Lenin's political testament: the reality of history and the myths of politics

Selected articles from the book “Lenin's political testament: the reality of history and the myths of politics” by Sakharov V.A.

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Lenin And Trotsky- Alienation Is Growing

Information about the political and personal relations between Lenin and Trotsky in the middle and second half of 1922 comes mainly from Trotsky. He assesses the general nature of these relations as follows:

“After our short-term disagreement on the issue of trade unions, he [Lenin] during 1921, 22 and early 23 did not miss a single opportunity not to openly emphasize his solidarity with me .. ... he had not personal, but political motives for this. “

Trotsky did not talk about his closeness to Lenin, but on the contrary, emphasizes Lenin's interest in establishing close political relations with him, Trotsky:

“Lenin sought my support and found it” [555].

Detailing this picture, he wrote:

“When Lenin recovered from his first bout of illness and returned to work, the bureaucracy was well entrenched, and Stalin gained great influence over the masses of [party] members. Lenin insisted that I should be the successor in the Council of People's Commissars and discuss with me measures to get rid of the Stalinist bureaucracy. We sought to achieve this goal of ours without causing too much friction.”

Trotsky assures that Lenin was ready to fight with him against his political supporters. After such a “preparation”, the following explanation by Trotsky of the “true” meaning of Lenin’s “Testament” will no longer seem incredible:

Furthermore... it pursued the exact opposite goal. As a rule, historians accept this statement without a shadow of criticism. Exceptions to this rule are rare. For example, Vasetsky considers Trotsky's attempt to substantiate the thesis that Lenin saw him as his successor as pointless [558].

In the light of everything that we now know about the difficult political relations between Lenin and Trotsky, about the creation by Lenin of a mechanism of political power in which Trotsky could not find a place, such revelations cannot be taken for granted without the most serious verification, and verification yields negative results.

As a manifestation of his political affinity with Lenin, Trotsky pointed to his report, which he made at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, and Lenin's review of it. We have discussed above the invalidity of this argument. Documents relating to the preparation of the congress and this report on it also do not give grounds for such conclusions. On September 7, 1922, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), discussing the preparations for the Congress of the Comintern, accepted Zinoviev's proposal for a speaker at the IV Congress on the issue of "The Fifth Anniversary of the Russian Revolution and the Prospects of the World Revolution.

" The nature of the report was defined by the Politburo as a program speech explaining the NEP, "inserting the NEP into the framework of international development and explaining the entire transitional stage," since the Communist Parties have not yet understood its essence. An extract from the protocol was sent to Lenin [559].

Lenin agreed with this decision, of which Zinoviev was notified on September 28:

“As for the speaker, I agree conditionally: 1) Trotsky should also be for a replacement (and for an independent report).”

At the same time, he stipulated his intention to make a report [560].

To prove the identity of his own and Lenin's positions in matters of state and party building and Lenin's readiness to cooperate with him, Trotsky actively used the question of the threat of bureaucracy, presenting Stalin either as the main bureaucrat, or as the planter of bureaucracy, or as its patron and defender. He left several stories about his conversation with Lenin on this topic, each time relating it to a different time and describing it in different ways. In a letter dated January 15, 1923, Trotsky argued his refusal to become Lenin's deputy for the Council of People's Commissars by disagreeing with the practice of resolving Soviet issues.

He was especially indignant at the fact that on issues under the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Defense, i.e. him, Trotsky, decisions were made "in fact, apart from the department concerned and even behind his back", which "completely violated the possibility of correct work, selection and education of workers and any correct calculation and foresight, any planned economy."”

In this situation, Trotsky "did not consider it possible to take responsibility for other institutions as well." Lenin, for his part, “pointing out that our leadership apparatus and the selection of workers are really extremely poor and that we need a special authoritative party commission to consider the question of more correct selection, education and promotion of workers and more correct organizational relationships... He suggested that I join one when he had more definitely considered its functions and composition. I readily agreed. However, before his new illness, Comrade Lenin did not raise the issue of this commission anymore” (see Appendix No. 7). This is how Trotsky wrote when Lenin was still able to work and could, in principle, be acquainted with this letter, and, if necessary, protest it.

