”.

Lenin believed that it was impossible to establish effective control over the activities of purchasing offices, which were granted the right to export. A situation will arise incomparably more complicated than that which smuggling can create. He proposed to improve the existing system of foreign trade, and not to abandon or destroy it, leaving complete chaos in its place.

Lenin expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that this question was introduced at the Plenum "hastily", without a careful study of all the consequences and without a preliminary serious discussion.

“Where is there even a shadow of a correct attitude to the matter? Tired people will vote in a few minutes and that's it. We weighed less complex political questions many times and often took several months to decide.”

Referring to his absence from the meeting of the Plenum due to illness, Lenin asked for "a certain exception to the norm" and suggested "postponing the solution of this issue for two months, i.e. until the next plenum, and until then to put together the consolidated and verified documents on the experience of our trade policy” [643].

On October 12, the Politburo, after discussing Krasin's article and Lenin's proposals, decided to instruct the Secretariat to question all members of the Central Committee in Moscow regarding postponing the final decision on the question of the monopoly of foreign trade to the next Plenum, and in the event that there was not a majority of the respondents in favor of this proposal, to refer the question to the decision of the next meeting of the Politburo. Krasin was instructed to provide the members of the Central Committee with all the materials within two days [644].

A number of written replies to the Secretariat's inquiry have been preserved, indicating that almost all of the respondents agreed with Lenin's proposal to postpone the final decision of the issue, without changing, however, their opinion on the merits. Only Zinoviev opposed Lenin's proposal. On October 14, he wrote to Stalin:

“I am strongly against reconsidering the decision ... both for formal reasons and in substance. In the article T. Krasin (apparently, he believed that it was she who embarrassed Lenin. - BC) I see nothing but demagoguery. I vote against any revision."[645]

Interestingly, the most active and principled opponents of Lenin - Sokolnikov and Bukharin - took a more flexible position than Zinoviev: they agreed with a second discussion of this issue. On October 14, Sokolnikov, in a letter to Stalin, supported “Comrade Lenin’s proposal to postpone the decision on the monopoly of foreign trade”[646].

Bukharin, in principle, was against reconsidering the decision, but agreed to meet Lenin halfway for tactical reasons. On October 17, he wrote to Stalin that he considers the fears of Lenin and Krasin unfounded, since they ignore the losses that the country suffers due to the inability to "mobilize the peasant commodity fund", which is the fault of the poor apparatus of the Foreign Trade. He thought it would be better if the partner capitalists make a profit, than agricultural products will remain unsold. While agreeing to postpone the final decision for another two months, he noted that this would lead to additional financial losses. Bukharin explained his consent to wait by the fact that such an important issue could not be resolved if the Central Committee of the party wavered [647].

On October 14, Kamenev informed Stalin that he “agreed to revise it at the first meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee” [648].

Stalin also agreed to a second consideration of the issue, declaring that he remained committed to the decision: “

“Letter from Comrade. Lenin did not dissuade me of the correctness of the decision of the plenum of the Central Committee of the 6/10 on foreign trade ... Nevertheless, in view of Comrade Lenin's insistent proposal to postpone the decision of the plenum of the Central Committee by execution, I vote for the postponement of so that the question would be again brought up for discussion at the next plenum with the participation of Comrade Lenin” [649].

On October 16, based on a poll, the Politburo decided to postpone the issue of the monopoly of foreign trade to the next Plenum of the Central Committee [650]. Trotsky's answer is not at the disposal of historians. Either he was not asked (he was on vacation), or he evaded answering.

Having received the consent of the members of the Central Committee to return to the question at the next plenum, Lenin began to prepare for the struggle for a revision of the decision taken, to collect material in favor of a decision on maintaining the regime of monopoly of foreign trade intact. The weightiest arguments were presented by the Trade Commissioner of the RSFSR in Germany, B.S. Stomonyakov [651]. Until December 12, Lenin did not feel any need for Trotsky's help to resolve the issue of maintaining the monopoly of foreign trade.

On December 12, Lenin sent Trotsky for review a letter he had received from N.N. Krestinsky, in which he reported that the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade would have a catastrophic effect on the development of economic relations with Germany. Lenin asked Trotsky whether he agreed with Krestinsky and informed him that he would "fight at the plenum for monopoly" [652].

On the same day, Trotsky replied to Lenin, formulating his attitude to this problem:

“The preservation and strengthening of foreign trade monopoly is a matter of absolute necessity... On the other hand, modifications, and improvements in the methods of foreign trade monopoly are absolutely necessary.”

The last statement is rather vague and in general corresponds to the decisions of the October (1922) Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b). It turns out that Trotsky seemed to agree with Lenin, but immediately stipulated that he was not against any change. Why did he take this position? Perhaps the answer lies in the statement that followed immediately, which can be regarded as an attempt to sow distrust in Lenin towards the members of the Central Committee, to present them as double-dealers:

“But now even the actual opponents [of the monopoly] of foreign trade are not conducting frontal offensives against it, but are acting with complex roundabout maneuvers ... There is a danger, that under the guise of improving the methods of exercising a monopoly, measures can be slipped in that essentially undermine the monopoly” [653].

