RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF A MEMBER OF THE USSR DELEGATION AT THE THIRD SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY S.K. TSARAPKINA WITH MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION OF ISRAEL IN THE UN M. ORENSHTEIN

Stalin, Soviets and Israeli Question

RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF A MEMBER OF THE USSR DELEGATION AT THE THIRD SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY S.K. TSARAPKINA WITH MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION OF ISRAEL IN THE UN M. ORENSHTEIN

October 13, 1948

Paris, Palais de Chaillot

Secret

1. Outlining the position of the Jewish delegation on the Bernadotte plan, Orenstein said that he is now preparing the text of their statement, which, as the first paragraph, confirms that Jews are in principle in favor of the General Assembly's decision of November 29 on the Palestinian issue. Such a position, as could be concluded from the words of Orenshtein, if accepted by the Jewish delegation, will be the result of persistent efforts on the part of him personally, Orenstein. Meanwhile, Shertok2, as Orenshtein made it clear, is currently not inclined to adhere to the General Assembly decision of November 29. For example, at a press conference on October 6, Shertok said that they reject Bernadotte's plan as a possible basis for discussion, however, at the same time, Shertok did not say a single word about the General Assembly decision of November 29.

Then Orenshtein said that they considered it necessary for some territorial changes to be made, since in November of this year. The General Assembly defined the boundaries of the Jewish state without considering strategic considerations. At that time, decisions were taken by the General Assembly taking into account the fact that peace will be established in Palestine and that there will be an economic union between the Jewish and Arab states of Palestine, etc. Life over the past period of time has shown the impracticability of an economic union and the illusory premise that the Jewish and Arab states, at least at the present time, can build their relations on the basis of friendship and cooperation. Taking these circumstances into account, in the firm opinion of the Jewish delegation, it is necessary to eliminate the discovered strategic weakness of the borders of the Jewish state, for which it is necessary to make such corrections to the border line of the Jewish state, which would provide to some extent the possibility of a more effective defense of the Jewish state in case of possible the future of military clashes. These corrections, first of all, include the incorporation of the Western Galilee into the Jewish state and the liquidation of the Arab enclave of Jaffa. This last point is especially important for Jews, since recent military events have shown that the Jewish state and, in particular, Tel Aviv would be in a critical situation and, perhaps, they would fall into the hands of the Arabs, if the Jews had even before the invasion of Arab troops Jaffa would not have been completely captured within the Jewish state. According to Orenstein, there are now 5-7 thousand Arabs left in Jaffa out of 35 thousand.

Orenstein also stated that they were opposed to Bernadotte's plan being accepted even as a basis for discussion. However, from inquiries, I found out that Shertok and, one might say, the majority of the Jewish delegation here, as well as in the government in Tel Aviv, are not inclined to support the decisions of the General Assembly of November 29. In particular, Shertok and the majority in the interim government of Israel are inclined to agree to the transfer of the Arab territories of Palestine to Transjordan. They do this out of political and practical considerations, arguing that it will be possible to come to an agreement with Abdallah and obtain his consent, and consequently the consent of the British, to include the Western Galilee and the Negev in the Jewish state, meanwhile, with the Mufti of Jerusalem Husseini, for Jews it is almost impossible.

2. The second most important point in which the Jews depart from the decisions of the General Assembly of November 29 is their demand to include the Jewish part of the city of Jerusalem (New City) in the Jewish state. At the same time, they agree that the Arab part of the city of Jerusalem should become part of the Arab state. At the same time, they would agree that in some form international control over the protection of the Holy Places should be established by the UN, but that this control and supervision only concern the Holy Places, in the strict sense of the word.

3. The Jews will also insist on providing them with a corridor to connect the Jewish part of the city of Jerusalem with its 90,000 Jewish population with the main part of the state of Israel (Tel Aviv).

4. Regarding the port of Haifa, Orenstein said that the delegation was in the mood (Shertok et al.), Ultimately, to agree with the proposal to declare Haifa a free port, but not the entire port, but only part of it should be allocated for this purpose , bearing in mind, of course, that such a step on the part of the Jewish state should be based on reciprocity. Orenshtein did not develop what is meant by reciprocity.

