Lenin's political testament: the reality of history and the myths of politics

Selected articles from the book “Lenin's political testament: the reality of history and the myths of politics” by Sakharov V.A.

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"Georgian Conflict" In the History of Relationships Lenin and Stalin

Contrary to Lenin's expectations, the concessions to the national deviationists, which he himself made and forced the Central Committee to accept, did not lead to an end to the struggle, or even to its weakening. Success only whetted their appetite, and they began to struggle for new concessions, now at the expense of the Leninist scheme of the "Union of Equals", using its inherent internal contradictions. The political meaning of their new demands was to transform the USSR from an instrument for mitigating interethnic and interstate contradictions into an instrument for preserving and strengthening existing interethnic and interstate relations. Obviously, not understanding the political meaning of Lenin's concession and exaggerating their ability to influence him, Mdivani and his supporters in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia went to exacerbate the political situation in the Communist Party of Georgia. The immediate goal was to disrupt the decisions of the October (1922) Plenum on the formation of the USSR. The means was the demand for Georgia to join the USSR directly, and not as part of a special subject of the federation - the Transcaucasian Federative Soviet Republic. The meaning of the creation of the ZFSR was to ensure the integration of economic and political structures at the regional level, in an effort to muffle or circumvent some of the acute problems that divided the Transcaucasian republics (border, for example) and to ensure the strengthening of internationalist sentiments over nationalist and separatist ones.
In traditional historiography, this phase of the struggle is usually viewed as a continuation of the struggle of Mdivani and his supporters against the course pursued by Stalin and Ordzhonikidze. However, this is not the case, since in the Stalinist version of the creation of the USSR on the principles of autonomization, there was no ZFSR, and Georgia, along with other republics, was part of the RSFSR, which at the same time turned into a new state - the USSR. ZFSR as a subject of the USSR appeared only because the Georgian and Ukrainian national deviators forced Lenin to abandon the autonomization plan. And this is understandable: as part of the RSFSR, which turned into the USSR, all the republics acquired the same status, those problems that the ZFSR was called upon to solve on a regional scale were solved within the framework of the new federation, so the preservation of the ZFSR lost its meaning.

Now Mdivani and his supporters have opened a front of struggle precisely against Lenin, and precisely because he made a concession to them on the question of the form of the federation. True, in Lenin's letter of September 26, the method of entry of the Transcaucasian republics into the USSR was not specified in any way, Lenin ignored this issue.

Stalin's letter of September 27, 1922, in which he agreed to accept the Leninist scheme, explicitly stated that each of the three Transcaucasian republics would enter the USSR independently. Consequently, Stalin did not offer to return to the scheme of the inclusion of the Transcaucasian republics within the Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Republic, which Mdivani and his supporters rebelled against. For the first time, a proposal for the entry of the Transcaucasian republics into the USSR as a "Union of equals", as part of the ZFSR, appears in a note by Kamenev to Lenin (no later than September 27). And that itrself became a response to Lenin's proposal to join him in this work. Apparently, Kamenev's letter preceded the appearance of an updated version of the decision of the Orgburo commission, and, perhaps, his proposal influenced the formulation of this thesis [757]. ZFSR in the Leninist scheme for the formation of the USSR acquired meaning, so the commission of the Organizing Bureau accepted it.

By forcing Lenin to abandon the autonomization plan, the Georgian national deviators doomed themselves to join the USSR as part of the ZFSR. Their like-minded people in the Central Committee of the CP(b)U found themselves in a better position: Ukraine joined the USSR on its own, so they limited themselves to fighting for a relative reduction in the rights of federal authorities and a corresponding strengthening of republican ones. Perhaps this explains the fact that in the following months it was the Georgian national deviators who became the main, most active, and irreconcilable force opposing the decision of the October Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on the formation of the USSR, and therefore against Lenin. The united front of the national deviationists has cracked and, consequently, weakened. It became easier to fight against them.

Mdivani "thanked" Lenin for his compliance, starting to put his plan into action, as he had planned, with the help of "a well-organized business of information." Lenin received a political blow from Mdivani's supporters in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia unexpectedly*, two weeks after the end of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b). They launched an attack on the decisions of the Plenum of the RCP (b) through criticism of Ordzhonikidze.