There is no reason to doubt the very fact of a conversation on this subject. It easily reads the well-known fundamentally different approach of Lenin and Trotsky to criticism of the apparatus. Lenin criticized the state apparatus for the fact that politically it still to a large extent remains a stranger, acting contrary to Soviet laws, and assigns the main role in improving it to the parties.

Trotsky, on the other hand, sees the main danger of bureaucracy in the party apparatus, primarily in the highest organs of the party, in the Politburo, in the Secretariat of the Central Committee and its apparatus, i.e. in "driver". Therefore, he demands that the real power in the economy be removed from the hands of the party and transferred to the hands of the economic apparatus, in fact moving the party away from the real control of the country.

The objects of criticism are different, and the methods of combating bureaucracy are also different. If, according to Lenin, it was the party that was supposed to organize and lead the fight against bureaucracy, then, according to Trotsky, the party should be attacked as the main source and carrier of the most dangerous forms of bureaucracy. Lenin argues that

the car (the system of organs of power) is good, and the driver (party) is good, but the grass-roots apparatus sabotages and does what it wants, as a result, the car sometimes goes in the wrong direction [561].

It is precisely to eliminate this deficiency that Lenin's critique of bureaucracy is directed. And, according to Trotsky, the “car” is bad, and the “driver” is no good. It is this understanding of the problem that will later become the basis for criticism of the so-called "secretary regime", accompanied by the demand for the defeat of the party apparatus as the main means of defeating bureaucracy.

It is important for us to take into account not only what Trotsky recorded, it is even more important to see what is not in his story: there is not a word about bureaucracy in general, about party bureaucracy in particular, and specifically about the Orgburo as a stronghold of bureaucracy, i.e. what Trotsky would write about later, in October 1923, when Lenin could no longer speak on this subject. At this time, Trotsky, in a letter to the Central Committee, painted a different picture: during one of his conversations with Lenin at the end of 1922, the conversation turned to bureaucracy:

“Yes, our bureaucracy is monstrous,” Lenin picked up, “I was horrified after returning to work. .. So, you can shake up the apparatus, - Lenin quickly picked up, alluding to the expression I once used. - I answered that I mean not only the state bureaucracy, but also the party one; that the essence of all the difficulties lies in the combination of two apparatuses (party and state. - BC) and in the mutual harboring of influential groups that gather around the hierarchy of party secretaries. Lenin listened intently and confirmed my thoughts in that deep chesty tone that appeared in him when, convinced that the interlocutor understood him to the end, and, discarding the inevitable conventions of the conversation, he openly touched on the most important and disturbing. After a little thought, Lenin put the question point-blank: “So you are proposing an open struggle not only against state bureaucracy, but also against the Orgburo of the Central Committee?” I laughed in surprise. The Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee signified the very concentration of the Stalinist apparatus. - Perhaps it turns out like this. “Well, then,” continued Lenin, obviously pleased that we had named the essence of the question, “I propose to you a bloc: against bureaucracy in general, against the organizing bureau in particular. “It is flattering to make a good bloc with a good man,” I replied. We agreed to meet again after some time. Lenin proposed to consider the organizational aspect of the matter. He planned the creation of a commission under the Central Committee to combat bureaucracy. We both had to get into it. In essence, this commission was supposed to become a lever for destroying the Stalinist faction, as the backbone of bureaucracy, and for creating such conditions in the party that would give me the opportunity to become Lenin’s deputy, in his opinion: the successor to the post of chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars” [562].

