



The History
of
INDUSTRIALIZATION
USSR

Documents & Materials

1926 - 1928

Science, Publishing House 1969

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IN THIS SERIES:

- *The History of the Industrialisation of the Soviet Union: 1926–1928. Documents and Materials. Moscow: Science. 1969.*
- *The History of the Industrialisation of the Soviet Union: 1929–1932. Documents and Materials. Moscow: Science. 1970.*
- *The History of the Industrialisation of the Soviet Union: 1933–1937. Documents and Materials. Moscow: Science. 1971.*
- *The History of the Industrialisation of the Soviet Union: 1938–1941. Documents and Materials. Moscow: Science. 1972.*

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FROM THE EDITORIAL OFFICE

The Main Archive Directorate under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Institute of History of the USSR and the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR are publishing a series of documentary collections "History of the Industrialization of the USSR (1926-1941)".

Socialist industrialization is the most important part of Lenin's plan for building socialism in our country. "The only material basis of socialism," wrote V. I. Lenin, "may be large-scale machine industry capable of reorganizing agriculture as well" [1]

The successful restoration of the national economy made it possible by the end of 1925 to raise the question of the industrialization of the Soviet Union. Proceeding from Lenin's plan for building a socialist society in the USSR, the XIV Congress of the Communist Party gave instructions "to follow the course towards the industrialization of the country, the development of the production of means of production ..." [2]... Socialist industrialization, as indicated in the theses of the Central Committee of the CPSU "50 years of the Great October Socialist Revolution", was carried out in an atmosphere of capitalist encirclement and the constant threat of attack from the aggressive forces of imperialism. This led to extremely tight deadlines and an extremely high rate of industrial construction, which required a lot of exertion of all forces and means. Industrialization in the USSR was carried out without outside help, solely at the expense of internal savings, the strictest economy.

The implementation of Lenin's GOELRO plan and the first five-year national economic plans ensured the country's rapid economic development. The Soviet Union has become a powerful industrial power. Completely new industries were created - automobile, tractor, aviation, a number of chemical and other industries, a number of new large industrial centers were created in the Eastern regions of the country, technical reconstruction of the largest enterprises in all sectors of the national economy was carried out. In 1940, the gross industrial output increased in comparison with 1913 by 7.7 times, and the production of means of production by 13 times. The output of consumer goods also increased significantly.

Industrialization was of key importance for the construction of socialism in our country. It created the necessary material basis for strengthening the economic independence of the Soviet Union, for the technical reconstruction of all branches of the national economy, for transferring agriculture to a new, socialist basis. She created the material basis for raising the people's well-being. Industrialization was of tremendous social and political importance. It strengthened public ownership in a decisive area of the economy, ensured the ousting of capitalist elements in the city, the victory of the socialist order in industry, and the growth of the working class, which contributed to the strengthening of its leading role in society. Industrialization has strengthened and strengthened the economic and defense might of the socialist country, was one of the decisive factors in the elimination of the economic backwardness of the national outskirts. The industry created by the Soviet people largely predetermined the victory in the Great Patriotic War.

Researchers of the history of socialist industrialization of the USSR already have a number of editions of the most important directive documents of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, which reveal not only the development of economic policy, but also the specific guidance of the country's industrial development [3]. A significant addition to them are previously published such important sources as five-year plans for regions and the country as a whole, reports on their implementation, annual reports of the government, reports of regional party committees, economic people's commissariats to congresses and conferences, statistical collections of the CSO and a number of other materials.

It should be noted that most of the departmental publications have survived in a small number of copies and are bibliographic rarities.

Soviet historians and archivists also made a certain contribution to the creation of a source study base for studying the processes of socialist industrialization. In recent years, a number of documentary collections have been published covering the development of industry in individual regions of the country [4].

These collections provide researchers with a large amount of documentary material not previously published. However, they are mainly devoted to the labor heroism of the Soviet working class,

leaving aside economic problems. The overwhelming majority of published collections reflect the industrialization of industrially developed areas; therefore, the peculiarities of the development of industry in the national, previously backward republics were not reflected in them.

In this series, an attempt is made, using a large, previously unpublished material stored in state and party archives, to reveal the basic laws of the socialist industrialization of the USSR and the peculiarities of its implementation in the main economic and national regions of the country, the leading role of the Communist Party in mobilizing all the forces of the Soviet people to resolve the fundamental economic task, to show the joke of overcoming those great objective difficulties that were caused by the economic backwardness of Russia and the capitalist environment of the world's first socialist state. In the collections of the series, mainly for the first time, a large number of archival documents are published, which contain information about the development of the material and technical base of Soviet industry and related quantitative and qualitative changes in the environment of the working class and technical intelligentsia. The collections of the series contain mainly summarizing reports of the USSR Council of People's Commissars, Council of People's Commissars of the union non-autonomous republics, the Council of Labor and Defense, party, trade union and Komsomol organizations, as well as economic bodies. As for the directives of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, the reader will find them in a number of well-known publications mentioned earlier. The directive documents of local party and Soviet organizations are presented in serial collections much more fully, since they were almost never republished; Besides,

The documents included in the collections of the series reflect the most important problems, on the solution of which the success of the whole industrialization business depended. The reader will find materials about the sources and methods of financing the industry, construction and reconstruction of the most important branches of heavy and light industry and individual largest enterprises, about the methods of construction work and the transformation of construction into an industrial sector of the national economy. The successful development of new enterprises, which was a serious victory for the workers, a maturity test for new Soviet specialists, the elaboration of five-year

long-term plans for the development of the national economy, the constant improvement of the industrial management system and the participation of broad masses of workers in it,

The collections of the series reveal a number of important pages in the history of the Soviet working class and the technical intelligentsia: improving the system of personnel training, quantitative and qualitative changes in the composition of workers and specialists.

The creative activity and labor heroism of the working class and the engineering and technical intelligentsia is especially widely and fully shown - one of the most important conditions for the successful implementation of socialist industrialization.

The documentary collections of the series are divided into two groups. The collections of the first group, published in the center, reflect the process of industrialization as a whole, on a national scale. Collections of the second group contain materials on the features of the industrialization of individual regions

The first group provides for the publication of four collections of documentary materials, the first of which is dedicated to the initial period - 1926-1928, the second, third and fourth collections, respectively, include documents that reveal the process of industrialization in the first, second and third five-year plans. In addition, two collections of documentary materials on the history of railway transport and communications for the entire period of the socialist reconstruction of the national economy will be published. As part of the second group, collections are being prepared on the history of industrialization of the union republics, as well as the main economic regions.

Archaeographic processing of documents was carried out in accordance with the generally accepted rules for the publication of historical sources, and individual deviations and features are specified in the prefaces to the corresponding collections

[1] V. I. Lenin. Poly. collection cit., vol. 44, p. 9

[2] "The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee", Part II. M., 1954, p. 197.

[3] "The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee", Part II, III. M., 1954; "Directives of the CPSU and the Soviet government on economic issues", vols. 1, 2; "Decisions of the party and government on economic issues", vol. I, 2. Moscow, 1967

[4] See collections of documents: "The Saratov party organization in the years of socialist industrialization of the country and the preparation of the complete collectivization of agriculture (1926-1929)". Saratov, 1960; "The struggle of the workers of the Kharkov region for the creation of the foundation of the socialist economy (1926-11932)". Kharkov, 1960; "The political and labor rise of the working class in the USSR (1928-1929)". M., 1956; "The first steps of the industrialization of the USSR (1926-1927)". M., 1959; "Socialist competition in enterprises. Leningrad during the first five-year plan (1928-1932) ". L., 1961; "Communists of Leningrad in the Struggle to Implement Party Decisions on the Industrialization of the Country (1926-1932)". L., 1960; "Socialist industrialization of Azerbaijan". Baku, 1957.

FOREWORD

This volume is an integral part of the all-Union series of collections of documents and materials on the history of industrialization of the USSR (1926-1941). It contains consolidated materials revealing the general patterns of the initial stage of building industry on a national scale in the period from the XIV Congress of the CPSU (b) to the adoption of the first five-year plan.

During this period, the Communist Party not only developed the Leninist principles of socialist industrialization in the difficult conditions of the capitalist encirclement, but also defended them in the struggle against the "left" and right-wing opportunists.

The main practical issue, on the successful solution of which the whole industrialization of the country depended on, was in those years the problem of accumulating funds for the development of industry. The Soviet state had the necessary sources to receive funds. These were revenues from state industry, domestic and foreign trade, banks, agriculture. Some of the funds could have been withdrawn from the capitalist elements in town and country. The contribution of the working people of the city and countryside to the cause of industrialization was significant. It was necessary to collect these funds and use them expediently, pursuing austerity.

The struggle for the economy regime went through two stages. In 1926, the main direction was the elimination or reduction of unproductive costs in enterprises and institutions: staff reduction, excessive reporting, the implementation of unnecessary tools, materials, etc. However, these measures, with all their positive significance, could not significantly affect the profitability of the industry. Therefore, in December 1926, the 15th All-Union Party Conference raised the question of the need to move to a new, more important stage - to rationalize production by introducing a number of organizational and technical measures, which sometimes required significant capital work.

The rationalization of production and the further introduction of cost accounting required the deepening of the economic methods of industrial management. In June 1927, a new regulation on trusts was developed and approved, which was of great fundamental importance, giving enterprises a certain degree of independence.

The undoubted successes in accumulating funds made it possible, already in 1927, to begin the construction of such large enterprises designed to radically reconstruct the entire industry of the Soviet country, such as the Dneproges, the Ural Machine-Building, Kuznetsk Metallurgical, and Stalingrad Tractor Plants.

The successes of socialist industrialization contributed to the growth and strengthening of the ranks of the Soviet working class. The number of workers, the training of skilled workers and the network of schools for factory training were systematically increased. Despite this, unemployment continued to rise in the country, mainly due to the surplus of workers in the countryside.

The disclosure of sabotage in the coal industry of Donbass, which sharply raised the issue of training new Soviet engineers from workers and peasants, accelerated the adoption of a number of measures to improve the work of higher education.

Together with the successes of industrial construction, the labor activity of the working class grew. Production conferences and their bodies, production conferences, social production reviews, competitions and shock brigades - this is not a complete list of forms of labor activity put forward by the trade unions, the press, the Komsomol and approved by the Communist Party. These forms were of no small importance in the successful construction of the socialist economy.

In 1927-1928. the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy was basically developed - a plan for building the foundation of a socialist economy, which had enormous political significance not only within the country, but also abroad.

Based on the main features of industrialization in 1926-1928, the published collection is divided into three sections:

- 1) the course of the Communist Party towards socialist industrialization;
- 2) the first steps of socialist industrialization;
- 3) the working class of the USSR in the struggle for socialist industrialization.

The first section includes the fundamental documents of the Communist Party, revealing the main features of socialist

industrialization: the resolutions of the XIV Congress of the CPSU (b) "On the report of the Central Committee", the XV All-Union Conference of the CPSU (b) "On the economic situation of the country and the tasks of the party", "Results of work and the next tasks of the trade unions" and "On the opposition bloc in the CPSU (b)". Also published is the resolution of the XV Congress of the CPSU (b) "On directives for drawing up a five-year plan of the national economy." In these documents, the party, on the basis of Lenin's teaching about the victory of socialism, gave a detailed program of socialist industrialization. The second section is divided into three chapters.

The first chapter is devoted to the question of the sources and amounts of financing for industry and construction. It publishes explanatory notes to the reports of the USSR People's Commissariat of Finance on the execution of the state budget for 1925/26-1928/29. (doc. No. 6, 7, 8, 9). These notes contain information on the structure of budget revenues and expenditures, on the financial results of the industry and the amount of intraindustrial savings, on the ratio and size of budgetary funds and intraindustrial savings in the financing of industry and their distribution by industry and destination. The notes cover in detail the issue of increasing the profitability of industrial enterprises as a result of the implementation of the decisions of the party and the government on the implementation of a regime of economy and rationalization of production.

Since the notes cover the results of the industry for the previous year, when its profits and losses were created, the collection includes the corresponding part of the explanatory note to the report for 1928/29. However, the notes are not published in full. The omitted parts contain information on all revenues and expenditures of the state budget, financing of all sectors of the national economy, transport and communications, on the execution of the budgets of the union republics, as well as a general overview of the economic and political situation in which the budget was executed.

The published materials also reflect the participation of the Soviet people in financing industrial construction - subscription to the first loans, contributions to cooperation, etc.

Explanatory notes to the reports of the People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR are the most important and most complete sources

that reveal the results of the implementation of the party's policy in the field of financing the national economy of the country, but they are far from the only ones.

Of interest are also the draft state budgets for 1925 / 26-1928 / 29, although the planned targets of the projects did not always correspond to the execution. The reported data were published in the materials for the government reports for 1925 / 26-1928 / 29.

Foreign trade was of great importance for the development of industry. A significant part of equipment, raw materials and semi-finished products was delivered from abroad, and export earnings were one of the most important sources of funds needed for industrial construction. The comments contain information about the structure of exports and imports and its changes in connection with the possibilities and tasks of the country's national economy.

The issues of foreign trade are covered more fully in a number of published sources, mainly in materials to government reports. Detailed data on the structure of industrial imports and exports and its changes in connection with industrialization are published in a separate edition [1]. Statistical information on foreign trade, in addition to general economic statistical collections and reference books, was published in a special collection [2], however, the prices of goods, and hence their cost, were recalculated in accordance with the prices of 1955, which makes it somewhat difficult to compare them with all other materials cited in this edition.

The second chapter includes documents on the first successes of the Soviet state in the field of industrial development. The main source containing information on the development of industry are materials to the government reports for 1925 / 26-1927 / 28. (doc. No. 10, 13, 23). The reports contain information on the growth of industrial production in general and by industry, on organizational and technical measures to rationalize production: mechanization of labor-intensive processes, standardization of products, improvement of labor organization (especially in the textile industry), specialization and cooperation of enterprises, transition to mass or large-scale production. production, resulting in a systematic increase in labor productivity. These materials also contain information about the first successes of the industry in the development of products previously imported from abroad,

Contains information about measures for the development of small industry, about such an important form of participation of the peasantry in industrialization, as the supply of industry with agricultural raw materials.

Thus, the materials for the government reports represent an official source of a generalizing nature, most fully covering all the main issues of the country's economic development, and in comparison with the market reviews of the Council of Congresses of State Industry and Trade, published in the collection of documents "The First Steps of Industrialization of the USSR" exact data.

Organizational and technical measures have led to a significant improvement in the quality indicators of the industry. The chapter publishes the report of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR to the Council of People's Commissars "on the cost of industrial production for 1926-27, which contains detailed information about the reasons for the change in the cost of production and its constituent factors (doc. No. 14).

The chapter includes statistical materials prepared by the Central Statistical Administration for the XVI Party Conference, reflecting the growth of industrial production in the USSR in physical terms, technical and economic indicators of industrial performance and the growth of gross industrial output of the Union republics (doc. No. 24, 25). Document No. 24 contains information on changes in the share of products of certain industries in the economy of the republics already in the first years of industrialization.

To increase industrial production and improve quality indicators, large capital works were required. The materials for the government reports contain information about the capital construction of industry. The issues of construction of power plants are covered in particular detail. However, the most detailed results of capital construction and the main work on rationalization in the coal, metallurgical, oil industry, mechanical engineering, chemical, textile, sugar and forest industries are given in the reviews of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR in the STO for 1925 / 26-1927 / 28, years. But these reviews cover only construction in the all-union industry, subordinate to the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR. Information for the whole 1927/28 is not complete. The surveys

show the state of the industry by the end of the recovery period, shortcomings in the structure of enterprises, built before the October Revolution, the degree of wear and tear of equipment and especially heat and power facilities. They contain materials on the structure of expenses for major repairs, reconstruction and expansion, as well as for new construction by years and industries, the growth rate of allocations for the development of heavy and light industry (doc. No. 15-22).

For the study of the organization of construction work, the conclusions of the USSR People's Commissariat of Finance and the USSR State Planning Committee for published reports are of interest (TsGAOR USSR, f. 374, op. 1, d. 485, pp. 306-315, 320-330). A complete description of capital construction projects was published by the editors of the "Commercial and Industrial Newspaper" [3].

An indicator of the efficiency and volume of capital work carried out in the main industries is also a noticeable increase in its power supply. These materials may be found in a number issued at the time of statistical handbooks [4]. Detailed information about the rationalization measures carried out by the Supreme Economic Council in industry, including the use of foreign technical experience, measures in the field of scientific organization of labor, the development of the system of research and design organizations, is contained in a report specially prepared by the Supreme Council of National Economy for the Council of People's Commissars, which was published in 1928. . [5]

As a result of the successes of industrial construction, the role of the capitalist elements in the eligible industry has noticeably decreased. The materials published in the chapter by the CSO, prepared as material for compiling the control figures for 1928/29 (document no. 26), contain information on the social structure of industry for a number of key indicators: the number of enterprises and gross output.

This chapter contains information about the distribution of the concession industry by industry, product, capital and number of workers. Despite the insignificant volume of production of concession enterprises in the total volume of industrial production, the concessions were used by the Soviet state to obtain currency and alleviate unemployment. A number of information about the struggle for the economy regime is contained in the published report of the NK RFL for 1926-1927. [6]

The increased spread of self-supporting principles in the national economy required further improvement of industrial management based on economic methods, which found expression both in expanding the rights of enterprises and in changing the structure and tasks of the administrative apparatus of the Supreme Council of the National Economy. The same chapter publishes the "Regulations on State Industrial Trusts" adopted on June 29, 1927 (doc., No. 12). The "Regulations", which was the fruit of the long-term work of the Supreme Council of the National Economy ("Commercial and Industrial Newspaper" for 1925-1927), provided enterprises with a certain independence in the field of production, financing, and staffing.

More detailed issues of production management during this period are covered in special collections [7].

The third chapter is devoted to the development of the first five-year plan. The chapter mainly publishes the minutes of the Central Commission for Long-Term Planning and Presidium of the State Planning Commission and the Supreme Economic Council, reflecting the main stages of the development of the five-year plan, as well as a number of tables containing planned targets for the optimal and minimum options.

The development of the first five-year plan was carried out over a number of years, starting in 1926, both in the State Planning Committee and in the Supreme Economic Council. Variants of plans prepared by these institutions, as well as directives for drawing up an industrial plan for 1928 / 29-1932 / 33. were published in due time [8]. The first five-year plan was also published in 1929, and the revised version in 1930 [9]

The third section of the collection consists of two chapters.

The first of them examines changes in the size and composition of the working class, training; the report of the People's Commissariat of Labor of the USSR for 1926/27 is published (doc, No. 54). It contains information about the number of workers, the first steps of the bodies of the People's Commissariat of Labor on the planned supply of enterprises and economic bodies with labor, to regulate the departure of the rural population to work. The latter was especially urgent, an event for the first years, since in a number of sectors of the national

economy, especially in construction, the labor of *otkhodniks* was used almost exclusively. The report examines the nature and causes of unemployment in the USSR, measures to eliminate it and help the unemployed. This chapter contains statistical information from the CSO on the number of workers and employees by branches of the eligible industry for the Union republics and the country as a whole, on the number of women workers (doc. No. 57.58). It also publishes a number of documents on the training of qualified workers and specialists, in particular, the decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of March 11, 1926 "On the training and education of the labor force", as well as extracts from the materials for the government report for 1925/26, 1927 / 28 years. (doc. No. 51, 52, 56). In addition, the chapter includes information on the number of members of the CPSU (b) according to the party census of 1927 and members of trade unions among workers and specialists (doc. No. 53, 55).

A number of sources published at one time significantly supplement the published documents. Among them, first of all, one should point to the materials of the professional census of 1929-1930, carried out among the workers of the main industries. They contain information on social background, age composition, due to agriculture, literacy workers as a whole, industries and parts [10]. Subsequently, the trade unions did not undertake detailed surveys. Unfortunately, the census materials were not fully processed. Detailed data on the number of workers were systematically published in the Bulletin Labor Statistics. In 1929, the materials of the CSO were published on the number of migrant workers, their geographical distribution and qualifications [11] ... The materials of the survey of specialists at enterprises and in the management apparatus, carried out in 1929, as well as a number of information on the training of qualified personnel in the USSR [12] were published.

The second chapter of the third section contains documents on the labor rise of the working class and its participation in the management of production. It also publishes the guiding documents of the Communist Party that guided the creative activities of the working people: the appeal of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) "On the Struggle for Economy", the Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party (Bolsheviks) "On the organization of oral and print agitation for the rationalization of production and the involvement of broad workers the masses in the campaign to rationalize production" (doc. No. 59, 61). A circular letter from the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the Supreme Economic Council on the work of industrial meetings is also published (doc. No. 60).

In the materials of the organizational and distribution department of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), it is said about the participation of party organizations of various enterprises in the management of mass work to implement a regime of economy and rationalization of production. These documents focus on deficiencies with a view to eradicating them. This is the specificity of these reviews (doc. No. 62, 63).

In the reports and reviews of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, the issues of organizing the work of production meetings and their bodies are covered in detail: the transfer of work to the shop, the organization of temporary control commissions for in-depth study of complex issues, cooperation between production meetings of enterprises connected with each other in the production process. All these materials do not contain accurate statistics on the work of the meetings (the reporting was only approximate), but they show the main trends in the development of the main form of mass production work of trade unions (doc. No. 67, 72, 73).

The information review of the Central Committee of the Komsomol (doc. No. 68) clearly reveals the main forms of mass work put forward by the Komsomol organizations: contests for the best

worker, production roll call and, finally, the highest form of socialist competition of those years - the first shock brigades.

By the end of 1928, the roll-call of enterprises took on such a wide scale that they turned into a kind of competition between regions, a striking example of which is the Ural-Siberian roll call.

The chapter publishes materials on the organization by the editors of the "Commercial and Industrial Newspaper" jointly with the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council of National Economy of the competition for the best enterprise to reduce the cost of production - the initial form of interfactory competition (doc. No. 69).

The report of the press department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) to the 15th Congress (doc. No. 66) contains detailed information about yet another form of mass production work, first put forward by the newspaper Tverskaya Pravda - about social production reviews of enterprises.

Much space in the chapter is devoted to the participation of workers in the management of production. In addition to the already mentioned production meetings and temporary control commissions, the workers participated in improving the organization of production through production conferences and bodies of the NK RKI. The report of the organizational distribution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for the 15th Congress contains a lot of material on the promotion of workers from production to the economic apparatus and to the posts of engineering and technical workers (doc. No. 65)

Information about the participation of trade unions in production management - discussion of control figures and the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy, consideration of the balances of households. bodies, participation in the formation of economic bodies, etc. - are available in the report of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions to the VIII Congress of Trade Unions. Published at one time, it not only became a bibliographic rarity, but is also the only document that contains the specified information in a generalized form [13].

The published documents have been extracted from the funds of the Central State Archives of the National Economy of the USSR (TSGANKH USSR), the Central State Archives of the October Revolution, the highest bodies of state power and government bodies of the USSR (TSGAOR USSR), the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU (TsPA.IML), the archive of the Central Committee of the Komsomol, as well as from previously published editions, which are currently a bibliographic rarity.

Archaeographic processing of documents was carried out in accordance with generally accepted publication rules.

All abbreviated words not included in the abbreviation list are expanded without square brackets, unless the correctness of the expansion is in doubt or may be twofold. The figures in the tables, in the event that the amount does not converge with the total number during the calculation, have not been corrected, but the footnotes indicate that the sum of the numbers does not converge with the total.

Some of the documents are published in extracts. Information that is not related to the topic of the collection or is of secondary importance is omitted. All extracts are specified in footnotes. Extracts include a list of omitted sections, chapters and paragraphs or a brief summary of them, except for the following documents: a) resolutions of congresses and conferences of the CPSU (b); b) statistical tables, if data outside the chronological scope of the collection is omitted.

In the materials for the reports of the government and the People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR, the omitted chapters and paragraphs are indicated only for the section from which the extract is published. Extracts from documents are indicated in the title and in dashes in the text, and the latter is not put in the case of missing whole sections, chapters and paragraphs.

In the materials for the reports of the government and the People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR, the numbering of tables was changed in accordance with the extracts, and the diagrams were omitted without reservations. Materials and statistical tables, previously published and without a date, are dated by content, since it is not possible to establish an exact date.

The appendices to the collection contain notes, a list of abbreviations, a list of sources used, an index of enterprises, as well as a chronicle of the decisions of the Communist Party and the Soviet government on industrialization for the period from December 23, 1925 to September 19, 1928. Central Committee of the CPSU and published materials.

[1] "Industrial exports and imports". M., 1930.

[2] "Foreign trade of the USSR. 1918-1940 ". M., 1960.

[3] "Capital construction of industry". M., 1928.

- [4] "The USSR in 15 years." M., 1932; "Union industry in figures. Growth rates and development factors. (Materials for the party conference in 1929) ". M., 1929.
- [5] "Rationalization of the industry of the USSR". M., 1928
- [6] "Two years of work of the Central Control Commission - RCI of the USSR. Report to the XV Party Congress". M., 1927
- [7] "Management of the national economy of the USSR (1917-1940)", M., 1968;. "Soviets of National Economy and Planning Bodies in the Center and in the Local". M., 1957
- [8] "Materials OSVOK", series III. Prospects for the development of industry in connection with the prospects for the development of the national economy. M., 1927; "Materials for the five-year industrial development plan (1927/28 - 1931/32)" M., 1927; "Control figures of the five-year industrial development plan of the USSR (1927 / 28-1931 / 32)." M., 1928; "Commercial and Industrial Newspaper", April 24, 1928; "Prospects for the development of the national economy of the USSR for 1926 / 27-1930 / 31." M., 1927; "Prospective orientation for 1927 / 28-1931 / 32". M., 1927
- [9] "Five-year plan for the national economic development of the USSR", v. I-IV. M., 1930.
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COURSE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY ON SOCIALIST INDUSTRIALIZATION

No. 1 From the resolution of the XIV Congress of the CPSU (b) "According to the report of the Central Committee"

December 31, 1925

... In the field of economic construction, the congress proceeds from the fact that our country, the country of the dictatorship of the proletariat, has everything it needs to build a complete socialist society" (Lenin) [1]. The congress considers that the struggle for the victory of socialist construction in the USSR is the main task of our party. The reporting year has fully proved the correctness of these provisions. Before the seizure of power in other countries by the proletariat, but with its undoubted support, without the so-called "help" from foreign capital and in the continuous struggle with private capital in our country, the working class, in alliance with the bulk of the peasantry, had already achieved its first serious successes in socialist construction.

The past year was marked by the rapid growth of the national economy as a whole, with it approaching the pre-war level and the growth of its individual branches: industry, agriculture, transport, foreign trade, domestic trade, credit system and banks, public finance, etc. With all the diversity of its constituent parts (natural peasant economy, small-scale commodity production, private capitalism, state capitalism and socialism), the proportion of socialist industry, state and cooperative trade, nationalized credit and other commanding heights of the proletarian state is sharply increasing.

Thus, there is an economic offensive of the proletariat on the basis of the New Economic Policy and the advancement of the USSR economy towards socialism. State socialist industry is increasingly becoming the vanguard of the national economy, leading the national economy as a whole.

The congress notes that these successes could not have been achieved without the active participation of the broad masses of the workers in the common work of building socialist industry (campaigns to raise labor productivity, production conferences, etc.).

At the same time, however, the special contradictions of this growth and the specific dangers and difficulties determined by this growth are developing. These include: the absolute growth of private capital with a relative decline in its role, especially private merchant capital, which transfers its operations to serving the countryside; the growth of kulak farms in the countryside, together with the growth of differentiation of the latter; the growth of the new bourgeoisie in the cities, striving for economic integration with the commercial capitalist and kulak farms in their struggle to subjugate the bulk of the middle peasant farms.

On this basis, the congress instructs the Central Committee to be guided in the field of economic policy by the following directives:

a) prioritize the task of ensuring the victory of socialist economic forms over private capital in every possible way, strengthening the monopoly of foreign trade, the growth of socialist state-owned industry and the involvement, under its leadership and with the help of cooperation, of an ever larger mass of peasant farms in the channel of socialist construction;

b) to ensure for the USSR economic independence, which protects the USSR from turning it into an appendage of the capitalist world economy, for which purpose it is to pursue a course towards the industrialization of the country, the development of the production of means of production and the formation of reserves for economic maneuvering;

c) based on the decisions of the XIV Party Conference, to promote in every possible way the growth of production and trade in the country;

d) use all resources, observe the strictest economy in spending public funds, increase the turnover rate of state industry, trade and cooperation to increase the rate of socialist accumulation;

e) to develop our socialist industry on the basis of a higher technical level, but in strict accordance with both the market capacity and the financial capabilities of the state;

f) to promote in every possible way the development of Soviet local industry (district, okrug, province, oblast, republic), in every possible way stimulating local initiative in organizing this industry, calculated to meet the diverse needs of the population in general, and the peasantry in particular;

g) support and push forward the development of agriculture in the direction of improving agricultural culture, developing industrial crops, improving farming techniques (tractorization), industrializing agriculture, streamlining land management and providing all-round support for various forms of collectivization of agriculture.

The congress considers that one of the necessary conditions for solving these problems is the struggle against disbelief in the building of socialism in our country and with attempts to view our enterprises, which are enterprises of the "consistently socialist type" (Lenin), as state capitalist enterprises. Such ideological currents, making it impossible for the conscious attitude of the masses to the construction of socialism in general and socialist industry in particular, can only slow down the growth of the socialist elements of the economy and facilitate the struggle against them on the part of private capital. The congress therefore considers it necessary to carry out extensive educational work to overcome these distortions of Leninism ...

"The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee", Part II. M., 1954, pp. 195-197.

No. 2 From the resolution of the XV conference of the CPSU (b) "On the economic situation of the country and the tasks of the party"

November 3, 1926

Introduction

The greatest historical task of building a socialist society, set before the dictatorship of the proletariat, imperatively requires the concentration of all the forces of the party, state and working class on questions of economic policy.

In the difficult conditions of the world capitalist encirclement, the technical and economic backwardness of the USSR, the motley combination of various socio-economic structures in the national economy, the acute struggle between the socialist and capitalist elements both in the countryside and in the city - sober consideration of the driving forces of economic development and firm, flexible and the timely impact of the state on the entire economy of the country in order to ensure its planned development along the path to socialism. The main prerequisite for the success of socialist construction is the consolidation of the economic hegemony of large-scale socialist industry over the entire economy of the country and, above all, its leading and socialistically transforming role in relation to the peasant economy.

The development of the country's productive forces, which took place in the past years of the New Economic Policy, and the faster growth of the socialized sector of the national economy in comparison with the private capitalist sector are the best refutation of the views of the opposition, which sees in the difficulties and obstacles of the first steps of economic construction an argument against the possibility of the victorious building of socialism in our country.

Under the leadership of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), on the whole, a huge amount of work has been completed to restore the national economy. The recovery period can be considered complete in general terms. Now the national economy is entering a new period of its development - the period of restructuring the economy on the basis of new, higher technology.

By this period, the gathering of the proletariat, scattered during the civil war and intervention, had ended, its organizations were strengthened,

and a significant improvement in the material situation of the working class was achieved.

The main results of the restoration process are ensuring the leading role of the commanding economic heights in the hands of the proletariat, while reaching the pre-war levels of industrial and agricultural production, railway transport, achieving the predominant role of cooperation and state trade in the field of commodity circulation, establishing a hard currency and building on a new basis of credit systems.

I. The period of restructuring the economy on a new technical basis and the pace of industrialization

With the end of the restoration period, the further development of the national economy comes up against the inadequacy and backwardness of the production and technical base inherited from bourgeois society. The national economy enters a period when the rate of its development slows down greatly in comparison with the past years.

The defeatist ideology that manifested itself in the speeches of the opposition, linking with this slowdown in the pace of the disruption of industrialization and the threat to the dictatorship of the proletariat, is completely wrong. This ideology does not take into account the fact that the development of industry on the basis of the expansion of fixed capital (new capital construction) could never and cannot proceed as fast as the development of industry on the old basis took place in the recovery period in recent years. However, the specific conditions of the Soviet state ensure a faster rate of development for industry than under the conditions of a capitalist state.

A prerequisite for further industrial growth is the expansion of fixed capital.

All the efforts of the Party and the Soviet state should be, first of all, aimed at ensuring such an expansion of fixed capital that would lead to a gradual restructuring of the entire national economy on a higher technical basis.

It is necessary to strive to overtake and then surpass the level of industrial development of the advanced capitalist countries in a relatively minimal historical period. The successful implementation of this depends on the rate of accumulation in the national economy and

on the resources that it can allocate for solving the problem of industrialization.

One of the distinctive features and, at the same time, one of the main difficulties of the initial stage of industrialization is that the costs of capital construction will require significant stress on the national economy, while the results of new construction, that is, the production of new factories and plants, is better. Quality and cheaper in price, will enter the market only after a considerable period of time, often in several years.

It would be wrong to assume that the rate of development of the national economy in the future will not exceed the rate of the pre-war, or even be lower than it. This view does not take into account the fact that as the plan of industrial construction is being implemented, more and more new opportunities are opening up for a subsequent increase in the rate of development of both industry and agriculture, and ever greater prospects are opening up for the use of all the internal resources of the USSR. Such a view also does not take into account the fundamental changes that have taken place in the economy of the Soviet Union, and distinguishes it from the economy of the capitalist countries. These differences, which consist, first of all, in the abolition of private ownership of the basic means of production and in the planned management of the entire economy, are turning more and more as the economy develops into gigantic advantages.

The realization of these advantages in practical construction is the most important task of the Party during the period of the socialist reorganization of the entire national economy.

The rational and planned use of all the possibilities available in the national economy ensures the preservation of a fairly significant rate of development of the national economy, the growth from year to year of its socialized part, the strengthening and strengthening of the leading role of the proletariat in our country.

II. Sources of accumulation

The rate of expansion of fixed assets will depend on:

a) on the amount of accumulation of socialized industry;

b) use through the state budget of the income of other sectors of the national economy;

c) using the savings of the population by involving them in cooperation, in savings banks, domestic government loans, the credit system, etc.

The process of expanded reproduction of industry must be ensured, first of all, by the investment in the industry of new masses of surplus product created within the industry itself. The main conditions for increasing the size of intraindustrial accumulation are: a decisive reduction in overhead costs, an acceleration of capital turnover, an all-round rationalization of industry, the use of the latest technological advances in it, an increase in labor productivity and an increase in labor discipline.

However, no matter how the intraindustrial accumulation grows, it, at least for the next period, cannot be sufficient to ensure the required rate of industry development.

Therefore, the further development of industry will largely depend on those additional funds that will be directed to industrial construction.

One of the main instruments for the redistribution of the national income is the state budget. In the state budget of the Union, the interests of the country's industrialization must find full expression. In the expenditure side of the budget, appropriate appropriations for industry, electrification, etc. should be provided.

The interests of industrialization should be taken into account, first of all, when drawing up an export-import plan (an increase in imports of capital goods with a decrease in imports of consumer goods).

The conference finds that until now no serious efforts have been made to concentrate the funds accumulated by the population in cooperatives, in savings banks, in loans, etc. As the general welfare of the population grows, this is used through cooperative and credit institutions. Small savings of the population should acquire more and more importance as one of the sources of funds for the development of the economy.

The conference categorically condemns the views of the opposition on the need for industrialization by taxing the countryside and such a price policy, which would inevitably lead to a halt in the development of

agriculture, reduce the sources of raw materials for industry and the market for its products, which would inevitably lead to a sharp drop in the rate of industrialization. country.

III. Economy mode and new management challenges

The industrialization of the country is impossible without strict and unswerving implementation of the economy regime. The attention of the entire Party and all Soviet organs must be directed towards putting an end to all unnecessary and unproductive expenditures.

A necessary condition for the successful and correct implementation of a regime of economy is the participation of broad masses of workers in it. The firm implementation of the austerity regime can and should save considerable funds for the further development of the economy on the basis of the country's industrialization. The conference notes that during the implementation of the austerity regime, distortions of the Party's directives were allowed, expressed in attempts to economize at the expense of the vital interests of the working class. A decisive struggle must be waged against such a distortion of the economy regime and all attempts in this direction must be suppressed at the root.

With the implementation of the austerity regime, decisive successes should be achieved in reducing the staff of both self-supporting and state budgetary bodies, minimizing the currently extremely high overhead costs, rationalizing the entire management system and decisively fighting bureaucracy. Bureaucracy was a huge evil throughout the entire period of the existence of Soviet Power. This evil is becoming even more dangerous at the present time, when the country begins to restructure its entire economic life. The enormous cost of the bureaucratic apparatus, extreme red tape in resolving urgent construction issues, and often distortion of party and government directives are a major obstacle to further construction.

In accordance with the new economic tasks, it is necessary, not confining ourselves to correcting minor shortcomings in the administrative and economic apparatus, to raise the question of revising the entire system of building the administrative apparatus of the economy, in order to improve it, to simplify it as much as possible and to make it cheaper.

To recognize the need to establish by law a more precise delineation of the functions and responsibilities of individual instances both in the field of control and in the field of management and planned management of the economy.

During the nine years after the October Revolution, a very complex system of organizing production, distribution networks, credit agencies, etc. was created. Various links of this system often grew spontaneously. The very range of their activities was determined in a completely different economic situation. The new tasks facing the state and the national economy often do not find the necessary support in these bodies. The implementation of the principle of centralization, which is absolutely necessary in a planned, organized economy, is being carried out at the present time by the same methods that were necessary in the period of the first steps of organizing the Soviet economy, but which are outdated at the present time. Within the organs themselves, the principle of an accurate division of labor and responsibility is not sufficiently implemented, both between the various links of these organs, and between individual workers. The discrepancy between the system of organization and the unchanged situation with its new tasks inevitably leads to a waste of funds and an increase in bureaucracy.

In accordance with the decisions of the April plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) on streamlining the work of planning bodies, as well as reducing the instances of passing plans, the conference considers it necessary in the near future to achieve a more complete and correct use of regional and republican planning and operational bodies in managing the economic life of the USSR ...

When developing economic plans, special attention must be paid to the interests of economically backward republics and regions.

During the recovery period, a cadre of workers has been formed, having already accumulated vast experience in organizing industrial management. The administrative apparatus of the main production units (factory, plant) has sufficiently matured and mastered the business. The enormous role (which will continue to grow even more) of production meetings, conferences and the system of promotion, as forms of direct participation of workers in the organization of production, was determined. All this makes it possible to take a

furthermore decisive step in freeing the lower levels of the production system from petty tutelage, control and accountability. At the same time, the responsibility of the leaders of each individual body (from top to bottom) for the work they perform should be increased.

"The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee", Part II. M., 1954, pp. 293-299.

No. 3 From the resolution of the XV Conference of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) "Results of work and immediate tasks of trade unions"

November 3, 1926

Economy mode

The political and cultural growth of the main cadres of the proletariat develops its sensitive attitude to all violations of revolutionary law and bureaucratic distortions by individual administrators of the line of Soviet power, is the basis for further growth in labor productivity and further successes of socialist construction with the conscious participation of the entire proletariat, demanding at the same time from administrators and business executives a sensitive approach to the workers, attentiveness and precise implementation in all branches of Soviet and, in particular, economic work, the line of the Soviet state, observance of laws and workers' rights.

The economy regime as a necessary prerequisite for socialist accumulation, lowering the cost of production and lowering prices for all products and goods has already yielded some, albeit still modest, results, and undoubtedly, our successes in this area will grow from year to year, being at the same time and precondition for further improving the economic situation of workers.

The economy regime is thus aimed at strengthening and developing the October gains of workers and women workers and can be successfully carried out only with the indispensable active support of the broad working masses themselves and on the basis of combating the shortcomings of the state. and hozaparat, improving the production management system and setting up production itself, drastically reducing unproductive costs and strengthening labor discipline while effectively protecting the rights and interests of workers,

Therefore, it should be recognized that the obvious distortions of the economy regime on the part of a number of economic bodies towards its implementation not by rationalizing production processes and reducing overhead costs, but by violating the urgent needs and interests of workers, unnerving them with frequent untimely revision of norms and prices, should be considered intolerable. petty, picky attitude of the administrative staff and even sometimes allowing direct

violations of collective agreements and the Labor Code. The Party and the trade unions must declare the most resolute struggle against all kinds of bureaucratic distortions of the line of the Party and Soviet power on the part of economic agencies and individual administrators.

At the same time, the next task of the trade unions is systematic tireless work to strengthen trade union and labor discipline, a decisive struggle against anarchist methods used by individual groups of workers to resolve economic and domestic issues ("bagpipes", strikes without the permission of the union, etc.) without in order to exhaust legal and normal methods of satisfying their claims.

Likewise, resolutely fighting against the bureaucratic distortions of economic agencies, vigorously defending the economic and everyday interests of the workers, the trade unions must, relying on the main, most conscious cadres of the proletarians, wage an equally vigorous struggle against an unbridled attitude to production and labor discipline, as a threat to disrupt the entire socialist construction, which is a vital affair of the working class. The trade unions, relying on proletarian public opinion, must declare the most resolute struggle to absenteeism, laxity, and an unfair attitude towards their duties. Trade unions should not only support all reasonable measures of economic bodies aimed at implementing a regime of economy, but also initiate specific proposals aimed at implementing the party's slogans about a regime of economy and rationalization of production.

Accurate implementation by both the administration and the workers of laws, contracts and rules on labor and production (the Code of Labor Laws, collective agreements, internal regulations, decisions of conciliatory authorities and arbitration courts, etc.) should be the most necessary prerequisite for the correct organization of labor and healthy labor discipline.

Production meetings

The 14th Congress of the CPSU pointed out to the party and trade unions that "the best form of drawing the broad masses of workers into the practical construction of the Soviet economy, instilling in them an understanding of the close dependence of the interests of the working people on the degree of economic success of the socialist state, promoting and educating new cadres of business executives and

administrators from among the workers are production meetings at factories, factories and other large enterprises and farms " [2]... The conference considers that this definition of the role of production conferences given by the Fourteenth Congress has been fully and completely confirmed by life. At present, production conferences (and conferences), with skillful and energetic guidance from the trade unions, should play a particularly outstanding role in attracting broad strata of workers to conscious participation in the organization of industry and in the whole work of socialist construction, educating and teaching them how to manage production, and putting forward new thousands of proletarian administrators and business executives and thereby creating a solid foundation for the fight against bureaucracy and the improvement of the entire state and economic apparatus.

Contrary to the panicky cries of the opposition, the production conferences are developing and are gradually shifting to more in-depth work. The first stage of the work of production meetings - discussion and elimination of the most pressing shortcomings - basically almost finished.

The temporary hesitations observed in the work of production conferences were explained by the red tape in the economic agencies, the disdainful attitude towards them on the part of some of the business executives and the factory administration, and at times its jealous attitude towards the proposals of the workers; the inattentive and sometimes negligent attitude towards them on the part of individual trade unions, their failure to understand (by the trade unions) the need for energetic implementation of technically possible and productively expedient proposals from industrial meetings; inability to use glasnost and proletarian democracy in the fight against red tape (wall newspapers, correspondence, reports at general meetings); inadequacy of accounting, control and reporting on the fate of proposals put forward by production conferences.

Confirming the directives of the XIV Party Congress on the tasks of production meetings, the conference recognizes that the next tasks at the moment are:

1. Deepening the work of production meetings by moving, as a rule, to planned work, establishing for the first time plans for their work for a relatively short period of time, at the same time not refusing to put in

the order of their discussion of extraordinary issues put forward by the participants of the meetings.

2. The transition to the discussion and development of larger general issues, such as: improving the organization of labor and production of the entire workshop, the entire enterprise, the trust as a whole, etc. of them in shop production meetings and in commissions specially created for this purpose. The Presidium of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and individual Central Committees of the Unions, on the basis of a careful study of the work of production meetings, should develop a number of approximate instructions on the methods and system of work of production meetings, both of a general nature and in relation to individual industries, and discuss the issue of publishing a special journal to guide the work and combining the experience of production meetings.

3. All trade union organizations should, to a greater extent than until now, increase attention and practical guidance to the work of production conferences, persistently striving for the earliest possible implementation of their production-expedient decisions, regularly and possibly fully together with business executives informing the conferences about the reasons rejecting their decisions or slowing down their implementation. Party organizations should fully help trade-union organizations in this work.

4. To oblige economic agencies to increase their attention to production meetings on the basis of the July circular (VSNKh and All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions) [3]. The Supreme Council of the National Economy should oversee the implementation of this circular and take measures to eliminate red tape and negligence when considering proposals from industrial meetings, bringing to responsibility administrators and business executives who do not comply with these directives and distort the line of the Soviet state on this issue.

In the interests of deepening the work of production conferences, bringing them closer to the business of managing enterprises, and thereby bringing the working masses closer to the business of managing the workers, their best acquaintance with their plans, finances, trading and operating apparatus, rational use of available resources, it is useful to recognize experience to apply at individual

enterprises the creation of temporary control commissions [4] from the workers of this enterprise, formed by the FZK and production meetings. The task of such commissions should be a detailed acquaintance with all the activities of the plant management for a certain period of its work, its plans, finances, management methods, the structure of the apparatus, as well as the rational use of the resources at its disposal for a corresponding joint report with business executives at the plenum of the production meeting.

An exact listing of the rights and obligations of such commissions, their structure and method of formation, as well as the definition of those enterprises where this experience should be carried out in the first place, is instructed to develop and determine the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the Supreme Economic Council.

Trade unions should deepen the work of industrial conferences by more thorough, competent preparation and preliminary study of their daily agenda, taking into account their experience and regularly checking the implementation of their decisions and eliminating the shortcomings indicated at these conferences.

Trade unions and economy

It is necessary to recognize the work and attention of trade unions to economic and economic issues and to the matter of nominating their candidates for administrative and economic posts are clearly insufficient and weak. At the same time, it is necessary to state a number of cases of lack of attention by economic agencies to the instructions of the trade unions and the candidates they put forward for economic posts. This situation should be eliminated as soon as possible.

For this, all party, professional and economic organizations must strictly remember the resolutions of the XI Congress of the RCP and the XIV Congress of the CPSU on the need for the energetic participation of trade organizations in all planning and regulatory bodies and the promotion of business executives-administrators from workers. Particular attention should be paid to the coordination and approval of candidates nominated for economic posts.

Trade-union organizations should increase their attention to the work of the audit commissions of economic bodies, improve the composition

of their representatives in them, establish a close relationship with them so that they are always aware of the work of both their representatives and the audit commissions as a whole, and thus of all economic activities of this enterprises, trusts and industry in general. This will bring the trade union bodies closer to the economy, increase their competence and provide an opportunity to actively influence the organization and management of production.

Trade unions should do everything possible to strengthen their work to train and educate new strata of workers in the management of the socialist economy, nominating the most talented workers and women workers to various economic posts (through production conferences), organizing evening production circles and courses with the support of the state, and in every possible way involving working youth in them. , courses of red directors, publishing of industrial literature, etc.

Party organizations must unswervingly support all business proposals and candidates nominated by trade unions for various economic posts.

The Conference believes that:

- a) deepening the work of production meetings;
- b) strengthening their control functions;
- c) the steady and energetic promotion of workers to all economic posts;
- d) the systematic and planned participation of trade unions in the organization of production on the basis of the decisions of this conference and with the support of the entire party will be the necessary prerequisites for involving the unions and the entire working class in organizing production and will most fully ensure the success of socialist construction.

"The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee", Part II. M., 1954, pp. 315-320.

No. 4 From the resolution of the XV conference of the CPSU (b) "On the opposition bloc in the CPSU (b)"

November 3, 1926

A characteristic feature of the period we are going through is the growing complexity of the struggle between the capitalist states and our country, on the one hand, and between the socialist elements and capitalist elements within our country, on the other hand.

If the attempts of world capital to the economic encirclement of our country, to its political isolation, to a disguised blockade and, finally, to direct revenge for the help of the workers of the USSR to the struggling workers of the West and the oppressed peoples of the East create external difficulties, then the transition of our country from the recovery period to the period the restructuring of industry on the basis of new technology and the increasingly complicated struggle between the capitalist and socialist elements of our economy, create internal difficulties.

The party sees these difficulties and has the ability to overcome them. The Party, with the support of the vast masses of the proletariat, is already overcoming these difficulties, confidently leading the country along the path to socialism. But not all detachments of our party believe in the possibility of further forward movement. Some parts of our party, though small in number, frightened by difficulties, experience fatigue and hesitation, fall into despair and cultivate depressive moods, become infected with disbelief in the creative forces of the proletariat and come to the ideology of surrender.

In this sense, the present turning point reminds to a certain extent the turning point of October 1917. Just as then, in October 1917, the difficult situation and difficulties of the transition from the bourgeois revolution to the proletarian revolution gave rise to vacillations of one part of the party, defeatism and disbelief in the possibility of taking power and retaining it by the proletariat (Kamenev, Zinoviev), and now, in the current critical period, the difficulties of transition to a new phase of socialist construction give rise to vacillations in some circles of our party, disbelief in the possibility of victory of the socialist elements of our country over the capitalist elements, disbelief in the possibility of victorious construction socialism in the USSR.

The opposition bloc is an expression of these decadent and defeatist sentiments in the ranks of one part of our party.

The party sees the difficulties and has the ability to overcome them. But in order to overcome these difficulties, it is necessary, first of all, to overcome the depressive moods and defeatist ideology in the ranks of one part of the party.

The opposition bloc in its document of October 16, 1926, rejecting factionalism and dissociating itself from clearly Menshevik groupings inside the CPSU (b) and outside it, at the same time declares that it remains on its old principled positions, does not abandon its fundamental mistakes and will defend these erroneous views within the framework of the Party Charter.

It follows from this that the opposition bloc thinks to continue to cultivate depressive moods and surrender in the Party, that it thinks to continue to propagate its erroneous views in the Party.

Therefore, the next task of the party is to expose the fundamental inconsistency of the main views of the opposition bloc, to explain their incompatibility with the foundations of Leninism and to wage a decisive ideological struggle against the fundamental errors of the opposition bloc with a view to overcoming them completely.

I. The transition of the "new opposition" to Trotskyism in the main question of the nature and prospects of our revolution

The party proceeds from the premise that our revolution is a socialist revolution, that the October Revolution is not only a signal, an impetus and a starting point for a socialist revolution in the West, but at the same time, firstly, it is the basis for the further development of the world revolutionary movement and, secondly, second, it opens a transitional period from capitalism to socialism in the USSR (the dictatorship of the proletariat), during which the proletariat, with a correct policy towards the peasantry, can and will successfully build a complete socialist society, provided, of course, the might of the international revolutionary movement, with one on the other hand, and the might of the proletariat of the USSR, on the other, will be great enough to protect the USSR from the military intervention of imperialism.

Trotskyism adheres to completely different views on the character and prospects of our revolution. Despite the fact that Trotskyism went

along with the party in October 1917, it proceeded and continues to proceed from the fact that our revolution itself is not essentially white socialist, that the October Revolution is only a signal, impetus and starting point for the socialist revolution in West, that if the world revolution is dragged out and the victorious socialist revolution in the West does not arrive in time in the very near future, then the proletarian power in Russia will have to fall or be reborn (which is the same thing) under the pressure of inevitable clashes between the proletariat and the peasantry.

While the party, organizing the October Revolution, proceeded from the premise that "the victory of socialism is initially possible in a few or even in one, separately taken, capitalist country", that "the victorious proletariat of this country, expropriating the capitalists and organizing socialist production at home", can and must stand up "against the rest of the capitalist world, attracting the oppressed classes of other countries, raising an uprising in them against the capitalists, acting, if necessary, even with military force against the exploiting classes and their states" (Lenin, vol. XIII, p. . 133) [5]- Trotskyism, on the contrary, collaborating with the Bolsheviks during the October Revolution, proceeded from the premise that "it is hopeless to think ... that, for example, revolutionary Russia could withstand the face of conservative Europe" (Trotsky, vol. III, part I, p. 90, "Peace Program", first published in August 1917).

While the party proceeds from the premise that the Soviet Union has "everything necessary and sufficient" "to build a complete socialist society" (Lenin, "On Cooperation") [6], Trotskyism, on the contrary, proceeds from the fact that "genuine the rise of the socialist economy in Russia will become possible only after the victory of the proletariat in the most important countries of Europe "(Trotsky, vol. III, part I, p. 93," Afterword "to the" Peace Program ", written in 1922).

While the party proceeds from the premise that "10-20 years of correct relations with the peasantry and victory on a worldwide scale is guaranteed" (Lenin, Plan of the brochure "On the tax in kind") [7], Trotskyism, on the contrary, proceeds from the fact that the proletariat cannot have correct relations with the peasantry until the victory of the world revolution, that the proletariat, which has taken power, "will come into hostile clashes not only with all the groupings of the

bourgeoisie that supported it at the beginning of its revolutionary struggle, but also with the broad masses of the peasantry, with whose assistance he came to power ", that" the contradictions in the position of the workers' government in a backward country with the overwhelming majority of the peasant population can find their solution only on an international scale, in the arena of the world revolution of the proletariat "(Trotsky , "Preface" to the book "1905", written in 1922).

The conference states that such views of Trotsky and his associates on the fundamental question of the nature and prospects of our revolution have nothing in common with the views of our Party, with Leninism.

The conference considers that such views, belittling the historical role and specific weight of our revolution as the basis for the further development of the world revolutionary movement, weakening the will of the Soviet proletariat to further build socialism and thus preventing the unleashing of the forces of the international revolution, contradict the very principles of real internationalism and the main line of the Communist International.

The conference believes that these views of Trotsky and his associates are a direct approximation to the views of Social Democracy represented by its current leader Otto Bauer, who asserts that "in Russia, where the proletariat is only an insignificant minority of the nation, it can only temporarily assert its rule." that "he must inevitably lose it again as soon as the peasant mass of the nation becomes culturally mature enough to take power into his own hands", that "the temporary domination of industrial socialism in agrarian Russia is only the flame that invites the proletariat of the industrial West to the struggle "that" only through the conquest of political power by the proletariat of the industrial West can the long-term dominance of industrial socialism be ensured "in Russia (see O. Bauer, "Bolshevism or Social Democracy", in German).

The conference therefore qualifies such views of Trotsky and his associates as a Social Democratic deviation in our Party on the fundamental question of the nature and prospects of our revolution.

The main fact in the development of internal party relations in the CPSU (b) after the XIV Congress (which condemned the principled

views of the "new opposition") is the fact that the "new opposition" (Zinoviev, Kamenev), which earlier fought against Trotskyism, against the social-democratic deviation in our party, went over to the ideological positions of Trotskyism, that it completely and completely surrendered its former general party positions to Trotskyism, now advocating Trotskyism with the same fervor as it had previously opposed Trotskyism.

The transition of the "new opposition" to the side of Trotskyism was determined by two main circumstances:

a) fatigue, vacillations, depressive moods and defeatism, alien to the proletariat, among the supporters of the "new opposition" in the face of new difficulties in the current turning point, and the current vacillations and defeatism of Kamenev and Zinoviev did not arise by chance, but as a repetition, a relapse of those vacillations and depressive moods, which they showed nine years ago, in October 1917, in the face of the difficulties of the then turning point;

b) the complete defeat of the "new opposition" at the XIV Congress and the resulting desire to achieve unification with the Trotskyists at all costs in order to unite the two groups, Trotskyists and the "new opposition", to compensate for the weakness and isolation of these groups from the proletarian masses, especially since the ideological positions of Trotskyism fully corresponded to the current decadent moods of the "new opposition."

This also explains the fact that the opposition bloc has become a rallying point for all and sundry, condemned by the party and the Comintern, bankrupt currents within the CPSU (b) and outside it, from "democratic centralists" and "workers' opposition" in the CPSU (b) to The "ultra-left" opportunists in Germany; and the liquidators of the Souvarine wing in France.

From this also follows that promiscuity in the means and lack of principle in politics, which formed the basis for the existence of the bloc of Trotskyists and the "new opposition" and without which they could not have brought together various anti-party currents.

Thus, the Trotskyists, on the one hand, and the "new opposition" on the other, quite naturally met on a common platform of a social democratic deviation and unprincipled unification of various anti-party elements

in the struggle against parties, thus forming an opposition bloc representing - in a new form - something like a relapse of the August bloc (1912-1914).

II. Practical platform of the opposition bloc

The opposition bloc's practical platform is a direct continuation of the bloc's main mistake in the question of the nature and prospects of our revolution.

The most important features of the opposition bloc's practical platform boil down to the following main points:

a) Questions of the international movement. The party proceeds from the premise that the advanced capitalist countries, on the whole, are experiencing a state of partial, temporary stabilization, that the current period is an inter-revolutionary period that obliges the communist parties to prepare the proletariat for the upcoming revolution, that the offensive of capital, which is trying in vain to strengthen stabilization, cannot but evoke a counter-struggle and unite the forces of the working class against capital, that the Communist Parties must intervene in the intensifying class struggle and turn the attacks of capital into counterattacks by the proletariat with a view to conquering the dictatorship of the proletariat, that in order to achieve these goals, the Communist parties must take possession of the millions of the working class still adjoining the reformist trade unions and the Second International, that united front tactics are,

The opposition bloc proceeds from completely different premises. Not believing in the inner forces of our revolution and falling into despair in the face of the protracted world revolution, the opposition bloc is slipping from the soil of a Marxist analysis of the class forces of the revolution to the soil of "ultra-left" self-deception and "revolutionary" adventurism, denying the existence of partial capitalist stabilization, and thus gets lost. on the path of putschism.

Hence the opposition's demand for a revision of the united front tactics in disrupting the Anglo-Russian Committee, a lack of understanding of the role of trade unions and the slogan to replace trade unions with new, invented "revolutionary" organizations of the proletariat.

Hence the support from the opposition bloc of "ultra-left" loud mongers and opportunists in the Communist International (for example, in the German party).

The conference considers that the international policy of the opposition bloc does not meet the interests of the international revolutionary movement.

b) The proletariat and peasantry in the USSR. The party proceeds from the premise that "The highest principle of dictatorship is the maintenance of the alliance of the proletariat with the peasantry so that it can retain the leading role and state power" (Lenin, vol. XVIII, part I, p., 331) [8] that the proletariat can and should be the hegemon over the bulk of the peasantry in the economic sphere, in the sphere of building socialism, just as it was in October 1917 the hegemon of the peasantry in the political sphere, in overthrowing the power of the bourgeoisie and establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat; that the industrialization of the country can be carried out only if it is based on a gradual improvement in the material situation of the majority of the peasantry (poor, middle peasants), representing the main market for our industry, that in view of this, such an economic policy should be pursued (price policy, tax policy, etc. etc.), which strengthens the link between industry and peasant economy and preserves the alliance of the working class and the bulk of the peasantry.

The opposition bloc proceeds from completely different premises. Departing from the main line of Leninism on the peasant question, not believing in the hegemony of the proletariat over the peasantry in socialist construction and considering the peasantry mainly as a hostile environment, the opposition bloc proposes such economic and financial measures that can only break the link between town and country, break the alliance the working class and the peasantry, and thereby undermine every possibility of real industrialization. These are, for example: a) the opposition's proposal to raise the selling prices for manufactured goods, which increase cannot but cause an increase in retail prices, impoverishment of the poor and significant strata of the middle peasants, a decrease in the capacity of the domestic market, a discord between the proletariat and the peasantry, a fall in the exchange rate of the chervonets and a decline, after all, real wages; b) the opposition's proposal for maximum

tax pressure on the peasantry, which pressure cannot but create cracks in the alliance between workers and peasants.

The conference considers that the policy of the opposition bloc towards the peasantry does not meet the interests of the industrialization of the country and the dictatorship of the proletariat ...

"The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee", Part II. M., 1954, pp. 329-335.

№ 5 From the resolution of the XV Congress of the CPSU (b) "On directives for the preparation of a five-year plan of the national economy."

December 19, 1927

I. Results and prerequisites of socialist construction

1. The results of the decade that have elapsed since the October Revolution reveal the enormous international significance of this revolution as an integral part of the great international revolutionary process transforming capitalist society into a socialist society. The dictatorship of the proletariat, the proletarian nationalization of the means of production, transport, credit, foreign trade, the nationalization of the land - all these prerequisites determined the development of the USSR economy on a fundamentally different, socialist basis. The social and class content of the commanding economic heights that determine the development of the entire national economy as a whole has become fundamentally different. The relationship between town and country has become fundamentally different, for industry has turned "facing the countryside," becoming a powerful factor in its socialist transformation. and the growth of the domestic market began to express itself, in contrast to capitalism, not the process of ruining the countryside, but the growth of its well-being. The organizational form of the national economy has become fundamentally different, since on the basis of the nationalization of large-scale industry and other commanding heights, planned economic leadership has become possible, increasingly crowding out the anarchy of the capitalist commodity market. The distribution of the national income has also become fundamentally different due to the almost complete elimination of the previously dominant classes and the associated elimination of a significant share of unproductive consumption in general.

2. The results of economic development since the beginning of the so-called new economic policy, which laid the foundations for the correct combination of state socialist industry with small and smallest farms of simple commodity producers-peasants, fully confirmed Lenin's thesis that we have in our country everything necessary and sufficient for building socialism. that in the objective internal conditions of the economic and social development of the USSR, the inevitability of the

fall or degeneration of the proletarian dictatorship is by no means laid down, that the presence of a large number of peasant farms and the link with them on the part of the state economy by no means transform our country into a country of peasant limitation.

The results of economic development reveal with full clarity that during the period of the new economic policy, a radical regrouping took place in the relations between socialized forms of economy (in (first of all, socialist industry), simple commodity economy and capitalist economy. in the field of commodity circulation, state and cooperative bodies themselves resorted to private mediation, and private capital, having all the advantages of rapid turnover, played a relatively large role, then on the threshold of the transition from the restoration to the reconstruction period, socialist industry and other commanding heights are already playing a decisive and leading role in the entire national economy, state and cooperative trade embraces the overwhelming part of the country's general trade turnover, the socialized sector of the national economy determines the general direction of development, displacing private capital, taking in tow and gradually transforming the economy of simple commodity producers-peasants

Under such conditions, despite a certain growth of the private owner in absolute numbers, the much faster growth of the socialized part of the economy, reducing many times the danger of private capital growing on a petty-bourgeois basis, creates solid preconditions for the final victory of socialism. From the social-class point of view, this means that, despite all the contradictory nature of the development process, despite the growth of the bourgeoisie in town and country (kulak, NEP), the proportion of the working class has increased, its connection with the bulk of the peasantry has increased, the dictatorship of the proletariat has strengthened.

3. The experience of planned leadership has proved that planning assumptions more than once needed more or less significant amendments, that they inevitably had to be relative and conditional, that a real plan inevitably develops organically to the extent of the actual growth of the organization of the national economy and to the extent of the increasing possibilities of accurate accounting and foresight based on the growing socialization of the country's

economy. Dependence on the harvest and the impossibility of preliminary accurate statistical coverage; dependence on the market element, which is more and more constrained by the planned principle, but still does not fit entirely into its framework; fluctuations in the world market situation and dependence on this latter; finally, non-economic factors, associated primarily with a hostile capitalist environment and affecting both economic relations with abroad and economic relations within the country - all this determines the relativity of the meaning of planned and digital assumptions in general. The five-year plan for the national economy must experience special pressure from international moments in connection with the aggravation of relations between the capitalist states and the USSR.

Taking into account the possibility of a military attack by the capitalist states on the proletarian state, it is necessary, when developing the five-year plan, to pay maximum attention to the fastest development of those sectors of the national economy in general and industry, in particular, which play the main role in ensuring the country's defense and economic stability in wartime.

Defense issues in connection with the construction of a five-year long-term plan must not only attract the attention of planning and economic bodies, but also, most importantly, ensure the tireless attention of the entire party. On the other hand, when constructing the five-year plan, the possibility of crop failures after a number of productive years should be taken into account in the same way.

4. When drawing up a five-year plan for the national economy, as well as when drawing up any economic plan calculated for a more or less long term, it is necessary to strive to achieve the most favorable combination of the following elements: expanded consumption of the workers and peasants; expanded reproduction (accumulation) in state industry on the basis of expanded reproduction in the national economy in general; faster than in the capitalist countries, the rate of national economic development and the inevitable systematic increase in the proportion of the socialist economic sector, which is the decisive and main point in the entire economic policy of the proletariat.

At the same time, in the field of international relations, it is necessary to proceed not from the bare slogan of the broadest possible development of these relations (such a slogan put forward by the

opposition, if consistently applied, would mean the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade and the capitulation - economic and military - to the international bourgeoisie), I not from the curtailment of economic relations with the capitalist world (the implementation of such a slogan would mean a great slowdown in the rate of our economic development in general and the rate of all socialist construction). Here it is necessary to proceed from the broadest possible ties, since these ties (expansion of foreign trade, foreign credit, concessions, attraction of foreign technical forces, etc.) increase the economic power of the Union, make it more independent from the capitalist world,

In the field of the relationship between production and consumption, it must be borne in mind that one cannot proceed from the maximum number of both (as the opposition now demands), for this is an insoluble problem, or proceed from the one-sided interest of accumulation in a given period of time (as Trotsky demanded, setting out the password of tough concentration and increased pressure on workers in 1923), or proceed from a one-sided interest in consumption. Taking into account the relative inconsistency of these moments and their interaction and coherence, and from the point of view of long-term development, these interests generally coincide, it is necessary to proceed from the optimal combination of both of these moments.

The same must be said about town and country, socialist industry and peasant economy. It is wrong to proceed from the demand for the maximum transfer of funds from the peasant economy to the industry, for this demand means not only a political break with the peasantry, but also undermining the raw material base of industry itself, undermining its internal market, undermining exports and upsetting the balance of the entire national economic system. On the other hand, it would be wrong to refuse to attract rural funds for the construction of industry; at present, this would mean a slowdown in the pace of development and an imbalance at the expense of the country's industrialization.

In the question of the rate of development, one must also bear in mind the extreme complexity of the task. Here one should proceed not from the maximum rate of accumulation for the next year or several years, but from such a ratio of the elements of the national economy that

would ensure the fastest rate of development for a long time. From this point of view, it is necessary to decisively and once and for all condemn the opposition slogan of price increases: this slogan would not only lead to bureaucratic degeneration and monopolistic decay of industry, not only would it hit the consumer and, first of all, the working class and the poor in town and country, not only would give the greatest trump cards in the hands of a kulak, after a while it would give a sharp decrease in the rate of development, narrowing the domestic market, undermining the agricultural base of industry and stalling technological progress in industry.

In the area of the relationship between the development of heavy and light industries, it is equally necessary to proceed from the optimal combination of both aspects. Considering it correct to transfer the center of gravity to the production of means of production, one must also take into account the danger of too much linking of state capital into large-scale construction, which is realized on the market only after a number of years; on the other hand, it must be borne in mind that a faster turnover in light industry (production of basic necessities) makes it possible to use its capital for construction in heavy industry, provided that light industry develops.

Only taking into account all the above-mentioned facts and planning their coordination make it possible to conduct the economy along the path of more or less planned, more or less crisis-free development.

5. From the point of view of the class struggle and the alignment of class forces, the period into which we are entering is characterized by an increase in the class power of the proletariat, the strengthening of its alliance with the poor and middle peasant masses, with a relative decline and a possible still absolute growth of the private capitalist elements in town and country.

The decisions of the Fourteenth Conference and the Fourteenth Party Congress served as the basis for a correct policy towards the countryside in the current period, and it was they who ensured the strengthening of the alliance of the working class with the bulk of the peasantry. The proletariat, having overcome the anti-middle peasant deviation in the midst of its party, on the basis of the achieved strengthening of the workers 'and peasants' bloc, together with the entire poor and middle peasant masses, now has the opportunity to

move on to further, more systematic and persistent restriction of the kulak and the private trader. This should be the basic class directive of the five-year plan for the national economy.

"The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee", Part II. M., 1954, pp. 450-454.

[1] V. I. Lenin. Full collection cit., vol. 45, p. 370.

[2] "The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee", Part II. M., 1954, pp. 218-219

[3] See doc. No. 60

[4] See doc. M 73.

[5] V. I. Lenin. Full collection cit., vol. 26, pp. 354-355

[6] V. I. Lenin, Poln. collection cit., vol. 45, p. 370

[7] V. I. Lenin. Full collection cit., vol. 43, pp. 379-387

[8] V.I. Lenin. Full collection cit., vol. 44, p. 47

FINANCING OF THE INDUSTRY

No. 6 From the explanatory note to the report of the People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR on the execution of the state budget for 1925/26.

Not earlier than October 1, 1926 [1]

Unified State Budget Expenditures

Industry [2]

Financing of various industries

The largest amount of budgetary expenditures for financing industry falls on heavy industry, namely: for the coal industry, according to the unified budget for 1925/26, 33% was spent and for the metal industry - 22.2% of the total budgetary expenditures for financing industry; for the coal and metal industries, shipbuilding, mining, gold-platinum and electrical engineering industries, 113.8 million rubles were spent together, or 69.8% of the total. Thus, the heavy industry, which suffered the greatest damage during the civil war, requires the greatest funds for its recovery and development, and is, moreover, in less favorable conditions on the sales markets (the so-called planned consumers of coal products receive coal at very low prices), absorbed the largest share of funds spent in the order of budgetary financing of industry [tab. 1].

Among other branches of industry, the timber industry occupies a significant place, for which, in 1925-26, 15.9% of the total expenditures made to finance industry were spent under a single budget.

[TABLE 1]

[State budget expenditures]	Spent		
	according to the all-union budget	on the budgets of the union republics	unified state budget
	thousand roubles.		
A. Ordinary costs			

All-Union departments and institutions (except NKPiT, NKPS and People's Commissariat for military and naval affairs)	177,072	-	177,072
NKPiT	132,732	-	132,732
NKPS	1,468,000	-	1,468,000
People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs (with the Military Sanitary Directorate)	638,046	-	638,046
Total:	2,415,850	-	2,415,850
Joint departments and agencies	69169	105 566	174,735
Non-consolidated departments and agencies	-	407 606	407 606
State Treasury Operations	167414	-	167414
Subvention fund	-	87,154	87,154
Subsidies to Azerbaijan	-	3340	3340
Grant to Georgia	-	2,500	2,500
Deductions from state revenues to local budgets	-	295 911	295 911
Participation of the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in All-Union Expenditures	-	850	850
Total ordinary expenses	2 652 433	902 927	3,555,360
B. Extraordinary expenses			
Agriculture	100169	61,924	162,093
Industry	129,729	33761	163,490
Electrification	58644	8,040	66684
Cooperation	1549	23649	25198

Community loan	70,000	664	70664
Building	4,000	1969	5969
Formation of the grain fund	-	200	200
For measures to combat unemployment	-	5997	5997
Loan to the Far East Bank	-	500	500
Extraordinary expenses of the Karelian ASSR	-	4556	4556
Industrialization Fund	-	315	315
Total extraordinary expenses	364,091	141,575	505 666
Total government spending	3,016,524	1,044,502	4,061,026
Less 400 thousand rubles received from the Karelian ASSR	-	-	4,060,626

[TABLE 2]

Industries	According to the budgets of the union republics [3] (issued, thousand rubles)						According to the all-union budget	Total for a single budget
	RSFSR	Ukraine n SSR	BSS R	TSFS R	Uzbe k SSR	Turkme n SSR		
Coal	619	-	-	85	200	-	52379	53,283
Gold platinum	320	-	-	-	100	-	6967	7387
Mountain	450	3610	-	200	-	-	-	4260
Metal	-	400	-	550	-	-	35215	36165
Shipbuilding	-	-	-	-	-	-	7,000	7,000
Electrotechnical	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,700	5,700
Chemical	281	2,290	-	-	60	-	5198	7829
Forest	6440	450	750	1 420	-	-	16800	25860
Silicate	450	2555	91	300	300	-	-	3 696

Textile	-	-	-	1,300	750	750	-	2 800
Paper	1,000	-	-	-	100	-	-	1 100
Tannery	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	100
Food	3,162	1395	194	-	120	-	-	4 871
Rybnaya	805	-	-	-	-	-	470	1,275
Building	200	-	-	-	-	-	-	200
Film industry	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
National areas	939	-	-	-	-	-	-	939
Supreme Council of Physical Education	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
For long-term loans to local, county, regional and agricultural industries	-	-	825	-	-	-	-	825
Total	14866	10,700	1860	3 955	1630	750	129,729	163,490
%	9.2	6,7	1.1	2.4	0.9	0,4	79.3	100.0

The bulk of the funds spent on industry falls on the "all-union budget, which almost entirely financed the coal and metal industries. Financing of the same light industry was carried out mainly from the budgets of the union republics [tab. 2].

Of the indicated total amount spent during 1925/26 to finance industry (163.5 million rubles), according to rough estimates, about 90% was issued in cash and about 10% by short-term payment obligations of the Central Office of the People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR.

Industrial capital construction plan

The plan for the capital construction of industry for 1925-26 provided for costs in the amount of 873.9 million rubles; the same work was performed according to the data of the Supreme Economic Council for

810.9 million rubles, i.e. 92.8%. For individual industries, the fulfillment

Industries [and institutions]	According to plan	Execution	% execution
	million rubles		
Metal	212.5	188.9	89
Electrotechnical	13.4	13.0	98
Coal	87.5	77.0	88
Oil	140.9	140.3	99
Mountain	17.9	14.7	82
Chemical	57.1	48.3	85
Silicate	49.1	33.1	67
Forest	21.6	17.3	80
Paper	33.4	23.9	72
Textile	134.3	131.9	98
Food	59.3	67.6	114
Polygraphic	2.7	2.8	102
Tannery	16.1	21,7	134
Syndicates and resource organizations	27.8	30.2	108
Construction offices	0.3	0.2	69
Total	873.9	810.9	92.8

of the plan showed strong fluctuations, as can be seen from the data [tab. 3].

[TABLE 3]

The capital construction of the all-union and republican industry was assumed according to the plan and was carried out in the following sizes [tab. 4].

[TABLE 4]

[Industry subordination type]	According to plan	Execution	% execution
	million rubles		
All-Union Industry	628.7	586.2	93
RSFSR	163.2	149.2	91
Ukrainian SSR	62.0	59.1	95
BSSR	5.8	4,3	75
Georgian SSR	2.1	3.4	163
Armenian SSR	3.3	2.7	84
Azerbaijan SSR	2.5	2.7	107
Uzbek SSR	3.4	1.4	40
Turkmen SSR	2.9	1.9	66
Total	873.9	810.9	92.8

The bulk of the expenditures for capital work in industry according to the 1925/26 plan was directed to existing factories and relatively insignificant sums to new construction. This direction of funds guaranteed a production effect in a short time. Relatively large sums were spent on major repairs, which will increase even more if we take into account at the same time the costs of current repairs, determined in the amount of 275 million rubles. At the same time, it should be noted that in the outlying republics, where industry is not developed, the foundation was laid for the creation of a new industry on their territories.

The total amount of capital expenditures in 1925/26 was distributed between their different types as follows: overhaul - 157 million rubles. (19.4%), expansion and reconstruction - 446.9 million (55.1%), housing construction - 106.7 million. (13.2%), new plants - 100.3 million (12.3%), total - 810.9 million rubles. (100%).

The role of budget financing in the total capital expenditures of industry

The role of budgetary financing of industry in the total amount of capital expenditures is significant. Indeed, in the reporting year, industry received 161.6 million rubles in the form of loans and grants under the unified state budget of 1925-26. [4]

In addition to this direct financing from the budget, the industry received budget funds indirectly, namely through a loan for economic recovery and through Tsekombank for housing construction. With regard to both sources, there is a full opportunity to equate the amounts received through the loan of economic recovery and through Tsekombank, to budget financing. Although the funds received by industry on the economic recovery loan were issued to industry in the form of bank loans, secured by the bonds of this loan, the repayment of these loans is made at the expense of the state budget; the loans obtained by the industry secured by the loan bonds are made in this way by Treasury loans repayable on a repayment basis. In this way,

In total, the industry received 152 million rubles on a loan for economic recovery in 1925/26. [5] It is necessary to make a reservation that not all the sums received by the industry from the budget and from the loan of economic recovery were directed to capital construction; some of them were used for other industrial needs. However, without a big mistake, it is possible to recognize the entire amount received by the industry directly from the budget and from the economic recovery loan as used for capital expenditures.

Likewise, loans received by the industry for housing construction, to a certain extent, were issued at the expense of funds received by Tsekombank from the budget. Such budgetary funds on the balance sheet of Tsekombank as of October 1, 1926, with a total amount of its liability of 186.6 million rubles. amounted to 66.4 million rubles, i.e. 35.5%.

Therefore, in accordance with this participation of budget funds in the capital of Tsekombank, it is possible to calculate the share of budget funds invested through Tsekombank in the housing construction industry. Industry for the designated purpose, according to Tsekombank, was given 27.9 million rubles; in addition, 4.8 million

rubles. was issued by Tsekombank to factory housing and construction cooperatives; this amount can be fully attributed to the loans for housing construction industry. Further, in addition, 12.5 million rubles. was issued by Tsekombank for housing construction of workers' cooperatives, not directly related to this or that enterprise, but serving mainly factory workers. Of this last amount, at least half can be attributed to the housing construction industry. In total, this way

In total, the industry received budget funds of 328 million rubles. (161.6 million rubles + 152 million rubles + 13.8 million rubles) [6], or 40.4% of the total capital expenditures of the industry.

TsGANKh USSR, f. 7733, on. 3, d.186, ll. 44, 78 about. - 80 about. Typ. copies No. 7

No. 7 From the explanatory note to the report of the People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR on the execution of the state budget for 1926-27.

Not earlier than October 1, 1927 [7]

Income from industrial enterprises converted to cost accounting

Revenues from industry go to the budgets of the all-Union and union republics on the basis of Art. 45 of the decree on trusts, approved by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR on April 10, 1923, according to which the profits of state industrial enterprises (trusts) belong entirely to the treasury, but deductions for various purposes are established from it, so that only a part of this profit is contributed to the treasury income. In total, the above deductions from profits are 40%, namely: 10% for the payment of income tax (together with a supplement to the local budget), 10% for the fund for improving the life of workers and employees and 20% for increasing the reserve capital; Only 60% of all profits remain for the state budget. However, in reality, an even smaller part of the profit usually goes to budgetary resources,

The distribution of income from industry according to individual budgets corresponds to the division of industrial capital between the USSR and the union republics. According to the balance sheet as of October 1, 1926, the authorized capital is distributed between the industry belonging to the Union and the Union republics as follows: All-Union - 4459.2 million rubles. (86.9% of the total), the RSFSR -329.2

million (6.4% of the total), the Ukrainian SSR-240 million (4.7% of the total), the BSSR -28.4 million (0.6 % of the total), the ZSFSR-36.4 million (0.7% of the total), the Turkmen SSR-15.5 million (0.3% of the total), the Uzbek SSR - 21.2 million (0.4 % of the total), total - 5129.9 million rubles. (100% of the total).

The largest part of the authorized capital belongs to the all-Union industry, which depends on the need for centralized planning of industry. Indeed, the most powerful factories and plants, united in large trusts and having all-Union significance, are subordinate to the Union authorities; all the rest of the enterprises were transferred to the republican and local authorities.

Due to the fact that the determination of the amounts that should go to the treasury from the profits of state industrial enterprises is made on the basis of the balances of these enterprises approved by the established procedure as of October 1 of this fiscal year, the receipt of profits of state industrial enterprises for the reporting year does not reflect on itself only the solvency of these enterprises in the reporting year 1926/27, but also the success of their activities in the previous 1925/26. year when their profits and losses were created, shown in the balance sheets as of October 1, 1926.

Due to the lack of systematized data on the state and activity of the republican industry, the subject of further presentation is exclusively the all-Union industry [8]. An indicator of the success achieved by the state industry is the improvement in the organization of the production process in 1925/26, which finds its digital expression in the growth of production by 1 ruble. fixed capital, what growth is seen from [data] table. [1].

[TABLE 1]

Industries	Product size for 1 rub. share capital, Cop.		% growth
	1924/25 g.	1925/26 g.	
Metal	48	68	+42
Coal	45	60	+33
Oil	22	23	+5

Electrotechnical	86	74	-fourteen
Textile	75	84	+ 12
Chemical	61	112	+83
Food	96	117	+22
Paper	73	61	- sixteen
Others	149	137	- 8.1
Total	62	73	+18

Another indicator of the success of industry in 1925-26 is the decrease in working capital by 1 ruble. products. The changes that took place in this respect in comparison with 1924/25 can be seen from the data in Table. [2].

[TABLE 2]

Industries	The amount of working capital per 1 rub. products, cop.	
	1924/25 g.	1925/26 g.
Metal	158	129
Electrotechnical	255	270
Coal	106	85
Oil	183	167
Chemical	158	115
Textile	194	89
Food	143	108
Paper	157	212
Total	128	114

Industries	Profit of the all-Union industry, million rubles		% growth
	1924/25 g.	1925/26 g.	
Metal	27.6	33.1	+19.9
Electrotechnical	10.2	14.6	+43.0
Coal	0.5	14.5	+2800.0
Oil	70.6	52.0 [9]	-26.4
Chemical	21.9	27.9	+862.0
Textile	121.5	199.1	+64.1
Food	51.7	71.0	+27.9
Paper	15.2	17.7	+16.4
Others	1.9	2.4	+26.3
Total	321.1	432.3	+34.8

As shown [data] table. [2], in almost all industries in 1925/26 a decrease in working capital was achieved by 1 ruble. products, which is evidenced by an increase in the rate of capital turnover. The only exceptions are two industries: electrical, due to its organizational shortcomings, and paper, for which the unfavorable change in the indicator under consideration is explained by the different distribution of domestic and imported products in the compared years.

The increased load on fixed capital and the acceleration of turnover mean the achievement of the all-Union industry in the sense of facilitating the possibilities of intra-industrial accumulation and freeing them from subjection to market conditions.

As a result of the noted processes of strengthening and improving the all-Union industry, its profits for 1925/26 increased markedly, namely [tab. 3].

[TABLE 3]

Characteristic of 1925-26 is the growth of profits in heavy industry, which was freed from deficits later than other industries. If we consider the net profit of industry as a whole, it should be noted that its growth (34%), exceeding the growth of production (31%), was possible only as a result of the above-mentioned successes in the field of economic management. [ten]

The profitability of industrial capital is characterized by the data in Table. [4].

[TABLE 4]

Industries	Return on authorized capital. all-union industry, %	
	1924/25 g.	1925/26 g.
Metal	1,2	1.6
Electrotechnical	8.0	10.4
Coal	-	3.8
Oil	10.8	8.7
Chemical	13.4	15.3
Textile	7.5	13.0
Food	10.3	13.2
Paper	29.0	34.0
Total	6,7	9.2

The total amount of net profit according to the approved balance sheets as of October 1, 1926 was 432.3 million rubles. was distributed in 1925/26 by industry as follows: metal - 33.1 million rubles, electrical - 14.6 million, coal - 14.5 million, (oil - 52 million [11] , chemical - 27.9 million, textile - 199.1 million, food - 71 million, paper - 17.7 million, other - 2.4 million, total - 432.3 million rubles.

As can be seen from the above, in the reporting year, much less was paid to the treasury in all industries than it should have been, according to the above-mentioned Art. 45 of the law on trusts; instead of 60% of net profit, only 41.3%, which was due to the financial situation of enterprises and the tasks assigned to them. The smallest share of profits was allocated to the treasury income in heavy industry, which is explained by the insufficient working capital available to it. In the light industry, which produces consumer goods, withdrawals to the treasury rose to almost 50% of net profit. [12]

Industry

In 1926-27, 523,316 thousand rubles were spent on financing state industry under the unified state budget, which is 49.2% of all expenditures on financing the national economy made this year. The structure of expenditures for financing industry in the reporting year was supplemented by the inclusion in it of two expenditures, of which one - financing of the military industry in 1925/26 - was included in the expenditures according to the estimate of the People's Commissariat for military and naval affairs, and the other - payments for the repayment of a recovery - in the reporting year entered the budget for the first time. The last expense is the redemption, from 1926-27, of the Economic Recovery Loan Bonds. These payments are attributed to industry financing costs because they are secured by economic recovery loan bonds, released in 1925/26 for the amount of 250 million rubles, the industry received in 1925/26 and 1926/27. loans from the State Bank; such loans were issued to industrial enterprises in 1925-26 in the amount of 151.5 million rubles, and in 1926-27 - for 35 million rubles. The resulting industrial debt to the State Bank is to be repaid from budgetary appropriations within four years, beginning in 1926-27.

The expense incurred in the reporting year to repay the loan for economic recovery in the amount of 58,140 thousand rubles, represents the first payment to repay the debt of industry to the State Bank, formed in 1925/26 and 1926/27, why this expense does not represent the amount actually received in the reporting year by the industry from budget funds. In view of the above, the costs of payments on the loan of economic recovery, as well as the costs of financing the military industry, are shown in the budget of 1926-27 and in the report on its execution separately from other costs of financing industry, collectively called "direct budget appropriations to industry."

Comparing the direct expenditures on industry according to the state budget (together with expenditures on the military industry) in the amounts given in this report with the corresponding reporting data for the last year, it can be seen that the mentioned expenditures of the reporting year for financing the industry (465,176 thousand rubles) more than the corresponding expenses of 1925/26 (202 489 thousand rubles) by 262 687 thousand rubles, or 129.7% [13] .

Such a significant increase in budgetary allocations for industry, which took place for the first time in 1926/27], is a consequence of the industrialization directive in the budget.

This amount is distributed between the industry of all-Union significance and the industry of the Union republics in the following proportions: the share of the union industry accounts for 73% of all expenses for industry, the share of the republican-27%. In the past 1925/26, this ratio was expressed in the figures of 80 and 20%.

Financing of the republican industry has been strengthened in order to raise the prosperity of the outlying republics, to bring backward regions and to bring industrial production closer to the main sources of raw materials.

The distribution of the total amount of direct budgetary allocations to industry according to the all-union budget and the use of these allocations in individual industries are presented in the following form [tab. 5] [14].

It is necessary to note the opening of oversized loans: for the metal industry - for 7950 thousand rubles, the fuel industry - 100 thousand, the mining industry - 26 thousand, the chemical industry - 59 thousand,

silicate - 255 thousand, Dneprostroy - for additional work in excess of the industry approved by the industrial financial plan for 1926/27 - 3825 thousand and for special expenses - 1000 thousand, in total - 14 138 thousand rubles.