On October 21, 1922, at 2:55 am, Kamenev, Bukharin and Yenukidze were invited from Tiflis by direct wire to the apparatus. In Moscow, Yenukidze approached the apparatus**. The apparatus tapped on the tape:

“Please pass on Comrades. Kamenev and Bukharin the following note. Text followed: “The hopeless situation that has arisen here in Georgia forces us to disturb you. We ask you to convey all of the following to Comrade Lenin: We are convinced that his and your absolutely authoritative decision will put an end to the anarchy and devastation that is now taking on a catastrophic character. There is no limit to Ordzhonikidze's tyranny. In connection with the question of the decision of the Central Committee of the RCP on the Union of Republics, large meetings began. On October 19 there was a meeting of responsible comrades. The convened Bureau of the Tiflis Committee, at which the Central Committee of the KKE welcomed the decision of the Central Committee of the RCP, expressed a desire to file a petition with the Central Committee of the RCP on revising the point on the entry of the Transcaucasian Federation into the union in the sense of extending the provision on Ukraine and Belarus to Georgia and Azerbaijan. In view of the special political conditions, this served as a pretext for the most unacceptable expressions of Ordzhonikidze against the Central Committee of the KKE and the old workers with vulgar abuse and threats of merciless reprisals. Today, October 20, Zakkraykom, headed by Ordzhonikidze, has already begun to rout, starting with the Central Committee of the KKE. The most authoritative comrade Okudzhava was removed from the post of Secretary of the Central Committee and expelled from his Presidium. The same threatens everyone, according to Ordzhonikidze's loud statement at a meeting of the Zakkraykom, that he will crush the entire party and create a new one from the young ones. These attacks, completely undeserved, are made available to anti-Soviet elements, the authority of the Soviet government and the prestige of the party are declining, the comrades are bewildered, confusion and disorganization begin, which tomorrow will continue to assume terrible forms and dimensions. We are placed in a position where we are no longer able to bear responsibility. Therefore, finding no other way out, we decided - tomorrow, 21, at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the KKE to announce this. The situation is the same in the Georgian trade union council. Responsible comrades heading the commissariats declare the impossibility of their further work. In a word, Soviet power in Georgia has never been in such a threatening position as it is at the moment.

We urgently ask Comrades Kamenev and Bukharin to take the most active part in the situation that has arisen. In a day or two everything will be known in the province. There, the devastation can take even more horrifying forms. All this was created by Ordzhonikidze, for whom persecution and intrigue are the main weapon against comrades who do not servile him. It became unbearable to live and work under his Dzhimordovsky regime. Do we really not deserve a better leader in the Marxist and comradely sense and are doomed to be the object of Ordzhonikidze's tyranny. Please kindly notify us with a response."

Then followed the signatures of the members of the Central Committee of the KKE K. Tsintsadze, S. Todria, V. Dumbadze, Eliava, Makharadze, Kavtaradze, Sabashvili.

This text gives an idea of the form in which the Georgian national deviators under the guise of "informing" exerted psychological pressure on Lenin. They frighten Lenin with the threat of a split in the party, the loss of Soviet power.

Yenukidze replied:

“Everything that you have reported, at a later time, I will pass on tomorrow morning to the comrades you indicated, also to Stalin. I hope that a proper answer will be given to you tomorrow. Everything you say is very sad, and I can see from the tone of the telegram that relations between the top workers have become extremely aggravated. Personally, I think that if you really see confusion and disorganization among our party organizations and among the working masses, then the ground for this was prepared by the efforts of the majority of members of the Central Committee of the KKE (i.e., the Mdivani group. - V.S) "*** .

Thus, Yenukidze, who knew perfectly well all the underlying motives of the political struggle in the leadership of the KKE, but did not personally participate in it, declared that he was not deceived by the words of the authors of the note handed over to Lenin and did not share their assessment of the causes of the crisis.

An answer followed from Tiflis:

“If you personally think that the ground for this disorganization has been prepared by the majority of the Central Committee of the KKE, then the Central Committee does not belong here in Georgia and we ask you to put an end once and for all to the inquisition to which we have been subjected for a year and a half by Ordzhonikidze. We affirm that this soil, if it was prepared by anyone, was by Ordzhonikidze. Until now, we have not raised the question of anyone personally. Now our cup of patience is overflowing, and in order to save our party and Soviet power from the final disintegration in Georgia, in this politically scandalous country, we are already raising this question. If anyone doubts our correctness, then we ask our higher organizations and our old comrades to transfer the question of our relations to the higher Party investigation.

You, Abel, cannot imagine to what monstrous proportions the persecution of old comrades in Georgia reaches, and not only in Georgia, but also in Russia. Yenukidze retorted: “I repeat that everything I conveyed to you is my personal opinion, and the members of the Central Committee of the RCP are not in the least responsible for my words. No matter how much I respect my old comrades, I am obliged to tell you the truth, which I felt and which I observed when I was in the autumn (1922 - V.S.) in Georgia. Goodbye". The apparatus finally chimed from Tiflis: “Goodbye” [758].

On October 21, Lenin sent a telegram in cipher to the members of the Central Committee of the KKE with such an answer that they did not expect:

“I am surprised by the obscene tone of the note by direct wire signed by Tsintsadze and others, handed over to me by Bukharin for some reason, and not by one of the secretaries of the Central Committee. I was convinced that all disagreements had been settled by the resolutions of the plenum of the Central Committee with my indirect (our italics. - BC) participation and with the direct participation of Mdivani. Therefore, I strongly condemn the abuse against Ordzhonikidze and I insist on transferring your conflict in a decent and loyal tone for the permission of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), to which I am transmitting your message by direct wire. A copy of this telegram was sent to the Zakkraykom member of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) Ordzhonikidze and the secretary of the Zakkraykom Orakhelashvili [759].