Declaring that he finds it difficult to choose between the options of the Deputy People's Commissar of the RCT V.A. Avanesov (the largest economic organizations - syndicates, concerns - trade under the control of Vneshtorg), on the one hand, and on the other - N.N. Krestinsky and B.S. Stomonyakov (trade missions trade as specialized economic bodies), Trotsky brought the question of monopoly to the problem of restructuring the entire economic mechanism, which Lenin opposed.

“The most important issue, however, has been and remains the regulation of our foreign trade from Russia in connection with all economic work in general. Someone needs to know and decide what can be imported and what cannot, what needs to be exported and what needs to be kept for oneself. Solutions are needed here not in terms of legislative regulation, immovable nomenclature, but practical, changing, always adapted to economic needs, taken in their entirety. This, obviously, should have been the work of the State Planning Commission, which, in turn, stands under the sign of the development of state industry. But this is a special topic, about which I have written more than once. [654]

As can be seen, Lenin and Trotsky, considering the question of the monopoly of foreign trade, agreed in its general formulation, disagreeing on the same point in which Lenin disagreed with the Plenum of the Central Committee, but, more importantly, Trotsky entered this monopoly into a completely different scheme than Lenin. economic mechanism. As a result, there was a coincidence in the approach to solving a particular (albeit important) issue, while maintaining the confrontation in the main one. In addition, if Lenin was worried about how to export, then Trotsky was worried about what to export and who decides.

The next day, December 13, in a letter to Frumkin and Stomonyakov, Lenin announced that he had received a letter from Trotsky and that he agreed with him

“in everything essential, with the possible exception of the last lines about the State Planning Commission. I will write to Trotsky about my disagreement with him and about my request to take upon myself, in view of my illness, the defense of my position at the plenum”.

Agreement on everything essential meant that Lenin, in principle, accepted the variants of both Avanesov and Krestinsky and Stomonyakov, that between them one could and should choose the best one. Consequently, Lenin took a definite step towards the position taken by the Plenum of the Central Committee, including Stalin, Kamenev, and Zinoviev. Here, for the first time, Lenin suggested that this issue could be brought up for discussion by the communist faction of the Congress of Soviets and the upcoming party congress if the Plenum “does not get agreement” [655].

Indeed, at the same time, Lenin writes to Trotsky:

“I think that you and I are getting the maximum agreement, and I think that the question of the State Planning Commission in this formulation excludes (or postpones) the dispute about whether administrative rights are needed for the State Planning Commission” [656 ].

It is noteworthy that the dispute is withdrawn or postponed only when the question is “posed in this way”, and it consisted in a proposal to resolve it in a practical, and not legislative, plan. It means, that the question of reorganizing the system of administration in this case is not on the table, and in this situation (with the “present formulation of the question”) Lenin could find a common language with Trotsky on one, separately taken question. In a letter to Trotsky, he repeated his proposal to transfer the question to the faction of the Congress of Soviets and the Party Congress in the event of a defeat at the Plenum. The fact that Lenin only repeated this proposal makes it impossible to regard it as an offer to Trotsky of an alliance against the Central Committee of the Party.

On the same day, December 13, Trotsky sent a note to Lenin, in which, for his part, he recorded agreement on a particular issue, while maintaining disagreements on the main one:

“ within the limits of the question of the monopoly of foreign trade, I think that we have complete agreement ... On the question of the State Planning Commission, I retain my old point of view, but this question does not, it seems to me, violate the unity of position on the question of foreign trade. [657]

On the same day, Lenin received a letter from Frumkin, in which he expressed “concerns that the question of the monopoly of foreign trade could be removed from discussion at the Plenum because Lenin could not participate in it.

“I would consider it absolutely necessary to put an end to this matter. The further uncertainty of the situation disrupts all work,”

writes Frumkin and asks Lenin:

“Would you find it possible to discuss this issue with Stalin and Kamenev” [658].

Lenin complied with this request. On December 13, he had a long conversation (2 hours 5 minutes) with Stalin, during which the question of discussing this issue at the Plenum of the Central Committee [659] was also touched upon.

The next day Lenin spoke with Kamenev. On the morning of December 15, Lenin wrote to Trotsky:

“I believe that we have completely come to an agreement. I ask you to declare at the plenary session our solidarity. Hope our decision goes through for a part of those who voted against in October are now going over partly or completely to our side” [660].

There is every reason to believe that when Lenin spoke of the members of the Central Committee who revised their positions, he also had in mind Stalin. Intrigue (in the spirit of Trotsky's stories) is introduced into this text by the words "on our side." It turns out that Stalin (according to Trotsky, fearing his bloc with Lenin) went over to their side. However, it turns out that the words "on our side" are inscribed in the text of Fotieva's Lenin manuscript***. In this letter, Lenin proposes for the third time to appeal to the faction of the Congress of Soviets and the Party Congress if “our decision” does not pass at the Plenum. In the context of the letter, "our decision" can no longer be regarded as a bloc of Lenin and Trotsky directed against Stalin and the Central Committee.