The remainder of unused credits in 1926-27 for industry amounted to 10,187 thousand rubles, which amount almost entirely falls on the military industry.

Discrepancies between the amount of appointments under the all-union budget and the amount of open loans were in the direction of excess in the metal industry, and in the direction of decrease in the fuel industry. The reasons for these discrepancies lie in those changes in the main industrial financial plan, which were made after the first half of 1926-27, based on the results of the industry in the first half of the year. At the same time, the allocation of a reserve specially provided for in the budget for the industrial fund in the amount of 6.4 million rubles was made, and a work plan for the second stage was approved with the corresponding additional funding from the budget, as well as with a slight decrease in funding for the fuel group.

[TABLE 5]

Industries	Appointed according to the all-union budget	Loans open		Total final consisted of spending	Spent
		estimated	oversized		
thousand roubles.					
I. Direct budgetary appropriation of industry					
Metal					
black metal	78281	88743	4950	93863	92,905
color	13,500	13,500	3,000	16,500	16,500
[Total]	91 781	102,243	7 950	110,363	109,405
Electrotechnical	7,335	7,335	-	7,335	7,335
Fuel					
Coal					
Donugol	50 701	46701	-	46701	46701

others	9 890	And 890	100	11,990	11,990
Oil	33,194	30,019	-	30,019	30,019
[Total]	93 785	88610	100	88710	88710
Mountain (gold-platinum)	6 640	6 640	26	6 666	6204
Chemical	12163	11,773	59	11832	11 788
Forest	14610	14,275	923	15198	15198
Food flavor					
Sugar	16,000	16,000	-	16,000	16,000
Distillery	2,000	2,000	-	2,000	2,000
[Total]	18,000	18,000	-	18,000	18,000
Silicate	1561	1561	-	1561	1561
Syndicates (Prodasilicate)	1,000	1,000	255	1 255	1 255
Dniprostroy	7,000	7,000	3825	10825	10825
Shipbuilding	17,500	17,500	-	17,500	17,500
Reserve	6400	-	-	-	-
Special expenses	-	-	1,000	1,000	1,000
II. Military industry	43100	44707	-	44707	35,984
Total	320 875	320 644	14138	334,952	324 765 [15]

A summary picture of the financing of the all-Union and republican industry according to the unified state budget of 1926/1927 for individual industries is given in the table [6].

The above table shows that the bulk of budgetary funds is directed to finance heavy industry, mainly metal and fuel, and only to a small extent is used to support light industry. This assignment of budgetary appropriations is fully consistent with the target setting of our industry, which has as its main task the development of industries that produce means of production and, first of all, our own machine building.

It should be especially noted that in the matter of financing industry, along with budgetary funds, off-budget sources of financing are beginning to play an increasing role. Therefore, a correct assessment of the overall picture of financing industry and the achievements that have resulted from one or another direction of budget funds invested in industry is impossible without studying extra-budgetary financing and without establishing a relationship between these two sources.

The total amount of funds provided in the reporting year by the state industry in the order of financing from all external sources amounted to 907.1 million rubles against 6663 million rubles received by the industry in 1925/26.

According to separate sources, this amount is distributed as follows: state budget - 465.2 million rubles. [16], local budgets - 27.7 million, Tsekobank - 54.3 million, State Bank (on a loan for economic recovery) - 35 million, short-term lending banks - 324.9 million [17], total - 907, 1 million rubles.

The above data do not include loans under the UEC of Prombank, which in 1926-27 amounted to 65.2 million rubles, since the resources of the UEC represent part of the internal accumulations of the industry itself, which enter the UEC only for redistribution between individual industries.

From the above data, it can be seen that budgetary funds accounted for 54% of all investments in industry (465.2 million out of 907.1 million rubles).

Thus, in 1926-27 the budget is the main source of infusion of new monetary resources into industry.

The distribution of the amounts provided to the industry between the industries producing means of production (the so-called group "A") and the industries producing the means of consumption (the so-called group "B"), as well as the direction of investments of each of the sources that feed the industry into those or other industries, you can see from [data] table. [eighteen]

The table shows that of the total budgetary investments in industry, about 90% is directed to heavy industry and only 10% to light industry.

Taking into account the need for the intensified development of the branches of heavy industry”, it is necessary to admit such an installation of budgetary financing of industry as correct and fully consistent with the tasks of industrialization. [19]

The use by the all-Union industry of the funds it received in 1926-27 in the order of budget financing for the intended purpose is presented in the following form: capital construction - 339 million rubles, conservation of factories - 4.4 million, replenishment of working capital - 121, 8 million, in total for direct appropriation together with expenses for the military industry and without payments on the loan of economic recovery - 465.2 million rubles.

From extra-budgetary sources, loans were used to replenish working capital: 1) for a loan of economic recovery - in the order of debt recovery to the State Bank of individual enterprises for short-term loans and 2) bank loans for the system of banks of short-term loans; for capital construction are directed: 1) loans from Tsekombank (especially for housing construction industry) and 2) most of the funds received by the industry under the UEC.

The investment in industry of significant monetary resources made in 1926-27 made it possible for state industry to widely expand its production program during this year, both in the direction of increasing its output, and especially in the direction of capital construction.

[TABLE 6]

Industries	By the all-union budget	According to the budgets of the union republics [20]						Total on a single budget
		RSFSR	Ukraine in SSR	BSSR	TSFSR	Turkmen SSR	Uzbek SSR	
spent, thousand rubles								
I. Direct budgetary appropriation of industry								
Metal	109,405	18 628	10 516	785	400	-	220	139 954
Electrotechnical	7,335	-	-	-	-	-	-	7,335
Mountain	6204	4603	11684	-	1 460	405	515	24871

Fuel	88710	6 089	-	-	285	850	1 220	97,154
Chemical	11 788	1 992	6711	55	480	295	-	21321
Forest	15198	17870	896	1,750	1,550	-	-	37264
Paper	-	5 693	-	-	-	-	-	5 693
Textile	-	976	-	-	3437	1335	1,600	7348
Food flavor	16,000	5868	450	270	1,200	100	176	24,064
Distillery	2,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,000
Silicate and construction	1561	13 859	7151	420	463	200	600	24254
Tannery	-	1975	-	450	-	-	100	2525
Photo-cinema	-	460	-	-	-	-	-	460
Syndicates (Prodasilicate)	1 255	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 255
Shipbuilding	17,500	-	-	-	-	-	-	17,500
Dniprostroy	10825	-	-	-	-	-	-	10825
Reserve	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Others (handicraft, bristle, printing, local, Ukrvozduhoput, Institute of Applied Mineralogy in Moscow, Moldavian Combine)	-	381	198	65	-	-	335	969
Ganjin cotton-factory (under the fund of the Council of People's Commissars of Azerbaijan)	-	-	-	-	1 900	-	-	1 900

Paper Mill of Georgia (according to the fund of the Council of People's Commissars of Georgia)	-	-	-	-	1,500	-	-	1,500
Special expenses	1,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,000
II. Military industry. ...	35,984	-	-	-	-	-	-	35,984
III. Economic Recovery Loan Financing (payments on loan repayment)	58140	-	-	-	-	-	-	58140
Total	382,905	78 394	37606	3795	12 675	3,185	4756	523 316

Undoubtedly, in both areas the industry achieved certain positive results in the reporting year. At the same time, the work of industry in some areas was not free from some defects.

The main points of the work of industry in 1926/27 are characterized by the following indicators.

The industry in the reporting year continued to develop intensively. The amount of gross output (at wholesale selling prices without excise tax) reached 8587 million rubles in 1926-27. [21], which is 105% against the total production in 1913. Thus, in 1926-27, our industry had already passed the pre-war level.

Compared with 1925-26, industry in 1926-27 yields an average growth in output of 19.5%; in particular, in heavy industry, which produces means of production (group "A"), this growth is determined at 26.4%, and for light industry, manufacturing consumer goods (group "B"), at 15.3%

The distribution of the total amount of gross output in groups "A" and "B" is expressed in the following ratio: group "A" - 40.4% and group "B" - 59.6%.

Within the industry itself in the total volume of production, the share of the republican and local industry is increasing and the share of the union industry is decreasing. This is explained by the pulling up of the industry of the Union republics, which was still lagging behind, which for the first time in 1926-27 received significant appropriations from the state budget.

The commodity part of industrial products (at selling prices without excise tax) in the reporting year amounted to 6600 million rubles in value terms. against 5738.8 million in 1925-26, which gave an increase in the commodity mass by 861.2 million rubles.

The growth in the sale of manufactured goods in 1926-27 almost did not lag behind the growth in production (except for sugar). However, the growing demand - rural - due to the repeated good harvest and urban - as a result of higher wages - in 1926-27 made demands on industry for its products in amounts slightly exceeding its capabilities.

The gradual elimination of this disproportion, the establishment of a balance between demand and supply of industrial products are the ultimate task of our planned economy.

Compensating for the shortage of goods of domestic production through the widespread use of imports would not be a solution to the issue of "scissors" between supply and demand, since the need to pay for imports in foreign currency would create a constant dependence of our commodity supply on export and foreign exchange opportunities and thus support our permanent dependence on capitalist countries. Therefore, the only correct way is to use our import capabilities not through the import of consumer goods, but through the import of equipment - in order to quickly reorganize the fixed capital of industry, create a solid intra-union base for the development of production - through the organization of our own machine building.

In the reporting year 1926-27, the possibility of further increasing industrial production through the use of old, long-working and largely worn-out capital was exhausted, and therefore from this year the problem of capital construction became the main target of our industry.

The path of industrialization is the path that the USSR must take and on which it firmly embarks in 1926-27

This path leads, first of all, to the need for the development of the metal industry, since this industry is the cornerstone of the entire industry as a whole.

The achievements of 1926-27 in the metal industry are very indicative, since here we are for the first time crossing the pre-war level; metal production in 1926-27 amounts to 772.4 million pre-war rubles. [22] against 728 million pre-war rubles. in 1913, mechanical engineering gives a particularly fast pace of development. Thus, in general mechanical engineering 1926-27 yields 25% growth against 1913, and including agricultural engineering and automotive engineering, even 42.8% growth. Only ferrous metallurgy (70.5%), non-ferrous (84%) and ore (53.8%) now remain below the pre-war level.

Such significant advances in mechanical engineering still do not relieve us of the need to import equipment, although the share of imports in meeting the total industry demand for equipment is gradually decreasing. Before the war, imports covered about 50% of the total mass of industrial equipment, in 1926-27 this percentage is much lower, and in the following years it decreases even more. However, in 1926-27, domestic production was not yet able to cover the entire need of industry for certain types of machines, and the construction of new factories equipped with the latest technology, using the latest foreign achievements, will require an expanded import of machines of the latest designs. It is necessary to develop the production of special grades of metal, special mechanical engineering for individual industries, etc., which we cannot do today without imported equipment. This explains the growing import of machinery for industry in absolute figures: in 1926-27 it amounted to 78 304 thousand rubles. against 56 670 thousand in 1925/26

Nevertheless, our metal industry is undergoing a process of liberation from the need to import equipment, which is confirmed by the fall, despite the absolute growth of imports, of its share in covering the total industry demand for metal equipment. The reason for this lies in the significant growth in domestic production of metal equipment. The above is illustrated by the data in Table. [7].

[TABLE 7]

Domestic production [and import of machines]	1913	1925/26	1926/27
	г.	г.	г.
General machine building products, million pre-war rubles	144.0	120.0	180.0
Imports, million pre-war rubles [23]	122.0	72.4	87.4
Import to domestic production ratio, %	84.7	60.4	48.5
Production of agricultural machines and implements, million pre-war rubles	53.0	70.0	97.0
Imports, million pre-war rubles	50.0	34.0	15.0
Import to domestic production ratio, %	94.5	82.9	15.6

[Data] tab. [7] show that our dependence on capitalist countries is gradually declining. [24]

TsGAOR USSR, f. 5684, on. 1, d.541, ll. 39-40, 42-43, 116-117 about., 118 about - 119 about. Typ. ind.

No. 8 From the explanatory note to the report of the People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR on the execution of the state budget for 1927/28.

No earlier than October 1, 1928 [25]

Tax revenues [26]

Distribution of tax revenues by payer category

Preliminary calculations of the State Tax of the People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR, based on the methodology adopted by the Commission of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR for studying the severity of taxation, give the following picture of the distribution of the total amount of tax revenues by categories of formal (first) payers (that is, without taking into account the transfer of taxes) [tab. 1].

[TABLE 1]

Payer category	Amounts of tax payments [27]				
	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.	% by 1926/27	% to total	
	million rubles			1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.
Enterprises	1987, 6	2419.6	121.7	80.2	81.8
Including					
state	1600.9	1983.7	123.9	64.6	67.1
cooperative	214.3	287.8	134.3	8.6	9.7
private	172.4	148.1	85.9	7.0	5.0

Population	491.7	538.0	109.4	19.8	18.2
Including					
agricultural	353.5	350.3	99.1	14.2	11.8
non-agricultural	138.2	187.7	135.9	5.6	6.4
Total	2479.3	2957.6	119.1	100.0	100.0
Including					
socialized sector	1815.2	2271.5	125.1	73.2	76.8
private sector	664.1	686.1	103.3	26.8	23.2

As can be seen from [data] table. [1], in 1927/28 more than 3/4 (76.8%) of all tax revenues were mobilized by the state budget through the socialized sector and only 23.2% was received through the private sector, including 18 received directly from the population, 2%. [Data] tab. [1] also show that the proportion of receipts received through the socialized sector increased (from 73.2% in 1926-27 to 76.8% in 1927-28), and the proportion of receipts received through the private sector, on the contrary, decreased (from 26.8% to 23.2%).

Income from industrial enterprises transferred to self-financing

... [28] All the industry planned by the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR - all-Union, republican and local - finished 1926-27 with a balance that exceeded the balance of the previous year by 16%. Instead of 11,019 million rubles. as of October 1, 1926, the balance as of October 1, 1927 was determined in the amount of 12,762 million rubles.

The liabilities of the consolidated balance sheet of the all-Union, republican and local state industries as of October 1, 1927 are presented in the following form [tab. 2].

[TABLE 2]

Liabilities Articles	On October 1,	On October 1,	More (+) or
	1926	1927	less (-)
million rubles			
Authorized, reserve and amortization capitals	7356.8	7675.2	+318.4
Special purpose funds and reserves	220.5	275.7	+55.2
Budget financing	446.5	723.8	+277.3
Loans and credits	436.8	805.1	+368.3
Bills issued	576.3	755.0	+178.7
Lenders	1296.0	1746.0	+450.0
Other liabilities	9.0	6.0	- 3.0
Arrived before the reporting year	51.6	67.7	+16.1
Profits of the reporting year	626.2	707.5	+81.3
Total	1019.7	12762.0	+ 1742.3

The growth of the passive part of the balance was due to almost all items, except for "other liabilities", which showed a slight decrease. At the same time, the largest growth is shown by loans and credits of various kinds out of the total increase in all resources available to the industry, expressed in the amount of 1,842.3 million rubles, the increase in loans and credits accounts for 368 million rubles, the increase in promissory notes - 178, 7 million rubles. and the growth of creditors - 450 million rubles. [29], which is directly related to the expansion of current operations due to the growth of production and favorable conditions for the marketing of manufactured goods in 1926-27.

Further, a rather significant increase is shown by various kinds of capitals and funds, replenished in part due to the accumulations of the previous year in the amount of 318.4 million rubles. A significant

increase is shown by budget financing (by 277.3 million rubles). Finally, the profit of 1926-27, amounting (before distribution) to 707 million rubles, exceeded the profit accumulated in the previous year by 81.3 million rubles.

Thus, in 1926-27, industry was able to accumulate a significant amount of funds from its own resources and, at the same time, attract significant funds in the form of loans and borrowings. According to the law, part of the accumulations of 1926-27 was to be paid by industry in the next 1927-28 in the form of deductions to the treasury, and these payments are distributed between separate budgets depending on the subordination of industrial enterprises to all-Union, republican or local regulatory bodies. The regulation on the budgetary rights of the Union and the union republics, as well as the regulation on local finances, provide that the costs of financing the industry are carried out for each budget separately, depending on which SNKh - all-Union, republican or local - the industry is administratively subordinate to;

The distribution of industrial capital and net profit of some enterprises (net of losses of other enterprises) by type of subordination of industrial enterprises in 1926-27 presents the following picture [tab. 3].

More than 2/3 of all capital belongs to enterprises of all-Union significance. These same enterprises provide the highest rate of return on the authorized capital.

Republican industry received smaller profits on its capital than all-Union industry. This is due to the varying degrees of organization of the all-union and republican trusts; the first were much earlier subjected to the planned influence of regulatory bodies; improvements in their management, rationalization of the production process and supply and a number of other measures affecting profitability were carried out faster and more successfully; in the republican trusts, these processes proceeded with a certain delay, which, with the same strict regulation of selling prices, lowered, of course, the profitability of their capital.

[TABLE 3]

Industry subordination	Authorized capital, rubles	billion	% to total	Private profit less losses, RUB mln	% to total	Return on share capital

Republican	4.56	67.3	459.4	73,7	10.2
RSFSR	0.49	7.4	24.6	3.9	5.0
Ukrainian SSR	0.22	3.1	10.6	1.7	4.8
BSSR	0.05	0.7	4,3	0.7	8.0
TSFSR	0.04	0.6	2.8	0,4	7.0
Uzbek SSR	0.03	0,4	1.8	0.3	6.0
Turkmen SSR	0.02	0.3	1.4	0.2	7.0
Total	5.41	79.8	504.9	80.9	9.4
Local	1.37	20.2	120.6	19.1	8.8
Total	6.78	100.0	625.5	100.0	9.4

Local industry gives a high rate of profitability, which, however, is achieved not so much by the favorable results of rationalization, as by the fact that mainly light industry enterprises that manufacture consumer goods are concentrated here. The financial results of the activities of the all-Union industry for 1926-27 can be judged by the summary balance sheet below [30], which unites the balances of individual enterprises of all-Union significance as of October 1, 1927, grouped by the main industries.

When considering this balance sheet, first of all, it should be noted that of the total amount received by the all-Union enterprises in 1926-27, 480 million rubles were profit. (without deducting losses, that is, only for profitable enterprises), the largest amounts were received in the following industries: textile - 241.4 million rubles. (i.e., more than half of all profit), oil - 79.3 million, metal - 61.3 million, chemical - 29.4 million and sugar - 24.7 million rubles. These industries were the main source of deductions from profits to the treasury in 1927/28. In general, in 1926/27, all industries, except mining, which did not give any profit or loss, and forestry, where the profits of some enterprises (5, 3 million rubles) are covered by losses of others (6.2 million rubles), turned out to be generally profitable.

Along with this, it should be noted that there has been a drastic reduction in the amount of losses for individual trusts. In 1926-27, only 25% of enterprises did not receive profits, and the losses were the result

not so much of poor organization of enterprise management as of the established low prices for products for deliveries to planned consumers. Such prices were established for some metal products, for coal and for the products of the main chemical industry, as a result of which some trusts of these industries turned out to be unprofitable. Some timber industry enterprises also turned out to be unprofitable.

The success of the industry in terms of reducing losses is clearly characterized by the data given in table [31]; losses of previous years left on the balance sheet of enterprises amount to 83.3 million rubles, of which the amount of 55.7 million rubles falls on losses in 1925/26, more than 2 1/2 times the amount losses in 1926-27. At the same time, in some branches of industry there are no enterprises at all that caused losses in 1926-27. These industries include textiles, electrical engineering, oil and paper, where all businesses are profitable.

Although for the size of the contributions made to the treasury from the profits of enterprises that gave income for a given year, it does not matter whether other enterprises had losses for the same year, since coverage of losses by profits is allowed only in relation to the same enterprise and therefore can apply only to losses of previous years, the fact of a decrease or absence of unprofitable enterprises of state industry in 1926-27 is important in itself as an indicator of the financial situation of industry by the end of 1926-27, and in addition, as a circumstance that influenced the size of budgetary appropriations 1927/28 to cover losses and replenish the working capital of unprofitable enterprises.

The distribution of net profit when approving the balance sheets as of October 1, 1927 is presented by the main industries as follows: metal - 61287.9 thousand rubles, electrical - 12257.7 thousand, textile - 241,312.1 thousand, chemical - 29524 thousand ., fuel - 92509.7 thousand, sugar - 24798.8 thousand, forest - 5269.8 thousand, paper - 13088 thousand, all industries - 480 048 thousand rubles. [32]

Industry [33]

Financial industry of industry: An increase in the total volume of production and a decrease in production costs, on the one hand, an increase in the state budget and, accordingly, an increase in

appropriations for industry, on the other, led to a significant increase in financial resources in industry.

The fulfillment by the industry of its financial plan for 1927/28 gives quite significant deviations from the original plan, but almost does not deviate from the adjusted financial plan, since the latter was already drawn up during the reporting year, taking into account the changes that have occurred since the approval of the original main plan.

The total increase in new industrial capital and the target direction of these capital are presented in table. [five].

In the total volume of investment in industry during 1927-28, an increase in the share of domestic savings should be noted, with a corresponding decrease in the percentage of external investment.

The change in this ratio can be seen from [data table. 4] in%). [34]

[TABLE 4]

	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.
External savings	29	42
External sources	61	58
Total attachments	100	100

This evolution is explained by the powerful pace of industrial expansion, outstripping the growth of both the budget and the credit system.

The own accumulations of industry are partially used to meet the needs of those industries in which these accumulations are formed, in the rest, they are redistributed by law through the BDK and are used to cover the needs of other industries. The amounts that are missing to fully cover the plans of individual industries are provided to them from external sources (indicated in [Table 4]).

The distribution of the sums of the main of these sources [35] for individual industries (planned VSNKh) is given in [tab. 6] (in million rubles) [36]

[TABLE 5]

Target direction of industrial capital	According to the	By
	adjusted financial plan	implementation
	million rubles	
A. Capital inflows		
1. Own savings		
Depreciation	456.0	440.0 [37]
Remaining profit [38]	299.0	325.1
Total savings	755.0	765.1
II. External sources		
The state budget	541.9	587.4 [39]
Local funds	83.0	55.1
Tsecobank	75.5	54,7
YODK (except for the redistribution of industry's own savings)	5.0	30.0
Short-term loan	330.0	390.8
Other sources	11.0	59, b [40]
Total external investments	1046.4	1177.6
Total new capital	1801.4	1942.7
B. Direction of capital		
Capital works	1306.0	1334.6

Increase in working capital	495.4	607.9
Total	1801.4	1942.5

The distribution of the total amount of these investments between the all-Union and republican industry and between different sources of funding is seen from [data] table. [7].

[TABLE 6]

Industries	The state budget	Extrabudgetary			Total for all sources
		Tsekombank	Long-term lending bank	short-term loan	
million rubles					
Group "A"					
Metallic [41]	231.6	20.5	53.7	18.6	329.4
Electrotechnical	9.1	-	4.3	1.9	15.3
Fuel	114.4	19.6	70.2	37.5	241.7
Mountain	12.2	0.6	0.1	2.4	15.3
Gold platinum	17.4	-	-	-	17.4
Chemical	44.0	4.4	7.3	1.9	53.8
Forestry and woodworking	63.8	0.7	0.6	29.4	94.5
Silicate	28.8	2.1	3.2	8.6	42.7
Other	9.5	2.4 [42]	-	-	11.9
Total	535.8	50.3	139.4	96.5 [43]	822.0
Group "B"					
Porcelain-faience	2.3	-	-	-	2.3
Paper	12.3	0.5	14.0	-	26.8
Textile	14.6	1.5	2.5	218.9	237.5
Tannery	3.8	-	1.4	68.8	74.0

Food flavor	9.6	0.3	0.6	2.6	13.1
Other	9.0 [44]	2.1	6.0	4.0 [45]	21.1
Total	51.6	4.4	24.5	294.3	374.8
Total for the whole industry [46]	587.4	54,7	163.9	390.8 [47]	1196.8

Finally, according to the target direction, the entire amount of external investments was distributed as follows (Table 8).

As seen from. given table. [8], the entire amount of external investments was almost equally distributed between capital construction and working capital.

[TABLE 7]

Group	The state budget	Tsekombank	Long-term lending bank	Short-term loan	Total
	million rubles				
Union	438.2	44.4	146.6	363.3	992.5
Republican	149.2	10.3	7.3	27.5 [48]	204.3
Total all industry	587.4	54,7	163.9	390.8	1196.8

[TABLE 8]

[Purpose budgetary investments]	The state budget	Tsekombank	Long-term lending bank	Short-term loan	Total
	million rubles				
Capital construction	363.1	54,7	163.9	-	581.7
Working capital	224.3	-	-	390.8	615.1
Total investment	587.4	54,7	163.9	390.8	1196.8

Turning to the assessment of the role of each of the external sources supplying the industry [49] separately for the last two years, we can establish the following [table. nine].

[TABLE 9]

[Sources of financing]	1926/27 g.		1927/28 g.	
	million rubles	%	million rubles	%
State Budget [50]	454.4	52.8	658.7	54.1
Local budget	27.7	3.2	55.0	5.1
Tsecobank	54.3	6,3	54,7	4.8
Short term loan	324.9	37.3	390.8	36.0
Total investments from external	861.3	100.0	1159.2	100.0

From [data] table. [9] it can be seen that 658.7 million rubles were spent to finance industry under the unified budget of 1927/28. against the expenses of the last year in the amount of 454.4 million rubles, which gives an increase of 44.9%. At the same time, expenditures on industry accounted for 49% of all expenditures for financing the national economy under the unified budget of 1927-28.

In addition, the above table shows an interesting regrouping among the sources financing the industry: the participation of budgets of both the unified state budget of the USSR and local budgets is growing, and the share of short-term lending is increasing. Inkombank's loan remains almost stable.

The involvement of local funds in industrial construction, reflected in the above data, is in connection with the above-mentioned rapid growth of this form of industry.

The share of the state budget in investments derived from external sources increased significantly in the reporting year; he has a leading role in the financing of industry; its resources are directed to the most critical sectors of the industry.

The distribution between groups "A" and "B" of budgetary investments in industry for the last two years can be seen from [data] table. [ten].

[TABLE 10]

[Production group]	1926/27 g.		1927/28 g.	
	million rubles	%	million rubles	%
For capital construction	369.7	88.6	535.8	91.2
To replenish working capital	47.7	11.4	51.6	8.8
Total by industry	417.4 [51]	100.0	587.4	100.0

The overwhelming part of budgetary funds (91.2%) was directed to financing heavy industry (mainly metal and fuel industries). Only 8.8% of all budgetary funds were invested in the reporting year in the light industry, and, in addition to replenishing the working capital of the union syndicates, all other budgetary investments in group "B" fall on the industry of the union republics. Thus, light industry, to a greater extent than heavy industry, made investments of its own funds in working capital and in construction.

[TABLE 11]

[Purpose of budgetary investments]	1926/27 g.		1927/28 g.	
	million rubles	%	million rubles	%
For capital construction	290.9	69.7	363.1	61.8
To replenish working capital	126.5	30.3	224.3	38.2
Total	417.4	100.0	587.4	100.0

[TABLE 12]

Ind of investments by industry and other purposes	Budget							
	all-union	RSFSR	Ukraine in SSR	BSSR	TSFSR	Turkmen SSR	Uzbek SSR	Total
								According to the unified

								state budget of the USSR"
thousand roubles.								
A. Capital costs								
Metal								
black metal	112 781	4211	940	879	739	-	25	119,575
non-ferrous metal	17,076	691	-	-	-	-	-	17767
Coal	38865	3098	-	-	508	-	-	42 471
Oil	28559	-	-	-	-	571	1,050	30180
Electrotechnica l	7144	-	-	-	-	-	-	7144
Mountain	6 954	2183	-	-	955	268	145	10505
Gold platinum	16978	463	-	-	-	-	-	17441
Chemical	23346	2,053	2 350	940	190	-	150	29,029
Forest	14307	3626	-	1 194	1,050	-	-	20,177
Paper	1948	9681	-	450	-	-	-	12,079
Silicate construction	3728	8166	4677	577	1590	50	185	18973
Tannery	1 350	1842	-	400	97	-	-	3 689
peat	-	-	-	234	-	-	-	234
Processing agricultural raw materials (food)	-	5 795	945	562	1383	386	175	9246
Textile	-	317	-	320	7431	3200	3 314	14 582
Sewing	-	-	-	20	-	-	-	20
Polygraphic	-	-	-	-	100	65	165	330

Porcelain-faience	-	70	-	-	-	-	-	70
Scientific and technical department of the Supreme Economic Council	9 114	-	-	-	-	-	-	91 114
Special expenses	470	-	-	-	-	-	-	470
Total for capital expenditures	282620	42196	8 912	5 576	14,043	4540	5209	363,096
B. Working capital								
Metal								
black metal	47 426	8702	7,075	521	343	-	-	64,067
non-ferrous metal	3670	-	-	-	-	-	-	3670
Coal	31192	1 106	-	-	-	-	-	32298
Oil	9367	100	-	-	-	-	-	9 467
Electrotechnical	1 958	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 958
Mountain	1,582	75	-	-	-	-	-	1,657
Chemical	8,900	1 125	4960	-	-	-	-	14985
Forest	10,748	30869	-	-	2,002	-	-	43619
Silicate construction	3 052	5,900	523	258	100	-	-	9833
Shipbuilding	29 326	-	-	-	-	-	-	29 326
Porcelain-faience	-	2251	-	-	-	-	-	2251
Peat	-	-	-	126	-	-	-	126
Tannery	-	50	-	-	85	-	-	135

Processing of agricultural raw materials (food)	-	73	315	-	-	-	-	388
Paper	-	200	-	-	-	-	-	200
Syndicates and Merchants	8134	-	-	-	-	-	-	8134
Total working capital	155355	50451	12 873	905	2530	-	-	222 114
B. Coverage of damages								
Metal								
Black metal	220	-	1,483	490	-	-	-	2 193
Total	438195	92647	23268	6,971	16 573	4540	5209	587 403
Besides								
A. Capital expenditure								
Investments in the trust "Georgian manganese"	6705	-	-	-	-	-	-	6705
B. Investments in working capital of Tsentrosirt	8 967	-	-	-	-	-	-	8 967
Special expenses	500	-	-	-	-	-	-	500
D. Miscellaneous, special and unallocated expenses	54,001	960	146	-	-	-	-	55 107
Total	508368	93607	23414	6,971	16 573	4540	5209	658682

Finally, according to their intended purpose, budgetary investments in industry were directed [tab. eleven].

The increase in the percentage of budget investments going to replenish working capital finds an explanation in the fact "that loans from Tsecombank and Prombank are used only for capital construction, and the State] Bank finances only the current trade turnover of the industry, which imposes on the budget big 'tasks of financing investments in working capital.

This replenishment had as its purpose the strengthening and rehabilitation of individual enterprises, whose own funds did not correspond to the volume of their production, for example, in the fuel, timber and part of the metal group. Then, at the expense of budgetary appropriations, the capital of new construction organizations was created and the capital of most of the syndicates was replenished. Finally, in order to replenish working capital, losses were covered in shipbuilding, agricultural engineering and the production of chemical fertilizers.

The distribution of budgetary expenditures by individual industries in 1927/28 can be seen from [data] table. [12].

The ratio of expenditures on the all-Union and republican industry was expressed in 1926/27 and 1927/28. in the following values [tab. 12] [52].

As can be seen from [data] table. [13], the share of the republics in the total amount of budgetary financing of industry has slightly decreased, which is explained by large investments in the main branches of heavy industry (metal, fuel), which are predominantly owned by the industry of Union significance. The specified amount of expenditures of the unified state budget for financing the industry (658,682 thousand rubles) was formed in the reporting year from both estimated and oversized expenses.

Over-estimate loans for financing industry were opened in the amount of 31,094 thousand rubles, including 24,239 thousand rubles for the union industry and 6855 thousand rubles for the republican one. The main part of oversized credits falls on the industry: forestry, chemical and metallurgical (non-ferrous) and in small amounts - on mining, oil, leather and coal. Most of the oversized loans were opened due to the need for some additional import operations. In addition, 2305 thousand

rubles were opened to cover losses in ferrous metal (agricultural engineering), including: 765 thousand in the RSFSR, 830 thousand in the Ukrainian SSR, 490 thousand in the BSSR, and in the Union - 220 thousand rubles.

[TABLE 13]

Budget	1926/27 g.		1927/28 g.	
	million rubles	%	million rubles	%
All-Union	314.0	69.1	508.4	77.0
RSFSR	78.4	17.3	93.6	14.3
Ukrainian SSR	37.6	8.3	23.4 [53]	3.6
BSSR	3.8	0.8	6.9	1.1
TSFSR	12.7	2.8	16.6	2.5
Turkmen SSR	3.2	0.7	4.6	0.7
Uzbek SSR	4.7	1.0	5.2	0.8
	140.4	30.9	150.3	23.0
	454.4	100.0	658.7	100.0

Of particular note is the oversized loan for the Georgian Manganese trust in the amount of 6705 thousand rubles, representing the payment of capital investments in the said trust in connection with the liquidation of the Harriman concession and the transfer of equipment belonging to it to the Union state industry. In addition, extra-estimated loans for 3105 thousand rubles were opened for special expenses. Of the total amount of open loans to industry, 7981 thousand rubles were not used according to the all-union budget, mainly for metal, shipbuilding, gold-platinum, partly for the oil industry and: scientific and technical management, for only 4 million rubles. The reasons for not using loans are due to delays in obtaining licenses. The rest of the unused loans (RUB 3,981 thousand) is accounted for by "other" expenses.

The relationship between the total amount of investments in industry from the state budget and payments from industry to the budget is presented in the following form [tab. fourteen].

From [data] table. [14] it can be seen that the positive balance in favor of the industry gave further growth in 1927-28. The budget not only returns to the industry in the order of redistribution all the amounts that it pays to it, but, in addition, gives it a part of the resources. from other sectors of the national economy. Thus, the problem of industrialization found a duly reflected in the performance of the budget 1927/28 [54] of [55]

[TABLE 14]

[Investment in industry from the state budget and its payments to the state budget]	1925/26 г.	1926/27 г.	1927/28 г.
	million rubles		
I. Obtained by industry			
Direct appropriations to industry	197.8	454.4	658.7
Economic Recovery Loan	152.0	35.0	-
Debt write-off of Sukharotrest	-	53.0	-
Total	349.8	542.4	658.7
financing from the local budget	11.1	58.2	55.1
Total [56]	360.9	600.6	713.8
II. Industry payments			
Profit deductions	93.5	203.0	243.0
Income tax (surcharge)	61.0	63.0	65.0
Buying an 8% Guaranteed Loan	29.5	60.0	50.0
Total	184.0	326.0	358.0
Payments to the local budget (excluding income tax)	32.8	55.0	63.0
Total	216.8	381.0	421.0
Industry balance	144.1	219.6	292.8

DGANKH USSR, f. 7733, on. 5, d.165, ll. 133, 159, 159 ob., 160 ob., 185-187 ob. Typ. Copies

No. 9 From an explanatory note to the report of the USSR People's Commissariat of Finance on the execution of the state budget for 1928/29.

At the earliest October 1, 1929 [57]

Income from industrial enterprises converted to cost accounting

... [58] The activity of the state industry, planned by the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR for 1927/28, is characterized by further successes in the field of production deployment. This is indicated by the following digital data on the sales of products of the state industry for 1927/28 in comparison with the plan and with the implementation of 1926/27 (see table) [59]. From the data in this table it can be seen that the gross proceeds from the sale of products of the entire state industry (all-Union, republican and local, with the exception of the local industry of the Ukrainian SSR) in 1927-28 exceeded the planned target by 4.9% - Noticeable under-fulfillment of the plan took place only in the ZSFSR, where the specified revenue was 96.7% of the planned target.

The profit of the entire state industry from the sale of products and from work performed on the side, minus the losses incurred by some enterprises, was expressed in 1927/28 in the amount of 839.4 million rubles, which is 8.8% of the gross proceeds (9501,7 million rubles). This profit turned out to be higher than the expected one according to the plan (682.2 million rubles), both absolutely and relatively (8.8 versus 7.5%), and in comparison with 1926/27 it increased by 21.5% (839.4 million rubles for 1927-28 against 690.8 million rubles for 1926-27).

The indicated value of the profit of the entire state industry of the USSR for 1927-28 was 839.4 million rubles. does not characterize the profit of industrial enterprises from which, according to the law in force in 1927/28, the deductions listed at the beginning of this article were made.

For the production of the deductions specified in the law, the profit of industrial enterprises from the sale of their factory products was subjected, in accordance with the rules in force in the reporting year, to be clarified by adding to it some benefits additionally received by industrial enterprises and reducing it by the amount of some losses incurred by these enterprises.

For the production of all such additions and write-offs, the net profit of the entire (all-Union, republican and local) industry of the USSR is determined for 1927-28 in the amount of 864.7 million rubles; it was from this amount that all the deductions listed in the law were made. This amount includes the profit of the all-Union industry alone in the amount of 541.1 million rubles, from which the deductions demanded from the all-Union industry were made, and the balance of which, after covering these deductions, went to the treasury according to the all-Union budget in the amount of 189.9 million rubles. ., as can be seen from the table below. [60]

If from the indicated amount of net profit of state industrial enterprises of the USSR that ended the reporting year with a profit (864.7 million rubles), we exclude losses incurred in the reporting year by some enterprises in the amount of 54.2 million rubles, it turns out that the net profit of the state industry was determined in 1927-28 in the amount of 810.5 million rubles. (864.7 million rubles - 54.2 million rubles), which in relation to "the average amount of own funds of the state industry for the reporting year (9429 million rubles) is 8.6%, and against the corresponding profit of the previous 1926 / 27 (635.8 million rubles) gives an increase of 12.8%.

The distribution of the authorized capitals of the state industry and the profitability of these capitals for 1927-28 in comparison with the previous 1926-27 according to the types of industry subordination present the following picture:

Industry subordination	Authorized capital, billion rubles	% to total	Net profit less loss, RUB mln	% to total	Return on authorized capital, %	
					1927/28 g.	1926/27 g.
All-Union	5.36	70.1	518.6	64.0	12.0	10.0
Republican						
RSFSR	0.46	6.0	25.2	3.0	5.5	5.0
Ukrainian SSR	0.23	3.0	23.5	3.0	10.2	4.8
BSSR	0.06	0.8	10.6	1.4	17.7	8.0

TSFSR	0.05	0.6	2.9	0.3	5.8	7.0
Uzbek SSR	0.03	0,4	3.8	0.5	12.6	6.0
Turkmen SSR	0.02	0.3	1.9	0.2	9.5	7.0
Total						
Republican	0.85	11.1	67.9	8.4	8.0	5.4
Local	1.43	18.8	224.0	27.6	15.7	8.8
Total	7.64	100.0	810.5	100.0	10.6	9.4

The highest profitability is provided by enterprises of local industry, whose profits increased from 120.6 million rubles. in 1926/27 to 224 million rubles. in 1927/28, due to which the share of the profit of local industry in the total net profit increased from 19.1 to 27.6%, and the return on the authorized capital increased to 15.7% against 8.8% in 1926/27 d. In the republican industry, an increase in profitability is also observed; the profit of the republican industry increased by 22.4 million rubles. (67.9 million rubles in 1927-28 and 45.5 million rubles in 1926-27), or in relation to the authorized capital from 5.4 to 8.4%. Of the republican industry, only the industry of the TSFSR gave a relative decrease in profits. All-Union industry increased the profitability of the authorized capital from 10.2% in 1926-27 to 12% in 1927-28 [61]

TsGAOR USSR, f. 5684, on. 1, d. 696, ll. 103 ob., 104 ob., 105 ob. Typ. copies

[1] Dated by content

[2] The following paragraphs have been omitted: "Budget allocations for industry and actual expenditures", "Forms of budgetary financing of industry", "Subject of assignment of budgetary financing of industry", "Estimated balance of state industry and the state budget"

[3] The information about the costs due for all changes to the opened loan has been omitted.

[4] In addition, within a grace period and according to creditor lists, 1.8 million rubles were spent on financing the industry. document.

[5] State loans as a means of mobilizing part of the national income and money of the population were one of the essential sources of financing

for the socialist industry. On the growing importance of government loans for 1925 / 26-1927 / 28 According to the following data: if in 1925-26 the proceeds from loans covered 15.3% of the expenditures on the national economy, then the next year - 23.2%, and in 1927-28 - 34.9%. The internal loans placed over the years, according to the sources of their implementation, were three main groups: 1) winning loans intended to mobilize national savings; 2) interest-bearing loans that serve for the placement of funds from savings banks and partly for temporarily free funds of economic bodies; 3) 8% loans for storing the reserve and spare capital of economic bodies.

In 1925/26, the main loan was the economic recovery. The industry received 152 mln under this loan in the same year. rub. In 1926/27, five loans were issued: three winning and two interest-bearing, no-winning. In September 1926, the loan was issued for 30 million rubles for a period of five years. Within two months, the loan was fully implemented and, moreover, unlike all previous loans, without the participation of funds from banks and savings banks. The loan was placed through the individual sale of bonds. On February 4, 1927, a 10% winning loan for 100 million rubles was issued. for a period of eight years. It was designed for the free funds of all groups of the urban population; implemented in full, and only 10% of the loan amount was placed among state and economic authorities. Released March 11, 1927 3% peasant loan for 25 million rubles. for raising agriculture was not fully implemented. The 12% loan of 1927 was issued for 200 million rubles. for a period of 10 years for the placement of free capital of credit institutions. The largest credit operation in 1927-28 was the issuance of the state's domestic 6 percent winning first loan to industrialization. This was the beginning of the annual issuance of large mass loans, intended to mobilize the savings of the broad masses of workers to finance industrial construction. The first loan for industrialization was issued for 200 million rubles, and placed - for 198.3 million rubles. (of which 10 million rubles were allocated in the village). The loan to strengthen the peasant economy issued on December 30, 1927 in the amount of 150 million rubles. for a period of three years was sold for 135.5 million. rub. (of which 15 million rubles were allocated in cities). The funds collected by the savings banks were transferred to the state budget in 1927-28 by placing them in 12 and 11 percent state loans. The concentration in the budget of the reserve and

reserve capital of economic bodies for subsequent redistribution was carried out in 1927-28 by placing these capitals in an 8% loan. Over the years, the implementation of the second, third and fourth 8% loans took place. The total amount of their implementation in 1926-27 was 119 782 thousand, pv6., And in 1927-28 - 142.8 million rubles. (TsGANKh USSR, f. 7733 op. 5, d. 165, pp. 165, 167; op. 3, d. 186, l. 80; TsGAOR USSR, f. 5684, on. 1, d. 541, l. 104)

[6] The sum of the numbers does not agree with the given total

[7] Dated by content

[8] The consolidated balance of the all-Union state industry as of October 1, 1926 was omitted (TsGAOR USSR, f. 5684, on. 1, d. 541, l. 40 rev.).

[9] Less losses on Kubcherneft in the amount of 0.7 million rubles. - Approx. document.

[10] Information on the composition of gross profit and gross loss of industry has been omitted.

[11] Less the loss on Kubcherneft in the amount of 0.7 million rubles. - Note. document.

[12] Information about the time of receipt of industry income deductions has been omitted.

[13] If to the expenses for financing industry for 1926/27 we add the expenses on capital construction and equipment of scientific and technical institutes, carried out in 1926/27 according to the estimates of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, but according to the expenditure classification of 1927/28, attributed to expenses for the financing of industry, as well as expenditures on industry, made at the expense of extra-estimated allocations from the reserve fund of the Council of People's Commissars and included not in the department "financing of the national economy", but in the structure of departmental expenses, then the total amount of expenditures for financing industry for 1926-27 will be 469,532 thousand rubles, and the increase in these costs compared with the costs of 1925/26 - 131.9%. document

[14] From the table in the document, only basic data are published.

[15] Moreover, on the loan of economic recovery 58,140 thousand rubles, together with which the total cost of financing industry in the all-Union budget will be 382,905 thousand rubles. - *Approx. document.*

[16] Here is taken the amount of direct appropriations without budget payments to the State Bank to repay a loan for economic recovery. Loans extended in 1926/27 by the State Bank of Industry secured by the Economic Recovery Loan bonds are shown in a separate entry in the same table. - *Approx. document*

[17] According to the latest data, the amount of bank lending to the industry turned out to be slightly higher - *Approx. document*

[18] The table is not published (TsGAOR USSR, f. 5684, on. 1, d. 541, l. 118)

[19] The information about the payments of industry to the state revenue, which are not transferred to consumers, has been omitted.

[20] The information about the funds allocated for the all-union and republican budgets has been omitted.

[21] These and subsequent data on the work of industry are based on the figures of the industrial financial plan of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR for 1927/28, and partly (for the union industry) on the reporting data of the NKF-USSR on the balance campaign of 1926/27 ("Financial issues of the union industry and trade." Financial publishing house NKF USSR, 1928).- *Approx. document*

[22] According to VSNKh. - *Approx. document.*

[23] 'Industrial machines and tractors (data from Metalloimport). - *Approx. document*

[24] Information about the supply of industry with raw materials and fuel has been omitted.

[25] Dated by content.

[26] The following paragraphs were omitted: "Execution of the amount of budgetary estimates", "Growth of tax revenues", "Arrears".

[27] When comparing the data of this table with the data of the publication of the Commission of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "The severity of taxation in the USSR" (Moscow, 1929, p.

41), it should be borne in mind that the mentioned edition gives the distribution of all tax payments, including local taxes, and without export duties, while this table shows only one government taxes, including export duties. The distribution of payments in 1927/28 is preliminary and subject to further clarification. *document.*

[28] Information about the system of deduction of profits from industry and the income of the state has been omitted.

[29] The amount of the increase in loans does not include operations on accounting for bills of exchange. *document.*

[30] The consolidated balance sheet is not published (TsGANKh USSR, d 7733, on. 5, d 165, l. 160)

[31] The table is not published (TsGANKh USSR, f. 7733, on. 5, d. 165, l. 160)

[32] Information on the distribution of payments from industry profits and the timing of their payment has been omitted

[33] The following paragraphs are omitted: "General characteristics of the work of industry", "Capital construction of industry", "Disadvantages of capital construction".

[34] Without local funds and other sources. - *Approx. document*

[35] Without the local budget and sources indicated in the capital gains table (fol. 14 vol.) Under the heading "other sources." - *Note of the document.*

[36] In addition, the industry received 55 million rubles from local funds, which are mainly in the RSFSR and partly in the Ukrainian SSR. No reported data on the implementation of the plan were received from local sources. *document.*

[37] Due to the lack of reported data on local industry, this figure is not final. *document.*

[38] Excluding payments to state and local budgets, 25 ° / "to the fund for improving the life of workers, bonus funds. - *Approx. document.*

[39] For the VSNKh industry, excluding the gold-platinum industry, Gruzmarginets, Tsentrosiprt and some others for the amount of 71.2 million rubles. - *Approx. document.*

[40] Other sources include a selection of funds from current accounts and from the cash desk. *document.*

[41] Including shipbuilding. - *Approx. document*

[42] To expand the production of building materials (in the republican industry). - *Approx. document*

[43] The sum of the numbers does not agree with the given total

[44] Including syndicates - 8.1 million rubles, clothing industry - 0.02 million, printing industry - 0.3 million and 0.5 million rubles. unallocated. *document*

[45] Including unallocated - 5 million rubles. and other - 1 million rubles - *Note. document*

[46] Excluding Tsentrospirt, Gruzmarginets, other and special expenses, totaling 71.2 million rubles, including 133.9 million rubles, redistributed through the BDK from the industry's own resources. *document.*

[47] The sum of the numbers does not agree with the given total

[48] Including local, planned VSNKh. - *Approx. document.*

[49] Without BDK loans, which is almost entirely a redistribution of industry's own accumulations. *document.*

[50] Without the payments on the loan of the economic recovery, but including appropriations Tsentrospirt, Gruzmarginets n pr [ochie] expenses in the amount of 71.2 million. Rubles,, ke included in previous tablitsy. - *Notes document*

[51] For the sake of correctness of comparison, the figure is taken for a comparable volume, ie, without payments on the loan of economic recovery, and others and Dnipro-Stroy, which has been financed from 1927/28 by financing electrification. *document.*

[52] No payments on the economic recovery loan. - *Approx. document*

[53] The drop in the share of the Ukrainian SSR is explained by the transition of the Yuzhnorudny trust, which took place in the republic in the previous year, into the union group. *document.*

[54] For the implementation of the first plans for the industrialization of the country, foreign trade was of great importance, since not only the main part of industrial equipment, but also part of raw materials for light industry had to be imported from abroad. The total volume of exports from 1925/26 to 1927/28 increased from 676 620 thousand to 774 409 thousand rubles, despite the poor harvest in 1928. The most important Soviet export products in those years were bread, livestock products, furs, fish, timber and oil. By 1928, the export of industrial goods also increased significantly - from 33,194 thousand in 1925-26 to 388 3401 thousand rubles. in 1927/28

The value and structure of imports changed even more, which increased from 756,332 thousand rubles. in 1925/26 to 944 786 thousand rubles. in 1927-28, the import of industrial equipment increased especially, amounting to 67,738.2 thousand, 119,597.1 thousand and 255,825 thousand rubles in three years. It should be borne in mind that capitalist firms sold equipment to the Soviet Union 25-30% higher than average world prices. ("Year of government work. Materials for the report for 1925/26". M., 1927; the same for 1926/27, M., 1928; the same for 1927/28, M., 1929; "Industrial export and import".. M., 1.1930).

[55] The information on the implementation of the plan of bank lending to industry has been omitted

[56] In the interests of greater accuracy, the payments from the state budget of non-ferrous metallurgy, produced through the sale of non-ferrous metal scrap, should be added to the indicated amounts. *document*

[57] Dated by content

[58] The information about the system of deduction of industry profits and the composition of payments of the all-Union industry to the state revenue has been omitted.

[59] The table is not published (TsGAOR USSR, f. 5684, on. 1, d. 696, l. 104).

[60] The table is not published (TsGAOR USSR, f. 5684, on. 1, d. 696, l. 105)

[61] Information on the distribution of profits by industry is omitted.

No. 10 From materials to the report of the government of the USSR for 1925/26

Not earlier than October 1, 1926 [1]

Industry [2]

General industrial plan and its implementation [3]

Implementation of the consolidated industrial plan [4].

The reduction of the original plan led to the need to restructure industrial production on the fly, to adapt it to new import, financial and raw material opportunities. One of the most painful consequences of the reduction in the rate of expansion of production was the relative surplus of labor force, especially the unskilled and untrained, hastily recruited at the end of 1924/25 and at the beginning of 1925/26 in connection with the intensive expansion of production.

However, the slower pace of expansion of production, especially in the branches of heavy industry, demanded a great deal of stress from the industry and forced in a number of cases to put into operation the worst factories that were previously mothballed and partially intended for liquidation, and in working factories forced to use in many cases worse equipment ...

All of this has significantly slowed down advances in technical advances. The industry also experienced serious difficulties in obtaining certain types of agricultural raw materials due to a decrease in yield against initial assumptions and a reduction in imports.

The supply of industry with fuel was not satisfactory enough, especially in the first half of the reporting year, and although the situation in this respect improved in the second half of the year, by the end of the year there was still a significant decrease in fuel reserves.

Despite these difficulties, in 1925-26 the industry accounted for by the DSP of the Supreme Council of the National Economy increased its production by about 42.4% in terms of the value of gross output in pre-war prices. The consolidated industrial plan, on average for the entire industry, was fulfilled, according to preliminary data, by more than 100%. At the same time, industries producing mainly tools and means of production (group "A") fulfilled the plan by 95.9%, and industries producing mainly consumer goods (group "B") fulfilled the program "a

104.9% with fluctuations by industry. Despite this circumstance, the share of industries producing mainly instruments and means of production in the total gross factory output in 1925-26 increased in relation to industries producing consumer goods. True,

The growth of production in 1925/26 as compared with 1924/25 and the degree of fulfillment in 1925/26 of the VSUNKh industrial plan included in the master plan are shown by the preliminary data in the table [5].

From these preliminary data, it can be seen that the fuel industries, operating under the pressure of fuel shortage in a country with extreme stress, fulfilled the planned plan with some excess.

The metal industry (pig iron, open-hearth furnace, rolled metal), subordinate to Glavmetal, has fulfilled, on average, the initial production program by 90%. If we take into account that during the revision of the industrial plan, the reduction of the metal program was planned by about 10%, and the initial (expanded) program was approved by the STO as the maximum (with an assumption of 10% underperformance), then we can assume that the large metal industry has fulfilled the reduced program completely. Together with the other (local) metal industry included in the plan, the metal industry completed the initial expanded program of about 95%.

The ore industry (iron and manganese ore) worked in accordance with the reduced demand for ores from the metal industry, and the under-fulfillment of the original program is largely due to the reduction in the volume of metallurgical production.

The cement industry also failed to fulfill its program (92.7% of the plan). In addition, it should be pointed out that of the industries that do not appear in the above table [6], the electrical industry fulfilled the program only by 88%, mainly due to difficulties in supplying it with raw materials, both imported and of Soviet origin (transformer iron, dynamo, copper, etc.); the main chemical industry, according to the plan of which an extremely large expansion of production was planned, fulfilled its program only by 87.5% due to delays in capital work due to untimely fulfillment of orders for equipment in the country and a reduction in the import plan; the glass industry fulfilled the plan in the amount of 97.6% and the timber industry - 90.8%. For the rest of the

branches of Group A, the production program has been completed in full or with some excess.

For the majority of sectors of group "B", the production program was exceeded. Due to the processing of a larger amount of cotton (16.1 [million] against 15.4 million poods) due to the use of underestimated stocks and some lightening of fabrics, the cotton industry exceeded its production program. The woolen industry, despite the reduction in imports of wool, has fulfilled its program with an excess in footage, due mainly to the transition to the production of semi-woolen fabrics. The linen industry, the leather and footwear industry (especially in the part of large leathers and footwear) and most food industries, with the exception of the oil mill and starch-treacle, exceeded their program, which did not fulfill the program by several percent due to raw material difficulties. Extremely favorable conditions (good harvest, high sugar content of beets) allowed the sugar industry to significantly increase sugar production. The planned production plan for bread wine has been significantly exceeded.

Thus, industry as a whole, with a significant strain on the resources and technical capabilities of a number of industries, overcame the unfavorable conditions of 1925-26 and expanded production approximately within the limits of the reduced plan.

General results of industrial production [7]

The past year in the field of industrial production, as well as in the general course of development of our national economy, was the year of completion of the restoration process, including at the same time elements of the transition to the reconstruction period. And although this year the state industry did not have such an abundance of old stocks and unused technical equipment as it did in the previous year, nevertheless, the production of our large state industry, as can be seen from the table [8], showed significant growth. While in 1924/25 the gross output of all continuous production (excluding seasonal production) was (in pre-war rubles)

2 559 925 thousand rubles, in the reporting year it rose to 3 569 087 thousand rubles, giving an increase of 38.9%. Taking into account seasonal production, the growth of industrial production is 42.4% (2 642

925 thousand rubles in 1924-25 and 3 763 087 thousand rubles in 1925-26).

With regard to the production results of individual industries, it must first of all be noted that the greatest growth in 1925-26 was observed in heavy industry, in the production of means of production. In the first place in terms of increased production is the cement industry (+ 92.16%), which is explained by the growth of construction in the country, which has shown an increased demand for cement industry products. An increase of 51.7% was provided by the coal industry. An even greater increase was provided by the metal industry, whose gross output (in pre-war rubles) rose from 496,621 thousand rubles. in 1924/25 up to 765,681 thousand rubles. in 1925-26, the annual growth of the metal industry is thus 54.18%. At the same time, the production of pig iron increased by 71.9%, the production of steel increased by 57%, and e-rolled products increased by 60%.

In the field of steam locomotive and car building, the following results should be noted. In 1925/26, 302 steam locomotives were produced against 186 steam locomotives in 1924/25, and 1750 new cars were built against 968 in 1924/25. The car building industry reached its greatest development by the end of the year: in the fourth quarter, about half of the total annual output (835 cars).

In the field of agricultural machine-building, production increased from 38.6 million rubles. in 1924/25 to 76.6 million rubles. in the reporting year, which gives an increase of 100%. The planned group of factories has fulfilled 95% of the production program. The number of plows released increased in 1925/26 by 58%, seeders - by 96, harvesters - by 64, scythes - by 52%, etc.

The electrical industry in the past operating year continued to be in a period of intensive growth. The rate of this growth was, however, somewhat slower than in the previous year. Gross production for the reporting period is estimated at 107,534 thousand pre-war rubles. (against 74,743.8 thousand pre-war rubles in 1924-25) for the entire electrical industry and 94.4 million pre-war rubles - for the plants planned by Glavelectro.

The main chemical industry gave a 37.5% increase over the year (32,519 thousand pre-war rubles in 1924-25, 44,717 thousand pre-war rubles in 1925-26).

Moving on to the production of consumer goods, it should be noted that the gross output of the cotton industry increased by 36.7% (from 421,460 thousand pre-war rubles in 1924-25 to 576,172 thousand pre-war rubles in 1925-26). In 1925/26 the woolen industry produced products for 143,332 thousand rubles, exceeding the production of the previous year by 26.29%. At the same time, the increase in production for yarn was 19.5%, for severity - 30.6, for finished goods - 32.7%. The linen industry produced goods in the amount of 101,759 thousand rubles, exceeding the production of 1924/25 by 34.2%.

The growth of the tobacco industry (39%), the fat and perfumery and cosmetic (39.2%) and glass (38.6%) industries is almost at the same level. A slightly smaller percentage of growth was given by: the match industry (27% of the increase), rubber (30%), porcelain-faience (29.1%) and paper (16.7%). The sugar industry produced in 1925/26 10 695 679 centners. sugar against 4,554,001 centners in 1924-25, thus exceeding the production of the previous year by 136%

Capital construction and electrification [9]

The end of the recovery period and the transition to the reconstruction of the national economy set before the government as the most important economic task to expand the production and technical base of industry, both through the re-equipment of factories and factories, and mainly through new capital construction and the implementation of the general plan for the electrification of the country, which received its approval back in VIII Congress of Soviets (1920). The establishment of plans for capital construction and electrification is therefore the most important part of government activity in the reporting year in the field of directive guidance of the work of industry.

Capital construction

Capital work plan

The size of the capital construction of Industry until 1925/26 was insignificant. In 1924/25, according to the reported data, the entire state industry of the Supreme Council of the National Economy carried out capital works worth about 385 million rubles, which is about 100

million rubles. exceeded the amount of depreciation deductions for this year, which amounted to about 285 million rubles.

When drawing up the capital construction plan for 1925-26, the national economic resources appeared to be larger than they actually turned out to be. This led to the need to revise this plan in the middle of the year towards its reduction.

The plan for capital works of industry in 1925/26, approved by the STO on February 23, 1926, provided for costs in the amount of 820 million rubles, of which 74.5 million rubles. were conditionally approved, depending on the real possibilities of purchasing equipment on credit in Germany and other countries. On top of that, during the year the government gave certain branches of industry the right to carry out additional capital work in excess of the plan. As a result, the capital work plan for 1925-26 was expressed in the amount of 862.8 million rubles.

Implementation of a plan

According to tentative data, in 1925-26, the industry carried out capital work to the amount of about 780 million rubles, i.e. in terms of value, the plan was implemented by 90.5%, and after deducting the conditional list of capital works from the plan (which was carried out only on a very small scale, approximately amounting to about 5-10 million rubles) - almost entirely. In terms of volume and title list of works, deviations from the plan, as will be shown below, are more significant.

TABLE 1]

Industries	According to plan		Execution (according to preliminary data)	% completion	
	common	net of contingent capital works		to general plan	net of contingent capital works
Metallic and iron ore	218.9	179.8	188.6	86.1	105.0
Electrotechnical	13.4	13.4	12.5	93.3	93.3
Coal and oil	215.9	199.2	204.1	94.6	102.5

Other mountain	17.9	17.9	15.0	83.8	83.8
Chemical	54.5	54.5	54.8	100.0	100.0
Silicate	42.3	38.0	36.1	85.4	95.0
Forest	20.2	20.2	21.5	106.4	106.4
Paper-printing	34.4	30.4	23.2	67.4	76.3
Textile	144.1	133.7	139.8	97.0	104.5
Food	63.8	63.8	47.2	74.0	74.0
Tannery	14.6	14.6	17.9	122.6	122.6
Total	840.0	765.5	760.7	90.6	99.4
Others, including syndicates	22.8	22.8	20.0	87.7	87.7
Total	862.8	788.3	780.7	90.5	99.0

For individual industries, the percentage of plan fulfillment in value terms fluctuates sharply, as can be seen from the data (in million rubles) given in Table. [1]. By the nature of the work, the implementation of the plan (also in terms of value) is presented in table. [2]. From a comparison of the data table. [2] it can be seen that in terms of value, the under-fulfillment of the general plan falls mainly on new construction, and then on capital work on existing plants, which is mainly explained by unjustified assumptions regarding the import of equipment according to the conditional list of capital works.

If we take only the works included in the master plan, the picture, at first glance, changes. Thus, for new plants, the shortfall in fulfillment of the plan is insignificant (3.7%); However, if from the sums of costs for new plants we subtract the costs incurred by individual republics and not approved by the STO (in total, about 6.5 million rubles), then the percentage of plan fulfillment minus the contingent costs for new plants will be about 90.

TABLE 2]

[Type of work]	According to plan	Performance	% completion
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	common	net of	(according to	to the	net of
		contingent	preliminary	general	contingent
		capital	data)	plan	capital
		works			works
Major works in existing factories	643.2	586.0	587.4	91.3	100.3
Housing construction in existing factories	90.6	90.6	85.0	93.8	93.8
Construction of new factories, mines and other structures [10]	129.0	111.7	107.7	83.5	96.3
Total	862.8	788.3	780.1	90.5	99.0

The failure to fulfill the plan for the construction of new factories is explained by the delay in the pace of some of the work already begun, and in some cases, the very start of the work due to the import and financial difficulties that came to light later.

For the existing factories, the amount of capital expenditures made in 1925-26, in terms of value, somewhat (although slightly) exceeds the basic plan. This is explained by the fact that in a number of cases there was a performance of work crossed out during the final approval of the plan by local authorities that received the appropriate permits from the republican higher authorities (for example, the leather and timber industry of the RSFSR). Overruns also took place due to the increase in the construction index. Further, in some cases, for example at metal factories, due to the non-arrival of imported equipment, an increase in the cost of overhaul of worn-out equipment was required.

As for the housing construction plan, its underfulfillment by about 6% is mainly due to the fact that the bulk of work in this category in 1925/26 was carried out in the second half of the year, that is, precisely at the time when the need for a significant compression of the initial capital work plan. And since in a number of cases some of the works that were deleted from the plan at its final approval were actually completed in the first half of the year, the trusts were forced to delay somewhat the work on housing construction as well.

Electrical construction

Electrical construction work

1925/26 was the year of completion of the construction of a group of district power plants and the beginning of the construction of a new group of district power plants.

In 1925/26, the following operations began: Shaturskaya power plant named after V.I. Lenin with a capacity of 32 thousand kW. Nizhny Novgorod power plant near the town of Balakhna, 38 km. from the city of Nizhniy Novgorod, with a capacity of 20 thousand kilowatts in excess of the previously entered Kashirskaya, "Red October" and Kizedovskaya stations. The last two stations of the first group - Shterovskaya for 20 thousand kW and Volkhovskaya for 56 thousand kW - came into operation in the first quarter of 1926/27. In addition, in the reporting year, construction of a new group of district stations with a total capacity of 77 thousand kW began. kW, namely: Kharkovskaya in the city of Chuguev, 35 km from Kharkov, with a capacity of 22 thousand kW, bringing this capacity to 44 thousand kW; Shakhtinskaya in the Aleksandro-Grushevsky district of Donbass at the Vlasovsky anthracite mine to supply power to the mines and Rostov-on-Don with a capacity of 22 thousand kW, bringing it to 44 thousand. kW; Kievskaya with a capacity of 22 thousand kW and Saratov with a capacity of 11 thousand kW. In total, in 1925/26, it was in the construction and expansion of regional stations for a total capacity of 422 thousand kW, of which 78 thousand kW were put into operation in a calendar year, 77 thousand .kw continued to expand existing.

The total capacity of the district stations under construction in the reporting year slightly exceeds the total capacity of all public power plants before the October Revolution and amounts to 68% of the total power of public power plants by October 1, 1926.

In 1925/26, quite large-scale work was carried out on local power construction. Two new hydroelectric stations with a total capacity of 4,200 kW (first stage) were opened, and four new large stations with a total capacity of 21 thousand kW were built.

Despite the rapid pace of power construction, the year 1925-26 was marked by an electrical famine in our large industrial centers, as the

growth in energy demand outnumbered the growth in electric construction due to the extremely rapid pace of industrial development.

Brief description of the stations built and expanded in the reporting year

Shaturskaya District Power Plant named after V.I. Lenin is the largest peat plant in the world. It is located in the center of peat deposits, 130 km from Moscow. In 1925/26, two generators of 16 thousand kW each operated on it and a third generator of 16 thousand kW was installed. In addition, a new turbine generator of 44 thousand kW was ordered and in 1926-27 another one of the same capacity was ordered. Thus, the total capacity of the Shaturskaya station is supposed to be brought up to 136 thousand kW by 1929/30.

The Nizhny Novgorod peat district power plant serves a large industrial region, where, in connection with the construction of this station, a number of new large enterprises arose, such as a paper mill, etc. In 1925/26, preparations began for the second stage and one turbine generator was ordered for 22 thousand .kw. In 1926 / 27, it is planned to order two more turbine generators of 22 thousand kW each, and the total capacity of the station will be increased to 108 thousand kW by 1930/31.

In 1925/26, the following regional power stations were expanded: at the Klasson peat station (formerly Electric transmission), 75 km from Moscow (the only pre-revolutionary regional power plant), a new turbo generator of 16 thousand kW was installed, at the peak power plant "Krasny Oktyabr" in Leningrad installed a second turbine generator of 10 thousand kW, which completed the first stage of 20 thousand kW, and began work on the second stage, which will consist of installing two more turbine generators of 44 thousand kW. The total capacity of the station is expected to be increased by 1929/30 to 188 thousand kW.

On May 1, 1926, the first two large local hydroelectric power stations built during Soviet power were opened, exceeding in their capacity all hydroelectric stations that existed before the October Revolution, namely: the Yerevan hydroelectric station on the Zanga River in Armenia with a capacity of 2 thousand kW and a pressure of 52 m and the Tashkent hydroelectric station on the Boz-Su irrigation canal with a

capacity of the first stage of 2,200 kW at a head of 14 m. The hydroelectric structures at both stations are designed for double capacity, and the capacity of both stations will be doubled in the coming years.

Brief description of the stations under construction and expansion

In 1925/26, the construction was completed: Volkhovskaya hydroelectric station for 56 thousand kW, Shterovskaya station on anthracite coal in Donbass for 20 thousand kW, which, starting from 1926/27, will be expanded and brought to a capacity of 80- 100 thousand kW (these two stations were opened at the end of 1926), and the Zemo-Avchal hydroelectric station near Tiflis, which will open in the spring of 1927, with a capacity of 13 thousand kW (in the future it will be doubled).

In Baku, the power station was expanded by 22,000 kW, in Leningrad - the 1st state power plant with 30,000 kW, the Kashirskaya station - by 22,000 kW.

Of the newly begun construction of stations, one Shakhtinskaya - on an anthracite mine, the rest (Kharkovskaya, Kievskaya and Saratovskaya) - on imported coal.

From large local stations, the Batumi hydroelectric power plant with a capacity of 5500 kW is being built (the station was designed for 3700 kW, but it turned out to be possible to increase its capacity); The Kondopoga hydroelectric power plant in the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic with a capacity of 5 thousand kW, which will serve the paper mill under construction; The Yaroslavl peat station on the Lyapinsky bog with a primary capacity of 5 thousand kW with an increase in the future to 15-20 thousand kW (this station was opened in November 1926); Sverdlovsk peat power plant of 6 thousand kW (first stage), which began operation in March 1927; Egorshinskaya power plant (in the Urals) of 4 thousand kW.

In 1925/26, turbine generators with a capacity of 44 thousand kW and equipment for high steam pressure of 25-30 atm were ordered for the first time. In the same year, the first experiments with pulverized combustion of solid fuel began, and all new coal stations are designed to burn pulverized coal.

For the first time in the construction of new district stations in 1925/26, in addition to funds allocated for electrification from the state budget, also funds from consumers themselves were attracted, just as it was previously done for electrification of local importance.

In addition, in 1925/26, the preliminary design of the Dnieper hydroelectric station with a capacity of the first stage of 200 thousand kW was completed, and this project was subjected to expert examination by Soviet and American specialists. In 1927, the construction of a station with a capacity of 100 thousand kW will begin.

Labor and wages [11]

Labor productivity and government action

The uneven growth of workers during the year, the predominance of poorly trained workers among the new cadres and the involvement in production of a large number of relatively worn out machine tools and enterprises with the worst technical equipment resulted in a somewhat slower growth in labor productivity in comparison with the dynamics of the previous year and the norms outlined in production plans.

The following table (according to the data of the DSP VSNKh) [12] gives the dynamics of output per man-day for the entire industry over the last two years.

In view of the significant slowdown in the growth rate of labor productivity at the beginning of the past year, the STO, in its resolution of May 18, issued a directive to the Supreme Council of the National Economy to raise labor productivity throughout industry during the remainder of the reporting financial year by at least 10%, both due to organizational measures and technical improvements, and by increasing the intensity of workers' labor. To achieve this goal, the Supreme Council of the National Economy took measures to fully load existing enterprises, to minimize the downtime of enterprises, to increase labor discipline, to tighten the working day, to reduce absenteeism and absenteeism, and to bring the number of workers in line with the actual needs of production.

The dynamics of output by half-year for the most important industries is presented in table. [3] average output per man-day worked (in rubles at pre-war prices):

As can be seen from [data] table. [3], labor productivity throughout industry increased by 7.9% during the second half of the year. The industry as a whole did not comply with the STO directives. However, if we take into account the difficulties that industry experienced in the past year in its work to increase labor productivity, it should be admitted that the work of industry in this respect was more or less satisfactory.

TABLE [3]

Industries	Average output for		Second half of the year in% relative to the first half of the year
	first half of the year	second semester	
Mining	2.91	2.93	100.7
Coal	2.87	2.78	96.9
Rudnaya	3.09	3.54	114.5
Processing	6.55	7.13	108.9
Silicate	2.73	3.24	118.7
Metal	5.57	6.53	117.2
Electrotechnical	13.85	16.80	121.3
Textile	5.15	5.43	105.4
Tannery	11.19	13.12	117.2
Chemical	16.57	18.20	109.8
Food	19.83	18.10	91.2
Woodworking	6.95	6.82	98.1
Paper	6.02	6.39	106.1
Industry average	6.08	6.56	107.9

Average output per worker increased in 1925-26 against 1924-25 in pre-war rubles. from 5 rubles. 65 kopecks up to 6 rubles. 32 kopecks, or 11.8%.

The cost of industrial products and selling prices [13].

Cost dynamics

A significant decrease in the cost of industrial production in 1924/25 compared with 1923/24, calculated by the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR for the industry on average in the amount of 13.3%, was achieved mainly as a result of improved use of equipment, a strong increase in its load, and in connection with this, a significant increase in labor productivity, more rational and economical combustion of fuel and a decrease in overhead costs. At the same time, the industry has almost completely exhausted the possibilities for reducing the cost of production due to the further loading of unused and unused equipment available in an unused state.

Proceeding from this, the control figures for 1925/26 projected a slower rate of average decline in the cost of industrial production than in the previous year, namely, 7-8%. Preliminary data show that even this reduction in the cost of production was not achieved, and in most industries there was an increase in the cost compared to 1924/25 (see table (4)).

TABLE [4]

[Type of raw materials and products]	Factory cost price,		1925/26, % to 1924/25
	1924/25 g.	1925/26 g.	
Coal of the Donetsk basin, pood	16.059	16.53	102.8
Oil-Azneft, pood.	30.08	29.0	96.4
"--- Grozneft"	19,825	23,809	121.0
Iron ore - YURT, pood	7,711	9.52	123.4
Pig iron - South, pood	83.74	-	105.3
	less refund 88.18 (first half)		
Open-hearth ingot, pood	115.64	124.09	107.3
Galoshes (pair, full cost)	215.23	271.55	126.1
Plantar leather of Russian raw materials, 100 kg	18783.0	19825.3	105.5

Sunflower oil, (i.e. the average for four trusts)	26433.0	31430.0	119.0
Window glass (drawer; average for three trusts)	4373.0	4184.0	95.7
Matches (box, average for three trusts)	451.5	475.1	105.2
Sugar, 100 kg.	2888.7	2280.9	78.9
Cottons (meter weighted fabric)	40,173	39.28	97.8
Thin broadcloth-Mossukno (meter of weathered fabric)	502.6	420.1	83.6

In general, throughout the industry there was a rise in the cost of production by an average of about 2% without excise as a result of its increase in the coal industry (across all basins) by 3.4%, in the oil industry - by 4.3, in the ore industry - by 23.4, metal - by 11.5, basic chemical - by 9.6, rubber - by 16.4, leather - by 4.6, forestry - by 29.5, oil mill - by 19.6%, etc. only in the electrical engineering industry by 6.5%, aniline-colored industry - by 19%, textile industry - by 5.2% on average, and sugar industry - by 21.5%.

Reasons for the increase in production costs

This state of the cost of industrial products was the result of a number of reasons, of which the most important are: the rise in prices for certain types of raw materials and fuels, the growth of wages out of line with the growth of labor productivity, and, finally, an increase in excise taxes, taxes and transport tariffs. In addition, it was caused by the need for a painless decrease in the previously taken rate of development of production in a number of industries and the insufficient use by industry of the possibilities of saving in the economy.

Comparison of the cost elements for a number of products shows that the greatest rise in prices occurred in the "salary" and "payroll" items. This was caused by the recruitment of surplus labor and an increase in wages by 25% against the planned 15% increase in labor productivity by 11.8%, while the plan provided for an increase in labor productivity by 22.6%. the article "materials", especially in the metal and ore industries, due to the rise in prices for the transportation of fluxes (pig iron) and an increase in the consumption of pig iron instead of scrap in open-hearth production. In the paper, cement and other

industries under this item, the cost increased under the influence of the increase in prices for forest materials due to the increase in stumpage fees.

A significant increase in expenditures is also taking place in a number of industries under the item "other production costs", which is mainly the result of higher fiscal costs. At the same time, it should be emphasized that those costs that depend on the production and technical state of industrial enterprises have shown some decline. This determines the possibility of a successful struggle for a real cost reduction in the future.

Concessions

The development of the concession business proceeded in the reporting year under the sign of a significant increase in proposals submitted to the Main Concession Committee by foreign concession seekers. Against the 253 proposals received in 1925, 506 proposals were received in 1926, that is, the number of the latter has doubled over this one-year period.

As of October 1, 1926, 101 concession agreements were in force, including 10 agreements on technical assistance and 6 - on the financing of commercial operations.

Mining concessions [14]

As of October 1, 1926, there were 18 mining concessions, which envisage the investment of capital, not counting working capital, in the amount of about 50 million rubles. It is too early to speak about the economic results of most of these concessions, since 11 of them are still in the stage of primary organization. For seven mining concessions, the value of the property transferred by the government is estimated at 17.5 million rubles, while the funds invested by the concessionaires are distributed as follows [tab. five].

Products and sales for five concessions are [tab. 6].

Information about the other two concessions is not shown due to the fact that their work is still exploratory in nature.

The payments to the government in the form of share deductions were received under concessions: Lena-Goldfields - 1,500 thousand rubles in advance; "Harriman" - 4200 thousand rubles. (2 million rubles in advance in order to ensure the correct execution of the contract, and

2200 thousand rubles for operations from July 25, 1925 to July 25, 1926) American company Asbestos -16 thousand rubles.. and "Tetyukhe" - 54 thousand rubles, and only 5770 thousand rubles.

The number of employees and workers employed at four concession enterprises on October 1, 1926 is presented in table. [7].

The share of mining concessions in certain sectors of the national economy (gold, manganese, etc.) is quite significant. So, for example, the enterprises: "Lena-Goldfields", "Tetyukhe" and the Primorsky mining company should play a significant role in supplying the USSR with non-ferrous metals. By the time the minimum programs are implemented, their production of copper should reach 15,400 thousand tons, zinc - 10 thousand tons and lead - 11,300 thousand tons.

Since the entire production of the USSR by 1930 for copper should be supposed to be 80,460 thousand tons, for zinc - 38,950 thousand tons and for lead - 24,780 thousand tons, the share of concession enterprises for these types of non-ferrous metals should be 19, 26 and 45%.

In the field of gold mining, Lena-Goldfields currently covers about 30% of all gold production in the USSR.

Harriman's concession should restore the pre-war productivity of Chiatura manganese deposits within the next two to three years, and according to the export plan from 1929/30, the products of this concession will account for about 75% of all manganese exports from the USSR.

TABLE [5]

Concession	Date of information	Capital investment RUB mln.			Beginning of action
		into equipment	in working capital	total	
Lena-Goldfields	1 / IX 1927	2548	4355	6903	18 / VIII 1925
"Harriman"	25 / X 1926 "	300	2500	2800	25 / VII 1925 "
American K and "Asbestos"	1 / X 1926 "	109	255	364	15 / V 1922 "
Joint-stock mining company "Tetyukhe"	1 / X 1926 "	1012	441	1453	25 / VIII 1925 "

Gold-mining [iski] "Vint"	pr1 / X 1926 "	400	-	400	1 / VIII 1922 "
Ayan Society K	1 / X 1926 "	250	-	250	16 / X 1925 "
Italian-Belgian Society	1 / X 1925 "	175	-	175	21 / III 1924 "
Total	-	4794	7551	12345-	

TABLE [6]

Concession	Products	Duration	number		Sold		Export, thousand rubles
			quantity	cost, thousand roubles.	gostorg [ovle]	private [iku], %	
"Aunt"	Zinc, lead	From 14 / VII 1925 to 1 / VII 1926	4880 t	255	-	-	182
American "Asbestos"	Asbestos	From 15 / V 1922 to 1 / X 1926	2246 "	-	55 o / o	-	45%
	Asbestos	By 1 / X 1926	2360 "	-	90%	ten	-
"Harriman"	Georgian manganese	From 25 / VII 1925 to 25 / VII 1926	763000 "	6000	-	-	6300
Lena-Goldfields	Cast iron, iron, etc.	Since 1 / X 1925	58 400 "	-	-	-	-
	Gold	By 1 / X 1926	499 poods	8141	7674 [15-	-]	469

Kita Sagaren Kigio Kumiai	Coal	From 14 / XII 1925 to 14 / IV 1926	10,508 t	-	-	-	-
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TABLE [7]

Concession	Workers	Employees	Total	Including foreigners
American "Asbestos" Company	230	33	263	-
"Harriman"	2497	405	2902	56 [16]
Lena Golfields	10885	1096	11981	12
"Aunt"	735	59	794	240
Total	14347	1593	15940	309

As for the concession of the American company "Asbestos", then its specific weight is insignificant. The release of its products (asbestos) from October 1, 1924 to October 1, 1925 was expressed in the amount of 800 tons of sorted asbestos, which is 7% of the production of the Uralazbest trust for the same period.

The significance of the Vint concession for the development of gold mines in the Amur Region in the gold industry of the USSR is negligible. It gives about 50 kg of placer gold, but as an enterprise that produces gold by mechanical means and at the same time in such a remote area, it should be recognized as useful.

It is not yet possible to draw a conclusion on the oil-industrial concession of the Italian-Belgian society, since it is still carrying out exploration work, but it should be noted that the study of the Shirak steppe in the oil industry is of interest to the national economy of Georgia.

The Ayan corporation (prospecting and mining of gold in the region of the Okhotsk district of Kamchatka province) was of great interest in the gold-mining respect, since this society took over the exploration of a little-explored area. The concessionaire spent about 300 thousand

rubles for exploration from August 18, 1925 to December 30, 1926. The results of the exploration for the concessionaire were, however, not very positive, as a result of which this concession was liquidated at the request of the corporation itself.

The American Aluminum Company (the contract was concluded on May 10, 1926) will search for and prospect for aluminum ores throughout the USSR for two summer seasons, that is, until December 1, 1927. Under the contract, the company must spend at least 50 thousand dollars; the company presented a bank guarantee to secure these obligatory costs.

The concession of the Priamurskiy mining company, the agreement with which was concluded on July 1, 1925, is engaged in exploration, development and production of ferrous and non-ferrous metals in the Priamurskaya lips. This concession provides for construction worth about 15 million rubles. Obligatory costs for preparatory and exploration work are at least 400 thousand rubles. within three years from the date of the conclusion of the contract.

On December 14, 1925, agreements were signed with Japanese industrial groups: 1) Kita Sagaren Sekio Kigio Kumiai - for exploration, development and production of oil on the eastern coast of Sakhalin; 2) "Sakai Kumiai" - for exploration and production of coal on the western coast of Sakhalin; 3) "Kita Sagaren Sekitan Kigio Kumiai" - for the extraction of coal on the western coast of Sakhalin. The production program and the amount of mandatory costs under these contracts are not provided.

The contract concluded on February 16, 1926 with the Japanese industrial firm "Tsukahara Kumiai" for the exploration and production of coal on the western coast of Sakhalin provides for a mandatory expenditure on exploration work before December 1, 1927 at least 150 thousand rubles. Amount, capital costs are not provided.

Concession "Iotaro Tanaka" (the contract was concluded in November 1925 for the extraction of gold at the Lidinskoye mine in Kamchatka) - a small enterprise, the amount of costs under the contract is not determined; on October 1, 1926, equipment for 25 thousand rubles was imported.

Under the agreement with the Finn Storen company, concluded on December 8, 1924, for prospecting and exploration of minerals on the Buzachi peninsula, capital investment is provided for at least 800 thousand rubles over five years. By the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the concessionaire was granted a deferral of one year to fulfill the obligation under the contract. At the end of 1925, a geological expedition was sent to the Buzachi peninsula, on the work of which, according to the concessionaire himself, about 300 thousand rubles were spent. The concession has now been liquidated.

Forest concessions

In the reporting year, 6 concessions were in force [tab. 8].

The total size of the concession forest area should be more than 5576 thousand dessiatins. The companies "Dvinoles-Limited" and "Re-pola-Wood" do not have a specific concession area, but annually receive from 700 [thousand] to 750 thousand sawlogs: the first - from the forests of the Western Dvina basin, and the second - from the forests of Karelia, gravitating rafting to Finland. From those indicated in table. [8] For 38 frames, 16 new frames were installed by the concession enterprises. In addition, during the work, other technical equipment was installed (machines, forestry trucks, etc.). The total amount of funds invested in equipment (including frames) was: Rusonorwegoles - 2 million rubles, Russangloles - 400 thousand, Russgollandoles - 600 thousand and Molo-goles - 2.5 million, total - 5.5 million rubles.

TABLE [8]

Concession	Time of conclusion of contracts	Term (years of)	Forest area of the concession, thousand dess.	Equipment by the number of sawmills	Capital invested	
					the government	concessionaire
					thousand roubles.	
"Russangloles"	27 / W 1923	20	1200	6	750	750
"Russnorvetoles"	10 / X 1923	20	1973	fourteen	1500	1500

Russgollands	27 / III 1923 "	20	1403	8	671	671
Dvinoles-Limited	7 / VII 1922 "	five	-	-	510	490
"Repola Wood"	12 / XI 1924 "	ten	-	-	-	-
"Mologoles"	12 / X 1923 "	25	1000	ten	-	9727
Total	-	-	5576	38	3431	13138

The concessions "Dvinoles" and "Repola-Wood" do not have any industrial enterprises within the USSR, but they are engaged in sawing wood (in Riga and in Finland) and selling it abroad.

Forest concessions, except for Mologoles, in 1925/26 attracted loans from abroad up to 4 million rubles. Lending by the banks of the USSR for the same time was expressed in the amount of up to 7.5 million rubles, and of the last amount, a significant part was used by Mologoles - up to 4.5 million rubles. (60%).

The total number of workers and employees employed in concessions is determined at 33,300 people (including permanent workers - 3,013 people, seasonal - 29,180, office workers - 1117, of which 50 are foreigners).

For individual concession enterprises, they are distributed as follows [tab. nine].

The salary paid for the entire duration of the four concessions, according to reports as of October 1, 1926, is expressed in an amount of about 17 million rubles.

Concession	Workers		Employees	Total	Including foreigners
	permanent	seasonal			
"Russangloles"	322	3000	22	3344	-
"Russnorwegles"	809	6180	265	7254	sixteen

"Russogolandles"	642	5000	129	5771	five
"Mologoles"	1240	15000	701	16941	29
Total	3013	29180	1117	33310	50

TABLE [9]

Payments to the government on forest concessions for the same period (1922-1926) are seen from [data] table. [10] - (in thousand rubles). _

The amount of payments for 1925/26 for four concessions is expressed in the amount of 3786 thousand rubles. In addition, social insurance contributions for the same period amounted to 1,685 thousand rubles.

TABLE [10]

Concession	During	Rent	Equity deductions	By penny	Tax and Patent	Fees and Fees	Total
Russangdoles	From 1922- to 1 / X 1926	-	-	2112	276	348	2736
"Russnorvetoles"	By 1 / X- 1925	-	28	1860	229	107	2224
	For 1925/26 -	-	fourteen	930	114	53	1111
Russgollandoles	From 1922- to 1 / X 1925	285	-	1494	443	123	2345
	1 / X 1925 -1 / X 1926	107	-	656	31	87	881
"Dvinoles"	From 1922/23 to 1 / X 1925	-	-	2131	-	-	2131
	1 / X 1925 -1 / X 1926	-	-	594	-	-	594
"Repola Wood"	From 1924- to 1 / X 1926	-	-	655	-	-	655
"Mologoles"	From 1923- to 1 / X 1924	44	180	650	12	27	913

	1 / X 1924 - 1 / X 1925	54	292	590	65	thirty	1031
	1 / X 1925 - 1 / X 1926	-	-	1200	-	-	1200
Total		490	514	12872	1170	775	15821

The cost of harvested forest materials for the entire duration of the concessions is approximately 35 million rubles, of which 27 million rubles are exported.