There is no price for this document. It shows, firstly, that Lenin personally took Ordzhonikidze as a politician under his political protection. But, most importantly, this story once again convinces us that Lenin's concessions to the national deviationists were exclusively tactical in nature and that Lenin, having already understood their game, did not want to indulge it. An indication of the need to contact him only through the secretariat of the Central Committee, i.e. through Stalin, who oversaw all Caucasian issues, showed them that the establishment of the truth in this dispute Lenin handed over to the decision of the secretariat of the Central Committee (again, to Stalin in the first place). It can be argued that Lenin showed everyone that Stalin retains complete confidence in his eyes. Consequently, the disagreements that arose between them at the end of September 1922 on the question of the unification of the republics did not have any serious impact on their political relations.

Further, Stalin acted based on the opinion and authority of Lenin. On the afternoon of October 21, he telegraphed Ordzhonikidze and Orakhelashvili to Tiflis:

“The Clerk received in the Central Committee through Yenukidze ... **** with a complaint and swearing at Ordzhonikidze, who allegedly tavyzhe***** the Central Committee of Georgia, and accusing him of squabbling deepening conflicts. The Central Committee asks Ordzhonikidze and Zakkraykom to report separately their ... ****** code in a nutshell. The answer is urgent.” [760]

Following the first, Stalin sent another telegram to Ordzhonikidze*******, which, in particular, said:

“We intend to put an end to the squabble in Georgia and thoroughly punish the Georgian Central [Central] Committee. Tell us who else we should transfer from Georgia besides the four withdrawn ... In my opinion, we need to take a decisive line. Expel from the Central Committee all [and] all remnants of nationalism. Did you receive Lenin's telegram? He is furious, ekdini dissatisfied with ******** Georgian nationalists (emphasis added. - BC)” [761].

Meanwhile, on 21 October in Tiflis, Mdivani's supporters continued to escalate the conflict. They encouraged their supporters with Lenin's support and declared their readiness to demonstrate "strength" and use underground methods to defend their position. Prior to receiving Lenin's answer, a meeting of the Central Committee of the KKE was held, which was attended by Ordzhonikidze and other members of the Zakkraykom of the RCP (b), as well as a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) A.I. Rykov, who was at that time in Tiflis. The plenum by a majority of votes adopted a decision that ran counter to the decisions of the October (1922) Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) - on the independent entry of Georgia into the USSR, rejected the need to create the ZFSR and introduce the Transcaucasian banknote [762].

This decision was a flagrant violation of the Party Rules and Party discipline, expressed not only in direct disobedience to the decisions of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) (which is usually noted in the literature), but also in open confrontation with it (which is silent in the literature). Such an act entailed expulsion from the party. Under these conditions, the Presidium of the Zakkraykom proposed to the Central Committee of the KKE to resign. Lenin was informed about what was happening in Georgia, including the decision of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia:

“The Plenum (Central Committee of the KKE. – B.C.) accepted the proposal of the Presidium (Zakkraykom of the RCP (b. – B.C.) on resignation in view of the discrepancy between its [political] line and the line of the Zakkraykom”, “the Presidium of the Zakkraykom, stating an unprecedented case in the history of our party of the resignation of the Central Committee because of the unwillingness to carry out the decisions of the party” [763].

It is impossible to imagine that the actions of Mdivani and his like-minded people set Lenin up for their political support.

Kamenev and Bukharin, avoiding getting involved in this conflict on the side of Mdivani, whom they supported in this conflict, turned to the rebellious Central Committee of the KKE very late - on October 23. Outwardly, their answer was quite in the spirit of Lenin, but contained a barely hidden advice on how to behave further, so as not to expose yourself to organizational measures for violating party discipline and preserve the possibility of continuing the struggle:

“You must know that the decision of the Plenum on the entry to the Union of the Transcaucasian Federation must be strictly implemented and can only be reconsidered by a new Plenum if it so desires. The tone of your open note is a gross violation of party morals. We advise an end to the squabbles and work on the basis of the decisions of the Central Committee” [764].

On October 24, 1922, Bukharin wrote a note to Lenin:

“You have probably read “Georgian Conversation by Direct Wire”. In my opinion, it is necessary to ban or deactivate the question for the time being. A softening of morals or appropriate] gestures should be made during the Congress of the Comintern, when an authoritative Georgian delegation will be present here. Expecting in a short time" [765].

This proposal by Bukharin betrays in him the defender of Mdivani and others. Lenin did not accept this advice. The composition of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia was changed.