After dictating the letter, Lenin then asks Fotieva to contribute to it, an addendum, not yet sent to Trotsky, containing a request to protest if the question of postponing the discussion arises [661]. And after that he sends another letter with an urgent request to oppose attempts to postpone the solution of this issue due to the absence of Lenin himself and again expresses the idea of the expediency of raising the question of monopoly at the party congress [662].

Trotsky, and after him the literature following in his wake, fix their attention and their readers only on that part of the correspondence between Lenin and Trotsky, in which they declared the unity of their positions regarding the preservation of the monopoly of foreign trade. But, as can be seen, it also contains another part that is organically connected with the first - statements about the persistence of the previous disagreements on the question of the State Planning Commission. True, in correspondence it occupies a smaller place, but it plays an equally important role. Having achieved unity of position on the question of the monopoly of foreign trade, Lenin made no attempt to bring his position closer to Trotsky on the question of the State Planning Commission. And this is understandable. Here is a situation of choice. Either a change in the "legislative" capabilities of the State Planning Commission as a commission of experts, or an expansion of the administrative ("administrative") rights of the State Planning Commission as an operational planning body.

The positions of Lenin and Trotsky on the question of the monopoly of foreign trade converged exactly as far as their differences on the fundamental issues of the NEP allowed. It should also be noted that Lenin and Trotsky fit the question of the monopoly of foreign trade into completely different ideas about the NEP. For Lenin, it is an effective way to protect the socialist economy and a sufficient condition for its growth. And for Trotsky, this is just a step towards creating conditions for establishing a planned economy and for the functioning of the economic mechanism built according to his scheme, but the condition is not sufficient to ensure its development and the victory of socialism.

Trotsky tries to present these contacts as an offer by Lenin to him of a political alliance, directed with its edge against Stalin, Kamenev, and Zinoviev.

In historiography, most often this statement of Trotsky is accepted as corresponding to the truth and not in need of verification and proof. So, E. Radzinsky believes that this alliance predetermined the inevitable defeat of Stalin [663]. Critical attitude is rare. H.A.Vasetsky calls Trotsky's statements "a clear exaggeration of Lenin's favorable attitude towards him" [664], nevertheless recognizing, in this way, the fact of "favor".

Lenin, however, clearly shows a political calculation. In Lenin's letters it is impossible to find traces of a proposal to Trotsky for a political alliance directed against the Central Committee of the party and, in particular, against Stalin [665]. This is the conclusion made on the basis of the analysis of the texts of Lenin's letters. To establish whether Trotsky is right, one must find out, first, what the political conditions were at the moment when Lenin turned to Trotsky to clarify his position. Secondly, did Trotsky really share Lenin's views on the monopoly of foreign trade. Thirdly, did Lenin need a political alliance with him against Stalin and other members of the Central Committee.

Due to the aggravation of his illness, Lenin could not take part in the work of the December (1922) Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and again could not personally influence the course of the discussion, therefore every extra vote “for” the preservation of the monopoly was important for him. Trotsky's position was also important. He also did not participate in the work of the October (1922) Plenum of the Central Committee and did not reveal his attitude to the decision. For this reason alone, there are no grounds for presenting Lenin's written question about Trotsky's position as an offer to him of a political alliance.

In addition, Lenin could not have been unaware that Trotsky was not opposed to changing the foreign trade monopoly regime. For example, at a meeting of the Politburo on June 26, 1922, he did not object to Zinoviev's proposals aimed at limiting it [666].

In different ways, they assessed the effectiveness of the monopoly as a means of protecting the economic interests of the state. Lenin believed that it makes it possible to fight against smuggling, which he wrote to the members of the Central Committee (through Stalin) on October 13, 1922, challenging those who argued that “it doesn’t matter, they say, and smuggling against the monopoly is also in full swing” [667].

Trotsky belonged precisely to the number of those with whom Lenin argued. He made no secret of his skepticism about the possibility of a foreign trade monopoly becoming a reliable barrier to smuggling. It is no coincidence that at the Twelfth Party Congress, in a report on the work of industry, Trotsky “sang out” both “for the health” of monopoly and “for the repose” of it: having declared himself as a principled supporter of monopoly [668], he immediately began to assert that “smuggling ... will break barriers, and no monopoly of trade, no border guard will protect us from the pressure of the world market” [669].

Such a statement means that he actually took a position much closer to Bukharin's than to that held by Stalin, Kamenev, and Zinoviev.

All this testifies to the politically opportunistic nature of Trotsky's position and behavior. In correspondence with Lenin, he was clearly cunning. Rather, he tried to play in his favor the contradictions that arose between Lenin and the majority of the Central Committee, including his closest associates. However, be that as it may, Trotsky was among those whom Lenin could rely on in the fight against his irreconcilable opponents - Bukharin and Sokolnikov. Trotsky's voice here, of course, was useful, it could and should have been used. But not for the political struggle against Stalin, Kamenev, and Zinoviev. December 13, i.e. at a time when not only the closeness, but also the difference between their positions was fully revealed, Lenin sent a lengthy letter to Stalin for the Plenum of the Central Committee with a detailed argumentation of his position in favor of maintaining the monopoly of foreign trade. His blow is directed against Sokolnikov and Bukharin, and not against Stalin, Kamenev, and Zinoviev. Not a word about Trotsky, about his position, authority, and the importance of his support [670]. And not because the negotiations with Trotsky were conducted in secret. Lenin did not hide them, and Stalin knew about them.