The positions of the parties, as they are depicted here, have nothing in common with how Trotsky himself characterized them in a letter dated January 15, 1923. Trotsky contrasts the real problems that then worried Lenin and the Central Committee with a far-fetched version of the problem of the struggle against bureaucracy, in which he tried to present Lenin not only as his ally, but also as the initiator of this alliance, a man who viewed Trotsky as his "hope and support" in his planned struggle against the Central Committee.

In the first letter, Trotsky does not even approximately determine the date of this conversation, but in the second he indicates its time quite definitely - in December 1922. And the lie is immediately revealed. The fact of their meeting is not confirmed by documents, the Diary of Duty Secretaries is silent about Lenin’s telephone conversations with Trotsky, and it does not record Trotsky’s visits to Lenin’s office. This conversation could not have taken place during any meeting, since from the end of November Lenin no longer participated in them. Trotsky himself does not report any external circumstances of this meeting either.

The documents say otherwise. The fact that the events of the last year could and should have set Lenin up for a critical and even distrustful attitude towards Trotsky. Some of them were discussed above, others - ahead.

In the spring of 1922, some details, and results of "economic activity" in the Moscow Combined Bush (MKK) were revealed. Since this story has been completely ignored by historians, and it is absolutely necessary to take it into account when studying the problems of Lenin's political "Testament", let's touch on it briefly. It was said above that the idea of creating the Moscow combined bush as a kind of economic testing ground (or economic experiment) was put forward by Trotsky on the eve of the August (1921) Plenum of the Central Committee, which allowed him to conduct this experiment [563].

Since Lenin understood the true purpose of this organization and considered it as a kind of compromise that he had to make, it is natural that he had strong doubts about this undertaking. Therefore, immediately after the creation of the IWC, he placed Trotsky's new brainchild under special control. In late July - early August 1921, Lenin wrote to Kamenev:

“Please send me an exact list of plants, factories, state farms and all other enterprises taken under the control of Trotsky ... You don’t know if he took (and could take) anything else besides you (directly from the people's commissars?)”.

A second note followed:

“Please find out and is it possible to make it so that he should tell you everything in cases of leasing immediately” [564].

The notes speak for themselves: distrust, anxiety because of the impossibility or difficulty of keeping Trotsky under control to the extent that one would like. Trotsky was quite autonomous in his actions, and over time, the scope of the IWC's activities began to expand. Thus, on March 9, 1922, the Politburo took note of Trotsky’s statement that his activities “spread to enterprises that go beyond the Moscow province” [565].

At the beginning of 1922, the Politburo decided to inspect the ICC [566]. Trotsky resisted it as best he could. On February 18, 1922, he sent a letter to the Politburo, in which he argued his objections by the fact that regulations and instructions for such an inspection had not yet been developed [567]. While agreeing that the issue of control over leased enterprises was very acute, he argued that this did not apply to his economic organization:

“In relation to the enterprise, by its very nature, this issue is not as acute as in relation to private entrepreneurs, or less responsible state bodies, cooperatives, artels, etc.”

Trotsky especially protested against the fact that the inspection was carried out by the forces of the People's Commissariat of the RKI, headed by Stalin. Trotsky only agreed to provide the Supreme Council of National Economy or the RCT with the opportunity to "observe the observance of the technical and economic conditions of the contract by the leased enterprises." He insisted on postponing the inspection until the necessary regulatory framework (decrees, instructions, etc.) was created, arguing that there was no danger of wasting time. Moreover, Trotsky frightened the members of the Politburo that the check of the IWC by the RKI would mean nothing more than the disruption of the NEP:

“It would be, however, the greatest disaster if the competence of the Workers' and Peasants' Committee, as such, were extended to these enterprises. This would mean a failure of the New Economic Policy, because with the threat of such inspection, no one will invest capital. Objectively, behind this thesis lies the desire to get private capital out of the control of the Soviet state, which could not but weaken those very "commanding heights", in the preservation and strengthening of which Lenin saw the guarantee of the future victory of socialism over capitalism.”