The shares of foreign groups of mixed companies Ruosanglo-les and Russgollandoles were bought by Severoleo at the end of 1926. Severoles is currently the sole owner of these companies; thus, the latter became, in fact, purely Soviet organizations.

Manufacturing concessions

As of October 1, 1926, 30 agreements (concessions) were concluded, of which 13, which were at the stage of organization, in 1925/26.

The activities of the remaining 17 concessions are characterized by. October 1, 1926 by the following data obtained directly from the concessionaires [tab. eleven].

TABLE [11]

Industries	Number of concessions	Property value before [this] government, thousand rubles	Invested concession funds, thousand rubles		
			in fixed assets	in working capital	total
Metal	nine	903	4451	3762	8213
Chemical	3	5834	1954	2352	4306
Paperworking	2	32	448	110	558
Polygraphic	1	151	298	421	719
Food	1	-	68	367	435
Woodworking	1	b / ots.	144	185	329
Total	17	6920	7363	7197	14560

For 13 enterprises, which are in the period of organization, it is envisaged under the agreements to invest capital in the amount of at least 4.5 "million rubles.

During the period of operating activity, concessionaires attracted loans: foreign - 1340 thousand rubles. and in the USSR - 911 thousand rubles, and the largest amount was received on the "foreign loan" by the joint-stock company "Bersol" - 740 thousand rubles.

There were 2267 workers and employees on 17 concessions in 1925-26 (including 77 foreigners), of whom 1825 were workers and 442 employees.

The concessionaires imported from abroad, according to contracts, finished products in the amount of 2,437 thousand rubles. Raw materials in the period of implementation of the production program by the concessionaires was purchased in the foreign market in the amount of 1.2 million rubles. The gross value of products sold during 1925/26. expressed in 23 685 thousand rubles. Its buyers on average for all concessions were 80% of state institutions, 10% of cooperation and 10% of participants.

The significance of most of these concessions lies in the fact that they produce goods that were previously imported.

On October 1, 1926 (according to the data of the concessionaires), the existing concessions for the period of their activity were entered into. treasury income of various taxes and fees 2292 thousand rubles, including: rent - 156 thousand rubles, share deductions - 550 thousand, taxes - 783 thousand and duties and fees - 1203 thousand rubles. In addition, social insurance contributions amounted to 617 thousand rubles.

Construction concessions

On October 1, 1926, three construction concessions were concluded:

- 1) Moscow Industrial Syndicate with a capital of 656.5 thousand rubles. (of which the main - 505.5 thousand and circulating "- 151 thousand rubles);
- 2) Julien Weiler - 116 thousand rubles;
- 3) "Russger-Stroy".

The first two firms have been operating in the USSR as developers under an agreement with the Moscow Department of Real Estate since 1922. Their proportion is negligible.

The third enterprise deserves attention - Russger-Stroy - a mixed joint-stock company, approved on September 27, 1926.

Its founders are: on the one hand, the German firm "I. Kossel and K^o", on the other - Tsentrozhilsoyuz with a fixed capital of 6 million rubles. The main task of the company is the production on a contract basis of construction work for the construction of dwellings and, in addition, operations as a developer. "Russgerstroy" is still limited to the planned works in Moscow, Rostov-on-Don and Donbass with an approximate estimate for the first year of work of 12 million rubles. The two above-mentioned societies, during their work on January 1, 1926, contributed to the government income of various taxes and fees in the amount of 143 thousand rubles.

Technical Assistance Agreements

On October 1, 1926, 10 agreements on technical assistance were in force, the purpose of which is technical assistance by a foreign firm to the relevant state-owned enterprise in improving production in this enterprise. The obligations of a foreign company are to provide the state-owned enterprise with working drawings, models, patents and descriptions, as well as admitting our technical forces to study, production at the company's factories, sending the company's technical forces to our enterprises for instruction, etc.

The principle of payment for services is different: either a fixed amount, or a certain percentage of the amount of transactions of a state-owned enterprise.

The following data are available for certain types of technical assistance contracts and their results:

1. "General Company of Wireless Telegraph" - technical assistance to the Trust of Low Current Plants; the contract was concluded on July 31, 1923 for five years. The concessionaire delivered 38,060 drawings and 3168 specifications, etc. The Trust paid the firm: 84 thousand rubles for the first year, 209 thousand for the second year and 308 thousand rubles for the third year.

2. "Neumeier" - technical assistance in the production of water turbines; the agreement was concluded on December 6, 1924 for five years. Working drawings, methods of production and operation of installations for all hydro turbine installations built by Leningradmashrest in the USSR were received. At the present time, the contract has actually terminated, as the company has stopped turbine construction.
3. Firm "May" - technical assistance in the Gomza diesel engine business; the contract was concluded on March 31, 1925. Complete sets and drawings of 10 types of diesel engines were received. Until October 1, 1926, the trust paid 327 thousand rubles for technical assistance.
4. LM Erickson - technical assistance to the Trust of Low Current Plants in the matter of automatic telephone installations; the contract was concluded on October 30, 1925 for six years. Materials and drawings were received for automatic telephone exchanges for Kharkov and Kiev, as well as projects for Moscow, Rostov, Petrozavodsk, for which the trust paid 36 thousand rubles.
5. "General Electricity Co." - technical assistance to the State Electrotechnical Trust in the production of devices and machines of technically strong current. The agreement was concluded on February 2, 1926 for five years. Drawings, lists, etc. were received. Paid by GET from April 1 to July 1, 1926 45 thousand rubles.
6. "Tegel-Borzig" - technical assistance to the [trust] Gomza in the manufacture of refrigeration machines; the agreement was concluded only on March 2, 1926, and its operation is just beginning.
7. "Faudewag" - the contract was concluded by Orgmetal on March 16, 1926 for three years for mutual technical assistance. The relationship between the parties has not developed enough yet.
8. "Deitz" - technical assistance to Mosmashrest in the construction of internal combustion engines; the agreement was concluded on March 16, 1926 for three years, and its operation has just begun.
9. "Igerusko" - technical assistance of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR in the chemical industry; the contract was concluded on August 17, 1926 for three years. Executed unsatisfactorily.

10. "Thyssen" - for the production of contract works for the excavation of mines in Donugle; the contract was concluded on June 8, 1926 and began implementation.

Of the 10 existing contracts for technical assistance, 8 contracts were concluded with German companies.

State revenues from all concession enterprises operating in the USSR during the reporting year were expressed, according to preliminary data, in the amount of 15 283 thousand rubles, of which the share of taxes and fees accounted for 5648 thousand rubles, and the share of women - 3380 thousand, per ton payments - 2,200 thousand, share deductions - 3,792 thousand and rent - 263 thousand rubles. The gross output of concession enterprises for the reporting year was 35382 thousand rubles. against 11 379 thousand rubles. in 1924/25, ie, increased more than 3 times [17].

"Year of government work. Materials for the report for 1925/26". M., 1927, pp. 194-204, 209-211, 219-222, 408-412, 416-418.

**No. 11 Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b)
"Questions of rationalization of production"**

March 24, 1927

The importance and necessity of widespread development of work to improve the technology and organization of production under the conditions of socialist construction in our country was especially emphasized by Comrade Lenin. He repeatedly pointed out that in order "to win, in order to create and consolidate socialism," the proletariat must take the path of a new organization of labor, combining the last word of science and capitalist technology with a mass association of class-conscious workers who create large-scale socialist production, for, he said, socialism is unthinkable without large-scale capitalist technology, built according to the latest word of modern science (Lenin) [18].

In accordance with this, the XIV Party Congress issued a directive on the industrialization of the country and the rationalization of production, and the XV Party Conference, concretizing this slogan, decided:

"All the efforts of the Party and the Soviet state should be primarily directed towards ensuring such an expansion of fixed capital that would lead to a gradual restructuring of the entire national economy on a higher technical basis. It is necessary to strive to overtake and then surpass the level of industrial development of the advanced capitalist countries in a relatively minimal historical period" (resolution XV of the party conference) [19].

To move forward, to develop industry, to strengthen the national economy and to maintain the link with the peasantry, an increase in labor productivity and a systematic reduction in prices for manufactured goods are necessary. But it is impossible to pursue a policy of lowering prices for manufactured goods and to develop labor productivity without introducing new technology and systematically improving the organization of labor in production. Lenin said:

"Labor productivity is, in the last analysis, the most important, the most important thing for the victory of the new social system. Capitalism has created a labor productivity unseen under serfdom. Capitalism can be finally defeated and will be finally defeated by the fact that socialism

creates a new, much higher productivity of labor "(Lenin," Great Initiative ") [20].

The VII All-Union Congress of Trade Unions was therefore absolutely right when he stressed in his resolution that "in the future, the attention of the Union and economic bodies for a long period of time should be focused on the rationalization of production processes and labor force."

In view of this, all organizations of the working class, especially Party organizations and trade unions, must devote special attention to improving the technology and organization of production, taking into account their decisive importance in the matter of socialist construction.

The socialist rationalization of production carried out by the proletarian state (improvement of technology and organization of production) is fundamentally different from capitalist rationalization. The capitalists, while carrying out rationalization, shift its entire burden onto the shoulders of the working class, as a result of which the capitalist rationalization of production leads to a lengthening of the working day, an increase in unemployment, a decrease in the living standard of the working class and the impoverishment of the broad working masses. Unlike capitalist rationalization, socialist rationalization aims at increasing the size of the working class, raising its material and cultural level, and meeting the growing needs of the broad working masses. strengthening the bond between the proletariat and the peasantry and creating the material basis for the further development of the socialist elements of our economy. The fact that over the past two years the size of the working class in large-scale industry (excluding transport, construction, etc.) has risen by 640,000, while real wages have risen by 37%, as well as the fact that the current economic year is ahead of a further increase in the size of the working class in large-scale industry by 130,000 people, with the already carried out increase in wages by an average of 10% - these facts clearly indicate that

That is why the organizing role of the working class and its trade unions is acquiring great importance in solving the problems of reorganizing and expanding the technical base of industry. Our successes in this area entirely depend on the conscious and active participation of the broad masses of workers and their "Trade Unions in improving technology and organizing production: Improving technology and organization of production should go in three main directions:

- 1) the creation of new enterprises based on the latest advances in science and technology;
- 2) radical re-equipment of existing enterprises by introducing better technical equipment and more correct organization of labor;
- 3) carrying out a number of practical measures in order to maximize the use of available equipment and reorganization of production.

Work experience (on carrying out measures for improving technology and organizing production in all these areas over the past period has revealed major shortcomings.

The main of these shortcomings should be considered the fact that the measures taken did not lead to any significant reduction in costs, lower prices for goods and improve their quality.

The main reasons for the insufficiently successful rationalization work over the past period are:

- a) the cumbersomeness and bureaucracy of the management apparatus of industry, hindering the initiative and timely implementation of measures to improve the technology and organization of production;
- b) underestimation on the part of economic, professional and party organizations of the decisive importance of improving technology and organizing production in further economic development;
- c) insufficient involvement in this work of the broad masses of workers and their trade unions;
- d) insufficient activity of the administrative and technical personnel in this work;
- e) the formation of surplus labor in a number of enterprises due to its improper use in production and shortcomings in the registration and distribution of labor, which inevitably delays the successful implementation of measures to improve the technology and organization of production, the correct setting of labor rationing, the full use of working time and maintenance labor discipline;
- f) insufficient coordination of individual rationalization measures within a given production unit;

g) insufficient use of the achievements of foreign technology and the lack of exchange of inventions and experience in rationalization work between enterprises and industries.

All these shortcomings led to the fact that the results of the use of improved technology and new methods of labor organization over the past period turned out to be completely inadequate, and sometimes simply negligible, in terms of reducing costs and improving the quality of goods.

In view of this, the direct responsibility of all economic, trade union and party organizations is a determined struggle to eliminate these shortcomings.

To successfully carry out work on the rationalization of production, it is necessary to carry out the following measures:

1. At factories and plants, work should be widely undertaken on the mechanization of production, specialization of factories, rationalization of heat and power facilities, organization of work in a continuous flow (conveyor system), mechanization and improvement of intra-plant transport. Along with this, it is necessary to accelerate the implementation of measures for a greater division of labor in enterprises, servicing workers of a larger number of mechanisms and a better organization of the entire labor process. Particular attention should be paid to mass and serial production and the development of work on the standardization of products.
2. Economic agencies, trade unions and bodies of the People's Commissariat of Labor should develop a number of practical measures to improve and improve working conditions, mechanization of heavy and harmful work so that these measures simultaneously facilitate the rise in worker productivity (safety measures, improved lighting, normal temperature, ventilation etc.).
3. In view of the fact that the knowledge and experience of technical personnel in improving technology and organization of production are of decisive importance and that enterprises already have a cadre of engineers and technicians who have linked their fate with the working class, it is necessary to create such conditions in their work that would provide an opportunity making the most of their initiative, industry experience and knowledge.

At the same time, it is necessary to take all measures to raise the qualifications and technical knowledge of both the lower technical staff, who came out of the workers (foremen, technicians, etc.), and the cadres of business administrators (directors), for which to expand the network of special courses for their retraining and accelerate the creation of an academy for the training of industrial command personnel.

For the scientific and technical service of enterprises and the use of the achievements of modern science in them, it is necessary to link the activities of scientific and technical institutes and institutions with the practical work of enterprises (through consultations, scientific and technical service of enterprises, experimental setting up of new industries), while strengthening factory laboratories, as well as creating exhibitions of the latest inventions and scientific achievements of both foreign technology and our factories and promoting the expansion of the activities of scientific and technical societies.

4. In order to make the best use of business proposals “inventions of workers and technical staff, it is necessary:

a) economic agencies and trade unions to take decisive measures to eliminate any red tape in the implementation of inventions;

b) accelerate the implementation of the resolution of the Supreme Council of the National Economy and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions on the formation of special funds for rewarding inventions and proposals and the organization of special bureaus in enterprises to consider proposals and establish prizes;

c) organize expertise and technical assistance to workers-inventors.

5. In cases where the improvement of technology and organization of production cannot be accompanied by the expansion of the given enterprise or when the available number of workers exceeds the needs of the enterprise, it is necessary to free the enterprise from surplus labor, and when the number of workers in the enterprise is reduced, in particular, the natural decrease in the labor force and the seasons of the ebb of workers for agricultural work are taken into account. Along with this, it is necessary to assign to economic agencies more responsibility for the correct use of the available labor force and for hiring a new one.

6. To oblige the economic agencies to warn the organs of the People's Commissariat of Labor about the mass labor force being released at least one month before its reduction, as well as to promptly inform about the required labor force, while strengthening the role of the People's Commissariat of Labor in order to ensure the timely placement of the labor force released in connection with other enterprises. improvement of technology and organization of production. When recruiting labor force for newly opened and expanded factories and plants, grant priority right to employment to those workers who are released or are subject to dismissal due to technical improvements.

7. In connection with the inevitable redistribution of labor in the country, associated both with the transfer of workers from one factories to others, and with the launch of new factories, to invite the People's Commissariat of Labor and the NKVD to urgently develop a law regulating the use of apartments (communal, cooperative and at enterprises), in the direction of establishing the right to free exchange of apartments, the introduction of contractual principles in the use of factory apartments for a period after which the workers must vacate the apartments they occupy, the establishment of the right to freely move from one housing cooperative to another and the complete release of factory premises from persons who do not work at this enterprise.

8. In cases where the implementation of measures to improve the technology and organization of production leads to the release of a part of the workers who cannot be used in other jobs, it is advisable to issue benefits to the dismissed workers in the amount of 1.5-3 months' earnings, depending on the region ... The plans for the development of industry provide for such an increase in production that, despite the inevitable reduction in workers in individual enterprises, due to the improvement of production technology, the total number of workers in industry as a whole and in the main industrial regions does not decrease, but increases.

9. Attaching particular importance in connection with the rationalization of production to the business of labor rationing and the establishment on the basis of firm norms for the production of piece rates, to oblige economic and professional organizations to strengthen work in this area and to strengthen in every possible way the tariff and economic departments of trade unions and departments of labor

economics in industry, At the same time, special attention is paid to the correct selection of employees of these organizations and to strengthening the work of the pricing and conflict commissions.

Particular attention should be paid to the setting of rationing at new enterprises. The most technically possible standards should, as a rule, be established before the start-up of enterprises and fixed with appropriate changes for a long period after a certain period of normal operation of enterprises and their verification.

In those enterprises where organizational and technical improvements of production have been carried out and are being carried out, it is necessary to revise the production rates and piece rates in accordance with the results of organizational and technical improvements, so that, however, this revision does not lead to the reduction of the existing before the introduction of technical and organizational improvements in the daily wages of workers, but, on the contrary, would give an opportunity with an increase in the intensity of labor further growth in wages of workers.

10. To propose to the People's Commissariat of Labor and the Supreme Council of National Economy to revise the current norms for the armor of adolescents in order to maximize their alignment with the actual needs of the industry, for which the current percentage of the reservation should be calculated only in relation to skilled workers so that new norms begin to be introduced from October 1, 1927. In the current the number of adolescents in armor actually employed in the industry should not be reduced so as not to make the actual replenishment of armor in those enterprises where it is below the current legislation. When filling out reservations for teenagers, proceed from the need to give preference to the children of workers.

11. In order to make fuller use of working time and strengthen labor discipline at enterprises, limit the number of unjustified absences to work to a maximum of three days a month.

The Central Committee considers that the implementation of these measures, taken in conjunction with the systematic implementation of a regime of economy, the fight against bureaucracy, red tape and the swelling of the staff of the economic apparatus, is the minimum condition without which it is impossible to achieve successful

rationalization of industry and improvement of technology and organization of production.

The Central Committee emphasizes on the spot that the main condition for ensuring the possibility of carrying out all these measures is the conscious attitude of the working class to questions of socialist rationalization of production and the active support of the broad masses of workers in carrying out the above measures. Therefore, the Central Committee invites all Party, professional and economic organizations to take all measures to strengthen the work of production-shop and factory conferences and to work out all the planned measures to improve the technology and organization of production at them.

". The decisions of the party and the government on economic issues", vol. 1. M., 1967, pp. 605-611.

No. 12 From "Regulations [21] on state industrial trusts" [22].

June 29, 1927

Section IV [23]

Management of manufacturing enterprises belonging to the trust

24. Direct management of individual production enterprises that are part of the trust is entrusted to directors (managers, administrators) appointed and dismissed by the board of the trust and acting on a sole basis within the powers determined by the board of the trust.

25. The relationship between the board of the trust and the director, as well as the rights of the latter to manage the enterprise, are determined in a special regulation on the management of the given enterprise, developed with the participation of the director on the basis of a standard provision and approved by the board of the trust.

The standard regulation on the management of production enterprises that are part of a trust is approved by the institution in charge of the trust.

26. The director manages all the operations of the enterprise, disposes of the property entrusted to him in accordance with the power of attorney issued to him (Article 33), fulfills the orders and directives of the board, is accountable to the latter and bears criminal, civil and disciplinary responsibility for the integrity of the property entrusted to him and for the economic conduct of the case, in accordance with applicable laws.

27. The director independently appoints and dismisses the administrative and technical personnel, including his direct assistants and the chief accountant of the enterprise, with the approval of the appointment and dismissal of the latter by the board of the trust.

28. The annual production and financial plan for each enterprise, as well as the plan and deadlines for the delivery of products, the size and procedure for supplying the enterprise by the management of the trust with monetary and material resources in accordance with the production and financial plan, the procedure and forms of settlements between the management of the trust and the enterprise for the last products, based on the system of orders-orders, are developed by the director, reviewed by the board of the trust with his participation and

approved by the board of the trust. Changes to the production and financial plan and all issues related to such a change are considered and resolved in the same manner.

29. Plans for new construction, major repairs, retrofitting and re-equipment of the enterprise are considered by the board of the trust with the participation of the director of the enterprise and, upon approval, are carried out under the control of the board of the trust.

Title lists are attached to the major overhaul plan. These title lists are drawn up by enterprises that are part of trusts subordinate to the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR and the Supreme Councils of the National Economy of the Union Republics, in accordance with the instructions of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR, and by enterprises that are part of local trusts, in accordance with the instructions the highest councils of the national economy of the union republics. Medium and minor major repairs, current repairs, installation of small machines and auxiliary equipment are carried out by the director of the enterprise independently within the estimates approved by the board of the trust without submitting title lists for these works.

30. The rationalization of production, in particular the application of inventions, since it is not associated with large costs not provided for by the production and financial plan, is carried out by the director of the plant independently with immediate notification of this to the board of the trust.

31. The savings obtained as a result of the company's activities without lowering the quality of products, expressed in the difference between the cost of production of the enterprise, established in the order-order on the basis of a preliminary calculation, and the actual cost established on the basis of the final cost estimate, in a certain part you receive the order of the director. The size of the aforementioned part of the savings for an individual enterprise is determined by the board of the trust with the participation of the director of the enterprise within the limits established by a special instruction approved by the Council of Labor and Defense on the proposal of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR. The same instruction determines for what purposes and in what order this part of the savings is spent. The use of said savings, in accordance with this article,

32. Each enterprise that is part of the trust maintains independent bookkeeping and draws up a balance sheet and calculation according to instructions and forms approved by the board of the trust.

33. All transactions related to the management of the enterprise, the director makes on behalf of the trust by virtue of a power of attorney issued to him by the board of the trust on the basis of a standard power of attorney approved by the institution in charge of the trust.

The power of attorney must, in particular, provide for the right of the director to perform the following actions on behalf of the trust within the limits established by the board of the trust:

a) open current accounts in credit institutions in the name of the trust for this enterprise;

b) issue promissory notes;

c) present purchase bills for accounting; d) receive loans for the products of the enterprise;

e) carry out operations for the supply of the enterprise and for the sale of its products, concluding contracts of sale, contract, supply, transportation, etc.;

f) conclude lease agreements; g) to alienate structures, structures and equipment that have fallen into disrepair or disrepair.

34. The director submits to the board of the trust periodic and annual reports on the activities of the enterprise in terms and in the forms that are established by the board of the trust.

35. The director has the right to appeal to the institution in charge of the trust, with the notification of the trust board of the wrong actions of the latter without, however, suspending the execution of the orders of the board.

36. No bodies and persons, other than those who have this right granted by the current laws and the charter of the trust, have the right to interfere in the administrative and economic life of an enterprise that is part of the trust, and also to demand information and reports. Legal orders and orders of the director are binding on all persons on the territory of the enterprise.

SZ, 1927, No. 39, art. 392.

[1] Dated by content

[2] The chapters are omitted: "Fuel supply plan", "Supply of industry with agricultural raw materials", "Organizational measures of the government", "Planned work of the government", "Small and handicraft industry".

[3] The following paragraphs are omitted: "General characteristics of the state of the national economy at the time of drawing up the general industrial plan", "Consolidated industrial plan for 1925/1926"

[4] The original plan called for a > 50% increase in production over the previous year. However, already in the first quarter of 1925-26, because of the rains, the marketable part of the harvest decreased, which entailed a slowdown in grain procurements and a rapid rise in bread prices. Hence, it became necessary to cut both the export and import plan. At the same time, the general level of prices increased and difficulties arose in the procurement of agricultural raw materials for industry. According to the shortened plan approved by the STO (this plan did not include: the industry of the TSFSR, the Uzbek SSR, the Turkmen SSR, the entire local industry of the Ukrainian SSR, some industries of the RSFSR), the production of marketable products was planned for 40% more than in 1924/25 ("Year of government work. Materials for the report for 1925/26". M., 1927, p. 193).

[5] The table is not published ("Year of government work. Materials for the report for 1925) 26", M., 1927, p. 195).

[6] The table is not published ("Year of government work. Materials for the report for 1925/26". M., 1927, p. 195).

[7] The general results of industrial production are given here in the assessment according to the so-called "previously adopted DSP VSNKh method." The essence of this method lies in the fact that it seeks to obtain the cost of production of a ton or another industry sector minus from the gross turnover the value of all semi-finished products that have gone into further processing in this industry, regardless of whether they are developed in industrial plants that process them into a further product. , or other industrial establishments of the industry. This method differs significantly from the method of "gross factory output", which gives the sum of the production of individual factories, factories, etc. In view of the transition to this last, more

advanced method of assessment, which has not yet been completed by the end of the reporting year, in this case it is necessary to operate with numbers identified by the old method. *Approx. doc.*

[8] The table is not published ("Year of government work. Materials for the report for 1925/26". M., 1927, p. 198).

[9] The chapter "Power supply" has been omitted.

[10] Without the Konstantinovskiy Glass Factory. - *Approx. document.*

[11] Skipped paragraphs: "Labor force growth", "Wage movement"

[12] The table is not published ("Year of government work. Materials for the report for 1925/26". M., 1927, p. 210)

[13] The paragraph "Dynamics of selling prices" is omitted.

[14] Numerical data on the results of economic activities of the existing concessions as of October 1, 1926 should be considered preliminary, since they were compiled in part according to preliminary data of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, NKTorg and NKF. partly according to the reports of the concessionaires themselves. document

[15] The value of the gold transferred to the government in the amount of 467 poods. - *Approx. document.*

[16] As of January 1, 1926 - *Approx. document.*

[17] By September 1, 1928, there were 68 foreign concessions in the USSR (as of October 1, 1927, there were 74, on the same date in 1926 - 82); including belonged to subjects of Germany-13, USA-9, Japan-7, Austria-5, Great Britain-7, France-3, Poland-6, Sweden-3, Norway -2, Denmark-2 "other countries-11. The largest concession enterprises belonged to the mining (14), manufacturing (24), timber (6) and construction (3) industries. By the beginning of 1927-28, foreign investments in the USSR industry accounted for 0.57% of all-Union investments, and the number of workers and the volume of gross output-1% ("Year of government work. Materials for the report for 1926/27". M., 1928, p. 384; the same for 1927/28, M., 1929, p. 348)

[18] See V. I. Lenin. Full collection cit., vol. 39, p. 17; vol. 43, p. 210

[19] The CPSU in resolutions and decisions of congresses, conferences and plenums: Central Committee ", Part II. M., 1954, p. 295.

[20] V. I. Lenin. Full collection cit., vol. 39, p. 21

[21]Up to the published position, the relationship between the trust and the enterprise was built on the basis of the "Regulations on trusts", approved in 1923, according to which the enterprise did not have independence both in the production and financial sphere, and in the selection of personnel. This procedure fettered the initiative and reduced the responsibility of the head of the enterprise. The first draft of the new regulation was developed on the initiative of F.E. Dzerzhinsky at the end of 1925. According to this project, the rights of the enterprise were somewhat expanded, but the financing was still under the jurisdiction of the trust, and the enterprise did not participate in the distribution of profits. At the beginning of 1926, along with the further development of new principles of industrial management, the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR determined the rights and obligations of the administrative and technical personnel of the enterprise. This was a serious step towards establishing one-man management. On November 16 of the same year, the first meeting of the Commission of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR on simplification of industrial management was held, which mainly focused on finalizing the published regulations. The new provision on trusts was slowly being implemented, which was noted in the resolution of the April (1928) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) ("The CPSU in the resolutions and decisions of congresses, conferences and plenums of the Central Committee", part II. Moscow, 1954, pp.. 500-510)

[22] Approved by the decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated June 29, 1927

[23] Sections are omitted: "General position", "Institution and organization", "Trust management", "Trading activity", "Lending", ". Special capital and profit", "Reporting of the trust and audit of its activities", "Liquidation, connection and division of trusts".

№ 13 From materials to the report of the government of the USSR for 1926/27

Not earlier than October 1, 1927 [1]

Industry [2]

Capital construction [3]

Implementation of the capital construction plan. Capital construction environment

Capital construction in 1926-27 is inextricably linked with the construction of the previous year, which largely predetermined the situation and the amount of capital works scheduled for the reporting year. It is therefore necessary to highlight in a few words the conditions in which capital construction has developed over the last two years.

The situation in construction in 1925/26 is characterized in the report submitted by the Supreme Council of the National Economy to the government as follows: insufficient organizational and technical preparedness for extensive construction; insufficient coordination of the spontaneous aspirations of localities towards industrialization with national economic demands; the general stress of the national economic resources and the difficult financial situation, which delayed the development of work; restructuring of the capital work plan on the fly and insufficient planning discipline among economic bodies; ill-considered and incorrect assessment of the needs for building materials, which caused a stir in the market; starting individual work without well-developed and approved projects.

The situation in 1926-27 can be characterized as much calmer compared to 1925-26, the slow development of construction in the first half of the year; breakdown of construction into two stages and start of the second stage only after the appropriate permission of the higher authorities; systematic financing of construction, which made it possible to establish uninterrupted work; lack of excitement in the building materials market; improvement of organizational forms of construction; and, finally, somewhat better, although still far from sufficient, preparation for construction.

All of these factors contributed to the implementation of a much larger volume of capital work. If in 1925/26, with the already revised and

reduced plan of 874 million rubles. the industry has completed work for a total of 811 million rubles. (and for the industry of all-Union significance - 555.9 million rubles against the plan of 600.9 million rubles), or about 93% of the plan, then in 1926-27 the opposite picture is observed. With the plan of capital construction for 990 million rubles. execution of capital works amounted to 1,067.8 million rubles. [4], or almost 108% of the plan.

Implementation of the plan for individual industries

The implementation of the capital work program for individual industries is illustrated by the following figures [tab. 1].

TABLE 1]

[Industries]	According to plan	According to the estimated performance data
	million rubles	
Coal	131.0	138.8
Oil	186.2	180.4
Metal	258.3	284.8
Electrotechnical	16.5	17.2
Chemical	59.2	60.3
Silicate construction	50.8	44.6
Forest	26.1	29.4
Paper	42.6	37.6
Textile (together with sewing)	135.9	137.4
Tannery	11.2	16.5
Food flavor	58.8	62.7

These figures show that all sectors, except silicate, construction, paper and oil, have exceeded construction targets (in value terms). In the silicate-building group, the plan is not fulfilled mainly in the Ukrainian SSR in the field of construction in the refractory and brick industries. In the paper industry, there is a non-fulfillment of the program for the RSFSR (Syaskoe construction, Lenbumentrest).

It is necessary, however, to point out that the performance of work in terms of value does not quite coincide with the performance of it in terms of physical volume, and in some industries there are already certain indications that some work in terms of its volume has not been completed in full. But, on the other hand, there is a number of minor works that are not included in the plan. In general, however, it must be admitted that the situation in 1926-27 was quite favorable to capital construction and industry to a large extent made use of this situation.

If we compare the results of capital construction for the last two years by industry, we get the following picture [tab. 2].

TABLE 2]

[Industries]	1925/26 g.		1926/27 g.	
	million rubles	%	million rubles	%
Coal	77.08	9.51	138.83	12.97
Oil (including Oil Syndicate)	150.20	18.50	180.41	16.95
Mining	14.67	1.81	14.64	1.37
Metal	188.91	23.29	284.86	26.75
Electrotechnical	13.07	1.61	17.24	1.62
Chemical	48.21	5.95	60.31	6.65
Silicate	33.08	4.08	42.90	4.03
Forest	17.24	2.13	29.46	2.76

Paper	23.92	2.95	37.59	3.53
Textile (including VTS and MCC)	147.15	18.15	170.90	16.0
Sewing	-	-	2.55	0.24
Tannery	21.68	2.67	16.46	1.55
Food flavor	67.60	8.35	64.66	5.90
Polygraphic	2.77	0.34	2.71	0.25
Syndicates (except for Oil Syndicate, MTC and MCC)	5.10	0.63	2.50	0.23
Various	0.21	0.03	0.04	0.04
Total	810.99	100	1067.8 [5]	10027

If we go to the grouping of capital work on the so-called groups "A" and "B", then the following figures characterize the policy of the direction of capital construction [tab. 3].

[Production group]	1924/25 g.	1925/26 G.	1926/27 g.
	%		
"AND"	73	63.9	71.1
"B"	27	36.1	28.9

The nature and degree of completion of capital work Along with the distribution of construction work by industry, it is also necessary to highlight the question of which direction the construction of the reporting year was going in terms of the distribution by type of work (repair, expansion and re-equipment, new industrial construction and housing construction).

In the given table. [4] this distribution of works in its dynamics is given. Tab. [4] points to a drop in the total amount of construction of the role of two items: capital repairs and housing construction, and the absolute amount of housing construction remains almost stable, and capital repairs are decreasing not only in their specific weight, but also

in their absolute value. The share of work on the expansion and re-equipment of existing enterprises in general remains the same, and the share of costs for new industrial construction is growing strongly [tab. 4].

TABLE [4]

[Type of work]	1925/26 g.		1926/27 g.	
	million rubles	%	million rubles	%
Overhaul	157.01	19.4	141.87	13.32
Expansion and refurbishment	446.94	55.2	598.87	56,00
New construction	100.30	12.3	219.23	20.57
Housing construction	106.74	13.1	107.82	10.11
Total	810.99	100	1067.79	100

The reduction in the amount of capital repairs is a natural factor, since in previous years, in addition to repairs in the narrow sense of the word, funds had to be spent on the restoration of property.

With regard to housing construction, given in table. [4] Figures showing the direct costs of construction by industry itself do not coincide with the size of construction, which is spent on other funds allocated by industry through housing cooperatives. In 1926-27, industry spent about 20.7 million rubles along this line.

The degree of completion of the capital work carried out in the reporting year can be judged from the data of the industrial financial plan of individual industries by October 1, 1927. According to these data, by the indicated date, work was completed and put into operation for the amount of about 864.3 million rubles. Compared to previous years, we have in this respect the following dynamics [tab. five].

These figures show a significant convergence of the cost of completed work with the total amount of work in the corresponding year.

[TABLE 5]

[Year]	The total amount of capital works, million rubles	Completed and put into operation (including overhaul)
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		million rubles	% to the total amount of work
1925/26	811.0	597.7	73.6
1926/27	1067.8	864.3	80.8

At the accepted rate of completion and commissioning of capital works, the following movement of unfinished capital works remaining on the balance sheet at the end of each year will turn out [tab. 6].

[TABLE 6]

[Enterprises]	1 / X 1925	1 / X 1926	1 / X 1927
All-Union significance	-	326.2	476.4
RSFSR	-	56.9	93.1
Ukrainian SSR	-	14.6	15.9
BSSR	-	2.4	5.0
TSFSR	-	6.0	14.7
Uzbek SSR	-	1.3	3.2
Turkmen SSR	-	1.0	3.5
Total for the USSR	232.6	408.4	611.8

Electricity construction and power supply [6]

Actual results of electrical construction in 1926/27

The following factual data give an idea of the fulfillment of government directives in the field of power construction: in 1926-27, three new regional power plants were completed and put into operation: Volkhovskaya, Shterovskaya and Zemo-Avchalskaya with a total capacity of 91 thousand kW, and was also expanded capacity of the Shaturskaya station and the 1st Leningradskaya HPP by 46 thousand kW. In addition, in the reporting year, expansion was carried out, while unfinished, at 10 stations for a total capacity of 538 thousand kW, of which 142 thousand kW at four pre-revolutionary stations (1st and 2nd Moscow HPP, 2nd Leningradskaya and Baku) and 396 thousand kW at six newly built: Shaturskaya, Kashirskaya, "Red October", Nizhegorodskaya, Shterovskaya and Kizelovskaya.

The construction of four new power plants, begun in 1925/26, continued: Shakhtinskaya, Kharkovskaya, Kievskaya and Saratovskaya with a total capacity of 121 thousand kW; In addition, the construction of the Grozny station of 11 thousand kW continued, which is financed by Grozneft (in addition to the electrification plant).

Construction of 11 new stations with a total capacity of 414,500 kW has begun, including the powerful Dneprovskaya hydroelectric power station of 105 thousand kW (the first cell of the total capacity of 430 thousand kW); Svirskaya No. 3 for 80 thousand kW; the rest of the stations under construction have a capacity: Ivanovo-Voznesenskaya and Chelyabinskaya - 44 thousand kW each, Bryansk, Novorossiskaya and Osinovskaya - 22 thousand each, Rionskaya and Dzoragetskaya - 21 thousand each, Gizel-Donskaya - 22 thousand and Krasnodar - 11 thousand. kW.

Summing up the given figures of the regional electrical construction, we get that in 1926-27 the capacity of 1222 thousand kW at 29 stations was in operation and under construction.

In addition to district construction, in 1926-27 the construction of several large local power plants of republican significance took place. Of these stations, two peat stations came into operation (Yaroslavskaya with 5 thousand kW and Sverdlovsk with 6 thousand kW) and the construction of two hydropower stations continued; Batumi (Adjaris-Tskhali) 5 thous. kW and Kondopozhskaya for 5.5 thousand kW of the first stage.

Shterovskaya station in Donbass was commissioned at the beginning of October 1926 with one turbine generator of 10 thousand kW, the second unit of the same capacity was put into operation later. The station operates on anthracite litter, which is a waste product and is available on site in huge quantities.

During the reporting year, Shterovka produced 20 million kW of energy. At present, it is expanding by 66 thousand kW.

The Zemo-Avchal state regional hydroelectric station, located on the Kura River, 12 km from Tiflis, went into operation in April 1927. Four units with a total capacity of 15 thousand kW were installed on it. The hydraulic structures are designed for double power. In addition to

Tiflis and its industry, the station will serve as a reserve for the electrified Suram pass railway in the near future.

During the reporting year, the station supplied 3 million kWh [7].

Labor and wages [8]

Labor productivity growth

The production of gross output at pre-war prices per one payroll increased in 1926-27 against the previous year, according to the reporting data of the DSP of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, by 13.3% (in 1925-26 the increase in output was 11.4%). The growth rate of output per one payroll worker per month (12.6%) outlined by the industrial financial plan was thus actually achieved on average throughout the industry. This growth in monthly output per payroll worker was due to a number of reasons, among which the most important were: a more normal working environment in industry in 1926-27 compared with the previous year, increased capital investment, specialization and standardization of production, organizational and technical improvements. (introduction of a continuous flow, division of labor, etc.), an increase in the number of mechanisms serviced by one worker (weaving and spinning, etc.). But at the same time, in the reporting year, there were some factors that lower the level of labor productivity. These factors include: interruptions in the supply of raw materials that caused interruptions in work (in the linen industry); worn-out equipment accidents; lack of qualified labor (in metallurgy, for example); errors in resolving the issue of reducing the labor force, etc.

For certain industries, the growth in output per one payroll worker in rubles at pre-war prices, according to the DSP, was [tab. 7].

TABLE [7]

[Industries]	1926/27 g. growth of production according to the industrial financial plan	% by 1925/26 actual growth in worker output
Coal	110.7	107.1
Oil	112.0	126.8
Metal	115.4	117.9

Textile	111.6	111.8
Chemical	127.6	117.9

Cost of production [9]

Actual results of the cost reduction campaign

As mentioned above, when setting out the question of the implementation of the consolidated industrial plan, the directives of the government q to reduce the cost of industrial production in the reporting year by at least 5% compared to the previous year were not generally fulfilled. According to preliminary data, the actual cost reduction in the entire industry was determined by only about 2%, and in the Union industry the cost as a percentage of the cost of 1925/26 was 98.6, in the RSFSR - 101.35, in the Ukrainian SSR - 95.8, in the BSSR - 103.7, in the Turkmen SSR - 91.04, in the Uzbek SSR - 97.5, in Azerbaijan - 105.9, in Georgia - 99 and in Armenia - 104.8%.

For individual industries, the change in the cost in the reporting year as a percentage> to the cost of 1925/26, according to preliminary (tentative) data, gives the following picture:

Coal industry	103.6	RSFSR	97.0
Including Donugol	102.1	Fine cloth (allied)	98.7
Oil	99.5	Worsted (Allied)	89.2
Including Azneft	98.4	Hemp-jute (RSFSR)	94.5
Rudnaya (YURT)	106.0	Basic chemical (allied)	110.3
Salt:		Rubber (union)	86.0
RSFSR	98.9	Aniline colorful (allied)	90.6
Ukrainian SSR	86.8	Paintwork (RSFSR)	93.3
Ferrous metallurgy	100.0	Coke-benzene (union)	95.0
Including:		Chemical-pharmaceutical (union)	97.0
Yugostal	98.0	Matchbox (union)	99.5

Uralmet	101.7	Glass (semi-white glass, RSFSR)	104.3
General engineering: the USSR	95.6	Paper (union) Forest (allied)	101.9 108.0
Ukrainian SSR	93.4	RSFSR	109.3
Non-ferrous metallurgy (allied)	99.0	BSSR	110.1
Agricultural engineering	92.3	Cement (Union)	104.2
Electrical industry (allied)	93.2	Refractory (RSFSR)	107.0
Cotton (union)	95.6	Sugar (union)	115.9
RSFSR	95.3	Makhorochnaya (allied)	92.8
Turkmen SSR	94.7	Oil mill (Ukrainian SSR)	95.0
Linen	98.4	Leather and footwear:	
Coarse-haired (allied)	104.7	RSFSR	96.4
		Ukrainian SSR	93; 9
		BSSR	95.5

Local and handicraft industry [10]

Local government industry development activities [11]

The issue of the development of local state industry attracted the attention of the government at the beginning of the reporting year, and by the decision of the STO of October 5, 1926, the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR was asked to submit a report on the state of the local state industry and measures for its development. The report presented to the Supreme Council of the National Economy contains factual data on the state of the local state industry.

The value of the local state industry.

The share of the gross output of the local state industry in the output of the entire state industry shows an upward trend: from 25.2% in 1924/25, its share increased in 1925/26 to 30.2% "in 1926/27, to 30.3% - At the same time, in the field of production of means of production, the value of the local state industry in 1926-27 compared with the previous year slightly decreased (19.5% in 1924/25, 26.7% in 1925/26. , 26.2% in 1926/27); in the field of production of consumer goods, there is a continuous growth: 28.7, 33.2 and 34.2% -In absolute figures, the production of the state local industry in 1926-27 was 2.3 billion chervonny rubles.

In individual branches of industry, the most rapid development rates are observed: forestry and woodworking industries (244.8% in relation to 1924/25), chemical (177.3%) and metal (166%). Lagging behind the average rate of development: the printing industry (103%) and the leather industry (127%), which is explained in relation to the latter by an insufficient supply of leather raw materials.

In connection with such dynamics of production, the Supreme Council of the National Economy considered that forcing the production of means of production could not be set as a special task for the further growth of local industry, which should be aimed primarily at the production of consumer goods and building materials, the extraction of local types of fuel, as well as the production of industrial goods. consumption from local raw materials.

Geographic location of local industry.

The geographical location of the local industry is given in Table. [8] (according to data for 1924/25, % of the total for the USSR).

[TABLE 8]

[Production group]	RSFSR	Ukrainian SSR	BSSR	TSFSR	Turkmen SSR	Uzbek SSR
"A" (production of means of production)	82.8	10.2	4,3	1.7	0.3	0.7
"B" (production of items)	76.7	3.5	2.2	5.3	1.6	10.7
Total	78.5	5.5	2.7	4.2	1.3	7.8

The concentration of a significant part of local industry in the central regions of the USSR (for example, the Central Industrial Region covers about 50% of all local industry) and its extremely weak development in the outskirts indicate the need for further new construction of local industry in agricultural areas and in the outskirts of the region, where there is more both raw materials and other economic prerequisites.

Fixed capital and working capital of local industry

The fixed capital of the local industry is technically much more worn out than the fixed capital of the centralized industry, and at the same time it is loaded to a higher degree. According to the consolidated industrial financial plan of the local industry of the RSFSR for 1925/26, the use of available resources of fixed capital is determined at 85-87% of its technical power, and the load of the used part reaches an average of 90%.

Since the state of the state budget does not allow building the deployment of local industry on the basis of subsidies from the state budget, the main source that ensures the expanded reproduction of local industry is its internal accumulation. In this regard, the Supreme Council of the National Economy considered it necessary to carry out a number of measures to promote the growth of the internal accumulation of local industry. These measures concern, first, changes in the system of distribution of profits of local industry in the sense of increasing contributions to the local pre-fund; secondly, the strengthening of local industrial funds at the expense of other sources stipulated by law and, finally, lending to industrial funds at the expense of depreciation funds and reserve capital of individual enterprises of local industry.

As for the working capital of the local industry, it should be noted that there has been some distraction observed in recent years, expressed in a decrease in the share of working capital in stocks of raw materials, materials, fuel, etc. At the same time, there is an increase in cash and current accounts. The attraction of foreign funds by the local industry into its turnover occurs more intensively than in the all-Union and republican industry, namely, in the total working capital, foreign funds are: for the all-Union industry - 31%, for the republican industry - 29 and for the local - 39%. For example, in the first half of 1925-26, bank

lending to the local industry of the RSFSR was fulfilled by 92.4% of the annual plan. Nevertheless, in the second half of 1925/26 g.

In this regard, the Supreme Council of the National Economy in its report emphasized the inexpediency of early withdrawal of funds from the local industry at the expense of future appropriations and profits and considered it necessary to pay the most serious attention to the systematic servicing of local industry with a bank loan. " operations of the latter.

"Year of government work. Materials for the report for 1926/27 ". M., 1928 pp. 167-171, 176-178, 183-184, 187-188, 197-200.

[1] Dated by content

[2] The chapters are omitted: "General industrial plan and its implementation", "General results of industrial production", "Fuel supply in 1926/27", "Supply of industry with agricultural raw materials".

[3] The paragraph "Financing of capital construction" has been omitted.

[4] This figure cannot be considered final. It is based on the materials of the consolidated plan for 1927/28, taking into account the fact that some further increase in these data is revealed from the received accounting reports, it should be assumed that the amount of capital construction in the reporting year will probably be about 1,090 million rubles . *document*.

[5] The sum of the numbers does not add up to the given total.

[6] The following paragraphs have been omitted: "Five-year plan for electrification", "Organization of works of Dneprostroy", "Power supply"

[7] The capacity of power plants in the USSR at the end of 1926 was 1,452 thousand kW. In total, power plants generated 3248 million kWh for 1925/26, including 1435 million kWh of power plants for general use ("Year of government work. Materials for the report for 1925/26."., 1927, p. 203).

[8] The following paragraphs have been omitted: "Labor force growth", "Wage growth", "Additional labor costs".

[9] The paragraph "Government actions" is omitted.

[10] The chapter "Measures for the development of handicraft industry and industrial cooperation" has been omitted.

[11] The paragraph "Resolution of SNK and STO" is omitted.

№ 14 From the report of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR in the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on the cost of industrial production for 1926/27 and the first half of 1927/28 [1]

June 20, 1928

I. General characteristics of the dynamics of production costs in 1926-27

The semi-annual report to the Council of Labor and Defense on the dynamics of the prime cost in 1926-27 provided data indicating that the prime cost for the half-year 1926-27 increased by an average of 1.1%. At the same time, it was indicated that the outlined signs of improvement give reason to count on a break in the second half of the year, and the size of a possible decrease in a year [by] 1-2% was roughly predicted. Later, on the basis of preliminary annual data, this conclusion was also confirmed in the industrial financial plan for 1927/28. At the moment, the completed reporting campaign makes it possible to more accurately establish the results of the actual cost reduction. It equals:

	%
Union industry	- 1.85
Industry of the RSFSR (republican and local)	- 1.0
[By industry] Ukrainian SSR (republican)	- 6.12
[By industry] BSSR [2] (republican).	+ 0.9
[By industry] Azerbaijan SSR (republican)	- 5.7
Total on average	- 1.8

Thus, the assumptions of the Supreme Economic Council were generally justified.

It is necessary for the analysis of the dynamics of the cost price for 1926/27 to be preceded by several preliminary methodological remarks.

Deriving the average coefficient of the cost price dynamics, the VSNKh tried to give it the highest possible accuracy in this work. For this, it was required to involve in the development of material, covering, if

possible, the entire range of industrial enterprises and the entire range of manufactured products. The most consistent with this goal was the method of evaluating all the products of 1926/27 of each of the trusts (in a comparable assortment, of course) at the cost of 1926/27 and 1925/26. Comparison of the data obtained gives the most accurate idea of the shifts in production costs that have occurred in the industry. During the summary, adjustments were made that were made when the reports of the respective trusts were passed to the Supreme Economic Council.

In some industries, where depreciation plays a significant role, in order to identify the correct dynamics of the cost price, it was necessary in 1925/26 to include the so-called additional depreciation, that is, the difference in depreciation due to the revaluation of fixed capital and attributed in 1925/26 not to the cost price, and on the account of profit and loss. However, in secondary industries, especially where depreciation does not play a significant role, due to the complexity of recalculations, this adjustment had to be abandoned.

When analyzing the factors of cost price change, we proceeded from the premise that the coefficient of the dynamics of production costs itself is not yet an unconditional indicator of the success of the industry, since it reflects the influence of not only internal production and technical results, but also external factors independent of industry. ... This moment especially had to be reckoned with in 1926-27, for it was a year of significant market fluctuations in the field of prices for means of production and significant shifts in the field of wages, tax policy, railroad tariffs, large assortment breakdowns, etc. the actual qualitative results of the work of industry can only be given by the cost of production, recalculated on the condition of invariability of factors independent of industry. Unfortunately, the extremely great complexity of such work, not only in relation to the entire industry, but even to individual factories and plants, made it necessary to resort to this method not in the plane of a continuous study, but in the order of separate illustrative calculations only for individual industries.

II. Overall results of changes in production costs by industry

After these preliminary remarks, let us turn to the consideration of the results of the cost price change in individual industries. For the industry of the Union value, the situation is as follows [tab. 1].

[TABLE I]

Change in the cost of industrial production in 1926/27 (in% to 1925/26)

[Industries]	Per year	For six months 1926/27 (according to the report in the service station)
Coal	+2.03	+2.6
Oil	-8.4	-
Iron ore	+6.1	+ 10.7
Metal industry	-1.9	-
Including ferrous metallurgy	+1.0	+1.44
Yugostal	-4.0	+0.72
Uralmet	+3.40	+3.14
non-ferrous metallurgy	+0.78	-
general engineering	-4.82	-
Electrical industry	-6.5	-8.0
Textile		-
Including		
cotton	-4.6	-2.8
linen	-1.0	-
rude		+0.1
fine cloth	-9.1	-7.5
worsted	-12.0	-
Main chemical industry	+4.6	-
rubber	-9.4	-7.6
pharmaceutical	-5.1	-3.0
Aniline-colorful	-8.9	-9.0

Forest	-2.9	-
Paper	+4.1	+8.7
Sugar	+ 15.4	-

A turning point towards improvement in the second half of the year is observed in the industry of coal, oil, iron ore, Yugostal, in cotton, linen, rubber, chemical-pharmaceutical, paper.

As can be seen from [data] table. [13], the average percentage of change in the cost for the entire industry masks very intense shifts in individual industries, both downward and upward. Indeed, a large reduction in prices is observed in the oil, electrical, rubber, aniline-paint, fine-cloth industries. Comparatively satisfactory results were obtained in general mechanical engineering, cotton industry and southern metallurgy. But in ore, coal, paper and sugar, we are faced with a significant rise in the cost of production.

TABLE 2]

Industries [industry]	Subordination	% reduction
Coal	RSFSR	+5.7
	Ukrainian SSR	+18.4
Salt	RSFSR	- 0.9
	Ukrainian SSR	- 16.0
	Azerbaijan SSR	- 11.0
Metal	RSFSR	- 4.0
	Ukrainian SSR	- 6.9
Including agricultural		
mechanical engineering	RSFSR	- 8.6 (-7.8) [3]
	Ukrainian SSR	- 7.0 (-6.9)
	BSSR	- (-3.1)
Cotton	RSFSR	- 2.0 (-4.0)
	Azerbaijan SSR	- 3.5

Linen	RSFSR	- 2.1
	BSSR	+1.0
Woolen	RSFSR	- 6.3
	Ukrainian SSR	- 2.1
	Azerbaijan SSR	- 39.0
Hemp	RSFSR	- 7.3
	Ukrainian SSR	- 11.3
Knitted	RSFSR	- 12.0
	BSSR	-5.6
Sewing	RSFSR	- 11.4
	BSSR	- 9.0
Leather and shoe	RSFSR	- 3.9
	Ukrainian SSR	- 7.4
	BSSR	- 4.8
Basic chemical	RSFSR	- 0.4
	Ukrainian SSR	- 9.4 (-7.8)
Paintwork	RSFSR	- 6.0
Matchbox	RSFSR	+2.4
	BSSR	+3.1
Fatty	RSFSR	+11.6
Bone-processing	RSFSR	+1.0
Wood chemical	RSFSR	+10.4
Tobacco	RSFSR	- 1.7
	Ukrainian SSR	+0.9
Makhorochhnaya	RSFSR	+0.3 (+0.8) 37
	Ukrainian SSR	- 17.0 (-14.6)
	BSSR	- 7.1 (-5.5)

Oil mill	RSFSR	+3.1
	Ukrainian SSR	-4.0 (-6.3)
	BSSR	- (-6.8)
Starch syrup	RSFSR	- 16.4
Distillery	RSFSR	+2.7
	Ukrainian SSR	- 5.0
	BSSR	- 5.0
Woodworking and forestry	RSFSR	+10.6
Paper	RSFSR	+3.6
	Ukrainian SSR	- 6.0
	BSSR	+ 11.9
Cement	RSFSR	+ 2.3
	Ukrainian SSR	- 2.2
Cement	Azerbaijan SSR	+18.9
Glass	RSFSR	+5.6 (+4.6) 37
	Ukrainian SSR	+9.07 (+3.6)
	BSSR	+9.0 (+15.3)
Porcelain-faience	RSFSR	+5.4 (+4.6)
	Ukrainian SSR	- 5.3 (-6.9)
Brick	RSFSR	- 2.9
	BSSR	+4.6

No fewer sharp fluctuations in the dynamics of the level of prime cost occur in the republican industry. Here, first of all, attention is drawn to the difference in the coefficient for individual republics: the RSFSR gave a decrease only by 1%, Belarus - even a rise in price by 0.8%, but Ukraine reduced the cost by 6.12% and the Azerbaijan SSR - by 5.7%. Unfortunately, with the exception of the RSFSR, the allied Supreme Council of the National Economy was unable to verify the correctness of the results in all sectors. The available fragmentary data

force us to assume insufficient methodological accuracy both in deriving indicators for individual industries and for the republican industry as a whole. In any case, for the most important industries of republican and local significance, the available materials paint the following picture [tab. 2].

Table [2] draws attention, first of all, to the relative stability of the tendency of cost price change in individual industries. Thus, a continuous rise in prices in all republics is observed in the coal, match, glass, and partly paper industries. A continuous reduction in price is taking place throughout the republican metal industry, agricultural machinery, cotton, hemp, sewing, knitwear, leather, and basic chemical. This generality of results indicates that these changes are based on common reasons, especially since these trends coincide with those revealed in the Union industry.

III. The main factors in the change in production costs in 1926/27

The complex process of the cost price dynamics is usually not localized within one year, being closely intertwined with the factors of the previous year and causing a change in the cost price of the next year. In particular, shifts in the level of production costs in 1926-27 are largely determined by the conditions prevailing in 1925-26. That is why it is necessary to recall the main trends in the cost price of 1925-26. As you know, in 1925-26 Numerous difficulties emerged, partly connected with the peculiarities of the development of industry, and partly with difficulties of the general economic nature.

The most important role among these factors, which had an unfavorable effect on the cost of 1925-26, was played by the lag in the growth of labor productivity from the growth of wages, the sharp rise in prices for raw materials of agricultural origin, carried out in order to stimulate the production of agricultural raw materials; also affected by the rise in prices for industrial products, as well as unfavorable conditions on the world market for some types of raw materials (rubber, dyes).

The increase in public-law rates also had a negative impact on costs. Thus, excise rates were raised on many goods, and] the tax on mineral resources in the mining industry and share deductions in the

oil industry were increased. From July 1, 1925/26, an increase in railway and water tariffs was carried out.

To overcome the impact of these unfavorable conditions, the industry needed to make very significant improvements in the production process. However, the results achieved were not so significant, partly due to organizational and economic defects, and partly under the influence of technical issues (deterioration of equipment, the introduction of the worst units, etc.). This moment was also reflected in the exorbitantly increased expenses for current repairs (although the trusts' policy - carrying out capital works under the guise of current repairs) - was also partly affected here. As a result, in 1925/26, a fairly significant increase in production costs was observed in many industries: it reached 22.6% in the iron ore industry, 9.8% in the cement industry, 4.7% in the glass industry, 6.6% in ferrous metallurgy, and 4% in agricultural engineering., five, basic chemical - 5.0, rubber - 21.5, match - 1.9, sawmill (RSFSR) - 38.8, tobacco - 4.0, oil mill - 19.5%. Cost reduction was observed only in coal (3%), electrical (6.5%), textile (1.8%), sugar (25.6%).

Many of the factors noted continue to operate in 1926-27, especially in the first half of the year. The prime cost of this period is under pressure from stocks of materials of expensive blanks of the previous year; the increase in railway tariffs and excise taxes was in effect throughout the entire 1926-27, while in 1925-26 their effect was limited to a six-month period, and railway tariffs were further increased from November 1, 1926, surplus labor was partially absorbed by the expansion of production in 1926 / 27 y., Etc.

Overcoming the inertia of 1925-26 was the most important task of 1926-27. In the first half of the year, this task was not achieved, and the cost of industrial production, as noted in the report of the Supreme Council of the National Economy in the STO, increased by 1.1%. But in the second half of the year, a turning point was reached, and therefore, on an average annual basis, the prime cost decreased by [by] 1.8%.

Among the most important factors that determined the level of the cost of 1926-27, the following should be noted:

a) condition of equipment and load of enterprises;

- b) the impact of value shifts on raw materials, materials and fuels, as well as the use of improvements in the production of material elements;
- c) the ratio of wages and labor productivity;
- d) the results of campaigns "for the economy mode" aimed primarily at reducing plant-wide, management and sales costs; e) the impact of the commissioning of new and overhauled equipment, etc.

The ratio of these factors in different industries was not the same.

Anticipating some further analysis, we can note that the basis for the sharp fluctuations in the cost in the direction of rising and falling prices in individual industries were the special specific operating conditions of each industry. These industries can be classified as follows:

- 1) industries that have given rise in prices mainly under the influence of rising prices for raw materials and materials (timber, paper, glass, coarse wool, wood chemical, Ural metallurgy, etc.);
- 2) industries that have given a decrease in production costs mainly under the influence of a decrease in prices for raw materials and materials (rubber, cotton, linen, tobacco, paint and varnish);
- 3) industries that have reduced costs mainly due to the rationalization and streamlining of production (electrical, aniline-colored, oil, general and agricultural engineering, southern metallurgy) and, finally,
- 4) industries with insignificant intra-production achievements that did not paralyze the influence of rising prices (coal).

Equipment utilization and plant loads.

First of all, it is necessary to dwell on the general conditions of production work in industry in 1926-27, associated both with the condition of the equipment and with the supply of basic raw materials and materials. This question is important when highlighting the reasons for the dynamics of the cost, because it directly determines the level of workload of enterprises, the efficiency of equipment, and in general determines the entire tone of the enterprise.

In a brief review, of course, on this issue we have to confine ourselves to only the most cursory remarks. First of all, it is necessary to mention a number of industries that operated in 1926-27 with a reduced load due to a lack of raw materials. These include the sugar, butter, and flax

industries. The sugar industry, due to the poor harvest of beets in 1926, produced 16.7% less sugar than in 1925/26. With a significantly increased number of operating factories (by 23), the load of factories decreased from 574 thousand centners to 372.5 per plant, and the duration of the work of the factories decreased by 35.4% (from 94 days in 1925/26 to 60.7 days in 1926/27). This moment was the most important in the rise in the cost of granulated sugar in 1926-27, causing a sharp increase in overhead costs. Already in 1927-28, as we will see below, a good harvest corrected this situation,

With significant interruptions in the supply of raw materials, the linen industry operated, forced to stop the enterprises for 1.5 months. Hence the increase in production and overhead costs, mitigated only by the results achieved by better use of raw materials and some reduction in prices for them. In linen yarn, the share of wages increased by 8.6%, social insurance expenses - by 4.1%, and shop floor expenses - by 10.4%.

The oil industry found itself in a similar situation, which processed 35% less seeds in 1926/27 than in 1925/26. The increase in costs equaled (sunflower oil) fuel 80% [4], overhead costs - 28%.

In very many industries, equipment could not be used intensively enough due to its enormous deterioration, the presence of bottlenecks in production and especially often due to a lack of energy.

The lack of energy all the time slowed down production in the coal, ore, asbestos, metallurgical and other industries. For example, in the coal industry it is estimated that only as a result of interruptions in the operation of the Shter power station, there were downtime, which caused the loss of 304 thousand tons of machine mining; in the asbestos industry, the lack of energy did not allow the use of mechanized equipment; sorting work was carried out by hand, which made production extremely expensive. In ferrous metallurgy (Yugo-steel), along with the tension of the blowing and power plants, the lack of reserves, a number of accidents due to equipment deterioration, etc., had an acute impact on production. Downtime for this reason affected all shops, reaching up to 20% and more in rolling mills. Yugostal's report estimates the total metal loss at 53,727 tonnes due to accidents. The bottleneck that abnormally responded during the work of the plants was the lack of coke and open-hearth steel. However, compared to the previous year, some improvements are noted mainly

under the influence of capital expenditures. This improvement is reflected in the improvement of the equipment utilization ratio for Yugostal blast furnaces - by 4.3%, open-hearth furnaces - by 4.6, coke plants - by 3.2, rolling mills - by 10, power plants - by 2.9% (see table.[5]), as well as a slight decrease in the percentage of downtime (except for rental, where downtime has increased).

Also, in the forest industry, the main equipment of sawmills and plywood mills is sufficiently worn out. Insufficient financing of the woodworking industry in the previous years did not allow renewing the steam power facilities, frames, peeling flocks, and size presses in the required sizes. The lack of energy for the operation of the machines affects their incomplete use, as a result of which, for example, the frames do not give the required speed, it is impossible to install auxiliary machines and mechanize the processing processes. The actual size of the load, although it increased against 1925/26 by 2.5-8% (for different trusts) and amounts to 85-97% of the technical capacity, is still insufficient due to the lack of raw materials, due to the incomplete number of frame revolutions , peeling machines; low utilization of working time (factories are not able to work normally 260 days a year, but only 240, since they are not fully provided with raw materials). In addition, it is still impossible to note any results from experiments on the mechanization of firewood and logging and removal of firewood, which were produced in absolutely negligible amounts.

However, in spite of the indicated state of the equipment, with the exception of certain industries (the indicated sugar, oil mill, and linen), both the load and the coefficient of equipment utilization have increased. Data on Yugostal has already been provided. In the cotton industry, output per 1,000 spindles increased by 2.1% per machine (in kg by 2.9%), and downtime decreased by 0.8-1.2% (in spinning - from 5.4 to 4 , 6%, in weaving - from 4.4 to 3.2%); in linen, the productivity of equipment increased from 0.6 to 1% with a decrease in downtime from 6.01 to 5.25% for spinning and from 11.55 to 9.42% for weaving. In the oil industry (for Azneft), the average production per well-hour of operation increased by 4.9%, in the paper industry, production per machine-day increased by 4.5%, and downtime decreased by 10.3% (from 8.8 to 7 , 9%, etc. (see table.[6]). All this indicates a certain improvement in the operation of equipment, although it still cannot be considered sufficient, and the possibilities for further improvements

both in the field of intensification of the equipment operation and in terms of downtime are still quite large, especially in relation to individual factories and plants.

This factor is of general importance for the cost price because it affects its change at once for a number of elements, and it is extremely difficult to separate this influence from a number of other factors.

TSGANKH USSR, file 3429. on. 117, d. 157, ll. 4-15. Rogat, specimen no. No. 15-22

[1] The following sections have been omitted: "The efficiency of capital investments", "The dynamics of the most important elements of the cost", "The cost of the most important industries", "The cost of industrial products in the first half of 1927128".

[2] Without Lesbel, iron foundry "Proletary" and "Belgostoy".
- *Approx. document.*

[3] In parentheses are given the data of changes in the cost as calculated by the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR. *document.*

[4] So in the document

[5] The table is not published (TsGANKh USSR, f. 3429, on. 117, file 157, sheet 158).

[6] The table is not published (TsGANKh USSR, f. 3429, on. 117, d. 157, pp. 156-157).

From the reviews of the Supreme Council of the National Economy in the Council of Labor and Defense on the capital construction of the union industry for 1925 / 26-1927/28. [1]

August 3, 1928 [2]

No. 15 Capital construction in the coal industry

Donugol

His main task - to ensure the supply of the country with mineral fuel - Donugol carried out:

- 1) the restoration of mines that passed to him from pre-revolutionary times;
- 2) construction of new large mines, equipped according to the latest achievements of world technology;
- 3) the construction of small and medium-sized mines, the purpose of which was to fill the lack of fuel until the time when the large mines came into operation, and
- 4) Donugol sought to meet the special needs of metallurgy in coke not only by restoring old coke ovens, but also by building new, large units that also correspond to the latest technological advances;
- 5) finally, housing construction was carried out on a large scale to restore and develop the basin.

Over the past three years (including the current year 1927/28 and considering that the execution of work this year will correspond to the plan) Donugol has carried out capital work in the indicated directions for an impressive amount of 291.3 million rubles, and of this amount for housing construction alone, both in old mines and in newly passed large, medium and small mines, is about 70 million rubles. Over the years, these costs are distributed as follows [table. 1].

[TABLE I]

[Year]	New large mine construction	Construction of new large and small mines	Coke construction	Old Donbass (mines, power construction, aboveground)	Total
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				structures, etc.)	
1925/26	6463.0	10334.8	1537.2	50393.7	68734.7
1926/27	14281.0	15047.6	13074.6	78746.2	121149.4
1927/28	25941.8	7800.0	9472.9	58285.3	101500.0
Total	46691.8	33182.4	24084.7	187425.2	291284,1 [3]
including					
housing construction	9391.0	6773.5	583.8	53340.7	70089.0
the amount of capital works without housing construction	37300.8	26408.9	23500.9	134084.5	221195.1

Of the total amount of capital works performed (excluding housing construction), 221.1 million rubles. 152.6 "million were put into operation, including 105.4 million for the old Donbass, not counting the new coke ovens, the operation of which during the current year will be reduced to the minimum. Thus, of all costs for the old Donbass was commissioned almost 80%.

When assessing the effectiveness of Donugol's work, it is necessary to take into account the peculiarities of mining, which boil down to the fact that only to maintain production at this level it is necessary to make significant costs. According to the calculations made by Donugl, out of the total amount of capital work for three years indicated above, about 70 million rubles fall on the maintenance of production, about 189 million on expansion and about 32 million on rationalization. rub. From this it is also clear that capital work, pursuing exclusively or primarily the task of reducing the cost of production through rationalization, played a relatively modest role. Of course, those works that mainly pursued the goal of expanding production, at the same time were associated with certain achievements in the field of reducing the cost of production.

Let us first of all turn to the work on the existing mines, which until recently were the main sources of the Donugol production growth.

The restoration of the old Donbass was carried out by selecting and concentrating mines, changing their development system, and strengthening their equipment. Strengthening the equipment of mines (hoists, ventilation, drainage, etc.), in turn, required the creation of appropriate sources of motive power, the need for which was further intensified, in particular, by replacing manual labor with mechanical processes both for the extraction and delivery and haulage of coal.

The main costs for existing mines fell on the following types of costs (in million rubles):

Mining works	18.8
Mechanization	10.5
Electromechanical equipment	18.1
Boiler facilities	3.8
Technical structure (pit buildings, pumping stations, etc.)	13.5
Sorting	1.4
Transport	7.9
Centrifugation (centralization of surface devices)	1.96
Property (minecarts, rails, livestock, etc.)	7.6

Especially in the first years, the bottleneck in the Donugol mine economy was the state of preparatory work and discovered reserves. Mining costs have now largely removed this bottleneck. The size of hidden reserves has changed in recent years as follows (in thousand tons):

On 1 / X 1925	167,650
"1 / X 1926"	164,403

"1 / X 1927"	179,365
"1 / X 1928"	213344

Thus, despite the fact that over three years more than 50 million tons of coal were issued from the main mines, which reduced the discovered reserves in the subsoil by the same amount, the size of these reserves still increased by 45.7 million tons.

As a result of the cost, the main mines have become much more powerful production units than they were before the war. The process of selection and concentration of mines is clearly evident from the following figures. In 1913, there were 1,200 active mines throughout the Donbass, giving a total production of 25.3 million tons. Since the restoration of Donbass, the number of mines and production shows the following movement:

Year	Number of mines	Production, million tons
1921/22	954	7.2
1922/23	577	8.1
1923/24	591	12.2
1924/25	238	12.5
1925/26	377	19.6
1926/27	480	24.5

Thus, in 1926-27, pre-war production was almost achieved with the number of mines accounting for 40% of the pre-war level. It should be borne in mind that since 1925/26, a significant number of newly completed small and medium-sized mines have already been included in the number of mines, which worsen the general picture in relation to the average.

According to Donugl, the average annual productivity of one main mine increased from 87,383 tons in 1925/26, to 99,481 tons in 1926/27, to 113,690 tons in 1927/28. But this is not easy in the selection of mines and the closure of a large number of small ones, it will become clear if we

compare the production of a certain range of mines that worked both before the war and in recent years. For 127 mines of this category, which produced 12,473 thousand tons in 1914, or an average of 98 thousand tons per mine, in recent years the production was (in thousand tons):

[Year]	Total	One mine
1924/25	8 617	68
1925/26	13187	104
1926/27	15 102	119

Thus, the capacity of the selected mines has been significantly increased against their pre-war capacity, which was achieved by strengthening the individual technical factors that make it up. The production capacity of Donogol in 158 main mines has increased as follows [below] (in thousand tons):

	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	% increase
Ascent	16965	20,099	+18.5
»Preparation	14,767	16 844	+14.0
»Tramway	15411	19380	+25.8

Moreover, the operating capacity of the main equipment of mines (hoisting machines, traction winches, pumps, compressors, fans) has changed as follows:

[Date]	Thousand. t	%
1 / X 1925	104.7	100.0
1 / X1926 "	115.5	110.0
1 / X 1927 "	127.4	121.5

Mechanization.

Already from the very beginning of the restoration process, Donugol, although he was forced to prioritize questions of a quantitative nature, nevertheless began to qualitatively improve production processes and already in 1921 raised the question of mechanization, which, however, was widely developed only in recent years. The mechanization of coal-mining enterprises presented enormous difficulties: it was completely new for us, since before the war in the Donbass only timid undertakings were made in this regard, there were no definitely established views on the benefits of mechanization among industrialists and technicians, and a significant part of them outright denied economic profitability of mechanization. Given the low wages that existed in the Donetsk Basin, such a negative attitude, it can be assumed, was to a certain extent justified. But,

The Donetsk coal industry has not fully coped with all these difficulties until now, and this largely explains the great defects that we observe in mechanization along with great achievements.

Among the main defects in mechanization, it is necessary to note, on the one hand, the extreme dispersion of work on mechanization, on the other hand, discrepancies in the development of mechanization of individual production processes. Having started mechanization with a limited number of mines, but having not yet achieved the final results, without properly studying the experience of the first undertakings, they rapidly moved on to the spread of mechanization in breadth, and if back in 1924/25 the total number of mines where mechanization was carried out was 15, then in 1925/26 this number increased to 33, and in 1926/27 - up to 70, and on October 1, 1927 it reached 82, and in 1927/28, according to the original program, 104.

The successes achieved in the field of mechanization are illustrated first of all (by the following figures [Table 2].

The movement of the number of individual machines and items of equipment used in mechanization is shown in table. [3].

[TABLE 2]

	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.
Selection of thousand tons	1168.0	2942.9	5455.9

% of total production	7.8	15.7	25.4
Delivery thousand tons	1194.7	3584.1	7426.0
% of total production	8.0	19.2	32.4
Haulage, thousand tons	519.0	651.9	870.0
% of total production	3.5	3.5	3.8
Loading, thousand tons	95.0	496.5	571.0
% of total production	0.6	3.3	2.5
Average number of work of cutting machines			
heavy	89.8	203.9	356.5
lungs	1.4	17.8	76.5
Average monthly productivity of one machine, t			
heavy	1079	1183	1203.5
easy	322	218	289

[TABLE 3]

	1 / X 1925	1 / X 1926	1 / X 1927
Cutting machines			
heavy	95	237	407
lungs	17	64	136
Conveyors	24	43	70
Scraper winches	31	46	249
Electric locomotives	-	3	17
Loading machines	-	21	20

The delivery indicates the entire amount of coal delivered without sledges, so the figures given include a significant amount of delivery made without the help of mechanical devices, mainly by descent on sheets, which amounted to 1,194.7 thousand tons, and in 1926/27 - 1 871,754 tons, out of a total of 3584.1 thousand. The last figure also includes 832.8 thousand tons, delivered by wagons delivered directly to the face. Thus, the actual mechanical delivery, which took on any significant size only from 1926/27, was [tab. 4].

But, in any case, for mechanized mines as a whole, delivery is linked to excavation, although in some mines, not everything is all right here.

[TABLE 4]

[Delivery]	Number of mechanisms			Thousand. t	
	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.
Conveyors	24	43	70	81.0	332.4
Scrapers				81,7	497.7
Winches				85.6	49.3
Total				248.3	879.4

The mechanization of haulage and, in particular, loading into wagons on the surface lags behind the extraction and delivery the most, and this discrepancy is extremely adversely reflected in the efficiency of all work on mechanization ... [4]

It has already been indicated above that the lag of surface mechanization from the mechanization of underground work is one of the major shortcomings of work on mechanization in general. But for other types of capital work on the surface, we have the same picture.

The limited funds available at Donugol's disposal for capital work forced him to pay priority attention to the direct extraction of coal from the bowels and neglect the subsequent processes. So, for example, the situation with sorting and washing is extremely acute, despite the fact that these operations are becoming all the more important [than 1 with

the intensive development of Donugol mining it is necessary to involve more and more layers of thin, as well as dirtier [coals] in the work, leads primarily to an increase in ash content and waste rock content in the coal directly discharged from the mine. Ash content of Donugol coals was (in%):

1924/25 g.	11.18
1925/26 "	11.87
1926/27 "	12.33

and one of the essential tasks is to significantly improve these indicators.

The drop in the average thickness of the reservoirs can be seen from the following figures showing their average dynamic thickness based on actual production (in tonnes):

1924/25 g.	0.954
1925/26 "	0.947
1926/27 "	0.934

The latter circumstance, along with the increasing depth of development, must be borne in mind when assessing the effectiveness of capital work in the direction of reducing the cost, since the influence of capital [work] is to a certain extent weakened by deteriorating natural conditions. Despite the above provision, the costs of sorting and washing in recent years amounted to all (for the main, additional and newest large mines) [table. 5], that is, only a small percentage of the costs incurred by the mine economy. At the same time, the indicated amounts include a new sink, built at the new coke ovens of the Gorlovsky mining department (worth about 2,500 thousand rubles).

[TABLE 5]

	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.	Total

Mount	314.3	960.3.	1379.3	2653.9
Washing	299.0	357.4	2475.3	3331.7
[Total]	613.3	1317.7	3854.6	5985.6

The situation with sinks will be sufficiently characterized by the following few digital data: before the war (in 1913) there were 24 sinks with a possible annual capacity of 5800 thousand tons, and the amount of washed coal was 28.3% - The pre-war sinks passed to us in dilapidated condition and were structures of a completely outdated type A. Their restoration, in fact, begins only in 1925/26, and the survey carried out by that time showed the inexpediency of restoring and operating most of them. Development in recent years is shown in the following figures [tab. b].

[TABLE 6]

[Year]	Number of washes operation	The amount of coal supplied to the sink, thousand tons	% of all production	% losses
1922/23	2	117	2.9	10.8
1923/24	2	204	3.4	8.4
1924/25	4	444	7.2	8.1
1925/26	6	1156	11.4	9.1
1926/27	6	1741	13.5	11.3

A further increase in the capacity of sinks due to the indicated state of old sinks can only go through the construction of new ones. In addition to the already mentioned new installation at the Gorlovsky coke ovens¹ with a capacity of 200 tons per hour and a washer at the Chistyakovsky mine administration (with a capacity of 40 tons per hour), there are currently 4 more washes at the design stage.

Despite the insignificance of the costs of the existing washes, a certain effect has been achieved in terms of improving the operation of these plants, and the increase in losses shown above is not only the result of

increased ash content, but also a consequence of the restoration and improvement of the plants.

In relation to mechanical sorting, we give the following data [table. 7].

[TABLE7]

[Year]	Number of sorts	Sorted coal output	% of production (gross)
1924/25	71	3695.6	40.5
1925/26	72	5739.4	38.4
1926/27	73	6998.0	37.3

Thus, the throughput of the existing sorting plants does not keep pace with the production growth. At present, 2 new powerful sortings are under construction at the Shcherbinovsky and Shcheglovsky ore departments: the first with a capacity of 250 thousand tons, the second - 100 thousand tons. Three more sortings are in the design stage.

It has already been pointed out above that mechanical loading into railway cars lags behind. It must be said that the task of rationalizing loading is extremely complicated by the diversity of the rolling stock. Lack of handling during loading does not make it possible to load exclusively freshly sorted coal, which is why it is necessary to maintain warehouses for storing sorted coal. To eliminate this, in addition to further mechanization of loading and improvement of the transport economy as a whole, it is necessary to follow the path of constructing large sorting systems operating on the principle of sorting only during loading.

In general, it should be said that the rationalization of the surface is hampered by the presence of a large number of medium and small mines with little production, and a small residual life of many of them. Full rationality in this regard can be created only after the creation of a new Donbass, but from now on, one of the essential tasks, the implementation of which should have a very significant effect, is the centralization of production units.

With regard to the unification of underground mines, etc., the possibilities in this regard are quite limited, a much greater effect can

be achieved by centralizing the surface, which for these dispersed mines creates the working conditions for a large enterprise in terms of enrichment and mechanization of surface operations. Incidentally, this creates very favorable conditions for the production of standard coal grades by mixing.

Capital work in this direction consists of:

- 1) in the arrangement of central structures: sorting, bunkers, warehouses, access roads to central sorting, etc.;
- 2) [c] the re-equipment of mines included in this system, caused by the centralization of surface structures, the construction and re-equipment of mine buildings, the re-equipment of a haulage to the surface, a bunker, etc.;
- 3) arrangement of transport from mines to central sorting.

Relatively quiet insignificant amounts were also spent on the systematic implementation of such centralization, namely (in thousand rubles):

1925/26 g.	43.9
1926/27 "	798.6
1927/28 "	1119.3

In just three years - 1961.8 thousand rubles, and these works are being completed only this year. The above figures do not include the costs of constructing central sorting systems, which are shown above - under Art. "Sorting".

Centralization work was developed primarily in the Chistyakovsky mining administration (started in 1926/27 and is expected to be completed in 1927/28 or by the beginning of 1928/29). Preliminary calculations show that with the right approach to this matter, it is possible to achieve huge savings both in capital works and in

Operating costs, which we illustrate with the next few examples.

In the Chistyakovsky mining department, work on the centralization of surface devices is carried out in three groups: Davydkovskaya,

Postnikovskaya and Yuzhnaya. In the Davydkovo group, mines No. 1 and 9 with a total capacity of 160 thousand tons per year are connected by a 7.8 km cable car with each other and with the Serdita station, at which a sorting of 50 tons per hour is being built, loading bunkers and a wide-gauge dead end for sorting 1, 7 lin. km length ... [5] In the Postnikovskaya group, six mines are centralized with a capacity of 70-80 thousand tons per year, united by a central wash with a central warehouse at it and the corresponding access roads. According to the Southern group, the general centralization plan unites nine mines into one system with the construction of sorting and washing facilities with a capacity of 1,500 thousand tons per year, and, first of all, the work being carried out at present includes six mines with a total capacity of 550 thousand tons per year. The calculated economic effect here is as significant as for the Davydkov group.

Therefore, it is necessary to admit that it is a serious defect that there is still no developed general plan for the centralization of the surface and that the work was carried out on such an insignificant scale. This is largely due to a lack of funds.

Concluding our survey of superficial work, it is necessary to say a few words about the situation with the Donugol railway transport, which is also one of the most essential branches of its economy. With regard to capital works, railway transport belongs to the most bypassed items, the situation is becoming more and more tense here, and the costs incurred here were clearly insufficient to ensure the further development of Donugol production. These costs were expressed in the following amounts (for all categories of mines) (in thousand rubles):

1925/26 g.	2539.6
1926/27 "	4636.0
1927/28 "	3583.4
[Total]	10759.0

(of which approximately 2 million rubles will not be completed by the end of 1927-28).

At the expense of these amounts, the rolling stock was renewed and replenished, the existing ones were lengthened and new branches were built, the planned replacement of rails and sleepers was carried out, unfortunately, only in the smallest sizes, part of the wide-gauge track was repaired on rails of type no lighter than IV-a (22 , 5 lb in linear foot) and to the relocation of the junction points of some access roads from the spans to the station tracks. The last two categories of work are very energetically insisted by the NKPS, and they are really absolutely necessary for the regulation of the railroad transportation of coal. Replacing on rails of a heavy type should make it possible to handle heavy locomotives and wagons on the Donugol branches, which is currently not possible ... [6] [7]

... [8] If we now turn to the electrical facilities of Donugol, we will again come across one of the most bottlenecks, which greatly complicated and complicated Donugol's work not only in the field of operation, but also in capital construction, especially in sinking new mines. In recent years, it has been spent on power construction (in thousand rubles):

1925/26 g.	1221.1
1926/27 "	8386.6
1927/28 "	9724.0

The demand for electrical energy grew extremely rapidly due to the fact that the Donugol mines were increasingly equipped with mechanisms driven by electricity, as can be seen from the following [table. 8].

[TABLE 8]

Operating power of the main equipment (lifting machines, traction winches, pumps, compressors, fans) (in kW)

	1 / X 1925	1 / X 1926	1 / X 1927
Steam equipment	46994	40118	40625
Electrical equipment	57749	75354	86810
[Total]	104 720 [9]	115 472	127 435

% electrical equipment	55	66.5	68.5
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Meanwhile, the provision of growing electricity consumption is expressed in the data [tab. nine].

[TABLE 9]

Electricity consumption (net) (in kWh)

	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.
Own	178346	194,570	218,000
%	100	109	122.2
From the side	-	16197	34,000
[Total]	178346	210,767	252,000
%. .	100	118	141.5

[This] has been achieved until recently almost exclusively by rebuilding the old mine power plants.

The creation of new stations and the expansion of some of the existing ones were extremely difficult, and only this year the size of the installed capacity should be increased by new large units (at the end of 1926/27, during the installation period, there were seven units with a total capacity of 30,925 kW). In addition, ordered and further units with a capacity of 20 thousand kW were partially received. Until now, the lack of electricity has delayed the electrification of mines and even led here to regressive movement. Electricity consumption in the Donugol mines (in kWh per tonne of mined (in kWh per tonne of mined and ventilation), but the main reason was the absolute lack of energy. This is already evident from the fact

According to some theoretical calculations, electricity consumption per ton of production with 100% electrification in Donbass conditions should be 20 kWh, which shows how much Donugol still has to achieve in this regard. The situation with the electrification of the lift is especially unfavorable: here the consumption of electrical energy per ton of production fell from 1.070 kWh in 1925/26 to 0.898 kWh in 1926/27, while the steam consumption increased from 0.096 kWh in 1925/26 up to 0.110 kW-h in 1926/27. As of October 1, 1927, out of 265

working lifting machines accounted for by the Donugol Statistical Bureau with a total capacity of 36.3 thousand hp, there were 29.6 thousand steam ones. True, in the mines opened in 1923-1927, out of 74 hoisting machines, there were only 45 steam hoists, accounting for 58% of all power.

The situation with the power supply of Donugol in the last two years has become especially aggravated due to problems with the completed construction of the Shterovskaya district station.

The energetically carried out renovation of the boiler facilities of power plants should be attributed to the positive achievements in the field of power construction: suffice it to say that 154 boilers with a total heating surface of 33 thousand sq. m - 64 boilers with a total heating surface of 18 thousand sq. m have been installed over the past four to five years. Most of the new boilers are equipped with automatic chain firing.

The most outstanding achievement in the field of power construction is the work carried out in Donugle to combine and ring power plants by district. This eliminated the need to have its own reserve at each small station and thus made possible a much fuller use of the installed capacity. This, along with other improvements, made it possible to greatly increase the energy production on old units.

The increase in the capacity of old mines, possible with the introduction of all the improvements, could not keep up with the country's growing demand for coal fuel; new large-scale mine construction could give results only after a number of years. Therefore, to meet the demand in these transition years, there was nothing else to do but to go along the path of building medium and small mines that could give results in a short time. The STO resolution on the construction of small and medium-sized mines took place on June 4, 1926. This resolution by no means meant a rejection of the general installation - the development of Donbass through large-scale mine construction, using the latest achievements of foreign technology. Moreover, not to mention the fact that the recourse to medium and small-scale mine construction was in the nature of a temporary measure, it had to be linked from different sides with the subsequent large-scale mine construction. Some of these small mines were to be used for exploration of deposits in order to prepare for the laying of new large mines; the shafts of the mines after

mining were to serve as ventilation and auxiliary shafts for future new large mines, etc. The effect from small and medium-sized mine construction is expected to be very fast. Already in 1925/26, these mines were supposed to produce 839 thousand tons and in 1926-27, 3839 thousand, t. Normal annual production of 7176 thousand tons was supposed to be achieved already in 1927/28. 188 mines, namely:

Rebuild and go through new small mines	125
Including	
recoverable	59
new	66
Complete new medium mines	22
Complete exploration type mines	41
[Total]	188

According to the program finally established by Donugl (Order No. 127), this number was reduced to 185, of which 8 mines were not started at all, but 25 mines were completed in excess of the plan. In total, thus, work was carried out at 202 mines.