On the other hand, by the time Lenin and Trotsky reached an agreement on their position on the question of the monopoly of foreign trade, the moods of parts of the members of the Central Committee had also changed. Additional material and conversations with Lenin prompted Stalin, Kamenev, and Zinoviev to change their previous position and speak out in support of Lenin's position before the Plenum of the Central Committee [671]. On December 15, Stalin informed the members of the Central Committee of the Party by letter:

“In view of the new materials accumulated over the past two months on the question of foreign trade (materials of the commission of comrades Yaroslavsky and Avanesov, on the one hand, and materials of comrade Stomonyakov on the revival of negotiations with interested capitalists on the organization a number of large mixed foreign trade companies - on the other hand), speaking in favor of maintaining the monopoly of foreign trade, I withdraw my objections to the monopoly of foreign trade, which I communicated in writing to the members of the Central Committee two months ago. [672]

The removal of disagreements with Stalin meant that Lenin no longer had any significant disagreements with him on questions of economic policy.

Trotsky claims that Stalin, on the issue of monopoly in December 1922, "sensing danger, retreated without a fight" [673]. The entire proof of this thesis rests on the fact that Stalin's statement about changing his former position followed only on December 15, i.e. following the agreement reached between Lenin and Trotsky.

But, firstly, the date of the letter does not mean that Stalin changed his mind precisely on the date indicated, this could have happened a little earlier. Secondly, there is no reason to believe that Stalin was more amenable to political pressure than, for example, Bukharin and Sokolnikov, who did not change their views. Thirdly, it is unlikely that Stalin had to be afraid of creating a political alliance between Lenin and Trotsky, while maintaining disagreements on more important issues of the NEP and the principles of building an economic mechanism.

Trotsky hints that it was his agreement to support Lenin that allowed the latter to insist on considering the issue of monopoly at the December Plenum and not allow a new postponement (it is not clear who made such a proposal) under any pretext [674].

This point of view is not well founded. From Lenin’s letter to Trotsky of December 15, it is clear that it was not Trotsky’s support that allowed him to put the question in this way, but other circumstances:

“the most important thing: further hesitation on this most important issue is absolutely unacceptable and will disrupt all work” [675].

In addition, Lenin’s statement about the inadmissibility of postponing the discussion to the next Plenum because of his illness was made when an understanding was reached among the main supporters of Lenin in the Politburo on this issue, therefore, the acceptance of Lenin's proposal was secured. The question has matured, the conditions for the victory of Lenin's point of view have developed. I had to make a decision. Trotsky's position was important, but not decisive.

Negotiations with Trotsky took the form of correspondence only because Lenin avoided personal contact with him. And conversations with Stalin and Kamenev did not leave written traces precisely because they were conducted in the course of personal meetings. Thus, the correspondence itself speaks not so much of Lenin's political closeness to Trotsky (even on this separate issue), but of Lenin's distancing from him even in the situation when he was interested in his support.

This is also evidenced by Lenin's appeal on December 14, 1922, to Em. Yaroslavsky**** with a request to record the discussion at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) [676].

“Lenin called me to his office,” he recalled, “and talked with me about raising the question of maintaining the monopoly of foreign trade in the Plenum of the Central Committee. At that time he was very worried that this question would not be revised in the sense desired by Lenin, that is, in the sense of canceling the previous resolution of the Plenum, and he was especially worried about the position of Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin and Sokolnikov.

Lenin therefore sought to secure support for his proposal. Lenin knew that Stalin had already expressed himself in a letter to the Politburo that he was in favor of maintaining the monopoly. He asked me to come to terms with Comrade. Trotsky and jointly defend the issue in the Plenum of the Central Committee, and if necessary, then transfer it to the faction of the Congress of Soviets ... To speak on the basis of such an agreement on this issue with Comrade Trotsky about a bloc against Zinoviev and Kamenev Lenin with Trotsky in general, it would be completely wrong. During my almost hour-long meeting with V.I. Lenin, he never hinted to me about his fundamental differences with the Politburo on other questions, although Lenin, I remember, spoke not only about the monopoly of foreign trade, I can least of all admit that Lenin had in mind some kind of stable "bloc" with Trotsky. He, in my opinion, treated him precisely as a former Menshevik ... and only defended with the help of Comrade Trotsky a certain line on the issue of maintaining the state monopoly of foreign trade ... I think that Lenin would not have limited himself only to the advice to come to an agreement with Trotsky on this issue, if I had in mind a longer "bloc": after all, I was then a member of the Central Committee, and, indirectly, though, Lenin would have initiated me into the emerging combination" [677].