It is clear from Trotsky's argument that the point, of course, was not the fundamental inadmissibility of such an inspection, but that the Politburo intended to put him, Trotsky, under control of economic activity, which, as he understood, did not bode well for him.

Despite Trotsky's protests, the verification was carried out in February 1922. *

In April, the conclusions of the commission were discussed twice at meetings of representatives of the NK RKI and the IWC [568]. The main conclusions reached by the inspectors of the RSFSR People's Commissariat for Foreign Studies were known to both Lenin and Trotsky even before the start of the 11th Party Congress.

On May 31, the Secretariat of the Central Committee, in pursuance of the decision of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) of May 16, 1922, sent out for familiarization to all members of the Central Committee the material on the results of the check of the ICC. They also entered the Lenin secretariat [569]. In the "Conclusion" it was shown that the "Regulations" on the Moscow Combined Bush, which could not pass by Trotsky as its actual creator and official leader, were "entirely built on negative definitions" and did not give "an idea of the legal nature of Moscust." This, it turns out, is "not a state organization", and not private capitalist. It was supposed to be under the RVSR, but it was made independent "from military science." As a result, no one knows it and it remains outside the state system**. In the "Regulations" on the IWC it is not defined by whom the Council of the IWC is elected, composed of whom it consists, and also to whom the profits of the IWC belong. The conclusion of the inspectors is as follows:

the situation does not meet the conditions and requirements of the New Economic Policy “and is subject to categorical and final condemnation” [570].

Further, it was stated that the meaning of the creation of the IWC was distorted. The idea was to test the management experience in a small amount. In fact, the main idea—combination—is not being implemented; the enterprises included in the MCC are separated from each other.

“The idea ofcombining was the guiding one when the bush rented one or another enterprise. All of them were recruited without a system, and this was done for the sake of giving universality to the trading activities of the Moskust ”(our italics. - BC) [571].

Normally operating enterprises were leased, but now, six months later, financially, and technically, they are “in a miserable state” and require huge funds for their restoration. The large enterprises of the MCC are "certainly unprofitable." They can be exploited profitably "only because of the speculative market opportunities." This fundamentally important circumstance was recognized by the Chairman of the Board of the IWC, i.е. Trotsky himself [572]. Meanwhile, the MCC received funds for conducting operations from the state, the state bank opened three accounts for it [573]. “The economic benefit of all these operations for Moscust is obvious, and their non-economic nature from the state point of view is just as clear” [574].

Thus, the parasitic essence of the economic offspring of Trotsky was revealed. In the "Regulations", the IWC set the goal - "to place at the disposal of the state an increasing number of products." “The task,” the inspectors of the NK RKI record, “remained not only unfulfilled, but facts and figures indicate that the trade turnover of Moskust had completely the opposite results of pumping state stocks to the free market.” And again, it was stated:

"This is not denied by the Chairman of the Board of Moscow" (i.e. Trotsky) [575].

The mechanisms of abuse were revealed. “The material p / department was not in the best condition. There was no systematization of requirements and monitoring of their use. Accounting was extremely primitive, and the accounting did not give confidence that all business transactions were at least recorded in a timely manner. Big doubts were caused by the organization of accounting.

“The position of the Central Accounting Department is such that its criticism should be reduced to listing what is not being done ... In general, the accounting department of the ICC in its present form is an empty place, which, with its illiterate reports, can only mislead enterprises about the actual state of affairs". The lease is set up in such a way that the IWC robs the Moscow Economic Council, i.e. state [576]. MMK used illegal methods of commission awards. This experience from the “production” sphere, the IWC is now trying to “extend” to the trade sphere [577].

The results of the check allowed the inspectors of the NC RCT to draw the following conclusions and suggestions. Firstly, MCC “by its legal nature appears to be the most unfortunate economic neoplasm” (italics ours. - V.S.) [578]. Since its work violated the most important condition of the decision of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) of August 21, 1921 - no privileges for the sake of observing the "purity" of experience, it was proposed to bring it into line with common practice.