Now the situation in which this construction took place is already known. The implementation of the construction plan was started in a manner of extreme haste, without prior due preparation. The restoration of a significant number of small and medium-sized mines was started without preliminary exploration and without appropriate economic calculations, as a result of which a significant number of already completed or restored mines turned out to be unviable due to insufficient reserves in the subsoil, poor coal quality, abnormal bedding conditions, abundant water inflow, due to discovered too late formation thinning, extremely high cost, etc. To all this was added a lack of equipment (hoisting machines, pumps, motors, winches, etc.), lack of electricity, remoteness from operating mines,

The progress of medium and small mine construction in general terms can be represented as follows:

In 1925/26, work began on 184 mines, of which 6 in the same year. 25 mines were liquidated and 3 mines were leased. Of the remaining 151

mines, 82 mines were put into operation in the same year, giving 547.6 thousand tons this year.

In the state of sinking and re-equipment in 1925/26, 74 mines were transferred. In 1926/27, work began at 20 mines (of which 18 were new), 42 were liquidated. Of the mines operated in 1926-27, only 1,871.9 thousand tons were mined, in 1927-28 tons, according to currently available data, 12 more mines will be liquidated.

Extraction from medium and small mines is expected in 1927-28 at the rate of 3300 thousand tons. Of the total number of 202 mines on which work was started, only 79 mines were liquidated, on which 2276 thousand rubles were spent, which is 5, 3% of the total cost of work in medium and small mines.

The costs of medium and small-scale mine construction were: in 1925/26 - 10,334.8 thousand rubles, in 1926/27 - 15,047 thousand rubles, in the future it is assumed: in 1927/28 - 7500 thousand and in 1928/29 - 10241.1 thousand rubles; The total cost of this construction is thus projected at 43,123.6 thousand rubles, which in terms of the total amount is quite close to the initial assumptions, but only due to the fact that housing construction is included in this amount in a much smaller amount. Due to technical factors, it was a huge overspending.

According to initial assumptions, the cost of technical factors should have amounted to 26.6 kopecks per tonne of reserves. and per ton of normal annual production - 245.6 kopecks.

In fact, the following results were obtained (in kopecks):

	By rehabilitated mines	On new passages
Per ton of industrial stock	34	46
»» Normal annual production	392	529

Yet, despite this huge discrepancy with the assumptions, these figures should be considered quite acceptable, and the initial assumptions are largely based on erroneous calculations. With regard to the average capacity of the mines, the result turned out to be even better than the initial assumptions.

This average was assumed to be 2380 thousand tons, but in fact it turns out to be about 3590 thousand tons.

So far, the results have been unfavorable in terms of cost. This was supposed to be lower than the cost at the main mines. In fact, in 1926-27, we have the following picture: the cost of one ton of production at the main mines is 8.04 kopecks; in medium and small mines 9.82 kopecks; rise in price by 22.2%. This rise in cost is only partly explained by the incomplete load of the newly commissioned mines, not entirely correct accounting for depreciation in the same sizes for all mines and the lower thickness of the seams in new mines.

On the other hand, when comparing the cost price, it is necessary to take into account a very significant circumstance - the quality of the produced coal is much worse compared to the main mines.

The deployment of production, as seen in the data above, deviates extremely sharply from the initial assumptions. Here are the currently planned figures, as well as the percentage of medium and small mines in the total production of Donugol:

	1925/26 г.	1926/27 г.	1927/28 г.	1928/29 г.	1929-30 г.
Extraction of medium and small mines, i.e. ...	547.6	1871.9	3300	5336	6125.8
% to total production	3.7	9.5	14.4	19.4	19.2

Summing up, we can say that, despite all those special phenomena that accompanied this business, and despite all the defects and failures, the costs of medium and small mine construction still give certain positive results, being a significant factor in covering the demand for coal in the future. before the commissioning of new large mines and at the same time a source of rich experience that could contribute to a more perfect organization of business in the further construction of small and medium-sized mines.

New large mine construction

The beginning of a new large mine construction refers to the 1924/25 operating year, when the Donugol production program included loans

for the additional equipment and completion of the sinking of 10 mines, started but not completed before the revolution, and 17 new mines, and in total - 27 mines ...

With the concrete implementation of the plan for a new large-scale mine construction, Donugol encountered a number of very significant and significant difficulties, which forced partly to change both the composition of the new mines planned for sinking, and the number, their capacity, the place of laying, the proposed initial dates for the start and end of the sinking of new mines, the planned their initial full cost, etc.

Among the difficulties that caused the change in the program of new large-scale mine construction originally planned in 1926/27 are the following:

1. Only by the beginning of the 1925/26 operational year, Donugol organized a design bureau, which later turned into a design department. In view of the novelty of the design of new large mines and Donugol's lack of experience and design materials for such a construction, the design bureau had to deal with the development of general design methods, development of design standards, etc. at first, which took a significant amount of time.
2. It turned out that the geological data available to Donugol about the deposits where new mines were planned to be drilled were insufficient and that additional exploration was required, which was started by Donugol and the Geological Committee.

As a result of the exploration carried out, some of the new mines originally planned for sinking were replaced by others, other reserves were obtained in some mines, which caused a change in their originally planned productivity.

As a result of all of the above, Donugol entered into 1926/27 with a plan for excavation, additional equipment and re-equipment of 24 production units with a total normal production of 650 million poods. coal and anthracite.

During 1925/26, the successful implementation of the plan for new mine construction was also hampered by the following circumstances: 1) the lack of the necessary tunneling equipment, boilers, underground machines, compressors, pneumatic hammers and other smaller

equipment; 2) the lack or lack of electricity and due to the late start-up of the Shterovskaya power plant and the high consumption of electricity for the needs of operation; 3) the absence or lack of materials of the required quality or size (seed, caps, iron beams, etc.); 4) lack of qualified tunnellers - workers and technicians; 5) negotiations with German firms that dragged on until the end of the operating year for the delivery of tunneling works; 6) unexpectedly encountered geological conditions unfavorable for penetrations (Mushketovskoye and Gorlovskoye ore administrations). Due to the above [10] Adverse circumstances 1925/26 should be considered only as the accumulation of initial experience and as preparation for further work.

Loans allocated for the 1925/26 for new mine construction in the amount of 9400 thousand rubles. Donugle was used only in the amount of 6469 thousand rubles, that is, 68% of the assignment.

Of the total of 24 production units included in the 1926/27 work plan, there are 12 new mines: 8 mines started by excavation but not completed before the revolution, and 4 mines slated for refurbishment to obtain increased production.

A list of these 24 mines and their brief characteristics are presented in the following table [11].

In the work on new mine construction in 1926-27, in general, the same shortcomings were felt as in 1925-26, namely: the success of sinking new mines was hampered by the absence or lack of equipment, there was also a lack of qualified tunnellers - workers and technicians; the late start to work on the sinking of three mines by the German company "Thyssen" and others, and, finally, the main drawback that was reflected in the success of the work in 1926/27 and that makes itself felt in 1927/28 is the lack of the relevant authorities approved projects and estimates for new mines.

Despite the fact that Donugol managed to organize a rather powerful design bureau, a technical council and attract prominent mining specialists in Russia, as well as prominent mining specialists from Germany and America, as consultants, the design of new large mines is progressing very slowly.

Due to the lack of sufficient experience in the new business of designing very large mines, due to the lack of projects already implemented,

which would make it possible in practice to check the correctness of the design and develop certain standards for projects of new large mines, the already drawn up schematic designs were partially or completely changed several times, which also could not not to delay the normal course of development of new mine construction.

In this case, it should be noted that Donugol has not yet fully coped with the design business. At the present time, at the end of the third quarter of 1927/28, Donuglem presented to the Scientific and Technical Council for the Coal Industry under the Scientific and Technical Directorate of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR only 8 draft designs out of 24 large mines, and the deadlines for submitting projects for the rest of the mines stretch until the end of 1927 / 28 operational year and even go to 1928-29. However, it should be noted that Donugol is taking heroic measures to improve and accelerate the design of the sinking of new mines. For design and consultation purposes, German specialists were invited: professors Geise and Herbst and American mining specialists engineers Stewart, Dokoy, Allen-Garen, and others. An engineer was also sent to America to draw up projects there with the help of American specialists for two mines. The sinking of three new mines was contracted to the German company Thyssen. The results of the work of Thyssen are quite satisfactory.

At the same time, the organization techniques and practical methods of the sinking itself are used by our technicians in their work on sinking new mines.

One large mine "American" is being run quite successfully like American mines.

In the process of implementing the plan for a new large-scale mine construction, cadres of tunneling specialists - workers and technicians are being trained, methods for a more perfect organization of excavation and equipment are being developed, practical experience is accumulating for further successful passage and design of new mines.

Insufficient coverage of the entire plan for a new large mine construction by Donugol, on the one hand, and a lack of financial resources, on the other, led to the fact that the final plan for a new large mine construction established in 1926/27, which included 24 production units with a total annual production in 650 million poods, was

temporarily reduced, and the production program of 1927/28 operating year included the production of sinking and equipment of only 17 out of 24 mines. an increase in funds to maintain on them the pace of work established by the end of 1926-27; 26,200 thousand rubles were allocated for new large-scale mine construction in 1927-28.

The normal annual production of 17 large mines in the sinking and equipment in the 1927-28 operating year is 510 million poods, and the total cost of these mines is (approximately) about 144 million rubles.

The temporary reduction of the program of new large-scale mine construction, made in 1927/28, postpones for some time the dates of completion of new mines, which were outlined in the original program, and, consequently, the dates of obtaining full normal annual production from them ... [12]

The ratio of production from new large mines to the total production in Donugol, expressed as a percentage over the years, leads to the following:

1927/28 g.	1928/29 g.	1929/30 g.	1930/31 g.	1931/32 g.	1932/33 g.	1933/34 g.
0.97	3.30	9.0	15.3	19.9	21.4	22.1

Coke production.

In addition to the general task of supplying the country with mineral fuel, Donugol also has a special task of ensuring the development of southern metallurgy with coke, since Yugostal itself produces less than half of the coke needs. Coke ovens were also handed over to us in a very ruined state. Until now, the development of coke production has been solely due to the restoration and improvement of existing coke ovens, for which it was spent (in thousand rubles):

1926/27 g.	1363.9
1927/28 "	832.7
1928/29 "	451.9
[Total]	2648.5

The course of development of the coke business in recent years is illustrated by the data [table. ten].

[TABLE 10]

	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.
Number of ovens	1175	1417	1535
%.	100	120.5	130.8
Capacity, thousand tons	1370	1700	1990
%.	100	124	145
The amount of coke burning	1369.9	1696.9	1987.7
%	100	123.8	145
% load	100	100	100
% coke yield	77.1	77.4	77.4
% use of coke oven gas	60.0	70.0	75.0 [13]
Cost of a ton of coke	1873.9	2070.9	1829.6

The rise in the cost of coke, as well as a decrease in the percentage of coke yield from coal compared with previous years (in 1924/25, over 80%) is mainly explained by the fact that, while in the first years the best furnaces were selected, in recent years the need forced the worst to be reintroduced. Nowadays, almost everything that can be used from old equipment is already involved in the work. The growth of production on old furnaces is possible only within very narrow limits and with the greatest stress in work. Further development of the Donbass coke industry depends on the commissioning of new coke ovens.

New coke ovens are being built according to the project of German firms: in Rutchenkovo - "Otto", and in Gorlovka - "Coppers", the installations of which are world famous both in Europe and America. The construction is carried out by our workers and technical personnel, but under the supervision and instruction of German engineers and several foremen.

Designed according to the latest German coke burning [technology] furnaces with complete capture and use of gases produced during cooking, with full mechanization of all processes [14] (for which the

corresponding chemical plants were also built). At the same time and in terms of their grandeur, these structures represent one of the most outstanding phenomena in our capital construction in recent years. The sink being built at the Gorlovka installations according to the designs of the German company "Greppel" is the largest of all existing facilities of this type and one of the largest in Europe. The capacity of each unit will be about 25 million poods. anhydrous coke per year, and due to complete mechanization, the staff at each plant will be only about 100 people ... [15]

In conclusion, let us briefly characterize the progress of housing construction in Donugol, which once took on an unprecedented scale in the Donbass; if in 1913 only 56.6 thousand cubic meters were built throughout the Donbass. soot., then already in 1925 this figure was reached in Donugol alone 55.2 thousand cubic meters. soot., and in 1926 it was already 167 thousand cubic meters. soot.

It should be borne in mind that housing construction in the coal industry is by no means exclusively "social construction". More than in any other industry, it has a direct production value ... [16] [17]

Other coal basins

In other coal basins, capital work has also focused on expanding capacity and rehabilitating existing mines and boring new ones. All these pools have now far exceeded pre-war production levels; yet, even before the war, they were ill-equipped to accommodate the necessary cadre of workers. Currently, the state of the housing stock is the bottleneck in the deployment of most of these pools. It is therefore natural that a significant part of the costs fell on housing construction.

So, over the past 3 years (1925 / 26-1927 / 28) according to Kizeltrest, out of the total capital work of 9675 thousand rubles. housing construction accounts for 3134 thousand rubles, in Kuzbassugol from 16 112 thousand rubles. - 6555.7 thousand rubles., In Moskvugol, where the housing issue has not reached such an acuteness as in the Urals and Siberia, - out of 8450 thousand rubles. 1564 thousand rubles.

In addition to housing construction, a significant part of capital expenditures also fell on the strengthening of the energy economy of the coal trusts, which was especially necessary due to the rather vigorous electrification carried out here.

So, for individual basins, the degree of electrification shows the following growth [tab. eleven]

Dynamics of the electrification coefficient

	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.
Kuzbassugol	40	41	64
Kuzbassstrest	51	57	77
Cherembass	32.5	56	84.9
Kizeltrest	90	94	96
Moskvugol	50	60	70

Especially significant are the costs of the energy sector in the Kuznetsk Basin. From the above-mentioned total amount of capital work in Kuzbassugol, over 3 million rubles fall on the heat power sector. The most important object in terms of power construction here was the expansion of the power plant of the Kemerovo region from 1,500 kW to 6 thousand kW of installed capacity. First of all, this year, one turbine of 3 thousand kW is installed, then the expansion of the power plant of the Leninsky mine from 675 to 4 thousand kW by the installation of two turbine generators of 2 thousand kW each, with the abolition of the old unit.

Due to a lack of funds, the completion of the installation of electrical equipment should be postponed until 1928/29, as a result of which the next period will be marked by a lack of electricity. At the central power station of Kuzbassstrest, the work consisted of expanding the turbine room of the boiler room and installing a new turbine of 3 thousand kW, a new boiler with a heating surface of 302 "v. m, etc.

Capital work on the expansion of existing mines and the development of new ones is dictated by the consideration that the production capacity of the existing mines is close to complete exhaustion. Load percentage of existing mines (least technical factor):

	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.
Kuzbassugol	93.0	94.1
Moskvugol	75.0	85.0

Kizeltrest	80.0	88.0
Cherembasstrest	87.9	98.3

For Kuzbassugol, the most significant work is the central adit of the Prokopyevsky mine, which began in 1926/27. This work is intended to concentrate the work that is still scattered in a number of small adits, and to enable the correct and rational development of this deposit. The annual productivity of the adit is assumed to be 40 million poods, and its total cost is 9.5 million rubles. (including housing construction), or 23.7 kopecks. per pood of annual production. Of this amount, by the end of 1927-28, only about 1.9 million rubles will be spent. The main part of the costs falls in 1928-1930. Of the work on the Prokopyevsky mine, one should also note the insignificant in cost, but very important work on the sinking of two small mines, set up specifically for the extraction of coal, which is used in the Ural metallurgy on a par with coke.

For other mines of Kuzbass, it should be noted the re-equipment of the Kapitalnaya mine of the Leninsky mine, which began in 1926/27 and is aimed at mechanizing the supply of coal trolleys from the stands and rolling them to the surface, as well as the construction of new and reconstruction with the expansion of existing bunkers, etc. As a result, at a cost of 725 thousand rubles. the production capacity should be increased from 21-23 million to 35-37 million poods.

In Kuzbassstrest, in addition to the expansion of two existing mines, work is underway on the sinking of a new large mine No. 15 with an annual capacity of 500 thousand tons, begun in pre-revolutionary times and renewed at the end of 1925/26. The total cost of the mine is 6.5 million rubles., on account of which about 1.3 million rubles were spent. Full completion is expected by 1929/30, but production will begin in part in 1928/29.

For Kizeltrest over the past three years, capital work amounted to only 9.7 million rubles, of which 3.1 million rubles fell on housing construction. Of the rest of the amount of work on the existing production units amounted to 1910.7 million rubles. (including housing construction). Work was commissioned for 6.7 million rubles.

Most of the costs fell on the restoration, strengthening and mechanization of existing mines. Production here increased from 842.7 thousand tons in 1925-26 to 1157.2 thousand tons in 1927-28, i.e. by 37%, but to a large extent the increase in production is the result of more even operation of mines during a year. A fairly correct idea of the growth in the production capacity of mines is given by comparing the maximum monthly production for subsequent years.

Maximum monthly production of mines [tab. 12].

[TABLE 12]

	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.
thousand tons	104.8	119.5	128.5
%	100.0	114.0	122.5

Mechanization is of particular importance to Kieseltrest due to the shortage of labor and the low tide during the summer months. Growth me- hanization is seen from [data table. thirteen].

[TABLE 13]

	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.
Number of heavy cutting machines	-	-	8
Number of light cutting machines	55	81	93
Machine mining, % of the total	28	37.2	45
Number of scrapers	1	8	fifteen
Number of conveyors	-	3	five

Labor savings due to mechanization were expressed in 1925/26, 1926/27 and 1927/28. 76, 137 and 152 people, respectively, and a greater uniformity of work throughout the year is visible from the fact that the discrepancy between the minimum and maximum monthly production is constantly decreasing: the percentage of deviation was 150 in 1925/26, 148 in 1926/27, and in 1927/28 - 133.

Improving the work of mines is expressed in the growth of labor productivity and the seduction of fuel consumption for their own needs [tab. fourteen].

[TABLE 14]

	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.
Monthly labor productivity	13.85	14.86	16.68.
%	100,00	107.20	120.20
Coal consumption for own needs	3.08	1.77	1.85

Regarding the cost price, the successes, unfortunately, despite all these achievements, are minimal, which is largely due to the deteriorating mining and geological conditions of the Kizeltrest operation.

Since the productivity of old mines cannot be greatly increased, Kizeltrest already in 1926 began excavating a new large mine "Capital No. 1" with an annual capacity of up to 30 million poods. It was supposed to partially exploit it already in 1928/29, but due to the great difficulties encountered in sinking, it is very much delayed ... [18]

Another new mine with a capacity of about 12 million poods is being designed. Sinking will begin next year.

Of particular importance are the works aimed at solving the problem of coking the Ural coals (opening a plant: for enrichment and coking).

Moskvugol. Capital work in the Moscow Region basin amounted to (in thousand rubles) [tab. fifteen].

[TABLE 15]

	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.	Total
Total capital expenditure. ...	1810	2641	4000	8450
Including				
housing construction	393	490	700	158.3
including				
New construction	-	1240	2454	-

Commissioned	1134	2088	1097	4319
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These works, in addition to improving the living conditions of the workers, were necessary primarily to maintain the mining capacity at the achieved level and to strengthen it in accordance with the mining development plan. The development of the capacity of the mine economy can be seen from the data [table. sixteen].

[TABLE 16]

	1925/26	1926/27	1927/28	1928/29
	г.	г.	г.	г.
Coal production, thousand tons	942	971	1195	1474
%	100	103	127	156.5
Capacity of the active part of fixed capital (thousand tons) in terms of possible production (at the beginning of the year)	647.5	1171.7	1199.3	1526.5
%	100 [19]			
Number of operating mines	fourteen	sixteen	19	-
Average capacity of mines, t.	65710	60,000	63 150	-
Recovered reserves to top	4318	6383	9595	10620

The maintenance and development of mining was carried out by laying a number of new mines; capital construction was proceeding extremely abnormally. The laying of mines was started without sufficient exploration, and this led to the fact that a significant part of these mines turned out to be unusable. In general, the conduct of exploration on a large scale is a necessary condition for the development of this basin, and increased attention has been paid to this matter, especially since the second half of 1926-27.

Of the new mines founded in 1926-27, six mines were transferred to 1927-28, the total annual production capacity of which is 660 thousand tons. In addition, six mines with a total capacity of 780 thousand tons are being laid again. The size of the new mines is all more strengthened-introduced a number of improvements in their equipment.

Among the works on secondary basins, coke construction in the Kuznetsk basin should also be noted, which is of paramount importance for the Ural metallurgy.

Initially, it was planned for the existing two batteries in Kemerovo, 5 million poods each. to deliver two more of the same productivity, but in view of the insufficient clarification of the question of reserves in different regions suitable for coking coal, they have so far confined themselves to starting the construction of one battery for 5 million poods. worth about 1,335 thousand rubles, which is supposed to be put into operation by 1929/30.

The negative side of the construction of coke plants is that Kemerovo coals will always require significant mixing of coals from the Leninsky and Prokopyevsky mines, which makes the cost of coke significantly more expensive even with preferential tariffs for railroad transportation.

At present, intensified reconnaissance is underway and the question of the place of construction of coke ovens is being studied.

TsGAOR USSR, f. 374, on. 1, d.485, ll. 120-141, 143-147. Rotat. copies

[1] The following reviews are omitted: "Characteristics of the general conditions in which construction was carried out for the period 1925 / 26-1927 / 28", "Review of capital construction of the USSR Supreme Council of National Economy in the field of energy management", "Review of capital construction of non-ferrous metallurgy", "Review capital construction in the timber industry ", " Capital construction of the paper industry ", " Review of capital construction of the Sugar Trust ".

[2] Date of forwarding relation to the reviews of the Supreme Economic Council to the Labor and Defense Council

[3] The sum of the numbers does not agree with the given total.

[4] Information about the economic effect of mechanization in Donugle is omitted.

[5] The information about the savings in capital costs during the construction of the cable car has been omitted.

[6] The capital work carried out by Donugol in the field of transport facilities made it possible to increase the cargo turnover from 16,123.6 thousand tons in 1925/26 to 20,780.7 thousand tons in 1927/28, and the number of steam locomotives that were in operation over 30 years, cut from 50 to 36.2%. Reconstruction of the mine boiler facilities made it possible to increase the heating surface of boilers from 98 357 sq. m on October 1, 1925 up to 120,816 sq. m on October 1, 1927 (TsGAOR USSR, f. 374, on. 1, d. 385, l. 129).

[7] Information about the state of the Donugol railway park has been omitted

[8] Information about the state of the heat and power facilities of Donugol is omitted.

[9] The sum of the numbers does not agree with the given total.

[10] In the document: thanks to the above.

[11] The table is not published (TsGAOR USSR, f. 374, on. 1, d. 485, pp. 136-137).

[12] Omitted the calculation of the deployment of the production capacity of new large mines for 1927/28 - 1933/34

[13] From free gas. - Approx. document.

[14] For example, the loading of chambers, produced mechanically, occurs almost instantly, up to 12 tons are loaded in one step. document.

[15] Information about the growth of labor productivity on new coke ovens has been omitted.

[16] Information about the state of housing construction has been omitted.

[17] Despite the relatively large scale of housing construction, the growth of the housing stock lagged significantly behind the growth in the number of workers living in miner settlements. If from 1925/26 to 1927/28 the living area increased by 25%, then the number of inhabitants during the same time increased by 46% (TsGAOR USSR, f. 374, on. 1, d. 385, l. 142).

[18] Information about labor productivity and reduction of the cost of coal at the Kapitalnaya mine No. I has been omitted.

[19] The percentage is not specified further in the document.

№ 16 Capital construction in ferrous metallurgy

The fixed capital of ferrous metallurgy trusts as of October 1, 1925 was expressed in the amount of about 502 million rubles. Capital expenditures for the maintenance, restoration and expansion of this capital amounted for the five years 1925 / 26-1927 / 28. about 360 million rubles Comparison of these two figures shows the scale of construction of ferrous metallurgy. The question arises, what are the tasks that these investments were supposed to accomplish.

If we recall that in 1924/25, iron smelting was only 30.7% of the 1913 smelting, steel smelting - 44% and rolled products - only 39.6%, then it becomes clear that the main task during this period was the maximum forcing units and assemblies that were on conservation. The poor condition and wear and tear of the equipment required large expenditures for the repair of fixed capital, and the changed working conditions in the industry put forward the urgent task of maximizing the modernization of factories and their equipment in order to maximize the struggle to reduce the cost of production.

It is therefore understandable that, first of all, over all these three years, the expenses for the repair of factory property should be high. And indeed, if you look at where the costs were directed over these three years, the following dynamics of costs according to the intended purpose [in million rubles] [tab. 1].

[TABLE 1]

[Type of work]	1925/26	1926/27	1927/28	Total for three years
	г	г.	г.	
Overhaul	18.39	21.14	19.13	58.66
Expansion and refurbishment	37.34	66.50	117.84	221.68
Housing construction by existing factories	13.70	15.56	15.07	44.33
for new plants	1.03	8.00	26.03	35.06
[Total]	70.46	111.20	178.07	359.73

In 1925/26, capital repair costs accounted for about 25% of all capital costs, in 1926/27 they already amounted to 19%, and in 1927/28 they will approach 11-12% of the total annual costs ... Very large sums, as is generally known, were also spent over the same years on the so-called current repairs. But even if we leave them aside, it turns out that in 1925/26 the cost of capital repairs absorbed 75%, and in 1926/27 - 70% of the actual depreciation deductions, and for the main trust of ferrous metallurgy, in Yugo - steel, the cost of capital repairs annually even exceed the depreciation deductions, despite the fact that the latter are 6% of the property value. This ratio best of all depicts the state of fixed capital of ferrous metallurgy trusts by the beginning of the three years under consideration.

The costs of new enterprises amounted to a small amount, only about 35 million rubles, of which 26 million rubles falls on the current 1927/28. These costs are mainly spent on two enterprises: the Kerch metallurgical and Mariupol pipe-rolling plants. If these costs are excluded from the field of view, it turns out that about 222 million rubles were spent on re-equipment and expansion of existing enterprises over the entire three-year period.

The direction of capital expenditures for existing plants for the development of individual branches of the ferrous metallurgy economy is drawn [in million rubles] [data table. 2].

[TABLE 2]

[Type of work]	South Steel [1]	Kramatorsky [2]	Uralmet	Beloretsk [plant]	In just three years, %
Capital works in the field of extraction of raw materials (ore)	-	-	6.91	0.12	7.03 = 2.70
Capital work in the field of fuel procurement (mines, mechanized)	36.71	-	4.90	0.77	42.38 = 16.20
Coke production	28.70	-	.-	-	28.70 = 11

Blast-furnace shops	14.18	5.32	4.55	0.69	24.74 = 9.30
Steel workshops	11.60	0.36	4.37 [3]	0.91	17.24 = 6.6
Rolling shops	12.28 [4]	0.42	6.73 [5]	0.20 [6]	19.68 = 7.55-
Power economy	29.30	2.58	8.79	0 ^ 58	41.25 = 16.8
Transport	19.30	0.36	3.07	3.80	26.53 = 10.2
Other production	32.23	2.99	18.34	0.44	54.00 = 20.65
[Total]	184.30	12.03	57.66	7.66 [7]	261.55 = 100

From these data, it follows that over the past three years, capital expenditures on strengthening the main workshops of ferrous metallurgy (blast furnace, steel and rolling) amounted to only about 23.5% of the total cost, while the costs of ore mining, fuel procurement (coal mines, woodworking and coking plants) about 30%, on power facilities - about 17 and on transport facilities (off-site transport) - about 10% main production workshops. It should also be noted that the above figures do not yet contain all costs related to metallurgy,

The following provides an overview of the main characteristic areas in which the main costs went in certain sectors of the ferrous metallurgy economy.

Coke production. The above data show a large role in the costs of the southern metallurgy of capital costs for fuel procurement and for coke shops. The coke burnout was:

[Year]	Thousand. t	%
1925/26	1153	100.0
1926/27	1367	118.3
1927/28	1724	149.5

(for the first half of the year)	872	
in 1928/29 scheduled	1923	167.0

As is known, coke has been a bottleneck in the work of the southern factories in recent years. At the same time, coke is the main component in the cost of pig iron. Meanwhile, the lack of coke forced to put into operation not only the best units, but even the old wasteful furnaces without recuperation. As a result, coke is very expensive. Construction of two batteries (125 thousand tons of coke with recuperation) at the Stalin plant, two batteries [in] 56 furnaces (90 thousand tons of coke) with recuperation at the [Makeevsky] plant, construction of a battery in 20 Koppé system furnaces at the plant m. Frunze (45 thousand tons) and ordered abroad and currently installed three new coke plants using chemical products at the plants. Petrovsky, Dzerzhinsky and Voroshilov (capacity of each 415 thousand tons of coke per year), as well as a coke plant at the new Kerch plant of the Becker system with a capacity of 280 thousand tons should resolve the issue of coke. Lack of coke forced in the same years to restore a number of furnaces without recuperation. These are the works on the restoration of six batteries [in] 30 furnaces [each] at the plant [named after] Voroshilov (PO thousand tons of coke), three batteries of furnaces [8] at the Mariupol plant. These last two groups of ovens are extremely disadvantageous and were only put into operation as a result of extreme necessity ... [9]

Blast-furnace shops. In 1925/26, 23 blast furnaces were already put into operation in Yugostal. In 1926/27, 25 furnaces were already in operation (by the end of the year -24). In the current year 1927/28, 26 ovens are in operation. Smelting of pig iron has developed over the years as follows:

[Year]	Thousand. t	%
1925/26	1523	100.0
1926/27	2065	135.5
1927/28	2255	148.0
Scheduled 1928/29	2368	156.0

For comparison, let us point out that at the factories that are part of the Yugostal trust, 2682 thousand tons were smelted in 1913, and at the

factories that are currently operating, 2059 thousand tons. Thus, in comparison with the last one figure, it turns out that the:

[Year]	% From smelting in 1913 at the same factories
1925/26	74.0
1926/27	100.3
1927/28	109.2
1928/29	115.0

In 1913, iron smelting in the South was carried out in 45 blast furnaces. At the present time, it was impractical to start up all the small furnaces. Better and more powerful ovens were selected for the job. However, even among these furnaces there are furnaces of small volume (350-375 cubic meters) with a small hearth size (3.4-3.5 m). The need to speed up the smelting of pig iron as much as possible posed, along with the repair and restoration of old furnaces, the problem of the simultaneous reconstruction of these furnaces in the sense of increasing their capacity. Instead of furnaces with a hearth of 3.4-3.5 m, furnaces of 5-5.3 m are obtained with a daily smelting of 450 tons and more. At the same time, the construction of a new large American-type blast furnace was started - for 500 tons per day. The main works of this nature are listed in the following list:

Furnace No. 5 was reconstructed and put into operation at the plant named after Petrovsky with an annual capacity of about 140 thousand tons (hearth diameter - 5.3 m, smelting - 410 tons per day after conversion; 4 m and smelting - 310 tons per day before conversion).

Blast furnace No. 2 with a capacity of 500 tons per day was also rebuilt there. The reconstruction of furnace No. 6 was also started there. Dzerzhinsky, furnace No. 6 was rebuilt (the diameter of the hearth increased from 4 to 5 m, and the daily production increased from 280 to 382-415 tons in 1927-28). Furnace No. 3 is also being re-equipped there (hearth diameter 5 m, volume 753 cubic meters, annual capacity about 150 thousand tons).

At the plant them. Stalin began construction of furnace No. 3 for 180 thousand tons of pig iron per year (hearth diameter 6.3 m, volume 800 cubic meters). At the Makeyevsky plant, a furnace No. 4 of the

American type with a capacity of 180 thousand tons is being built; Voroshilov's blast furnace No. 5 is being rebuilt for 140 thousand tons per year. Construction of blast furnace No. 2 at the Kramatorsk plant for 380-400 tons per day.

Lack of capacity forced the restoration of small furnaces at the same time: at the plant. Voroshilov furnace No. 1 [for] 80 thousand tons per year, at the plant named after Frunze - furnace No. 1 [for] 65 thousand tons per year, at the Mariupol plant - furnace No. 2 for 90 thousand tons.

Simultaneously with the reconstruction of the furnaces, there was a better use of their volume. The utilization factor of the furnace volume, i.e., the furnace volume per 1 ton of daily smelting, was 1.84 in 1925/26, 1.76 in 1926/27, and 1 in 1927/28. 74, and this coefficient varies greatly for individual furnaces. There are old furnaces with very poor volume utilization (furnace # 1 at the Petrovsky plant - 2.06, furnace # 1 at the Yenakiyev plant - 2.39, etc.), and vice versa, in the converted furnace # 6 at the plant [them.] Petrovsky this coefficient is only 1.50.

Improvement of technical coefficients in connection with such a conversion and modernization of furnaces is determined, in addition, by the consumption of coke per unit of pig iron: the average consumption of coke in Yugostal in 1925/26 was 1.19, in 1926/27 - 1.16; coke consumption in furnace No. 5 at the plant [named after] Petrovsky before reconstruction 1.15, after reconstruction - 1.05 ... [10] [11].

The development of capital works in blast-furnace shops of the Ural metallurgy developed in general in the same direction as in Yugostal. - And here the same task of re-equipment is set in order to increase the capacity of individual units and modernize equipment. The difference in comparison with Yugostal is determined by the scale of the equipment used here and the uniqueness of the Urals fuel base. The scale of the equipment can be seen from the following comparison: the average daily smelting per blast furnace in Yugostal in 1926-27 [was] 250 tons, in the Urals - 66.1 tons.

If blast furnaces with a daily capacity of about 500 tons have already been built in the South, then in the Urals the construction of a blast furnace with a daily capacity of 450 tons, smelting (Nizhne-Saldinskaya

blast furnace) is scheduled only for 1931/32. a huge number of blast furnaces run on charcoal, for which even in the future, only the maximum standard scale of 100 tons of daily smelting is planned, and the increase in blast capacity is associated only with the development of cast iron smelting on mineral fuel.

Mineral fuel in blast furnace business in the Urals began to be used only in 1923-24, when 10.3 thousand tons of pig iron were smelted on it. The further development of this process is characterized by the following figures:

	1923/24	1924/25	1925/26	1926/27	1927/28
	г.	г.	г.	г.	г.
Pig iron smelting on mineral fuel, thousand tons	10.3	56.1	96.4	151.8	159.6
% of total production	4	fifteen	20	26	25

In connection with this transition to mineral fuel, a number of blast furnaces had to be rebuilt and adapted. An example is the completed reconstruction of the Nizhne-Saldinskaya blast furnace No. 5 for a total capacity of 45 thousand tons per year, the restoration of the furnace No. 2 and its adaptation for mineral fuel at the Nizhne-Tagil plant (a small furnace for 22 thousand tons), completion of the furnace No. 3 (capacity 37 thousand tons, *ibid.*), Restoration of 'furnace No. Z'na of the Kushva plant (28 thousand tons).

Simultaneously with the work on the introduction of mineral fuel into blast-furnace smelting, the process of raising the productivity of the blast-furnace in general took place. This process is characterized by the following figures

	1925/26 г.	1926/27 г.	1927/28 г.
Dynamics of iron smelting in the Urals,	474.8	573.2	138.9
Average smelting per blast furnace	60.9	66.13	74.16

If in 1913, on average, one blast furnace in the Urals and Siberia accounted for 12.7 thousand tons of pig iron per year, then, according

to Glavmetall [12], already in 1925/26, “and one blast furnace turned out to be 19.8 thousand tons per year.

The dynamics of the development of the capacity of Uralmet's blast-furnace shops is characterized by the following series of figures: as of October 1, 1925 - 608 thousand tons, as of October 1, 1926 - 677 thousand, as of October 1, 1927 - 748 thousand, and on October 1, 1928 - 791 thousand tons, that is, the capacity of blast furnace shops from October 1, 1925 increased by 183 thousand tons. This increase in capacity took place, as the given figures show, due to an increase in daily smelting per blast furnace from 60, 9 to 74.16 tons, which happened due to the reorganization of a number of domains.

An example of such rearrangements is the following (in t):

	Power increase
Reconstruction of blast furnace No. 6 at the Nadezhda plant	7,000
domain no. 1 and no. 5	16,000
Nizhne-Serginskaya blast furnace	6,000
»Blast furnaces No. 2 at the Zlatoust plant	12,000
Re-equipment of the blast-furnace shop at the Ufaley plant	7,000
»» »At the Kusinsky plant	9,000
Reconstruction of two charcoal blast furnaces at the Chusovsky plant	26,000
Reconstruction of the Asha-Balashevskaya blast furnace	23,000
"Blast furnaces No. 6 at the Nizhne-Salda plant	30,000

The process of enlarging the capacity of blast furnaces continues further, and, according to the materials currently available for the five-year development of the Urals, it is planned to bring the average daily productivity of one charcoal blast furnace to 96.2, and of one blast furnace using mineral fuel - to 173.7 tons per day, and in on average for all blast furnaces - up to 110.9 against 74.2 at present.

The work on the reconstruction of blast-furnace shops is accompanied by the mechanization and modernization of the entire blast-furnace economy and the rationalization of the ore mine. As one of the results of this improvement of the economy, a decrease in the consumption of charred fuel per ton of cast iron was obtained, namely: in 1925/26 - 1.20 tons, in 1926/27 - 1.13, in 1927/28 - 1.09 t.

Steel workshops. Turning to capital works in the field of steel workshops, we note the following basic data related to Yugostal (in thousand tons) [tab. 3].

[TABLE 3]

	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.
Steel smelting, thousand tons	1382	1659	2117 [13]
%	100	135	153
% of 1913 (at the currently operating factories)	66	89	101.5
Number of open-hearth furnaces	62	66	70
Bessemer number	2	8	8
Total tonnage of open-hearth furnaces	2909	2417	2637

Steel smelting at the currently operating factories reached 101.5% in 1927-28 against the corresponding smelting in 1913. In comparison with this latter, fewer open-hearth furnaces are in operation in the South (instead of 82 throughout the South in 1913, in 1926 / 27 g. Only 72 ovens were in operation). And here the task of restoration was reduced at the same time to the repair of furnaces and to their conversion to the largest possible tonnage. The average tonnage of one kiln in operation was 35.5 tons in 1925/26, 36.8 tons in 1926/27, 37.6 tons in 1927/28. These figures show that on average, small-scale furnaces operate at southern factories. At the plant them. Dzerzhinsky has a workshop of five open-hearth furnaces with a tonnage of 15-20 tons with manual filling and the same casting. At the plant them. Petrovsky, the old open-hearth shop consists of three furnaces with a tonnage of 25-35 tons.

All work on the development of the steel business is therefore now going in the direction of rebuilding open-hearth [furnaces] to the largest possible capacity. Recently, the furnaces have been rebuilt and are being rebuilt at the plant. Dzerzhinsky No. 7, 9 and 10 from 60 tons to

100 tons. The same alteration of furnaces for a 100-ton capacity is carried out at other factories (named after Petrovsky - furnace No. 10, the plant named after Stalin - furnaces No. 2, 3 and 4, oven No. 3 is already in operation). Other furnaces are being repaired, their heads are being rebuilt (furnaces No. 1, 5 and 8 at the [named after] Petrovsky plant), cranes are being rebuilt to the furnaces for servicing (a 30-ton crane at the [named] Voroshilov plant, an 80-ton filling crane at Mariupol plant), filling devices are installed (Yenakievsky plant, named after Frunze), casting ladles are being altered, etc.

Thanks to a number of such measures, steel production per ton of the nominal tonnage of open-hearth furnaces reached 615 tons in 1925/26, 645 in 1926/27, and 678 tons of steel in 1927/28.

The metal yield from the charge was 91% in 1924/25, 91% in 1925/26, 93% in 1926/27.

Fuel consumption (in terms of coal) was 0.31 tons in 1924/25, 0.306 in 1925/26, 0.298 tons in 1926/27 [14], and for a new open-hearth furnace 100-ton No. 3 at Stalin's plant - 0.270 tons.

However, the number of open-hearth shop downtime has increased over the past year. If in 1925/26 the percentage of working time to the calendar was 71%, then in 1926/27 it dropped to 68%. This increase in downtime is partly due to the need to rebuild shops and furnaces, and partly due to the increased number of repairs to furnace vaults. Open-hearth furnaces are a very weak point in the work of Yugostal. In this regard, according to an additional plan of capital works, this year it was proposed to Yugostal to start building and rebuilding the following furnaces: open-hearth furnace No. 10 for 100 tons at the [them.] Petrovsky and [them.] Dzerzhinsky plants, 2 open-hearths for 60 tons at Taganrog plant and plant them. Liebknecht, the Bessemer workshop at the Stalin plant ... [15]

The processes taking place in the Urals in the area of open-hearth furnaces are, in general, similar to the corresponding processes in the South, with the difference that, as in the blast furnace business, we are dealing here on a much smaller scale. If in the South the average daily smelting of one open-hearth furnace is about 100 tons, then in the Urals it is only about 65 tons. In addition, here the furnaces themselves are even more outdated than in the South. According to Uralmet, out of the

available total number of 46 furnaces with a total tonnage of 1,377 tons (or 30 tons per furnace), 22 furnaces are of the outdated type with no mechanization, and furnaces with mechanical loading are only 21. The objective of the furnace conversion here is to increase the average tonnage and productivity furnaces, mechanization of charge filling, transfer of open-hearth furnaces to mineral fuel,

General data on the work of open-hearth shops in the Urals are as follows [tab. 4].

[TABLE 4]

	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.	1928/29 g.
Smelt steel	671.3	741.9	779.9	912.4
Average kiln tonnage, t.	-	27.6	28.2	29.93
Smelting of an open-hearth furnace in	62.7	63.0	67.15	(pre-war 63.26)
Equivalent fuel consumption per ton	0.36	0.346	0.331	(pre-war 0.31)

The increase in the capacity of open-hearth shops for the three years under consideration is characterized by the following number of figures: as of April 1, 1925, 746 thousand tons, as of October 1, 1926, 781, as of October 1, 1927, 827, as of October 1, 1928, 913 thousand tons.. t.

The total increase in capacity is, therefore, 167 thousand tons. This increase in capacity is determined by the gradual putting in order and reorganization of open-hearth shops. With an average capacity of one furnace of about 30 tons, the converted furnaces receive a tonnage of 50 tons. These are the new Verkh-Isetskaya furnace of 50 tons (instead of the 20-ton furnace that existed until now) and the Zlatoust 50-ton furnace. The first of these furnaces is also especially interesting in that it is specially designed for the production of dynamo iron, the production of a completely new one, introduced in the Urals only in the most recent years.

The lack of high-quality steel raised the question of the development of electric smelting in the Urals, and this was carried out at the Verkh-Isetsky (transformer steel) and Zlatoust (tool steel) plants.

The above-mentioned process of fuel mineralization in open-hearth furnaces is currently only in the initial stage of its development. So far, there are only four gas generating furnaces for coal in open-hearth furnaces. Mineralization of fuel in open-hearth workshops is very important in order to release the maximum amount of firewood for charcoal blast furnaces. However, this process of mineralization will develop only in the following years.

Rolling shops... If we turn to the rolling shops, in Yugostal we had over the past years a certain surplus of equipment for rolling shops in comparison with the capacity of the steel shops. The shortage of steel led to the fact that rolling mills were put into operation only gradually. In 1925/26, 10 mills were put into operation. During 1926-27, 3 more mills were launched, and the total production in Yugostal was carried out at 55 mills. This year, work is carried out at 57 mills. The general condition of the rolling equipment is poor. Obsolete mills, poorly equipped mechanically, with worn out or weak in power electric motors or with even more worn out steam engines require large funds for re-equipment and additional equipment. The work that was carried out in the rolling shops over the past years was mainly reduced to repairs,

The task of additional equipment and re-equipment is reduced to their electrification, supplying them with harvesting devices, strengthening and rebuilding heating furnaces, mechanization of feeding, roller tables, cranes, etc. Thanks to such measures, the productivity of workshops has increased significantly, and in this respect there are now known reserves that allow to further increase the power of the mills by strengthening electric motors, adding heating furnaces.

As a result of commissioning and re-equipment, the dynamics of rental has changed, it is seen from [table. five].

[TABLE 5]

	1925/26	1926/27	1927/28	1928/29
	г.	г.	г.	г.

Production dynamics of production, thousand tons	1020	1487	1678	1894
In Yugostal, %	100	146	164	186
% of 1913 at the same factories	66	95		

... [16] In the field of rolling business in the Urals, the main task is to increase the production of roofing iron and rolling of sheet metal, and the task of concentrating the rolled slabs necessary for the production of sheet iron. In addition, the high quality of the Ural metal has set the task of setting up the production of special grades of iron: di-much, transformer, axles, etc. From works of this kind, you can indicate:

Expansion of the roofing iron workshop at Nytva (increase in roof output by 9000 tons);

installation of roofing stands and breakers at the Nizhne-Turinsky plant (increase in roof output by 5000 tons);

installation of two roofing stands at the Mikhailovsky plant (increase in roof output by 5000 tons);

expansion of the roofing shop at the Alapaevsky plant (increase in output of about 100 thousand tons);

organization of a workshop for dynamo and transformer iron at the Verkh-Isetsy plant;

expansion of sheet-rolling shops at the Nadezhdinsky and Nizhny Tagil plants;

expansion of the tin-rolling business on Lysva;

reconstruction of the day-to-day shop at the Alapaevsky plant, etc.

As a result of activities in the rolling shops of the Urals, the following product dynamics was obtained [tab. 6].

[TABLE 6]

	1925/26	1926/27	1927/28	1928/29
	г.	г.	г.	г.
Rolled metal output, thousand tons	502.8	542.2	576.4	667

%	100	108	115	133
Roofing iron production, thousand tons	186.8	224.7	240.8	278.5
%	100	121	129	149
Diam tin sheet production, thousand tons ...	-	-	9.3	20
Release of transformer [iron],	-	-	0.8	2,3

As for the capacity of rolling shops, Glavmetall estimates its growth as follows: on October 1, 1925 - 577 thousand tons, on October 1, 1926 - 587, on October 1, 1927 - 631, on October 1, 1928.-722 thousand tons.

Thus, the capacity of rolling shops increased by 26% over the years under review.

Ore economy. In direct connection with the capi-. It is also necessary to consider works on the development of iron ore mining with the development of iron ore mining. In the South, the ore economy is separated into an independent organization - YURT; in the Urals, it merges into one whole with metallurgical enterprises. This circumstance affected the very rate of recovery of the ore industry in both regions. The nature of the occurrence and the different qualities of ore in both metallurgical regions also influenced the well-known difference in the tasks that had to be solved in the ore economy of the South and the Urals.

The main task of the southern ore industry for the period under review was the maximum development of mining, since the restoration of the ore economy lagged far behind the growth of metallurgy, as can be seen from the following comparison [table. 7].

[TABLE 7]

	1925/26	1926/27	1927/28
	г.	г.	г.
Blast furnace production in the South, thousand tons	1670	2222	2491
%	100	133	149

Iron ore production YURT, thousand tons	2423	3538	4328
%	100	146	179

This circumstance forced first of all to pay attention to the restoration of canned mines. In 1924/25 there were only six iron mines in operation, by the beginning of 1926/27 there were already nine mines in operation, and in 1926/27 six more mines were put into operation. By the end of 1927/28, the task of removing the mines from conservation can be considered complete.

The impact of the introduction of the mines from conservation on the total production can be seen from the following comparison [table. 8].

[TABLE 8]

	1925/26 г.	1926/27 г.	1927/28 г.
Iron ore mining, thousand tons	12	332	574
in the reactivated mines in the mines restored before 1925/26	2411	3206	3754
Total	2423	3538	4328

This comparison shows that, after all, the main work to expand production was not due to the withdrawal from the conservation of the mines, but due to the expansion of the working mines.

Simultaneously with the task of maximum acceleration of mining, YURT faced the task of even greater difficulty, namely, the transition to underground ore mining. The development of mining in underground operations is characterized by the following coefficients: in 1925/26 - 27%, in 1926/27 -49, in 1927/28 -63%.

As of October 1, 1927, the total ore reserve for the opening of works was only 9 million tons, which at the pace of work in 1927/28 will be exhausted in the coming years, and all ore mining will have to go underground. Such a prospect required the strengthening of exploration work, strengthening and updating mechanisms for lifting, drainage and transport, the introduction of mechanization of production processes (drilling, loading, etc.). And this task, in turn,

came up against the task of re-equipment and development of the energy economy of the mines, its electrification. Meanwhile, the degree of electrification in Kryvyi Rih before the revolution was only 35%, and eight small power plants with a total installed capacity of about 9.3 thousand kW with a cost of 1 kWh of 4.8-9.5 kopecks were transferred to YURT from the old owners. , while, according to Glavmetall's estimates, by 1929/30 a working capacity of 11 thousand kW will be required. The supply of electricity through the construction of a new power plant with an installed capacity of 20 thousand kW (first stage) was set to YURT as the main task of capital works. This station will be completed in 1928/29 and should provide electricity for 3.7 kopecks. per kWh

The results of strengthening the equipment at the iron mines of the southern ore industry are characterized by the following figures [tab. nine].

[TABLE 9]

	On 1 / X 1925	On 1 / X 1927
Lifts		
number	27	71
power hp	1916	3786
Pumps		
number	33	127
power hp	808	3463
Compressors		
number	3	32
power hp	821	2678
Motors		
number	23	70
power hp	195	692

In the field of mechanization of production, the perforators imported over the years in large numbers made it possible to mechanize drilling already in 1926-27 by almost 90%, and this year - almost completely. Mechanization of transport on the surface is partially permitted by the introduction of petrol carriers. As for the mechanization of underground transport, as well as the installation of conveyors and scrapers for haulage, these are tasks that will be carried

out only from next year. With regard to loading, experiments are being carried out using excavators for loading ore in open pit mines.

As a result of the measures taken, the capacity of mines for the years under consideration changed as follows [tab. ten].

[TABLE 10]

	On 1 / X 1925	On 1 / X 1926	On 1 / X 1927	On 1 / X 1928
Iron mines, thousand tons	2686	3770	4328	4900
%	100	140	161	182
Manganese, thousand tons	520	540	559	600
[Total], thousand tons	3206	4310	4887	5500
%. .	100	134.5	152	172

As for some technical and economic coefficients, they are characterized by the following figures [tab. eleven].

[TABLE 11]

	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.	1928/29 g.
Consumption of equivalent fuel per 1000 t, iron ore, t			
in open works	5.87	5.52	4.61
in underground work	7.31	6.85	6.11
Sled consumption per 1000 tons.			
Rock mass in open work	374	351	327
Iron mass in underground works	853	826	759 ... [17] [18]

The total amount of capital work on the ore economy is determined by the following figures (excluding major repairs and housing construction) (in thousand rubles) [tab. 12].

[TABLE 12]

	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.	Total
YURT	5545	8081	13 858	27484
Uralmet	1470	2518	2917	6905
[Total]	7015	10,599	16,775	34389

However, these capital works include the construction of a new power plant in YURT, for which 7552 thousand rubles were spent until October 1, 1928. The station will go into operation in 1928/29. In general, the works were put into operation (in thousand rubles) [tab. thirteen].

[TABLE 13]

	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.	Total
YURT	4884	7101	6820	18803
Uralmet	302	372	6510	7284
[Total]	5186	7473	13 330	25 989 [19]

This series shows that the maximum commissioning of works, especially in the Urals, took place in 1927/28 (the end of the Goroblagodatskaya enrichment plant). Thus, the main effect of these works will be only in subsequent years [20].

TsGAOR USSR. f. 374, on. 1, d.485, ll. 148-161. Rotat. eke. No. 17

- [1] Including related major repairs. - Approx. document
- [2] Including related major repairs. - Approx. document
- [3] Including the production of dynamo iron. - Approx. document.
- [4] Including pipe-rolling shops. - Approx. document
- [5] Including tin-rolling shops. - Approx. document
- [6] Including wire and nail workshops. - Approx. document.

- [7] The sum of the numbers does not agree with the given total.
- [8] So in the document.
- [9] Comparative calculations of coke for old and new coke ovens are omitted
- [10] Information about the cost of pig iron on new units is omitted.
- [11] The modernization of blast furnaces has led to a significant reduction in the cost of pig iron. So, if the cast iron of the furnace No. 5 of the Yenakiyev plant cost 49 rubles before conversion. 83 kopecks, then after the reorganization in 1927/28 - 45 rubles. 56 kopecks per ton. The modernization of blowers was of great importance for Yugostal, out of a total capacity of 89.8 thousand liters. from. 19.7% were steam turbines, 48.3% were gas blowers and 37% were highly uneconomical steam piston blowers. To replace the most worn-out machines, 10 new blowers were ordered from abroad in 1928 (TsGAOR USSR, f. 374, on. 1, d. 385, pp. 152-153).
- [12] "Metal industry in 10 years". - Approx. document
- [13] In fact, in the first half of the year - 1103 thousand tons - Approx. document.
- [14] In 1913 - 0.290 tons. -Application of the document.
- [15] The calculation of the workshop cost of steel for the new furnace at the Petrovsky.
- [16] Information about the productivity of rolling mills after their conversion at Yugostal plants has been omitted.
- [17] Information about the construction of processing plants has been omitted.
- [18] In the iron ore industry, great work was carried out on the construction of concentration plants. In the Urals, an enrichment plant was built on Blagodati with a total cost of 5.3 million rubles, designed to enrich 280 thousand tons of first grade ore, the Vysokogorskaya enrichment plant in the Tagilo-Kushva region, a small enrichment plant at the Lebyazhinsky mine and at the Bakalsky mine, which increased the total capacity of factories from 300 thousand to 850 thousand tons of concentrate. In the South, only manganese ores were enriched. In 1927/28, the installation of the first two modern washing units was

carried out, which required the expansion of the power station named after Chubar from 375 to 2375 kW (TsGAOR USSR, f. 374, on. 1, d. 385, ll. 1160-161).

[19] The sum of the numbers does not agree with the given total.

[20] The main tasks of capital construction in non-ferrous metallurgy, as indicated in Art. the corresponding unpublished review. VSNKh, from 1925/26 to 1927/28 were: all-round acceleration of production at existing enterprises, the transition of non-ferrous metals production to a new technical base and the construction of new plants. Uraltsvetmet Trust was making a punching of a new mine in the area of the Konyukhovskie mines (which increased the productivity of the mines from 130 thousand to 240 thousand tons of copper per year); started the construction of a new processing plant at Kalat worth 3 million rubles; led the restoration of the Karabash plant to its pre-war capacity of 8 thousand tons of blister copper and an electrolytic plant (its productivity was doubled). Over the years, work on the Armmed trust has been carried out for 4620 thousand rubles, of which 2,910 thousand rubles. went to the mines.

For the extraction of zinc and lead in 1925 / 26-1927 / 28 only one enterprise functioned (Alagir in the Caucasus). 3856 thousand rubles were spent on the restoration of its obsolete equipment. In 1925/26, the construction of two new factories began: Bogomolstroy in the Urals and Atbastsvetmet in Central Asia. The construction of the Ridder lead-zinc plant continued (the construction of the first stage was completed in 1927-28). Trust Gos-Promtsvetmet spent in 1925 / 26-1927 / 28. for mechanical work at their factories 14,519 thousand rubles. (re-equipment of foundry and rolling shops, power facilities, etc.) (TsGAOR USSR, f. 374, on. 1, d. 385, pp. 197-212).

No. 17 Capital construction of general machine building trusts.

The rapid growth of all branches of the national economy has posed a number of urgent problems for our machine building. Of these, the largest and most important demanded, of course, their permission first. First of all, the prospects for the development of the country's economic life on the basis of electrification made it necessary to provide the power plants planned for construction with powerful engines: steam and water turbines and diesel engines. The general development and reconstruction of transport, which has not renewed its rolling stock for 10 years, set the task of urgent development of carriage and steam locomotive building and, in particular, setting up the production of heavy-duty cars and powerful steam locomotives. The shipbuilding development plan worked in the same direction. The need to import a large number of textile equipment from abroad during the construction of new textile factories and the re-equipment of existing ones put on the order of the need to organize textile machinery. Tractor construction for the industrialization of agriculture was the fourth production to be delivered. And, finally, in order to ensure the possibility of fulfilling all these tasks, as well as to supply the other branches of the metal industry, the machine building was faced with the urgent task of setting up the domestic machine tool industry.

In order to understand the possibilities at the disposal of our main machine-building trusts, we give a description of their fixed capital in the years produced for the period 1925 / 26-1927 / 28. capital investments in order to increase its capacity.

The pre-war capacity of machine-building trusts of Union significance, covering over 60% of the entire machine-building industry of the Union, was as follows (in million rubles):

Gomza Trust	62
Lenmashtrest	38
Southern mashtrest	29
State sewing machine	27
(including foreign parts imported for 22 million rubles.)	
Total	156

On October 1, 1925, the value of their property and technical loads was estimated as follows [tab. 1].

[TABLE 1]

[Trusts]	Restorative property value, million rubles	Cost including depreciation, mln	including RUB wear %	Load, % to technical capability
Gomza Trust	166.0	96.7	42	44.2
Lenmashtrest	115.0	80.3	31	56.8
Southern mashtrest	109.0	61.4	43	59.6
State sewing machine	25.6	18.9	26	70.0
[Total]	415.6	257.2	38	-

Thus, the factories of Lenmashtrest were in the most satisfactory condition. This is due to the fact that during the war, a significant amount of imported equipment was brought to Leningrad, a number of workshops were built for military needs, etc. But in general, the property of the trust, especially of [such] old factories as Putilovsky, presents a variegated picture, and along with new workshops and machines, there were workshops and machine tools that had worked for 25 years or more, which had become completely unusable. The worst was the case in YMT, where property depreciation was 43% in general and for some factories reached 50% and more. The [factories] of Gomza were in almost the same position. The buildings of the Podolsk plant are perfectly preserved at the State Shveymashin,

As for the wear and tear in the shops, the hot shops, such as, for example, the forge of the Putilov plant, were in a very poor condition. The state of the steam economy is characterized by the following data on the service life of steam boilers at large enterprises (in%):

Under 18	19
" 20 "	fifteen
" thirty "	27
Over 30 years	eighteen

The operating pressure at a number of installations was reduced from 12 to 8 atmospheres and below, and the load of such boilers was 12-15 kg of steam per square meter.

The auxiliary devices of the factory were also in an extremely unsatisfactory condition. Nevertheless, in the preceding monitored period - 1923/24 and 1924/25 - considerable work had already been done at the factories of the trusts to put their property in order and streamline production processes. At a number of Lenmashtrest factories (the tractor workshop of the Putilov factory, the Karl Marx factory), a regrouping of machine tools was carried out to maximize the straightening of the flow of the processed products; Workshops for the mass production of small parts were organized, cold stamping of small parts of tractors and steam turbine blades was introduced, the mechanization of foundries began by installing molding machines (the Karl Marx plant), etc. All these rationalization works had a major effect. The same trust in 1924/25 increased its output by 77% over 1923/24 and significantly improved all technical ratios. Similar work on the [trust] Gomza, where, by the way, special attention was paid to the dilapidated heat-and-power economy, made it possible for the trust to reduce the cost of casting by 22-30%, etc. A significant role here was played, of course, by a large increase in the load of factories.

By the beginning of 1925/26, as already indicated, machine-building plants possessed 40-60% of free capacity, but for the further development of production it was impossible to limit ourselves to rationalization measures and repairs, but it was necessary to start large-scale work on the expansion of the plants and their reconstruction ... This was caused both by production prospects, many times greater than the pre-war capacity of the factories, and mainly by the irrational structure of their main property.

As you know, Russian factories were distinguished by great universalism. A plant like Profintern in Bryansk produced a wide variety of products: from steam locomotives to plows and horse drives. The same goes for other factories. The development of factories proceeded in a "fitting-out" way, with separate workshops developing and building without any plan. As a result of this growth, factories are a conglomerate of workshops with completely unmatched capacity. With regard to, for example, the relationship between hot and exhaust shops, the following examples can be given: the iron foundry of the Lugansk plant will not be fully loaded even if the plant is reconstructed to produce 350 steam locomotives per year; the forging shop of the Sormovo plant was already in 1924/25, with a total plant load of 39%, 70% loaded, The molded foundry of the Kolomna plant in the same year, with a plant load of 35%, produced 70% of the pre-war castings. In general, it should be said that hot shops remain the bottleneck of production almost everywhere. The disproportion, naturally, increased with the setting up and expansion of a number of industries at the factories: tractor building at the Putilov plant, diesel building at Kolomensky [skom], etc.

The second characteristic feature of Russian machine-building factories was their simply technical backwardness. Especially, again, in hot shops, where work was done in primitive ways. Attempts to put in them the production of thin parts of modern machines, for example, parts of tractors in the forge and foundry of the Putilov plant, gave a huge marriage of products.

Another feature of factories should be paid attention to - this is an extremely irrational structure of the heat and power facilities of the factories. A good example of this is the Sormovo plant, which had 21 stoker rooms with 100 boilers.

Moving on to capital works for 1925 / 26-1927 / 28, we present several tables for their general assessment. Total spent for three years on general engineering (in million rubles) [tab. 2].

[TABLE 2]

[Type of work]	1925/26	1926/27	1927/28	Total
	г.	г.	г.	

Overhaul	6.1	8.6	6.2	20.9
Expansion and reconstruction	12.3	26.7	28.7	67.7
Housing construction of new factories	6.0	8.5	4.5	19.0
New factories	1.3	4.9	8.4	14.6
Total	25,7-	48.7	47.8	122.2. [1]

Locomotive building currently employs seven factories that specialized in this production even before the war. Their pre-war production and development for the period 1925 / 26-1927 / 28. presented in this form (in pieces) [table. 3].

[TABLE 3]

[Factory]	Pre-war issue of 1913	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.
Putilovsky	100	eighteen	fourteen	49
Nevsky	83	-	-	-
Sormovsky	114	159	62	90
Kolomensky	95		57	62
"Profinter"	66		67	70
Luhansk	82	143	75	69
Kharkiv	114		90	126
[Total]	654	320	365	396 [2]

It should be borne in mind that a comparison with the pre-war power does not sufficiently assess the development of steam locomotive construction, if we take into account the significant changes made in recent years to the design of old types of locomotives and the production of new ones. Thus, the Kolomensky Zavod redesigned a passenger steam locomotive of the "C" ("SU") series, which the Lugansk Plant also went over to build; The Putilov Plant developed the design and set up production (14 units were produced in 1926/27 and 49 will be produced in 1927/28) of a new type of three-cylinder powerful passenger steam locomotives of the "M" series, etc.

The indicated development of steam locomotive construction to a large extent required the re-equipment of the corresponding shops, their reinforcement with new machine tools and powerful cranes, etc. (new steam locomotives require 150-ton cranes, instead of the 50-ton ones at the factories). However, there were no major investments in capital re-equipment of locomotive shops during the reporting period. The costs were mainly for the purchase and installation of machine tools. So, according to the [trust] Gomza for steam locomotive shops for 1925/26 and 1926/27. 1,400 thousand rubles were spent, including 1 million rubles - for equipment, 360 thousand rubles - for overhaul. The Kharkov steam locomotive plant for the same time spent 490 thousand rubles on the same workshops, of which 320 thousand rubles. spent on equipment and 160 thousand rubles - for overhaul.

The further development of steam locomotive construction is associated with major work on the radical reconstruction of factories. At present, a project has been developed to re-equip the Lugansk plant to produce 350 locomotives of the M and T series per year. Over the past year, only preparatory work has been carried out in the direction of the project. On October 1, 1928, 3.1 million rubles were spent. mainly for the construction of a steel mill, which is a bottleneck in the production of the plant. In addition to Luhansk, Sormovskiy and Putilovskiy factories are also planned for reconstruction with 350 steam locomotives a year, but concrete implementation has not yet begun ... [3] [4]

The main trend of the new freight car building is the transition to heavy 50-ton cars. The largest work on setting up this new production in our country is the re-equipment of the car-building shops of the Bryansk plant, begun in 1925/26, for the production of 3,500 heavy-duty cars per year. The total cost of the workshop is calculated in the amount of 7230 thousand rubles, and for three years the following amounts were spent (in thousand rubles):

1925/26 g.	890
1926/27 "	2270
1927/28 "	1800

Total	4960
-------	------

Remains to spend 2270 thousand rubles. A significant part of the newly installed equipment has already been put into production. In 1926/27, 804 cars were produced; production to date has reached 8 wagons per day, for the entire 1927/28 the plant will build 1,700 wagons. Along with the increase in production, the cost of the car decreases. In 1926-27, the cost of a carriage was 9242 rubles, in the current year the last consignments cost 8208 rubles. wagon, i.e., 11% lower than 1926/27.

In addition to Bryansk, heavy wagons were also built by the Tver plant, which produced 293 wagons in 1926/27 and 382 in 1927/28.

In view of the large tasks of HKJIC for the construction of heavy-duty cars, to date, projects have been developed and approved for two new car-building factories for heavy-duty cars: the Dnepropetrovsk Yugostal plant for the production of 5 thousand cars and a new plant in Nizhny Tagil also for 5 thousand cars, and for the last plant at present a new version for 12 thousand cars is being drawn up. The start of the construction of these factories is delayed solely by financial considerations.

During the reporting period, no major works on car building, with the exception of the Bryansk plant, were carried out.

It should be noted that the Tver plant was removed from conservation, which required about 500 thousand rubles. for the carriage workshop, 2 million rubles. for the installation of diesel engines, 150 thousand rubles. for hammers, etc. The burned down assembly buildings were restored at the Tver and Mytishchi plants. The latter work will make it possible to increase the [production of] tram cars from 120 to 240 per year.

In general, the movement of the release of cars for 1925/26 and 1927/28. this is [5]:

	1925/26 g.	1926-27 g.	1927/28 g
Production of passenger cars at all factories	305	748	550
Release of freight cars in conventional units	670	7443	13 140

Turbo building is concentrated at a metal plant in Leningrad. The turbine workshop should be considered both in terms of the capacity of the entire workshop and [in] the capacity of individual machines as a completely new construction. Before the war, only turbines up to 1250 kW were built in Russia, and the entire output of the metal plant in 1902 was about 6 thousand kW. The cost of the entire workshop is calculated in the amount of 6580 thousand rubles, including 3180 thousand for construction work and 3400 thousand for equipment. Work began in 1925/26, when 530 thousand rubles were spent, in 1926/27 - 1620 thousand, scheduled for 1927/28 - 2280 thousand, it remains to spend - 2250 thousand rubles.

The capacity of the workshop is designed for 320 thousand kW. The works are gradually being put into operation and annually increase the output of the plant. The production of turbines in 1925/26 before the beginning of the reconstruction of the shop, but as a result of the measures of the previous years, was equal to 20 thousand kW. In 1925/26, 41 thousand kW were produced, in 1926/27 100 thousand kW will be produced, and in 1925/26 one turbine of 1000 kW was produced, and this year turbines up to 22 thousand kW are being built. kW power. In 1926/27, the first high-motion turbine of 30 atm was built, and this year turbines for a pressure of 35 atm will be produced.

Boiler building also received for the period 1925 / 26-1927 / 28. the rapid pace of development, since the extreme deterioration of the boiler industry in industry and the need to set up the production of high-pressure boilers up to 40 atm and above attracted increased attention from machine-building plants. The pre-war production of boilers was 28.2 thousand square meters. m. In 1925/26, 32.3 thousand square meters were built. m, in 1926/27 - 67.6 thousand, in 1927/28 - 91.6 thousand square meters. m.

The construction of high-pressure boilers was supplied by the Leningrad Metal Plant. This plant builds boilers with pressure up to 40 atm with a productivity of 35-40 kg of steam per 1 sq. m and a total heating surface up to 727 sq. m (the equipment of the boiler workshop cost the trust 600 thousand rubles). All expenditures were made in 1926-27 to pay for imported equipment and already in 1926-27 made it possible to increase output by 65%. The production of the workshop before the conversion was 6770 sq. m by 1230 thousand rubles, in

1926/27 - 18 505 sq. m for 3351 thousand rubles. and in 1927/28 the output will reach 23,421 sq. m for 6303 thousand rubles.

The work on boiler workshops of other factories also consisted in the installation of equipment, which resulted in a direct increase in their capacity. About 1 million rubles were spent on the Taganrog Boiler Plant in three years. Works 1925/26 and 1927/28 aimed at expanding production. Release in 1927/28 reached 18 thousand square meters. m against 13 thousand square meters. m in 1926/27

To assess the achievements in the construction of diesel engines for the reporting period, we will compare the rate of development of diesel engine construction during this time with the same for three years before the war [tab. 4].

[TABLE 4]

Before the war	1911 g.	1912 g.	1913 g.
HP release	30625	33525	41,400
% by 1911	100	111	135
% to the previous year		124	
During the reporting period	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.
HP release	22400	33,000	55,000
% by 1911	100	147	247
% to the previous year			167

This shows how much the development of recent years is faster than the pre-war rate. In 1927-28, the output of diesel engines will exceed the output of 1913 by 33%. The following factories were engaged in the organization and expansion of the trusts of the union machine building.

In Sormovo in 1925/26, a re-equipment and expansion of the plant's diesel workshop was undertaken in order to increase its capacity from 6 thousand to 20 thousand liters. from. The workshop is intended for the production of high-power diesel engines of the stationary type of the "Man" system. The plant will build vehicles up to 6 thousand liters. from. in the unit and 1 thousand liters. s.- in the cylinder.

The cost of the whole work is 3.51 million rubles, spent in 1925/26 900 thousand rubles, in 1926/27 - 862 thousand, in 1927/28 - 1100 thousand, in total - 2350 thousand rubles, it remains to spend 1160 thousand rubles. The costs incurred did not affect the output of the plant for the reporting period. In a new workshop, the cost is 1 liter. from. will be reduced from 230 to 186 rubles.

Kolomensky Zavod is also expanding its diesel plant, increasing its capacity from 15 thousand to 37 thousand liters. from. The workshop specializes in the construction of special purpose diesel engines. Its total cost is 5650 thousand rubles, costs in 1926/27 - 160 thousand and in 1927/28 - 2180 thousand, in total - 2340 thousand rubles. Another 3210 thousand rubles will have to be spent. The workshop is supposed to be finished in 1928/29. The cost of 1 liter. from. in a converted workshop is projected at 190 rubles. instead of 230 currently.

The third major work on diesel engine construction is a complete re-equipment of the Leningrad plant "Russian Diesel" (formerly Nobel). The plant's capacity is increased from 12 thousand to 40 thousand liters. from. Powerful ship diesel engines of the Sulzer system will be built. All work is estimated at 3,500 thousand rubles. and is divided into three completed queues. Costs over the years are as follows (in thousand rubles):

1925/26 start of construction	509
1926/27 "	543
1927/28 "	910
Total	1962
It remains to build	1538

The work is supposed to be completed in full in 1930/31.

The work, as noted, is being put into operation in part and already during the reporting period made it possible to increase the output in 1927-28 to 21 thousand liters. from. The cost price is 1 liter. from. will be at the converted factory equal to ... [6]

During the reporting period, the diesel production process was significantly streamlined. Thus, the assembly of a 150-horsepower

diesel engine at the "Russian Diesel" decreased from 12.5 hours. 1 liter. from. up to 6 hours, and 300-strong - from 10 to 4-5 hours. Small expenses were made in the diesel workshop of the Kharkov steam locomotive plant, but they nevertheless made it possible to increase the production of diesel engines and oil companies up to 9 thousand liters. from. on October 1, 1927 against 7 thousand liters. from October 1, 1926

It should be noted that almost all the plants that build diesel engines have concluded agreements with the relevant foreign companies for technical assistance, for setting up production and for consulting foreign specialists.

Tractor building at the present time "is supplied at two plants of the all-union machine building: Putilovsky and Kharkov steam locomotive building. The Putilor plant manufactures tractors of the Fordson type. The plant started equipping a tractor workshop back in 1924. The first stage of work costing 1,740 thousand rubles. was completed in 1926/27, in 1924/25 1,280 thousand rubles were spent, in 1925/26 - 400 thousand and in 1926/27 - the rest. The production of tractors and the movement of production costs are expressed in the following figures:

[Year]	Tractors produced, pcs.	Tractor factory cost price, rbl.
1925/26	450	4433 without fenders and without spare parts
1926/27	623	3990 with fenders and spare parts
1927/28	1200	

A further increase in the output of tractors rests mainly on the need to build a separate smithy and foundry at the workshop. It has already been noted that servicing the tractor workshop with general procurement workshops gave an extremely high percentage of scrap.

In general, the production of tractors at the Putilov plant is planned to be increased to 5 thousand units. per year at a final cost of about 1,500 rubles. We consider it necessary to provide two technical indicators to

characterize the achievements for the reporting period in organizing the production of tractors (in rubles):

	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.
Labor expended on production	573	434	406
Overhead, shop and factory	1930	1605	1416

The Kharkov steam locomotive plant, which manufactures tracked tractors, spent about 250 thousand rubles on its tractor workshop, mainly for the purchase of equipment. The plant produced:

in 1925/26	101	tractor	27,291 rubles per piece. at factory cost
"1926/27"	103	tractor	»21 365» »» »»
"1927/28"	103	"	"19 361" "" ""

The weak development of output is due to weak demand for tracked tractors, and a further increase in output is due exclusively to special tasks.

The question of satisfying the country's demand for wheeled tractors, determined in the amount of 30,000 per year, of course, cannot be resolved by setting up this production at existing factories. The maximum old factories can produce up to 7 thousand tractors per year. To date, a project has been developed and work has begun on the construction of a tractor plant in Stalingrad with the production of 10 thousand tractors in one shift. The cost of the plant is 35,163 thousand rubles. [7] Until October 1, 1928, 3380 thousand rubles were spent. Construction will go at full speed since 1928/29.

During the reporting period, several factories were engaged in the production of types of textile machines, but the largest and decisive in this direction is the re-equipment and adaptation specifically for the construction of textile machines at the plant. Karl Marx Lenmashtrest. The total cost of this work is estimated at 8500 thousand rubles; as of October 1, 1928, the costs were 2850 thousand rubles, of which 630 thousand rubles. as early as 1924/25 Most of the costs fall,

thus, for the coming years. But the costs incurred have given a large production effect to date. The plant has completely adjusted the mass procurement of parts for textile machines, spindles, a can of throwing rolls, various bushings and gears, etc. Of the complete machines, Northrop weaving machines were put into production: production of 200 pcs. per month, carding machines - 12-15 pcs. per month (serial production). Trial sets of water machines and a bank of brooches were made ... [8]

Here is a comparison of the factory cost of a weaving machine - "at several factories that manufacture these machines (in rubles):

	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927-28 g.
Klimovsky plant	2276	1341	1005
Shuya plant	1693	1 154	1032
Karl Marx Factory	-	1272	978

Among other factories engaged in textile machinery, the plant named after V. Engels, who set up the production of parts on a massive scale and achieved great results in this respect.

In recent years, machine-tool building has developed at the factories of republican and local trusts: The Red Proletarian (former Bromley) of Mosmashtrest, the Engine of the Revolution in Nizhny Novgorod, etc.

Of the major works on allied plants, it should be noted that, begun in 1925/26, the adaptation to the machine-tool building of the plant named after V.I. Sverdlov. For three years, this plant spent in 1925/26 230 thousand rubles, in 1926/27 - 170 thousand, [in 1927/28] - about 100 thousand rubles, in total - about 500 thousand roubles. The plant's output developed slowly due to the novelty of production, the lack of experienced designers in machine-tool building, etc.

For other types of production, we present the following major works:

1. Construction of a shipyard at the Sormovsky plant. This work costing 16 300 thousand rubles. so far only started. Until October 1,

1928 [9], 2600 thousand rubles will be spent. The construction is of great importance for the river and Caspian fleet.

2. Equipment of the Podolsk factory of sewing machines with machines for replacing worn-out and equipment of new workshops for the manufacture of parts that were previously imported ready-made from abroad. Significant advances have been made in this regard. Thus, the plant produced only 48% of the total number of parts on machines of two basic types in the pre-war period, and even then incompletely. In 1925/26 the plant launched production of 37, in 1926/27 -49, in 1927/28 - the last 14 units; from 1928/29 the plant will fully manufacture all parts.

3. Construction of a triernaya plant in Voronezh.

Of the works on metallurgical and hot shops, the following should be noted:

1. Construction of the 5th open-hearth furnace and the beginning of construction of the 6th [at the Putilov plant] at a cost of 1,135 thousand rubles, which should increase the capacity of the workshop from 76.6 thousand to 98.7 thousand tons. As a result of the construction of this [10] open-hearth furnace, the following results will be obtained to reduce the cost of production of the open-hearth shop:

	Cost 1926/27 [rub]	The cost of the first half of 1927/28 [rubles]
Blank open-hearth iron ordinary	84.83 per ton	80.16 per ton
Iron blank	98.84 ""	94.60 ""
Carbon blank	101.11 ""	98.69 ""

2. Re-equipment of the banding shop of the Kulebasky plant worth about 250 thousand rubles. These costs increase the capacity of the workshop from 13.3 thousand to 18.4 thousand tons.

3. Start of construction of a powerful steel foundry at the Lugansk plant. The plant's capacity is increasing from 60 thousand to 100 thousand tons. At the same time, the output of rolled products will increase from 50 thousand to 80 thousand tons per year.

4. Start-up of a broad-sheet mill at the Putilovsky plant. There are only two such mills in the Union: in Leningrad and [at] the Mariupol plant. The mill produces sheet with dimensions 3000X 60 mm, length up to 7 m from qualified metal for high pressure boilers. Its capacity is 4 thousand tons per year. Work began in 1925/26 and ends in the current one. The mill will develop its full capacity from next year, when it will be retrofitted with kilns.

5. Finally, the construction of a 5-span forge at the Putilov factory. Work began in 1924/25 and finished in 1926/27 at a total cost of 860 thousand rubles. The forge produced in 1926/27 6070 tons of forgings from an area of 6201 m of usable working area, i.e. about 1 ton per sq. m.

As for the energy facilities of the factories, there was relatively little work on steam power plants, and it boils down to replacing especially worn-out boilers and rationalizing the use of heat. For example, at the Sormovo plant, the work of the boilers was concentrated. The arrangement of the ring steam pipeline made it possible to reduce the number of stokers from 21 to 10 and the number of operating boilers from 100 to 35. But in general, the factories did not start to re-equip their steam power facilities in anticipation of the transition to electric power. During the reporting period, most of the work on the electrification of the Sormovsky plant and its connection to the Balakhna power plant was completed. Kharkov steam locomotive plant for 1926/27 and 1927/28 spent about 200 thousand rubles. for connection to the Kharkov power plant; [eleven]

The general conclusions from all of the above are as follows:

1. Capital expenditures 1925 / 26-1927 / 28. were aimed primarily at increasing the output of factories. In this respect, capital works have already produced a large production effect during the period under review. For a number of industries, the capacity of the factories significantly exceeded their pre-war throughput. A number of new industries were established, already during the indicated period, which gave a significant output of quite good-quality products: turbine building, textile machinery, etc. The full effect of the work performed should be expected in the coming years, since the full cycles of the largest works have not yet been completed.

2. The distribution of work on individual types of production should be recognized as quite rational, since the bulk of the funds was spent on the production of engines, transport and those types of mechanical engineering that are most important for our country.

3. Overhaul works helped to reduce the cost of production and improved technical production factors. When assessing this factor, it is necessary, however, to take into account that the period we are observing was a period of establishing a number of industries; that during this period there were circumstances that worsened the impact of capital works: the rise in prices for materials, the transition in some cases from oil to coal fuel and partly back, etc. and, finally, the fact that technical improvements in production could not be reflected in reducing the share of wages in the cost of goods.

4. Capital construction significantly influenced the return on fixed capital. In this regard, it is enough to point out the construction of a forge at the Putilov plant, the elimination of bottlenecks in production, such as at the Podolsk plant, etc., although it is difficult to distinguish in this case the influence of capital works from other factors influencing the load and purely organizational measures. In general, the growth in the use of fixed capital can be represented as follows [tab. five].

[TABLE 5]

[Year]	Property value	Gross output at cost	Release for 1 rub. property
	thous.	rub.	
1925/26	257.3	217.5	85 kopecks
1926/27	281.5	273.7	97 "
1927/28	304.3	342.6	1 RUB 12 kopecks

5. Capital works have not yet been able to eliminate the disparity between the shops due to the allocation of funds to the final shops and relatively insignificant allocations for procurement. The issue is largely losing its urgency with the proposed projects for the arrangement of regional procurement shops and, in general, greater cooperation in the work of individual plants. In this regard, the example of the Bryansk plant is typical, where the issue of procurement shops for a workshop

of heavy-duty cars is allowed to supply steel rolling wheel centers from the Pavlovsky mining district.

6. The newly installed machines were mainly aimed at increasing the output, and not at replacing worn-out machines, which leads to an incomplete possibility of their use.

7. It is necessary to note the slow pace of work, but this is largely due to the fact that, firstly, the work was carried out at the existing factories without interrupting production in them, as, for example, one can point to the Sormovskaya diesel workshop, where "work in 1926 / 27 were delayed due to the impossibility of demolition, but for production reasons, the bolt and electrical workshops, secondly, the imported and internal equipment was significantly late and it turned out in incomplete form and, finally, the general lack of allocations.

8. The cost of work in some cases, to a large extent exceeded the initial assumptions (workshop of heavy-duty wagons [in] Bryansk, shipyard in Sormovo), which is mainly explained by the changed tasks. But for most of the works, the actual "costs slightly deviated from the estimates.

9. The main defects in the construction of machine-building plants should be recognized: firstly, the fact that the largest works were carried out without plans approved by all instances, as a result of which the general prospects of this production were not sufficiently taken into account; secondly, the lack of master plans for the reconstruction of factories, which sometimes led to irrational measures and unnecessary costs.

10. With regard to the planned discipline in the production of work, it should be stated that business is improving every year and this year does not cause any particular complaints.

TsGAOR USSR, f. 374, on. 1, d.485, ll. 162-164, 166-173. Rotat. copies No. 18

[1] Information about changes in the structure and cost of fixed capital of plants has been omitted

[2] The sum of the numbers does not agree with the given-total.

[3] The information about the cost price of the "E" series locomotive has been omitted.

[4] The work carried out on the reconstruction of steam locomotive factories made it possible to significantly improve the technical coefficients and the organization of production, which resulted in a significant reduction in the cost of steam locomotives. Thus, the factory cost of a series "E" steam locomotive at the factories of the Gomza trust was 1,050 thousand rubles in 1925/26, 95.0 thousand rubles in 1927/28, and at the YMT factories - respectively 95.9 and 94 thousand roubles. (TsGAOR USSR, f. 374, on. 1, d. 385, l. 166).

[5] Information about the reduction in the cost of cars at the Tver plant has been omitted.

[6] The number is not specified in the document

[7] In view of the government decree on increasing the plant's capacity to 20 thousand tractors per year, its cost was increased by approximately 4.5 million rubles, so that its total cost will be about 30.5 million rubles. document.

[8] Information about the reduction in the cost of production at the plant im. Karl Marx.

[9] The document is erroneously dated 1925

[10] So in the document.

[11] Information about the state of housing construction has been omitted.

No. 18 Capital construction in the oil industry

Whereas in other industries capital construction has developed only in the last two or three years, in the oil industry this process began much earlier. Capital construction 1925 / 26-1927 / 28 is to a large extent only a continuation of what was started in previous years, differing from this period in a much wider scope, especially the start of some large projects of new construction.

The scale of construction in the oil industry is evident from the fact that for three years (1925 / 26-1927 / 28) the total. The amount of capital work on three trusts of union significance and the Oil Syndicate reaches 550 million rubles. Of this amount falls on [various types of work] [tab. 1].

[TABLE 1]

[Type of work]	1925 // 26, million rubles	%	1926 // 27, million rubles	%	1927 // 28, million rubles	%	For three years, million rubles	%
Overhaul	5710	3.9	6412	3.4	6 952	3.0	18714	3.4
Expansion and reconstruction	127.9	88.2	153.9	82.5	137.8	63.5	419.5	76.5
New construction	11.5	7.9	26.5	14.1	172.4	33.5	110.4	20.1
[Total]	145.1	100	186.8	100	216.8	100	548.7	100
Including								
housing construction	10.3		8.2		8.3		26.8	
drilling	71.1		91.9		80.5		243.6	

The change in the ratio between the individual categories of work is mainly reflected in the development of the construction of port factories and oil pipelines to them from the fields. In the same direction is influenced by the fact that drilling operations, whose growth has slowed down in recent years, are the largest item in the expansion and reconstruction work. Let us now consider where these enormous funds were directed and what is the effect of the work done.

Expenses for expansion and reconstruction and for new construction are distributed as follows for the main branches of the oil industry (for three trusts of the Union value in million rubles) [tab. 2].

[TABLE 2]

[Branches of oil economy]	1925/26 g.			1926/27 g.			1927/28 g.			In three years	
	expand- m and repairs	new build- telst- in	Total	expand- m and repair	new build- telst- in	Total	expand- m and repairs	new build- telst- in	Total	expand- m and repairs	new build- telst- in
Primary production	100.9	5.5	106.4	122.6	12.6		109.2	23.5		332.7	41,7
Including											
drilling	71.1	-	71.1	91.9	-	-	80.5	-	-	243.6	-
gas and oil production	23.1	0.9	24.0	23.1	-	-	14.5	-	-	61.5	-
processing, etc.	9.3	2.1	-	20.2	-	-	37.6	-	-	69.2	-
Heat and power facilities	7.8	-	-	7.1	0,4	-	5.4	2.4	-	20.3	2.8
	1.6	4,3	-	1.9	7,7	-	2.7	31.5	-	6,3	43.6
Ancillary enterprises	3.3	0.1	-	4.8	0.5	-	4.9	1.5	-	13.0	2.0
Housing construction	9.7	-	-	7.2	-	-	7.8	-	-	24.7	-
Total	123.3	9.9	-	143.7	21.2	-	130.0	58.9	-	396.9	90.0

Of the total amount of capital works in 486.9 million rubles. completed works by the end of 1927/28 will total 373.2 million rubles. [1], namely (in million rubles):

By main production	289.9
Thermal power industry	13.2
By transport [2]	29.8
By subsidiary enterprises	15.2
Residential construction	25.1
[Total]	373.2

Let us turn first of all to the field business and, first of all, to drilling ... [3] Let's start our review with production drilling, the size of which is expressed in the following figures (in thousand log meters) [tab. 3].