On December 16, a sharp deterioration in the state of health of V.I. Lenin, and in the evening N.K. Krupskaya asked Yaroslavsky at the Plenum of the Central Committee to record for Lenin the speeches of Pyatakov, Bukharin, and, if possible, others on the question of the monopoly of foreign trade [678]. Apparently, Lenin did not expect information about the discussion at the Plenum on this issue from Trotsky (there is no direct appeal with such a request in correspondence with him), but from Yaroslavsky, who was Trotsky's political opponent. This fact gives additional grounds for doubting Trotsky's interpretation of his contacts with Lenin regarding the forthcoming discussion at the Plenum of the Central Committee.

In this context, Lenin’s statements that his absence from the Plenum is not an obstacle to discussion, as well as his words in a letter to Stalin for members of the Central Committee that “Trotsky will defend my views no worse than I” [679], should be perceived. It is of fundamental importance that he writes to Stalin about this, not hiding from him, as his like-minded person, the agreement reached with Trotsky and acquainting him with his plan of action.

It is clear from Lenin's letter that Stalin for Lenin is not an adversary against whom Trotsky must act, but an ally whom Lenin introduces to the battle on his side another major political figure, about whom Lenin intended to fight at the Plenum is well known from Lenin himself - against Bukharin, Sokolnikov and Pyatakov. There was no anti-Stalinist orientation in this correspondence between Lenin and Trotsky.

On December 18, 1922, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) considered the question of the monopoly of foreign trade and adopted decisions agreed with Lenin. V.A. Kumanev and I.S. Kulikov argue that the decisions Lenin insisted on were made thanks to Trotsky, since he was able to prove "the fallacy of the previous resolution" and "get it canceled." The authors do not provide any evidence to support the formulated thesis; moreover, they ignored the obvious facts. They take away from Lenin his victory, secured by his efforts and his authority, and pass it on to Trotsky. It turns out that it was not Lenin's preliminary work that ensured that the Plenum changed its previous decision, but Trotsky's argumentation at the Plenum[680]. Radzinsky goes further and turns Trotsky into the main speaker on the question of monopoly at the December Plenum [681].

A handwritten draft of the decision of the Plenum of the Central Committee on the question of the monopoly of foreign trade has been preserved, the very decision that some historians associate with Trotsky's activity. The draft shows that the preparation of the draft decision proceeded without the participation of Trotsky. The draft was written in ink, judging by the handwriting, by Stalin and signed by Stalin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev. The first is Stalin's signature, it was made in the same ink as the text was written, which also testifies in favor of the Stalinist authorship of this document. The signatures of Zinoviev and Kamenev are in different inks. The draft was amended by Zinoviev's hand, he also wrote paragraph "1a" of the resolution [682].

The resolution was introduced in the name of Zinoviev, who, as everyone knew, had previously opposed concessions to Lenin on this issue. This could achieve a demonstration of the unity of all members of the Leninist group on this issue. However, the signatures under the draft resolution prepared by Stalin mean that, if not formally, then in fact it was introduced on behalf of the "troika" - Stalin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev.

The document is not dated. Correspondence between Lenin and Stalin dating back to the same time on the question of the monopoly of foreign trade, their negotiations in personal meetings, Stalin’s statement about withdrawing his objections, Lenin’s confidence that the question was ready and should not be postponed, as well as the fact that Lenin was satisfied with the adoption of this project ( and it was he who was accepted) gave grounds for the assumption that this document could have been drawn up on December 13-15 and, perhaps, shown to Lenin at the same time [683]. Since no questions regarding the preparation of a draft decision were discussed with Trotsky, there is therefore reason to believe that the approval of the draft went around it. In any case, it is clear that under these conditions there was no political need for Lenin to conclude a political alliance with Trotsky in order to fight his supporters in the Politburo.

This question was considered at the morning session of the Plenum of the Central Committee on December 18, 1922 [684] The minutes of the meeting do not contain information about the progress of its discussion, but there is a story by Zinoviev at the XII Party Congress:

“ such, but that this should not prevent the largest regional units from conducting foreign trade a little more independently” [685].

The draft prepared by Stalin, Kamenev and Zinoviev was unanimously adopted by the Plenum. It said:

“Adopted the resolution proposed by Comrade Zinoviev, with some amendments from Comrade Frumkin's resolution. Further, “the unconditional need to preserve and organizationally strengthen the monopoly of foreign trade” was confirmed, and it was proposed “to issue, in the party order, a strict instruction explaining this resolution of the Central Committee and forbidding, under pain of severe punishment, speeches against the monopoly of foreign trade in negotiations with representatives of foreign capital in Russia and abroad and with an indication of the serious harm of discussions on the question of monopoly, which give the capitalist world an idea of our instability on this issue. The People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade was required to establish strict control over the observance of the monopoly regime, to bring to trial the tribunal of its violators and report to the Central Committee on cases of violation of the monopoly of foreign trade. The decision of the previous Plenum to weaken this regime was canceled, it was instructed to “establish a fixed list” of economic agencies, which were granted the right to “direct trade on the basis of Decree 16/X under the control of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Trade and Trade (with the right of veto of the latter)” [686].

Both in the draft prepared by Stalin and in the resolution adopted by the Plenum, the emphasis was placed on the fact that the rejection of the monopoly could disrupt agreements with Western firms, which indicates the influence of those materials that VS Stomonyakov sent to Lenin and to which Stalin referred in his statement of 15 December [687].