Secondly, from the point of view of state interests, the choice of enterprises is extremely unfortunate and needs to be reviewed.

Thirdly, trading activities were carried out to the detriment of the state and in violation of the laws. It was proposed to change the Charter of the IWC and the composition of its enterprises, as well as to approve the charter of the “Vnuttorg” of the ICC [579].

The general conclusion is: "The whole experience of running industrial and agricultural enterprises ... proved to be a failure" (our italics. - BC) [580]. The validity of the observations and the conclusions drawn were recognized by the leading economic and financial workers of Moskust.

There are no markings on the document made by Lenin, but this does not mean that Lenin did not personally get acquainted with him at that time or was not familiar with the essence of the conclusions and proposals contained in it. In addition, Lenin's archive contains other materials about violations in the work of the ICC, related to employment, wages, etc. guess. This question remained in Lenin's field of vision almost to the very end of his active political activity, as evidenced by a letter sent to him by Trotsky (November 24, 1922), in which he again raised the question of inspecting the ICC [582].

The history of Trotsky's management in the IWC could only serve Lenin as an additional argument in favor of the conclusion that Trotsky's experiment was ineffective and strengthened doubts about Trotsky's ability to do serious economic work. The results of the check gave Lenin and his supporters serious grounds and arguments for building up the struggle against Trotsky, which were used during the internal party discussion at the end of 1923. Members and candidate members of the Politburo in a statement sent to the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on December 31, 1923, wrote:

“Even when it came to the attempt of comrade Trotsky to create for himself a surrogate for economic work in the form of the famous Moskust, comrade Lenin struggled for months even against this small "economic idea" of Comrade Trotsky and dozens of times in the presence of comrade Trotsky, and in his absence comrade Lenin argued in detail that with the approach to economic issues that Comrade Trotsky, the economy can only be destroyed”[583].

One way or another, the second half of 1922 was marked, on the one hand, by the almost complete cessation of Lenin’s contacts with Trotsky, and, on the other hand, by such steps towards Trotsky that cannot be assessed otherwise than as aimed at ousting him from the sphere of economic management. M.I. Ulyanova, recalling Stalin's first visit to Lenin after his first stroke on July 11, 1922, wrote:

“On this and subsequent visits, they talked about Trotsky, talked in front of me, and it was clear that here Ilyich was with Stalin against Trotsky. Once the question of inviting Trotsky to Ilyich was discussed. It was in the nature of diplomacy.”[584]

Lenin sent an invitation to Trotsky, indicating how to get to Gorki by car [585]. Trotsky did not take advantage of this invitation and in the summer of 1922 did not visit Lenin in Gorki. Ulyanova's information is supported by documents.

“In July 1922,” writes Volkogonov, “Lenin, while convalescing in Gorki, wrote a note to Stalin asking him to express his and Kamenev’s opinion on Trotsky. It is not clear what is at stake, but it is clear that a line is being worked out on some question of at least three people: Lenin, Stalin, Kamenev, in opposition to Trotsky, or about him. And again, about Trotsky, behind Trotsky's back ... Probably, it came to radical proposals, perhaps even to the point of dismissing Trotsky from office or positions. This, in particular, is evidenced by Lenin's note to Kamenev. Lenin wrote:

“... I think exaggerations can be avoided. "Throws out (the Central Committee) or is ready to throw a healthy cannon overboard," you write. Isn't this an immense exaggeration? Throwing Trotsky overboard - after all, you are hinting at this, it cannot be interpreted otherwise - the height of absurdity. If you don't think I'm stupid to the point of hopelessness, then how can you think that? The boys are bloody in their eyes...”[586].

Volkogonov assumes that Stalin was the author of the unknown proposal, and on this basis, he concludes that Kamenev occupied more moderate positions in relation to Trotsky than Stalin, while Lenin stood up for Trotsky. However, Volkogonov himself is not sure of his assumption and states:

“But the fact remains: Lenin was not always open and sincere with Trotsky” [587].