After resigning, Mdivani and his supporters did not stop fighting against the decisions of the October (1922) plenum. The materials of the Lenin Secretariat testify that Lenin received all the main materials on the development of the conflict in a timely manner and was aware of everything that was happening in the Caucasus. Documents came not only from the Central Committee, but also from the Mdivani group. They made it possible to get an idea of the development of the conflict and said that the nationalist deviators, despite the difficult political situation in Georgia, took a course to further aggravate it, launching agitation against the decision of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) in party organizations and among the non-party masses [766]. Lenin could not have any doubts about the disloyalty, moreover, the double-dealing nature of the political position of Mdivani and his supporters.

It was under these conditions that the well-known incident occurred with the slap that Ordzhonikidze inflicted on the old (with pre-revolutionary experience) party member Akaki Kabakhidze. The incident, which is considered in traditional historiography, was the reason for the creation of Lenin's notes "On the Question of Nationalities or "Autonomization"", the main accusation against Stalin and Ordzhonikidze and one of the reasons that prompted Lenin to radically change his assessment of Stalin as a politician and his attitude to him.

In describing the history of this conflict, two or three accidental or deliberate distortions are usually allowed. Firstly, they directly connect him with the ongoing political struggle over the formation of the USSR, and secondly, all the blame for him is shifted to Ordzhonikidze, and his assault is characterized as an act of political reprisal [767]. In general, much more is said and written about this episode than is actually known about it. It is unclear even the exact time when the conflict occurred. In the literature, the question of time is bypassed, it was not even raised. Based on the available archival documents, it can only be established approximately - the third week of November 1922. On November 24, the Secretariat of the Central Committee considered the issue of sending a special commission to Tiflis.

Information about the conflict is contained in the testimony of two eyewitnesses, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) A.I. Rykov and member of the Central Control Commission of the Communist Party of Georgia Rtviladze. Records of their stories are kept in the materials of Lenin's secretariat. Rykov, in a note dated February 7, 1923, wrote:

“In Tiflis, at the apartment of Comrade Ordzhonikidze, the following incident broke out in my presence: A member of the Russian Communist Party and my comrade in exile in Siberia Akaki Kabakhidze came to see me at Comrade Ordzhonikidze's apartment. During a general conversation, Comrade Kabakhidze reproached Sergo Ordzhonikidze for having some kind of horse and that the comrades standing at the top, including Comrade Ordzhonikidze, were much better off materially than other party members. In particular, there was some talk about the impact of the new customs policy in Batumi on the increase in high prices. One of the phrases, apparently, Akaki Kabakhidze said to Sergo in his ear, regarding the fact that Sergo Ordzhonikidze feeds some horse at the state expense,. Following this, a verbal squabble broke out between them, during which Comrade Ordzhonikidze hit Kabakhidze.

With the intervention of my wife and I, the incident was stopped and Comrade Kabakhidze left the apartment. After that, Sergo Ordzhonikidze experienced a very strong nervous shock, which ended in hysteria. “On the merits of the incident,” Rykov wrote, “I believe that Comrade Ordzhonikidze was right when he interpreted the reproaches that Comrade Kabakhidze made to him as a cruel personal insult.” He saw the reason for the breakdown in the extreme exhaustion of the nervous system of Ordzhonikidze as a result of a long and acute intra-party conflict [768].

Rtviladze confirms Rykov’s conclusion:

“The incident with the slap given by Comrade Ordzhonikidze to Comrade Kabakhidze is of a private nature, not related to factionalism (there was no written statement to the KK ********* Georgia [Kabakh]idze and this incident was not considered in the Central Committee of Georgia)”[769].

Ordzhonikidze himself also denied the political nature of the conflict. Pleading guilty to assault, he stated that it was caused not by a political dispute, but by a personal insult[770].

It is believed in the literature that Lenin was very disturbed by this incident. This is not a fact. Nothing is known from Lenin's documents about his reaction to this story. As a manifestation of Lenin's concern and his political distrust of Stalin and the majority of the Politburo, the history of the creation of a commission sent to Tiflis to investigate this incident is presented. The main arguments are seen in the fact that Lenin did not vote for the composition of the commission [771], as well as in the assessments of its work contained in the notes "On the Question of Nationalities or "Autonomization"".

At the XII Congress, Yenukidze spoke about the circumstances of the creation of this commission. Unfortunately, this evidence was not claimed by historians, although any of them could use the published transcript of the congress. Yenukidze said: “

The Central Committee decided to send a commission there. At first it was suggested that I go there as a chairman or a member of the commission, but I stated that I had recently returned from Georgia, I knew the state of affairs, I knew these comrades ... I am a politician, etc. deviators considered wrong. I then refused to go there and raised some personal considerations against my trip. Another commission was elected under the chairmanship of comrade. Dzerzhinsky. Lenin specifically then asked me: "In your opinion, is this commission suitable?" I answered frankly and now I confirm that the commission was very suitable and authoritative” [772].

No one challenged Yenukidze's words, therefore, there is no reason to doubt the correctness of his story. deviators considered wrong. I then refused to go there and raised some personal considerations against my trip. Another commission was elected under the chairmanship of comrade. Dzerzhinsky. Lenin specifically then asked me: "In your opinion, is this commission suitable?" I answered frankly and now I confirm that the commission was very suitable and authoritative” [772].