The issues that separated Lenin from Bukharin, which he pointed out in his letter to Stalin (“they,” they say, they can ruin us) [688], were not reflected either in the draft or in the decision of the Plenum, perhaps because the fundamental decision on the preservation of the foreign trade monopoly regime made the arguments against them unnecessary. Since the decision adopted corresponded to what Lenin wanted, we have every reason to believe that he was satisfied with it. In any case, at the Twelfth Party Congress, when Zinoviev, in the political report of the Central Committee, announced the victory of the point of view advocated by Lenin [689], no one objected to him, no one protested this statement. Including Trotsky. Some information about the discussion is given by Yem's memoirs. Yaroslavsky:

“The Plenum of the Central Committee adopted Lenin's proposal, although there were debates; and it was accepted, if my memory serves me correctly, unanimously. In any case, there was nothing in the speeches of Zinoviev and Kamenev that would indicate their serious differences with Lenin. Therefore, writing down briefly the course of the debate for a note to Lenin (which he agreed with me the day before, that I would send him such a secret note), I tried in every possible way to reassure Ilyich, pointed out in a note that he had no fundamental differences with the Plenum of the Central Committee. I remember that I wrote the note itself under the impression of the agitated state in which I left with Ilyich. [690]

The minutes of the meetings of the Plenum (both the manuscript and the official typewritten copy) and other documents do not record any activity of Trotsky when discussing the issue of the foreign trade monopoly [691]. Trotsky himself, nowhere in his numerous memoirs, also said nothing about exactly how he defended Lenin's position at the Plenum, nor did he state that thanks to his activity, the decision that pleased Lenin so much was made. There is no reason to believe that Trotsky somehow influenced the decisions made. It is not surprising, therefore, that he was not assigned any special role in the implementation of the decisions of the Plenum.

Further events developed, judging by the information of Yaroslavsky (his letter to Fotieva and Volodicheva of January 22, 1924), as follows. Yaroslavsky gave his note to Lenin's secretaries.

“Volodicheva gave someone to copy my note, and the typist, imagining for some reason that it was Comrade Stalin’s manuscript, turned to him for information about the word that was not clearly written”[692].

Here it was revealed that Lenin, bypassing the Central Committee, was sent another document - Yaroslavsky's "secret note". Obviously, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) at the next meeting was acquainted with Lenin's request and adopted a special resolution on the conditions for informing him about the decisions *****:

“In the event of a request from Comrade Lenin about the decision of the Plenum on the issue of foreign trade, by agreement between Stalin and the doctors, inform him of the text of the resolution with the addition that both the resolution and the composition of the commission were adopted unanimously.” [693].

With regard to Yaroslavsky’s notes, it was decided:

“The report of Comrade Yaroslavsky should not be transmitted in any case now and kept in order to be transmitted when the doctors allow it by agreement with Comrade Stalin” (our italics. - V.S.) [693].

Apparently, the ban concerned only Yaroslavsky's notes, and not the decision of the Plenum. It is clear that this “agreement” does not mean Stalin’s conspiracy with the doctors against Lenin, but the clarification of the opinion of the doctors, obtaining permission from them to transfer documents.

The first part of the resolution may have been prepared by Stalin and printed in advance, before being submitted for consideration by the Plenum. The second part of it (the last paragraph (indent)) has a completely different character. Firstly, it is entered into the typewritten text of the original by Fotieva’s hand:

“Comrade Stalin is to be personally responsible for the isolation of Vladimir Ilyich, both in relation to personal relations with employees and correspondence” [694]

There is also her note:

"Not a written solution."

It is not clear why this decision was not recorded in the minutes, why, by whom and when it was decided to enter it. A possible answer is that after this resolution was edited and printed, it was announced at the Plenum and it was also decided to place personal responsibility on Stalin. Yem. Yaroslavsky confirms these assumptions, reporting (in a letter to Fotieva and Volodicheva dated January 22, 1923) that the first part of the decision was adopted first (although it is not very clear what is considered the first part, but it can be assumed that this is a printed text) [ 695].

Secondly, this point cannot be explained, like the previous ones, by a sharp deterioration in the state of Lenin's health, since it did not refer to Lenin himself, but to those who could come into political contact with him. Its wording indicates that the Central Committee feared a violation of the ban by someone from Lenin's inner circle. This could be expected either on the part of the secretaries (it was difficult for them to resist Lenin), or on the part of N.K. Krupskaya, who, due to her position, could neglect the usual ban or inadvertently violate it, since she did not always control herself in conversations with Lenin. About the presence of this "weakness" in Krupskaya M.I. Ulyanova wrote:

“Most of all, it was necessary to fear that V.I. didn’t tell anything to N.K., who was so accustomed to sharing everything with him that sometimes, completely involuntarily, without wanting to, she could let it slip” [696].

This decision could not have been intended to conceal the essence of the decision taken and the results of the vote, since this information should have been communicated to him immediately. Two extracts were made from the minutes of the Plenum of the Central Committee, one - for Lenin - was handed over to Fotieva (registered with the Lenin secretariat in December 1922), the second - for Stalin [697] ******.