This is true. In war as in war. Everything known about the relationship between Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky at this time allows us to consider another assumption more justified: Lenin, seeing that Kamenev objected to radical measures (perhaps introduced by himself or together with Stalin), tried to calm him down.

Perhaps at the same time, it was also about the proposal to Trotsky to become Lenin's deputy for the Council of People's Commissars, which Lenin made in September 1922. Trotsky and the historiography following in his wake regards this proposal of Lenin as an attempt to strengthen Trotsky's political positions, making him his first deputy and thereby ensure his further promotion to power and becoming "successors" as chairman of the government. However, there is no basis for such assertions.

On September 11, 1922, through Stalin, Lenin submitted to the Politburo a proposal to increase the number of deputy chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars and the STO. He proposed, in addition to the two deputies, Rykov and Tsyurupa, to appoint two more, Kamenev and Trotsky. He wrote:

“In view of the fact that Comrade Rykov received leave from the arrival of Tsyurupa ... and the doctors promise me (of course, only in case that nothing bad happens) to return to work (very moderate at first) by 1/X, I think that for one comrade, It is impossible for Tsyuruup to charge all the current work and I propose to appoint two more deputies (Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and Deputy Chairman of the STO), namely: comrades Trotsky and Kamenev. Distribute work among them with the participation of mine and, of course, the Politburo, as the highest authority.

It can be seen from the text that Trotsky (the first on the list) was assigned the first of the posts - Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. Outwardly, it looks more important than the one that was intended for Kamenev: SRT is just a commission of the Council of People's Commissars. But in economic matters, everything was the other way around: all economic issues went not through the Council of People's Commissars, but through the STO. Trotsky himself admitted that he, as deputy for the Council of People's Commissars, was asked to take control of "non-economic people's commissariats, primarily Narkompros" (see Appendix No. 7). This document also crushes the legend that Lenin proposed to Trotsky to become the first deputy and, thus, to take the second post in the government. The post of first deputy did not yet exist at that time, and Lenin did not propose to create it.

Having received Lenin's letter, Stalin informed Trotsky about it by telephone (possibly on the same day), who refused this proposal. The next day, September 12, Stalin was in Gorki with Lenin. M.I. Ulyanova, who witnessed the conversation between them, reports that "the proposal made to Trotsky that he be Lenin's deputy for the Council of People's Commissars" had the "character of diplomacy"[589]. Subsequent events speak in favor of this. After Trotsky's refusal to accept Lenin's proposal, it was put up for discussion at the next meeting of the Politburo (September 14), the minutes of which read:

"a) The proposal of comrade. Lenin on the appointment of two deputies. Chairman SNK and STO - accept.

b) The Politburo of the Central Committee notes with regret the categorical refusal of Comrade Trotsky” [590].

Trotsky was not present at the meeting of the Politburo, but since copies of the protocols were sent to all members of the Politburo, he, naturally, was familiar with this decision, not objecting either to the wording or to the resolution on the merits.

What was the reason for Trotsky's refusal? In a letter on January 15, 1923, he wrote to the Central Committee:

“A few weeks after his return to work, comrade. Lenin suggested that I take the place of deputy. I replied that if the Central Committee appoints, then, of course, as always, I will obey the Central Committee, but that I will look at such a decision as deeply irrational, completely going against all my organizational and administrative views, plans and intentions. The reasons for the refusal are as follows: “I consider the very existence of a collegium of deputies to be harmful, since, by removing the most responsible comrades from certain administrative and administrative posts, the collegium of deputies creates an indefinite position for them, in which they are all responsible, as it were, for everything and at the same time as for nothing. I thought and still think that it is necessary and sufficient to have a permanent deputy for the Council of People's Commissars and, perhaps, another for the SRT with their correct relationship (STO - Commission of the Council of People's Commissars) ... The second reason that I pointed out to Comrade Lenin, is the policy of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, the Orgburo and the Politburo in Soviet questions, "leading to the adoption of decisions that ignore the opinion of the heads of the departments concerned, which violates the possibility of their correct and planned work. Naturally, that in this situation "I did not consider it possible to take responsibility also for other institutions."