What about documents? They do not provide any basis for the traditional historiography version of the history of the creation of this commission and Lenin's attitude towards it.

On November 24, Stalin sent Lenin material from Tiflis, as well as a draft resolution of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) in connection with the conflict in the KKE, prepared "according to the statement of Philip Makharadze and other members of the old Central Committee of Georgia." This material was reported to V.I. Lenin, as evidenced by the corresponding note in the log of incoming documents (marked with the “D” icon), Lenin himself looked at the draft resolution of the Secretariat (there is a mark “VM”) [773]. There were no objections. Lenin’s “Diary of Duty Secretaries” records the arrival of the Politburo protocol for voting by poll on the evening of November 24, “by telephone”, and then the entry follows:

“Vladimir Ilyich did not vote” [774].

Publishers interpret this in such a way that Lenin "abstained from voting" [775], but this is a free interpretation of the diary entry. If you didn't vote in the evening, it doesn't mean you abstained. There could be other reasons. The question for voting came in the evening of the 24th, the Politburo meeting was to be held the next day. Apparently, this protocol was not handed over to Lenin. November 24 was a difficult day for him. The secretary on duty began his diary entry with the words:

“Vladimir Ilyich is unwell, he was in the office for only five minutes, he dictated three letters by phone, to which he wanted to ask for answers later. Maria Ilyinichna (Ulyanova) said not to bother him with anything...”[776].

It was only in the evening of the 25th that Lenin got acquainted with this protocol, sent for voting [777]. He returned to work on the evening of the 26th. But the decision of the Politburo by that time had already taken place without his participation. It did not cause any negative reaction in Lenin. And it is understandable, because the discussion of the issue took place with his participation, and the Politburo could have voted without him. There was no point in voting "for" "after".

On November 25, the Politburo accepted the proposal of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) to create a commission for "urgent consideration of the application" and "outlining the measures necessary to establish a lasting peace in the Communist Party of Georgia." It included F.E. Dzerzhinsky (chairman), D.Z. Manuilsky, BC Mickevicius-Kapsukas.

Lenin was aware of the matter, and if he had been against the decision, he could and should have made a definite protest. There was time for this, since the results of voting by "poll" by telephone were subject to approval at the next meeting of the Politburo, and only after that it was drawn up in a special protocol. The approval took place at a meeting of the Politburo on November 30 in the presence of Bukharin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Kalinin, Molotov, Stalin, Trotsky. Considering that on November 30, Lenin worked, and the day before, on November 29, he received the minutes of the meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Party dated November 25 with proposals regarding the goals and composition of the commission [778], then there are no grounds to believe that Lenin was against the composition of the commission or that he was bypassed in solving this issue.

The assertion that the commission was unable to conduct an objective investigation, that it had appropriate instructions from Stalin, do not receive confirmation in the documents. On the other hand, a document of a different kind is known: during the work of the Dzerzhinsky commission in Tiflis, Stalin telegraphed Ordzhonikidze:

“ Check again (our italics. - BC) reports of the aggressive actions of the Georgians and give an official statement on this case, signed by all people familiar with the case. Be careful and don't exaggerate the danger." [779]

It is believed that the acquittal of the commission's conclusion aroused Lenin's anger against its chairman, Dzerzhinsky. Historians unanimously condemn the conclusions of the commission, but no one bothered to pick up and study its documents. There is nothing to indicate that the Dzerzhinsky commission concealed any critical material regarding Ordzhonikidze. The minutes of the commission's meeting (Nos. 1-6 for December 4-7, 1922) contain a lot of information about the facts of his rough treatment of people and that this met with condemnation among his political associates. Nothing indicates that Lenin was suspicious of the commission's work. The reproach of her bias, therefore, remains unfounded.

The opinion was also firmly established in the literature that Lenin was impatiently awaiting the results of the commission's work in order to use the brought material to strike a political blow at Stalin and Ordzhonikidze.

The main argument in favor of this thesis is usually seen in his showing interest in the time of Rykov and Dzerzhinsky's return to Moscow. For confirmation, the entries of the "Diary of secretaries on duty" for December 2-4, 1922 are used. [780] Indeed, the records of the secretaries record an increased interest in Rykov, but they do not note such interest in the return of Dzerzhinsky.

From December 2 to 9 (when Rykov's first conversation with Lenin took place), the "Diary" of the secretaries records that Lenin asked about Rykov's return five times, and Dzerzhinsky for the period from December 2 to 12 (when Dzerzhinsky visited Lenin) only twice. It is wrong Lenin's expectation of Rykov and Dzerzhinsky to associate exclusively with the Georgian incident. Lenin had a direct wire to Tiflis at his disposal. He could send and receive telegrams. He could receive all the necessary information firsthand in any volume, at any time convenient for him. But he did not resort to this remedy. Moreover, when it became known that Dzerzhinsky was in no hurry to return to Moscow, and on the way, he would stop to make revisions on the railway (he was People's Commissar of Railways), Lenin did not worry and did not rush him [781].