It is believed that further events developed as follows. On December 21, Krupskaya told Lenin about the decision of the Plenum and, under his dictation, wrote a letter to Trotsky:

“It was as if we had managed to take a position without firing a shot with a simple maneuvering movement. I propose not to stop and continue the offensive, and to this end, to carry out a proposal to raise at the Party Congress the question of strengthening foreign trade and measures to improve its conduct. Announce this at the faction of the Congress of Soviets. I hope you won’t object and won’t refuse to make a report to the factions” [698].

This letter is perceived as Lenin's. However, it raises a number of source-related questions. The absence of a manuscript and a signature under it is easily explained by illness, but it is more difficult with other issues. Firstly, for some reason it was not registered with the Lenin secretariat. In addition, and secondly, in the published version of this letter, the postscript allegedly made by Krupskaya is omitted. Of interest is not its text itself (“V.I. also asks to call him an answer”), but the signature placed under it - “N.K. Ulyanov". This is surprising, since Krupskaya always signed with her last name - "Krupskaya". This is how she signed other documents written these days [699].

Thirdly, there is not even an original written by her hand, there is only a copy from a copy. Is it possible in this case to treat such a letter with confidence? I think not! In any case, it cannot be made the basis of judgments, giving it priority over the totality of other documents, the authenticity of which is beyond doubt.

In addition, the content of this letter is in clear contradiction with the well-known documents on the preparation of the discussion at the Plenum of the issue of the monopoly of foreign trade and the course of its discussion: the concern about the decision, which Lenin allegedly expressed [700], is unclear. The letter contains a proposal to transfer this question to the faction of the Congress of Soviets and to the Party Congress. Lenin expressed these thoughts several times in the course of his correspondence with Trotsky, but in a different context - in the event that the Plenum did not support the proposal to preserve the monopoly of foreign trade. But the Plenum supported Lenin's proposal, and Lenin was completely satisfied with the decision. It is unclear what now was driving this proposal. It is curious how Trotsky himself interprets this letter: after reading the decision of the Plenum, Lenin proposed to him a political bloc against the Central Committee:

“he insisted that I should appeal against the Central Committee to the party and the congress” [701].

Let us ask ourselves the question: why did Lenin need to make an alliance with Trotsky against his supporters and plan a fight against the Central Committee of the RCP (b) at the party congress for maintaining the monopoly of foreign trade? Why "break through the open door"? Maybe because the members of his group in the Politburo and the Central Committee did not immediately identify with him? Well, what about Trotsky? Didn't he consider it necessary to record the difference between his views and Lenin's on a question that was more general and important in relation to the question of monopoly?

These doubts, at first glance, are removed by Kamenev's letter to Stalin, in which he reports that Trotsky received this letter from Lenin.

“Tr[otsky] called me last night. He said that he had received a note from Starik, in which Starik, expressing his satisfaction with the resolution on Vneshtorg adopted by the plenum, nevertheless asks Tr[otsky] to make a report on this issue to the faction of the congress and thereby prepare the ground for raising this issue at the party congress. The point, apparently, is to consolidate this position. Trotsky did not express his opinion but asked that this question be referred to the commission of the Central Committee for holding the congress. I promised him to hand it over to you, which I am doing.” [702]

However, not everything is clear with this letter of Kamenev. Three members of the Politburo are aware of Lenin's written proposal to put the question of the monopoly of foreign trade on the agenda of the faction and the party congress, but this question is never discussed in practical terms. Suppose Stalin and Kamenev did not want to stage it, but why didn't Trotsky insist? Why not only did he not come out in the faction, but did not respond at all to the call for help contained in the letter?

It is not only documents that are silent about Trotsky's activity, Trotsky himself is also silent: often telling about this story, he never spoke about any actions taken by him in this direction. Further, the document is not dated, not registered (there are no traces of registration on it) either in the secretariat of Kamenev or in the secretariat of Stalin). Is it possible to be sure that it belongs to this time? There is no reliable evidence. Moreover, there is a strange typo in the text - instead of the words "the resolution adopted by the plenum" it was first written "the resolution adopted by the congress."

It is strange only if the letter was written immediately after the plenum. If we assume that this note was created later (and we have the right to do this), then the passage of time easily and naturally explains not only the strange “mistake”, but also the lack of registration, and the contradictory combination of satisfaction with the decision and fear for its fate, and ignoring The Politburo of Lenin's proposal to discuss the report at the faction of the Congress of Soviets and at the XII Congress of the RCP (b).
Kamenev's letter seems to receive confirmation of its authenticity in a note that Stalin replied to him:

“I received the note. In my opinion, we should confine ourselves to a statement in your report, without demonstrating to the factions. How could the Old Man organize some correspondence with Trotsky with the absolute prohibition of Foerster” [703].

It cannot be concluded from this note that it is a response to this particular letter from Kamenev. For now, this is just a guess. Stalin is talking about correspondence, about the organization of correspondence. Let's accept the version that the letter of December 21 really belonged to Lenin. Still no correspondence. One letter is not some correspondence. Maybe we are talking about some part of Lenin's heritage that is still inaccessible to researchers? It is also unclear what report Kamenev is referring to. It can be assumed that the report in the com-fraction is meant. Unfortunately, this report (if it took place) is still unknown to historians.