[TABLE 3]

	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.
Azneft	182.0	219.3	229.0
Grozneft	55.1	71.5	56.9
Emba	4.4	7.4	4.9
[Total]	241.5	298.2	290.8

The weakening of the rate of drilling is explained by the discovery and commissioning of new rich formations in the Baku region (especially the 5th Surakhany) and the increase in fountain production in Grozny, which is largely due to the fact that, contrary to initial expectations, the penetrated seam No. 16 turned out to be a rich gusher layer.

Drilling effect:

1) An increase in the number of productive wells [tab. 4].

[TABLE 4]

	1 / X 1926	1 / X 1927	1 / X 1928

Azneft	2962	3040	3517
Grozneft	400	471	527
Emba	115	151	194

Moreover, the composition of the wells is significantly rejuvenated, which ensures the sustainability of production development.

2) Production growth (in thousand poods) [tab. five].

[TABLE 5]

	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.
Azneft	6665.4	6970.0	7965.1
Grozneft	2411.4	3105.7	3312.9
Emba	218.0	249.7	275.4

Production and exploration drilling was [table. 6].

[TABLE 6]

	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.	In just three years
Azneft	12,940	23 449	-	-
Grozneft	18181	25381	19454	83018
Emba	-	2 153	5455	7 608 ... [4]

Oil drilling, which is the largest capital expenditure in the oil industry, can at the same time be viewed as one of the most important field operations. For a proper drilling setup, in turn, significant capital expenditures are required, mainly for the purchase and installation of the equipment necessary for this. Improvement and cheapening of drilling is a necessary condition for reducing the cost of oil. Azneft alone spent 17.2 million rubles in this direction, and the capital invested in drilling equipment almost doubled during this time. the oil industry

in this direction, as you know, consisted in the introduction of more improved methods of drilling: rotary instead of percussion,[5] [6]

Hence, it is clear that the transition from percussion drilling to rotary drilling is a powerful factor in reducing the cost of drilling. This transition has been accomplished in recent years with rapid steps. The figures for Azneft say the following.

Metering by drilling methods (in m) [tab. 7].

[TABLE 7]

[Year]	Rotational	Turbine	Cable	Shock	Rod	Total	% rotary drilling	% rod drilling
1924/25	66198		9389.7		45493	122,023	54.0	37.2
1925/26	127,066	-	41 789	-	32806	202,985	62.7	25.8
1926/27	181,903	4479	50164	-	18709	255 255	71.4	7.4
1927/28 (First half)	84 237	3099	19,023	-	3434	109 793	77.0	3.1

Thus, on the one hand, rotary drilling displaces percussion, on the other hand, inside percussion, the least perfect rod drilling is supplanted by wireline drilling (before the war, wireline drilling was not used in the Baku region).

The number of rotary machines was:

		% from all of us machine tools
On 1 / IV 1927	180	54.1
"1 / X 1927"	209	59.4
"1 / IV 1928"	216	69.0

In Grozny, development went in the same direction; rotary drilling in 1925/26 accounted for 24.5% of the total meterage, in 1926/27 - already 38.3, and in 1927/28, according to planned assumptions, 46% of the total meterage was planned; the number of rotary drilling rigs as of October 1, 1925, 13, as of October 1, 1926, 25, as of April 1, 1927, 35 (16.1%), as of

October 1, 1927, 36 (24.5%) and the estimated-on October 1, 1928 -39 (27.8% of the total number of machines) ... [7]

Capital expenditures for oil production include the necessary equipment for wells, the device of a production tank for the passage and storage of oil, the device of internal oil pipelines, etc. (for Grozneft, this also includes the costs of drilling equipment). These costs are caused, on the one hand, by the expansion of production and an increase in the number of operating wells, which require appropriate equipment, on the other hand, by a complete technical reorganization and rationalization of the entire field economy, expressed primarily in the transition from tartar to pumping production, to electrification of wells and sealing. extraction, pumping and storage.

The spread of pumping operation can be seen from the following data showing the change in the percentage of different production methods.

For Azneft [in%] [tab. 8].

[TABLE 8]

	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.
Fountain mining	fifteen	18.3	46.9
Compressor room.	24.2	28.7	46.9
Deep pumps	29.9	35.9	45.8
Tartanie	28.8	15.6	6,7
Other loot	2.1	1.5	0.6
[Total]	100	100	100

[TABLE 9]

	1 / X 1925	1 / X 1926	1/4 1927	1 / X 1927	1 / IV 1928	1 / X 1928
Deep pumps	34.1	56.9	66.9	73.2	75.6	82.6
Tartanie	57.6	34,7	24.7	18.3	15.3	-
Compressor	6.5	6.4	6.5	6.5	6.8	-

Fountain	1.8	2.0	1.9	2.0	2.1	-
[Total]	100	100	100	100	100	

Grozneft.

Percentages of distribution of artificial lift by operation method [tab. ten].

[TABLE 10]

	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.
Deep pumps	58.5	70.9	84.0
Reciprocating	12.7	8.7	6.1
Tartanie	28.5	20.1	9.8
Compressor	0.3	0.1	0.1
[Total]	100	100	100

The distribution of the number of operated wells is as follows [in%] [tab. eleven].

[TABLE 11]

	1 / X 1925	1 / X 1926	1/4 1927	1 / X 1927	1 / X 1928
Deep pumps	64.4	71.2	76.2	81.8	83.9
Bailer	26.0	22.5	16.2	10.8	8.5
Piston	-	-	3.4	2.1	1.8
Compressor	-	-	0.1	0.2	0.2
Fountain	-	-	4.1	5.1	6.1
[Total]		-	100	100	100 ... [8]

Well electrification is characterized by the following data showing how complete the electrification process carried out in the oil industry is.

The number of wells (by the type of engine) (in% of the total number of wells) [tab. 12].

[TABLE 12]

[Date]	Azneft		Grozneft	
	electric motors	steam engines	electric motors	steam engines
1 / X 1925 "	81.6	7.8	56.5	36.7
1 / X 1926 "	90.7	1.9	71.0	23.4
1 / X 1927 "	95.0	0.9	81.3	14.5
1 / X 1928 "	97.4	-	89.3	4.4

How electrification, coupled with the transition to pumping operation, affected fuel consumption in the fields, can be seen from the following data showing the percentage of fuel consumption in the fields throughout the production (electricity and gas are conditionally converted to oil):

	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.
Azneft	7.5	4.9	3.9
Grozneft	9.7	8.6	6.2

Moreover, the share of electrical energy in the total energy consumption was [in%]:

	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.
Azneft	36.8	46.7	55.9
Grozneft	5.6	8.0	10.9

Along with pumping operation and electrification of oil fields, a number of measures are of great importance for the oil industry, united under the general concept of "sealing" (closed operation system), aimed at protecting oil from the evaporation of its light fractions during production, pumping and storage. These measures consist in supplying wells airtight container - dipstick instead otstoechnyh open vats, an

airtight closure of the well itself and the closed piping system instead of the gutters, the supply tanks serving for the collection and storage of oil hermetic lids ... [9]

Oil refinery business... Capital construction in the field of factory business took on a wider scale much later than in the field of industrial business. This is explained by the fact that up to 1925 the capacity of the factories that passed to us from the pre-revolutionary period far exceeded the amount that was presented for processing. Until that time, Azneft not only had not built new plants, but also demolished a number of old ones, the start-up of which, due to their worn-out condition, was not considered profitable, and almost Azneft went too far in this direction. True, this, among other considerations, was prompted by the extreme overcrowding of factories, which did not allow carrying out a number of measures to improve processing at existing factories. In this situation, a decisive turning point began in 1925/26. The powerful growth of production leads to the fact that the state of oil refineries is increasingly becoming a bottleneck in the oil industry as a whole. Due to the insufficient throughput capacity of the refineries, a significant amount of valuable light oil remained unrefined and went into fuel.

The growth in light oil production has already intensified, especially due to the entry into operation of the rich new, 5th Surakhani reservoir, which yielded light oil, and the state of the factories led to the fact that the wealth extracted from this reservoir remained far from fully used. The relationship between the production of light oil and refining in Azneft is seen from [data table. 13] (in thousand tons).

[TABLE 14]

	1 / X 1925	1 / X 1926	1 / X 1927 [10]	1 / X 1928
Azneft				
Kerosene batteries	3700	3740	4740	5500
%	100	101	127	148
Oil batteries	792	940	1265	1295
%. .	100	119	160	164

Grozneft				
Kerosene batteries	2300	2800	3030	3605
%	100	122	132	157
Emba				
Kerosene batteries	1640	1640	2630	2631
%	100	100	160	160

These figures do not yet include the capacity of the factories being built in the norths, since these factories will start operating after October 1, 1928.

Now let us briefly characterize those largest objects that were the result of capital construction and allowed to increase the throughput of factories, especially in the last two years, when these units come into operation.

One of the first large plant construction projects was the construction of a new oil plant in Baku, which was started back in 1924/25. Lubricating oils are the main export commodity of Azneft (there was still little hope for Baku gasoline), the situation on the export market at that time was very favorable why and. decided to start the construction of this plant, designing the building according to the latest technology. The construction of the plant took a long time, and in fact it [was] completed only at the very end of 1927, and even then it was incomplete: the construction of an electric station with steam extraction was not yet completed, there was something wrong with the pumping station, with desalination plants, so for now the work of the plant cannot be considered quite normal. The plant is designed to process 246,700 tons of fuel oil, and with its construction, the existing disproportion between the output of oil fuel oil and the capacity of oil batteries is eliminated. The estimated cost of the plant was 2833 thousand rubles, in fact, it will cost about 3500 thousand rubles ...[eleven]

The Grozny Paraffin Plant, which was built in 1924/25 and completed in 1927, however, only with a capacity of 300 thousand poods, is also among the earliest objects of fishing plant construction. white and match paraffin instead of the projected total productivity of 400 thousand poods. A plant with a full capacity of 400 thousand

poods will cost 4.3 million rubles.. instead of the estimated 2.45 million. Both the overspending and the delay are mainly due to the unpreparedness for this completely new business for us, and partly to the delay in the equipment ordered by the USSR. With the existing high prices for paraffin wax (which is the subject of import), the profitability of this plant is extremely high and amounts to about 1.4 million rubles. a year, not to mention the importance of stopping the import of paraffin from the point of view for our currency.

With regard to kerosene batteries, we must point out, first of all, to the transition of our oil industry to the construction of pipe-type factories instead of vat batteries. Such installations have recently been widely used in the United States and represent to a large extent a real revolution in the refining business. The advantages of these installations are their smaller volume, smaller heating surface, smaller area, which they occupy, and the speed of the process. As a result, the consumption of steam, and, consequently, the fuel consumption is much less than in cubic batteries. The availability of evaporometers makes it possible to widely apply the principle of rectification, which immediately results in clearly separated products of high quality. In general, improving the quality of [products is one of the important advantages of these installations.

The first attempt in this direction is the construction of a kerosene-gasoline plant on the site of the former. "Bakunit", which consists of two sectors with a total capacity of 327.0 thousand tons. The equipment was produced by means of Azneft at its subsidiary enterprises. The cost of the plant is 891 thousand rubles. (with an estimate of 661.2 thousand rubles), its profitability is determined by preliminary calculations at 661.2 thousand rubles. in year. At present, next to the first two sectors, two more sectors of the same productivity are being built with (changes made based on the experience of the first sectors. Their cost will be about 450 thousand rubles.

In addition to these pipe plants, built from Russian equipment, Grozneft and Azneft have ordered four more units abroad (in Germany), which will soon be received and installed. Their total capacity will be about 660 thousand tons, and the cost - about 2.5 million rubles. Finally, tubulars were ordered in the United States with a production capacity of about 25 1 million poods. in year.

In addition to tubular batteries, the oil industry continued to build new cubic batteries, introducing a number of significant improvements in them. The 15-cubic-meter battery of the engineer Yelin-Shukhov's system, which is being completed in Grozny, stands out especially among these structures. The construction of this plant was started already in [12] ... The plant was supposed to be launched in November 1927, but in fact it is only now ending. The delay was due to the delay in the arrival of foreign equipment and its haphazard arrival; some pieces of equipment arrived without others closely associated with them. The estimated cost of the plant was 850 thousand rubles, in fact, it will cost 1.81 million rubles. The battery is designed to process 1,638 tons of crude oil per day, about 500 thousand tons per year, with up to 50% of distillates withdrawn. Its improvement in comparison with the existing vat batteries, by the way, consists in the fact that not only fuel oil, but also diethylate heat is recovered in it. and water vapor, wastewater vapor is used. In addition, the rectification devices are built in accordance with the latest technical data, the regulation of the production process is automated. The result of all this, in addition to increased gasoline yield (18% of heavy gasoline without re-race) and improved product quality, is a 3% reduction in fuel consumption and distillation losses calculated on the basis of oil, as well as elimination of re-distillation. This reduction in fuel consumption translates into annual savings. 15 thousand tons of fuel oil, which at a price of the latter at 19 rubles. 89 kopecks per ton is 298-350 thousand rubles.

Among the still batteries, we will mention the 10-cubic battery, which is still under construction in Azneft at plant No. 2D-group. For the construction of this battery with a capacity of 20 million poods. the old Lancashire boilers that have come out of work are used annually. Since the battery is being built at an existing plant and therefore very few auxiliary devices are required, the indicated additional capacity is 20 million poods. is obtained at a cost of only 280 thousand rubles. The battery is currently running out. In Grozneft in 1925/26 and 1926/27. a new 15-cc battery with a capacity [13] was built from old cubes, which cost 759 thous.rub.

Let us also mention that at the Embaneft Konstantinovsky plant in 1926-27, the equipment of a new kerosene section was completed, which increased the productivity of the plant from 6 to 12 million poods. 500 thousand poods

These works eliminate the disproportion that existed at the refinery between the kerosene and oil batteries (the capacity of the latter was 6 million poods of processed oil fuel when the output of fuel oil from the kerosene battery was 3 million poods).

The program of factory construction carried out so far makes it possible to bring oil refining in the Baku region up to 370 million poods in the upcoming 1928-29, which will make it possible to process all light oil. In Grozny, the end of the factories under construction creates even excess capacity, which will make it possible to disable the most worn out of the existing factories, which should be recognized as urgently necessary.

In addition to tubular batteries, another technical innovation that our oil industry is currently working hard to achieve is the introduction of installations for cracking (breaking up molecules) fuel oil to produce gasoline. Economic significance: obtaining an export product from fuel oil - gasoline.

The first experiments were carried out with the installations of the British firm "Vickers" and so far cannot be recognized as successful. In Baku, the installation was initially put into operation in September 1927, but the launch was unsuccessful, structural defects were discovered, and the company undertook to correct the defects and start up the installation in June - July this year. The trial work has already begun. If the installation turns out to be unsuitable, then, according to the contract, the company removes and takes away all the equipment, paying Azneft the entire cost of installation. The total cost of the installation according to the estimate was 1,657 thousand rubles, in fact, 1891 thousand. The situation is similar with the same installation in Grozny. In view of the enormous importance of cracking for the entire economy of the oil industry, in addition to the production of gasoline, cracking for Grozny helps to resolve the painful issue of paraffinic oil, can also improve the quality of Grozny gasolines, since the addition of cracking gasoline to the latter eliminates their detonating properties. These early failures do not stop our oil industry in its efforts to achieve positive results. Negotiations are currently under way to order seven cracking units in the United States with a capacity of up to 14 million poods gasoline per year. Since gasoline is an export

commodity, it is especially cost-effective to build them in ports to save rail freight for gasoline from areas to ports.

All of the above construction retreats far back in front of the enormous capital work carried out to build large oil refineries in Batum and Tuapse and the Baku-Batum and Grozny-Tuapse oil pipelines that make up a single whole with them. In view of the close connection between port factories and oil pipelines, we will consider these two constructions together in the future.

All this construction logically follows from the general setting of our oil industry as an export industry. At present, our export is not profitable enough, and for some products it was even unprofitable before due to the high cost of rail transportation; pumping by oil pipeline is much cheaper than railway transportation. If at present the railway tariff for an average pood of oil products exported from Baku is about 16 kopecks, then pumping through the pipeline will cost 5-5.5 kopecks. for a pood. But regardless of this, if the pipeline were not built, the railways would be unable to transport the entire growing amount of export goods; increasing the capacity of roads would cost no less than the construction of oil pipelines and would not give an effect in the sense. reducing the cost of transport. Finally, factories built using the latest technology will not only provide products' cheaper, but also of higher quality, which will undoubtedly increase our competitiveness in world markets ...[fourteen]

The oil refinery in Tuapse, on the instructions of the government, should be ready by October 1, 1928, in fact, it will be ready only by April 1, 1929, possibly with some delay. Failure to meet the deadline depends primarily on the unreality of the short construction deadline. The construction project was approved by the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR in February - March 1927, construction began in May of the same year. To complete the plant by October 1, 1928, that is, within 17 months, even in American conditions is a matter of great difficulty, especially if we take into account the climatic conditions in which the construction is carried out. As for the cost of the plant, when the project was approved, it was calculated at 26,572,816 rubles, while after revising it in 1928 as a result of the experience of the previous year - 29,399,014 rubles.

The increase in the cost of the plant by 11% will take place as a result, first, of the addition of a number of works that were overlooked in the initial estimate; some - as a result of the rise in the cost of some work. Can. assume that construction will have some cost reduction in order to reduce the cost of work.

The oil refinery in Tuapse is currently being built with a capacity of 72 million poods. with an expansion in 1928/29 to 90-100 million poods. The plant in the first stage consists of one vat and one tubular battery. Initially, it is supposed to disperse the mixture for kerosene, gasoline and fuel, but already in 1927/28, cracking began to be installed, the number of which is six with an approximate cost of 10 million rubles ... [15]

Construction of the Baku-Batum oil pipeline started in the current operating year; The deadline for the completion of the head part of the Khashuri-Batum oil pipeline with a length of 236 kilometers by October 1, 1928 - according to the government's instructions. The state of the work allows us to hope that this deadline will be fulfilled, perhaps only with a slight delay, no more than a month. The entire oil pipeline will be ready by October 1, 1929, and this deadline will probably be fulfilled, since there are very real prerequisites for this ... [16]

The plant in Batum should be partially ready by October 1, 1928 for the production of 50 <mln. poods - according to the instructions of the government; but in view of the difficulty of the matter and the shortness of the appointed time, the plant will not be ready by October 1, 1928; apparently, it is necessary to foresee a delay of no more than three months. As for the cost, it is calculated so far at 24.5 million rubles, but when considering the estimate, it is possible to expect some clarification of it by about 2-2.5 million.

The oil refinery in Batum is designed to ultimately process 2,460 thousand tons of oil, and the construction scheme is as follows: by October 1, 1928, the first kerosene battery with a capacity of 820 thousand tons will be installed; by October 1, 1929, two kerosene-oil batteries with a capacity of 1640 thousand tons will be ready together. In any case, the profitability will not be lower than that given for the Tuapse plant.

The commissioning of the Batumi refineries will increase the plant capacity of Azneft so much that the Baku oil industry, using the freed capacity of the oil refineries in Baku, will be able to move on to a practical solution to the major problem facing the front - the refining of heavy oil. Until recently, this oil was considered as fuel oil, unsuitable for further processing. However, both the experience of the United States and laboratory work show that a significant portion of this oil can provide a large number of valuable products, including good lubricants and other oils ... [17] [18]

The oil industry developed significantly ahead of other sectors of the national economy; this intensive development in the first years after nationalization rested on an insufficient supply of industry to the USSR with limited imports. It became necessary to provide itself with its own mechanical factories and workshops, its own rope and nail factories, etc. This quite healthy beginning for the first years after nationalization required revision in recent years, when the Soviet industry developed sufficiently to meet most of the needs of the oil industry. Having reduced the costs of mechanical ancillary enterprises, Azneft, at the same time, was forced in 1927-28 to start building an anhydride plant for the preparation of sulfuric acid, Frischer units, etc.

In conclusion, we present some more data showing the change in fixed capital as a result of the completed capital work. The fixed capital of the entire oil industry gives the following growth (in million rubles) [tab. fifteen].

[TABLE 15]

	1 / X 1925	1 / X 1926	1 / X 1927	1 / X 1928
All over the oil industry	556.5	651.2	757	914
%	100	117	138	168
Including				
Azneft	100	116	133	148
Grozneft	100	123	160	236
Embaneft	100	124	179	227
Oil syndicate	100	117	138	168

The composition of the fixed capital (operating) of Azneft and Grozneft [in million rubles] [tab. sixteen].

[TABLE 16]

	1 / X 1925	1 / X 1926	1 / X 1927
Main production (fields and factories operating)	287.5	335.2	404.4
Heat and power facilities	25.5	28.6	38.3
Transport	10.9	12.1	13.5
Ancillary enterprises	11.0	17.3	22.0
Housing construction	60.4	71.3	77.5
Main production (fields and factories operating)	287.5	335.2	404.4
Total	502.4	566.1	657.5

In percentage terms, the growth of the fixed capital of these two largest trusts is shown in table. [17].

[TABLE 17]

	1 / X 1925	1 / X 1926	1 / X 1927	1 / X 1928
Primary production	100	117	140	169
Heat and power facilities	100	112	130	146
Transport	100	106	124	136
Ancillary enterprises	100	157	193	256
Housing construction	100	117	127	137
Oil trading	100	112	124	144
Total	100	117	138	168

TsGAOR USSR, f. 374, on. 1, d.485, ll. 174-180, 182-196. Rotat. copies

[1] Without Emba. - Approx. document.

[2] The article "transport" includes railways, motor vehicles, road facilities, oil trunk pipelines. document.

[3] Omitted the enumeration of the types of drilling.

[4] Information about the discovery of new oil fields has been omitted.

[5] Information about the cost of drilling in various ways is omitted.

[6] The lowest cost of drilling at Azneft was achieved in 1926/27 by the rotary method and amounted to 190 rubles. 02 kopecks per running meter (the prime cost of rod and wireline drilling was, respectively, 294 rubles 85 kopecks and 229 rubles (dec. 83 kopecks). Turbine drilling, invented by the Soviet engineer Kapelyush-pikov, was also successfully developed at the Azneft fields (TsGAOR USSR, f. 374, on. 1, d. 385, l. 178).

[7] Information about the movement of the cost of drilling by new methods has been omitted.

[8] Information about the cost of work during pumping wells has been omitted.

[9] Information about the state of sealing of the oil industry is omitted.

[10] Together with the plant at the Bakunit site, completed at the very end of 1926/27 - Approx. Document.

[11] Information about an increase in the distillation of fuel oil and a reduction in fuel consumption at the plant has been omitted.

[12] No date is specified in the document.

[13] The figure is not indicated in the document.

[14] Information about the construction of the Grozny-Tuapse oil pipeline and its technical and economic indicators has been omitted.

[15] The calculation of the plant's profitability is omitted.

[16] The calculation of the pipeline profitability is omitted.

[17] Information about the development of the heat and power economy is omitted.

[18] In three years, Azneft, Grozneft and Embaneft spent 13 412 thousand, 9255 thousand and 415 thousand rubles, respectively, to rationalize the heat and power facilities, which made it possible to expand the power plant in Baku by two turbines of 20 thousand kW each, start construction power plants in Grozny with a capacity of 10

thousand kW, with the possibility of further expansion to 20 thousand kW (TsGAOR USSR, f. 374, on. 1, d. 385, l. 193).

No. 19 Capital construction in the electrical industry

The state of the fixed capital of the electrical industry by 1924/25 can be characterized as follows:

1. Most of the enterprises built in the period 1910-1912 were worn out by about 30%, and the equipment had an average of more than 15 years of service, although it was partially replenished after 1912.

2. Enterprises built in pre-revolutionary times were built and expanded not according to a pre-developed plan that took into account the entire industrial and economic situation in the country, but depending on the market conditions at one time or another. Therefore, the expansion of the enterprise was unplanned, creating a kind of layering of buildings and equipment. As a result of this, and also in view of the significant change in the range of market demand compared to the pre-war period in 1925/26, there were a number of bottlenecks in factories, along with underutilized workshops; "In addition, the equipment was installed in such a way that the movement of raw materials and semi-finished products did not follow the direct path of the production process, but made unnecessary return movements.

3. Private companies, which built enterprises in pre-revolutionary times, strove to produce the widest range of products at their factories in order to fully cover the market in this area; as a result, universal factories were created, which by this time were already outdated and poorly adapted to mass production and specialization. This applies mainly to machine building and low voltage plants.

4. Internal and external transport was little mechanized at all factories, and auxiliary workshops and storage facilities were underdeveloped.

5. The Moscow lamp factories. Carried out their production in three rooms, little adapted for production, and were essentially in a semi-handicraft state.

The noted state of the fixed capital of the electrical industry, the sharp discrepancy between its production capacity and the requirements of the national economy, and the inevitable significant dependence on imports, as a result, determined the nature and direction of investment

in subsequent years. Capital investment in the main fund of the electrical industry, of course, had to go along the line:

- 1) expanding production areas by building new factories and new buildings;
- 2) increasing the throughput of existing enterprises by replenishing equipment and replacing obsolete equipment with new ones;
- 3) radical redevelopment of enterprises;
- 4) specialization of factories and rationalization of production methods at them;
- 5) improving the production environment by strengthening the intra-plant transport and storage facilities.

[TABLE 1]

	1925/26 g.	1926-27 g.	1927/28 g.	Total for three years
Overhaul				
GET	1.84	1.52	1.10	4.46
ETZST	0.44	0.42	0.36	1.22
Battery trust	0.03	0.08	0.04	0.15
Total	2.31	2.02	1.50	5.83
Expansion and reconstruction				
GET	7.39	11.10	7.59	26.08
ETZST	1.32	1.50	3.67	6.49
Battery trust	0.03	0.08	0.30	0.41
Total:	8.74	12.68	11.56	32.93
New construction				
GET	0.38	2.37	2.13	4.88
ETZST	0.30	1.42	2.40	4.12
Battery trust	-	0.49	0.87	1.36
Total	0.68	4.28	5.40	10.36
Housing construction	0.40	0.72	0.71	1.83

Total capital works				
GET	9.86	15.29	11.40	36.55
ETZST	2.18	3.75	6.50	12.43
Battery trust	0.06	0.65	1.26	1.97
Total	12.10	19.69	19.16	50.95

The electrical industry began to achieve these tasks from 1924/1925. This year, however, only the first milestones were essentially outlined, and the electrical industry began to fully reorganize its enterprises and significantly expand the production area from 1925/26.

The total amount of capital work on the three trusts of the electrical industry for three years is expressed in the amount of about 51 million rubles. By the nature of the costs, the specified amount is distributed as follows [in million rubles] [tab. 1].

Analysis of the above table shows:

1. On the construction of new factories, only preparatory work was completed in 1925/26], and actual construction began only in 1926/27. The participation of new construction in all costs for three years is 20.1%.
2. Expansion and reconstruction of existing factories, consisting in the renewal of equipment, in the construction of new buildings and in the replenishment of their equipment, accounts for about 64% of all costs in three years, with the highest percentage of these costs (71.9) falling on 1925/26 year, which is completely natural, since this year is essentially the first year in the reconstruction of the electrical industry.
3. The last reason, which determined the high specific value of reconstruction costs in the total amount of costs for 1925/26, also led to a high percentage for this year of expenses on capital repairs - 19.1. The average percentage of repair costs over three years is about 11.4 of all costs over three years.

If we turn to the capital costs of production, then the following dynamics will become clear [tab. 2].

[TABLE 2]

[Type of production]	1925 // 26 g.	1926-27 g.	1927/28 g.	Total for three years	
				in absolute amount	%
Mechanical engineering	5.10	7.43	6.85	19.38	38
Cable production	1.00	1.66	1.56	4.44	8.3
Low voltage industry	1.87	3.75	6.50	12.12	23.8
Battery-cell	0.06	0.65	1.38	2.09	4.1
Others	4.07	6.20	2.87	13.14	25.8
Total	12.10	19.69	19.16	50.95	100

Table data. [2] show that within three years the costs of dynamo-building in the total amount of costs occupy the most prominent place (38%), although the share of dynamo-building in the output of the electrical industry is only 25-28% in three years. The prevailing role of dynamo-building in the total amount of capital investments in the electrical industry is explained by the exceptionally large lag in the production of electrical machines against other types of electrical products from the market requirements. The discrepancy between the dynamics of investments and the dynamics of output growth is explained, on the one hand, by the fact that, in comparison with other industries in the electrical industry, dynamo building requires much more complex and expensive equipment, which, naturally, reduces the efficiency of capital, and, on the other hand, is not massive production.

In accordance with the growth in demand for electrical products, the share of the low-current industry is also growing significantly, rising from 15.4% in 1925-26 tons to 23.7% on average over the three years.

The shown significant consumption for "other industries" in 1926-27 is explained by the large investments in the glass and lamp industry due to the concentration of these industries and their radical reconstruction.

The largest works during this period are the following:

1. Electric plant. On the territory of about 140 thousand m², belonging to the rubber company "Provodnik", the following production facilities are partly located, partly located or will be located: a) transformer

department. The first stage of works on small and medium-sized transformers is already coming to an end, it is planned to start "the sub-department of large transformers; b) lamp section with tungsten and automatic-bulb sub-sections; c) searchlight and reinforcement subdivision, the searchlight part of which is already working. The production of fittings is supposed to be concentrated at the electric plant in 1928/29; d) hardware department with subdivisions of high-voltage and low-voltage equipment at the design stage; e) general mechanical subdivision for servicing not only the electric plant as a whole, but in general all enterprises of the UET; f) two small subsections for the production of: 1) rolled metal products, insulating tubes (formerly the Metal plant), 2) small motors, fans, vacuum cleaners, etc. ; g) subdivision of insulating materials.

2. At the Electrosila plant in Leningrad, a department of normal vehicles was built. This department is equipped in the building [ex.] A. Koppel for the production of normal machines in a continuous flow, and larger machines in a serial way. Production is carried out on two belts, while the third belt and two serial shops are partially operational and will be fully operational in 1928/29. This year, the construction of a turbine building for the production of turbine generators up to 40 thousand kW has begun.

3. Glass Factory. Among the khans, a to supply lamp production with special glass entered production as early as 1926-27.

4. In the current year, the expansion and re-equipment of the Kazitsky plant for the production of devices for railway signalization and blocking has been started.

5. Plant "Electropribor". In 1925/26 the building for the production of counters and measuring instruments was started and finished by the beginning of 1927/28. This year the construction of the building for the production of special signaling devices is started.

6. A new element plant was built in Moscow.

In addition to these large over-limit works, during the reporting period, machine-building plants and plants of the low-current industry were significantly re-equipped, due to which the throughput capacity of these plants increased significantly.

Thanks to capital expenditures and the associated expansion of the production base, it was possible to carry out to a large extent the specialization of the factories.

To date, the following activities have been carried out in this area:

1. The production of tram motors, generators for lighting trains, railway motors and all equipment for them is concentrated at the Dynamo plant and liquidated at the Kharkov plant, at Electrosila (ends) and at the Electric plant.
2. The production of installation material and welding machines is concentrated at "Electric". The production of lighting fixtures and controllers was liquidated.
3. Electrosila concentrates on the production of turbine generators with a capacity of up to 20 thousand kW. and normal list-type AC machines.
4. The Kharkov plant concentrates the production of normal AC machines and low-voltage equipment.

The production of tram motors, installation material has been liquidated, and high-voltage equipment is being rolled up.

The distribution of the production of normal machines between the last two factories boils down to the fact that the same type is not produced in both factories.

5. The production of valve fittings is concentrated exclusively at the valve factory in Moscow.
6. On the basis of specialization, the distribution of work was carried out between three electroparcelain factories.
7. High-current cables, telegraph and telephone cables for long distances and enameled wire are manufactured only at Sevkabel.
8. Automatic telephony is concentrated at the Krasnaya Zarya plant.
9. The concentration of the production of meters and measuring devices has begun at the new plant "Electropribor".

[TABLE 3]

	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.	1928/29 g.
--	------------	------------	------------	------------

Mechanical engineering	21.2	33.1	46.2	66.4
% to the previous year	-	163.8	139.4	143.5
Cable production	20.8	25.9	31.8	50.6
% to the previous year	-	124.4	122.8	159.1
Lamp production	5.4	5.5	5.2	7.6
% to the previous year	-	101.8	94.5	146.0
Low voltage industry	12.3	21.3	33.2	41.9
% to the previous year	-	173.0	157.0	126.0
Battery-cell	2.4	2.9	5.1	7.0
% to the previous year	-	122.0	176.0	137.2
Other production	7.1	7.9	18.7	25.6
% to the previous year	-	111.2	237.0	137.0
Throughout the electrical industry	60.2	96.6	141.9	199.2
% to the previous year	-	139.5	147.0	140.3

10. The production of batteries with a large plate surface is concentrated at the Leninskaya Iskra plant, and with lattice plates at the Lieutenant Schmidt.

New factories and new buildings are naturally loaded exclusively with specialized products ... [1]

This is confirmed by the following dynamics of the output of the main types of products in the electrical industry for three years (at the cost price 1926/27) (in million rubles) [Table 3].

Table [3] draws attention to the insignificant increase in the output of lamp factories in the first three years. This is by no means due to a lack of production capacity, but solely due to the lack of demand, which makes it necessary to artificially delay production. In terms of the production capacity of lamp factories, the output of 1927/28 tons could

easily be increased by 30%; the increase in output in 1928/29 by 46% is due to a change in the assortment.

Along with the possibility of a general increase in the output of electrical products, the electrical industry received the opportunity to manufacture a whole range of products that had not been manufactured before, both with regard to the production of products of larger sizes or for higher voltages, and in the setting up of completely new industries.

In the electrical industry, it should be noted the successful implementation of generators for steam and water turbines of high power: for steam - so far up to 10 thousand kW, and in the version - and 22 thousand kW, and for water - for a capacity of 8750 kilovolt-amperes at 75 rpm per minute. Transformers were produced for voltages up to 38 thousand volts, and in production - up to 110 thousand volts. For the same voltages, equipment began to be produced: oil switches, instrument transformers, arresters, relays, pactors, etc. The first powerful mercury rectifier (500 amperes, 600 volts) was produced, and this laid the foundation for this new production.

In the lamp business, we have completely mastered the production of vacuum and gas-filled lamps, as well as mercury lamps, lamps for cinema, etc. In addition, the production of tungsten and molybdenum has been set up, and an automatic machine for the manufacture of glass bulbs is being manufactured, which was already mentioned above.

Cable industry generally produces older types. Let's point out all the same to high-voltage cables (up to 35 thousand volts), multi-pair telephone cords, enameled wire of thin cross-sections. The production of all types of high-voltage insulators required in practice, including garland elements, was delivered.

The mass production of all kinds of radio receivers - detector and lamp - was released. The fabrication of high-power tube radio transmitters was supplied. The production of vacuum devices, all kinds of X-ray and Coolidge lamps and tubes was completely reorganized. Much work is being done on the manufacture of telephones and switches for the automatic system. Finally, we will mention the 'mass production of single-phase meters.

All these achievements made it possible to significantly reduce the import of electrical products.

As a result of all the described processes, naturally, the efficiency of the capital of the electrical industry should have increased ... [2] [3]

TsGAOR USSR, f. 374, on. 1, d.485, ll. 212-216, 219-220. Rotat. copies

[1] Information about the installation of new equipment at individual plants has been omitted.

[2] Information about the efficiency of capital investments in individual branches of the electrical industry is omitted.

[3] The rationalization of production carried out in the electrical industry made it possible to significantly improve the technical and economic indicators of enterprises in the industry. Suffice it to point out that if the cost of fixed capital from 1925 to 1928 increased by 81%, then the growth of gross output amounted to 288%, and production by 1 ruble. share capital - 159%. These achievements put the electrical industry in one of the first places in terms of cost efficiency (TsGAOR USSR, f. 374, on. 1, d. 385, pp. 220-221)

No. 20 Capital construction in the chemical industry

The tasks facing the chemical industry in capital construction in recent years follow from the state in which the chemical industry was at the beginning of the period of reconstruction of the USSR industry, and from those new and complex tasks that the country put forward before the industry that has acquired in recent years absolutely exceptional value all over the world.

By October 1, 1925, the chemical industry accounted for 5.3% of the fixed capital of the USSR industry. The same was approximately the share of products in the total industrial production of the country. The basic capital of the chemical industry was "not only physically badly worn out and insufficient to meet the country's demand for basic chemical products, but also morally far behind. It was already difficult to compare the pre-revolutionary chemical industry with the Western European one in terms of its technical level, but during the years of the war and revolution, the development of foreign chemistry made giant strides forward, chemistry acquired exceptional importance in the industrial and agricultural development of Western

countries. Therefore, it is quite understandable that in our country, starting the reconstruction of the chemical industry, along with the task of bringing the existing high-profile capital into proper condition for the possibility of its maximum use in supplying the country with the main chemical products produced before the war, the question arose of a radical reorganization of the entire chemical industry on a higher technical basis; on a significant expansion of the range of products produced in the country with the aim of freeing from foreign dependence; on the transition to newer and more advanced production methods; on the actual creation of new branches of the chemical industry (such as wood chemical, rare elements, aniline-colored), etc.

It is quite clear that the fulfillment of all these tasks requires a considerably longer period than the past three years, and much larger funds than those that could have been allocated by the country for this purpose. Therefore, looking at the capital construction of the chemical industry over the past three years, one can only speak of the first steps towards solving the problems facing the chemical industry. These tasks, as well as their implementation, are different for individual industries, which we combine under the name of the chemical industry, just as the industries themselves differ from one another in their nature and in the degree of their development by the time the reconstruction period begins. These features of individual industries will be discussed below, when reviewing the capital construction carried out by them.

General data on the amount of capital work in the chemical industry for the last three years are as follows [in million rubles] [tab. 1].

[TABLE 1]

[Industry]	1925/26 g.		1926/27 g.		1927 / / 28 g. plan	In just three years	% to the current fixed capital as of 1 / X 1925
	plan	performance	plan	performance			
	27.24	25.11	31.42	31.26	39.13	95.50	104.0
Aniline- colorful	4.25	3.95	4,00	4.75	6.00	14.70	181.0
Coke-benzene	5.67	3.20	4.14	4.96	6.08	14.24	73.0

Paintwork.	1.81	1.90	2.43	2.81	2.57	7.28	66.0
Wood chemical	1.01	1.12	1.48	1.83	2.65	5.60	560.0
Bone-processing	0.56	0.65	0.53	0.66	0.88	2.19	73.0
Rare elements	0.43	0.20	0.69	0.51	1.66	2.37	-
Rubber	6.01	4.60	4.72	6.21	6.11	16.92	20.6
Fatty	2.19	2.38	4.07	4.36	4.69	11.43	31.6
Spmchechnaya	5.52	3.38	3.11	4.03	4.13	11.54	105.0
Pharmaceutical	0.85	0.66	1.10	1.06	1.57	3.29	33.0
Other	1.54	1.16	1.59	0.50	6.85	8.51	-
Total	57.08	48.31	59.28	62.94	82.32	193.57	71.0
Including							
group "A"	42.51	37.29	46.28	47.28	65.82	150.39	110.0
" B "	14.57	11.02	13.00	15.66	16.50	43.18	31.0

In addition to the main chemical industry, which accounts for about half of all costs, the largest relatively (in comparison with the current fixed capital on October 1, 1925) costs were incurred in such industries, whose fixed capital is negligible, for example, wood chemical. Large costs were also incurred in the aniline and dye industry, the fixed capital of which increased 2.5 times during this period. The lowest costs were incurred in the rubber and fat industry, where fixed capital required, in accordance with the rate of development determined by market requirements and raw materials, mainly only replacement of worn-out equipment, partly additional equipment, but mainly in the rubber industry, represented a wide field for rationalization work.

The direction of capital work is characterized by the following data (in million rubles) [tab. 2].

[TABLE 2]

[Year]	Overhaul		Expansion and reconstruction		New construction		Housing construction		Total	
	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%	abs.	%

1925/26	7.28	15.1	26.47	54.8	9.74	20.2	4.82	9.9	48.31	100
1926/27	5.85	9.3	34.69	55.1	16.81	26.7	5.59	8.9	62.94	100
1927/28	6.46	7.8	44.03	53.5	26.19	31.8	6.64	6.9	82.32	100
In three years	19.59	10.1	405.19	54.3	152.74	27.3	16.05	8.3	193.57	100

We see that along with a reduction in the share of capital repairs from 15.1% in 1925/26 to 7.8% in 1927/28 and housing construction - from 9.9% to 6.9%, the costs of expansion and reconstruction remain (relatively) at the same level, the share of new construction is growing strongly, namely, from 20.2% in 1925/26 to 31.8% in 1927/28. If we take into account that under the expansion and reconstruction in some branches of the chemical industry (for example, the main, aniline-colored, coke-benzene) actually new construction is being carried out, the share of this latter will be even much larger. As for the overhaul, in 1925/26 it was 2.7% of the current fixed capital on October 1, 1925, and in 1927/29 - only 1.7% of the fixed capital on October 1, 1927. ;[1]

To get an idea of the results of construction as a whole, let us give a general picture of the development of the chemical industry and its individual branches in recent years.

Gross output of the chemical industry for 1925/26 - 1928/29 (at selling prices as of October 1, 1926) [tab. 3].

[TABLE 3]

Industry	1925/26 g.		1926/27 g.		1927/28 g.		1928/29 g.	
	output, mln. rub.	specific weight, [%]	output, mln. rub.	specific weight, [%]	release, million rubles	specific weight, [%]	release, million rubles	specific weight, [%]
Main	62.9	15.4	78.6	15.6	100.0	15.0	123.0	14.3
Paintwork	32.8	8.1	32.5	6.5	50.5	7.6	65.0	7.6
Aniline-colorful	18.2	4.5	32.2	6.4	43.5	6.5	59.5	6.9

Wood chemical	6,3	1.5	9.6	1.9	15,8	2.4	23.0	2.7
Bone-processing	9.2	2,3	9.7	1.9	12.2	1.8	14.0	1.6
Other in group "A"	16.2	4.0	21.3	3.8	27.0	4.1	48.6	5.7
Total for group "A"	145.6	35.8	183.9	36.1	249.0	37.4	333.1	38.8
Rubber	121.6	29.8	148.7	29.7	190.8	28.7	221.6	25.8
Matchbox	25.0	6.1	25.8	5.1	31.6	4.7	36.0	4,3
Fatty	92.9	22.8	116.1	23.2	157.0	23.6	226.0	26.3
Pharmaceutical	22.3	5.5	29.7	5.9	36.9	5.6	41.3	4.8
Total for group "B"	261.8	64.2	320.3	63.9	416.3	62.6	525.8	61.2
Total for the chemical industry, million rubles	407.4	100.0	502.2 [2]	100.0	665.3	100.0	858.9	100.0
The share of chemical products in the products of the entire industry of the country, %	5.66		5.8		6.1		6.6	
The share of the fixed capital of the chemical industry in the fixed capital of the entire industry, %	1 / X 1925 5.28		1 / X 1926 5.44		1 / X 1927 5.55		1 / X 1928 5.7	

We see that the products of the chemical industry, which amounted to 407.4 million rubles. in 1925/26, increased to 859 million rubles. in

1928/29, that is, it shows an increase of 111%. At the same time, the share of chemical products in the total industrial production of the country increases from 5.66% in 1925/26 to 6.6% in 1928/29.

If we compare these data with data on the movement of fixed capital, then the picture will be as follows [tab. 4].

[TABLE 4]

	1 / X... 1 1925 X. 1926 г.	/1 / X 1927 1928	1 / X 1925 1926	1 / X 1927 1928	1 / X 1925 1926	1 / X 1927 1928	1 / X 1925 1926	1 / X 1927 1928
	%							
Fixed capital [3] of the chemical industry, million rubles. ...	278.2	310.9	353.1	414.0	100	112	127	149
Gross product of the chemical industry, million rubles	407.4	502.2	665.3	858.9	100	123	163	211
Gross output for rub. fixed capital by the beginning of the year, rub	11.47	1.62	1.88	2.07	100	110	128	141

Thus, the above-mentioned 111% increase in chemical production corresponds to an increase in fixed capital of only 49%.

We have repeatedly pointed out above that it is very difficult to determine exactly what part of the increase in production can be attributed to the capital work performed. This especially applies to 1925-26, when the canned enterprises were still put into operation. All the same, the figures cited undoubtedly indicate that construction has played a very noticeable role in increasing the supply of the country with chemical products.

As for individual branches of the chemical industry, their development is more clearly shown in table. [five].

[TABLE 5]

Growth in the gross output of certain branches of the chemical industry by 1915/26, taken as 100

[Industries]	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.	1928/29 g.

Main	125	159	196
Paintwork	99	154	198
Aniline-colorful	177	239	327
Wood chemical	153	251	365
Bone-processing	105	133	152
Other in group "A"	119	166	300
Total for group "A"	125	171	224
Rubber	122	152	182
Matchbox	103	126	148
Fatty	125	169	243
Pharmaceutical	133	165	185
Total for group "B"	122	150	201
Total for the chemical industry	123	163	211

The largest growth is given by the following branches: 1) wood chemical, whose production in 1925/26 was negligible (only 6.3 million rubles), mainly due to the commissioning of the Vakhtansky plant, two plants in the North Caucasus (ending in 1928/29 g) and strong development of undercutting; 2) aniline-colorful, the construction of which we have considered above; 3) other in group "A", which includes the coke-benzene industry, discussed above, and the industry of rare elements.

The growth of the rubber and fat industry is less connected with the capital work performed, although, of course, without these works it would have been impossible. On the other hand, the development of the main chemical industry, essentially the most important, should be attributed almost entirely to the results of construction.

Having such favorable (in accordance with the size of the produced construction) results in output, we must nevertheless point out that the great disadvantage of chemical construction is its slow pace. Quite

often, relatively minor work on Rezinotrest, Yuzhhimtrest took two, three and even four years, which, of course, negatively affected the effectiveness of these works. This (a phenomenon explained to some extent by insufficient experience in this area, especially with respect to new attitudes, should in no way be allowed in the future.

Of course, the results of construction are insufficient in terms of reducing the cost of chemical products (one of the elements that negatively affects in this direction is the high cost of construction, which increases depreciation), since what has been done in terms of transferring to new, more rational and cheaper production methods affected only a very small part of the total production.

It should be especially noted the situation with the construction of large wood-chemical plants (for the heat treatment of wood), which have been projected since 1926-27 and the construction of which had not begun until 1928-29. It is necessary at all costs to speed up construction in this industry, which should give very great results.

But in almost all other industries, with the exception, perhaps, of the match industry, the construction carried out over these years should be considered only as a first step, as preparation for much larger and more complex work that must be carried out in order to create a technically high-value chemical base for satisfying the country with chemical products in the right quantity and at the right price.

TsGAOR USSR, f. 374, on. 1, d.485, ll. 223-225, 246-248. Rotat. copies

[1] Information about capital construction for individual trusts of the chemical industry has been omitted.

[2] The sum of the numbers does not add up to the given total.

[3] The fixed capital is calculated by adding all the capital work performed and deducting depreciation deductions. document.

No. 21 Capital construction in the textile industry

The general condition of the fixed capital of the textile industry can be characterized as follows:

Most of the textile factories were built at least 50-60 years ago. They are low, dark, unsatisfactory in sanitary and hygienic terms. Few have ventilation and humidification. Interfloor ceilings, usually wooden, have fallen into disrepair and therefore, in some cases, are supported by columns that interfere with work and movement. In addition, buildings were usually added and built on as production developed. Therefore, factories for the most part are completely unsatisfactory from the point of view of the normal course of goods in production and cause reverse movements that increase the cost and slow down production.

The living quarters are also unsatisfactory. Suffice it to recall that for one person living in factory barracks and houses, there are approximately 4.4-4.5 sq. m of area - a third less than the hungry, not the general civil, but the factory norm.

To characterize production equipment, the following data are very indicative, roughly calculated by the former Glavtekstil for the cotton industry of Union significance:

	Average age (number of years)	Average% deterioration
Mule spindles	30.4	38
»Water rooms	25.4	thirty
Weaving machines	28	thirty

In addition to this, it should be noted that about 25% of mules, 10% of waterworks and 19% of looms have been installed over 35 years and 38% of mules, 35% of waterworks and 27% of looms have been in operation for over 30 years. If we take into account that the best enterprises have gone to the union industry, then we can assume that the deterioration of the production equipment of spinning and weaving factories of the entire cotton industry is at least 40-45%. The situation is approximately the same in the dyeing and finishing factories.

In the linen industry, about 30% of production equipment was installed before 1890 and is subject to complete replacement, about 35% was installed in the period 1890-1905. and required major overhaul, and only the remaining 35% - installations after 1905 - can be considered more or less satisfactory.

Equipment in the wool industry is in about the same condition.

In the hemp industry, in addition to the great physical and moral deterioration of equipment, it is necessary to bear in mind the widespread use of manual work and poor mechanization of production.

In the silk-processing industry, the production equipment is in more or less satisfactory condition. But in the silk-extracting industry there was almost no industrial processing of cocoons. The latter were unwound only in a small part by handicraft; in the overwhelming mass were exported and imported back in the form of yarn.

In the cotton industry, a large number of ginning machines and oil mills were destroyed during the civil war. The factories themselves in the pre-war period were equipped with machines of various systems, for the most part they were small enterprises. The production was designed for quick, within two to three months, cleaning of the harvested cotton. With the rapid recovery of cotton growing, which began after the New Economic Policy, the factories did not meet the requirements, either in terms of their quantity, or in terms of the state of their production and heating equipment.

No less important for understanding the direction of capital work in the textile industry is the well-known disproportion between the spinning power and the next stages of yarn processing. This imbalance was mainly due to the withdrawal of the western regions as a result of the European war and was reflected in all the main fibers.

The state of the heating equipment is even more unsatisfactory than that of the production equipment. First, according to the data of the bureau of thermal technical conferences of the textile industry, almost half of the thermal power equipment (559 out of 1290 engines) was installed before 1900, that is, over 25 years. The average age of the units is about 29 years old with 35-40% wear and tear. Secondly, the installation is extremely varied: 75% of installations with ~ 62% of the

total power are steam engines, mostly of low power, the greatest deterioration and obsolescence (out of 968 steam engines, 554 were installed before 1900). The state of the thermal power and especially steam power facilities is convincingly illustrated by numerous accidents.

From the above characteristics of the state of the fixed capital of the textile industry, the tasks that faced capital construction clearly follow. Obviously, first of all, especially taking into account the financial possibilities, it was necessary to ensure the maximum use of existing factories. Since in previous years, starting with the establishment of NEP, the main efforts were directed to major repairs and since, thanks to this, the factories were more or less put in order, the center of gravity had to shift towards reconstruction and expansion. It was necessary to eliminate, as far as possible, the indicated imbalance between spinning and subsequent stages of production by replacing and replenishing the spinning equipment, to eliminate defects in the movement of goods in production, to make factories healthier with ventilation and humidification devices, to increase the use of equipment through rationalization measures, etc. Special attention should have been paid to the improvement of the heat and power economy. But since by the beginning of the reporting period, the workload of most textile enterprises was already quite high, then at the planned rate of production growth it was impossible, mainly in the cotton industry, not to put the construction of new factories in line. How acute the question was can be judged by the fact that already in 1927-28, a significant part of the spinning cotton factories were transferred to the third shift. This was due to the fact that cash spindles (7.4 million) could be processed in two shifts, even taking downtime only 3-4%, no more than 21.3-21.5 million poods. with a production program of 22.4 million poods.

The need for new construction was also dictated by considerations of the need to speed up the production of domestic raw materials (artificial fiber, kenaf, kendyr, cotton, etc.) and to reduce imports (worsted yarn, technical cloth, twine, etc.).

[Data] tab. [1] show the volume and direction of capital work for the three years under consideration (in million rubles).

[TABLE 1]

[Year]	Overhaul	Reconstruction and expansion	New construction	Housing construction	Total
1925/26	37.2	63.8	18.7	28.4	148.1
1926/27	27.7	102.8	34.3	18.1	182.9
1927/28	24.7	99.3	54,7	15.1	193.8

... [1] The most significant reconstruction work on weaving is the construction of new buildings to replace those that have fallen into disrepair at the Likinskaya factory of the 3rd cotton trust for 1200 (including 400 new) looms worth 1.4 million rubles. and at Yartsevskaya 2nd Cotton Trust - for 1,098 (including 600 new) looms worth 1 million rubles.

Both in spinning and weaving, work was widely carried out to update, strengthen and rationalize the preparatory departments, as well as the weaving process itself.

The capacity of cotton finishing factories is estimated at 230 thousand pieces per day, or about 2,700 million cubic meters per year. Since the release of 1927/28 is scheduled for 2600 million, theoretically it satisfies the modern need. However, if we keep in mind the inaction of a part of the equipment due to the change in the assortment against the pre-war period (for example, many printing machines, the discrepancy between the capacity of individual workshops and other bottlenecks), then in practice there is a need to expand production both for this moment and for meeting the needs of the coming years in order to avoid the construction of new factories. These works at relatively low costs give very tangible results. So, the reconstruction of the Tver proletarian manufactory should increase the daily output from 9-10 thousand to 21.5 thousand pieces, Vyshnevolotskaya - from 1,[2]

In other sectors of the textile industry, the volume of basic equipment in the order of expansion and reconstruction remains almost unchanged. However, the capacity is increasing significantly due to the extensive reconstruction of existing plants. So, in the Rough-cloth Trust, the factories of which are mostly very old, consist mostly of a number of scattered buildings, have heavily worn and outdated

equipment, factory buildings are rebuilt in order to concentrate production and ensure a rational course of the production process, outdated devices are replaced with new ones, which have a much larger productivity, etc. So far, 18 devices out of 185 have been replaced, 5370 spindles out of 74,217 and another 22 devices and 9270 spindles are expected to be received. In the same way, 18 out of 192 machines are replaced in fine-cloth production,

Then, as in the cotton industry, all kinds of improvements to machines, mechanization, etc. are widely carried out, intra-plant transport develops, lifts, pneumatic conveyors for feeding wool, etc., are arranged. As a result of all these measures, the capacity of coarse cloth factories can be increased in 1927 / 28 by about 10%, or 1.5 million m of cloth. After the completion of the reconstruction, the capacity of the reconstructed factories will increase greatly: Morshanskaya - from 1.1 million to 2.2 million cubic meters per year, Arzhenskaya - from 1.65 million to 3 million cubic meters, etc.

The linen industry, which before the war had mostly worked in one shift, switched to two shifts in the period under review. This transition, in addition to some expansion of factory buildings for yarn warehouses, severity, etc., required an intensive renewal of extremely worn out and outdated equipment. During the reporting period, 40 thousand spindles out of 373 thousand in the entire industry were replaced and 4400 new spindles were installed. Another task carried out in the linen industry was the specialization of factories, the separation of carding factories, the division of spinning mills into linen, combing and special, the separation from the weaving bleaching and finishing departments, the concentration of twisting departments into special thread factories, etc. In 1925/26 A central card-house was arranged for the Vyaznikovsky district and carding was mechanized at the Melenkovo (factory), where before that there was manual work. At the same time, a significant number of card machines of a new design and gekling machines (carding machines) were installed. This re-equipment significantly reduces the cost of labor (each gekling machine saves 25 thousand rubles) and, most importantly, allows better use of raw materials: in 1927-28, the average yarn number is supposed to be increased to 14 instead of 12.8 in 1925/26 from the same quality of raw materials.

In linen weaving, a reorganization and expansion of the Krasnye Weavers weaving factory was carried out, which was transferred to the production of only one kind of linen, which reduced the processing cost by 10% compared to other factories, and a new weaving building is being built in Vyazniki instead of two that have fallen into disrepair. This work cost 3.3 million rubles. ends in 1928/29. A preparatory department is re-equipped in this factory and 600 new looms are installed.

In the hemp industry in 1925-26, mechanical semiautomatic machines began to be installed instead of hand-spinning rope yarn, and later began the transition to complete mechanization of rope-spinning with the replacement of semiautomatic devices (semi-hand spinning) with automatic machines (in Leningrad). For the rational use of raw materials, preparatory departments are being reorganized and refurbished. To expand the production of hemp bindings twine at the Kharkov and Odessa jute factories, hemp twine departments are being equipped with an output of about 250 thousand poods. twine per year. Finally, the Odessa jute factory was expanded.

The state of the cotton ginning plants has already been described above.

The rapid growth of sowing and harvesting of cotton (the area under crops in 1925/26 was 600 thousand tons, in 1927/28 it was 735 thousand, the harvest was 10 and 13 million poods of fiber) required an intensified reorganization of factories. The work consisted of replacing engines, genie batteries, expanding storage facilities, etc.

Significant costs are caused by the need to build warehouses for storing raw materials. This is caused by the lengthening of the period of work of the factories (from two or three months before the revolution to five or six or more months).

As a result of the concentration, the number of factories dropped to 80-90 instead of over 400 before the revolution. The number of gin saws per plant increased from 240 in 1915-1916. up to 465 in 1925/26 and 500 in 1927/28

New construction of the textile industry developed as follows [tab. 2].

[TABLE 2]

1925/26 g.		1926/27 g.		1927/28 g.		Total
million rubles	%	million rubles	%	million rubles	%	
18.7	100	34.3	189	55.9	307	108.8

New construction is growing extremely intensively - three times (from 8.7 to 55.9 million rubles), and the total volume of work is (in%):

In 1925/26	12.3
1926/27 ".....	18.8
1927/28 ".....	28.7
In three years	20.6

The overwhelming majority of work - 73% on average - is in the cotton industry and, again, in the overwhelming majority of the spinning mills, which, as indicated above, is mainly due to the desire to eliminate the imbalance between spinning and weaving. The following spinning mills were built in the center [tab. 3].

[TABLE 3]

Company	Power, pcs. spindle	Total cost, million rubles	Costs for 1926/27 - 1927/28, million rubles
Ordinary spinning			
Lakinskaya in Vladimir	101 232	9.5	9.3
Them. Dzerzhinsky Ivanovo-Voznesensk	in 127,000	12.0	11.8
Morokinskaya-Ivtekstila	31,744	2.6	2.6
"Red Talca"	120,000	11.3	6,3
Vladgubtextile	100,000	11.4	2.6
Total	479,976	46.8	32.6

Combed spinning			
Mostrikotazh	112 436	14.7	3.0
Glukhoyskaya (3rd cotton trust)	50,000 [3]	9.2	1.6
Total	162,436	23.9	4.6
Melange			
Melange plant of Ivanovo-Voznesensk trust	113,000	36.0	5.0
Vigontresta Melange Spinning Top	39,000	6.6	1.3
Total	152,000	42.6	6,3
Total	794,412	113.3	43.5

In addition to the main task of increasing yarn output, the combed product factory should reduce the import of high-quality yarn required by knitwear and thread production. Melange factories are designed to produce cheap clothing fabrics that are produced using cotton yarns ("ód goods") and in which there is an urgent need, especially in view of the high cost and scarcity of woolen fabrics.

Another motive for the construction of cotton factories is the desire to plant industry in areas where raw materials are produced. For these purposes, the following spinning and weaving factories are being built [tab. 4].

[TABLE 4]

Name	Power	Total cost, million rubles	Costs 1925/26 - 1927/28, million rubles
Ganja	66,000 spindles machines	2,0008.6	7.3
Leninakan [4]	40,000 "1300"	9.8	6.4
Fergana [5]	20,000 "600"	7,7	4.5
Ashgabat [6]	1,000 "300"	6.8	4.5

Total	136 000 spindles 3200 [7] machines	32.9	22.7
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In addition to these factories, a knitwear factory "Red Banner" is being built, or rather expanded, in Leningrad. Its total cost is 12 680 thousand rubles, 6.5 million rubles were spent over three years. Power at full load 350 thousand dozen knitwear, 1750 thousand dozen stockings and 125 thousand dozen shawls for 48 million rubles. against 12-13 million rubles. before conversion. Then the bleaching and mercerizing and dyeing and finishing factory of the Vladimir trust for 6.5 thousand pieces a day with a total cost of 6.9 million rubles; spent 2.2 million rubles. Finally, the Technotkan sleeve and belt factory, the total cost is 1.4 million rubles.

Thus, 16 cotton factories will cost 167 million rubles, of which 77.6 million rubles were spent in three years. At full load, 13 spinning machines under construction with 930 thousand spindles, which increase the capacity of the spinning equipment (in 1925/26 - 6.9 million spindles) by 12.5%, can process about 2.4 million poods. cotton, increasing the processing of the latter by 12.5%.

Of the listed factories were put into operation: in 1926/27 - the factory named after Lakina and sleeve-belt, in 1927/28 - them. Dzerzhinsky, Morokinskaya and Ganja. The rest of the factories will start working no later than 1929/30.

During the construction of new factories, the requirements for factory buildings in terms of height, cubic capacity, light, ventilation, humidification, etc. were taken into account. Experiments were made to "change the location of machines in comparison with the accepted one. In the same way, the construction was carried out as an experiment. the two-storey building of the Krasnaya Talka factory of Ivtektstil instead of the usual type of spinning mill in three or four stories. When factories were built in Central Asia and the Caucasus, for the first time, structures were used with the help of which factories are illuminated by reflected sunlight to reduce the temperature and provide a lower temperature inside factories; earthquake resistance is also taken into account.

In general, more favorable unit rates have been adopted for new factories. So, for ordinary spinning, 5.5 workers are installed (factory named after Lakin, etc.) for 1,000 spindles instead of 7-8 and more at similar existing factories (in fact, the factory named after Lakin, with an incomplete load, has b person), for weaving - no more than 0.5 per loom, etc.

In the woolen industry, new construction is reduced to the following enterprises [tab. five].

[TABLE 5]

Factory	Power	Total cost, million rubles	Costs 1925/26 - 1927/28, million rubles
Worsted-spinning Danilovskaya	27,000 spindles	4.8	1.9
Worsted-spinning them. Lantsutsky	61,000 spindles	10.9	1.5
Cloth in Tiflis	4 apparatus and 4000 worsted	4.9	3.8
Technical cloths in Leningrad	No information	1,2	0.7
Wool spinning in Derbent	4 apparatus and selfactors	20.5	0,4
Wool spinning in Ingushetia	2 apparatus and selfactors	20.2	0.2
Wool spinning in Cherkessny	2 machines, selfactors for 400 spindles and a loom	20.1	0.1
Chesalnaya in the Karachaevsk [Autonomous Region]	Carding machine	0.05	0.05
Total	-	22.65	8.65

The construction of worsted spinning mills is due to the desire, first, to provide yarn for weaving factories, the capacity of which exceeds the capacity of spinning mills; secondly, to replace imports of yarn with imports of wool or semi-finished products (top), which represents significant savings in foreign currency, more than 2 rubles. per 1 kg of

yarn, i.e. more than 2 ml. rub. when imported in 1927-28, about 1 thousand tons.

The need to import yarn disappears already in 1928-29, when the Danilovskaya spinning mill, which will be launched in the fourth quarter of this year for 18 thousand spindles, will work at full load. Its output is about 1300 tons of yarn per year, the factory. Laya-tsutskiy - 4300 tons. Only water spindles will work at the new factories. Production for 1 thousand spindles at 8 hours. it is planned to be 4600 kilometers, the average number is 41-42 at Danilovskaya and 3900 kilometers at the factory named after Lantsutsky with an average number of 48. Workers for 1,000 spindles are planned at the new Danilov factory 12 people against 12.8 at the same factory now. Fuel consumption at new factories is 0.084 tons of standard fuel per 1,000 kilometers against 0.096 tons at the Danilov factory in 1926/27.

The industrial felts factory is also pursuing the goal of stopping the import of these felts used by the paper, oil mill and other industries. The annual output is 350 tons. The cloth factory in Tiflis is designed to produce about 700 thousand m of worsted [and] 400 thousand m of woolen cloth.

The rest of the factories are small enterprises designed to process local raw materials and produce goods that meet the demand of the local population (cloaks, felt for saddles, etc.).

Before the revolution, there were no silk-winding factories in Central Asia at all. Cocoons were unwound by handicraft (by methods! Or directly exported. The first factory was set up in Fergana in 1923, and evacuated equipment was used. In Transcaucasia, handicraft unwinding also prevailed, although there were small industrial enterprises. Therefore, before the war 75-80% The vigorous construction of silk-winding mills in recent years aims to provide silk factories for domestic production and promote the industrialization of the outlying republics. In 1925 there were only 829 cans. New construction increases this number more than in 2 times, and by 1928/29 there will already be about 2900 cans, counting about 173 cans, which were put into storage. All factories start up no later than 1927/28 [tab. 6].

[TABLE 6]

New construction in the silk industry

Company	Power, cans	Total cost, thousand rubles	Expenditure 1925/26 - 1927/28, thousand rubles
middle Asia			
Silk-winding factory in Margelan	480	1555	1105
Silk-winding factory in Samarkand	104	561	561
Silk-winding factory in Ashgabat	96	414	414
Silk-winding factory in Old Bukhara	96	337	337
Silk-winding factory in Osh (Kyrgyzstan)	96	308	308
Total for Central Asia	872	3175	2725
Transcaucasia			
Silk-winding factory in Nuha	576	1527	1317
Silk-winding factory in Stepanakert	96	254	254
Silk-winding factory in Khoni	96	308	308
Silk-winding factory in Ozurgeti	72	344	344
Silk-winding factory in Kutais	152	464	204
Total for Transcaucasia	992	3897 [8]	3427 [9]
Total	1862 [10]	7072 [11]	6152 [12]

Mention should also be made of the construction of a hemp shop at the "Proletarsky Trud" factory of Shelkotrest, with the goal of producing a hemp (an intermediate product corresponding to yarn in cotton production) from silk waste. Singing was imported from

abroad. Despite the extreme compression of imports, in 1926-27 it was imported for 400 thousand rubles, in 1927-28 - for 200 thousand rubles. The new workshop, launched in 1928/29, will produce about 250 tons of foam and satisfy the need for silk weaving.

The production of singing will increase from 35 to 250 tons, while the cost price decreases from 9.2 to 6.4 [rubles] per 1 kg.

In the field of artificial fiber, in 1927-28, the construction of a factory in Leningrad with an output of 825 tons began. Its total cost is 6.3 million rubles, costs - 3 million rubles, start-up - in 1928/29.

In the hemp industry, in addition to the aforementioned construction of twine workshops in Kharkov and Odessa, in 1927-28 the construction of a twine-binding twine factory in Karachev, Bryansk District, was started, designed to produce 150 thousand poods. hemp twine per year, as well as 250 thousand poods. rope yarn, etc. First of all, the twine department is built. The cost of the factory, including housing construction, 3.7 million rubles. For 1927-28, 800 thousand rubles were assigned.

Significant construction was carried out by the Main Cotton Committee, namely [tab. 7].

[TABLE 7]

Ginning [factories]	Power	General	Costs 1925/26 -
		cost	1927/28
thousand roubles.			
Khakul-Abad	10 gin for 800 drank	600	600
Karasu	10 "" 800 "	800	800
Uch-Kurgan	10 "" 800 "	800	800
Shaarihan	10 "" 800 "	500	500
Kurgan-Tyube	10/5 [13] drank 890/400 gin	1000	248
Shaartuz	15 "" 400 "	175	175
Yevlakh	10 "" 800 "	200	200
6 small factories in Tajikistan	30 "" 2200 "	900	850

Total	95/90 [gin] at 7400/7000 [drank]	4975	4173
Oil mills			
Fergana	24 press	7825	4425
Ganja	16/18 [14]	2250	2250
Erivan	4	1158	1158
Total	41/40	11 233	7833
Mechanical workshops for 1200 tons of machine parts		1750	1750
Semkhozes for 28 thousand dess.		4554	4554
	Total	22502	18310

The constructed and under construction cotton ginning factories increase the capacity of the existing 78 factories from 37.9 thousand gin saws to 7.4 thousand saws, or by 19.5%. Three new oil mills for 44 presses can process up to 180 thousand tons of seeds and produce about 30 thousand tons of oil. Since by the beginning of the reporting period there were 10 factories with 72 presses, the new construction increases the capacity of the oil mill by 60%.

As for the seed farms of the Cotton Committee, their task is to supply the dekhans with selective seeds adapted to local conditions and yielding fiber that meets the requirements of the industry. Due to the contamination of seeds by dekhans, who often use their seeds for sowing, the five-year period of renewal of the seed fund is replaced by a three-year one. At present, the collection of Semkhozes makes it possible to satisfy almost all the needs of crops for selective seeds.

The joint stock company "Wool" in the North Caucasus at the Nevinomysskaya station is building, or rather, rebuilding and re-equipping a wool washing machine. Its capacity is 6.5 thousand tons versus 1.6 thousand tons. The total cost is 2.2 million rubles, costs 1927/28 - 0.5 million rubles, start-up in 1928/29 ...

Finally, mention should be made of the work related to the new fiber - kenaf. In 1927/28, 564 thousand rubles were allocated for the device of primary processing points and their equipment.

The results of new construction can be expressed in Table. [8].

[TABLE 8]

Number of enterprises under construction	Start of construction, [year]	Total cost, million rubles	Costs over 3 years
20	1925/26	107.8	79.7
12	1926/27	18.8	11.8
eighteen	1927/28	104.4	20.3
Total.50	-	227.0 [15]	111.6 [16]

Let us now see how the capacity of the textile industry has changed as a result of the reconstruction of existing factories and the construction of new ones.

In the cotton industry, the dynamics of technically suitable spinning equipment is as follows (in million spindles):

By early 1925	6710
"" 1926 ".....	6750
"" 1927 ".....	7 100
"" 1928 ".....	7 420

Consequently, the number of spindles increased by 710 thousand, or by 10.6%, including 450 thousand at existing factories and 260 thousand at new ones (named after Lakin, named after Dzerzhinsky, Morokinskaya and Gandzhinskaya).

A possible increase in processing is expressed in 1.6 million [poods], or about 8%. In fact, cotton processing was 16.2 million poods in 1925/26, 18.9 million in 1926/27, and 22.4 million poods according to the 1927/28 plan. Therefore, already in 1927-28, the capacity of the equipment turned out to be lower than the requirements of the program, and, as is known, this year it was necessary to introduce a third shift of 1.8 ml. ". spindle. As for the new factories that have not yet entered into operation, their capacity (660,000 ordinary and mélange spindles and 150,000 combed ones) is about 2.3 million poods. at full load in two shifts. In addition, you need to take into account the additional

production of vaters when replacing mules with them, depending on the volume of this replacement.

In the wool industry, as mentioned above, new factories in the reporting period have not yet entered into operation, except for the Danilovskaya worsted spinning mill, which is expected to start up in the fourth quarter of this year, in the amount of about 8 thousand spindles out of 27 thousand. The quantitative equipment of the wool industry has changed slightly, however, the replacement of outdated machines and the overhaul of the rest made it possible to significantly increase the output capacity of factories, as [data] tab. [nine].

[TABLE 9]

[Factory power]	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.
Rough cloth industry,	229	238	245
%	100	104	107
Cloth and worsted, thousand spindles	211.6	222.0	230.6
%	100	105	109
Technical capability of production	45.9	48.0	54.8
%	100	104.5	119
Actual yarn production, thousand tons	36.6	39.0	45.7
%	100	106.5	125
Merino wool consumed, thousand tons	6.4	8.1	10.5
[Wool consumed] coarse and semi-coarse	24.4	27.3	29.4
Total [wool], thousand tons	30.8	35.4	39.9
%.	100	115	129

The capacity of the equipment has increased (only by 7-9%, and the possible output - by 19%.

The capacity reserve of the woolen industry is about 80 thousand spindles of new worsted spinning mills, which can produce about 5.8 thousand tons of yarn, as well as the reconstruction of existing factories.

In the silk processing industry (Shelkotrest), production is far behind the capacity of the equipment. As for the silk-extracting industry, the situation is characterized by [data] table. [ten].

[TABLE 10]

[Year]	Cocoons			Grease production, t		Harvest of dry cocoons, t
	technical validity at the beginning of the year	on average cans per year	was in work	technical capability	actually	
1925/26	1102	1108	854	182	139	3000
1926/27	1214	1870	1422	306	236	3140
1927/28	2526	2718	1956	445	320	3270
1928/29	2910	-	-	-	-	-

The number of cans increases almost threefold, as does the production of greeze, taking 10 poods each. for one basin in two shifts per year. As you can see, the actual production lags far behind the possible, since the cans installed at the new factories have operated for less than a year. Consequently, with a full load of all 2910 cans, the production of heats will reach 475 tons [17].

Along with the intensive development of the silk-winding business in recent years, much attention has been paid to the development of the drainage business, in connection with which the drainage factories, green storage facilities, etc. are being built.

At the disposal of the Main Cotton Committee by the beginning of 1925/1926, there were 78 cotton ginning factories for 37 870 gin saws. Their capacity, counting 8 tons of raw material per saw per year, is about 680 thousand tons of raw material. During the reporting period, five factories with 800 saws each and six small factories for 2200 saws were built and put into operation in Tajikistan, a total of 6200 saws with a capacity of 160 thousand tons of raw material or 500 thousand tons of fiber. These factories increase their number by 16.4%, and the

possible processing of cotton - a little more - by 24%, since the processing of one saw in new factories is accepted at 27 tons versus 18 tons in old ones. In fact, rough was cleaned in 1925/26, 516 thousand tons, in 1926/27 - 523.2 thousand, according to the plan of 1927/28 - 687 thousand tons. / 29 and 1929/30

For butter factories, the capacity of factories built and put into operation is 12 presses, and the equipment of existing factories has been increased by 4 presses.

With 72 presses, this gives an increase of 22%. In addition, 32 presses will come into operation in the coming years, ie a total of 48 presses, or 67% of the available presses. They can process about 200 thousand tons of seeds and produce about 28 thousand tons of oil.

According to kenaf, the costs are included only according to the plan of 1927/28 in the amount of 560 thousand rubles. on arrangement of points for primary fiber processing and equipment of seed farms. Kenaph business is developing quite rapidly. The area under crops increased from 354 hectares in 1925 to 2.8 thousand hectares in 1927 and 10.3 thousand hectares according to the plan of 1928. The collection of seeds increases by 1.6 thousand poods. in 1925 up to 29.7 thousand poods. in 1928, in connection with which the import of seeds from 1928 ceases. Delivery of fiber to the industry from 15.6 thousand poods. in 1926 it rises to 54 thousand poods. according to the plan of 1928 ... [18] [19].

The fixed capital of the Union textile industry (excluding the Main Cotton Committee), according to the accounting data of the All-Union Textile Syndicate, according to modern estimates and taking into account wear and tear, changed as follows (in million rubles) [tab. eleven].

[TABLE 11]

[Industries]	1 / X 1925	1 / X 1926	1 / X 1927	1 / X 1928
Textile	1210.1	1224.6	1244.5	1392.8
Including				
cotton	964.9	985.2	1005.9	1104.7
Woolen	108.0	105.8	111.9	132.4

Linen	109.4	100.0	103.1	108.9
Silk	24.5	23.6	23,7	25.8

Thus, over three years the fixed capital of the Union textile industry increased by 182.7 million rubles, or 15.1%.

From a comparison of fixed capital, which is taken here as the arithmetic average of two adjacent dates, and gross production in constant prices, it follows that gross production grows much faster than fixed capital, namely [in million rubles] [tab. 12].

[TABLE 12]

[Industries]	Main capital			Gross output		
	1925/26 g.	1927/28	1927/28 g. % by 1925/26	1925/26 g.	1927/28 g.	1927/28, % by 1925/26
Textile	1217.3	1318.6	108.0	1884	2482	132.0
Including						
cotton	975.0	1055.3	108.3	1435	1829	127.4
woolen	103.0	115.3	112.0	283	400	141.3
linen	104.7	106.0	101.2	143	193	135.0

While fixed assets increase by 8%, production gives an increase of 32%. This trend is also seen in individual industries. The more intensive growth in production is explained by the fact that it depends not only on capital works in general and, in particular, not only on an increase in the volume of new equipment, but also on a more intensive use of available capital. It can be pointed out that in the cotton industry in 1927-28, about 1.8 million spindles were transferred to the third shift, or a quarter of their total availability, in the linen industry, the transfer to two shifts was almost completed, etc. organizational measures, such as specialization of factories, standardization of goods, increase in machine speeds, improvement of the technological process, etc.

The dynamics of production per 1 ruble leads to the same conclusions. capital [20]. For 1 rub. fixed capital accounted for products (in rubles) (Table 13).

[TABLE 13]

[Industries]	1925/26 g.	1927/28 g.	1927/28, % by 1925/26
Textile	1.55	1.87	121
Including			
cotton	1.47	1.73	117
Woolen	2.75	3.47	126
Linen	1.36	1.81	133

TsGAOR USSR, f. 374, on. 1, d.485, ll. 271-273, 275-284, 286-287. Rogat, specimen no.

[1] Omitted information about capital expenditures for expansion and reconstruction of factories.

[2] The most intensively developed work on the thermal power sector. Many factories were electrified on the basis of district power plants. In the cotton industry, about 450 thousand new spindles were installed at operating factories and outdated equipment was replaced, mainly with mules (275 thousand), which made it possible to increase cotton processing by 30-35%. The cost of these works amounted to about 23-25 million rubles. About 6,500 looms were installed at cotton weaving factories, mainly of allied trusts. Expenditures for the expansion and reconstruction of enterprises of the Union industry (without the Main Cotton Committee) in 1926-27 amounted to 65.5 million rubles, including 44.3 million rubles for the main production. In 1927-28, expenditures fell to 52.2 million and 34.3 million rubles, respectively.

[3] In addition to 50,000 new spindles, another 80,000 spindles from existing factories will be installed. document.

[4] In addition, the knitted and wadded sections - Approx. Document.

[5] First and second stage. - Approx. document

[6] First stage. - Approx. document.

- [7] The sum of the numbers does not agree with the given total.
- [8] The sum of the numbers does not agree with the given total.
- [9] The sum of the numbers does not agree with the given total.
- [10] The sum of the numbers does not agree with the given total.
- [11] The sum of the numbers does not agree with the given total.
- [12] The sum of the numbers does not agree with the given total.
- [13] In the numerator, the task is at full capacity, in the denominator - the first stage. Document.
- [14] So in the document.
- [15] In addition, seed farms with a total cost of 4.5 million rubles. and costs for three years for the same amount. document.
- [16] The sum of the numbers does not agree with the given total.
- [17] In addition, about 150 tons can be considered an increase in the productivity of the replaced equipment. document.
- [18] The information about the replacement of equipment and the dynamics of production is omitted.
- [19] According to the expert assessment of the All-Union Textile Syndicate, capital costs and organizational and technical measures in the linen and cotton industry and capital work, mainly in the wool industry, contributed to the improvement of technical and economic indicators. Labor consumption in spinning decreased in the cotton industry by 12%, in the linen industry by 9%, in the coarse cloth industry by 22%, and in the fine cloth industry by 19.5%. In terms of the production of spinning machines, the best results were obtained by the woolen industry, especially the fine-cloth industry (an increase of 18%), coarse-cloth-12%, worsted - 8%, in cotton production increased by 4%, in linen - by 2.2%. In weaving, only the woolen industry gave an increase in output per machine (from 9 to 15%), in the linen and cotton industries, output decreased by 3% (TsGAOR USSR, f. 374, on. 1, d. 385, ll. 284-285).
- [20] In the national republics of Transcaucasia and Central Asia, enterprises were built mainly in the light and food industries: in Georgia - four sawmills, two furniture factories, two riveting factories,

an oil mill and a tobacco factory; in the Uzbek SSR - a fruit cannery, two castor oil factories; in Kokand - a ceresin plant; in Tashkent - a tannery and a tobacco factory; in Semipalatinsk - a tannery; in Frunze - a sawmill and a tannery. In the autonomous republics of the North Caucasus, two sawmills and two starch plants, an oil mill and a large glass plant "Dagestanskije Ogni" were built.

No. 22 Basic summary data on capital construction in the union industry

The data below is a partial numerical summary of the above selected industry materials, carried out in relation to the total amount of capital expenditures and breakdowns by the main groups of the following sectors of the Union industry: coal, oil, metal, electrical, chemical, forestry, paper, textile and sugar (in the latter, the civil year is equated to the corresponding economic year, i.e., 1926 to 1925/26, etc.).

With regard to this summary, it must first of all be noted that it does not embrace all enterprises belonging to the corresponding industry sector; further, that the volume of these enterprises during the three years under consideration did not remain unchanged, and, finally, that the digital totals in the part of 1925/26 and 1926/27. cannot be regarded as strictly accounting, and in part 1927/28 as corresponding to the most recent changes in the 1927/28 plan. However, this does not in any way change the main trends presented below.

Considering the above, the summary data on capital work of the listed industries for 1925/26-1927/28. can be presented in table. [1] (in million rubles).

Considering [data] table. [I], we can first of all draw the conclusion that the overall fulfillment of the capital work plan in value terms (assuming that the 1927/28 plan will be fulfilled by 100%) turned out to be extremely close to 100% in three years, namely, it was expressed in 99.4%. In individual years, however, the following fluctuations in the fulfillment of the plan took place: in 1925-26 the plan was fulfilled by 91.2%), while in 1926-27 the fulfillment of the plan was about 105.5%.

TABLE 1

Industries	According to plan	Actual costs				Put into operation	Of all costs falls on. housing building
		Total	capital repairs	reconstruction and expansion	new building		

Coal	331.00	338.50	22.7 0	237.30	78.50	281.80	79.80
Oil	533.02	515.24	15.7 9	407.76	91.69	385.61	25.92
Metal	664.63	615.43	98.1 4	400.19	117.1 0	446.60	80.24
Electrotec hnical	48.33	51.00	5.83	32.98	12.19	"45.20	1.84
Chemical	90.75	93.70	11.8 4	66.65	15.22	50.11	11.67
Forest	31.12	29.69	2.07	14.04	13.58	18.75	4.89
Paper	58.23	46.15	2.89	20.32	22.94	30.31	3.97
Textile	312.80	346.80	66.2 0	236.10	44.50	277.70	49.20
Sugar	100.04	115.66	19.8 9	86.42	9.35	113.44	12.47
Total for the listed industries	2164.8 2 *	2152.1 8 [1]	245. 35	1501.76 [2]	405.0 7	1649.2 7 [3]	270.0

The degree of fulfillment of the plan for individual industries is shown in table. [2] (in%).

TABLE 2

Industries	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.	In three years
Coal	91	113	100	98
Oil	104	107	100	97
Metal	80	108	100	97
Electrotechnical	96	119	100	106
Chemical	83	127	100	103
Forest	62	108	100	95
Paper	61	99	100	87

Textile	100	137	100	111
Sugar	127	129	100	115

[Data] tab. [2] indicate that the least implementation of the plan was given by the [branches of] industry: paper (87% over three years) and forestry (95% over three years); both mainly due to the sharp underfulfillment of the plan in 1925-26; The greatest fulfillment of the plan was given by the [branches of] industry: electrical engineering (106%), textile (111%) and sugar (115%); in the latter, this overfulfillment of the plan is also explained by the inclusion in the total amount of capital expenditures [not only] of purchases, but also of the offspring of living inventory.

The rate of development of capital works for individual years is expressed [data] in Table 3 (in%).

TABLE 3

Industries	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.
Coal	180	143
Oil	127	142
Metal	148	215
Electrotechnical	162	158
Chemical	164	193
Forest	245	503
Paper	158	167
Textile	118	112
Sugar	97	123
Total for the listed	139	158

From [data] of table [3] it follows that the total amount of capital expenditures for the named branches of the Union industry grows in 1926/27 against 1925/26 by 39%, and in 1927/28 against 1926/27. - by 13%; at the same time, the relative maximum growth is provided by the metal, chemical and timber industries, the minimum is the sugar and textile industries.

If we now look at how the amounts of costs for individual main types of capital work change, then for the years indicated we will have the following dynamics [table. 4].

TABLE 4

[Type of work]	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.
Overhaul	100	91	79
Reconstruction and expansion	100	136	141
New construction	100	260	432

The figures given, when broken down by individual branches of industry, are shown in Table. [5] (in%).

TABLE 5

Industries	[Type of work]	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.
Coal	Overhaul	98	44
	Reconstruction and expansion	158	112
	New construction	385	522
Oil	Overhaul	109	120
	Reconstruction and expansion	121	107
	New construction	204	576
Metal	Overhaul	114	89
	Reconstruction and expansion	147	232
	New construction	211	363
Electrotechnical	Overhaul	87	65
	Reconstruction and expansion	145	132
	New construction	458	560
Chemical	Overhaul	83	95
	Reconstruction and expansion	150	207
	New construction	498	330
	Overhaul	107	167

Forest	Reconstruction and expansion	150	358
	New construction	710	1315
Paper	Overhaul	86	79
	Reconstruction and expansion	138	178
	New construction	194	178
Textile	Overhaul	65	59
	Reconstruction and expansion	134	113
	New construction	195	333
Sugar	Overhaul	87	130
	Reconstruction and expansion	85	105
	New construction	990	1430

[Data] tab. 5 indicate that, with the exception of the oil, timber and sugar industries (the last in part of 1927-28), in all other branches of the Union industry, the costs of maintenance work give a gradual absolute decrease; the costs of reconstruction and expansion in all branches of industry, with the exception of sugar, have a sharp rise in 1926-27, which also persists in 1927-28 in industry: metal, chemical, timber and paper; new construction for all three years represents an even more sharply rising curve, the general character of which is violated only in the chemical and paper industry, the new construction of which in 1927-28 slightly decreases compared with 1926-27.

If we now turn to the consideration of the specific weight of certain basic types of capital construction (overhaul, expansion and reconstruction and new construction) in the overall result of the latter, then we will have the following ratios (in%):

Overhaul	11.4
Reconstruction and expansion	69.9
New construction	18.7

For individual years, these ratios were expressed in the following figures (in%) [tab. 6].