If one adheres to the traditional point of view, then one must admit that for Lenin the revision of the railway was more important than the formation of the USSR. Of course not. It was just that at that time, Lenin was not concerned about the problem of the formation of the USSR to the extent that it appears in the literature.

Rykov was supposed to come to Moscow when Lenin was already in Gorki, so he asked him to call there [782]. However, the conversation did not take place (Rykov did not call Gorki or called, but could not talk because of Lenin's poor health). The first telephone conversation between them took place only on December 9, after Lenin's return to Moscow. Indeed, Lenin was looking forward to Rykov, but this can be explained not by interest in Georgian affairs, but by the need to urgently resolve economic issues and the question of organizing the work of the deputy chairmen of the STO. This assumption is supported by the fact that on December 12, Lenin met with his deputies - Rykov, Kamenev and Tsyurupa and discussed with them the issue of organizing their work [783]. Perhaps the conflict in the KKE was also discussed. What could Rykov say to Lenin? Obviously, the same as later, February 7, 1923, wrote for the commission created by Lenin to study the conflict in the Communist Party of Georgia:

“On the merits of the incident, I believe that Comrade Ordzhonikidze was right,” and the nervous breakdown occurred as a result of a long and acute internal party conflict that developed not along the Mdivani-Ordzhonikidze line, but along the line of the Central Committee of the KKE against the Central Committee of the RCP (b), in which Ordzhonikidze was no more guilty than Lenin himself [784].

On the same day, December 12, in the evening, Lenin talked with Dzerzhinsky for 45 minutes in private. The conclusion reached by his commission was in complete agreement with Rykov's opinion. Was Lenin upset as a result of the negotiations with Rykov and Dzerzhinsky? We do not know this for certain, but it is known that on the evening of December 13, Lenin was in a good mood, he was cheerful, joking, worried only about the liquidation of affairs before rest [785].

As for the material compromising Stalin, the Dzerzhinsky commission did not find it. Many prominent party figures (Secretary of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee A. Yenukidze, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia S.L. Lukashin), who knew about the events that took place in the Communist Party of Georgia in connection with the unification processes, said that Stalin's activity was aimed at seeking reconciliation of the opposing sides on the basis of accepted general party decisions [786]. “Lenin,” Yenukidze said,

“really believed these comrades (Georgian national deviationists. - BC), supported them, in his attitude towards them in this way, a large share (guilt, influence. - BC) belongs to Comrade Stalin” [787].

That's what Stalin's supporters said. But the most interesting thing is that they were echoed, confirming these testimonies, by the national deviationists themselves:

“A group of responsible workers, headed by the old Central Committee of the KKE, based on his knowledge of local conditions and on the directives received from Comrades Lenin and Stalin (letters, conversations) considered it necessary to pursue a line of some concessions to the national aspirations of the masses and on this basis diverged from the Caucasus Bureau (later the Zakkraykom) headed by Comrade Ordzhonikidze ”[788].

The news report from the Georgian Cheka dated December 14, 1922, which came to him from the Georgian Cheka, could set Lenin in a calm mood with regard to the development of events in Georgia. In Batumi there was “complete indifference”, the reason for which the Chekists saw in the weak work of the KKE and the strong propaganda of the Mensheviks, whom the workers, however, do not support. The attitude of the peasantry towards the Soviet government is sympathetic, good, although there are also those who are dissatisfied [789]. There are text underlining on the document, indicating that Lenin got acquainted with it.

The question of the formation of the USSR was resolved in principle on the terms Lenin insisted on. Of course, it still remained the subject of discussion and did not lose its political relevance. But it was not the fate of the Georgian nationalist deviators or the unpleasant incident with the slap that interested Lenin at that time. In the period from December 12 to 16, 1922, when his political work in the previous regime finally ceased, Lenin did not show any concern for Georgian problems and dealt with other issues (foreign trade monopoly, the budget of 1923, etc.).

Continuing to work actively and making a number of public speeches, he only once (and even then on behalf of the Politburo) touched on the formation of the USSR. On December 10, 1922, Lenin sent congratulations to the All-Ukrainian Congress [790]. He did not intend to address the problems of nation-building in his speech at the X All-Russian Congress of Soviets either - this problem was not in the plans of his speech [791]. Nor was it reflected in the materials prepared on behalf of Lenin by N.P. Gorbunov for his speech at the 10th All-Russian Congress of Soviets [792]. True, the “Diary of Duty Secretaries” in the entry for December 14 records Lenin’s intention to dictate “To Kamenev - about the Union of Socialist Republics”, but nothing is known about the content of the alleged dictation [793].