To summarize; the activation of Lenin's contacts with Trotsky in December 1922 is a fact. But the fact is that these contacts did not go to the detriment of Lenin's contacts with Stalin, Kamenev, and Zinoviev. At the final stage of preparations for the discussion of the question of the monopoly of foreign trade at the Plenum of the Central Committee, Lenin acted jointly with Stalin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, and Trotsky. The established contact between Lenin and Trotsky did not have the character of a political alliance, much less an alliance directed against his supporters in the Central Committee.

* Later, at the Twelfth Party Congress, Zinoviev characterized these disagreements as follows: “There was not the slightest dispute in the Central Committee about the inviolability of the monopoly of foreign trade. At one time there was a dispute in the Central Committee about whether, as the Central Committee expressed it, Vneshtorg could, or should, trade for all of Russia, including for all our own economic Soviet bodies ”(Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Verbatim report, Moscow, 1923, p. 188).

** B.N. Kasyanenko believes that Lenin in this letter reproached Stalin for insufficient preparation of the issue of monopoly ( Kasyanenko V.I. V.I. Lenin and business America (Realities and lessons in the history of Soviet-American relations) // Issues of the history of the CPSU. 1989. No. 4 pp. 17). This is not so, because, in accordance with the practice of that time, Lenin sent a letter to Stalin as general secretary for members of the Politburo. Consequently, reproaches were addressed to all its members, who approved the agenda of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b).

*** This letter was first published by Trotsky in 1927 with distortions. The tag “PS” was omitted, indicating Fotieva’s addition to the main text of the letter, as well as an indication of her insertion into the Leninist text (Trotsky L. Letter to the Eastpart of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. (On the forgery of the history of the October Revolution, the history of the revolution and the history of the party) / / Stalin's school of falsifications, Corrections, and additions to the literature of epigones, Berlin, 1932, pp. 74-75).

**** He was the chairman of the commission of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR on the revision of trade missions abroad (Izvestiya of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 4. P. 188-189).

***** In the protocol, before its text, it is written in the same hand with which the draft protocol was written: "Do not write in the protocol."

****** Trotsky was not involved in informing Lenin about the decisions of the Plenum. Nor were these extracts sent to Krupskaya, who, according to the generally accepted version, informed Lenin of the decision.

Notes:

[636] History of the socialist economy of the USSR. M, 1976. T. 1. S. 223.

[637] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 44. S. 427.

[638] Ibid. T. 45. S. 188, 549.

[639] Ibid. T. 54. S. 260.

[640] Ibid. T. 45. S. 548.

[641] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 84. L. 1.

[642] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 222, 562.

[643] Ibid. pp. 220–222.

[644] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 36. L. 3; Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 562.

[645] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 36. L. 7, 8.

[646] Ibid. L. 9.

[647] Ibid. L. 14.

[648] Ibid. L. 7.

[649] Ibid. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 693. L. 79, 80.

[650] Ibid. F. 5. Op. 2. D 36. L. 7.

[651] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 43. L. 43–54.

[652] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 323.

[653] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 35. L. 48.

[654] Ibid. L. 48–49.

[655] Ibid. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 26116. L. 3.

[656] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 54. S. 324.

[657] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 35. L. 51.

[658] Ibid. F. 325. Op. 1. D. 407. L. 75.

[659] See: Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 471.

[660] Ibid. T. 54. S. 325.

[661] Ibid.

[662] Ibid. S. 326.

[663] Radzinsky E.S. Stalin. S. 206.

[664] See: Vasetsky N.A. Trotsky. The experience of political biography. S. 173.

[665] Trotsky L. My life. Autobiographical experience. T. 2. S. 215-217.

[666] See: Kasyanenko V.I. IN AND. Lenin and Business America (Realities and Lessons from the History of Soviet-American Relations) // Issues of the History of the CPSU. 1989. No. 4. S. 17.

[667] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 221.

[668] Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Stenographer. report. M., 1922. S. 305–306.

[669] Ibid. S. 294.

[670] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45, pp. 333–337.

[671] Ibid. S. 339.

[672] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 35. L. 58.

[673] Trotsky L. Lenin's testament // Trotsky L. Portraits of revolutionaries. S. 279.

[674] Ibid.

[675] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 339.

[676] Ibid. S. 471.

[677] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 4. S. 188–190.

[678] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 473.

[679] Ibid. pp. 338–339.

[680] Kumanev V.A., Kulikova I.S. Confrontation: Krupskaya - Stalin. S. 14, 15.

[681] Radzinsky E.S. Stalin. S. 211.

[682] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 86. L. 7–7 rev.

[683] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 471.

[684] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 86.

[685] Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Stenographer. report. S. 188.

[686] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 86. L. 1–2.

[687] Ibid. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 43. L. 43–54.

[688] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45, pp. 333–337.

[689] Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Stenographer. report. S. 17.

[690] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 4. S. 188.

[691] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 86. L. 1–7.