[TABLE 6]

[Type of work]	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.
Overhaul	16.7	10.8	8.4
Reconstruction and expansion	73.8	71.6	65.8
New construction	9.5	17.6	25.8
Total	100	100	100

We see, therefore, a sharp year after year increase in the proportion of new construction, which occurs both due to a decrease in the share of capital repairs (the value of which in the total amount of capital works' not only decreases in 1927-28 against 1925-26 almost by half, but the absolute size of which, as is evident from Table 5, also decreases by more than 20%), and due to a slight decrease in the share of reconstruction and expansion; this last all three years is, however, prevailing in the total amount of capital expenditures, all the time at the same time giving an absolute growth (see Table 5), which under existing conditions cannot be recognized as absolutely expedient.

For individual industries, the dynamics of certain types of capital construction is shown in Table. [7] (in%).

[TABLE 7]

[Industries]	[Type of work]	1925/26 -	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.	For 1925/26 - 1927/28
Coal	Overhaul	11.8	6.4	3.6	6,7
	Reconstruction and expansion	78.4	72.8	61.0	70.2
	New construction	9.8	20.8	35.4	23.0
		100	100	100	100
Oil	Overhaul	3.4	2.9	2.9	3.1
	Reconstruction and expansion	89.0	84.9	66.9	79.1

	New construction	7.6	12.2	30.2	17.8
		100	100	100	100
Metal	Overhaul	24.3	18.8	10.1	16.0
	Reconstruction and expansion	62.7	62.5	67.7	65.0
	New construction	13.0	18.7	22.2	19.0
		100	100	100	100
Electrotechnical	Overhaul	19.0	10.2	7.8	11.4
	Reconstruction and expansion	72.0	64.3	60.5	64.8
	New construction	9.0	25.5	31.7	23.8
		100	100	100	100
Chemical	Overhaul	20.7	10.7	10.1	12.6
	Reconstruction and expansion	71.3	65.1	76.2	71.1.
	New construction	8.0	24.2	13.7	16.3
		100	100	100	100
Forest	Overhaul	15,8	6.9	5.2	7.0
	Reconstruction and expansion	65.8	40.3	46.8	47.2
	New construction	18.4	52.8	48.0	45.8
		100	100	100	100
Paper	Overhaul	10.0	5.4	4.7	6.2
	Reconstruction and expansion	45.0	39.6	47.7	44.1
	New construction	45.0	55.0	47.6	49.7
		100	100	100	100
Textile	Overhaul	28.3	15.3	14.8	19.1
	Reconstruction and expansion	65.0	73.4	65.2	68.1

	New construction	6,7	11.3	20.0	12.8
		100	100	100	100
Sugar	Overhaul	17.0	15,8	18.2	17.1
	Reconstruction and expansion	82.0	73.5	70.0	74.5
	New construction	1.0	10.7	11.8	8.4
		100	100	100	100

[Data] tab. [7] indicate that the above general trends in the area of capital repairs remain valid in all industries, with the exception of sugar; the same is true for new construction (except for timber and paper in part 1927/28); in terms of reconstruction and expansion, a number of industries (mainly chemistry and paper) show some deviations from the general trend indicated above.

To what has been said about capital expenditures for certain main types of construction, it must be added that the rather conditional and, moreover, not consistently attributed housing construction (according to Table 1) to reconstruction and expansion, or to new construction does precise determination of the specific weight of each of the last two types of construction; but this last circumstance cannot play a noticeable role in the above-mentioned trends in the development of capital works in their individual types.

The commissioning of the completed capital work for the three years under consideration is estimated for the listed sectors of the Union industry in the total amount of 164,927 thousand rubles, that is, 77% of the total capital expenditures for these years; the corresponding figures for individual years will be as follows:

1925/26 - put into operation	63.5o / 0	of the total capital costs	1925/26 g.
1926/27 "- " "	73.5%	[of total capital expenditures]	1926/27 g.
1927/28 "- scheduled to pass	88%	[of total capital expenditures]	1927/28 g.

When considering the figures given, it is necessary to take into account the above [in table. 7] the weather dynamics of the breakdown of capital works by separate main headings and the overall growth in the size of capital construction occurring from year to year; under these

conditions, the acceleration in the rate of commissioning of capital works cannot but be recognized as significant.

For individual industries, the ratio of commissioned work to the total amount of capital work for a given period of time is shown in table. [8] (in%).

TABLE [8]

Industry	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.	1925/26 - 1927/28
Coal	49.5	69.0	121.0	83.5
Oil	76.5	74.0	75.0	75.0
Metal	65.0	77.5	72.5	73.0
Electrotechnical	59.0	87.5	108.5	89.0
Chemical	38.0	49.0	65.0	53.5
Forest	74.5	55.5	65.0	63.0
Paper	40.5	40.5	104.5	65.5
Textile	44.5	75.5	116.0	80.0
Sugar	105.0	95.0	94.5	98.0
Total for the listed industries	63.5	73.5	88.0	77.0

[Data] tab. [8] indicate that the above-mentioned general trend of annual growth of the percentage of commissioning in relation to the annual amount of capital expenditures remains significant for all the considered branches of the Union industry, with the exception of the oil industry, in which this percentage remains more or less stable, the metal industry, in which 1927/28 gives a slight decrease in the percentage of commissioning against 1926/27, the sugar industry, in which the percentage of commissioning is generally the highest, for all the industries under consideration goes down from year to year ...

Attention is drawn to the extremely low commissioning rates for [branches of] the chemical, timber and paper industries.

If we now go from the above commissioning to the dynamics of fixed capital during the three years under consideration, then we will have the following rounded figures:

	1 / X 1925	1 / X 1926	1 / X 1927	1 / X 1928
Bln. rub.	... 3.38	3.62	4.02	4.58
%	100	106.9	118.9	135.3

If we now try to compare the size of the increase in property with the amount of commissioning for the corresponding years, then we will have the following data (in%):

	1925/26	1926/27	1927/28
	г.	г.	г.
The ratio of the increase in property to the amount of delivery	67.5	72.7	74.8

It goes without saying that the conventionality of the comparison made should be especially emphasized, since there can be no coincidence between the commissioning and the increase in property, not only due to the fact that both series of numbers do not include absolutely identical objects in terms of volume, "but also because property changes also occur for other reasons that are not dependent on capital construction costs (arrival and disposal of property, etc.). In addition, it must also be borne in mind that the figures characterizing the commissioning include all costs also for major repairs, which does not affect the increase in the value of the property. If we admit,

II GAOR USSR, f. 374, on. 1, d.485, ll. 298-304, Rotat. copies

[1] The sum of the numbers does not add up to the given total.

[2] The sum of the numbers does not add up to the given total.

[3] The sum of the numbers does not agree with the given total.

No. 23 From materials to the report of the government of the USSR for 1927/28

Not earlier than October 1, 1928 [1]

Industry [2]

General industrial plan and its implementation [3]

Execution of the production plan

Despite a number of unfavorable factors that influenced the implementation of the program in a number of industries, on the whole, for the entire planned VSNKh industry, the 1927/28 production parade ground was completed over 100% of the task, and in the sectors of group "A" it was fulfilled by 98.6 %, and for the branches of group "B" - by 100.5%. For individual industries, the implementation of the production plan is presented in the following form (at average wholesale selling prices in 1926-27, in million rubles) [tab. 1].

[TABLE 1]

Industries [4]	1926/27 g.	1927/28 [5] (preliminary data)	1927/28 g. % by 1926/27	% of plan completion
Group "A"				
Fuel	807.8	933.3	115.5	97.6
Including				
Coal	326.0	370.9	113.6	96.0
Oil	371.3	431.2	116.1	101.0
Mining	45.9	59.3	129.5	97.2
Metal	1511.1	1857.8	122.9	99.4
Electrotechnical	134.9	187.3	138.8	97.0
Building materials	711.6	815.8	114,7	98.5
Chemical	184.9	247.5	134.0	97.3
Total for group "A"	3396.2	4101.0	120.8	98.6

Group "B"				
Textile	3025.0	3549.1	117.3	98.7
Sewing and haberdashery	136.4	295.2	217.0	93.5
Tannery	428.3	617.0	144.1	110.0
Paper	129.8	138.4	106.6	86.5
Polygraphic	59.1	76.3	129.7	97.0
Porcelain and faience	38.8	44.0	113.4	105.1
Chemical	309.0	421.7	136.3	107.1
Food flavor	959.0	1348.0	140.7	104.0
Others	17.6	22.1	128.4	98.3
Total for group "B"	5103.0	6511.8	127.6	105.5
Total for a comparable range of enterprises	499.2	10612.8 [6]	123.6 [7]	100.4 [8]

Tab. [1], like the one on the next page [9], shows that in the group of industries producing tools and means of production (group "A"), the total underperformance of the production plan is about 1.4%, of the industries that underperform the plan, first of all, it is necessary to note the coal industry, especially in the Donbass, where, when miners were outflowing for field work in amounts higher than it was planned, the program was not fulfilled by 4%.

Despite this, the industry did not experience any problems with fuel during 1927-28 due to the availability of reserves and a number of organizational achievements in fuel economy at the enterprises.

The development of the ore industry in terms of iron ore was in line with the plan and gave 100% of its implementation. The program was not fulfilled, however, with regard to the extraction of manganese ore due to the delay in starting the washing.

The metal industry in general fulfilled the program close to 100%. Some underperformance was observed in pig iron production due to accidents at Yugostal factories and coke supply interruptions, as well

as due to supplies of poorer ores; in the production of non-ferrous metals, the lag behind the targets in some enterprises was associated with a shortage of ore and electricity, and in others, with the delay in launching new plants. In addition, due to organizational and technical reasons - the complexity of the deployment of new production - in the reporting year, there was a shortfall in the program for power equipment (diesel engines, steam turbines). The rest of the metal industry worked within the limits of the assignments or even with some excess.

The complexity of setting up new production facilities and deploying new plants was the reason for the 3% underperformance of the production plan for the electrical industry.

The building materials industries fell short of the plan by 1.5%. Failure to comply with cement (2.4%) is associated with accidents at the Amvrosievsky plant and at the plant. Vorovsky. The glass industry in terms of window glass did not fulfill the plan due to the fact that the planned start-up of the Trud plant and the start of production of window glass at the Merefa plant did not take place for financial reasons. The chemical industries in general missed the plan by 2.7% due mainly to the main chemical industry, where a slight lag behind the plan (1.5%) was due to the delay in launching new plants and organizational and technical difficulties in the full use of the new plants being launched.

Turning to the industries producing mainly consumer goods (group B), it should be noted that the production plan was fulfilled by this group of industries with some excess. When the plan was exceeded for the entire group "B" in individual industries, there was, however, some under-fulfillment of the plan. In particular, a significant under-fulfillment of the plan took place in the linen industry due to difficulties in the supply of raw materials. Raw material difficulties also determined the underdevelopment in the oil mill and starch-treacle industry. In addition, among the branches of group "B" that worked below the plan, it should be noted the sewing industry, which for organizational reasons could not overpower the production growth projected by the industrial financial plan of 232% in a year, and as a result did not fulfill the program by 6.5%.

The high target of the fishing industry (production growth by 46.7%) could not be achieved due to the poor fishing season in the Volga-Caspian region.

The entire production program was carried out in the cotton and salt industries, with an excess in the woolen, leather, porcelain and faience, rubber, match, fat and perfumery, chemical and pharmaceutical, sugar, tobacco, tobacco, brewing, canning and confectionery industries.

Organization of new industries

The issue of organizing new industries is essential for the characteristics of the industry in the reporting year. Significant progress was achieved in this area during the reporting year, primarily by the metal industry. Establishment of new productions in the USSR, namely: dynamo and transformer iron, stainless steel, steam locomotives of new series, heavy wagons, diesels of a new system, high-pressure boilers, high-power turbines, machine tools, refrigeration units, textile machines, oil equipment, cutting machines, parts of sewing machines, tractors, automobile construction, etc., in 1927-28 was further developed in quantitative and qualitative terms. Along with this, in 1927-28, a lot of design and technical work was done to identify the need for new machines, apparatus, etc. The greatest attention in the design work for the organization of new industries was paid to the setting of new chemical equipment, namely: general chemical-acid, special purpose, crushing and mixing, close to similar equipment for silicate-cement production. The developing mechanization of construction work put on a turn the production of a number of special machines: concrete mixers, mortar mixers, gravel sorting, stone crushers, concrete lifters, etc. Along with this, the production of plate conveyors, shakers, belt conveyors, mixers and feeders was delivered. The needs of road construction have caused the production of trenchers, rock crushers with screens, motor rollers, plows, irons, etc.

It is necessary to note the beginning of the organization in 1927/28 of the production of high-performance sleeve machines and prototypes of typewriters, which in case of satisfactory results in terms of quality and cost, will free the USSR from import dependence and open up broad prospects for the development of this new production.

The organization of new production facilities has been particularly developed in the chemical industry.

Serious development of new industries is observed in the paint and varnish and aniline-paint [branches] industry, the success of which has already made it possible, by reducing imports, to satisfy a number of needs with domestic production. In the paint and varnish industry for 1926/27 and 1927/28 the production of artificial resin, dug-free and alkali-free varnishes, camphor, celluloid, celluloid varnishes, as well as the pilot production of antifouling compounds and underwater paints and the production of a special grade of varnish varnish - "novol" was delivered.

The organization of new industries in one of the youngest branches of the Soviet industry - aniline and paint industry - developed even more widely. In addition to the semi-product productions delivered for the first time in recent years, a number of new productions were prepared for launch in 1928/29. The organization of these production facilities, which are most complicated in their technological process, provides a solid basis for our aniline-dye industry, allowing it to reduce the import of intermediate products, and ensures the production of dyes necessary for the textile and other industries.

The chemical and pharmaceutical industry from year to year puts on the production of numerous new drugs that are still imported from abroad (iodoforms, a number of alkaloids, antifouling agents, silver preparations, chemically pure reagents, synthetic odorous substances, dental materials, etc.) ...

In the electrical industry in 1927-28, in the new industries, the work was mainly directed towards the further development of new productions delivered in recent years, namely: transformers and equipment of high power and high voltage, generators, steam turbines of 22 thousand kW, automatic telephony, high-speed telegraph devices, radio products, searchlights, battery carts, mercury rectifiers, etc., and the development of these industries proceeded both quantitatively and qualitatively (increasing capacities, reducing costs, improving quality).

The given list of new industries, which is far from being a complete one, clearly characterizes the work of industry in the direction of implementing the main directives of the government in the field of

industrialization of the country, creating an expanded base of its own industrial production.

Capital construction [10]

Capital construction environment

The capital construction of the reporting year consisted to a large extent in the continuation of the work begun in previous years, and for a number of large projects the construction part was basically completed in 1927-28, and the center of gravity moved to the next stage - the transportation and installation of equipment. Therefore, if the total amount of capital work in 1927-28 in comparison with the previous year increased by 23.8%, then the need for capital construction in equipment should have increased significantly more. This explains the fact that in the reporting year, a number of construction projects in almost all industries experienced certain difficulties in connection with the delayed receipt of equipment (in the oil industry - Tuapse plant construction, in paper-conversion of the Sokol and Okulovskaya factories,

If, nevertheless, the increased demand for equipment did not lead to a sharp disruption in the course of capital construction, then this' is explained, firstly, by the implementation in 1927-28 of the bulk of German loans [11], due to which the import of foreign equipment in the reporting year significantly exceeded the corresponding figures for 1926-27, and, secondly, the growth of its own production of equipment. True, the growth of marketable output of general mechanical engineering was (in constant prices) only 24%, and taking into account the reduction in prices even only 19.5%, but for certain types of equipment, especially important for industrial construction, there was a much more intensive growth. So, for example, the growth of production in 1927-28 compared to 1926-27 for steam boilers (in m2) was + 34.9%, for steam turbines (in kW) + 47.8%, for diesels (in hp) + 49.5%, for oil engines (in hp) + 41.6%, for machine tools for metal (by number) + 46.5%, etc.

Even more significant difficulties than with respect to equipment, capital construction experienced from the market of building materials, especially with respect to cement, brick and roofing iron. Despite a strong increase in the production of building materials in 1927-28

compared with the previous year (for cement - by 21.7%, for brick - by 27.7%, timber - by 32.2%), this growth is due to an extraordinary rise construction activity in the country was completely inadequate. The deficit of building materials in 1927-28 was calculated for cement at 3.7%, for brick - 14.6, for sawn timber - 17, for glass - at 24.6 and for roofing iron at 28%. The lack of building materials sometimes led to work stoppages. Therefore, to avoid stoppages, building materials were often purchased on unfavorable conditions and of poor quality,

At many construction sites, especially in the remote outskirts, there was also a shortage of qualified labor and middle and higher technical personnel. The lack of technical personnel had an extremely unfavorable effect not only on the course of the capital construction itself, but was also very painful in relation to the improvement of the project business.

The design business continued to be one of the weakest areas on the capital construction front. However, the measures taken by the government in the reporting year to streamline this case have led to certain positive results. Of the 277 capital construction projects in 1927/28, they had final designs:

	Number of projects	% to the total number of objects
On October 1, 1927	19	7
“January 1, 1928	46	sixteen
»May 1, 1928	87	32
“October 1, 1928	133	48

Despite these achievements, by the start of the construction season, a significant part of the construction was still not provided with final designs. The construction of some very important facilities could not develop or did not develop sufficiently precisely because of the lack of preparation in this regard. Some improvement in the entire organization of the construction business, the organization of special construction offices and the improvement of their work had a beneficial effect on the course of capital construction.

Capital construction plan execution.

The implementation of the capital work plan for individual industries is illustrated by the preliminary data given in table. [2].

[TABLE 2]

[Industries]	Cry	Execution	% of plan completion
	million rubles		
Coal	131.67	133.71	101.5
Oil	212.60	207.86	97.3
Mountain	16.07	16.95	105.5
Metal	370.21	352.82	95.2
Glavchermet	204.31	185,60	90.5
Glavmashinostroy	137.15	136.57	99.4
Glavsvetmet	28.75	30.65	106.8
Electrotechnical	19.17	20.34	106.0
chemical "A"	63.34	65.62	103.2
the main	35.04	38.38	109.5
aniline-colorful	5.40	6.92	128.0
benzene coke	5.74	5.52	96.3
wood chemical	2.65	2.23	84.2
paintwork	2.56	2.79	109.0
bone-processing	0.89	1.20	135.0
rare elements	1.66	1.17	70.3

Potash Trust	5.55	2.60	102.0
State laboratory supply	0.37	0.31	83.8
Photo-cinema	0.28	0.30	107.0
Different	6.20	4.20	67.8
Building materials	53.13	39.51	74.2
cement	12.18,	12.24	100.5
refractory	11.68	11.28	96.2
brick-tiled	25.77	13.55	51.5
lime-alabaster	2.27	1.28	56.3
roofing	0.73	0.66	90.5
other	0.50	0.50	100.0
Glass	15.94	16.68	104.5
Forest	41.90	39.34	94.0
Textile "A"	7.83	7.85	100.0
Glavhlopkom	8.25	8.00	97.0
Construction companies	3.17	2.98	94.0
Scientific and technical department of the Supreme Economic Council	8.30	8.30	100.0
Different	2.63	2.33	88.5
Total for group "A"	954.21	922.29	96.6
Chemical "B"	16.79	19.66	117.0

rubber	6.11	8.12	133.0
pharmaceutical	1.67	1.64	98.0
fatty	4.69	5.79	123.2
matchbox	4.13	3.92	95.0
different	0.19	0.19	100.0
Textile "B"	180.75	200.63	111.0
Porcelain and faience	3.52	3.68	104.8
Paper	38.39	45.38	118.2
Tannery	27.70	28.68	103.0
Sewing	5.69	5.77	101.5
Sugar	48.73	51.30	105.2
Food flavor	38.70	40.38	104.3
Salt	1.93	2.35	121.8
Polygraphic	3.41	3.95	115.5
Total for group "B"	365.61	401.78	109.6
Total by industry	1319.82	1324.07	100.3

In terms of the total amount, the capital construction plan for the reporting year was fulfilled by more than 100%, but since the government's directives to reduce the construction index (by 15%) were not fully implemented, the implementation of the plan will probably be several percent lower in terms of volume.

If throughout the industry as a whole the plan was generally fulfilled, then the above data show that in group A there is a failure to fulfill the plan by 3.4%, and in group B, on the contrary, it is exceeded by 9.6%. If

according to the plan 72.2% fell on group "A", 27.8% of all capital works and on group "B", then preliminary data on the execution of the plan give 69.5% for group "A" and 30.5% -for group "B". Particular attention is drawn to the failure to fulfill the plan for ferrous metallurgy by 18.7 million rubles, or 9.5%. This non-fulfillment falls in its main part on Yugostal, where it is treated as objects of new construction (Mariupol pipe-rolling and

Kerch Metallurgical Plants), and to work on existing plants [12].

Construction proceeded more favorably in the machine-building industry, where for the largest construction projects the failure to fulfill the plan does not exceed 5-10%.

It should be especially noted that in the coal industry, in particular in Donugol, the plan is fully fulfilled in terms of the amount, but in terms of volume there is some lag behind the plan. True, for new large-scale mine construction, due to the unavailability of projects for some mines, the plan was fulfilled only by 86.5%, and for housing construction, due to the late receipt of additional loans instead of 21.6 million rubles. according to the plan, about 19 million rubles were spent. The costs of power plants and mechanization are in line with the plan [tab. 2].

In the oil industry, the underperformance falls mainly on Grozneft and Kubcherneft (about 6 million rubles), while in Azneft there is a certain cost overrun, mainly caused by the rise in the cost of drilling against the program: in terms of volume, the drilling plan was fulfilled by 101.6%. costs were almost 112% of the plan. Drilling costs have risen in Grozneft as well; in terms of volume, the drilling plan here was fulfilled only by 90%. The failure to fulfill the plan by the oil industry occurred mainly in relation to cracking and other additional work. While the oil pipeline construction in Grozny proceeded quite successfully, in the construction of the Baku oil pipeline and Batumi factories, certain organizational defects were discovered, which led to some slowdown in work.

In the chemical industry, there is an excess of the plan, especially in the group "B", whereas in previous years there was, on the contrary, some lag in reality from the plan. To what extent are given in table. [2] The execution of the plan in terms of volume corresponds to the value

amounts, it will be possible to say only after receiving the reports. The overrun in the rubber industry is largely attributable to the inclusion of housing construction from the workers' welfare fund, which was not included in the plan; in terms of aniline-ink, the overrun is explained by the fact that when drawing up the work plan for 1926/27, they were taken into account in a larger amount than they actually turned out to be.

The greatest failure to fulfill the plan is in the building materials industry. In addition to the late approval of the additional construction plan in this industry, it should be noted that the lack of planning discipline of the regulatory bodies played a large role here, expressed in untimely leave for the construction of the assigned funds with insufficient activity shown by local authorities, as well as the general unpreparedness of the industry to use additional appropriations. A significant part of the work envisaged by the additional plan, thus, passed on execution to 1928/29.

The late approval of significant additional work in the forest industry and insufficient preparation for them in design and organizational terms explains the failure to fulfill the plan in this industry, despite the cost overruns on a number of facilities, the construction of which was launched.

Large underperformance in Group A in respect of the metal and silicate industries is opposed by a strong excess in Group B, mainly in the textile industry. This excess is due mainly to the forcing of a number of work over and above the plan, but partly also to the rise in the cost of work.

As a result, throughout industry, with a general increase in capital construction in 1927-28 against the previous year by 23.8%, work in group A increased by only 20%, and in group B by 31.6%. However, despite the underperformance of the program for the metal and silicate industries, the growth in construction compared to last year in these industries was very intensive (32 and 37.2%) and far exceeded the average growth in construction in industry as a whole (23.8%) ... On the contrary, in the textile industry (+ 24%), despite the strong excess of the program, the growth in construction is significantly less than the industry average.

New factories and factories

In 1927/28, new factories under construction began to come into operation on a larger scale. The most important of them are the following: Chernorechensky chemical plant and partially Bereznikovskiy electrolysis plant; an oil plant in Baku with an annual processing of 200 thousand tons of oil fuel; Grozny paraffin plant (the first in the USSR) for 5 thousand tons of paraffin and a new 15-cubic meter oil refinery battery in Grozny with processing of 500 thousand tons of oil per year; a coke oven battery in Rutchenkovo (Donbass) for 410 thousand tons of coke per year; Karsakpay copper plant of Atbastsvetmet (first stage for 5 thousand tons of copper); the first stage of the Ridder enterprise, including the lead plant (5 thousand tons of lead); the inert plant in Zlatoust (Ural) with an annual output of 2.5 million braids; two cotton factories in the Central region with 200 thousand spindles, 4 silk-winding mills in Central Asia with 384 cans and 3 cotton ginning plants for 2,400 spindles with a total throughput of 15,000 tons of cotton per year; worsted spinning mill. Kalinin in Moscow for 27 thousand spindles; plant "Electropribor"; two match factories with a total capacity of 2 thousand boxes per shift; three sugar factories with a total annual capacity of about 38 thousand tons of sugar (Turbovskiy, Brodetskiy and "Kollektivist"), built on the site of old factories using some of the remaining equipment and some buildings; a number of sawmills with an annual production of about 330 m³ of timber; an extraction oil mill in the North Caucasus (14,262 tons of oil); a number of canneries and a number of others. At the end of 1927/28, a trial run of the first stage of the Balakhna paper mill took place,

Electricity construction and power supply [13]

Actual results of power construction

The actual results of construction at the expense of the above funds are presented in the following form. In the reporting year, two pre-revolutionary stations were expanded and the capacity was expanded at 10 stations, of which 3 were pre-revolutionary stations and 7 were newly built. The expansion of the capacity of pre-revolutionary stations was carried out by 37.5 thousand kW (2nd SHPP - tram - by 17.5 thousand kW, Baku "Krasnaya Zvezda" - by 20 thousand kW), the expansion of pre-revolutionary stations continued by 99 thousand kW.

kW (1st SHPP 1-35 thousand kW, 2nd L HPP - 44 [thousand kW] and in Baku - 20 thousand kW), and newly built stations - by 363 thousand kW (Shaturskaya - by 88 thousand kW, Kashirskaya -66 thousand, Nigra-44 thousand Yaroslavskaia (Lyapinskaya) -11 thousand, "Red October" -88 thousand, Kizelovskaya-22 thousand and Shterovskaya-44 thousand kW).

In addition, the construction of the following stations, begun in 1925/26, continued: five new state regional power plants with 131 thousand kW (Shakhtinskaya - 44 thousand, Chuguevskaya, formerly Eskhar-44 thousand, Kievskaya - 22 thousand, Saratov - 11 thousand and Grozny - 10 thousand kW) and 11 new state regional power plants with 552.5 thousand kW started in 1926-27. (Dneprovskaya-245 thousand, Svirskaya No. 3-80 thousand, Ivanovo-Voznesenskaya - 44 thousand, Chelyabinsk-44 thousand, Gizel-Donskaya - 22.5 thousand, Bryansk - 22 thousand, Novorossiyskaya - 22 thousand., Osinovskaya-22 thousand, Rionskaya-21 thousand, Dzoragetskaya-19 thousand and Krasnodar-11 thousand kW). Thus, in total, in the reporting year, 16 new state regional power plants were built with a total capacity of 683.5 thousand kW. Construction of new district stations was not started in the reporting year.

It should be noted that, in addition to regional electrical construction, in the reporting year, the construction of two large hydropower plants of republican significance continued: Batumi (Aja-rice - Tskhali) - for 5.5 thousand and Kondopoga - for 5 thousand kW.

As for rural electrification, as of January 1, 1928, the number of rural installations across the USSR reached 1120 with an installed capacity (round) of 29 thousand kW. By the end of the reporting year, the total installed capacity, including about 50 units under construction, was (round) 31 thousand kW. The annual electricity production of the rural installations themselves reached 39 million kW.

Construction of Dneprostroy

Dneprovskoe construction was started in June 1927, when the plant's capacity was set at 150 thousand liters. from. with the possibility of further development up to 350 thousand liters. from. Then, in connection with the development of the issue of future energy consumers of this station, it was decided to immediately build the first

stage of 350 thousand liters. s, referring to the second stage further development up to 650 thousand liters. from. Accordingly, in October 1928, the general estimate of the Dnieper structures of the first stage (round) was approved at 196 million rubles. By the end of the reporting year, all preparatory and auxiliary work had been completed, and the Dnieper construction came close to the implementation of the main structures: a dam, a hydroelectric power station, locks, a railway line and bridge crossings.

Power supply

In the reporting year, in total, all stations of the USSR generated 5.02 billion kWh of electricity, which is an excess of 23% compared to 1926/27 and 158% since 1913, moreover, electricity generation from public stations amounted to 2.45 billion kWh, which exceeds the output of 1926/27 by 27% and the output of 1913 by 257%.

The power supply industry is one of the first in the USSR in terms of the excess of the pre-war level, and the relative increases in the annual electricity generation by the Union's stations are so great that they are approximately twice the largest growth in the industrialized countries of the West. As a result, the electricity supply to the USSR moves slightly up the product scale every year in the list of countries, arranged in the order of their annual electricity production. So, in 1926/27 the USSR overtook Switzerland in absolute terms of output, and in 1927/28 it overtook Sweden.

The capacity of power plants of the Union as of October 1, 1928 was 836 thousand kW at public stations, which gives an increase in comparison with 1913 by 154% and compared with 1926/27 - by 8%, at factory stations - 830 thousand kW (11% growth against 1913 and 2.5% against the previous year).

The capacity of all stations in the USSR was 1738 thousand kW, which gives an increase in comparison with 1913 by 58%, and compared with 1926/27 - by 5%.

Labor and wages [14]

Labor productivity growth

The growth of the average monthly output per worker in the industry as a whole and in its individual branches is characterized by the table below (according to the data of the DSP VSNKh) [15].

Failure to fulfill the norms of the plan was, therefore, in the entire industry 3.1% (14.5% against 17.6% according to the plan). At the same time, the greatest deviation from the planned targets was observed in the group "B", and in the following industries: coal - 7%, metal - 3.5%, textile - 7.9, leather - 5.8%, and only in two industries (oil and food), the planned targets were exceeded. For the oil industry, this is due to an increase in gusher oil production and improved processing and selection of more valuable products, and in the food industry, an increase in the annual burden of enterprises due to an improved supply of raw materials of agricultural origin.

The production per man-day worked in the industry as a whole gave an increase in the reporting year by 13.8%.

Supply of industry with agricultural raw materials

As a result of a number of planning and economic measures aimed at strengthening the raw material base of the industry, a more favorable ratio of prices for industrial and grain crops, expanding production financing for agriculture, wider use of contracting crops for industrial crops, the reporting year was marked by a general rise and strengthening of raw crops. Thanks to this, the results of the procurement of agricultural raw materials in the reporting year gave generally quite satisfactory results, which ensured a more or less normal supply of the industry with agricultural raw materials, with the exception of only the flax industry, where the lack of procurement of flax led to a temporary suspension of enterprises. Besides,

The supply of industry with agricultural raw materials and the state of its carry-overs for certain types of raw materials can be characterized by the following data:

Cotton. The cotton industry received 2,151 thousand centners of union cotton in 1927-28, i.e., 30% more than in the previous 1926-27, but despite this and an increase in import receipts by 5%, its rate development is so significant that the cotton carry-over is not only not increasing, but even decreasing. So, if the carry-over on October 1, 1925 'ensured the work of industry for 2 months, then on October 1, 1927,

this security decreased to 1.7 months, and on October 1, 1928 it fell to 1.6 months.

Flax. The state of the general resources of industry and the provision of its procurements are illustrated by the following data: on October 1, 1927, the industry came out with a remainder of 202 thousand centners, processed in 1927-28, 970 thousand centners, including 35 thousand for the export of combed flax ... Having received only 930 thousand centners, the industry on October 1, 1928 came out with a reduced flax residue of 162 thousand centners.

The supply of the linen industry has deteriorated compared with the previous year, which resulted in a decrease in annual supplies and a forced suspension of production.

Hemp. The supply of hemp to the industry is illustrated by the following data: the residues as of October 1, 1927 were equal to 162 thousand centners, 434 thousand centners were processed by the industry with a total intake of hemp of 431 thousand centners, this led to a slight decrease in the residues on October 1, 1928 to 159 thousand c.

Thus, although there is a slight increase in the supply and processing of hemp in 1927/28 compared to 1926/27, the industry has not fulfilled the approved production program and has not created the necessary increase in reserves. The seasonality of hemp harvesting, actually starting from the third quarter, poses an especially acute problem of the accumulation of carry-overs in the amount of at least 6 months of the needs of the industry, which will make it possible to eliminate the existing annual stress in the first and second quarters and the need, in this connection, to feed the industry from the harvest for export.

Tobacco. Until 1927/28, the supply of the tobacco industry was always provided with the raw materials of the previous year, and it was only in the reporting year that accelerated fermentation was applied for the first time, which made it possible to significantly reduce the amount of required carry-overs. The state of industrial resources is characterized by a decrease in raw material reserves from 35 thousand tons by the beginning of the year to 28.8 thousand tons by the end.

Makhorka. Decrease in harvesting of makhorka resulted in a sharp decline in stocks by the end of the year. This decrease is especially

negative for the planned industry, the demand of which is growing every year and, in particular, increased for 1927-28 from 70 thousand to 79.8 thousand tons, which naturally sets the task of a timely increase in reserves and keeping them in sizes that ensure the smooth operation of enterprises.

Raw hides. The increased rate of procurement and the actual overfulfillment of plans for procurement of raw hides ensured a normal supply of industry, whose needs increased in 1927-28 by 13.4% for large hides and 30% for small-scale hides. The size of the remains by the end of the year increased for large hides from 1,060 thousand pieces. (including in the COP) on October 1, 1927 up to 1650 thousand units. on October 1, 1928 and for small - from 2800 to 4000 thousand pieces.

Oilseeds. The increase in the gross yield of oilseeds for the main crops in 1927-28 to 32.4 million centners against 26.1 million centners in 1926-27 made it possible to increase their processing by the VSNKh industry to 9.1 million centners against 5.6 million centners in 1926/27

Sugar beet. The year 1927/28 was also very favorable in relation to the sugar beet harvest, the harvest of which amounted to 97.8 million quintals against 61.2 million quintals of the previous year.

Wool. The growth rate of resources for coarse wool slightly exceeded the growth rate of industrial consumption in the reporting year, and in connection with this, industrial reserves increased from 4.6 thousand tons by the beginning of the year to 6.9 thousand tons by the end. For fine wool stocks decreased from 2 thousand tons by the beginning of 1927-28 to 1.6 thousand tons by the end of the year. In the reporting year, there was also a decrease in the balance of semi-coarse wool, which is explained by the increased consumption of the industry processing semi-coarse wool. The remains of this wool decreased from 1,000 tons by the beginning of 1926-27 to 730 tons by the end of it.

In general, the supply of industry with agricultural raw materials in the reporting year, with the exception of flax, ensured the implementation of the planned production programs.

Cost of production and rationalization of production [16]

Rationalization works

In the reporting year, the most widespread among the rationalization measures was the rationalization of technological processes. This latter mainly went along the line of mechanization, replacing some operations with others that made work cheaper and faster, the introduction of all kinds of devices, etc.

An example of extremely intensive mechanization is the oil industry. In 1927-28, over 7.5 million tons of oil were produced at Azneft enterprises and over 262 thousand meters were drilled, which exceeds the pre-war level in terms of production by 215 thousand tons, and in the length of drilling - by 90 thousand tons. m. Out of 3212 mechanized wells, only 3 were operated by steam engines, and 96 - by internal combustion engines, all the rest were operated by electric motors.

In the coal industry, mechanized coal mining, which in 1927-28 amounted to about 5 million tons, despite the underperformance of the production program, exceeded mechanized mining in 1926-27 by 70%, accounting for 22.8% of the total actual production (more than higher than for England, where mechanized coal mining accounts for about 20% of all production). In 1927-28, mechanization covered 90 mines (instead of 70 in 1926-27), and thus more than 30% of all operating mines to one degree or another used machine work in coal mining.

In addition to the improvement of technological processes, the rationalization of production is characterized by the specialization of enterprises, their cooperation, the concentration of service industries, the introduction of standardization and the transition from universal to mass or large-scale production, the conclusion of agreements with a number of foreign companies on technical assistance, etc. [17]

In the area of specialization, certain successes were achieved in the reporting year in the textile industry, where specialization affected not only trusts, but also individual enterprises. Even more specialization work has been done in the electrical industry. Thus, in the reporting year, the production of tram motors, generators for train lighting, railway motors and equipment for them was concentrated at the Dynamo plant and liquidated at other plants of the trust. At the "Electric" plant, the production of installation material and welding machines was concentrated and the production of controllers was liquidated; Electro-porcelain factories. Artema, Izolyator and Proletary

each specialized in a certain type of product, dividing the work among themselves, and so on. Low-current plants were also specialized.

The same connection between the specialization of production and its mass organization on the basis of work in a continuous flow is observed in the clothing industry.

In the field of the metal industry, one can point to a reduction (in connection with the centralization of orders through the All-Union Metallosyndicate and their enlargement due to this) in the range of products of rolling mills. So, the plant them. Dzerzhinsky rolled only 56 sizes in 1927-28 (instead of 1312 sizes in 1918), which is 4% of the previous range; The Makeevka plant rolled 93 sizes (instead of 1592 sizes in 1913), which is 6%. In the metalworking industry, the work on specialization of factories carried out by Mosmashtrest should be noted. At the Klimovsk plant, for example, the assortment of manufactured machines was reduced from 200 items to 7.

The specialization of enterprises is closely related to their cooperation by suspending certain industries at individual enterprises due to the concentration of these industries in one specific enterprise. The reporting year was marked by a number of events in this direction. Such, for example, is the concentration of the foundry works of Mosmashtrest in the central foundry [named after] Vladimir Ilyich, who supplies casting to other factories of the trust, where the foundries were closed. Melstroy concentrated on the plant. Lenin in Voronezh cast iron for three of its Voronezh factories. Lenmap Trust concentrated the production of running tools for the needs of the entire trust in the new tool factory "Krasny Putilovets", etc.

The specialization of production in the regional relation was carried out taking into account both the historical and economic characteristics of individual regions. So, in the North-West region, the production of the most delicate and qualified products was concentrated, requiring a lot of technical experience and skilled labor, in the Central region - medium mechanical engineering, in the factories of the South - heavy engineering.

In the field of standardization, the work, united in the scientific and technical management of the Supreme Economic Council, proceeded in the reporting year in 85 working commissions with the number of

participants exceeding 1,000 people. In total, about 300 standards were transferred to the Committee for Standardization at the STO during the year, of which more than 220 were approved by the committee for mandatory application. Thus, the total number of approved standards reached 350 by the end of the reporting year, exceeding the number of standards in all countries except Germany and U.S.A. By the end of 1927/28, the total amount of standardized products amounted to at least 30% of all products. Work on standardization took place not only in the center, in scientific and technical management, it was carried out to a large extent in the industrial periphery - in factories and plants. All-Union standards are becoming more widespread in the shops. The implementation of the standards in practice should be strengthened by the monitoring of their implementation organized in 1927/28.

Production specialization and standardization create the prerequisites for a gradual transition to mass production and to its most perfect organizational form, namely, to work in a continuous flow. Work in a continuous stream, despite the fact that it requires the preliminary organization of a number of external and internal production relations and is more difficult to implement than simple mass or batch production, is still gradually being introduced into enterprises and in 1927-28 it covered (more or less degree) about 90 plants and factories, not counting those where production is essentially continuous (as, for example, in some industries of the chemical, food and other industries) [18].

In order to strengthen rationalization work and introduce it into a certain channel, as well as to organize it in those production units where this work had not been given sufficient attention until then, the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council in the second half of the reporting year issued a number of orders and resolutions on the organizational design of the rationalization work at enterprises and in all industry bodies, on the management of rationalization work and, in particular, on the creation of rationalization bureaus in the main departments, trusts and at the largest enterprises [19].

Taking into account the role of scientific research in the development of industry and the national economy, the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the National Economy paid a lot of attention to strengthening and developing research institutes, of which by the end

of the reporting year there were 32 with 1740 scientific workers. Some of the most important works carried out and carried out by research institutes are: new methods of obtaining phosphoric acid and the production of combined fats, which allow adding salts to the soil, simultaneously enriching it with phosphorus, nitrogen and potassium (works of academician Ipatiev); thermal method of sublimation of phosphorites, which opens up broad prospects in the field of fertilizers (the work of Professor Britske); layer-by-layer milling method of peat extraction, which, in the event of a successful completion of the experiments, should make a real revolution in the sense of an extreme simplification of the entire peat economy, complete mechanization of production and a reduction in the cost of peat (the work of Instorf); dehydration of peat, which opens up prospects for organizing continuous, throughout the year, peat production, etc. New and new sources of national wealth discovered as a result of scientific and technical research have a revolutionary effect on the course of development of the national economy, creating a new technical base for it and accelerating the rate of industrialization of the country.

Local industry

The reporting year was a year of further growth and strengthening of the local industry. The growth of the production of the local industry of the USSR in 1927-28 reached 39%. At the same time, the production of heavy industry as part of the local industry increased by 29%, and light industry - by 38.7%. Among the branches of light industry in the composition of the local industry, a particularly significant expansion of production took place in the textile industry (31.5%), leather (57.9%), food flavoring (36.9%). In the garment industry, there was a tremendous growth, -195%, due to the introduction of a second shift at a number of garment factories, significant rationalization and mechanization of production and adaptation of the assortment to the increased requirements of the consumer. Among the branches of heavy industry, it should be noted the growth of the local metal industry by 30.5%) and the growth in the production of building materials - by 24.5%.

Along with the growth of production, the number of workers employed in local industry also increased. The number of permanent workers in local industry in 1927-28 increased by 12.5% -. The local textile industry

involved more than 22 thousand people in production, the local metal industry - more than 10 thousand people, the garment industry - 17 thousand people, etc.

The capital work of the local industry was determined at 274 million rubles. (taking into account additional capital work on the building materials industry). The overwhelming part of them falls on the local industries producing consumer goods (53% of the total cost), and the production of building materials (19% of the total cost). At the same time, 1927-28 gave a new shift towards the reconstruction of the fixed capital of local industry.

In 1926-27, the local industry showed particular indiscipline in the field of capital construction and in some cases significantly went beyond the limits of capital work plans, throwing a part of its working capital for this purpose. This entailed (in addition to a partial reduction in mobile working capital) an excessive accumulation of stocks of means of production within the local industry, led to increased demands made by it in 1926-27 on the short-term credit system, and in general caused some deterioration in the financial situation of local industry.

The Promfinplan for 1927-28 was built from the point of view of improving the tense financial situation of local industry. In accordance with this structure of the industrial financial plan, the local industry's own mobile working capital increased by 13.1% in 1927-28, while the borrowed funds increased by only 6.7%. However, in 1927-28, the share of borrowed funds in the turnover of local industry was still very high (62.6%), and its relationship with the credit system continued to remain quite tense, albeit to a lesser extent than in the previous year.

In parallel with the decline in inventories in the local industry, there was a relative decline in inventories. If on October 1, 1927, the commodity reserves of the local industry in relation to its marketable output amounted to 8.6%, then by October 1, 1928, they dropped to 6.7%. In the same way, the share of debtors in the sale of products decreased from 25.3% on October 1, 1927 to 22.6% on October 1, 1928.

All this suggests that the financial plan of 1927-28 was built taking into account the possible mobilization of all material resources of the local industry and created financial conditions for work bordering on the tension of working capital.

In this regard, it should be recalled that one of the government directives in the field of local industry management was the directive to shift the center of gravity of financing local industry to local funds. [20] ... In the 1927/28 plan, this directive was largely taken into account. With the total amount of funding for the local industry of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR in 1927-28 in the amount of 140.5 million rubles. 41.2 million rubles (29.3%) fell on centralized sources (state budget, UEC, etc.) and 99.3 million rubles. (70.7%) - to the local budget, while in 1926-27 the share of centralized sources in financing local industry was 37.5%, and local sources - only 62.5% - According to the Ukrainian SSR, the above government directive was fulfilled completely, and the local industry was 100% financed from local sources. The situation was somewhat different with respect to the local industry of the RSFSR, in the financing of which centralized sources played an even greater role in 1927-28 (40.8 million rubles, with a total funding of 124.7 million rubles).

It should be noted that in 1927-28 the role of local industry increased markedly: it is enough to point out that in 1927-28 the share of local industry in the gross output of the entire planned state industry reached 32.6%, and in light industry the share of local industry even amounted to 39.1%.

Handicraft industry

Government directives for the strengthening and development of the handicraft industry [21] had a significant impact on the growth of handicraft industries in the reporting year and strengthened the role of producer cooperatives in the field of non-socialized industry.

The digital expression of the processes taking place in the handicraft industry is extremely difficult due to the lack of a systematic accounting of it. Nevertheless, on the basis of individual information received partly from the Union republics, partly from the centers of industrial cooperation, extrapolated to the entire handicraft industry and corrected by expert judgment, it is possible to give the following digital characteristic of the dynamics of the handicraft industry for 1927-28.

The number of persons employed in non-licensed industry, the main and predominant part of which is the handicraft industry [22] (without flour milling), increased from 3342 thousand in 1926-27 to 3858

thousand in 1927-28, i.e. That is, by 15.3%, and the total mass of the gross output of the handicraft industry (including processed raw materials from customers) increased by 12.7% (from 2752 million rubles to 3112 million rubles in prices of 1926-27) ...

The processes of socialization in the handicraft industry are characterized by a significant organizational strengthening of industrial cooperation; the latter increased in the number of cooperative handicraftsmen from 409 thousand to 620 thousand (by 51.5%), and the percentage of cooperatives reached 16 against 12.2 in 1926-27. The gross production of industrial cooperation increased from 633 million rubles. up to 855 million rubles, ie by 60.3% ... [23]

"Year of government work. Materials for the report for 1927/28 ". M., 1929, pp. 133-145, 148-150, 154-155, 158-166, 173-176.

[1] Dated by content.

[2] The chapters are omitted: "Fuel supply", "Financial situation of the industry", "Organizational measures of the government".

[3] Omitted paragraph: "The main points of the production and financial plan of industry for 1927/28".

[4] For the range of industries included in the industrial financial plan for 1927/28 - Approx. document.

[5] The data for 1927/28 for the circle of included enterprises is somewhat wider than in 1926/27. The production of newly included enterprises in 1927/28 amounts to 10 million rubles. document.

[6] Compared with adjusted plan (23.1% growth). document.

[7] Compared with adjusted plan (23.1% growth). document.

[8] Compared with adjusted plan (23.1% growth). document.

[9] The table is not published ("Year of government work. Materials for the report for X927/28". M., 1929, p. 134).

[10] The following paragraphs have been omitted: "Financing of capital construction", "Government and subordinate measures to streamline the case of capital construction."

[11] An agreement on the provision of loans from Germany to the Soviet Union for the purchase of equipment was concluded in October

1925 - July 1926 with Datsche Bank in the amount of 300 million marks on the basis of the Soviet-German economic agreement signed on October 12, 1925 (SZ, 1926, No. 28, p. 181).

[12] Cost details for new plants are provided below. (Information is not published, see "Year of government work. Materials for the report for 1927/28". M., 1929, pp. 144-145). As regards the existing plants, the failure to perform work on blast furnace and coke construction is especially sensitive. So, for a new blast furnace being built at the Makeyevka plant, the costs are instead of 1 million rubles. according to the plan amounted to only 515 thousand rubles., and for three new large coke oven batteries at the plants. Petrovsky, Dzerzhinsky and Voroshilov against the planned figure of 23 785 thousand rubles. there is execution in the amount of 13 845 thousand rubles. (in addition, unidentified imported equipment amounts to 3556 thousand rubles). For the installed eight new gas blowers the consumption instead of 8.8 million rubles. according to the plan amounted to only about 3.9 million rubles. (in addition, no imported equipment for 2264 thousand rubles has been installed). The reasons for such a sharp non-fulfillment of the plan can be more definitely judged only after the presentation of the accounting report, but most importantly they are in the backlog of design, as well as in the late approval of the plan. document.

[13] The paragraph "Electricity construction plan" is omitted.

[14] The following paragraphs have been omitted: "Labor force growth", "Wage growth", "Introduction of the 7-hour working day", "Labor protection and housing construction".

[15] The table is not published ("Year of government work. Materials for the report for 1927/28". M., 1929, p. 155).

[16] The paragraph "Reducing the cost of production" is omitted.

[17] In the early years of industrialization in the USSR, foreign technical experience was actively studied and used. So, the number of foreign business trips of Soviet specialists was 328 in 1926/26, 418 in 1926/27 and 528 in 1927/28. As of July 25, 1928, 296 foreign engineers and 358 workers worked in the USSR, 37 agreements on technical assistance were concluded with foreign firms, including 14 agreements on the chemical industry, 10 on the metal and 7 on the electrical engineering

industries (" Rationalization of the industry of the USSR ". M., 1928, pp. 447-449).

[18] One of the most important forms of industrial rationalization was the improvement of the 'organization of technical regulation. By the middle of 1928, new technically sound norms had been introduced for a number of industrial associations. At the Gomza factories, the norms were increased by an average of 22%, Len-mashtrest - from 5 to 20-25, Sudotrest - by 5%. At the plants of the Southern Machine-Building Trust for individual products, the norms were increased: for a steam locomotive of the SU series (Lugansk plant) - by 15%, for 20-ton cars (Nikolaevsky plant) - by 45% ("Rationalization of the USSR industry". M., 1928, pp. 346, 362).

[19] To rationalize production, special bodies were created both for general planning of rationalization measures (bureaus of the scientific organization of labor, bureaus and rationalization departments) and for operational work (planning and distribution bureau, standardization bureau, etc.). If until the fall of 1927 these bodies were created mainly in trusts and at enterprises of all-Union significance, then by the spring of 1928 rationalization departments began to be created in industry of republican significance. The total number of trust and factory bodies for rationalizing production increased from 283 on October 1, 1927 to 460 on April 1, 1928. Congresses, conferences, and trust meetings on the rationalization of production were of great importance for the exchange of experience ("Rationalization of the USSR Industry.", 1928, pp. 432, 453-457).

[20] "Year of government work for 1926/27." - Approx. document

[21] Year of work of the government for 1926/27. "- Approx. Document.

[22] According to the state of statistical materials, it is not possible to single out the handicraft industry from the non-licensed industry. document.

[23] The statement of the directives of the Council of People's Commissars and the STO of the USSR on the development of handicraft cooperation for 1927/28 is omitted.

№ 24 From the information of the Central Statistical Administration of the USSR on the growth of industrial production of the union republics for 1925 / 26-1927 / 28. [1]

No earlier than October 1, 1928 [2]

Union republic and industry	Gross production, thousand rubles			% to the total for the republics		
	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.
Total for the USSR	9955990.6	11438948.0	13618352.0	-	-	-
RSFSR	7160674.6	8277511.2	9834806.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Including						
Cotton	1879383.3	2221498.9	2461875.0	26.2	26.8	25.2
Flour and cereal	561995.4	629177.9	620,006.0	7.8	7.6	6,3
woolen	314435.4	398486.2	459507.0	4.4	4.8	4.7
various food production	232730.3	271554.9	394416.0	3.2	3.3	4.0
industrial and other mechanical engineering	207329.2	264133.3	349060.0	2.9	3.2	3.6
sawmill and plywood	239274.3	296257.4	318840.0	3.3	3.6	3.3
tannery	243598.9	271955.1	321172.0	3.4	3.3	3.3
ferrous metallurgy	229747.6	267163.4	308028.0	3.2	3.2	3.2
sewing	118413.1	127217.5	279417.0	1.7	1.5	2.9
distillery-yeast, vodka-brandy, grape-wine	154968.1	222090.7	248827.0	2.2	2.7	2.5
linen	189014.6	205506.5	206576.0	2.6	2.5	2.1
rubber	149204.7	165429.4	182381.0	2.1	2.0	1.9
soap, fat and perfume	102931.5	133589.3	186665.0	1.4	1.6	1.9

production of various products from ferrous metals	126532.5	141770.7	169213.0	1.8	1.7	1.7
oil refining	111875.8	139499.0	162574.0	1.6	1.7	1.7
typography	143332.1	133365.9	149685.0	2.0	1.6	1.5
Non-ferrous metal processing	116841.7	129347.1	148818.0	1.6	1.6	1.5
power plants	102549.3	111185.1	137983.0	1.4	1.3	1.4
sugar beet	113289.2	85655.0	124050.0	1.6	1.0	1.3
oil mill	113783.3	88904.7	117226.0	1.6	1.1	1.2
manufacture of paper and cardboard	103487.4	86049.8	102313.0	1.4	1.0	1.1
glass-making	66930.9	75293.5	84973.0	0.9	0.9	-
coal	58428.1	75866.4	82528.0	0.8	9.9	
Ukrainian SSR	2046993.1	2286427.7	2705587.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Including						
sugar beet and refined	441269.7	431371.0	479597.2	21.6	18.9	17.7
metallurgy of ferrous metals.	260238.9	320943.5	368207.0	12.7	14.0	13.6
coal	213607.8	315374.0	332970.5	10.4	13.8	12.3
flour-cereal	316481.3	251559.9	301982.2	15.5	11.6	11.2
agricultural engineering	56091.1	71133.9	92919.2	2.7	3.1	3.4
various food production	46738.7	57236.2	88423.7	2,3	2.5	3.3
agricultural engineering	65844.3	69809.5	76441.3	3.2	3.1	2.8
machine production of mass products	40109.4	37816.6	45696.8	2.0	1.7	2.7

distillery-yeast, vodka-brandy, grape-wine	37143.5	53008.5	66475.5	1.8	2,3	2.5
railway, transport engineering	34434.1	48385.1	58846.5	1.7	2.1	2.2
production of various products from ferrous metals	38082.2	43973.2	58610.2	1.9	1.9	2.2
industrial and other mechanical engineering	20806.6	28250.2	40266.0	1.0	1,2	1.5
basic chemical	25998.0	32749.6	37621.5	1.3	1.4	1.4
sawmill and plywood	28917.6	32134.6	31287.6	1.4	1.4	1,2
power plants	20258.9	24737.5	33635.2	1.0	1.1	1,2
ceramic	21140.6	29411.6	30873.1	1.0	1.3	1.1
typography	30036.1	21204.4	30962.6	1.5	0.9	1.1
iron ore	12796.8	19112.7	26680.1	0.6	0.8	1.0
manufacture of leather footwear	14257.5	18771.5	27782.5	0.7	0.8	1.0
hemp processing	22757.5	23387.5	27334.9	1.1	1.0	1.0
glass	18916.3	25939.7	23908.6	0.9	1.1	0.9
makhorka	26522.2	24276.5	24091.9	1.3	1.1	0.9
BSSR	113026.5	128932.5	163930.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Including						
sawmill and plywood	21561.2	27508.8	30640.2	19.1	21.3	18.8
distillery-yeast, vodka-brandy and grape-wine	12232.4	14979 , 5	14337, 9	10.8	11.6	8.8
sewing	2364.2	4477.9	14430.7	2.1	3.5	8.8

manufacture of paper and cardboard	5666.7	11852.2	13638.4	5.0	9.2	8.4
tannery	4738.3	6162.7	8378.5	4.2	4.8	5.1
flour-cereal	5258.9	5826.8	7569.2	4.7	4.5	4.6
manufacture of leather footwear	2958.0	3651.6	6780.5	2.6	2.8	4.2
glass	4706.1	5063.8	6619.5	4.2	3.9	4.1
matchbox	7370.4	5218.8	6560.1	6.5	4.0	4.0
agricultural engineering	2277.3	3496.1	9162.4	2.0	2.7	3.2
manufacture of other wood products	1906.9	3344.0	5233.1	1.7	2.6	3.2
typography	3246.4	3658.4	4035.5	2.9	2.8	2.5
linen	3993.6	4614.1	3957.0	3.5	3.6	2.4
various production facilities for processing materials of animal origin	2977.5	3082.4	3366.0	2.6	2.4	2.1
power plants	1713.5	2033.6	2529.4	1.5	1.6	1.6
brewing	2329.7	1940.0	1942.4	2.1	1.5	1,2
makhorka	1489.1	1288.3	1601.5	1.3	1.9	1.0
TSFSR	446173.0	526788.9	639791.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Including						
oil refining	133790.9	169595.0	214387.1	30.0	36.3	36.6
oil production	158524.1	200,021.0	220114.0	35.5	30.0	26.4
flour-cereal	18676.4	19775.8	26428.5	4.2	4.2	4.5
ginneries	19654.4	20227.8	28312.4	4.4	4,3	3.1
distillery-yeast, vodka-brandy, grape-wine	11893.8	5846.4	17442.2	2.7	1.3	3.0
power plants	10451.9	13733.8	15101.2	2,3	2.9	2.6

various food production	9483.9	9626.3	14001.5	2.1	2.1	2.4
cotton	9479.0	9982.7	11841.2	2.1	2.1	2.0
tobacco	8341.9	8275.6	9870.5	1.9	1.8	1.7
plumbing	7417.3	6302.8	6696.7	1.7	1.4	1.1
sawmill and plywood	5316.1	5865.5	5794.5	1,2	1.3	1.0
manganese ore mining	5339.0	3630.7	1934.9	1,2	0.8	0.3
Uzbek SSR	146240.6	185288.6	235399.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Including						
ginneries	112597.2	126104.7	158424.7	68.6	68.1	67.3
oil mill	14675.4	17489.8	23940.3	8.9	9.4	10.2
flour-cereal	8921.7	10645.7	15436.8	5.4	5.7	6.6
distillery-yeast, vodka-brandy, grape-wine	6487.7	6708.1	7747.8	4.0	3.6	3.3
tannery	1403.4	1558.8	3471.4	0.9	0.8	1.5
silk processing	96.7	1949.3	3108.9	0.06	1.1	1.3
typography	3769.6	2783.7	2631.6	2,3	1.5	1.1
brewing	2257.3	2546.7	2320.3	1.4	1.4	1.0
various food production	2676.3	2063.9	2412.7	1.6	1.1	1.0
power plants	1456.2	1791.2	1775.2	0.9	1.0	0.8
cotton	1431.4	51.3	441.3	0.9	0.03	0.2
coal	1058.7	1062.1	236.4	0.6	0.6	0.1
Turkmen SSR	24882.8	33999.1	38846.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Including						
ginneries	14640.3	20010.1	23852.8	58.8	59.0	61.5
oil mill	1798.7	3630.0	3674.1	7.2	10.7	9.5

wool factories	2061.5	2887.1	2620.1	8.3	8.5	6.8
flour-cereal	845.8	2074.8	2223.7	3.4	6.1	5.7
distillery and yeast; vodka-brandy and grape-wine	847.5	1325.0	1736.7	3.4	3.9	4.5
typography	629.0	620.2	690.3	2.5	1.8	1.8
saline	426.0	457.7	665.4	1.7	1.3	1.7
soap, fat and perfume	1379.6	329.8	648.9	5.5	1.0	1.7
power plants	531.1	623.6	695.9	2.1	1.8	1.3
matchbox	437.3	388.4	-	1.8	1.1	-

"Union industry in figures. Growth rates and factors of development (Materials for the party conference of 1929)". M .. 1929, pp. 22-27.

№ 25 Information of the Central Statistical Administration of the USSR on the growth of industrial production of the USSR in physical terms for 1925 / 26-1927 / 28.

Not earlier than October 1, 1928 [3]

Products by industry	unit of measurement	Year			% to the previous year		
		1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.
A. Production of capital goods							
Power plants	thousand kWh	1,560,200	1 935 320	2 559 808	130.3	124.0	132.3
Fuel industry							
coal	t	20,303,800	24 933 254	27 277 243	151.1	122.8	109.4
anthracite	"	5 411 200	6,990,963	8 074 982	163.6	129.2	115.5
oil (produced)	"	8 244 200	10 239 711	11 771,921	117.9	124.2	115.0
Ore industry							
ore-metal	"	3 317 818	4,775,734	5,968,161	159.2	143.9	125.0
iron ore	"	425 435	509 405	644 795	246.2	119.7	126.6
copper ore	"	898,279	833 631	737,773	141.5	92.8	88.5
Metallurgy of ferrous metals							
cast iron, total	"	2 206 893	2 079	2 966 328 711	171.1	134.4	110.8
Martin and Bessemer	"	2 900 176	3 026	3 636 414 937 0	155.2	125.4	114.1
rental, total	"	2 255 100	2 333	2 702 323 702	159.0	119.8	119.6
Mechanical engineering							
a) agricultural:							

tractors	PC.	813	781	1 232	169.0	96.1	157.7
plows	PC.	945,000	1,036,653	1 167 037	162.4	109.7	112.6
seeders	"	61,995	58,065	55 123	206.8	93,7	95.0
mowers and headers	"	88100	170,501	248,035	158.9	193.5	145.5
threshers	"	54,700	64 472	61 468	153.7	117.9	95.3
winders and graders	"	94,800	141,974	192 641	164.6	149.8	135.7
b) other production							
machines and tools for metal processing	"	-	10746	11134	-	-	103.6
internal combustion engines	PC.	2528	3 503	5,332	187.7	138.6	152.2
Building materials production							
building brick	thousand pcs.	820,018	1 250 160	1 688 116	199.6	152.5	135.0
refractory brick	"	98,064	166,079	181002	154.4	169.4	109.0
ground cement	t	1,295,469	1 574013	1,851,865	183.2	121.5	117.7
semi-white window glass	"	64333	78693	107,430	114.5	122.3	136.5
Boehm glass	"	28613	39388	30163	278.3	137.7	76.6
sawn timber for the domestic market	m ³	8 092 600	9 160 665	9 826 608	126.9	113.2	107.3
export sawn timber	"	1,850,400	2 161 573	2 657 738	103.4	116.8	123.0
roofing iron	"	283530	324,432	371 116	159.3	114.4	114.4

Chemical industry							
acids, total	t	236342	314425	352 350	134.6	132.3	112.1
alkali, total	"	323610	254,426	305740	130.2	78.6	120.2
chemical salts, total	"	193,992	219 186	276,980	145.0	113.5	126.4
including superphosphate	"	91,808	97,002	147,200	171.6	105.6	151.7
Oil refining industry							
lighting oils	"	1,860,736	1,723,816	1 956 527	130.3	92.6	113.4
oil residues	"	3,754,887	4,137,321	4 540 143	122.4	110.1	109.7
B. Production of consumer goods							
Textile industry							
a) Cotton industry							
ordinary yarn	thousand m	242,547	304 365	326 984	128.0	125.4	107.4
harsh fabrics	"	2 208 782	2,483,847	2 813 725	135.5	112.4	113.3
finished fabrics	"	2,064,977	2,370,373	2 717 726	135.5	114,7	114,7
b) Woolen industry							
yarn	t	35836	43,779	49936	122.4	122.1	114.1
harsh fabrics	thousand m	70241	88,054	94512	127.5	125.3	107, 3
finished fabrics	"	66 794	85209	87 976	128.9	127.5	103.2
c) Silk industry							
harsh fabrics	"	4688	5 958	9,047	242.7	127.1	151.6
finished fabrics	"	5 588	6 468	9776	263.5	115.7	151.1
d) Linen industry							
linen yarn	t	67768	67395	67,005	142.3	99.5	99.4

harsh fabrics	thousand m2	175674	194,157	187 351	129.8	110.5	96.5
Food industry							
all kinds of flour		5 881 282	7,059,818	7 980 987	139.0	120.0	113.0
all kinds of cereals	"	358499	250 151	300 107	129.0	69.8	120.0
granulated sugar	"	1,076,584	984772	1 259 180	231.2	91.5	127.9
all vegetable oil	"	327,034	252,922	330376	149.1	77.3	130.6
raw alcohol	thousand degrees	1081 699	1,475,242	1,732,598	372.1	136.4	117.4
tobacco	t	782	1149	1186	190.3	146.9	103.2
Leather industry							
total skins in large	thousand pcs.	11636	12991	15 429	120.9	111.7	118.8
Shoe industry							
different leather shoes	thousand pairs	10828	17,035	22 572	132.0	157.3	132.5
Soap industry							
laundry soap	t	119188	132 647	183621	126.4	115.5	133.4
Match industry							
matches	box	4,035,000	4 2574 853	4 114 005	126.5	105.5	96.6
Rubber industry							
	thousand pairs	25301	29625	36,004	160.9	117.1	121.5
Silicate industry							
household porcelain	t	15312	17193	14,264	143.3	112.3	83.2
faience	"	13 084	10662	25394	99.5	81.5	237.5

Paper industry							
different cardboard	"	29487	45 459	44316	128.4	154.2	97.6
different paper	"	252 261	280,574	281,364	123.1	111.2	100.3
Salt industry							
salt	"	1,537,215	2,061,075	2 527 250	115.5	134.1	122.6
Plumbing							
raised water	million m3	254021	231,089	305 144	113.2	91.0	132.0

"Union industry in figures. Growth rates and development factors. (Materials for the party conference in 1929) "M., 1929, pp. 15-17.

№ 26 From the information of the Central Statistical Administration of the USSR on the social structure of the USSR industry in 1924 / 25-1927 / 28. [4]

July 29, 1929 [five]

Industries	Year	Number of operating establishments					Gross output				
		total, abs.	state	cooperative	private	concession	Total (thousand rubles)	state	cooperative	private	concession
		%					%				
All qualifying industry	1924 /25	111720	65.0	17.5	17.4	0.1	6798	76090.3	5.7	3.8	0.2
	1925 /26	12520	64.3	18.4	16.9	0.4	9990	93589.6	6.4	3.6	0.4
	1926 /27	13166	69.2	18.0	12.3	0.5	114948	91.3	6.4	1.8	0.5
	1927 /28	13121	71.2	21.2	7.2	0.4	13352	61890.9	7.7	0.8	0.6
A. Production of capital goods	1924 /25	41880	79.0	9.9	10.8	0.3	2111	153396.2	1.7	1.7	0.4
	1925 /26	47637	76.7	10.7	11.6	1.0	3268	15095.2	2.1	1.7	1.0
	1926 /27	52323	80.3	10.1	8.6	1.0	383	96296.0	1.8	1.0	1.2
	1927 /28	52473	80.3	12.6	6.3	0.8	4096	67495.9	2.3	0.6	1.2
Power plants	1924 /25	5297	94.7	4.0	1.3	-	1075	6399.8	0.1	0.1	-
	1925 /26	5918	94.8	4.4	0.8	-	1361	9699.8	0.1	0.1	-

	1926 /27	639	95. 0	4.1	0.9	-	154 105	99. 8	0.1	0.1	-
	1927 /28	673	94. 4	5.1	0.5	-	191720	99. 8	0.2	-	-
Coal	1924 /25	91	89. 0	5.5	5.5	-	165 394	99. 6	0.1	0.3	-
	1925 /26	100	89. 0	2.0	9.0	-	273,87 4	99. 9	-	0.1	-
	1926 /27	492	91. 3	1.4	6.9	0,4	393,28 6	99. 6	0.1	0.2	0.1
	1927 /28	441	88. 0	0.7	10.6	0.7	416691	99. 4	-	0.2	0,4
Oil producing	1924 /25	22	95. 5	-	4.5	-	191521	100- .0	-	-	-
	1925 /26	22	95. 5	-	4.5	-	238,30 1	100- .0	-	-	-
	1926 /27	23	95. 6	-	4.4	-	296,02 6	100- .0	-	-	-
	1927 /28	23	100- .0	-	-	-	335 987	100- .0	-	-	-
Neftepere working	1924 /25	26	100- .0	-	-	-	181,40 5	100- .0	-	-	-
	1925 /26	27	100- .0	-	-	-	246,23 4	100- .0	-	-	-
	1926 /27	31	100- .0	-	-	-	309,97 9	100- .0	-	-	-
	1927 /28	34	100- .0	-	-	-	377880	100- .0	-	-	-
Peat	1924 /25	167	100- .0	-	-	-	18,900	100- .0	-	-	-
	1925 /26	146	97. 79	2.1	-	-	26208	99. 8	0.2	-	-
	1926 /27	169	97. 0	3.0	-	-	42397	99. 9	0.1	-	-

	1927/28	184	92.4	7.6	-	-	51 119	99.4	0.6	-	-
Iron ore	1924/25	34	100.0	-	-	-	11690	100.0	-	-	-
	1925/26	46	97.7	-	-	2,3	18714	98.5	-	-	-
	1926/27	83	97.6	-	-	2.4	27 OUT	99.2	-	-	-
	1927/28	36	97.2	-	-	2.8	35359	99.6	-	-	-
Manganese ore	1924/25	49	23.9	-	76.1	-	7822	43.6	-	56.4	-
	1925/26	74	9.5	-	71.6	18.9	10,977	51.4	-	27.4	21.2
	1926/27	36	55.6	-	-	44.4	9,200	60.5	-	-	39.5
	1927/28	sixteen	18.8	-	-	81.2	8 660	77.7	-	-	22.3
Copper	1924/25	nine	100.0	-	-	-	1772	100.0	-	-	-
	1925/26	12	83.3	-	-	16.7	4050	88.7	-	-	11.3
	1926/27	thirty	93.3	-	-	6,7	6 835	92.4	-	-	7.6
	1927/28	19	89.5	-	-	10.5	8 555	88.2	-	-	11.8
Silver-lead-ore	1924/25	4	75.0	-	25.0	-	516	96.5	-	3.5	-
	1925/26	4	50.0	-	25.0	25.0	841	77.7	-	2.1	20.2
	1926/27	7	71.4	-	14.3	14.3	1632	62.9	-	2.8	34.3
	1927/28	6	50.0	16.6	16.7	16.7	2524	36.4	0.3	1.1	62.2

Other mountain	1924/25	169	42.6	1.8	55.6	-	27 527	67.6	1.0	2.1	29.3
	1925/26	268	41.0	3.0	54.5	1.5	29499	69.1	0.2	1.7	29.0
	1926/27	184	40.2	2.2	56.0	1.6	33153	84.6	-	12.4	3.0
	1927/28	204	47.0	0.5	51.0	1.5	40 108	98.2	0.1	1.7	-
Metallurgy of ferrous metals	1924/25	74	100.0	-	-	-	319,968	100.0	-	-	-
	1925/26	78	96.2	-	-	3.8	490,098	99.1	-	-	0.9
	1926/27	79	96.2	-	-	3.8	588165	99.2	-	-	0.8
	1927/28	71	97.2	-	-	2.8	676 235	99.1	-	-	0.9
Metallurgy of non-ferrous metals	1924/25	fourteen	93.3	-	6,7	4.8	17340	99.8	-	0.2	-
	1925/26	21	80.9	4.8	9.5	6.2	28377	96.2	-	1,2	2.0
	1926/27	sixteen	87.5	-	6,3	5.9	33 859	96.3	-	0.6	3.1
	1927/28	17	88.2	-	5.9	1.7	43603	95.1	-	0.3	4.6
Non-ferrous metal processing	1924/25	58	29.3	27.6	41.4	15.6	84726	92.0	3.5	4.4	0.1
	1925/26	64	23.4	35.9	39.1	1.7	118346	90.0	4.0	4.7	1.3
	1926/27	60	31.7	38.3	28.3	2.1	131,184	93.6	2.7	2.6	1.1
	1927/28	48	39.6	33.3	25.0	-	152 205	93.6	2.9	1.4	2.1
Machine mass	1924/25	95	50.5	15,8	33.7	0.8	53,990	85.1	7,7	7.2	-

production and stamping	1925/26	124	46.0	20.2	33.0	0.8	90 471	85.8	6.9	6,3	1.0
	1926/27	116	47.4	25.9	25.9	1.0	95663	88.1	7.6	3.4	0.9
	1927/28	100	60.0	29.0	10.0	-	118,054	90.3	6.1	1.6	1.9
Manufacture of other products from ferrous metals	1924/25	506	61.7	22.1	16.2	-	110,295	84.3	9.0	6,7	-
	1925/26	531	61.2	24.5	14.3	-	169,965	82.4	11.2	6.4	-
	1926/27	528	64.4	22.3	13.3	0.2	193,285	86.0	9.4	4.6	-
	1927/28	543	64.1	27.8	7.9	-	240 988	82.8	12.0	2.8	2.4
Railway and road transport [mechanical engineering]	1924/25	sixteen	100.0	-	-	-	61,734	100.0	-	-	-
	1925/26	17	100.0	-	-	-	85147	100.0	-	-	-
	1926/27	19	100.0	-	-	-	134,416	100.0	-	-	-
	1927/28	17	100.0	-	-	-	142 313	100.0	-	-	-
Shipbuilding	1924/25	102	98.0	1.0	1.0	-	50585	99.9	-	0.1	-
	1925/26	102	98.0	1.0	1.0	-	49,243	99.9	0.1	-	-
	1926/27	47	93.6	4.3	2.1	-	48672	99.6	0.2	0.2	-
	1927/28	40	92.5	5.0	2.5	-	78975	99.7	0.2	0.1	-
Rural	1924/25	118	70.6	26.9	2.5	-	53384	97.0	2.8	0.2	-
	1925/26	115	78.3	19.1	2.6	-	94 232	97.8	2.0	0.2	-

economic [mechanic al engineerin g]	1926 /27	109	79. 8	17.4	2.8	-	121 588	98. 4	1.5	0.1	-
	1927 /28	112	78. 6	20.5	0.9	-	163,83 7	98. 2	1.7	0.1	-
Industrial and other [mechanic al engineerin g]	1924 /25	245	66. 0	12.7	20.9	0,4	156 470	92. 5	3.1	3.9	0.5
	1925 /26	279	60. 2	19.0	19.4	1.4	232 119	92. 4	3.0	3.6	1.0
	1926 /27	274	62. 4	17.5	18.6	1.5	297,55 5	93. 4	2.6	2.4	1.6
	1927 /28	307	61. 6	9.0	8.1	1.3	392067 6	91. 6	4.5	1.6	2,3
Electrotec h- nichnaya	1924 /25	54	92. 6	1.9	5.5	-	61785	99. 4	0.1	0.5	-
	1925 /26	61	80. 4	8.2	9.8	1.6	80487	98. 1	0,4	1.3	0.2
	1926 /27	55	74. 5	10.9	12.7	1.8	109 601	98. 5	0.7	0.7	0.1
	1927 /28	55	78. 2	9.1	10.9	1.8	139,93 3	98. 4	0.5	0.7	0,4
Type- casting	1924 /25	12	50. 0	41,7	8.3	-	3481	83. 9	12.7	3.4	-
	1925 /26	fiftee n 3	53.	40.0	6,7	-	3161	69. 2	19.4	11.4	-
	1926 /27	fiftee n 0	60.	33.3	6,7	-	2637	66. 5	17.8	15.7	-
	1927 /28	17	47. 1	47.1	5.9	-	2941	61. 2	22.2	16.6	-
Sawmill	1924 /25	827	82. 2	11.2	5.8	0.8	173,29 6	90. 7	3.4	1.5	4.4
	1925 /26	824	80. 0	12.5	6.5	1.0	293,06 9	89. 3	5.7	2.1	2.9

	1926/27	885	80.4	12.8	5.9	0.9	361766	90.7	5.5	1.5	2,3
	1927/28	858	80.5	15.3	3.7	0.5	386,561	90.4	6,7	1.1	1.8
Resin-tar	1924/25	34	91.2	5.9	2.9	-	5194	97.9	1.4	0.7	-
	1925/26	31	93.6	3.2	3.2	-	7285	99.2	0.7	0.1	-
	1926/27	42	85.7	4.8	2.4	7.1	11747	97.6	0.3	0.1	2.0
	1927/28	26	73.1	22.2	4,3	0,4	14 562	93.3	5.5	0.7	0.5
Ceramic	1924/25	370	86.2	10.0	3.8	-	32616	95.2	3.5	1.3	-
	1925/26	528	87.8	8.8	3.4	-	62,409	94.1	4.9	1.0	-
	1926/27	598	88.3	8.2	3.5	-	80182	95.5	4.0	0.5	-
	1927/28	682	89.6	9.2	1,2	-	89 642	95.3	4.5	0.2	-
Glass	1924/25	142	87.3	9.2	3.5	-	58,000	93.5	3.7	2.8	-
	1925/26	151	85.4	9.3	5.3	-	91,586	92.9	3.9	3.2	-
	1926/27	159	83.6	11.3	5.1	-	107674	93.0	4.5	2.5	-
	1927/28	155	82.6	12.2	5.2	-	117 477	94.2	4,3	1.5	-
Cement	1924/25	23	95.7	-	4,3	-	23803	99.8	-	0.2	-
	1925/26	38	92.1	2.6	5.3	-	45810	99.8	0.2	-	-
	1926/27	39	94.9	2.6	2.5	-	69,602	99.98	0.01	0.01	-

	1927/28	35	97.1	2.9	-	-	65,995	100.0	-	-	-
Extraction and primary processing of minerals	1924/25	164	84.8	4.9	10.3	-	14358	91.6	1.9	6.5	-
	1925/26	214	84.6	8.4	7.0	-	30815	93.6	2.4	4.0	-
	1926/27	225	83.6	11.6	4.8	-	30 328	93.6	3.9	2.5	-
	1927/28	245	82.4	13.5	4.1	-	40 20	93.1	5.0	1.9	-
Asbestos	1924/25	6	83.3	-	-	16.7	3550	95.5	-	-	4.5
	1925/26	7	71.4	-	14.3	14.3	6,093	91.1	-	5.5	3.4
	1926/27	8	87.5	-	12.5	-	6556	97.4	-	2.6	-
	1927/28	8	75.0	12.5	12.5	-	7 766	98.0	0.4	1.6	-
Manufacture of other products from minerals	1924/25	sixteen	81.2	12.5	6.3	-	6490	95.8	3.2	1.0	-
	1925/26	23	68.2	13.6	13.6	4.6	11822	84.9	2.6	11.1	1.4
	1926/27	25	60.0	12.0	24.0	4.0	20,027	54.5	1.8	5.0	38.7
	1927/28	thirty	73.3	13.4	10.0	3.3	23936	73.3	1.0	1.9	23.8
Basic [chemical]	1924/25	44	90.9	4.5	2,3	2,3	40798	99.3	0.1	-	0.6
	1925/26	47	91.5	2.1	2.1	4,3	55513	98.2	0.3	0.8	0.7
	1926/27	45	86.7	4.4	4.4	4.5	71,028	97.8	0.3	1.1	0.8
	1927/28	49	87.9	6.1	4.0	2.0	84,734	98.6	0.7	0.2	0.5

Paintwork	1924/25	52	73.1	5.8	19.2	1.9	31867	85.0	2.9	7,7	4.4
	1925/26	64	67.2	7.8	23.4	1.6	51 612	86.1	4.0	7.9	2.0
	1926/27	64	65.6	9.4	23.4	1.6	44302	90.2	3.4	4.8	0.9
	1927/28	51	70.6	19.6	7.8	2.0	53 462	93.0	4.2	1.3	1.5
Wood chemical	1924/25	fourteen	78.6	14.3	7.1	-	2060	91.8	4.2	4.0	-
	1925/26	sixteen	87.5	6.2	6,3	-	4 807	93.3	2.8	3.9	-
	1926/27	sixteen	75.0	18.7	6,3	-	6391	92.7	7.2	0.1	-
	1927/28	23	82.7	13.0	4,3	-	8202	96.3	3.6	0.1	-
Other chemical	1924/25	41	87.8	-	12.2	-	27,080	99.2	-	0.8	-
	1925/26	53	90.6	1.9	7.5	-	55291	99.1	0.0	0.3	-
	1926/27	55	92.7	1.8	5.5	-	61104	99.6	0.1	0.3	-
	1927/28	58	89.8	3.4	5.1	1.7	71,702	98.2	0.2	0.3	1.3
Kosteob-burning	1924/25	ten	90.0	-	10.0	-	6408	99.4	-	0.6	-
	1925/26	fifteen	73.3	-	26.7	-	10,223	96.9	-	3.1	-
	1926/27	12	91.7	-	8.3	-	11594	99.6	-	0,4	-
	1927/28	nine	100.0	-	-	-	11832	100.0	-	-	-
	1924/25	51	72.52	1.6	5.9	-	39 851	95.9	3.8	0.3	-

Processing of hemp and other vegetable fiber substances	1925/26	55	76.4	18.2	5.4	-	61,428	97.9	1.8	0.3	-
	1926/27	47	78.7	19.1	2.2	-	65631	98.6	1.3	0.1	-
	1927/28	55	72.7	25.5	1.8	-	78263	97.5	2.5	-	-
B. Production of consumer goods	1924/25	69841	56.1	22.3	21.1	-	4 607487	87.7	7.5	4.8	-
	1925/26	7757	56.7	23.1	20.1	0.1	6 740922	86.9	8.5	4.6	-
	1926/27	79349	61.9	23.2	14.7	0.2	7,470,665	88.8	8.9	2.2	0.1
	1927/28	78741	65.1	26.9	7.8	0.2	8 944256	88.2	10.6	0.9	0.3
Cotton-cleaning tight	1924/25	46	89.1	2.2	8.7	-	84753	99.5	0.1	0.4	-
	1925/26	71	93.9	2.0	4.1	-	149681	97.4	2.1	0.5	-
	1926/27	72	94.4	2.8	2.8	-	170,772	97.87	2.12	0.01	-
	1927/28	67	98.5	1.5	-	-	210511	98.1	1.9	-	-
Cotton paper	1924/25	237	74.3	9.3	16.4	-	1,307,742	98.7	0.6	0.7	-
	1925/26	272	72.4	9.9	17.7	-	1 892109	97.4	1.4	1.2	-
	1926/27	295	74.2	12.2	13.6	-	2,234,392	97.6	1.6	0.8	-
	1927/28	301	76.4	15.9	7.7	-	2,476,884	97.7	2.0	0.3	-
Wool washing	1924/25	21	95.2	-	4.8	-	6 199	99.8	-	0.2	-
	1925/26	17	94.1	-	5.9	-	10 569	98.9	-	1.1	-

	1926/27	22	100.0	-	-	-	13329	100.0	-	-	-
	1927/28	sixteen	100.0	-	-	-	16294	100.0	-	-	-
Woolen	1924/25	131	75.6	9.9	14.5	-	292,215	97.3	0.6	2.1	-
	1925/26	134	68.7	11.9	19.4	-	333848	94.2	0.7	5.1	-
	1926/27	150	68.0	13.3	18.0	0.7	413383	95.4	0.5	3.5	0.6
	1927/28	156	66.0	17.3	16.0	0.7	480630	95.4	0.9	2.8	0.9
Silkobra-batting	1924/25	35	82.9	8.6	8.5	-	23356	94.6	0.9	4.5	-
	1925/26	31	88.9	2.8	8.3	-	45426	88.7	0.3	11.0	-
	1926/27	34	85.3	2.9	11.8	-	61,963	92.8	0.3	6,3	-
	1927/28	56	80.4	8.9	10.7	-	102030	97.4	0.9	1.7	-
Flax batting	1924/25	68	92.7	7.3	-	-	131,157	99.5	0.5	-	-
	1925/26	68	88.2	10.3	1.5	-	193,058	99.1	0.7	0.2	-
	1926/27	76	84.2	14.5	1.3	-	210121	98.2	1.6	0.2	-
	1927/28	74	87.8	12.2	-	-	210533	98.1	1.9	-	-
Mixed fiber processing	1924/25	22	54.5	4.6	40.9	-	19388	93.2	0.1	-	-
	1925/26	thirty	46.7	16.7	36.6	-	32625	92.2	1.6	6.2	-
	1926/27	23	60.9	8.7	30.4	-	30165	94.4	1.4	4.2	-

	1927/28	24	54.2	25.0	20.8	-	30 566	95.2	1.8	3.0	-
Sewing	1924/25	156	63.5	34.6	1.9	-	91,711	91.2	8.6	0.2	-
	1925/26	153	58.8	40.5	0.7	-	139,981	90.6	9.2	0.2	-
	1926/27	172	63.9	34.9	0.6	-	156 720	89.3	10.5	-	0.2
	1927/28	214	65.9	34.1	-	0.6	343,902	93.9	6.1	-	-
Knitted	1924/25	57	40.3	26.3	33.4	-	53,410	90.5	1.8	7,7	-
	1925/26	72	34.7	40.3	25.0	-	73,546	87.6	4.4	8.0	-
	1926/27	76	42.1	36.8	19.7	-	91,929	93.0	3.9	2.0	1.1
	1927/28	96	37.5	56.3	5.2	1.4	150508	89.0	7.5	0.5	3.0
Other production of clothing and toilet	1924/25	121	43.8	28.1	28.1	1.0	22852	64.2	12.9	22.9	-
	1925/26	138	39.1	34.1	26.8	-	35514	62.8	13.0	24.2	-
	1926/27	137	48.2	28.5	21.0	-	33,579	63.6	11.6	18.8	6.0
	1927/28	139	43.2	38.1	14.4	2,3	54 795	53.8	15.3	8.6	22.3
Flour and cereal	1924/25	1790	45.0	24.4	30.6	4,3	654,908	64.8	16.7	18.5	-
	1925/26	1826	46.8	23.5	29.7	-	912,179	66.9	18.0	15.1	-
	1926/27	1933	55.3	25.7	19.0	-	919,061	72.1	21.1	5.8	-
	1927/28	1867	59.8	30.0	10.2	-	973 646	73.6	24.0	2.4	-

Beet sugar and refined	1924 /25	134	90.3	9.7	-	-	297 463	96.2	3.8	-	-
	1925 /26	159	91.8	8.2	-	-	554,558	95.5	4.5	-	-
	1926 /27	182	92.9	7.1	-	-	518 136	95.9	4.1	-	-
	1927 /28	183	93.4	6.6	-	-	60481	95.7	4.3	-	-
Confection ery and candy	1924 /25	86	29.1	47.7	23.2	-	61,774	65.8	25.6	8.6	-
	1925 /26	96	27.1	45.8	27.1	-	88692	65.6	26.0	8.4	-
	1926 /27	97	27.8	53.6	18.6	-	94350	68.5	28.1	3.4	-
	1927 /28	124	32.3	64.5	3.2	-	149,242	77.1	22.3	0.6	-
Oil mill	1924 /25	252	63.1	20.6	16.3	-	96,098	91.6	4.8	3.6	-
	1925 /26	297	57.9	21.2	20.9	-	151228	88.9	6.3	4.8	-
	1926 /27	279	64.8	19.4	15.8	-	125 310	91.5	5.7	2.8	-
	1927 /28	241	69.8	22.0	8.2	-	173,091	94.0	5.4	0.6	-
Distillery- yeast, vodka- brandy and grape- wine	1924 /25	295	88.1	5.4	6.5	-	102336	94.4	4.3	1.3	-
	1925 /26	590	89.3	4.1	6.6	-	223,573	95.5	3.5	1.0	-
	1926 /27	674	91.8	2.2	6.0	-	303 958	97.7	1.6	0.7	-
	1927 /28	749	88.6	7.5	3.9	-	356 567	94.9	4.8	0.3	-
	1924 /25	266	31.2	10.5	58.3	-	64755	57.0	25.7	17.3	-

Pivomed-boiled and malted	1925/26	292	35.3	9.2	55.5	-	97293	58.9	20.8	20.3	-
	1926/27	295	42.0	6.1	51.9	-	89461	66.4	14.7	18.9	-
	1927/28	291	49.8	7.2	43.0	-	96475	70.2	19.9	9.9	-
Starch syrup	1924/25	153	36.6	52.9	10.5	-	16645	59.6	34.8	5.6	-
	1925/26	176	41.5	48.9	9.6	-	25816	63.9	30.6	5.5	-
	1926/27	172	45.3	46.0	8.7	-	28924	62.5	34.5	3.0	-
	1927/28	151	44.4	51.0	4.6	-	20607	65.9	32.7	1.4	-
Other food flavoring	1924/25	554	33.0	56.4	10.6	-	193,915	43.7	53.9	2.4	-
	1925/26	631	31.6	58.4	10.0	-	293,408	44.6	52.7	2.7	-
	1926/27	607	32.6	61.6	5.8	-	342,776	34.1	63.6	2.3	-
	1927/28	673	30.6	65.8	3.6	-	503,267	23.9	75.4	0.7	-
Tobacco	1924/25	114	28.9	27.2	43.0	-	79827	95.3	0.7	3.5	0.5
	1925/26	98	34.7	35.7	28.6	-	109,680	95.8	1.9	2.0	0.3
	1926/27	92	41.3	43.5	14.1	-	115,061	97.0	2.3	0.6	0.1
	1927/28	62	56.5	37.1	6.4	-	127,140	98.0	1.9	0.1	-
Makhorochhaya	1924/25	153	17.5	30.5	52	0.9	52,234	62.2	17.2	20.6	-
	1925/26	187	15.0	84.2	50.8	1.0	55508	63.2	20.6	16.2	-

	1926/27	162	21.6	43.8	34.6	1.1	49 449	74.8	19.1	6.1	-
	1927/28	120	32.5	46.7	20.8	-	48354	81.5	16.2	2,3	-
Salt	1924/25	50	84.0	12.0	4.0	-	12602	98.7	2.1	0.1	-
	1925/26	47	87.2	6.4	6.4	-	12 436	97.3	1.9	0.8	-
	1926/27	47	91.5	4.2	4,3	-	15930	99.4	0.2	0,4	-
	1927/28	60	96.7	1.7	1.6	-	16363	99.9	-	0.1	-
Tannery	1924/25	559	41.5	18.1	40.4	-	218,055	86.3	4.2	9.5	-
	1925/26	553	40.9	19.5	39.6	-	320 237	86.1	4.5	9.4	-
	1926/27	508	42.5	22.0	35.5	-	354 694	92.2	4.0	3.8	-
	1927/28	373	59.2	27.6	13.2	-	414489	93.9	5.2	0.9	-
Leather and shoe	1924/25	142	42.7	54.5	2.8	-	78554	87.3	12.1	0.6	-
	1925/26	143	41.3	55.9	2.8	-	109,974	82.4	17.1	0.5	-
	1926/27	146	45.2	53.4	1.4	-	134,368	87.3	12.6	0.1	-
	1927/28	192	56.4	53.6	-	-	205 416	89.8	10.2	-	-
Fur	1924/25	20	50.0	30.0	20.0	-	9378	77.3	9.6	13.1	-
	1925/26	25	48.0	36.0	16.0	-	17 140	68.8	16.8	14.4	-
	1926/27	28	53.6	32.1	14.3	-	22 105	78.3	12.7	9.0	-

	1927/28	33	57.6	39.4	3.0	-	50496	88.4	11.6	-	-
Other industries for the processing of solid materials of animal origin	1924/25	85	76.5	14.1	9.4	-	18304	92.5	6.1	1.4	-
	1925/26	90	78.9	14.4	6,7	-	20442	90.5	7.8	1.7	-
	1926/27	94	76.6	11.7	9.6	2.1	20331	88.0	9.6	1.7	0.7
	1927/28	90	81.2	10.0	5.5	3.3	22800	85.0	11.6	1.7	1.7
Manufacture of wood products	1924/25	195	76.9	15.9	6,7	0.5	39861	93.3	3.6	2,3	0.8
	1925/26	218	68.8	20.6	10.1	0.5	60833	89.4	7.1	2.5	1.0
	1926/27	226	70.3	22.1	7.1	0.5	82,139	92.1	6.0	1,2	0.7
	1927/28	257	73.1	22.2	4,3	0,4	115266	93.8	5.5	0.7	0.5
Pharmaceutical Chemistry	1924/25	38	72.7	3.0	24.3	-	24258	91.9	0.7	7.4	-
	1925/26	39	74.4	5.1	20.5	-	32819	90.9	1.6	7.5	-
	1926/27	44	75.0	9.1	15.9	-	42,094	90.3	3.2	6.5	-
	1927/28	47	76.6	10.6	12.8	-	48485	92.6	3.7	3.7	-
Soap, fat and perfumery	1924/25	69	63.8	24.6	11.6	-	79287	86.2	12.9	0.9	-
	1925/26	75	60.0	25.3	13.3	1.4	110,556	85.7	13.3	0.8	0.2
	1926/27	77	55.8	32.5	10.4	1.3	140944	85.5	13.5	0.5	0.5

	1927/28	78	58.9	27.2	2.6	1.3	197414	86.6	13.0	0.1	0.3
Rubber	1924/25	five	80.0	20.0	-	-	107,262	99.9	0.1	-	-
	1925/26	five	80.0	20.0	-	-	149,313	99.8	0.2	-	-
	1926/27	6	83.3	16.7	-	-	165,611	99.9	0.1	-	-
	1927/28	6	83.3	16.7	-	-	182,669	99.8	0.2	-	-
Matchbox	1924/25	47	78.7	12.8	8.5	-	18889	98.6	1.2	0.2	-
	1925/26	39	82.1	10.3	7.6	-	25289	97.7	2.3	-	-
	1926/27	33	90.9	9.1	-	-	26539	98.7	1.3	-	-
	1927/28	27	96.3	3.7	-	-	34371	99.5	0.5	-	-
Porcelain-faience	1924/25	29	89.6	3.4	7.0	-	28607	98.5	0.8	0.7	-
	1925/26	thirty	90.0	3.3	6,7	-	35 587	98.9	0.3	0.8	-
	1926/27	thirty	96.7	-	3.3	-	43,091	99.9	-	0.1	-
	1927/28	thirty	96.7	-	3.3	-	49740	92.9	-	0.1	-
Paper-pulp and cellulose	1924/25	ten	100.0	-	-	-	3 801	100.0	-	-	-
	1925/26	eleven	100.0	-	-	-	4 106	100.0	-	-	-
	1926/27	thirteen	92.3	7,7	-	-	5495	98.9	1.1	-	-
	1927/28	ten	100.0	-	-	-	6778	100.0	-	-	-

Production of paper and cardboard	1924/25	81	92.6	-	7.4	-	979327	98.7	-	1.3	-
	1925/26	90	87.8	1.1	11.1	-	122,006	97.2	0.2	2.6	-
	1926/27	90	87.8	2.2	10.0	-	1245122	98.2	0.1	1.7	-
	1927/28	94	89.4	5.3	5.3	-	1307597	98.7	0.3	1.0	-
Cigarette-sleeve	1924/25	39	2.6	28.2	69.2	-	368	17.6	51.6	30.8	-
	1925/26	35	2.9	31.4	65.7	-	8269	36.9	43.0	20.1	-
	1926/27	thirteen	7.7	15.4	76.9	-	6490	59.0	16.5	24.5	-
	1927/28	8	12.5	50.0	37.5	-	5892	68.2	28.9	2.9	-
Other paper	1924/25	58	63.8	12.1	22.4	1.7	211829	81.9	4.9	11.1	2.1
	1925/26	84	54.8	17.9	23.8	3.5	372013	80.3	6.7	9.9	3.1
	1926/27	78	59.0	17.9	20.5	2.6	367743	86.3	6.8	3.7	3.2
	1927/28	70	68.6	22.8	7.2	1.4	425154	87.4	7.0	1.0	4.6
Typographic	1924/25	658	84.0	11.9	4.1	-	1583471	92.1	6.6	1.3	-
	1925/26	693	80.8	14.9	4.3	-	185,970	84.2	14.5	1.3	-
	1926/27	701	83.7	12.8	3.5	-	166,561	89.3	9.7	1.0	-
	1927/28	635	85.8	12.8	1.4	-	194,557	91.3	8.1	0.6	-
	1924/25	25	64.0	12.0	24.0	-	9 1708	89.8	2,3	7.9	'

Other printing	1925/26	33	57.6	24.2	18.2		10817	77.3	9.2	13.3	-
	1926/27	33	60.6	27.3	12.1	-	8763	82.1	15.6	2.3	-
	1927/28	23	60.9	39.1	-	-	9597	82.3	17.7	-	-
Scientific and artistic	1924/25	64	59.1	33.3	7.6	-	9429	79.0	14.6	6.4	-
	1925/26	81	70.4	18.5	11.1	-	16317	81.1	12.9	6.0	-
	1926/27	79	67.1	27.8	5.1	-	22537	88.9	9.3	1.8	-
	1927/28	93	68.8	22.6	8.6	-	23,766	87.8	8.5	3.7	-
Plumbing	1924/25	117	100.0	-	-	-	36781	100.0	-	-	-
	1925/26	123	100.0	-	-	-	47808	100.0	-	-	-
	1926/27	133	100.0	-	-	-	51412	100.0	-	-	-
	1927/28	141	100.0	-	-	-	55119	100.0	-	-	-
Gas factories	1924/25	3	100.0	-	-	-	2575	100.0	-	-	-
	1925/26	2	100.0	-	-	-	2769	100.0	-	-	-
	1926/27	2	100.0	-	-	-	3681	100.0	-	-	-
	1927/28	1	100.0	-	-	-	4318	100.0	-	-	-
Other production of	1924/25	4	33.3	-	66.7	-	707	81.4	-	18.6	-
	1925/26	3	33.3	-	66.7	-	234	28.0	-	72.0	-

physical forces and water supply	1926/27	3	66.7	-	33.3	-	196	61.7	-	38.3	-
	1927/28	2	50.0	-	50.0	-	226	15.5	-	84.5	-

TsGANKh USSR, f. 4372, on. 26, d.250a, ll. 86-90. Copy.