5. Orenstein further advised that the proposals they are currently preparing provide for a commission for the purpose of limiting the ultimate boundaries of the Jewish state, but that they have not yet determined whether it will be a completely new commission, or whether they will propose the reopening of the Palestinian commission envisaged decision of November 29, 1947. Orenshtein promised to give more detailed information on this issue to me at the next meeting.

6. Orenstein stated that they would strongly insist on the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Palestine, since peace cannot be achieved until such a proposal is implemented.

7. On the issue of Arab refugees, Orenstein stated that the position of the Jewish delegation is as follows. The bulk of Arab refugees (now no more than 80-100 thousand Arab population remained in the Jewish state, while in November of this year there were over half a million of them) left the territory of the Jewish state even before the invasion of Arab troops into Palestine. This was done under the influence of the propaganda of Arab leaders, who at that time pursued a twofold goal: first, to show that the peaceful coexistence of Jews and Arabs as part of a Jewish state is unthinkable, and secondly, to arouse national, religious and other feelings of the population of Arab states , incite militancy among them and hasten the military intervention of the Arab states by invading Palestine and the Jewish state, using as one of the pretexts the need to return to these Arab refugees their homes, property, land, etc. At the moment, all Jewish leaders and the government are united in their intention to prevent the return of Arab refugees to Israel. The majority in the government is inclined to no longer let them into the territory of the Jewish state, but to use the property and land belonging to these refugees as a fund for the resettlement of Jewish immigrants. However, the united workers' party represented by Orenstein considers it possible, after the end of hostilities and the establishment of peace in Palestine, to allow Arab refugees to return to the territory of the Jewish state, provided that they declare their full loyalty to the Jewish state and will not be the fifth column. In practice, the Jews are thinking of dragging out the refugee issue, not by outright refusal, but by including this issue on the agenda during peace negotiations with the Arabs.

8. Orenstein said (while he made a reservation that these are still rumors that he must check) that there are allegedly direct negotiations between the Jews and the Egyptians, and in these negotiations the representatives of Egypt are trying to ensure that the Jews stop their negotiations with Abdallah of Transjordan ... As compensation for this, the Egyptian representatives propose to the Jews to divide the Negev into two parts: the northern part should become part of the Jewish state, and the southern part should become a Jewish-Arab condominium. Orenshtein promised at the next meeting to inform me of the details of these negotiations and their reliability.

9. Orenshtein drew my attention to yesterday's correspondence (October 12) in the French newspaper "Fran Thierer" from Bern regarding the fact that the USSR representative in Tel Aviv allegedly addressed the head of the Israeli government Ben-Gurion with a demarche, which allegedly contained warning that the Soviet Government will refuse to support the Israeli government if the latter concludes an agreement with Transjordan and agrees to the transfer of the Arab part of Palestine to Transjordan. When he asked if I knew anything about this demarche, I said that I had not heard anything about it. A translation of this correspondence is attached.

Conclusions:

1. From the conversation with Orenstein it became clear that the Jewish government is inclined to agree with the transfer of the Arab territories of Palestine to Transjordan and to refuse the creation of an independent Arab state in Palestine envisaged by the decision of the General Assembly on November 29, 1947.

2. The Jews will insist on the incorporation of the Western Galilee into the Jewish state and on the liquidation of the Arab enclave of Jaffa.

3. The Jews are inclined to allocate part of the port in Haifa as a free port for the Arab states, but on terms of reciprocity. What requirements will be put forward by the Jews as these conditions of reciprocity - they have not yet specified.

4. The Jews will insist on the demand for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Palestine.

5. The Jews do not intend now to give their consent to the return of Arab refugees to the Jewish state.

6. The Jews will insist on the inclusion of the New City of Jerusalem in the Jewish state and on the establishment of a Jewish corridor to connect Jerusalem with the main part of the State of Israel. Thus, the Jews are against part 111 of the General Assembly decision of November 29, which provides for the establishment of a special international statute in Jerusalem.

S. Tsarapkin

WUA RF. F. 07. Op. 21c. P. 49.D. 39.L. 61-67.