In other words, Trotsky was dissatisfied with the fact that state and economic issues were considered and resolved in the Central Committee of the party. Lenin replied,

"that against my will, he would not offer me as a deputy" (see Appendix No. 7).

Five days later, on January 20, in another letter, Trotsky added another argument:

“At this time, I myself asked for a four-week vacation (and received it) - mainly to prepare for the reports scheduled for me at the then forthcoming International Congress. Thus, quite independently of even my fundamentally negative attitude towards the expansion of Zemstvo, it is quite obvious that the practical problem that Comrade Lenin wanted to solve in view of the release of Comrade. Rykov, was not at all resolved by the appointment of me as a deputy, since for the coming weeks I myself received a leave, and later the Congress came, which completely swallowed me up”(see Appendix No. 9).

The problems pointed out by Trotsky could indeed be the reasons for the refusal. But the main thing, apparently, is not in them. Trotsky understood the real course of Lenin's thought, his intention to "load" him with work outside the economy and thus oust him from this sphere of activity.

Did Lenin allow such a refusal? Volkogonov believed that since Trotsky refused, and Lenin did not insist, therefore, he did not want Trotsky to agree, and in support of his thought he pointed to the facts that when Lenin wanted to accept his proposal, he always insisted. Volkogonov gives an example: Trotsky was asked to get involved in the work of checking the Gokhran - he refused. Lenin wrote about this refusal:

“Trotsky's letter is unclear. If he refuses, the decision of the Politburo is needed. I am for not accepting the resignation (from this Trotsky affair)"[591].

We also think that Lenin tolerated Trotsky's refusal, since it was not difficult to foresee. Receiving a voluntary refusal from Trotsky relieved Lenin of the reproaches that Trotsky was being "rubbed over", "offended", etc. *** and, in addition, relieved Lenin of the painful need for him to have constant working contact with Trotsky, often leading to sharp conflicts.

Moreover, Lenin, apparently, made his proposal precisely in the expectation of a refusal. This is indicated by the fact that Lenin did not first speak with Trotsky, but sent his proposals directly to the Politburo, apparently instructing Stalin to negotiate with him. Trotsky’s reaction to how this decision was carried through the Politburo speaks in favor of our assumption: in a letter to the Central Committee of the party dated January 20, 1923, he expressed his dissatisfaction:

“If you still wanted to resolve the issue now or fix the opinion of the Politburo, then you need to be to convene a meeting of the Politburo. After a brief conversation with Comrade Stalin on the phone, I was convinced that the question itself was being removed, at least until my return. But no. Voting (by telephone or in writing with my note on the document) was nevertheless carried out, and I first learned about its results only now from a letter from Comrade Stalin ****. It turns out that Stalin and Rykov voted "for", Tomsky and Kamenev "abstained", Kalinin "no objection".

After that, the Politburo, at its meeting on September 14, issued a resolution in which "the categorical refusal of Comrade Trotsky is stated with regret

" ... I was already on vacation. Nevertheless, despite the practical irresistibility of my arguments, at least in favor of postponing the question, the Politburo "regretfully notes" in my absence, and so on. I absolutely do not enter into an assessment of this entire episode ... But I once again state that the issue was never submitted to the Politburo and was not discussed at it - at least in my presence. And I think that my presence would not be superfluous since it was about my appointment”(see Appendix No. 9).

The last reproach is unfounded, since in the practice of the work of the Politburo, the solution of important political and personnel issues by questioning was a common thing.

As for working contacts on current issues, from June to September 1922 there were no contacts at all between Lenin and Trotsky (although Lenin at that time met and corresponded with many other members of the Politburo and the Central Committee of the party and people's commissars), in October-December they were episodic.