But something else is known. In mid-November, work began on the commission, created by the decision of the October (1922) Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), to prepare documents for the 1st Congress of the USSR, the work of which was led by I.V. Stalin. Before starting his work, on November 18, 1922, he gave an interview to a correspondent of the newspaper Pravda, in which, dwelling on the reasons for the unification of the republics, he repeated the main arguments of his letter to Lenin of September 26, 1922 [794] Speaking about the future federation, Stalin described it as one union state:

“The unification of the Soviet republics into one union state (emphasis added. - BC) undoubtedly creates a form of all-round military-economic cooperation” that will ensure their success [795].

In connection with the need to build a federation according to the scheme proposed by Lenin, Stalin raised the question of an upper chamber created on a parity basis by all union republics. It was new. The RSFSR was a union, but not of republics, but of Soviets and peoples. The second chamber within the framework of the former system of the international Republic of Soviets, which was built on the basis of the unification of all Soviets into a single state, was not needed. For the same reason, it was not needed in the case of the unification of the republics in the USSR on the principle of autonomization. The USSR as a union of equal republics, representing an association of different-sized states that made different contributions to the common budget and made different demands on it.

Since we had already chosen the path of creating nation-states and their federation, it became necessary to represent and defend not only the social interests of the international population of individual regions, but also individual nationalities, and, therefore, to create an appropriate political mechanism that did not exist before. National representation ran counter to previous ideas about the principles of building the Soviet state.

The Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies are bodies that ensure social, and not national, representation. National representation was reminiscent of the practice of bourgeois parliamentarism (Switzerland) and aroused mistrust and skepticism. Perhaps that is why Stalin posed the question in an interview in such a way that it is difficult to understand whether he is a supporter or opponent of this idea [796].

It seems that Stalin took into account the experience of the discussion about autonomization and decided to launch a "trial balloon".

One way or another, but the proposal for a second chamber is evidence that Stalin seriously accepted the Leninist scheme for the formation of the USSR and conscientiously engaged in its refinement and implementation. Stalin, it was he, and not someone else, who did everything to eliminate the problems associated with the creation of the USSR as a union of equal republics.

The provisions on the Union as one state and on the second chamber were of a fundamental nature and went beyond the framework of the scheme adopted by the October (1922) Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). They led to a revision of the previous views and assessments that had taken shape in the Party. We do not know whether Stalin agreed with Lenin on these issues prior to the interview. Considering the caution with which Stalin raised the question of a second chamber, one can assume that such an agreement took place. In any case, Lenin could not pass by these proposals if he did not share them. In reserve, he still had a few more days of active work, including a public speech in the Moscow City Council. And then there were still three weeks before the second stroke. Lenin did not consider it necessary to object. This circumstance gives reason to believe that Lenin agreed with Stalin. This means that the previous disagreements have been exhausted, if not completely, then on the most important issues.

It should also be taken into account that this interview, in a certain sense, set the tone for the entire work of the Commission of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), which began its work on November 21. The commission decided that the republics

“are united into one union state called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” (our italics - V.S.) [797].

Stalin's most important proposal, which determined the character of the USSR for decades, about the Union as one state, was accepted. Lenin was aware of the work of this commission. He met with Stalin and its other members, received letters from them, he was sent the protocols of the commission and sub commission, draft documents being prepared [798]. All the basic materials related to the preparation of the formation of the USSR continued to come to Lenin until the second stroke [799]. There were no objections from him.

On November 30, 1922, the Politburo heard the report of the Central Committee commission "On the Union of Republics" made by Stalin, and decided:

“The main points of the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should be basically adopted, including in it at the beginning of paragraph 10 “k” “approval of the unified state budget of the USSR.”

As a result, the Leninist scheme of the "Union of Equals", which could be interpreted in a wide range - from a federation with a strong central government to the "loosest" confederation - was refined, received the necessary clarity on the main issue. At this meeting, Bukharin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Kalinin, Molotov, and Trotsky were present and voted for the prepared project for the formation of the USSR [800]. Lenin knew about this decision and did not object. He also knew about the results of voting at the Politburo of the draft resolutions of the X All-Russian Congress of Soviets. It was at this meeting that the Politburo instructed Lenin to send a greeting to the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets [801]. The written greeting expressed support for the desire of the republics to unite and did not contain any criticism of how and in what direction preparations were made for the formation of the USSR [802].

Further work on the preparation and holding of the congresses of the Soviets of the republics and the USSR took place without the direct participation of Lenin.

To Summarize, after the October (1922) Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), Lenin never once called into question the line that Stalin, on the basis of the decision of this Plenum, pursued on the issue of the formation of the USSR and in the conflict in the Communist Party of Georgia. Having all the information about the preparations for the formation of the USSR, Lenin did not say a single word either in favor of the position of the national deviationists - members of the old Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, or against those documents on the formation of the USSR that were prepared by the Central Committee Commission under the chairmanship of Stalin. He didn't find it necessary. In the light of the material known to us, Lenin's silence could mean only one thing - complete agreement! This means that by the time of the second stroke, mutual understanding had been established between Lenin and Stalin in matters of the formation of the USSR. All this deprives those provisions that are formulated in the notes "On the question of nationalities or "autonomization" of any support in the events of the previous time, which supposedly caused their appearance.