№ 27 Information of the Central Statistical Administration of the USSR on the growth of labor productivity for 1924/25-1927/28.

August 1, 1929 [6]

Indexes	All workers				Workshop workers				
	1924/25 g.	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.	1924/25 g.	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.	
A. Composite indices for 16 industries [7]									
Natural production	a [8]	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	b [9]	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Gross output at current prices	a	100.0	112.6	123.7	132.5	100.0	110.7	123.3	131.7
	b	100.0	112.6	109.9	107.2	100.0	110.7	111.4	106.8
Nominal salary	a	100.0	125.4	141.4	154.8	100.0	125.4	141.4	153.4
	b	100.0	125.4	112.7	109.5	100.0	125.4	112.7	108.5
The relative cost of labor	a	100.0	112.3	114.8	118.7	100.0	114.6	117.4	121.0
	b	100.0	112.3	102.2	103.4	100.0	114.6	102.4	103.1
Energyfication of labor	a	100.0	107.1	109.6	118.7	100.0	105.8	168.7	117.1
	b	100.0	107.1	102.4	108.3	100.0	105.8	102.8	107.7
	a	100.0	107.4	112.0	114.6	100.0	107.4	111.0	112.2

% of piecework hours	b	100.0	107.4	104.3	162.3	100.0	107.4	103.4	101.1
% of production hours	and	100.0	101.3	101.0	101.3	-	-	-	-
	b	100.0	101.3	99.8	100.3	-	-	-	-
B. Composite indices for 10 industries with indicators of natural production									
Natural production	and	100.0	110.3	119.7	131.8	100.0	108.0	116.7	128.3
	b	100.0	110.3	108.6	110.1	100.0	108.0	108.0	110.0
Gross output at current prices	and	100.0	114.2	125.3	133.3	100.0	111.6	123.6	129.4
	b	100.0	114.2	109.7	106.4	100.0	111.6	110.8	104.6
Nominal salary	and	100.0	125.1	141.5	154.6	100.0	126.4	143.2	154.8
	b	100.0	125.1	113.1	109.2	100.0	126.4	113.3	108.1
The relative cost of labor	and	100.0	110.7	116.8	119.2	100.0	113.9	119.4	122.6
	b	100.0	110.7	105.5	102.1	100.0	113.9	104.4	102.7
Energyfication of labor	and	100.0	105.7	111.5	124.5	100.0	104.6	110.9	121.7
	b	100.0	105.7	105.7	111.6	100.6	104.6	106.0	109.7
% of piecework hours	and	100.0	103.7	108.6	111.8	100.0	104.1	108.6	109.7
	b	100.0	103.7	104.7	102.9	100.0	104.1	104.3	101.1
% of production hours	and	100.0	101.5	101.9	102.6	-	-	-	-
	b	100.0	101.5	100.4	100.8	-	-	-	-

TSGANKH USSR, file 4372, op. 26, d.250-a, l.30. Copy

[1] Information on the average number of workers is omitted

[2] Dated by content.

[3] Dated by content.

[4] Information about the number of person-days worked has been omitted.

[5] Date of receipt of information by Gosplan.

[6] Date of receipt of information by Gosplan.

[7] The composite indices for 16 industries include the following industries: ferrous metallurgy, metalworking, general mechanical engineering, agricultural engineering, cotton, woolen, linen, leather and footwear, glass, match, rubber, sawmill, paper, printing, tobacco, tobacco. -Approx. document

[8] a-dynamics by 1924/25; b-dynamics to the previous year. document.

[9] a-dynamics by 1924/25; b-dynamics to the previous year. document.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOLK ECONOMY

No. 28 From the resolution of the XV Congress of the CPSU (b) "On directives for drawing up a five-year plan of the national economy."

December 19, 1927

In the field of industry, the following major problems should be noted: first, the relationship between the production of means of production and the production of consumer goods, that is, between heavy and light industry; secondly, the ratio between the number of new industrial units under construction and the timing of their final construction (due to the danger of linking unbearably large funds on a too wide front of capital construction with a long-term impossibility of their implementation); thirdly, the relationship between the cost of production and wages; finally, the relationship between production for the needs of the domestic market and export, on the one hand, and for ensuring the country's defense, on the other.

In accordance with the policy of industrialization of the country, first of all, the production of means of production should be strengthened so that the growth of heavy and light industry, transport and agriculture, that is, the production demand presented by them, is mainly provided by the domestic production of the USSR industry. The fastest pace of development should be given to those branches of heavy industry that raise the economic power and defense capability of the USSR in the shortest possible time, serve as a guarantee of the possibility of development in the event of an economic blockade, weaken dependence on the capitalist world and promote the transformation of agriculture on the basis of higher technology and collectivization of the economy. ... Therefore, special attention should be paid to the prompt implementation of the electrification plan, the development of ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, especially in terms of quality metals, the development of chemical industries, especially c. parts of the production of artificial fertilizers, the further deployment of coal, oil and peat mining, general and agricultural engineering, shipbuilding, electrical industry, gold-platinum industry.

An industry producing consumer goods must bring the quantity and quality of its products to such a limit as to ensure a significant increase

in the per capita consumption rate of workers. Special attention should be paid to the development of the textile, leather and food industries, which, while ensuring the growth of agricultural raw materials, especially contributes to the growth of agricultural industrialization and the resorption of agrarian overpopulation.

In the field of new industries, the following should be developed or re-supplied: production of equipment for metallurgy, fuel and textile industries, auto, aircraft and tractor construction, production of artificial fiber, extraction of rare elements, production of aluminum, ferro-manganese, zinc, bound nitrogen, potassium, production of equipment for the film industry and radio installations, mining of radium, etc.

The selling prices for industrial products should be systematically reduced, ensuring a consistent compression of the "scissors" solution, that is, eliminating the imbalance in prices for industrial products, on the one hand, for agriculture, on the other, and the imbalance between the level of our prices and prices on the world market.

The implementation of these tasks is possible only under the condition of a decisive reduction in cost. Therefore, cost reduction is the central problem of industry, and all other tasks must be subordinated to the solution of this problem. Socialist rationalization of production should be the main method of its successful solution. The introduction of new technology, the improvement of the organization of labor, the improvement of the qualifications of the labor force and, with a decrease in the working day, its consolidation - these are the main components of the rationalization process. The results of energetic measures in this area, making it possible to raise wages and further increase the living standards of the working class, at the same time should lower the consumption of wages per unit of goods, reduce their cost, increase labor productivity,

An increase in intraindustrial accumulation, along with a redistribution of national income in favor of industry, makes it possible to make capital investments in industry in an amount that will ensure the necessary growth of production and its rationalization, subject to the greatest savings in spending, a decisive reduction in the cost of construction and strict implementation of the plan. The capital construction plan must proceed from the plan for the most expedient

development of the national economy as a whole, taking into account the regional specifics; equally, it should proceed from the greatest efficiency of capital expenditures both in terms of completion of work and in terms of the production effect of enterprises under construction.

Capital construction requires a vigorous struggle for the introduction of new methods of work and the application of the latest technical achievements. It is necessary, in particular, to put an end to the prohibitively high index of the cost of construction, materials and construction work in general.

When determining the rate of development of capital construction in the field of industry, it is necessary to provide for its proper provision with working capital, not only at the expense of budgetary appropriations, but mainly at the expense of savings in the industry itself and the acceleration of capital turnover in production.

Extra attention should be paid when building a housing construction plan. In view of the extreme severity of the housing crisis, such an increase in housing construction is necessary, which would ensure an increase in the provision of housing for the working population over the next 5 years.

When drawing up the five-year plan, it is necessary to keep in mind the development of small local industry, handicraft and handicrafts, which, serving at the present time as an absolutely necessary supplement to large state industry, helps to overcome the shortage of goods and alleviate unemployment. It is necessary to bear in mind the inclusion of this industry in the circle of influence of state and cooperative bodies, cooperation, unification and rationalization of production of small industrial producers and their recapture from a private buyer, distributor, usurer.

It is necessary to increase the rate of cooperation of handicraftsmen, especially in those industries where the influence of private capital is still strong, to intensify efforts to attract funds from cooperative handicraftsmen (share contributions, special deductions, contributions, etc.) into the handicraft industry. When drawing up the five-year plan, special attention should be paid to the development of small and handicraft industries in the outskirts, in particular, in the national republics and regions. In connection with the presence of a number of

industries with high earnings of artisans employed in them, it is necessary to differentiate our policy regarding benefits; And all kinds of assistance from the state to certain categories of artisans ...

CPSU in resolutions and decisions of congresses, conferences and plenums of IIK, part II. M., 1954, pp. 457-459.

No. 29 From the decree of the Economic Bureau of the Central Commission for Long-Term Planning [1] of the USSR State Planning Committee on the organization of work according to the five-year plan

January 7, 1928

1. General management of work on long-term planning in the USSR State Planning Committee is carried out by the Central Commission for Long-Term Planning under the Presidium of the State Planning Committee.

2. In order to coordinate all work on building a long-term plan in the country and in order to involve outstanding figures in the economy and technology in this matter, a meeting (plenum of the commission) is periodically convened with the participation of the leaders of this case in the republican Gosplan, major regions, union economic bodies and personally invited persons according to the list specially approved by the State Planning Committee Presidium.

3. Direct management of all current work on long-term planning is carried out by the Presidium of the Central Commission for Long-Term Planning. The Presidium resolves the main methodological problems of long-term planning, preliminarily approves individual elements of long-term plans and projects of these plans as a whole.

4. In its work, the Presidium relies on the sections and groups of the State Planning Commission, on the planning bodies of the republics, economic regions and people's commissariats, as well as on the Central Statistical Board and research institutes.

5. In accordance with clause 4 of the State Planning Committee, along with the consideration of individual plans and current issues, they intensify their work on the study of the situation (under the guidance of the section of the internal situation) and the dynamics of the corresponding sector of the national economy, and also draw up draft long-term plans for these sectors.

Note: All sections submit for approval by the presidium, the plan and procedure for their work on long-term planning.

6. In view of the particular importance of cooperation between the CSO and the State Planning Commission, under the presidium of the Central

Commission, a permanent meeting is organized under the chairmanship of S.G. Strumilin on the plan of statistical work and its implementation, the theory of the balance of the national economy, etc. and commissions on the balance of the national economy of the Central Statistical Administration, working in the State Planning Committee, and other persons appointed by the Presidium of the Central Commission.

The work of the Communist Academy and research institutes in terms of the theory and practice of planning must be coordinated with work on the latter.

The organizational forms and conditions for the implementation of this connection should be specially established ... [2]

TsGANKh USSR, f. 4372, on. 26, d. 90, l. 67-67 vol. Script.

No. 30 From the resolution of the III All-Union Congress of Planned Workers [3] on the main reports on the organization and achievements in the field of planning the national economy [4]

March 14, 1928 [5]

General principle part

1. The III Congress of Planning Bodies of the Union, assessing the prerequisites and conditions for the further development of work on drawing up a five-year long-term plan, considers it necessary to state significant progress along the path of planned leadership of the national economy, due to both the objective course of development of the national economy and the achievements of organized leadership.

In this latter respect, first of all, it should be noted and emphasized that after 3 years of careful and deep detailed discussion and study by the country's planned thought of the main and decisive problems of the development of the national economy, we already have firm directives on these issues, given by the Party and the government to the compilers five-year plan.

This achievement, creating one of the most important prerequisites for planned leadership - the unity of thought and willpower of planned workers, allows us to boldly embark on the final stage of work on the five-year plan.

2. The congress considers the second achievement that after three versions of the five-year plan [6] worked out since 1926 by the Commission for the Five-Year Plan, the questions of the program of the five-year plan ceased to be debated. In these versions, the program of the five-year long-term plan is broadly developed, and now we are faced primarily with the question of the quality of the implementation of this program, that is, of its socio-technical and statistical-economic expression.

3. Thirdly, the congress considers it necessary to note the fact that, as a result of many years of experience in planning work, we finally have a united methodological front of planners in the five-year plan, created in the process of the work itself. We consider the disputes about the methods of constructing the five-year plan to be a past shock. We now know not only what we will build (work plan), not only from what angle, we will build (principal directives), but also how we will

build. The differences in the methodology for constructing the five-year long-term plan are largely over.

4. Moving on to conditions that strengthen the position of the planned leadership, but lie outside the immediate work on the five-year plan, the congress notes the completion of the "restoration" process and the achievement of the pre-war level by the national economy in general (with an excess of it in some sectors and the ongoing reconstruction both in the field of economic forms, and in the field of technology itself and the organization of production processes).

The congress stresses that the basis of this whole process is the unshakable achievements of the proletarian revolution and Soviet power, which are the first and basic condition and prerequisite for the planned management of the national economy.

By now, this management more and more has the opportunity to rely on the accumulating experience of planned work, which already has its own history. Here should be mentioned the "Plan for the Electrification of Russia" (GOELRO plan), which had a huge organizing influence, and the three-year work on the general plan for the development of the USSR economy with a detailed study of its branches and regions in the State Planning Committee of the Union with the publication of the main technical-economic and economic-geographical guidelines of the general plan in the summer of 1926 ("General premises for the general plan", drawn up by the State Planning Committee of the USSR), and a number of promising five-year plans of republics, regions and departments detailing the development of the national farms by industry, territory,

By the present congress we have one more step forward - detailing the control figures for the republics and regions of the Union and the first attempt to introduce a regional section into a 5-year plan for the development of the country's national economy. In addition, it is necessary to note the experience that is accumulating from year to year as a result of constant market observations and the associated and "with work on planning a thorough study of the dynamics of the national economy of the country.

Assessing all these gains as a whole, the Congress considers that we are at a turning point towards a new stage in the building of socialism in

the country, the main prerequisite for which are the achievements noted above. At the same time, the congress considers it necessary to emphasize that the difficulties of planning ahead for five years of the most complex national economic organism are so great that this work can be completed only with the mobilization of all the planning forces of the country with the involvement of our academies and research institutes and apparatuses in this work. departments and initiatives of public organizations and the transformation of state statistics into a true science of organized accounting and identifying the laws of the building of a socialist society, working in full coordination with the planning centers.

This organizational and mobilization aspect of planning work is so important that without its proper permission it is useless to think about creating a five-year plan that meets the demands and needs of the very system of the national economy of the USSR.

In all this work of construction, in the foreground are the great tasks of industrialization and socialist rationalization of the country's national economy.

The congress emphasizes that an energetic approach to solving basic economic problems is a powerful lever for the most effective and planned solution of both problems.

TsGANKh USSR, f. 4372, on. 26, d.2, ll. 210-213. Copy.

No. 31 Resolution of the III All-Union Congress of Planned Workers on the organization of work to draw up the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the CCCP.

March 14, 1928 [7]

The III All-Union Congress of Planned Workers believes that the unity of the national economy of the USSR dictates the need for such organizational and methodological coordination of the work of the State Planning Committee of the USSR with individual republics and regions, union departments, which would fully ensure for the State Planning Committee of the USSR the possibility of building a draft of a single all-Union five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR ...

To this end, the congress considers that the work on the construction of a five-year plan for the development of the national economy should be organized on the following principles:

1. The long-term plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR is drawn up by the State Planning Committee of the USSR together with the State Planning Commissions of the Union republics and union departments and should be constructed so that it specifically presents integral plans for the development of the economy of the union republics and economic regions and plans for individual sectors of the national economy of the USSR.
2. The state plans of the union republics and the union departments draw up plans for the development of individual branches of the national economy, plans of the republics and regions on the basis of directives of the union and republican governments and directives, assignments and in the forms taught by the State Planning Committee of the USSR. The state planning authorities of the republics and union departments, as well as individual economic regions, if they recognize it as necessary, are developing, along with the main version of the plan according to the directives given by the USSR State Planning Committee, also options for individual elements of the long-term plan.
3. The State Planning Committee of the USSR during the period from the present congress to May 1, together with the planning bodies of the republics and union departments, considers the most important problems that are of decisive importance for the entire economy of the

Union as a whole, individual branches of the republics and economic regions, and on the basis of this gives guidance to the State Planning Commission union republics and union departments.

4. Gosplan of the USSR, in order to introduce maximum unity in the design of both the plans of the republics and union departments, and the elements of the plan, which depend on the development of the national economy as a whole and on general guidelines in economic policy (growth rates of productive forces, price dynamics and value relationships, wage policy, tax policy, etc.), between April 13 and May 1, gives the corresponding preliminary directives and specific assignments to the State Planning Commission of the Union republics and union departments [8].

5. Considering that one of the main tasks in the construction of five-year plans for the development of the national economy of individual republics and economic regions is to prepare elements for the construction of a unified plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, the All-Union Congress of Planned Workers believes that these elements should be equally represented in these plans in the form of holistic hypotheses that reveal both in statics and in dynamics the national economic image of a particular republic of the Union or region with all its characteristic features and specific differences.

6. Along with this, the congress considers that the task of the five-year plans of the republics and regions is to identify the role that the republics or regions should play in the national economic development of the entire Soviet Union, and especially to determine the specific tasks that arise from the national economic division of labor within the Union and are dictated by the originality their economic, natural-geographical and national-everyday appearance, with the implementation of special directives given in this direction by the XV Congress of the CPSU (b).

7. The All-Union Congress considers, however, that the task of constructing five-year plans for individual republics and economic regions does not include finding in their plans such a ratio of national economic equilibrium, which is included in the concept of an expanded balance of the national economy and can be fulfilled only by building a five-year plan for the development of the national economy the entire USSR as a whole (balance of accumulation and investment, balance of

supply and demand, proportions on the development of agriculture and industry, means of production and means of consumption, etc.).

8. The congress believes that the basis of the five-year plan for the national economic development of individual republics and economic regions should be sufficiently substantiated projects for the deployment of capital construction in the main sectors of the national economy, drawn up in accordance with the assignments for the regionalization of industry, agriculture and other sectors within the USSR.

9. At the same time, the congress considers that another major pivot of the five-year plan for the development of the national economy of each republic and economic region should be the design of a system of relevant economic, technical and organizational measures that should be implemented as prerequisites for achieving the rates and level of development of the national economy and its individual branches, which are projected in the corresponding plans.

10. The congress considers it necessary that the largest enterprises of union significance (union trusts, railway boards, etc.) located on the territory of union republics or economic regions should take an active part in the work of the corresponding planning bodies in drawing up long-term plans for the national economic development of the republics. or economic areas. In order to ensure this, the congress considers it necessary that the union departments give the aforementioned organizations directives agreed with the USSR State Planning Committee, defining the procedure and form of participation of these bodies in the work on drawing up five-year plans for the republics and regions. For the same purpose, the Union departments compose all the main indicators of the five-year plans not only for the Union as a whole, but also in the context of republics and economic regions.

11. In order to achieve maximum unity in the field of statistical programs and methodology, the All-Union Congress of Planned Workers considers it necessary that the Central Statistical Administration of the Union and the Central Statistical Administration of the individual republics directly participate in all studies of the dynamics of the national economy.

12. The congress also considers it necessary that the data on the dynamics of the population, the national economy and the socio-cultural sphere available in the CSO should be promptly published by the CSO or sent out to places prior to publication according to the new regional grid (State Planning Committee and Statistical Plan).

13. The All-Union Congress takes note of the statement of the representative of the Central Statistical Administration that in the current year the expert council at the Central Statistical Administration will present its calculations both for the grain-feed balance and for the balance of livestock products and technical raw materials in new regions.

Noting the elimination of the previous disagreements between the Central Statistical Administration and the USSR State Planning Committee on the definition of grain-fodder products, the congress considers it necessary that similar work on the harmonization of data on agricultural products be carried out in relation to individual republics and regions, since in this area, as the experience of constructing control figures for regions has shown, the readings of the center and places differ the most.

14. Considering that without the completion of the Central Statistical Bureau of the main work on the balance of the national economy, the final layout of the long-term plan and, in particular, the development of the problem of national income, the III All-Union Congress of Planned Workers asks the State Planning Committee of the USSR, together with the Central Statistical Bureau, to ensure the completion of the main work on the balance of the national economy, its temporary distribution of the relevant materials to the planning commissions and the urgent publication of these materials.

15. The congress considers that, as a rule, plans are drawn up in full for the republics, and within the RSFSR - for the registered regions (Siberia, the Urals, the North Caucasus, Leningrad Oblast, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Far East, Yakutia). With regard to the organization of work and the amount of work in the unregistered areas of the RSFSR, the State Planning Committee of the RSFSR, no later than April 1, submits to the State Planning Committee of the USSR a plan for the organization and amount of work in these areas. At the same time, the congress considers it necessary that the State Planning Committee of

the RSFSR develop an abbreviated program for drawing up five-year plans for the remaining autonomous republics and regions.

16. Regarding the organization and scope of work in the TSFSR, it is necessary to recognize it necessary to draw up a plan in full for the entire federation, for individual republics that are part of the Transcaucasian Federation, plans are drawn up in full optional. For a more accurate determination of the scope of work on the five-year plan, the Transcaucasian State Planning Commission calls a meeting of the republican State Planning Commissions no later than April 15.

17. The congress states that the enormous work that lies on the USSR State Planning Committee and the State Planning Committee of the republics and departments did not find its material support when drawing up estimates for planning bodies and departments, since only as a result of the III All-Union Congress a more complete scope and program of these works were determined. In this regard, the congress considers it necessary to ask the USSR State Planning Committee to urgently enter the Union government with a petition for the allocation of a special fund from the all-Union funds to ensure the fulfillment of the planned work plans.

18. The Congress considers it necessary that, in the interests of ensuring the necessary cooperation and mutual information in the construction of the five-year plan, the USSR State Planning Committee should inform all departments, republics and regions of all the most important stages of work carried out by these bodies to draw up a long-term plan.

19. The allied departments and the State Planning Commissions of the Union republics periodically report to the State Planning Committee of the USSR data on the progress of work on the construction of the five-year plan, as well as copies of the guidelines given by them on drawing up the five-year plans.

20. The congress considers it necessary that a month before the expected date of convening the next congress of planned workers a special meeting of the Presidium of the USSR State Planning Committee with the participation of representatives of the Union republics and representatives of union departments should be convened to consider the program and work procedure of the proposed congress.

TsGANKH USSR. f. 4372, on. 26, d. 1, ll. 3-8. Rotat. Copies

No. 32 Order of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR on the procedure and timing for drawing up the first five-year industrial development plan.

April 27, 1928

According to the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the work on drawing up a long-term plan for industry (as well as other branches of the national economy of the republics and regions) goes through two stages:

1) Drawing up control figures for a long-term plan for the development of industry, submitted "to the State Planning Committee of the USSR by July 1, 1928.

2) Drawing up a long-term plan of industry, submitted to the USSR State Planning Committee by November 1, 1928.

I. Drawing up control figures for the long-term plan

1. The basis for drawing up the control figures should be the control figures of the five-year plan adopted by the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR, to which the necessary adjustments must be made on the basis of special directives approved by the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR.

2. Work on drawing up control figures is carried out by the economic planning department, the main directorates (committees) of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR, together with the scientific and technical councils of the National Technical University of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR, syndicates, the Supreme Economic Council of the Union Republics and their local authorities.

Wherein:

a) All this work is combined by the Economic Department of the Supreme Economic Council of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR, which, on the basis of the directives approved by the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR, gives the necessary instructions on the compilation of individual sections of the control figures to the functional departments, main departments (committees), syndicates and the Supreme Economic Council of the Union republics.

b) The Economic Department of the PES of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR hears the preliminary reports of the main directorates (committees), the functional departments of the PES of the Supreme Economic Council of the Union Republics, identifies existing disagreements, outlines problems requiring fundamental guidelines, and submits all these issues for consideration and approval of the PES board.

c) To ensure the regional section for drawing up control figures, the PES economic department engages in this work the department of industrial geography and national policy of PES, and the latter works on all issues of five-year and annual planning on the basis of the established organizational plan.

3. In the work on drawing up control figures for the long-term plan, the economic department and other functional departments of the PES, the main departments (committees) and the Supreme Economic Council of the Union republics should be guided by the "Summary table of indicators of the long-term plan of the planned state qualification industry" and the instructions to it, approved by the USSR State Planning Committee, with those changes that are indicated in the special instructions of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR [9] .

4. Work on the compilation of control figures for branches of industry, union republics and regions should be completed by the main departments and the Supreme Economic Council of the Union republics and submitted to the economic department of the Economic Council of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR no later than June 10 of this year. in 10 copies.

5. The functional departments of the PES, without waiting for the receipt of these materials from the main directorates and the Supreme Economic Council of the Union republics, immediately begin to work out the corresponding sections of the control figures of the long-term plan, so that, on the basis of the draft control figures for the sectors, union republics and regions to complete the compilation of control figures for the corresponding sections of the plan by June 20 of this year. g.

6. On the basis of materials and projects received from the functional departments of the PES, the main departments and the Supreme Economic Council of the Union republics, the PES Economic Department, on the basis of materials and projects received from the PES functional departments and the Supreme Economic Council of the Union republics, shall complete the drafting of the target figures for the long-term plan no later than June 28 of this year. and submit it through the PES board for consideration by the approval of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR, so that the control figures of the long-term plan of industry on July 1 of this year. were presented to the USSR State Planning Committee.

II. Drawing up a long-term plan for the industry

1. Simultaneously with the start of drawing up control figures for the long-term plan, the main directorates (committees) and the Supreme Economic Council of the Union republics, together with their local authorities, should proceed with the selection of an enterprise and the allocation of those factories and plants that are subject only to temporary support, and those enterprises that subject to further expansion and reconstruction. For the last group of enterprises, it is necessary to immediately start working on specific projects for their future development and reconstruction, so that no later than June 15 of this year. These projects, in their initial outline for the most important enterprises, were submitted to the Economic Department of the Economic Commission for the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR (in three copies). At the same time, the main directorates (committees) and the BSNKh of the Union republics, according to their affiliation, begin the revision and economic justification of those new constructions that were outlined for implementation by the previous long-term plans for individual industries so that materials and preliminary considerations on the expediency of building the most important of these new plants and factories were presented to the economic department of the PES of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR also no later than June 15 of this year. g.

2. After the approval of the USSR State Planning Committee of the final directives on the construction of a long-term industrial plan, which should follow, according to the above-mentioned resolution of the

Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, no later than August 1 of this year. city, the main directorates (committees) and the Supreme Economic Council of the Union republics by belonging, on the basis of the subsequent instructions of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR, should proceed to the final drawing up of long-term plans both for each industry and the republic as a whole, and for individual industrial enterprises and economic regions with such calculation that these draft long-term plans of individual industries, republics and regions, as well as the most important trusts and enterprises were submitted to the economic department of PES no later than September 15 of this year. g.

3. The PES economic department, together with other PES functional departments and with the participation of the main departments (committees) and the Supreme Economic Council of the Union republics, to complete the work on drawing up a general industrial long-term plan in the sectoral and territorial context no later than October 25 of this year. g. and submit it through the PES board for approval by the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR, so that on November 1 with. The prospective industrial plan was presented to the USSR State Planning Committee.

Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR Rukhimovich

DGANKH USSR, f. 3429, on. 57, d.209, ll. 86-87 vol. Script. Published in part in the journal "Soviet Archives", 1967, M 3, pp. 16-17.

№ 33 Minutes of the plenary meeting of the Presidium of the USSR State Planning Committee on the consideration of preliminary directives of the Supreme Council of the National Economy for the first five-year industrial development plan [10]

May 7, 1928

G.M. Krzhizhanovsky presides.

Listened:

Report of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR on preliminary directives for the construction of a long-term plan for industry (introduced by the Central Commission for Long-Term Planning). Speaker from the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR Comrade Zolotarev [11].

Resolved:

Instruct comrade Grinko, on the basis of the judgments available at the meeting, to approve the draft resolution of the Presidium of the USSR State Planning Committee on this issue, in which to recommend to the localities and central departments the draft directives of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR on the construction of a long-term industrial plan based on the desirability of the highest possible rate of development. At the same time, it should be noted that all the numerical and quantitative indicators of these directives are of a conditional, illustrative nature, and also emphasize those parts of the directives of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR, to which special attention should be paid in places in the further development of the five-year plan.

Chairman G. Krzhizhanovsky Managing Director B. Ivanov Secretary Egorov

DGANKH USSR, f. 4372, on. 26, d.14, l. 266. Original, published in the journal "Soviet Archives", 1967, No. 3, p. 19.

No. 34 Minutes of the plenary meeting of the Presidium of the USSR State Planning Committee for the consideration of directives and economic assignments to the republics and regions for the first five-year plan

May 12, 1928

G.M. Krzhizhanovsky presides.

Listened:

Directives and economic tasks for the republics and regions for the construction of a long-term plan (submitted by the Central Commission for Long-Term Planning) [12].

Resolved:

1. On the basis of the adoption of the draft directives on this issue, submitted by the Central Commission for Long-Term Planning. At the same time, to invite representatives of departments for additional familiarization with the submitted materials to submit in writing the available comments to the Central Control Room within a week. This should not delay the distribution of materials to the republics and regions.
2. To extend the deadline for submission to the State Planning Committee of the USSR by departments and republics of materials on the five-year plan by two weeks, setting the deadline for submission of materials on July 15 of this year instead of July 1, without changing the deadlines established by the USSR Council of People's Commissars.
3. To recognize it necessary during the period of elaboration of the five-year plan to send to the site for inspection and instructing the work of the responsible employees of the Central Control Center, and also to recommend such trips and planned employees of departments.

Chairman Krzhizhanovsky Managing Director Ivanov Secretary Yegorov

TsGANKh USSR, f. 4372, on. 26, d. 15, l. 2. The original.

№ 35 Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR on the development of the first five-year industrial development plan [13]

May 19, 1928

1. In the five-year industrial development plan now being worked out, it is necessary to ensure that it differs from all past five-year plans in more deeply worked out technical and organizational elements. For this, all work should be organized in such a way as to ensure the use of all the knowledge of world science and technology, which determines the possibility of a technical revolution in the organization of production and in capital construction, during the five years.

2. To this end, to personally entrust the chiefs of the main directorates with the obligation (with the right to replace themselves in some cases by members of the collegium directly in charge of planning issues) to manage the issues of long-term planning from the point of view of technical reconstruction, relying in this work on a group of the best engineers and specialists of their department, as well as those involved from outside, who should be entrusted with a systematic study of the most important problems of technical design and quality indicators of construction.

The specified group of employees should be exempted from all other work during the five-year plan.

These groups of workers should carefully link the issues of technical reconstruction of a given branch with other branches through the corresponding groups in other chapters.

a) To propose to the main departments to issue directives to the trusts as soon as possible on the basic and technical lines for drawing up the five-year plan.

To instruct the main departments to give instructions to trusts and the most important enterprises that the above questions of technical planning and design be worked out along with the main departments also in enterprises and trusts. To this end, it is necessary to admit that it is necessary to attract scientific and technical workers engaged in research work, laboratories and other institutions at enterprises for direct participation in the development of a long-term plan for this enterprise.

To suggest that the trusts give directives to the factories as soon as possible on the main technical lines for drawing up a five-year plan and on the conduct of this work by persons or commissions specially designated for this purpose.

b) Consider it necessary for enterprises and trusts to subject their planning proposals, target figures and five-year plans concerning the enterprise or trust to discussions at production meetings with the participation of engineers and technicians. To ask the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions to give relevant instructions on this matter to the Central Committee of the Unions and VMBIT.

c) Suggest to scientific and technical councils to organize reports both on the five-year plan as a whole and on the most basic problems associated with its development, at broad meetings of engineering and technical workers and business executives, both in the center and in the localities.

3. When working out the five-year plan, the knowledge and experience of specialists who have been abroad should be taken into account to the fullest extent, for which it is necessary that the travel reports become widely publicized, so that the whole industry knows about them, and not only the individual enterprise in which the traveler works. abroad specialist. At the same time, it is necessary to involve these specialists in the fullest possible participation in the elaboration of the five-year plan.

4. Taking into account the insufficient mutual coordination of scientific and technical councils and the corresponding central administrations and the insufficiently energetic role of scientific and technical councils as bodies of initiative influence on the problems of technical reconstruction, it is necessary to consider:

a) for the best coordination of the entire work of scientific and technical councils with the main departments, introduce the heads of the main departments into the presidium of the NTU collegium, who, as members of the NTU presidium, will be charged with supervision, leadership and responsibility for the work of scientific and technical councils and institutes before the NTU presidium;

b) select groups of the best specialists in the scientific and technical councils, relieving them of all other duties, so that these groups fully

devote their strength and knowledge to working out all the problems of technical reconstruction and provide long-term plans for individual industries with correct technical organizational policy, which should be built on the highest possible base of scientific and technical knowledge.

Consider it necessary in some cases when working out the most complex technical problems to attract foreign specialists;

c) to propose to the scientific and technical councils to involve in the work on the scientific and technical elaboration of the five-year plan all the district and regional scientific and technical councils working in the respective republics and regions;

d) oblige the NTU and the heads of the main directorates in accordance with the above tasks to work out and submit to the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR Comrade Kosior a program of technical planning and cost estimates for newly invited specialists.

5. In order to create a center for guiding technical and organizational thought in the development of a five-year plan, in order to ensure correct design during the construction of new enterprises and the development of new industries, as well as for the maximum implementation of rationalization measures, it is necessary to consider the immediate creation of a High Expert Commission under the Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council THE USSR. The main task of this commission should be reduced to ensuring the development of industry during the next five years on a higher and more perfect technical and organizational basis than it has been up to now. Moreover, the main lines of technical policy should be determined both for each branch of industry separately and for the entire industry of the USSR as a whole.

6. The commission should include the most outstanding scientists and specialists working on the problems of technical and organizational reconstruction, including foreign specialists, as well as practitioners who have proven themselves in the field of industrial restructuring on a higher basis.

7. Instruct the commission consisting of com. Chubarov, Gulin, Sverdlov, Mantsev, Zolotarev, Vasiliev, Shein, Dolgov and Radchenko chaired by Comrade Kosior, within a week, to develop a regulation on

the High Expert Commission, on the procedure for its work and linking with the main departments, NTU and PES.

Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR
Rukhimovich Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR Lucca

TsGANKh USSR, f. 3429, on. 1, d.560, ll. 83 about - 85. Typ. copies

Published in the journal "Soviet Archives", 1967, No. 3, p. 22.

No. 36 Circular of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions to all economic bodies and trade union organizations on the involvement of trade unions in industrial planning

June 26, 1928

In development of the order of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR No. 356 of February 1; from. The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions of the USSR and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions draw the attention of economic bodies and trade unions to the particular importance of such participation in working out issues of annual and future control figures and plans. The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions propose to the relevant state agencies and trade union organizations, according to their affiliation, to establish proper communication on the study of these issues, ensuring the provision of the necessary materials to the trade organizations in advance and agreeing on the procedure for participation, the question of trade union representatives, etc.

The Supreme Council of the National Economy of the Union Republics is invited to issue an appropriate order for subordinate enterprises.

Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR Rukhimovich Secretary of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions Dogadov

TsGANKh USSR, f. 3429, on. 57, d.221, l. 69. Original. Published in the journal "Soviet Archives", 1967, No. 3, pp. 21-22.

No. 37 Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR on the target figures of the first five-year industrial development plan [14]

13 August 1928

The audited control figures of the five-year industrial plan should be submitted to the State Planning Committee [15], accompanied by a resolution of the Presidium, which comrade Mezhlauku, based on the following directives:

I. When drawing up a five-year plan for industry, it is necessary to recognize:

1. To achieve a more even increase in the fixed capital of industry (capital works) over the years than it is assumed by the control figures.
2. To increase the reduction in production costs by: a) revising the ratio of prices for agricultural raw materials and industrial products in the direction of reducing the former; b) increasing labor productivity; c) greater account of the efficiency of capital investment.
3. To take into account in full measure the reconstruction of industry not only by branches of industry, but also to establish a general beginning of reconstruction for the entire industry, especially on the basis of electrification and chemicalization.

II. Indicate in resolution [16] that the present benchmarks did not sufficiently take into account the development of the chemical industry, especially in the field of fertilizers, in connection with recent tasks, and also note that the amendments to be made to the control figures for the chemical industry in connection with the above, will dramatically change the number of investments in the chemical industry.

III. With regard to work on occupational safety and health, it is necessary to determine the appropriations for these works taking into account the decrease in the construction index.

IV. Indicate in the resolution the methods for working out the five-year industrial plan.

Chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR Kuibyshev

Deputy Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council
of the USSR Burzin

DGANKH USSR, f. 3429, on. 1, d.560, ll. 135 v. - 136.
Typ. copies Published in the journal "Soviet Archives", 1967, M 3, p. 22.

№ 38 [17] Minutes of the meeting of the plenum of the permanent planning meeting at the presidium of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR [18]

September 27, 1928

Listened:

Adjustments to the main indicators of the five-year plan target figures. Resolved:

- 1) Report comrade. Kornitsky take note.
- 2) Note that the following points were not sufficiently taken into account when constructing the reported version of the adjustments: a) uneven growth of fixed capital; b) reducing the cost of industrial products as a result of technical reconstruction; c) limits of building materials.
- 3) Propose to the main departments and committees of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR to submit no later than October 1 of this year. d. his digital outlines for adjusting the target figures of the five-year plan based on the indicators reported by Comrade Kornitsky, decisions of the Presidiums of the State Planning Committee and the Supreme Council of National Economy of the USSR on the consideration of the control figures of the five-year plan, taking into account the circular letters of the permanent planning meeting of September 12, No. 5/12 and September 25, No. 2.
- 4) When working out these adjustments, take into account the need for a significant increase in production and, in connection with the maximum increase in labor productivity, a certain increase in wages, a more systematic distribution by years of capital work due to capital work in 1929/30 and 1930/31. To revise the prime cost towards a further decrease (up to about 33%) and, when calculating the cost of capital construction, bear in mind the need for a greater (up to 50%) reduction in the cost of construction in connection with the rationalization of construction work and a reduction in the cost of building materials.
- 5) At the same time, instruct the functional departments to adjust the corresponding key indicators of the target figures of the five-year plan, in particular:

a) instruct the capital work subdivision (comrade GI Smirnov) to revise the distribution of capital works by year in order to make them more systematic and, when drawing up a capital work plan itself, take into account the balance of building materials, provided that at least a minimum reserve is required. When working out adjustments in terms of capital works, keep in mind the need to accelerate the completion date of individual works;

6) instruct the department of labor economics (Comrade Yu. A. Yuriev) to make adjustments according to the data concerning the number of workers, labor productivity, wages, and in connection with the installation on the maximum growth of labor productivity, it is necessary to provide for a certain increase in wages. To instruct the department of labor economics together with the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions to work out the issue of safety measures;

c) to propose to the department of trade policy (comrade A. S. Kupriyanov) to draw up a project of a possible reduction in the cost price for the whole industry and roughly for the sectors;

d) instruct Comrade B. Ye. Barsky to present his views on reducing the cost of construction;

e) invite the department of trade policy to identify the possible size of the cost of industrial products in connection with a possible decline in prices for agricultural raw materials. When determining prices for agricultural raw materials, keep in mind the need to ensure the appropriate growth of industry [and] the development of the raw material base;

f) instruct Comrade. GA Sakharov, in connection with the instructions of the Presidium of the State Planning Commission, to give his thoughts in the form of a general outline of a reduction in the cost of production under the influence of a reduction in the cost of electricity. In particular, this should affect the enterprises of the Urals, Donetsk basin and Leningrad region.

Listened:

The procedure for drawing up the control figures of the five-year plan by December 1 of this year. and a five-year plan by March 1, 1929.

Resolved:

Inform all the main departments and the Supreme Economic Council of the Union republics.

Listened:

On linking the work of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR with the Supreme Council of National Economy of the Union Republics on drawing up the control figures of the five-year plan. Resolved:

In view of the short time period (December 1 of this year) for presenting the control figures of the five-year plan, it should be deemed necessary in relation to the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the RSFSR to suggest that the main directorates and committees work out these control figures together with the apparatus. VSNKh RSFSR. With regard to the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the BSSR and the Ukrainian SSR, it is necessary to admit that it is necessary to come to Moscow for joint work with the main directorates and committees of a member of the presidium of the corresponding Supreme Council of the National Economy, authorized to make decisions on behalf of the Supreme Council of National Economy, with the required number of employees.

With regard to the Supreme Economic Council of the other Union republics, use the apparatus of their representative offices in Moscow.

Chairman Mezhlauk Executive secretary of the permanent planning meeting Krylenko

TsGANKh USSR, f. 3429, on. 117, d.550, ll. 2-3. Script.

№ 39 Minutes of the meeting under the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR V. V. Kuibyshev on the consideration of the main directives for finalizing the control figures of the first five-year industrial development plan

November 23, 1928

Listened:

AO Zolotarev's report on the main directives for the control figures of the prospective 5-year industrial plan.

Resolved:

1. Take note of the report.
2. To note the need for additional elaboration of directives on a number of indicators, in particular, on the issue of the relationship between industry and the state budget [19].
3. To note the inadequacy of the projections of capital investments in a number of industries [20], on which the faster rate of industrialization of agriculture depends.
4. Note the insufficient rate of cost reduction, especially in the first years of the five-year period, namely: 1929/30 and 1930/31, when the level of cost reduction falls in comparison with the level achieved in 1928/29.
5. To note the insufficient increase in the number of workers for the entire five-year period, amounting to 21.2%, partly due to the sharp and inexplicable drop in the growth of the number of workers in 1932/33.
6. Noting all these shortcomings, the Presidium considers it necessary to set before the industry the solution of the following main tasks within five years:
 - a) the maximum possible elimination of the shortage of basic production materials;
 - b) a much wider development of industries, the products of which are necessary to increase the rate of industrialization of agriculture (especially agricultural machinery and fertilizers) and to satisfy the economic needs of both the individual and its socialized sectors;
 - c) a much wider deployment of auto and tractor construction with more careful consideration of needs, also in the second five years;

d) an increase in capital investments in the line of the raw material base, providing a wider deployment of industries processing

agricultural raw materials;

e) additional design of a number of new objects and reconstruction works in the field of ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, in the field of the electrical industry, in the field of building materials and the timber industry.

7. Along with this, it is also necessary to set ourselves the task of expanding the volume of housing construction and creating a broader base for improving the living and cultural situation of the working people. Taking into account all the directions in which capital work will have to develop, it is also necessary to provide for extensive road construction, which should ensure maximum communication between the factory centers and the surrounding peasant population.

8. Finally, the Presidium considers it necessary to develop a number of additional large regional power plants, which would not only provide the additional capital construction with the necessary energy, but would serve as a base for new factory units in accordance with the new geographical location of industry projected in the general perspective plan.

9. In order to cover the additional necessary capital investments, the Presidium considers it expedient to increase the inflow of appropriations from budgetary sources so that the balance in favor of industry would remain approximately at the level achieved in the middle years of the five-year period. Along with this, it is necessary to design higher quality indicators, reducing the level of production costs since 1929/30 more significantly than it was projected in the directives.

10. Considering the level of growth achieved in relation to nominal wages to be more or less satisfactory, the Presidium proposes to project a higher growth rate of real wages by lowering the accumulation rate established for the industries of Group B. However, given the undoubted presence of some commodity shortage throughout the entire five-year period and the need to transfer significant funds from the more profitable light industry to the heavy industry, it is necessary to arrange the price reduction process over the years in such a way as

to relieve the budget tension to the maximum extent, while ensuring all planned capital construction.

On the timing of the development of control figures for the five-year plan

1. Taking into account the requirement of the State Planning Commission to submit a report on the control figures no later than December 10, to propose to the main departments and committees, PES and the permanent planning meeting to revise the terms and methods of work in such a way that the main materials would be ready by the specified date.
2. To this end, to propose to the main directorates and committees to work out the control figures on the basis of the directives given by the Presidium and earlier developed materials of trusts and enterprises, consulting only with the largest trusts on capital construction issues.
3. All main departments, PES and NTU for the forthcoming period of elaboration of the control figures of the five-year plan, allocate special persons responsible for this work, who will be released for this purpose from all other work until December 15.
4. Suggest the teaching staff to submit to the chairman for signature the schedule of work, developed taking into account the terms specified in the first paragraph of the second section.
5. Enter the appropriate institution with a petition to release com. Kuibyshev for the entire period of working out the control figures until December 15 from all work, except for the management of the industrial five-year plan.

Chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR V. Kuibyshev

TsGANKh USSR, f. 3429, on. 117, d.549, ll. 84-87. Script.

Published in part in the journal "Soviet Archives", 1967, No. 3, pp. 23-24.

№ 40 From materials to the report of the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR V. V. Kuibyshev at the VIII All-Union Congress of Trade Unions on the first five-year industrial development plan [21] [22]

Not later than December 10, 1928 [23]

1. The five-year plan for the national economy in general and industry in particular, being a segment of the general master plan for the socialist reorganization of the national economy, should ensure, as indicated in the "Directives for the preparation of a five-year plan for the national economy" adopted at the XV Congress of the CPSU (b), expanded reproduction of socialist industry on the basis of expanded reproduction in the national economy in general; further pursuing a course towards the industrialization of the national economy and raising the material and technical level of its development; increasing the defense capacity of the Soviet Union and further liberation from capitalist dependence both in terms of raw materials and, in particular, means of production;

From the point of view of resolving these basic tasks, the design of a five-year plan of economic development should also be carried out. In particular, and in particular, the five-year plans must be checked from the point of view of correct relations with the peasantry, strengthening the leading and transforming role of socialist industry in relation to agriculture, ensuring the rise of the industrial poor and middle peasants and the intensive growth of the socialist sector of the countryside (collective and state farms).

2. The construction of socialism in a technically backward country, in an atmosphere of hostile capitalist encirclement, predetermines and determines the rates of our economic and, in particular, industrial development. The directive to catch up with and then surpass the level of industrial development of the advanced capitalist countries in the shortest historical time is turning into a categorical imperative, into the main condition and the main prerequisite for solving the problem of the socialist transformation of our economy. This is also required by the interests of the defense capability of our Union and the liberation from the bondage of capitalist dependence; this is also required by the interests of strengthening the leading and transforming role of socialist

industry and overcoming the extreme backwardness of agriculture, this, finally,

These high rates of development, and in particular and especially industrial development, which are decisively outstripping the rates of development of the capitalist countries, as the experience of recent years has shown, are realizable with the maximum use of all the advantages of planned management and all the resources at the disposal of the national economy as a whole and industry in particular. The main drawback of all the previously drawn up five-year projections is an insufficiently complete account of all those resources and all those advantages that our economic system has. Hence, the real course of economic development was ahead of the five-year planning assumptions.

This underestimation of the really possible and real rates of our economic development must be avoided in the five-year plans of industry being worked out.

3. On the other hand, it is necessary to avoid the design of such rates of development, which are unbearable for the entire national economy and thereby create a threat of separation of industry from the entire national economy in general and agriculture in particular and in particular, i.e., lead inevitably to disruption necessary proportions between individual elements of the national economy.

The path of super-industrialist constructions in the long-term planning of industry, regardless of the real possibilities of our economic development, leading to an exorbitantly large linking of funds in capital construction, is a path that turns industry from a leading and transforming branch of the national economy into a brake on socialist construction, and ultimately inevitably leads - to the disruption of the very cause of industrialization, to the rupture of the alliance of the working class and the peasantry. Such a projection of five-year plans for industrial development would undoubtedly be a grave economic and political mistake.

4. The leading and socialistically transforming role of industry finds its expression in such rates of development at which an increase in its share in the national economy, enhancing its leading role in the reconstruction of technical level and on this basis its complete socialist

reconstruction. It is precisely in this latter that the main task, the main problem and the main difficulty of the five-year plan of industry consists: proceeding from the interdependence and interdependence of individual elements of the national economy among themselves, to find the optimum at which the maximum possible rate of growth of industry is achieved, ensured, however, by such development of other sectors national economy: agriculture, transport, budget, etc., at which "more or less crisis-free development" is achieved. Determining the rate of development of agriculture (supplying agriculture with chemical fertilizers, agricultural machines, etc.), industry at the same time in the rate of its development is determined by agriculture as a consumer of industrial products, a producer of raw materials of agricultural origin processed by industry, as a producer of those export funds, on which industry to a large extent builds its plans for the import of means of production and scarce raw materials and materials, and, finally, as a source of additional resources for carrying out the policy of industrializing the national economy.

The growth rate of railway transport, determined by the growth rate of this national economy, in general, and industry in particular, and, in particular, in turn, determines the boundaries of a possible increase in freight turnover, economic ties between individual regions of the Union, the speed of freight turnover, etc.

Finally, determining to a large extent the rate of budget growth both in terms of deducting profits, trade and customs income, and as the main source of excise receipts, industrial growth is at the same time limited by the growth rate of the budget, through which the redistribution of national income occurs.

Under these conditions, the long-term plan for the development of industry must be constructed in such a way that the necessary development of other branches of the national economy is not only predetermined by it, but that it also includes the entire sum of conditions and prerequisites that depend on industry, under which the entire plan as a whole was realistically feasible.

This interdependence and interdependence in the rates of development of individual elements of the national economy leads at the same time to a certain convention and digital design of the five-year industrial plan. The inclusion of the five-year plan of industry in the general plan

of national economic development, its coordination with the rest of the sectors of the national economy, and in particular agriculture, transport and the budget, will have to clarify the development plan itself (industry. On the other hand, the final specification of the five-year plan for industry can be carried out only after a five-year development plan was drawn up by individual industrial enterprises (plant, factory) and industrial associations (trust, syndicate, etc.).

5. With the task of keeping the course "to mitigate, and then to overcome the shortage of goods", the five-year plan for the development of industry should be structured in such a way that, ensuring the maximum rate of development for the industries that produce the means of production, the highest rate was given to those of its branches whose products are most acutely in short supply: metal, mechanical engineering, chemistry, timber, building materials, etc. The five-year plan for industry, setting as its task the maximum possible rate of industrialization, subject to more or less crisis-free development, should not proceed from aligning with "narrow" places on the branches of industry which are lagging behind in their development, and on their pulling up, on overcoming them. In accordance with this, a policy in the field of capital construction should also be pursued,

However, here, too, it is necessary to concentrate maximum funds on the possible minimum of objects in order to ensure the maximum effect of construction, both in terms of its quality and the timing of commissioning and construction cost.

VIII All-Union Congress of Trade Unions. Materials for VV Kuibyshev's report on the five-year industrial development plan. M., 1928, p. 3-8.

No. 41 Order of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR [24] on ensuring the active participation of the working masses and trade-union organizations in the discussion of the first five-year industrial development plan [25]

January 1929 g 3.

On December 15, 1928, the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR submitted to the State Planning Committee the second version of the control figures of the five-year industrial development plan.

Further work on drawing up a five-year plan will be carried out by the organs of the Supreme Economic Council of the Union together with the State Planning Committee: the USSR and the State Planning Committee of the republics. The procedure for this work will be established by additional orders.

At the same time, in accordance with the previous decisions of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council and the decree of the VIII Congress of Trade Unions on my report on the five-year industrial plan, the most active participation in the elaboration of the five-year plan should be ensured among the broad masses of workers, professional organizations, the engineering and technical community, and all bodies of factory and plant management.

The short period of time separating us from the Congress of Soviets, at which the report on the five-year plan for the development of the national economy will be considered, makes it difficult to make full and timely use of the results of this grass-roots study of the five-year plan.

However, the significance that a broad discussion of major questions of the industrial development plan can have for improving the five-year plan and bringing the working masses closer to socialist construction requires that all measures be taken to involve the widest circles of workers in this discussion.

The immediate subject of discussion should be the general plan for the development of industry and individual industrial sectors - on the one hand, and the specific fate of each individual plant and each major workshop - on the other.

For information about the general guidelines of the five-year plan of the PES, the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR will attend to the publication in the coming days of a report I made at the VIII Congress of Trade Unions [26], and the main basic indicators for industries and major regions.

The main directorates and committees of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR should inform as soon as possible: 1) the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the Union republics about additional capital work, 2) the trusts of union significance both about the general ways of development of this branch of industry and about the main technical lines of development of individual trusts, factories and plants.

The allied trusts, for their part, must transmit these directives to their member enterprises directly or at conferences and meetings convened for this purpose.

Professional organizations should be involved in this work from the very beginning. The main directorates, therefore, must work out, together with the Central Committee of the respective trade unions and with the involvement of representatives of the trusts, a plan for a campaign to discuss the five-year plan.

To ensure the systematic conduct of this campaign and the timely use of the results of the discussion of the Supreme Economic Council of the Union Republics, the main directorates and committees of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR, as well as the Union trusts, should allocate special persons who should be entrusted under their responsibility - monitoring the course of the campaign, field visits, periodic reports the relevant authorities on the course of the campaign and the most important decisions taken at production meetings and conferences convened by factories and trusts.

The forms and tables of the five-year plan must be completed by the trusts, taking into account the wishes made by the grassroots authorities, no later than March 1, 1929.

The Supreme Economic Council of the Union republics should, for their part, ensure the procedure for discussing the development plans of the largest republican enterprises, so that the main departments and committees of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR could take

into account the results of this discussion when finalizing the five-year plan. To do this, the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the Union republics must inform the main departments and committees no later than March 1, the plans they develop in a sectoral context, and those additions and changes that will follow from decisions made as a result of discussing plans in grassroots cells.

A permanent scheduled meeting, along with participation in the work of the State Planning Commission, should:

1) during the month of January, together with representatives of the Supreme Economic Council of the Union republics, the main directorates and committees of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR and the Central Committee of the respective unions, discuss the control figures of the five-year plan developed by the republican BCHX, identifying the most important disagreements and outlining certain decisions on them; 2) to allocate special persons for general observation of the campaign for each republic and for groups of industries. The duties of the members of the permanent planning meeting should be to unite information during the campaign and general monitoring of the timeliness and full elaboration of the five-year plan in all bodies of the Supreme Economic Council of the Union and the republics.

Chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR V. Kuibyshev

TsGANKh USSR, f. 3429, on. 57, d.227, l. 154-154 vol. Script.

Published in part in the journal "Soviet Archives", 1967, No. 3, pp. 24-25.

No. 42 Minutes of the plenary meeting of the Presidium of the USSR State Planning Committee on the consideration of the initial version of the first five-year plan

5-7, 9, 11, 12 February 1929

G.M. Krzhizhanovsky presides.

Listened:

Initial version of the five-year plan for the development of the national economy. Contribution [it is] of the Central Control Center. Resolved:

Instruct the small presidium to sum up the discussion of the initial version of the five-year plan and determine the organization and timing of further work on the initial and optimal versions of the five-year plan for the development of the national economy for 1928/29-1932 / 33.

Chairman G. M. Krzhizhanovsky

Secretary I. Kogan

TsGANKh USSR, f. 4372, on. 27, d.18, l. 17. Original.

№ 43 From the report of the USSR State Planning Committee at the 5th Congress of the Presidiums of the State Planning Commissions of the Union Republics [27] “The main problems of the USSR five-year plan for 1928/29 - 1932/33. [28] [29]

At the earliest March 7, 1929 [30]

1. Starting positions

The 15th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) gave exhaustive political and economic directives for the construction of a five-year national economic plan, based on the general course for the industrialization of the USSR and the consistent strengthening of socialist elements in its economic system in general and in agriculture in particular and in particular. Subsequent plenums of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) - on the one hand, and a number of government acts - on the other hand (decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR on crop yields [31]), additionally developed and concretized the instructions of the 15th Congress on the tasks of economic construction for the next period. It was the responsibility of the USSR State Planning Commission and the entire system of planning bodies of the country to translate these general political and economic guidelines and directives into the language of specific economic and technical and economic calculations and turn them into a specific program of economic development for the coming five years. The proposed preliminary report on the control figures of the five-year national economic plan is an attempt to solve this problem.

2. Organizational and methodological notes

The proposed five-year plan in terms of the scale of the projected growth in material production, capital investments and quality indicators, significantly exceeds the calculations of all past designs. This is based on, on the one hand, the newly accumulated experience of the first years of the reconstruction period, which revealed previously underestimated opportunities, and on the other hand, a certain change in the very nature and order of work on the five-year plan. In accordance with the directives of the 15th Congress on giving the work on the five-year plan a broader public character, as well as for the purpose of more comprehensive scientific expertise on the

most important elements of the plan, special conferences were held by the State Planning Committee [32] with the participation of prominent representatives of science and practical experience in metallurgy and mechanical engineering, agricultural reconstruction, transport reconstruction, in the chemical industry, in the forestry, in the wood-chemical industry, in the textile industry, in cooperative construction and in the reproduction of skilled forces in the country.

Based on these conferences, as well as on the great work of a number of people's commissariats, and especially the Supreme Council of the National Economy and the People's Commissariat for Railways, it turned out to be possible to build a fairly specific program (with the designation of objects, regions and dates) of new construction, reconstruction and rationalization in the decisive sectors of the economy, on which all the projected rates of quantitative and qualitative growth. From the methodological point of view, this made it possible to break away from that extrapolation technique, which inevitably had to be resorted to at the previous stages of long-term planning and which led to an underestimation of the possible rates of our development and construction.

Along with this, the State Planning Commission held special conferences with workers of the most important economic regions of the country, at which, with the participation of the local people themselves, the real resources and capabilities of each of the regions were comprehensively weighed both from the point of view of the all-Union tasks falling on it, and from the point of view of its specific features and needs. The work of these regional conferences for the first time makes it possible to present the most important elements of the five-year plan, in a regional context, thereby revealing both the general lines of redistribution of productive forces between the regions, and those special tasks for raising the backward regions, which were specially indicated in the decisions of the 15th Congress.

Finally, in the work on the five-year plan over the last period, it has been possible to somewhat intensify the coverage of a number of synthetic problems such as the national income, socialization processes, the country's energy balance, etc.

The work on the five-year plan has not yet been finally completed, and therefore the further presentation is preliminary and will require

additional clarifications. The main findings, however, will hardly undergo any significant changes. A broader and more specific coverage of the sectoral and regional problems of the five-year plan will be given in the report that is being prepared for the Congress of Soviets, and in a number of special monographs that will accompany this report.

3. About two variants of the plan [33]

The State Planning Committee proceeds from the need to draw up a five-year national economic plan in two versions. When analyzing the issue of options, it is necessary, first of all, to emphasize categorically the unity of the economic course and economic program in both options. The tasks of industrialization and socialization are decisive in both options. The construction of a socialized sector in agriculture is planned on almost the same scale for both options, with the maximum possible speeding up of this business for the next five years in view of its special significance. The distribution of the national income in general, and in particular the movement of the share of the proletariat in the total income of the population, proceeds in principle along common lines in both variants. Finally, the program of work to strengthen the country's defense is almost identical for both options.

The difference between the starting and optimal options, given the unity of their economic course, goes along the following lines. Starting option 1 takes into account:

- a) the possibility of a partial crop failure during the five-year period;
- b) approximately the current type of relations with the world economy (especially in the sense of an increase in long-term loans, the increase of which is projected at a rate characteristic of recent years);
- c) a relatively slower (in time) progress in the implementation of high-quality standards in national economic construction in general and in agriculture in particular;
- d) provided that the defense program is approximately the same in both variants, its greater relative severity for the starting variant.

On the contrary, the best option comes from:

- a) the absence during the five years of any serious crop failure;

b) a much wider scope of economic ties with the world economy, both due to the presence of large export resources in the country (full implementation of the CEC decree on crop yields), and especially due to the significantly faster growth of foreign long-term loans already in the early years of the five-year plan;

c) a sharp shift in quality indicators in the national economic construction in the next two years (cost, yield, etc.);

d) a smaller share of defense spending in the general economic system.

Thus, the movement of our national economic construction in the next five years according to one of these options may be due to both a number of independent factors (crop failure, insufficient long-term foreign loans), and the degree of our success in the most difficult task of implementing high-quality tasks (cost, yield). In accordance with this, the starting option can be considered as a kind of armored minimum within the optimal option with the unity of their economic program. The gap between them is established at approximately 20% (with the identity of a number of indicators), that is, approximately in the annual development period. In other words, the (optimal) program that under some conditions we can implement in five years, under others, less favorable conditions (typical for the starting option) will be stretched for about six years. The construction of a five-year national economic plan in two versions, with all the difficulty of this matter, can ensure greater flexibility in annual economic plans and greater preparedness for overcoming the enormous difficulties that stand in the way of implementing the five-year economic development program.

TsGANKh USSR, f. 4372, on. 27, d.4, ll. 2-3. Rotat. copies

No. 44 Extract from the minutes of the plenary meeting of the Presidium of the USSR State Planning Committee on the approval of the first five-year plan and its publication [34]

March 23, 1929

Listened:

Report on the status of work on the five-year plan and further, their direction. Resolved:

1. To approve the starting and optimal variant of the long-term plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR for 1928/29-1932/33, noting that certain elements of the optimal variant are not yet completely balanced and this version of the plan needs additional study and detailing.
2. To recognize it necessary, no later than the second half of April of this year, to publish printed materials for the five-year plan in three volumes with the following content: 1) summary report; 2) sectoral elements of the plan; 3) a five-year plan in the regional context.
3. Instruct Comrade Grinko, by March 25, submit to the small: the presidium a specific list of sections of the three volumes scheduled for publication.

Chairman of the Presidium G. Krzhizhanovsky Secretary of the Presidium I. Kogan

TsGANKh USSR, f. 4372, on. 27, d.21, l. 87. Original.

№ 45 Resolution of the XVI Conference of the CPSU (b) "On the five-year plan for the development of the national economy"

April 29, 1929

1. Having heard the reports on the five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, The XVI All-Union Party Conference establishes, firstly, that the five-year plan for the overall growth of the national economy provides for the following achievements:

a) While the total amount of capital investments in the five-year period 1923/24 - 1927/28. amounted to 26.5 billion rubles., for the five years 1928 / 29-1932 / 33. the size of capital investments in the entire national economy is determined in the amount of 64.6 billion rubles. While over the past five-year period capital investments in industry amounted to 4.4 billion rubles, for the projected "five-year period they are set at 16.4 billion rubles; the corresponding figures for agriculture are 15 billion rubles. and 23.2 billion rubles; for transport - 2.7 billion rubles. and 10 billion rubles. and for electrification - 0.9 billion rubles. and 3.1 billion rubles.

b) As a result of these investments, the total amount of the country's fixed assets from 70 billion rubles. in 1927-28 it grows to 128 billion rubles. in 1932/33, that is, by 82%, including the fixed assets of the entire industry, from 9.2 billion rubles. to 23.1 billion rubles, electrification - from 1 billion rubles. up to 5 billion rubles, i.e. 5 times, railway transport - from 10 billion rubles. up to 17 billion rubles, that is, by 70%, and agriculture - from 28.7 billion rubles. up to 38.9 billion rubles, i.e. by 35%.

c) The huge volume of capital investments is accompanied by a corresponding increase in production throughout the industry -

"From 18.3 billion rubles. in 1927-28 to 43.2 billion rubles. in 1932/33, which means more than tripling of the pre-war industrial production; in agriculture - from 16.6 billion rubles. up to 25.8 billion rubles, which means an excess of the pre-war size of agricultural products by more than one and a half times. The work of railways will increase from 88 billion tons / km to 163 billion tons / km; net production of the entire (in physical volume) of the national economy - from 24.4 billion rubles. up to 49.7 billion rubles.

d) Based on the general idea of industrializing the country, strengthening the defense capability of the Union and liberation from dependence in relation to capitalist countries, capital investment in industry is directed primarily to industry that produces the means of production (78% of all capital investment in industry), in accordance with which the products of these industries industry is growing much faster: with the growth of the total gross output of the planned industry by 2.8 times, the gross output of industries producing means of production increases by 3.3 times.

In terms of power construction, the plan provides for the construction of 42 district power plants (Dneprovskaya hydroelectric station, Svirskaya hydroelectric station, a peat-based power plant on M. Vishera, on coal near Moscow in Bobriki, Zuevskaya in the Donbass, etc., etc.). This huge construction should increase the amount of electricity produced from 5 billion kWh. up to 22 billion kWh. at the end of the five-year period.

In ferrous metallurgy, it is planned to build new powerful metallurgical plants (Magnitogorsk, Telbesskiy, Dneprovskiy, Krivorozhskiy, etc.). The construction of new factories and the reconstruction of the existing ones should bring the production of pig iron from 37 million tons in 1927 to 10 million tons in 1932/33.

For coal, a powerful mine construction is being projected both in the Donbass, and in the Urals, Kuzbass and the Moscow region, and the extraction of coal from 35 million tons in 1927 // 28 should be increased to 75 million tons in 1932/33 ...

Reconstruction and construction of new plants in the field of mechanical engineering (automobile plant, tractor plants in Stalingrad and the Urals, Sverdlovsk heavy engineering plant, Rostov agricultural engineering plant, tool factories, etc., etc.) make it possible to outline an increase in the gross output of engineering industry by a factor of 3 / y, and agricultural machine-building products by a factor of 4.

In the chemical industry, it is planned to build chemical plants (Bereznikovskiy, Moskovskiy on Egoryevskiy phosphorites, in the Donbass, etc.), and the production of chemical fertilizers in 1932/33 is brought to more than 8 million tons against 175 thousand tons in 1927 / 28 g

e) A significant excess of the projected rates of economic development of the Soviet Union in comparison with all capitalist countries by the end of the five-year period should significantly change the share of the USSR in world production: in cast iron, the USSR will move from sixth place to third place (after Germany and the United States), coal - from fifth to fourth place (after the United States, England and Germany).

2. The conference establishes, secondly, that the general growth of the national economy is provided for by a five-year plan in the direction of a decisive growth of the socialist sector in the city and in the countryside at the expense of the capitalist elements of the national economy, which is evident from the following data:

a) The structure of fixed assets changes (% of total by the end of the year)

sectors	1927/28 g	... 1932/33 g.
state socialist	51.0	63.6
cooperative socialist	1.7	5.3
private	47.3	31.1

b) Accordingly, the share in the gross output of the socialist sector (%) changes:

	1927/28 g.	1932/33 g.
By industry	80	92
Agriculture	2	fifteen
By retail turnover	75	91

The construction program of the socialized sector (state and collective farms) in agriculture is making a special shift. The growth of the cultivated area of the socialized agricultural sector in 1933 reached 26 million hectares of the cultivated area, accounting for 17.5% of the total sown area, and provides by 1933 (from the harvest preceding 1932, when the socialized sector makes up 13% of the total sown area) 15.5% of gross production and 43% of marketable grain production. The individual sector of agriculture stops its numerical growth due to the projected increase in the population drawn into the socialized sector,

up to 20 million souls, and the state farms (old and new) from the harvest of 1932 will produce at least 34 million tons of marketable grain, and the collective farms - not less than 50 million centners, which is 84 million centners, i.e., over 500 million centners.

c) The most important indicators of the growth of cooperation are given by the following comparison:

	1927/28 g.	1932/33 g.
Share of gross production of collective farms	1.0%	11.4%
The share of products of small cooperative industry in all products of small	19.4%	53.8%
Cooperation of retail trade	60.2%	78.9%
Number of farms united in agricultural cooperatives	9.5 million (37.5% of all farms)	23.58 million (85% of all farms)
The number (in millions of shareholders) of the population cooperated by consumer cooperation:		
In the city	8.7 million shareholders	16.5 million shareholders
In the village	13.9 million shareholders	31.8 million shareholders

This significant strengthening of the socialist elements throughout the national economy, in production and trade, with the development of a network of machine and tractor stations and a wide practice of contracting, covering 85% of grain crops by the end of the five-year period, signifies a strengthening of the leading role of the working class and creates a new form of link between town and country. leading to a massive restructuring of agriculture based on higher technology and collectivization,

3. The conference establishes, thirdly, that: a) The people's income grows in constant prices from 24.4 billion rubles. in 1927-28 to 49.7

billion rubles, i.e., by 103%. This gives an annual growth of the national income by more than 12%, that is, at a rate more than four times higher than the growth of the national income of pre-revolutionary Russia and sharply exceeding the rate of any capitalist country

b) The social structure of the national income is primarily characterized by the rise in the real wages of industrial workers and workers by 71% by the end of the five-year period, and the proportion of the income of the entire working class in relation to the total income of the national economy increases from 32.1% to 37%. The incomes of the entire agricultural population increase by 67% by the end of the five-year period, while the share of these incomes in the total national income has decreased due to the intensified growth of industry from 49.8% to 42.5%.

c) The growth of the consolidated budget (net) is characterized by the fact that the total budget in the next five years will amount to 51 billion rubles. against 19 billion in the past five years (an increase of 166.7%). Moreover, in relation to the national income in 1932/33. the budget will amount to 30.9% against 25.9% in 1928-29. This budget growth, along with strengthening the country's defense capability, provides an opportunity to increase financing of the national economy for the next five years by almost 4 times (393%) compared with the past five years and social growth. -cultural expenses; almost 3 times (276%).

d) The five-year plan provides for a significant increase in both commodity and foreign exchange reserves.

Based on the above data on the five-year plan and taking into account that this plan fully provides:

a) the maximum development of the production of means of production as the basis for the industrialization of the country,

b) a decisive strengthening of the socialist sector in the city and in the countryside at the expense of capitalist elements in the people; economy, the involvement of the vast masses of the peasantry in socialist construction on the basis of the cooperative community and collective labor and all-round assistance to the poor and middle peasant individual farms in their struggle against kulak exploitation.

c) the elimination of the excessive backwardness of agriculture from. industry and the resolution of the mainly grain problem:

d) a significant rise in the material and cultural level of the working class and the working masses of the countryside

e) strengthening the leading role of the working class on the basis of the development of new forms of ties with the main mass of the peasantry,

f) strengthening the economic and political positions of the proletarian dictatorship in its struggle against class enemies both inside the country and outside it,

g) economic and cultural development of the national republics and backward regions and regions

h) significant strengthening of the country's defense capability,

i) a major step forward in the implementation of the party's slogan: To catch up and overtake, in the technical and economic terms, the advanced capitalist countries -

the conference decides to approve the five-year plan of the State Planning Commission in its optimal version, approved by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR as a plan that fully meets the directives of the 15th Party Congress.

III

The implementation of the five-year plan, which is the program of a full-scale socialist offensive, is connected with overcoming enormous difficulties of an internal and external nature. These difficulties stem from the tension of the plan itself, due to the country's technical and economic backwardness, from the complexity of the task of reconstructing multi-million scattered peasant farms on the basis of collective labor, and finally, from the situation of the capitalist encirclement of our country. These difficulties are exacerbated by the intensification of the class struggle and the resistance of the capitalist elements, which are inevitably crowded out by the growing offensive of the socialist proletariat.

Overcoming these difficulties is possible only with a decisive improvement in the quality of work and labor discipline in all sectors of the national economy. Reduction of the cost of industrial products for five years by 35%; reduction of construction costs by 50%; increasing the productivity of industrial labor by 110%; increase in productivity by 35%; expansion of the cultivated area by

22%; unconditional implementation of the program of collective and state farm development; a decisive struggle against truancy and laxity at work; strengthening labor discipline; socialist rationalization of production; the provision of industry and agriculture with the necessary cadres of leaders and the creation of new cadres of red specialists from the people of the working class; finally,

The conference considers it necessary to note that overcoming these difficulties and the implementation of the five-year plan is possible only on the basis of the greatest growth in the activity and organization of the working masses in general and the working class in particular, on the basis of the all-round involvement of the vast masses of the working class in socialist construction and in economic management, on the basis of all-round the development of socialist competition and the powerful development of self-criticism of the millions from below against the bureaucratic perversions of the state apparatus.

The difficulties of the period of socialist reconstruction, especially in the context of the intensification of the class struggle, inevitably cause hesitation in the petty-bourgeois strata of the population, which is reflected in some strata of the working class and even in the ranks of the party. These vacillations, reflecting the influence of the petty-bourgeois element, find their expression in the departure from the general line of the party on fundamental questions and, above all, on the question of the rate of socialist industrialization, on the question of launching a socialist offensive against the kulaks and the capitalist elements in general, and on the question of the all-round strengthening of socialist forms of farming in the village.

In this regard, under the given conditions, the greatest danger within the party is the right deviation, as an expression of a direct rejection of the Leninist policy of the party, as an expression of an openly opportunistic surrender of Lenin's positions under the pressure of the class enemy. Only a ruthless rebuff to any hesitation in pursuing the general Bolshevik line, the implementation of which means strengthening the alliance of the working class with the peasantry, with a further strengthening of the leading role of the working class, can ensure the solution of the tasks of socialist construction set in the five-year plan.

The conference expresses its firm conviction that the Party will give a crushing rebuff not only to the Right deviation, but also to all conciliatory sentiments in relation to deviations from the Leninist line.

At the head of the masses of the workers, the Party will confidently march forward along the path of accomplishing the tasks of socialist reconstruction of the entire economy and will mobilize, under the leadership of the working class, the broadest masses of the working people to overcome difficulties and implement the five-year plan of economic development.

"The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee", Part II. M., 1954, pp. 569-575.

No. 46 Resolution of the V Congress of Soviets of the USSR [35] "On the five-year plan for the development of the national economy"

May 28, 1929

After listening to the reports of Comrades. Krzhizhanovsky G.M. and Kuibyshev V.V., the V All-Union Congress of Soviets approves the five-year plan for the national economic development of the USSR approved by the government and decides:

1. Note that the enormous advantages of the Soviet economic system and the correct economic policy of the Soviet government, based on a strong alliance of the working class with the poor and middle peasant strata of the countryside, ensured in a short time the restoration of the national economy of the USSR above the pre-war level and put the country on the path of socialist reconstruction. The five-year plan proposed by the government, being a detailed program for the socialist reconstruction of the national economy, corresponds to the general course of the Soviet government towards the industrialization of the USSR, towards the socialist reorganization of the countryside, towards overcoming the capitalist and consistent strengthening of socialist elements in the country's economic system and towards increasing the USSR's defensive capacity.

At the same time, the Congress notes with satisfaction the decisive economic and cultural upsurge in the backward regions and nationalities of the USSR envisaged by the five-year plan.

2. The congress approves the power plant of the five-year plan and the broad electrification program underlying it, which envisages an increase in the capacity of regional power plants from 500,000 kW at the beginning to 3.2 million kW at the end of the five-year period. In full succession with the VIII Congress of Soviets of the RSFSR, which approved in 1920 on the initiative of Comrade. Lenin's electrification plan, the congress considers the tasks outlined in the five-year plan for the construction and expansion of 42 regional power plants and for the construction of major industrial plants around the powerful power plants as a decisive prerequisite for the implementation of the plan for the reconstruction of the national economy and for the successful implementation of the slogan proclaimed by the Communist Party "Catch up and overtake in the technical and economic the advanced

capitalist countries ". The congress notes that the program of socialist industrialization projected in the five-year plan, which finds its expression in the growth of industrial production by more than two and a half times, in the strengthening of the position of heavy industry and in the volume of capital construction, determined for industry at a cost of 16.4 billion rubles. over a five-year period, is in full compliance with the energy setting of the plan, with the idea of chemicalization of the country and with the tasks set in the plan for the reconstruction of all sectors of the national economy.

The congress entrusts the special attention and supervision of the government to the production targets set in the plan and decisive for the socialist industrialization of the country by the end of the five-year period: electricity up to 22 billion kWh, coal up to 75 million tons, oil up to 22, pig iron up to 10 million tons, the powerful development of the chemical industry and the chemicalization of the country, in particular the production of mineral fertilizers - over 8 million tons, general machine building - up to 2 billion rubles. the cost of annual production, agricultural engineering - up to 610 million rubles. the cost of annual production and up to 53 thousand tractors.