With such a baggage of relations between Lenin and Trotsky came to the end of 1922. In mid-December, there was a surge in business contacts on one, but politically important issue - the monopoly of foreign trade. Trotsky tried to squeeze everything he could out of this story in order to present it as a manifestation of Lenin's truly comradely, respectful attitude towards him and the establishment of a political alliance between them against the Central Committee of the party. Since this story is also organically connected with the relations between Lenin and Stalin, we will consider it in the corresponding paragraph. We only note that this correspondence does not indicate a political conspiracy, but only a short-term and limited to one issue intensification of their business relations while maintaining confrontation on all fundamental issues of economic policy.

* The Politburo finally decided the issue of the legal status of the ICC on January 11, 1923. It did not decide the way Trotsky wanted: “To recognize that Moskust, as a private legal enterprise, is subject to revision by the RCT, in accordance with the rights granted by the RCT with respect to private legal enterprises "(RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 329. L. 3).

** There is reason to believe that this was not done by accident but was aimed at getting the IWC out of control. This, apparently, is indicated by Trotsky's attempts to substantiate the impossibility of conducting an inspection, which consisted precisely in pointing out the peculiar position of the ICC, that the NC RCT does not have instructions for its inspection, etc.

*** And this moment was taken into account by Lenin. This is evidenced by Molotov's letter to Lenin (July 30, 1921) regarding Trotsky's possible places of work outside Moscow. It hints that Trotsky was being “offended” were heard at the 11th Party Congress and were addressed primarily to Lenin.

**** This refers to Stalin's letter dated January 6, 1923 (see Appendix No. 6). Trotsky is not telling the truth, and Stalin caught him in this. On January 24, 1923, he wrote to the Central Committee of the RCP(b) that “Comrade. Trotsky had these protocols in his hands back in September last year, and if he found the behavior of the Politburo wrong, he could, of course, protest it in the Plenum for more than four months, or demand a new discussion, which, however, he did not do for some reason. then. Stalin obviously has nothing to do with it” (see Appendix No. 10).

Notes:

[555] Trotsky L. Portraits of revolutionaries. S. 284.

[556] RGASPI. F. 325. Op. 1. D. 373. L. 2.

[557] Trotsky L. Lenin's testament // Trotsky L. Portraits of revolutionaries. pp. 270, 277.

[558] See: Vasetsky N.A. Trotsky. The experience of political biography. M., 1992. S. 173-174.

[559] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 27. L. 78, 79, 81.

[560] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 54. S. 284.

[561] Ibid. T. 45, pp. 86, 95, 108–109, 110–111, 123.

[562] Trotsky L. My life. Autobiographical experience. T. 2. M., 1990. S. 215-217.

[563] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 71. L. 1.

[564] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 53. S. 84.

[565] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 279. L. 4.

[566] Ibid. D. 265. L. 3.

[567] Ibid. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 300. L. 1.

[568] Ibid. D. 27. L. 56.

[569] Ibid. L. 10, 19, 21, 56–72.

[570] Ibid. L. 56, 57.

[571] Ibid. L. 58.

[572] Ibid. L. 59.

[573] Ibid. L. 59–60.

[574] Ibid. L. 60.

[575] Ibid. L. 61.

[576] Ibid. L. 63–64.

[577] Ibid.

[578] Ibid. L. 64.

[579] Ibid.

[580] Ibid.

[581] Ibid. L. 70–72.

[582] Ibid. Op. 4. D. 9. L. 71v.

[583] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 3. S. 213.

[584] Ibid. 1989. No. 12. S. 198.

[585] Volkogonov D.A. Lenin ... Book. 2. S. 23.

[586] Ibid. S. 24.

[587] Ibid. pp. 24–25.

[588] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 275. L. 4–6.

[589] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 12. S. 198, 200.

[590] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 275. L. 4–6.

[591] Cit. by: Volkogonov D.A. Lenin ... Book. 2. S. 24.