* Of course, Lenin received information about the development of the situation in the Communist Party of Georgia even before Mdivani's speech. So, on October 18, 1922, he received a letter from G.K. Ordzhonikidze "on Russian chauvinism" (RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 4. D. 9. L. 31).

** Interestingly, they chose Kamenev and Bukharin as conductors of pressure on Lenin, who, at the October (1922) Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), already showed a tendency to listen to them and meet their demands. Kamenev and Bukharin did not come up. Maybe they did not want to get involved in Caucasian affairs, knowing Lenin's position, or they understood that Mdivani was trying to use them in his own interests? It is significant that Mdivani and his supporters did not address Trotsky, which is obviously not accidental, since at that time he did not declare his political position on this issue. And he himself, right up to the beginning of February 1923, did not support them. At least openly.

*** At the XII Congress, Yenukidze said that at that time in Georgia they talked and wrote a lot about the ongoing G.K. Ordzhonikidze's policy as a "policy of the mord". “But really, was this policy like that? Comrade Ordzhonikidze pursued the policy of the Central Committee. According to Yenukidze, Ordzhonikidze was compliant and, in order to alleviate the situation, hindered the implementation of many orders (Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Verbatim report. April 17-25, 1923, p. 539).

**** Claire - i.e. in clear text, which allowed interception and leakage of political information.

***** So in the text.

****** There is a gap in the text.

******* There is no date on the telegram. Her outgoing number is 5940/sh. The date of October 21 is established on the basis of the outgoing number of one of the previous documents (No. 5937), registered on December 21, and the mention of Lenin's telegram (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2441. L. 1).

******** So in the text. "Ekdini is dissatisfied" - apparently, "extremely dissatisfied" (?).

********* QC - Control Commission.

Notes:

[757] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 9. S. 206.

[758] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 26. L. 10–12.

[759] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 54. S. 299–300.

[760] RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2441. L. 1–2.

[761] Ibid. D. 2491. L. 1–1 rev.

[762] Ibid. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 26. L. 20–21.

[763] Ibid.

[764] Ibid. L. 14.

[765] Ibid. Op. 1. D. 935. L. 1.

[766] Ibid. Op. 2. D. 2. L. 22–28; D. 26. L. 15–18, 20–21, 29–29v., 37–39; D. 68. L. 56; D. 102. L. 5; Op. 4. D. 1. L. 86; D. 9. L. 68, 73, 77, 78, 79, 88v.; D. 26. L. 37, 79; Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Stenographer. report. S. 541.

[767] See: Antonov-Ovseenko A.V. Stalin and his time // Questions of history. 1989. No. 1. S. 97; Volkogonov D.A. Stalin ... Book. 1. S. 140; Gerasimenko A. Riddles of a small note // Young Guard. 1992. #1–2. S. 236; Zhuravlev V.V., Nenarokov A.N. "Georgian Incident" // Pravda. 1988. 12 Aug.

[768] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 32. L. 43–43 rev.

[769] Ibid. L. 44–44v., 60.

[770] Ibid. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 246 (IV issue). S. 58.

[771] See: Antonov-Ovseenko A.V. Stalin and his time. S. 97; Nenarokov A.N., Zhuravlev V.V. Decree. op.; Tucker R. Stalin. Path to power. 1879-1929. History and personality. S. 239.

[772] Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Stenographer. report. pp. 541-542.

[773] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 4. D. 9. L. 71; D. 26. L. 37.

[774] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 459.

[775] Ibid. S. 603.

[776] Ibid. S. 459.

[777] Ibid. S. 463.

[778] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 4. D. 9. L. 77–80. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 324. L. 1, 5.

[779] Cit. by: Nenarokov A.N., Zhuravlev V.V. Decree. op.

[780] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 464-466.

[781] Ibid. S. 465.

[782] Ibid. S. 466.

[783] Ibid. S. 469.

784] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 32. L. 43–43 rev.

[785] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 471.

[786] Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Stenographer. report. pp. 541, 551.

[787] Ibid. S. 541.

[788] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 32. L. 53.

[789] Ibid. Op. 1.D. 2657. L. 1, 3.

[790] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 330.

[791] Ibid. pp. 440–441.

[792] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 1867.

[793] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 472.

[794] Stalin I.V. Op. T. 5. S. 140.

[795] Ibid. S. 144.

[796] Ibid. S. 143.

[797] Domestic history. 1992. No. 4. S. 93.

[798] Ibid. pp. 91–106, 112–116; Source. 1993. No. 1. S. 56; Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 462; RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 4. D. 1. L. 85v.

[799] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 4. D. 1.

[800] Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 324. L. 4.

[801] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 469.
[802] Ibid. S. 330.