With regard to strengthening the defense capability of the USSR, the congress instructs the government, when fulfilling the five-year plan, to take concrete measures to guarantee the development of those branches of the national economy that are inextricably linked with the country's defense capability.

3. The congress especially approves the broad program outlined in the five-year plan for eliminating the backwardness of agriculture, raising its productive forces in full accordance with the country's rapid industrial development, decisively overcoming the kulak elite in the countryside and the transition to the mass socialization of agricultural production (the construction of Soviet and collective farms, machine-tractor stations, the intensified course of cooperation, contracting, etc.), which alone can ensure that the multimillion masses of the poor and middle peasants take the path of economic growth and the socialist reorganization of the individual peasant economy.

Powerful support from the rapidly growing socialist industry, new forms of industrial linkage between town and country, the experience of large mechanized farms, the widespread introduction of machines

and chemical fertilizers, the widespread development of agronomic knowledge, the stimulation of the rise of individual farms, an ever wider understanding by the working peasantry of the direct benefits of the transition to the path of mass collectivization and cooperation on the basis of large-scale machine technology - only this path ensures the rapid elimination of the age-old backwardness of the peasant economy and the ever-accelerating rise of its productive forces.

The congress calls on the multimillion masses of the poor and middle peasants; the peasantry to resolutely support the plan outlined by the Communist Party and the Soviet government for the development of agriculture and by powerful labor assistance to accelerate the solution of the great tasks of the socialist reorganization of the countryside.

4. The congress commemorates the extensive program of transport construction projected by the five-year plan, based on a major reconstruction of railway transport, on new railway construction, ensuring the expansion of railway lines from 76,000 kilometers at the beginning to 92,000 kilometers at the end of the five-year period, on decisively overcoming off-road and dirt roads and on the significant development of new modes of transport (road and air). At the same time, the congress instructs the government to revise the program of work on water transport outlined in the five-year plan to further strengthen this work, both to improve the maintenance of existing tracks and to further expand the system of river routes with the corresponding development of shipbuilding.

Taking into account the extreme insufficiency of the existing communication lines in comparison with the gigantic expanses of the country and the most important tasks for involving new regions in the national economic turnover, the congress considers the planned program of transport construction as a minimum task and obliges the government to use all the possibilities to exceed it in the course of fulfilling the five-year plan.

At the same time, the congress makes all local bodies of Soviet power a duty and calls on all public organizations to concentrate their efforts on combating the impassable roads that hinder our economic development.

5. The resolution of large construction and production tasks set by the five-year plan can be carried out only with a large increase in labor productivity, with a significant increase in productivity, with a large decrease in the cost of industrial products, transport services, with a decisive decrease in the cost of construction, i.e., with a large improving the quality indicators of the national economy, providing the country with the necessary capital accumulation, the necessary reserves of food and raw materials and the necessary savings in spending money, raw materials, materials and: fuel. While fully approving the assignments outlined in this direction by the five-year plan, the congress draws the government's attention to the need to create through a series of measures; conditions, guaranteeing not only the full implementation of the quality indicators outlined and determining the fate of the national economic plan, but also, if possible, exceeding them. An increase in the technical armament of labor, a labor upsurge of the masses, the consolidation of inspired and conscious socialist discipline, a better organization of economic management, a resolute struggle against bureaucracy, the broadest development of self-criticism, the broadest development of socialist competition in factories, factories, individual railways, workshops, Soviet and collective farms, individual villages and entire regions in fulfilling the great tasks of socialist construction - all this taken together should ensure such a rise in labor productivity in the land of the Soviets, which is inaccessible to capitalist society. The congress addresses the broad masses of workers

6. The congress approves the planned increase in the number of workers employed in industry and a significant reduction in unemployment, with a simultaneous radical reconstruction and rationalization of industry, the transfer of all industrial and transport workers to a 7-hour working day, a significant increase in real wages and the welfare of the broad working masses of the peasant population , the gradual elimination of material and cultural differences between town and country. The congress sees in this a fundamental difference between socialist construction and the paths of capitalist rationalization of production, which plunges the broad masses of the working people into chronic unemployment and hopeless poverty.

The congress instructs the government to take all the measures necessary for the full implementation of the above-mentioned tasks of

the five-year plan for raising the well-being of the broad working masses.

7. Noting that the five-year plan broadly sets the tasks of the cultural upsurge of the masses, and emphasizing that the decisive and massive cultural upsurge of the country, the training of qualified personnel for all sectors of the national economy and the full use of the latest achievements of world science and technology are necessary conditions for the successful implementation of the five-year plan, the congress instructs the government to take appropriate measures to ensure the outlined plan: a radical improvement of working conditions at enterprises and the expansion of the social insurance program, the transition to compulsory universal education of children, a decisive fight against illiteracy, the expansion of the school network, the further development of the network of people's houses, clubs, nurseries, institutions for folk food, hut-reading room, etc., broad development of vocational and economic education, broad and planned development of research institutes and research work, training new, rational use and retraining of existing technical personnel of all specialties and qualifications, attracting the best foreign specialists, broad development of book business in the languages of all the peoples of the USSR, the broad development of cinema and radio and the implementation of other cultural measures outlined in the five-year plan and necessary for the socialist reconstruction of the national economy the attraction of the best foreign specialists, the widespread development of book publishing in the languages of all the peoples of the USSR, the widespread development of cinema and radio, and the implementation of other cultural events outlined in the five-year plan and necessary for the socialist reconstruction of the national economy.

The congress especially emphasizes the all-round strengthening of the struggle against housing needs and the obligatory fulfillment of the program of housing construction and communal improvement projected by the five-year plan.

The congress calls on all public organizations, trade unions, cooperatives, etc., to assist with their initiative and initiative in solving the enormous tasks of cultural development in the country.

8. The congress approves the financial program outlined in the five-year plan, proceeding from an increase in the purchasing power of the

chervonets and the accumulation of significant foreign exchange reserves, based on the broad mobilization of national funds for the needs of economic and cultural development. The congress instructs the government and all organs of Soviet power to work tirelessly to further consolidate the regime of economy in the spending of people's funds and firm financial discipline, only if the Soviet country will be able to carry out large-scale industrial construction unparalleled in history.

9. The congress notes with satisfaction that the five-year plan of the national economy outlines a strong increase in the share of the socialized sector in all fixed assets of the country, coverage of cooperatives, in full accordance with Lenin's cooperative plan, 54% of handicraft industry, up to 85% of peasant farms, even greater coverage of cooperation the working class, the extensive construction of a socialized sector in agriculture (Soviet and collective farms), which should encompass over 20 million souls of the peasant population and provide by the end of the five-year period about 43% of marketable grain. All this together should deal a crushing blow to the capitalist elements and ensure a genuine triumph for socialist forms in the economic system of the USSR.

10. Fulfillment of the enormous economic tasks outlined in the plan requires the exertion of the entire apparatus of government and the country's national economy.

Under these conditions of extensive socialist construction in town and country, the revitalization and strengthening of the lower organs of Soviet power, the Soviets and their executive committees, as well as their work to implement the measures arising from the five-year plan for the development of the national economy, is of particular importance. The Fifth Congress of Soviets of the USSR therefore instructs the government of the USSR to pay serious attention to providing the lower bodies of power with the necessary material resources and experienced cadres of workers from workers, farm laborers and peasants - the poor and middle peasants - and to the further planned construction of the lower apparatus, involving new millions in its work. the working masses, bringing it closer to the population and resolutely eradicating all kinds of bureaucratic distortions in it.

11. Under the leadership of the Communist Party and Soviet power, the working people of the Soviet Union traveled the great path of the victorious civil war and the restoration of the economy destroyed by the war and capitalist intervention, the path of struggle and construction, during which they accumulated enormous economic experience and nominated new cadres of leaders in the country's economy. The five-year plan of the national economy, being evidence and the result of this accumulated experience of planned management of the national economy, at the same time opens up new opportunities and requires the fastest solution of organizational tasks that are of exceptional importance for ensuring the socialist reconstruction of the national economy.

The congress expresses its firm conviction that, despite the prophecies of enemies and the hesitations of the cowardly, the working people of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will overcome the difficulties they face and, crushing the resistance of hostile capitalist forces, will victoriously solve the great tasks of socialist construction.

Chairman of the V Congress of Soviets of the USSR - M. Kalinin
Secretary of the V Congress of Soviets of the USSR-A. Yenukidze

SZ, 1929, No. 35, Art. 311.

Published in Sat. "Congresses of Soviets of the USSR in documents", vol. III. M., 1960, pp. 155-161.

No. 47 Minutes of the meeting of the small presidium of the USSR State Planning Committee on the adoption of an updated version of the first five-year plan

April 11, 1930

Chairman - G.M. Krzhizhanovsky.

Attended by: vols. Clearing, Paskutsky, Minaev, Osadchiy, Strumilin and Kuznetsov.

Heard: 1. On the refinement of the five-year plan. Speaker V. A. Levin.

Decided: 1. The revised version of the five-year plan proposed by the Presidium of the Central Planning Bureau should be adopted as meeting the tasks of the party and government.

Litter: "The revised version of the five-year plan has been sent out by the Central Planning Bureau."

Chairman Krzhizhanovsky

TsGANKh USSR, f. 4372, on. 28, d. 15, l. 4. The original

№ 48 From the five-year plan of the national economic construction of the USSR for 1928 / 29-1932 / 33. on the development of the industry planned by the Supreme Council of the National Economy

April 11, 1930 [36

Indicators	1927/28 g.	1932/33 g.		For 5 years		1932/33 as% to 1927/28	
		starting option	the best option	starting option	the best option	starting option	the best option
I. Funds at the end of the year (million rubles)							
Basic (in prices of 1926/27), including industrial fund	7 792	19,090	22517	-	-	245.0	289.0
Including							
Group "A"	4514	13 634	16263	-	-	302.0	360.3
Group "B"	3278	5456	6254	-	-	166.4	190.8
Negotiable (commodity and material) in prices of 1926/1927	3700	6,945	7903	-	-	187.7	213.6
"" Corresponding years	3 755	6 105	6 615	-	-	162.6	176.2
II. Number of workers (excluding employees), thousand	2 103	2640	2 806	-	-	125.5	133.4
Including							
Group "A"	1,036	1 463	1545	-	-	141.2	149.1
Group "B"	1,067	1 177	1,261	-	-	110.3	118.2
III. Production, million rubles							
Gross output in prices of 1926/1927	10,909	25635	30455	94898	103,761	234.9	279.2
Including							

Group "A"	4393	12,027	14,547	42797	47171	273.8	331.1
Group "B"	6516	13608	15908	52 120	56590	208.7	244.0
in prices of the corresponding years	10449	19 587	22,005	79734	84,937	187.5	210.6
Including							
Group "A"	4227	8 587	9 764	34,064	36 319	203.1	231.0
Group "B"	6222	11,000	12241	45670	48 588	176.8	196.7
Marketable products in prices of 1926/27	8 740	21,075	26113	77,713	86830	241.1	298.8
Including							
Group "A"	3 658	10461	13134	36,725	41327	286.0	359.0
Group "B"	5,082	10614	12979	40 988	45503	208.9	255.4
in prices of the corresponding years	8369	16,098	18807	65,059	70825	192.4	224.7
Including							
Group "A"	3526	7469	8 813	29147	31798	211.8	249.9
Group "B"	4843	8 629	9994	35912	39,027	178.2	206.4
IV. Qualitative indicators							
Fuel consumption per unit of production	-	-	-	-	-	75.0	70.0
Consumption of industrial raw materials per unit of production	-	-	-	-	-	75.0	72.0
Consumption of agricultural raw materials per unit of production	-	-	-	-	-	85.0	82.0

Labor productivity (output per worker)	-	-	-	-	-	185.0	210.0
Cost price	-	-	-	-	-	70.0	65.0
Sales prices (1926/27 = 100)	101.5	87.9	83.7	-	-	86.6	82.5
V. Financial indicators, mln. Rub.							
Intra-industrial accumulation (without deductions)	792	2,056	2 403	8254	9278	259.6	303.4
Including depreciation	440	770	890	3110	3400	175.0	202.3
Involved funds	1,197	1875	2412	8,000	9 422	156.6	201.5
Including from the budget	585	1,462	1737	5890	6522	249.9	296.9
Total own and borrowed funds	1 989	3931	4815	16254	18,700	197.6	242.1
Of which capital works	1,305	2936	3465	11754	13,500	225.0	265.5
Balance with consolidated budget	+ 182	+40	+ 107	+902	+ 1132	22.0	58.0
Including with the state budget	+ 192	+ 118	+ 197	+1,200	+ 1400	61.5	102.6

"Five-year plan for the national economic construction of the USSR",
vol. 2, part I. M., 1930, p. 247.

№ 49 From the five-year plan of the national economic construction of the USSR for 1928 / 29-1932 / 33. on the gross industrial product planned by the Supreme Council of the National Economy (million rubles) [37]

April 11, 1930 [38]

Industries [industry]	Starting option		The best option			
	1927/28	1928/29	1929/30	1930/31	1931/32	1932/33
Group "A"						
Fuel	926	1 101	1290	1512	1787	2093
Including						
oil	438	530	623	740	874	1015
coal	361	421	478	540	630	740
Mining	50	74	110	150	190	235
Including						
ore (YURT)	32	39	52	72	89	109
Metal	1861	2,292	2833	3512	4,506	5 798
Including						
ferrous metallurgy	668	782	922	1 198	1545	1868
colored	141	177	214	263	367	475
general engineering	583	737	959	1 159	1497	2059
agricultural engineering	153	200	262	341	455	610
electrical	190	258	330	460	645	896
building materials	311	384	538	720	942	1 131
forestry and woodworking	493	695	925	1 190	1510	1990
Chemical "A"	256	341	454	643	925	1312

Primary processing of fibrous substances	306	371	480	631	825	1,092
Total for group "A"	4393	5 516	6960	8 818	11 330	14,547
Group "B"						
Textile	3525	3968	4551	5304	6 313	7829
Sewing	296	430	630	833	1 182	1,600
Leather and shoe	617	909	1,025	1 191	1335	1,500
Porcelain and faience	44	47	54	65	78	98
Paper	138	175	252	292	331	400
Polygraphic	76	93	102	114	129	150
Chemical "B"	422	531	627	751	879	1,056
Food flavor	1381	1559	1870	2,260	2720	3250
Salt	17	eighteen	20	21	23	25
Total for group "B"	6516	7 730	9131	10831	12,990	15908
Total "A" + "B"	10,909	13,246	16,091	19649	24320	30455

Continuation

Industries [industry]	In five years		1932/33 as% to 1927/28		% to total		
	starting option	the best option	starting option	the best option	1927/28 g.	1932/33 g. starting option	the best option
Group "A"							
Fuel	7286	7 783	197.8	226.0	... 8.5	7.1	6.9
Including							

oil	3,504	3 782	200.0	231.7	4.0	3.4	3.3
coal	2710	2 809	188.4	205.0	3.3	2.6	2.4
Mining	651	759	384.0	470.0	0.5	0.7	0.8
Including							
ore (YURT)	291	361	240.6	340.6	0.3	0.3	0,4
Metal	16914	18941	251.5	311.6	17.1	18.3	19.0
Including							
ferrous metallurgy	5 471	6315	220.8	279.6	6.1	5.8	6.1
colored	1,454	1496	332.5	336.6	1.3	1.8	1.6
general engineering	5 350	6411	246.0	353.2	5.3	5.6	6.8
agricultural engineering	1 720	1868	343.1	398.7	1.4	2.0	2.0
electrical	2313	2589	368.4	471.6	1.7	2.7	3.0
building materials	3 323	3 715	304.8	263.7	2.9	3.7	3.7
forestry and woodworking	5813	6 310	331.5	403.7	4.5	6.4	6.5
Chemical "A"	3419	3675	448.2	512.5	2,3	4.5	4,3
Primary processing of fibrous substances	3 059	3 399	291.7	356.9	2.8	3.5	3.6
Total for group "A"	42778	47171	273.8	331.1	40.3	46.9	47.8
Group "B"							
Textile	26 469	27965	196.9	222.1	32.3	27.1	25.7
Sewing	3,157	4675	293.9	540.5	2.7	3.4	5.3
Leather and shoe	5649	5960	217.2	543.1	5.7	5.2	4.9

Porcelain and faience	342	342	222.7	222.7	0,4	0,4	0.3
Paper	1 299	1 450	259.4	289.9	1.3	1.4	1.3
Polygraphic	589	588	193.5	194.8	0.7	0.6	0.5
Chemical "B"	3715	3844	230.1	250.2	3.9	3.8	3.4
Food flavor	10803	11659	207.3	235.3	12.7	11.1	10.7
Salt	97	107	123.5	147.1	0.1	0.1	9.1
Total for group "B"	52 120	56 592	208.7	244.1	59.7	53.1	52.2
Total "A" + "B"	94898	103,767	234.9	279.2	100.0	100.0	109.0

"Five-year plan for the national economic construction of the USSR",
vol. 2, part I. M., 1980, pp. 252-253.

№ 50 From the five-year plan of the national economic development of the USSR for 1928 / 29-1932 / 33. on the development of the main products of the state qualifying industry [39]

April 11, 1930 [40]

Products	Account unit	Starting option		The best option			
		1927/28	1928/29	1929/30	1930/31	1931/32	1932/33
A. Means of production							
Fuel [industry]							
oil production	million tons	11.7	13.2	14.8	16.8	19.1	21,7
refining	""	8.3	10.7	12.3	14.6	16.7	19.1
coal	""	35.4	41.1	46.6	53.0	63.0	75.0
peat	""	5.4	5.9	7.5	8.9	10.6	12.3
Mining							
iron ore	""	5.7	7.1	10.2	12.7	15.0	19.4
manganese ore	""	0.49	0.52	0.66	0.75	0.86	0.96
asbestos	""	0.026	0.051	0.069	0.085	0.125	0.150
Metal							
cast iron	""	3.3	4.1	5.0	6.2	7.8	10.0
steel	""	3.97	4.7	5.2	6.4	8.1	10.4
hire	""	3.2	3.6	4.0	4.9	6.1	8.0
including							
roofing iron	thousand tons	300	390	425.0	460	510	575
copper	""	28.3	35.0	44.1	58.2	74.3	84.7
zinc	""	3.0	5.0	16.3	27.8	53.9	77.4
steam locomotives for NKPS	PC.	480	545-	625	660	730	825

freight cars	thousand pcs.	2.7	4.0	4.7	5.9	8.6	12.6
general engineering	million rubles	583	737	959	1 159	1497	2059
agricultural engineering	""	153	210	262	341	455	610
plows	mln. pcs.	1.13	1.8	2.25	3.15	4.0	5.0
seeders	thousand pcs.	60	101	191	282	319	348
tractors (wheeled)	""	1.15	3.0	5.0	8.0	20.0	55.0
Building materials							
sawn wood	million m3	11.55	15.3	22.1	29.0	35,7	45.5
round "	""	16.3	25.5	35.0	40.5	44.5	50.0
brick (all production)	billions pcs.	1.78	2.6	4.15	5.9	7.8	9.3
including							
state qualification industry	""	1.7	2.2	3.4	4.7	5.8	6.5
cement	million barrels	11.9	14.0	19.5	26.0	34.2	41.0
glassware	thousand tons	320	370	422	522	680	800
including							
window glass	""	124	152	180	242	360	460
Chemical "A"							
sulphuric acid	""	208	301	420	630	1000	1450
superphosphate standard 14%	""	150	261	480	1100	2050	3400
B. Consumer goods							

Textile							
cotton fabrics	million m	2742	2970	3266	3600	4100	4700
cotton yarn	thousand tons	328	362	400	460	525	620
woolen fabrics (with scarves)	million m	96.6	105.4	124.0	152.0	193.0	270.0
linen fabric	million m	165	162	217	283	375	500
Leather and footwear	million pairs	23	42	50	60	70	80
Paper							
paper and cardboard	thousand tons	316	410	510;	610	710	900
Chemical "B"							
galoshes	million pairs	36.9	41.5	46.0	51.0	60.0	75.0
matches	»Box	5.5	6.8	7.9	9.2	10.7	12.2
Food flavor							
granulated sugar	thousand tons	1340	1,340	1600	1900	2,200	2 600
beer	million buckets	26	23	23	23	23	23.0
vegetable oil with cottonseed	million tons	342	450	545	690	870	1 100
canned food	million cans	90	132.5	185	285	430	650
makhorka	thousand boxes	3210	3460	3640	3810	4000	4900
cigarettes	billion pcs.	47.0	52.0	57.0	63.0	70.0	75.0

Salt	million tons	2,3	2.5	2.7;	2.95	3.1	3.25
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Continuation

Products	Account unit	For 5 years		1932/33	in%	By
		starting option	the best option	1927/28	starting option	the best option
A. Means of production						
Fuel [industry]						
oil production	million tons	80.3	85.6	162		185
refining	""	68.7	73.4	203		230
coal	""	267.3	278.7	192		212
peat	""	41.6	45.2	193		228
Mining						
iron ore	""	54.2	64.4	259		340
manganese ore	""	3.75	3.75	195		195
asbestos	""	0.48	0.48	577		577
Metal						
cast iron	""	29.3	33.1	240		303
steel	""	31.1	34.8	209		262
hire	""	23.9	26.6	197		250
including						
roofing iron	thousand tons	2.36	2.36	192		192
copper	""	254.0	296.3	228		299
zinc	""	98.0	180.4	1,267		2580
steam locomotives for NKPS	PC.	3145	3385	146		172

freight cars	thousand pcs.	35.8	35.8	467	467
general engineering	million rubles	5,003	6411	225	353
agricultural engineering	""	1730	1,878	343	399
plows	mln. pcs.	16.2	16.2	443	443
seeders	thousand pcs.	1241	1241	580	580
tractors (wheeled)	""	86.0	91.0	4348	4 783
Building materials					
sawn wood	million m3	118.2	144.6	284	368
round "	""	169.8	195.5	247	307
brick (all production)	billion pcs.	26.35	29.75	433	522
including					
state qualification industry	""	20.35	22.6	329	382
cement	million barrels	122.0	134.5	294	345
glassware	thousand tons	2592	2794	219	250
including					
window glass	""	1214	1394	290	371
Chemical "A"					
sulphuric acid	""	3541	3801	611	697
superphosphate standard 14%	""	6 091	7291	1733	2267
B. Consumer goods					
Textile					
cotton fabrics	million m	17990	18636	159	171

cotton yarn	thousand tons	2282	2367	174	189
woolen fabrics (with scarves)	million m	711.4	844.4	199	280
linen fabric	million m	1396.0	1537	261	303
Leather and footwear	million pairs	276	302	304	348
Paper					
paper and cardboard	thousand tons	2950	3140	253	285
Chemical "B"					
galoshes	million pairs	254.0	237.5	163	203
matches	»Box	43.9	46.8	195	222
Food flavor					
granulated sugar	thousand tons	8790	9 640	166	194
beer	million buckets	115	115	88	88
vegetable oil with cottonseed	million tons	3 150	3 655	249	322
canned food	million cans	1,437.5	1,682.5	556	722
makhorka	thousand boxes	19110	19 810	131	153
cigarettes	billion pcs.	316.0	317.0	160	160
Salt	million tons	14.43	14.5	139	139

"Five-year plan for the national economic construction of the USSR", vol. 2, part I. M., 1930, pp. 248-251

[1] The Central Commission for Prospective Planning (TsKPP) was created by order of the State Planning Committee of the USSR on December 30, 1927, under the chairmanship of G. M.

Krzhizhanovsky. The management of the current work of the Central Control Chamber was carried out by the Economic Bureau (TsGANKh USSR, f. 4372, op. 26, d. 90, pp. 1-2).

[2] Omitted, information about the education and tasks of individual groups of the Center

[3] The III All-Union Congress of Planned Workers was held from 6 to 14 March 1928 in Moscow. G. M. Krzhizhanovsky made an introductory report "The next tasks of planning work". The congress heard and discussed reports: on the problem of the long-term plan and economic zoning, on the systems of indicators for the long-term plan, on the dynamics of the national economy of the regions. The congress outlined the procedure for drawing up the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR. All resolutions of the congress are kept in the Central State Academy of National Economy of the USSR (f. 4372, op. 26, dd. 1-3).

[4] Sections are omitted: II- "Results of the restoration process by regions"; III - "Regional problems of all-Union significance".

[5] End date of the Congress.

[6] The first attempts to draw up five-year plans were made during the years of the restoration of the national economy. In 1923-'1924. drafts of sectoral five-year plans were drawn up: "Five-year plan of the metallurgical industry for 1923 / 24-1927 / 28", "Prospects for the development of industry for 1922 / 1923-1927 / 1928", "Five-year plan of transport for 1923 / 24-1927 / 28 biennium ". In 1925-1927. The State Planning Commission developed three drafts of the five-year plan of the national economy one after the other: for 1925 / 26-1929 / 30, for 1926 / 27-1930 / 31. and for 1927 / 28-1931 / 32. At the same time, the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR drew up three versions of a five-year plan for the development of industry in the USSR: "Five-Year Plan of the Special Conference on the Restoration and Expansion of the Fixed Capital of State Industry." "Materials for the five-year plan for the development of industry in the USSR. 1927 / 28-1931 / 32 ", "Target figures of the five-year industrial development plan. 1927 / 28-1931 / 32 ". The first versions of the five-year plan had significant shortcomings and were not approved by the government. These shortcomings were due to the lack of planning experience, the difficult

conditions of a multi-structured economy, as well as the bourgeois ideology of a number of employees of the State Planning Committee and the Supreme Economic Council, who took part in drawing up these plans.

[7] End date of the Congress.

[8] See doc. No. 32

[9] The table and instructions were not found.

[10] The Collegium of the PES of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR approved the directives for drawing up a long-term plan for industry on April 21, 1928 ("Commercial and Industrial Newspaper", April 24, 1928). In April - the first half of May, the Presidium of the State Planning Committee of the USSR considered and basically approved, in addition to the directives of the Supreme Economic Council, directives of other departments. Directives were approved for the development of a five-year plan for the metallurgical, chemical, forestry, wood-chemical industries, labor, social and cultural construction, financial policy, etc.

[11] Theses of the report see TSGANKH USSR, f. 4372, on. 26, d. 14, ll. 269-271.

[12] Directives see TsGANKh USSR, f. 4372, on. 26, d. 15, ll. 21-34.

[13] From the minutes No. 16/483 of the meeting of the presidium.

[14] From the minutes M 23/490 of the meeting of the presidium.

[fifteen]The first version of the control figures of the five-year industrial development plan outlined the following indicators: gross industrial output was to increase from 8965 million rubles. in 1927-28 to 19,977.6 million rubles. in 1932/33, that is, by 222.5%, and the growth in the production of heavy industry was projected to be much greater (241.7%) than in light industry (209.6%). Capital expenditures were projected at 11,095.6 million rubles. for the five-year period, of which by industries producing means of production - 7.8 billion rubles. These figures basically corresponded to the directives of the 15th Party Congress. At the same time, they also had a number of shortcomings, in particular, the absence of a link between individual industries and the absence of balances: supply and demand, energy and building materials; insufficient cost reduction; large investments from the

budget, etc. The shortcomings were noted in the report of V. I. Mezhlauk at a meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR. At the end of August 1928, the control figures of the Supreme Council of the National Economy were considered by the Presidium of the State Planning Committee. The main attention was paid to the issues of industrial reconstruction, the creation of an energy base for the entire national economy and the improvement of the material and cultural well-being of the working people ("Economic Life", September 2, 1928). The revision of the first version of the control figures of the five-year industrial development plan took place at the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR from August to December 1928. The second revised version of the control figures of the five-year industrial development plan was signed by V.V. industrial newspaper ". According to the new version, the gross output of the entire industry of the USSR increased by 167% over the five years, moreover, the production of heavy industry increased by 221%, and light industry - by 130%. The share of heavy industry products in general industrial production was to increase from 42.8% in 1928-29 to 49.3% by the end of the five-year plan. Discussion of the second version of the control figures of the five-year industrial development plan in the Presidium of the State Planning Commission took place on December 29, 1928 and January 5, 1929. The report on the meetings was published by the Trade and Industrial Gazette on December 30, 1928 and January 6, 1929. Transcripts of the Presidium meetings The State Planning Committee is kept in the TsGANKH USSR (f. 4372, op. 26, d. 46; op. 27, d, 37).

[16] The resolution is not published (TsGANKh USSR, f. 3429, on. 1, d. 560, ll. 143, ob.-144).

[17] The permanent planning meeting at the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the National Economy was officially established by order of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR No. 1069 dated September 21, 1928 (TsGANKh USSR, f. 3429, op. 117, d. 549, l. 164), but in fact it existed and is mentioned in the sources much earlier. From May to August 1928, at the meetings of the Permanent Planning Meeting, reports of the central administrations on sectoral five-year plans were heard. The conference gave directives to the main directorates and all functional departments of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR and the Union republics and

exercised direct systematic leadership in the development of the five-year plan. Most of its meetings were held with the direct participation and under the leadership of the Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR V.V. Kuibyshev. The meeting was chaired by the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR V. I. Mezhlauk.

[18] The permanent planning meeting at the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the National Economy was officially formed by order of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR No. 1069 dated September 21, 1928 (TsGANKh USSR, f. 3429, op. 117, d. 549, l. 164), but in fact it existed and is mentioned in the sources much earlier. From May to August 1928, at the meetings of the Permanent Planning Meeting, reports of the central administrations on sectoral five-year plans were heard. The conference gave directives to the main directorates and all functional departments of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR and the Union republics and exercised direct systematic leadership in the development of the five-year plan. Most of its meetings were held with the direct participation and under the leadership of the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR V.V. Kuibyshev. The meeting was chaired by the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR V. I. Mezhlauk.

[19] At this meeting, attention was drawn to the decreasing rate of investments in industry from the budget (by year: 803 million rubles, 1 billion, 1069 million, 1065 million and 936 million rubles). The balance of settlements between industry and the budget by the end of the five-year period, according to the plan, decreased to 310 million rubles. The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR decided that the balance of payments should not fall below 375-400 million rubles by the end of the five-year period.

[20] December 2, 1928 regular plenum of the Standing Planning meeting of the Supreme Council of the National Economy considered a new plan of capital works. Capital investments increased by 2,775 million rubles, with the largest increase accounted for by ferrous metallurgy. The Supreme Council of the National Economy eliminated the main drawback of all previous versions of the first five-year plan: the "damping curve" in the distribution of capital

expenditures. With the new distribution of capital expenditures, another significant drawback of the previous version of the five-year plan was eliminated: the share of heavy industry in capital expenditures did not decrease by the end of the five-year plan, but increased from 77.5% in 1928-29 to 80.3% by the end of the five-year plan. This distribution of capital expenditures was supposed to ensure the fulfillment of the main task of the five-year plan - the industrialization of the country.

[21] Only the introductory part is published.

[22] The publication of the theses of the report and the discussion of the report itself by V.V. Kuibyshev at the VIII All-Union Congress of Trade Unions were of great importance in the preparation of the five-year plan. The congress noted that the target figures for the five-year lamentable industrial development are a huge step forward compared to the previous versions of the five-year plan. At the same time, concrete proposals were made at the congress to eliminate the shortcomings in the control figures of the plan. The delegates pointed to the need for the development of leading industries at an accelerated pace, for a more detailed elaboration of the issues of technical reconstruction and rationalization of industry, an increase in allocations for housing and household needs, for labor protection. The congress proposed to conduct a more thorough examination of the efficiency of capital investments and the possibility of additional expansion of products and raw materials base; drew special attention to the importance of creating and developing new industries: auto, aircraft and machine-tool building, chemical engineering, production of artificial fiber, aluminum, a number of chemical industries, etc. Central and regional bodies of trade unions, despite a number of shortcomings in the organization of work, took an active part in drawing up the five-year plan. The metalworkers' union was especially active. After discussing the report of Glav-metal, he pointed out the shortcomings of the plan in the field of the metal industry ("Commercial and Industrial Newspaper", August 17, 1928). In the Leningrad Region, after discussing the five-year plan at the Krasny Vyborzhets factories, them. Engels, them. Ilyich, the metalworkers' union proposed to increase the growth of production of the metal industry in the region. The reports of the planning and economic bodies on the five-year plan were also discussed by the Central Committee of the trade

unions of construction workers, miners, workers in the chemical industry, wallets, etc. The proposals of the unions helped to improve some indicators of the control figures of the five-year plan (TsGAOR USSR, f. 5451, op. 13, 221, ll. 19-22; d. 222, ll. 11-26, 29-45). In early March 1929, a meeting of the Central Committee of trade unions was held at the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions to discuss labor issues in the five-year plan. The report on the meeting was published in the newspaper "Trud" on March 8, 1929

[23] Dated from the opening of the convention.

[24] In addition to the published order of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR, on January 5, 1929, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions issued a circular on the participation of trade union organizations and the working masses in the discussion of the five-year industrial plan (Trud, January 6, 1929); On March 28, 1929, the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions sent out another circular appeal to all economic and professional organizations about the need for a public check of the five-year plan (TsGANKh USSR, f. 3429, op. 117, d. 549, pp. 16-17).

[25] The discussion of the first five-year plan at the enterprises in January-March 1929 did not take on a wide scale since the trade-union organizations did not yet have the experience of discussing such materials. Moscow metalworkers, for example, discussed the five-year plan in February only at the Elektrostal plant. The discussion in Donbass went well. At the Grishanskiy mines, the miners examined in detail the issues of sinking new mines, coal production programs, and cost reduction. At the Proletary plant, several proposals were made for the mechanization of certain production processes (Trud, February 9, 1929). When discussing the questions of the five-year plan at the Leningrad plant "Electric", special commissions were organized on individual questions, in which about 70 workers and engineers took part. As a result, higher indicators were adopted for welding machines and equipment production. At the Lyudinovo Machine-Building Plant, as a result of discussion, the plan for the production of locomotives was increased to 1000 units. instead of the 400 previously outlined.

[26] V. V. Kuibyshev. Five-year industrial development plan. Reports at the VIII Congress of Trade Unions and the V Congress of Soviets of the USSR. M., 1930

[27] The 5th Congress of the Presidiums of the State Planning Commissions of the Union Republics was held in Moscow on March 7-14, 1929. The issues of the compilation of the five-year plan for the development of the national economy for 1928 / 29-1932 / 33 were considered. Agenda: general report (G. F. Grinko); energy issues, technical policy of the most important complex and regional problems; major balance sheet problems of the plan; problems of the metal industry; fuel problems; chemistry problems; building materials problems; agricultural problems; main lines of reconstruction of new construction in transport; cooperative plan program; labor and culture issues; research report; five-year plan and development trends of the world economy; about the regional section of the plan; report on electrification. The abstracts of reports and transcripts of the sessions of the congress are kept in the TsGANKH USSR (f. 4372, op. 27, dd. 4-12). The congress adopted resolutions on all reports, approved the basic guidelines proposed by the Presidium of the State Planning Commission, and also unanimously adopted the greetings of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and the SNK.

[28] Only the introduction to the report is published.

[29] The materials of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, set out in the report of GF Grinko, formed the basis of the consolidated review of the State Planning Committee "The main problems of the five-year plan of the USSR for 1928 / 29-1932 / 33", which was presented to the SNK and STO in April 1929 (TSGANKH USSR, f. 4372, op. 26, d. 50), and later included in the publication "Five-year plan for the national economic development of the USSR" (v. 1. M., 1929).

[30] Dated from the opening of the convention.

[31] This refers to the resolution of the 4th session of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of the IV convocation of December 15, 1928 "On measures to increase the yield" (SZ, 1928, M 69, art. 643).

[32] The State Planning Committee of the USSR in December 1928 - January 1929 held 16 all-Union conferences and meetings on specific problems. At conferences with the participation of prominent scientists

and practitioners, the correctness of the main sections of the planned plan was checked. At these conferences, the sections of the State Planning Committee were able to clarify a lot in their outlines, and in February 1929 the Presidium of the State Planning Commission heard a summary report and updated reports of the branch sections.

[33] When discussing the five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR - at the joint meeting of the Council of People's Commissars and the STO, held from March 26 to April 4

1929, the idea of two versions of the plan was not supported. AI Mikoyan and VV Kuibyshev spoke in favor of the union government approving not two versions of the plan, but one - the optimal one. The majority of those who spoke in the debate (N. K-Antipov, V. Ya-Chubar, Ya. A. Yakovlev and others) strongly supported their point of view, speaking out in favor of adopting the optimal version (Pravda, April 3 and 5, 1929) ... The right-wing opportunists, Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsy, spoke out in favor of a slowdown in the development of industry and the collectivization of agriculture. The decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of April 23, 1929 approved the optimal version of the five-year plan (SZ, 1929, No. 29, Art. 268). XVI Conference of the All-Union Communist Party) discussed and unanimously adopted the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy in the optimal version,

[34] No protocol found.

[35] The V Congress of Soviets of the USSR was held in Moscow on May 20-28, 1929. There were 1675 delegates with a decisive vote and 884 - with a deliberative right. Order of the day: report of the government of the USSR; approval of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR; the rise of agriculture and cooperative construction in the countryside; elections of the new composition of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. In the field of economic construction, the congress fully approved the policy of socialist industrialization and adopted the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR.

[36] Date of approval of the revised version of the plan (see doc. No. 47).

[37] The information on the initial version of the plan for 1929 / 30-1932 / 33 is omitted

[38] Date of approval of the revised version of the plan (see doc. M 47).

[39] Omitted information on the initial version of the plan for 1929 / 30-1932 / 33.

[40] Date of approval of the revised version of the plan (see doc. M 47)

III WORKING CLASS OF THE USSR IN THE FIGHT FOR SOCIALIST INDUSTRIALIZATION

CHAPTER ONE

NUMBER AND COMPOSITION OF THE WORKING CLASS, TRAINING AND DISTRIBUTION OF STAFF

№ 51 Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) "On the preparation and training of labor force"

March 11, 1926

In order to accelerate the preparation and training of the qualified labor force necessary for industry, it is necessary to carry out the following measures:

- 1) In the mass training of the labor force, it is necessary to focus on the 5-6th grade, as the mass normal level of production qualifications, while training for the 7-9th grade of the 17th grade grid should be based on the selection of the most capable workers.
- 2) The training of qualified workforce must be delivered in full accordance with the needs of a particular enterprise or group of their professions and the degree of their qualifications.
- 3) The forms of labor force training, along with factory teachers, should be: for mass training - short-term courses and courses on the CIT method [1], brigade and individual apprenticeship in production and retraining of the unemployed and courses for foremen and senior workers.
- 4) The training of the workforce must be taken into account by the Supreme Council of the National Economy and economic organizations in their production programs for the development of industry.
- 5) The main goal in training a qualified workforce should be the real mastery of production and labor techniques and organizational and production skills.
- 6) FZU schools must train qualified workers in the 6th grade, who can, upon leaving school, improve their qualifications to 7, 8, 9th grade.

At the same time, FZU schools should not have the goal of training foremen and junior technical personnel in general, but only a consciously competent, technically qualified worker.

7) The training of the labor force should be considered not only as an ordinary one (a kind of public education, but also as one of the most important economic tasks, in accordance with which the schools of the factory teacher should (unload from a broad educational program. The program should be reduced to the necessary applied disciplines and the necessary minimum polytechnic knowledge.

8) Bodies of the Chief Professionals must adapt their methodological work and organizational structure to the above tasks, shifting the center of gravity of all work to the production moments of preparation and conducting this training in accordance with the needs of industry.

9) In this regard, the Glavprofobr and the Supreme Council of National Economy should prioritize the selection and retraining of the production and instructor staff of the factory teacher in their organizational work.

10) The CIT methodology for the accelerated training of skilled labor should be fully used both in the methodological work of the Chief Professionals Board and in the economic work of the Supreme Council of the National Economy and economic agencies for the preparation of labor.

11) Consider it expedient to further expand the work of the CNT to retrain and train the unemployed who have no qualifications or have lost them.

12) Acknowledge it necessary that the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, the Supreme Council of the National Economy, Glavprofobr and the People's Commissariat for Railways develop and implement a number of measures aimed at raising the qualifications of workers already employed in production.

13) To consider it necessary to strengthen the involvement of women in all types of training of qualified labor force.

14) Training of the labor force on the basis of the above measures should be linked to the maximum reduction of costs, the preparation of qualified labor force and the reduction of the cost of training.

15) To consider it necessary on the part of economic agencies to develop a broader brigade and individual apprenticeship.

16) Consider it necessary to encourage apprenticeships in the handicraft industry in every possible way.

In addition, with a view to encouraging apprenticeships in the handicraft industry in every possible way, the Central Committee recognized the need to carry out, in the Soviet order, a number of measures to regulate the labor and wages of adolescents among handicraftsmen.

"Decisions of the party and government on economic issues", part I. M., 1967, pp. 512-514.

[1] The Central Institute of Labor (CIT) was organized on February 10, 1921 by decree of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions Presidium to study the organization of labor, develop methods and forms of industrial training of workers. CIT also trained instructors and standard setters. By the beginning of the second half of 1927/28, the latter had been produced over a thousand. The methodology for training workers, developed by CIT, was based on the division of production operations and made it possible to train qualified workers in a short time. A similar work was carried out by the Leningrad Institute of Labor, which prepared 5 thousand skilled workers by the indicated date. Of the republican labor institutes, Kazan and Ukrainian should be noted. Kazan Institute was engaged not only in personnel training, but also in the rationalization of production, and Ukrainian - by the issues of factory accounting. The accounting installations that existed at that time at the "Hammer and Sickle" plant and in the Donugol administration gave a number of practical results in mechanical and analytical accounting ("Rationalization of the USSR Industry". M., 1928, p. 452)

No. 52 From Materials to the report of the USSR government for 1925/26

Not earlier than October 1, 1926 [1]

Professional education [2]

In the field of vocational education, the reporting year gave a noticeable increase in the network of lower and secondary vocational institutions with the stabilization of the network of universities, which eliminated the observed disproportion between the contingents of trained specialists of higher, secondary and lower qualifications. On the other hand, the main achievement of the reporting period was the streamlining of the educational work of professional educational institutions, which took place under the sign of the struggle to improve the quality of trained specialists.

Secondary and lower vocational education

The significantly increased network of institutions of secondary and lower vocational education during the reporting period, when compared with previous years and pre-war time, gives the following picture [tab. 1]:

[TABLE 1]

Years	Number of institutions		Number of students	
	abs.	% by 1914	abs.	% by 1914
1914/15	2877	100.0	266,982	100.0
1920/21	3727	129.5	293811	110.0
1921/22	4025	139.9	324,721	121.6
1922/23	4649	124.9	312533	117.1
1923/24	4066	141.3	412,909	154.7
1924/25	3967	137.9	449,202	169.3
1925/26	4407	153.2	539 248	202.0

The development of work for certain types of educational institutions of secondary and lower vocational education is presented in the table [2].

TABLE 2]

Specialty	Number of institutions	Number of students
Medical	81	15,011
Pedagogical	354	55456
		(351 technical school)
Agricultural	182	23,021
		(for 175 technical schools)
Socio-economic	63	1521
Industrial and technical	139	32734
		(for 137 technical schools)
Transport and public communications	45	8324
Artistic-industrial and artistic	26	4349
		(for 25 technical schools)
Musical	60	17,178
Theatrical	thirteen	2 305

With regard to technical schools, in 1925/26 work continued to revise their network in order to better align it with the needs of certain areas in the relevant specialists. Compared with 1924/25, the network of technical schools increased by 6%, the number of students in them by 10.2%. The distribution of technical schools by specialty is presented in the table [3].

The social composition of students in technical schools of the RSFSR was determined by the following ratio: children of workers - 20.5%, peasants - 37.3%, office workers - 33.2%, others - 9%. In the technical

schools of the Ukrainian SSR workers accounted for 31.6% of students, peasants - 35.5%. Members of the CPSU (b) in the RSFSR were 2.5% of students and members of the Komsomol -25%; in Ukraine, members of the CPSU (b) accounted for 5.7%, the Komsomol - 18.5%. Women in the technical schools of the RSFSR made up 44.8% of the students.

In the reporting year, it was possible to give a clearer statement to the schools of factory apprenticeships, to clarify the relationship of these schools with the public education and economic bodies, to carry out a number of measures to rationalize their work and, as a result, significantly increase the economic value of the factory teacher's schools.

Factory apprenticeship schools received a specific task - to prepare qualified workers of the 6th grade, who, upon leaving school, in a relatively short period of time, could raise their qualifications up to 7th-9th grade while working in production.

At the same time, the schools of the factory teacher were not supposed to have the goal of training foremen and junior technical personnel in general, but only a consciously competent, technically qualified worker.

Tab. [3] gives the distribution of schools for working adolescents by specialties

TABLE [3]

Specialty	Number of institutions	Number of students
Metalworking	238	28474 (for 234 schools)
Mountain	35	2387 (for 26 schools)
Chemical	57	3 786 (for 54 schools)
Woodworking	24	1792
Textile	117	16 105

		(for 109 schools)
Sewing	eleven	1,305
Tannery	sixteen	1 206
Stationery	17	1011
Polygraphic	37	2774
		(for 36 schools)
Food and sugar	39	2,285
		(for 36 schools)
Construction and communal services	fifteen	1890
Transport	136	11,780
		(for 123 schools)
Agricultural	17	861
		(for 16 schools)
Office and trading	35	3,174
		(for 33 schools)

In 1925/26, the schools of the factory teacher of a number of specialties were unloaded curricula and programs from unnecessary general educational material, while retaining only the necessary minimum of polytechnic knowledge: Thanks to this, it was possible to reduce the duration of education in schools, thereby reducing the cost of training qualified labor for our industry. By the end of the reporting period, they were transferred to a two-year (from three-year) course of study at the factory teacher of the textile and chemical industry and to a three-year (from four-year) school of the metallurgical industry. In 1927, it was proposed to extend the reduction of training time to other industries.

Along with this work, special attention in the reporting year was paid to improving the production of industrial training in the schools of the factory teacher. In the direction of the work of the schools of factory apprenticeship, along with the organs of public education, economic organs are beginning to take an increasing part.

Simultaneously with the work on the factory teacher's schools, which prepare workers for large and medium-sized industry, the public education authorities paid serious attention to the deployment of a network of vocational schools and training workshops that train qualified workers for the handicraft, small and medium industry.

By specialties, the network of these educational institutions was distributed in 1925/26 as follows [tab. 4].

TABLE [4]

[Vocational schools and training workshops]	Number of institutions	Number of students
Vocational schools		
Medical	21	1838
Agricultural	308	21621
		(for 292 schools)
Socio-economic	61	10616
		(for 59 schools)
Technical	377	40135
		(for 368 schools)
Architectural and construction	27	3 136
Transport and public communications	42	5182
		(school 41)
Cultural craft	136	11,049
		(for 133 schools)
Artistic and industrial	fifteen	916
		(for 14 schools)
Musical	102	15142
		(for school 101)
Theatrical	6	643
Artistic	19	1,600

Total vocational schools	1 114	111,878
		(1 081 school)
Training workshops		
Joiner's and locksmiths	100	4,602
		(for 93 schools)
Sewing	50	3 054
		(across 49 schools)
Shoe	thirteen	392
		(for 10 schools)
Artistic	nine	560
Others	58	7 616
		(across 53 schools)
Total training workshops	230	16,224
		(for 214 schools)

Vocational courses were also widely developed in the USSR, which are of great importance both in raising the qualifications of workers and employees employed in production and state building, and in training narrow specialists in a number of professions and disseminating professional knowledge among wide circles of the population; The distribution of professional courses by specialty is presented in the following form [tab. five].

TABLE [5]

[Specialty]	Number of institutions	Number of students
Socio-economic	378	64143
		(for 336 courses)
Industrial and technical	207	14906
		(for 180 courses)

Handicraft and craft	157	14654
		(for 154 courses)
Medical	108	7141
		(for 104 courses)
Transport	64	2357
		(for 57 courses)
Agricultural	49	2786
		(for 47 courses)
Pedagogical	29	1627
		(for 28 courses)
Musical and theatrical	33	2913
		(for 31 courses)
Artistic and artistic - industrial	20	1,374
		(for 18 courses)
Construction	20	1,488
		(for 18 Courses)
People's connection	fourteen	991
Total	1,079	114 380
		(for 1,019 courses)

"Year of government work. Materials for the report for 1925 26 " M., 1927. p. 515-518

[1] Dated by content.

[2] The following paragraphs are omitted: "Workers' faculties", "High school".

No. 53 Information from the statistical department of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) on the number of members of the CPSU (b) at industrial enterprises of the USSR by industry and categories of enterprises (based on the materials of the party census of 1927) [1] [2]

Not earlier than August 1, 1927 [3]

Industries, categories of enterprises	Number of communists									
	workers		employees		junior service personnel		Total		including women	
	abs.	% to the number of employed workers	abs.	% to the number of employed cases of living	abs.	% to the number of employees on the pre-junior service personnel	abs.	% to the number of employees on the pre-staff	abs.	% to the number of employed on pre-acceptance of women
Total for the USSR [4]	245740	10.5	60401	21.3	11,255	8.8	317396	11.6	50943	7.1
Extraction and processing of minerals	9293	7.3	3251	26.7	453	6.7	12997	8.9	1765	5.6
Mining and mining industry	30610	9.1	8096	25.3	1923	11.0	40629	10.5	3296	9.6
coal	17883	7.7	4755	26.5	1,275	13.0	23913	9.2	2356	9.8
oil	8127	18.5	1502	20.1	265	7.4	9894	18.0	256	10.6

ore	3552	7.5	1387	29.8	281	9.5	5220	9.5	535	12.2
saline	579	13,7	143	29.2	36	12.0	758	15.1	65	9.7
other mountain	469	4.9	309	22.4	66	7.6	844	7.2	84	3.2
Metalworking industry	82359	13.6	15603	17.6	2642	8.1	100604	13.8	8770	12.2
Wood processing	8841	9.1	3033	23.3	522	7.4	12396	10.6	1,364	8.0
Chemical industry	11328	13.4	2364	17.1	598	8.9	14290	13.6	2881	9.3
Food, beverage and drug manufacturing	25649	13.2	10,049	22.5	1949	10.8	37647	14.6	7196	11.2
Processing of solid materials of animal origin	623	13.6	130	23.5	38	12.0	791	14.5	128	11.6
Leather and fur industry	5550	16.5	1159	24.1	195	8.5	6904	16.9	609	10.7
Textile industry	39731	6.2	9635	24.0	1955	8.2	51321	7.3	16,076	4.1
Clothes and toilet	10596	14.5	2021	24.1	205	7.3	12822	15.2	5181	13.3
Paper handling	4283	12.0	1,094	24.4	194	9.5	5571	13.2	1204	11.1
Printing production	10,234	17.7	2275	22.5	301	8.6	12810	17.9	1973	13.1
Art and applied	513	18.0	191	14.3	eighteen	6.0	722	16.1	80	10.3

science industry										
Production and transmission of physical forces and water supply	6 130	17.8	1,500	16.7	262	7.6	7892	16.8	420	8.7
Categories of enterprises										
State	237312	10.5	58175	21.4	10,923	8.9	306410	11.6	49392	7.1
Cooperative	6 313	13.3	1912	23.3	273	9.0	8498	14.5	1228	8.9
Concession	931	8.7	139	12.3	thirty	3.9	1100	8.8	98	5.6
Private	1 184	6.5	175	8.7	29	4.0	1388	6,7	225	3.9

"Izvestia of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (b)", No. 41 (214), November 9, 1927, p. 20.

[1] Information on the total number of employees of industrial enterprises has been omitted

[2] According to the party census on January 10, 1927, among the members of the CPSU (b) workers were 63.9%, or 460 104 people, among the candidates for membership in the AUKShb) -40.7%, or 18 353 people. According to a sample survey of the engineering and technical staff on October 1, 1927, in the industry of the Union significance, the members of the All-Union Communist Party) among persons with higher education was 0.81%, with Wednesday - 2.21, practitioners - 7.79%. The relatively high percentage of members of the VKShb) among practitioners is explained by the fact that there were many nominated workers in the group ("Results of the Decade of Soviet Power in Figures 1917-1927." M., 1927, p. 20; "Rationalization of USSR Industry."., 1928, pp. 244-245).

[3] Dated by the time the statistics department of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) received the information.

[4] The total for the USSR did not include data on the Bodaibinsky District of the Irkutsk District of the Siberian Territory, the Kamchatka and Sakhalin Districts of the Far Eastern Territory, the Vileika and Kolymsky Districts of the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the Pamir District of the Uzbek SSR. document

№ 54 From the report of the People's Commissariat of Labor of the USSR on the regulation of the labor market and the fight against unemployment for 1926-27.

Not earlier than January 1, 1928 [1]

I. General state of the labor market

1. Growth of the employed labor force in industry and the national economy

Throughout 1926-27, the number of the employed labor force continued to increase. So, according to the CSB, the number of employees in the qualifying industry was:

As of January 1, 1926 - 2,380.8 people

"July 1, 1926 - 2,504.2 -"

"January 1, 1927 - 2,486.4"

"July 1, 1927 - 2 679.8"

This growth in the labor force took place not only in the eligible industry, but also in the entire national economy, as evidenced by the following figures (thousand) (Table 1):

[TABLE 1]

Working	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.
Workers		
Industry	2 609.3	2 727.3
Transport	776.2	807.0
Institutions	382.0	407.5
Trade	12.9	14.4
Total workers	3 780.4	3 956.2
Employees		
Industry	299.6	303.0
Transport	384.0	399.3
Institutions	1,630.2	1,733.8

Trade	465.4	517.2
Total employees	2 779.2	2 953.3
Total workers and employees	6 559.6	6,909.5
Working lands and forests	1 918.5	2,012.2
Seasonal builders	750.0	960.1
»Water workers	126.2	132.1
Total employed	9 354.4 [2]	10,013.9

Thus, in total, during 1926-27, about 650,000 new workers were involved.

The growth of the employed labor force in general is also confirmed by the data of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions on the movement of the number of working trade union members [see. tab. 2]:

[TABLE 2]

[Year]	On 1 / X	1/1	At 1 / IV	On 1 / VII	On 1 / X
1925/26 g.	7,009.1	7,274.0	7 585.7	8 119.3	8 323.2
1926/27 g.	8 323.2	7 958.3	8,053.7	8 760.5	8,937.4
Percentage of 1926/27 to the previous	118.74	109.4	106.1	107.9	107.4

As can be seen from the above data, the development of the national economy is favorable for the general conjuncture of the labor market in the sense that it continues to attract new cadres of workers.

2. State and nature of unemployment

The movement of unemployment in the USSR is characterized by the following figures:

[TABLE 3]

Quarter	Total unemployed				
	the USSR	including			
	RSFSR	Ukrainian SSR	TSFSR	BSSR	Uzbek

						SSR and Turkmen SSR
On 1 / X 1925	920 409	-	-	-	-	-
1 / IV 1926	1,056,462	-	-	-	-	-
"1 / X"	1,070,759	799230	194 318	39354	18494	19358
1 / I 1927	1 310 488	957 870	246 244	57,074	23204	26,096
"1 / IV"	1,477,869	1,082,645	276 436	56 852	30484	31451
"1 / VII"	1 216 906	895,999	217,413	44555	25135	33804
"1 / X"	1,041,167	752 450	184 651	58965	24340	33189

As can be seen from the above data [table. 3], unemployment gives a significant increase in the first half of 1926-27. Thus, in the first half of 1925-26, unemployment increased by 14.8%, and in the first half of 1926-27, unemployment increased by 38.2%; from April 1927 until the end of the economic year, that is, until October 1927, there was a significant decrease in the number of unemployed registered at the labor exchange. Thus, in the second half of 1925-26, unemployment increased by 1.4%, and in the second half of 1926-27, unemployment dropped by 29.5%.

In general, unemployment has become stable. It hardly needs to be explained that this stability is due to the continuous growth of the employed labor force, since the cadres of the unemployed, as will be indicated below, are greatly replenished by immigrants.

As for the unemployment fluctuations noted by the figures, the latter are explained by seasonal influences. Every year, in the summer, a significant number of unemployed go to seasonal work, and by autumn and winter they return to labor exchanges. Thus, these fluctuations are natural. A certain influence on the number of unemployed was exerted by the decree of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions on the compulsory registration of unemployed members of trade unions at labor exchanges, due to which many trade union members who were not registered at labor exchanges were registered.

For the main production groups, unemployment, according to the data of 281 labor exchange of the USSR, was as follows [tab. 4].

[TABLE 4]

Categories	Timing	on 1 / X	by 1 / I	by 1 / IV	on 1 / VII	on 1 / X
Total	1925/26	920 409	951173	1,056,462	1,065,520	1,070,759
	g.					
	1926/27	1,070,759	1310488	1,477,869	1216 906	1 041167
	g.					
Including						
Industrial (no unskilled)	1925/26	142 237	139 391	159,279	168,075	182695
	g.					
	1926/27	182,695	207,907	240 326	202,731	165 331
	g.					
Construction (no unskilled)	1925/26	35,056	48802	72705	79161	32 318
	g.					
	1926/27	32 318	70974	96753	77672	41,017
	g.					
Intelligent labor (without unskilled ones)	1925/26	182,306	168162	180,944	159 109	193,095
	g.					
	1926/27	193,095	233 141	265689	241627	238,050
	g.					
Unskilled labor.	1925/26	482,436	503,546	568688	574464	586 102
	g.					
	1926/27	586 102	686,050	758,078	606 586	508 360
	g.					

A noticeable increase in the number of unemployed takes place only in relation to the soviet workers. The rest of the unemployed groups, despite fluctuations, are generally stable.

The share of certain groups of professions in the total mass of the unemployed is characterized by the following figures [tab. five].

[TABLE 5]

[Categories]	October 1925	January 1927	April 1927	July 1927	October 1927

Total unemployed	1,070,759	1310488	1477869	1 216 906	1,041,167
[%]		100.0	-	100.0	100.0
Including					
Industrial group of professions (no unskilled)	182,695	212,907	240 326	202,731	165 331
[%]	17.0	15.9	16.3	16.6	15.9
Including					
Metalworkers	54,557	63459	70 457	61 480	49956
[%]	5.1	4.8	4.7	5.1	4.8
Textile workers	26283	31,039	31,906	26510	21167
[%]	2.5	2.4	2.2	2.2	2.0
Builders	32 318	70,974	96753	77676	41017
[%]	3.0	5.4	6.6	6.4	3.9
Intelligent labor	210531	249347	283812	260 583	261 669
[%]	19.7	18.9	19.2	21.4	25.1
Including					
Soviet trade employees	144773	173,606	202,823	188 797	177,074
[%]	13.5	13.2	13,7	15.5	17.0
Rail, water and local transport (no unskilled)	26310	48741	55638	34 781	28777
[%]	2.5	3.7	3.7	2.9	2.8
Including					
Local transport	15928	21833	26916	21204	17,222
[%]	1.5	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.6
Unskilled	586 102	686,050	758,078	606 586	508 360
[%]	54,7	52.7	51.4	49.8	48.8
Including					
Industrial unskilled labor	48209	65,971	77312	71 210	60 957

[%]	4.5	5.0	5.2	5.9	5.9
Others: rabzemles, labor communications, food, utilities (without unskilled)	32803	42469	43772	34 598	36,013
[%]	3.1.	3.3	2.8	2.9	3.4

The first place in terms of number, as can be seen from the data presented, is occupied by the group of unskilled labor (about half of all unemployed). The second place is occupied by Soviet commercial employees (25.1%). Industrial [workers] are in third place. Thus, unskilled elements prevail in the total mass of the unemployed. As for intelligent work, it should be noted that [that] among the latter there are many such unemployed, in whose work the provinces are extremely in need, for example, doctors, engineers, etc. Meanwhile, these specialists are concentrated in large cities and for the most part do not want take jobs in the province.

The majority of the unemployed of intelligent labor, of course, are Soviet commercial workers (17.0% of the total number of unemployed). The stagnation and significance of the size of unemployment among them is explained by the fact that the hiring of new employees has not only stopped, but the apparatus everywhere is striving for contraction, and a significant number of employees have been reduced by virtue of this and are still declining.

The number of unemployed industrial occupations by the end of the financial year slightly decreased, despite the rationalization carried out in the majority of factories.

The following figures give an idea of the nature of unemployment (according to the data of 281 labor exchanges) (table [6]).

[TABLE 6]

Categories	On 1 / X 1926				
	Total	including			
		women	union members	arrivals from the countryside	teenagers
Total (with rabis)	1,070,759	519 796	514 715	126,158	144,067

Industrial group (no unskilled)	182,695	61,179	121 645	19 925	2481
Builders (no unskilled)	32 318	449	25 399	11 783	201
Intelligent labor (no rabis)	193,095	107,509	125497	11 393	1395
Unskilled labor	586 102	321 401	181,964	76601	139,729

Continuation

Categories	On 1 / X 1927				
	Total	including			
		women	union members	arrivals from the countryside	teenagers
Total (with rabis)	1,041,167	486 861	652 155	110,178	16 855
Industrial group (no unskilled)	165 331	51759	132,759	16,747	3 119
Builders (no unskilled)	41,017	669	31,009	17,064	826
Intelligent labor (no rabis)	238,054	126306	194,769	10481	1 951
Unskilled labor	508 360	274 788	216,275	61 436	162347

These figures show that the number of unemployed members of trade unions has increased significantly, which is due, as mentioned above, to the directive of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions on the obligation of trade union members to register at the labor exchange.

The main source of unemployment is a significant increase in the population of working age, which is expressed by about 2.3 million per year, an influx of surplus hands from rural areas to cities, young growth in cities and changes in social conditions, causing an increased supply of labor for women the whole year make up 50% of the total number of those who offer their labor.

Significant cadres of surplus labor in the countryside are annually moved to the city. The 1926 census established that, on average, about

1 million people arrive in cities throughout the USSR. The impetus for this increased influx is the backwardness of technology and industrial crops in agriculture, which entails the incomplete use of the availability of workers in the countryside, the inadequacy of the agricultural budget, which, along with the growth in the welfare of workers in the cities, naturally causes the former to strive for the city. This latter phenomenon is especially noticeable among seasonal workers who remain in the cities after the end of the season, and are demobilized from the Red Army, etc.

According to labor exchanges, out of a total of 3,566,961 registered in 1926-27, the supply of labor for arrivals from rural areas falls 818,152 offers, which exceeds the supply of labor arrivals from rural areas of the previous year in absolute figures by 138,522 offers, or 20.3%. It should be noted that in connection with the introduction of registration restrictions, unskilled cadres of the village in the proposal for the group of unskilled labor gave a decrease against last year from 395 692 people to 353 641, i.e. by 18.9%, but the proposal for the group of builders increased. having given proposals instead of 132,493 people last year, for 1926-27, 305,545 proposals. [Growth] by 130.6%.

In general, unemployment can be characterized mainly as a consequence of the presence of surplus labor in the countryside. To a certain extent, unemployment is of a persistent nature. The average length of stay of the unemployed at the labor exchange (including during this period and stay in temporary jobs), during which the unemployed is registered with the labor exchange, reached 4.5 months in 1925/26, and for 3 quarters of 1926/27. -4-6 months.

Thus, the last year has given an increase in the length of stay at the labor exchange for the unemployed.

The duration of unemployment since the end of the last job before registering at the labor exchange is on average up to 12.2 months, and the average duration of unemployment for men is almost 2 times less than for women (16.8 and 8.6 months, respectively) [3].

II. Organization and regulation of the labor market

By the beginning of the 1926-27 economic year, the People's Commissariat of Labor of the USSR summed up the results in the field of labor market regulation, from which it was clear that such a

regulation system is in clear contradiction with the system of planned construction of the national economy.

The following was taken as the basis for further work of the People's Commissariat of Labor bodies: a) planned regulation of the labor market; b) the organized supply of labor for the industry of the Grodian and seasonal labor market; c) regulation of the withdrawal of the rural population to seasonal branches of work; d) active participation in the redistribution of surplus labor; e) the release of labor exchanges from personnel seeking labor that cannot be employed in industry in the near future, proceeding from the basic premise - the involvement in industry, first of all, of persons who previously worked for hire; f) strengthening discipline among the unemployed, etc.

Thus, 1926-27 is very characteristic in the sense of a sharp change in the policy of regulating the labor market towards the active participation of the People's Commissariat of Labor in it in terms of accounting and distribution of labor. The decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of March 4, 1927 made the People's Commissars of Labor and their local bodies responsible for supplying the national economy with labor. By this decree, it was proposed to supply mass and group labor force in the order of preliminary conclusion of contracts by economic bodies with the People's Commissariat of Labor and labor exchanges.

According to these agreements, the conditions on which the supply of labor should be made are established in advance between the labor exchange and economic agencies.

The People's Commissariat of Labor of the USSR in the period of March and the beginning of May prepared and formalized all the necessary measures to implement the tasks assigned to the organs of the People's Commissariat of Labor.

Despite the relatively short period of existence of the new principles of labor market regulation, there are significant achievements. First of all, the practice of concluding agreements with economic agencies and other employers on the hiring of labor through labor exchanges was strengthened. Despite the novelty of the case both for labor exchanges and employers and, as in any new business, not without mistakes, etc., achievements in the field of recruitment coverage have yielded quite

serious results. The total coverage of demand on labor exchanges doubled during the second half of 1926-27, reaching an average of 70-75% in the USSR, and higher in some republics. The growing coverage of labor demand can be seen from the following data [tab. 7].

[TABLE 7]

The hiring of labor in the USSR for the 1926/27 economic year filed by the provincial and district cities [4]

[Categories]	Hired				% adopted through labor exchanges to the general number of
	Total	including			
		for temporary work	union members	arrivals from the countryside	
I quarter					
Total	373533	199,949	263,278	50329	
[%]	100.0	53.5	70.5	13.5	40.2
Including					
Industrial group (no unskilled)	58575	26347	46769	5 266	
[%]	100.0	45.0	79.8	9.0	50.8
Intelligent labor	78483	29710	61,157	2650	
[%]	100.0	87.9	77.9	3.4	29.6
Unskilled labor	151,054	100 806	95242	28 192	
[%]	100.0	66.7	63.1	18.7	46.7
II quarter					
Total	296,701	175,723	213,554	38,973	
[%]	100.0	59.2	72.0	13.1	54.8
Including					
Industrial group (no unskilled)	48388	22867	39,909	3489	
[%]	100.0	47.3	82.5	7.2	67.1

Intelligent labor	59 319	27660	49550	1 930	
[%]	100.0	46.6	83.5	3.3	43.3
Skilled labor	127,624	95,326	77831	26345	
[%]	100.0	74.7	61.0	20.6	55.2
III quarter					
Total	527 387	314,742	408,245	81,424	
[%]	100.0	59.7	77.4	15.4	70,7
Including					
Industrial group (no unskilled)	67454	38117	55849	6 129	
[%]	100.0	56.5	82.8	9.1	76.5
Intelligent labor	73,087	41,194	62,034	2544	
[%]	100.0	56.4	84.9	3.5	57.6
Unskilled labor	196,902	143636	137,442	32882	
[%]	100.0	72.9	69.8	16.7	71.6
IV quarter					
Total	606 394	394,735	448,214	90926	
[%]	100.0	65.1	73.9	15.0	70.5
Including					
Industrial group (no unskilled)	91,607	54243	76849	6324	
[%]	100.0	59.2	83.9	6.9	78.0
Intelligent labor	76 270	45334	64 523	3.263	
[%]	100.0	59.4	84.6	4,3	59.7
Unskilled labor	237,741	175 911	158 582	36450	
[%]	100.0	74.0	66.7	15.3	75.2

These figures indicate the growing influence of labor exchanges on the hiring of labor. This means that the industry began to be supplied with labor in a more organized manner. The increased organization in the

employment of labor for industry is explained by the fact that the People's Commissariat of Labor of the USSR conducted its work on supplying the economic agencies with labor on a contractual basis with them. Everywhere labor exchanges have concluded contracts with the largest economic bodies, and at present smaller enterprises are also involved in contractual relations.

In connection with the seven-hour working day, the NKT of the USSR, the NKT of the Union republics and their local bodies were faced with the task of supplying industry with a mass labor force. Despite the extremely short period during which part of the textile industry (22 factories) was transferred to a seven-hour working day, labor exchanges provided 13 thousand textile workers, and labor exchanges often gave a period of 1-2 days for this.

The NKT of the USSR has done a lot to improve the work of labor exchanges: the verification of the qualifications of the unemployed has been strengthened by sending them for testing to industrial enterprises, expertise at labor exchanges and in the collectives of the unemployed, the technique of selecting the unemployed to demand has been improved. An obstacle to further improvement is the lack of a number of labor exchanges, unsatisfactory wages for workers, extremely poor and unsuitable premises, etc. It is impossible to eliminate all this without additional funds being provided.

Strengthening the role of labor exchanges in the organized supply of industry with labor

In addition, labor exchanges are doing a lot of work to provide labor and material assistance to the unemployed, in particular, to organize production and labor collectives from the unemployed, deploying work with 141 collectives with 16,219 people employed in them in 1922 until 2020 collectives with 100 thousand employed in them in 1927

On average, the unemployed were allowed through public works per year: in 1922-23 - 30 thousand people, by 1927 they reached 160 thousand people. From this summary it is clear that the expansion of work necessitates the construction of a network of labor exchanges and its employees in accordance with the volume of work. Despite the above-mentioned increase in the volume of work, the network of labor exchanges and its employees is gradually decreasing. So, in 1924-25,

with a total number of registered unemployed 970 thousand people, there were 384 labor exchanges throughout the Union. The network of labor exchanges decreased according to the state budget in 1926-27 to 250 units. This network of labor mediation bodies not only does not cover many county towns, but not even all industrial centers (up to 400 points are not covered),

With such a state of the network of mediating bodies of the People's Commissariat of Labor, not only is it impossible to improve the work on regulating the labor market and to fulfill the increasing requirements in the field of planned satisfaction of the needs of the USSR industry with labor, but also to cover the entire labor market. At the same time, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) in its decision of July 26, 1927 (Presidium Minutes No. 28) recognized it necessary in the near future to take measures to ensure that the mediating bodies of the People's Commissariat of Labor were opened wherever at least 300 unemployed were registered by the trade union bodies. By the same decree, it was decided to terminate the fulfillment of intermediary functions by the union organizations in the labor market.

Thus, the increase in the number of unemployed and the increasing demands in terms of planning and regulating the labor market, in accordance with the resolution of the problem of the country's industrialization, pose to the People's Commissariat of Labor the task of expanding the network of intermediary bodies and strengthening their work by qualitatively improving the composition of labor exchange workers (up to 600-650 exchanges labor).

The composition of workers in labor exchanges in current conditions due to excessive workload, low wages (the intermediary registrar receives 30-45 rubles per month) and the unsatisfactory working environment is characterized by high turnover and unpreparedness in this regard for intermediary work. This turnover is so great that such categories of workers as section managers change on average three to six times a year, which has an extremely negative effect on the operation of the network. A real improvement in the quality of work of labor exchanges from this side is possible only with an improvement in the material situation of workers by raising wage rates to the level received by professional workers and skilled workers.

The urgent need to expand the network of labor exchanges is also dictated by the fact that, along with an ever-increasing number of workers and an ever-increasing number of unemployed registered by the labor exchanges, we have an increase in unemployment.

In addition to all this, it must be pointed out that the deepening of work on regulating the labor market in all its volume with the existing network of labor exchanges and working conditions will be a permanent brake on the normal development of work.

III. Regulation of the departure of the rural population to crafts and regulation of the seasonal labor market [5]

The bodies of the People's Commissariat of Labor began to regulate the withdrawal of the rural population to trades and to regulate the seasonal labor market as early as 1925/26. On the part of the highest government bodies, the work did not receive the required scope and no significant results were obtained.

In the expired 1926-27, the organs of the People's Commissariat of Labor, having experience in carrying out work in 1925/26, were able to expand the work on the regulation of waste and the regulation of the seasonal labor market on a broader scale and carry it out in a planned manner. As a result, significant advances have been made in both waste management and labor market regulation.

The success of the work was facilitated by the publication of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated March 1, 1927, the decree "On the regulation of the labor market of construction workers in 1927", the decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated March 4, 1927 "On measures to regulate the labor market" and the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR from April 11, 1927 "On measures to regulate recruiting operations" [6]. These resolutions brought the necessary clarity to a number of issues related to the regulation of the seasonal labor market, which had not been resolved until that time, imposed certain obligations on the economic bodies on the procedure for hiring seasonal workers, granted the necessary rights to the CNT bodies, and also provided the latter with additional funds to regulate the waste and regulation of the seasonal labor market.

The surveys of the rural population leaving for fishing, conducted annually by the NKT of the USSR, give the following figures for those leaving for seasonal fishing from rural areas [tab. 8].

[TABLE 8]

Departure year	It took everything	Including				
		agricultural workers	construction workers	loggers and lumberjacks	peat bogs	laborers
1923/24	1,672,000	215,370	236,935	195,727	81,737	512,180
1924/25	2,788,000	583,976	444,687	126,327	65,287	1,021,251
1925/26	3,285,000	355,252	557,153	555,213	85,612	746,494

To regulate the withdrawal of tubing, a special network of correspondent and information points was deployed in the places of departure, the task of which included accounting for migrant workers, information about their places of demand for labor, as well as participation in the recruitment of workers carried out by labor exchanges and economic organizations. In total, in 1927, 929 correspondent and information points were organized, of which 741 in the RSFSR, 157 in the Ukrainian SSR, 22 in the BSSR and 9 in the ZSFSR. As a rule, the correspondent and information points were organized in the provinces, giving the densest population withdrawal to the fields. Some of the correspondent and information points were organized in rural areas, areas where seasonal workers (mainly agricultural workers) arrived. These points, in addition to the general work indicated above, they also sent workers directly to work, mainly in state agricultural enterprises (sugar factories and beet fields). In addition to creating a network of correspondent and information points, in order to reduce the spontaneous waste of seasonal workers to earn money, the CNT bodies have made an experience in attaching the areas of residence of certain professions of workers to the areas of production of certain seasonal work. Fastening was carried out in the peat-mining, industry, wood and logging, beet fields. The experience was quite a success, and in 1927-28 the NKT extended it to other branches of seasonal production. In order to reduce the spontaneous waste of seasonal workers for work, the organs of the NCP have made an experience of attaching the areas of residence of certain professions

of workers to the areas of production of certain seasonal work. Fastening was carried out in the peat-mining, industry, wood and logging, beet fields. The experience was quite a success, and in 1927-28 the NKT extended it to other branches of seasonal production. In order to reduce the spontaneous waste of seasonal workers for work, the organs of the NCP have made an experience of attaching the areas of residence of certain professions of workers to the areas of production of certain seasonal work. Fastening was carried out in the peat-mining, industry, wood and logging, beet fields. The experience was quite a success, and in 1927-28 the NKT extended it to other branches of seasonal production.

Based on the decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of March 4, 1927, the CNT authorities launched a wide campaign to conclude agreements with economic agencies that consume large quantities of seasonal labor force on the procedure for hiring and attracting workers from their places of residence. The work was undoubtedly a success. In total, more than 600 agreements were concluded (according to incomplete data), covering the total need of economic agencies for more than 1,300 thousand workers. For individual republics and types of seasonal industries, the concluded agreements are distributed [see. tab. nine].

[TABLE 9]

Republics	number	The need gripped by them	Including	
			construction workers	loggers
RSFSR	350	538 616	226,239	198134
Ukrainian SSR	211	730,000	150,000	-
BSSR	60	10,000	-	-
Uzbek SSR	21		1,330 cotton field workers	
Turkmen SSR	2	1770	and 440 for wool-cleaning plants	

Republics	Including			
	peat bogs	Rybnikov	working beet fields	sugar factory workers
RSFSR	64,000	38891	34672	
Ukrainian SSR	-	-	500,000	80,000
BSSR	-	-	-	-
Uzbek SSR	1,330 workers for cotton fields and 440 for wool refineries			
Turkmen SSR				

The conclusion of agreements ensured an increase in the share of the CNT organs in the supply of labor for certain branches of seasonal production. Thus, the supply of manpower to sugar beet fields and sugar factories in Ukraine was entirely concentrated in the organs of the Ukrainian National Committee of the Soviet Socialist Republic and was carried out successfully, which is confirmed by Sakharotrest, which saved a significant amount of money on this, which had previously been spent on recruiting workers.

An increase in the role of labor exchanges in the supply of labor for construction is evident from the following data characterizing the movement of labor supply, demand for labor and sending construction workers to work at 281 labor exchanges [tab. ten].

[TABLE 10]

Months	1926 g.			1927 g.	
	labor supply	labor demand	sending to work	labor supply	labor demand
March - August	181,927	173,401	149,302	437,556	634,096
%	100	100	100	240.5	359.9

In the past year, the CNT authorities for the first time in a large volume also carried out work on the organized movement of workers from the areas of their residence to the areas of seasonal work in need of imported labor. According to far from complete data, in 1926-27, up to 500 thousand workers were transferred from region to region, of which 165 thousand in the RSFSR and 320 thousand in the Ukrainian SSR.

As a result of the above measures, it was possible in the past year to significantly improve the supply of seasonal sectors of the national economy with labor, eliminate a number of abnormalities that took place here in previous years, and also managed to bring greater organization to the departure and movement of seasonal workers to the fields.

Thanks to all these measures, the movement of seasonal workers has become more organized, their distribution according to the places of consumption of their labor has become more even, economic agencies are better supplied with labor, and the excitement between the economic agencies on the basis of hiring seasonal workers and wage inflation has stopped. The economic organizations also recognize the positive results of these measures. Thus, the Council of Trade and / Industry Congresses at a meeting of March 22, 1927, recognized that there were significant achievements in the field of regulation of the seasonal labor market. One of the largest consumers of seasonal workers' labor, Sakharotrest, who a year and a half ago had a negative attitude to the activities of the NKT, now believes that the latter are the only correct measures to supply economic agencies with seasonal labor and are already yielding serious positive results.

IV. Reproduction of skilled labor

Due to the somewhat slower growth rate of the labor force, there was no mass demand for skilled labor in 1926-27. The shortage was felt only in certain categories of skilled workers. In this regard, training and retraining of the unemployed was carried out, in 1925-26 11,600 unemployed were trained in this way, in 1926-27 (according to incomplete information) -26,863, and in just two years - about 40 thousand (38,400) people. 4,829 thousand rubles were spent on this, and part of these funds were spent on student benefits.

In 1927-28, it is planned to train about 28 thousand unemployed industrial professions. In addition, the NKT of the USSR, having analyzed the construction labor market and the needs of economic agencies in the labor force, found a serious shortcoming. In addition to training builders in construction schools and in production, the USSR NKT plans in 1927-28 the training of 15 thousand builders in the form of short-term training.

By the end of 1926/27, an interdepartmental commission was convened at the NKT of the USSR for the processing of adolescent armor in accordance with the decree of the SNK of the USSR. Unlike the previous system, armor is calculated in relation to skilled and semi-skilled workers.

V. Regulation of the labor market for specialists

1. Technicians and engineers

According to labor exchanges, unemployment among specialists, engineers and technicians had the following changes:

1925/26 g.	The remainder	%
I quarter-ia 1/1 1926	= 5 479	1.00
II "- " 1 / IV "	= 5,575	1.02
III "- " 1 / VII "	= 4 709	0.86
IV "- " 1 / X "	= 5 236	0.95
1926/27 g.		
I quarter - 1/1 1927	= 7 978	1.45
II "- " 1 / IV "	= 9 761	1.78
III "- " 1 / VII "	= 8 287	1.51
IV "- " 1 / X "	= 8,019	1.47

As can be seen from the above figures, unemployment among the above-mentioned specialists is showing an upward trend.

By specialties, these unemployed are distributed as follows [tab. eleven].

[TABLE 11]

Specialties by group	On 1 / X 1927		
	Total	including education	
		higher	the e

Agricultural and forestry	1320	1,032	288
Chemical and food flavoring	680	266	414
Textile	thirteen	4	nine
Mountain	111	42	69
Metallurgical	19	2	17
Heat engineering and mechanical	2223	198	2025
Electrotechnical	373	75	298
Construction and transport	1 185	326	859
Economic	212	-	-
Various	1883	-	-
Total	8,019	1945	3979

However, it would be wrong to conclude from this that we have an abundance of specialists. If we look at unemployment among specialists in individual cities, then we can immediately see that the unemployed are concentrated mainly in large cities, while in the provinces there is a shortage of them. This circumstance prompted the NKT of the USSR to take measures to induce unemployed specialists to take work in the provinces [7]. At the same time, the republics' people's commissariats of labor achieved the issuance of a number of decrees aimed at improving the working conditions of specialists.

In addition, a certain influence on the growth of unemployment among specialists is exerted by the presence of a large number of unstoppage people among them, while the survey is available mainly for experienced specialists. Also influenced by the well-known discrepancy between the quantity and quality of graduates from universities and technical schools, the requirements of production and the state of the labor market. For example, there was a shortage of 1414 specialists in the textile industry, while a surplus was produced in other industries.

Despite the fact that the registration and distribution of trainees and trainees is a new business and is accompanied by various difficulties, a

lot of work has been done in this area. In total, in 1926-27, at 2075 enterprises and institutions, 22 465 places of practice and 11371 places of experience were allocated.

These places are distributed across the republics as follows:

	Practice places	Places of experience
RSFSR	17689	9,063
Ukrainian SSR	3 378	1868
BSSR	119	68
TSFSR	1 217	368
Uzbek SSR	62	4

The main difficulty in the distribution of trainees is the above-mentioned discrepancy between the quality of graduates and the needs of the national economy. Due to this, some of the accounted places remain unused. The next difficulty is the lack of regulation of the working conditions of the interns and the inattention to them on the part of old specialists and the administration of enterprises. A large number of those who refuse to go for seniority to a certain extent is due to this lack of regulation.

The NKT of the USSR has developed a number of measures aimed at eliminating defects in seniority. The work on regulating the labor market of engineers and technicians of the USSR NKT was expressed in the general management of the intermediary service of these specialists, identifying the actual and future need for them on the part of the national economy, as well as coordinating the quantity and quality of those produced by universities and technical schools with the demand of the national economy for them. . [8]

Measures to combat unemployment

In 1926/27, 86,319,400 rubles were allocated for all measures to help the unemployed, which is 132.5% of the total amount allocated in 1925/26. Of this amount, 66,918 thousand rubles fall to Tsuostrakh. (of which 60,918 thousand - for unemployment benefits and 6 million - for labor

assistance); according to the state budget - 8100 thousand, according to the local budget - 8 383 400 and from other sources - 2918 thousand rubles.

The above sums for measures to help the unemployed were to be spent according to the plans of the republics as follows: 1) for labor assistance to the unemployed - 25401400 rubles, including for public works - 12,150,500 rubles, for labor collectives - 5,960,800, for the rest types of assistance (food, accommodation, retraining of the unemployed, over-armor) - 7 290100 and 2) for unemployment benefits - 60,918 thousand rubles. In fact, according to preliminary annual reports from the localities, 21,721,440 rubles were spent on labor assistance for the unemployed. The underexpenditure in this part of funds falls on public works, which were still carried out in the October and November months of the new budgetary 1927/28 at the expense of the appropriations for 1926/27. In fact, the expenditure on unemployment benefits for the year is not known, there are data only on the expenditure for three quarters at 55 076 200 rubles.

The following assistance was provided to the unemployed with the funds spent on assistance to the unemployed:

- 1) During the summer period, 34 thousand unemployed people were employed in public works (by 13% more than the previous year).
- 2) In labor collectives, the total number of people employed for the year increased from 90,289 to 115,137 people, or an increase was expressed by 26% against last year.
- 3) 480 thousand unemployed people received unemployment benefits from insurance funds every day (45% more than the previous year).

The total amount of assistance rendered to the unemployed in all types increased by 41% in comparison with 1925-26.

In addition to the above measures, in the reporting year, assistance was provided to the unemployed by organizing canteens, teahouses, lodging houses and road assistance by providing the unemployed with reduced fare. The number of unemployed who used a reduced fare with a 50% discount is 60 thousand and with a 35% discount) - 100 thousand people.

TsGAOR USSR, f. 5515, on. 24, d. 211, ll. 45-63, 80-81. Copy.

[1] Dated from the omitted part of the document (TsGAOR USSR, f. 5515, on. 24, d. 211, pp. 32, 33).

[2] The sum of the numbers does not add up to the given total.

[3] According to the data of 281 labor exchanges, in April - September 1928 the number of unemployed in the USSR decreased from 1576.4 thousand to 1364 thousand people, including 349.3 thousand who did not work before, 696 unskilled people, 1 thousand ("Labor in the USSR". Reference book 1926-1930. M., 1930, p. 36)

[4] As of October 1, 1927, 8,325 enterprises and institutions with 1,371,789 workers and employees were covered [by labor exchanges], including 2,192 factory enterprises with 1,078,577 workers and employees. document

[five] According to the materials of surveys of otkhodniki, carried out by the People's Commissar of Labor in two periods - from October 1, 1925 to October 1, 1926 and from October 1, 1926 to October 1, 1927 - and covering respectively 79.44 and 82% of the total the rural population of the country (excluding the ZSFSR, the Uzbek and Turkmen SSR), the total number of migrant workers in 1926-27 was 3,145,137; of these, only 339,852 people went to agricultural industries. Of those who left for non-agricultural trades, laborers accounted for 664.2 thousand, builders - 582.3 thousand, timber rafting workers - 579.11 thousand, factory and craft workers - 322.9 thousand, miners - 136, 1 thousand and peat bogs - 123.2 thousand. In terms of the number of migrant workers, the first place was occupied by the Central Industrial Region (875.4 thousand), followed by the Ukrainian SSR (515.8 thousand) and the Central Black Earth Region (292.3 thousand people).

[6] SZ, 1927, No. 13, art. 132, 139; M 19, art. 219

[7] This refers to the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated June 20, 1927 "On measures to attract specialists." According to this decree, specialists traveling to places received benefits; in particular, they retained their living space, they were provided with business trips to improve their qualifications, etc.

[8] Omitted information about the state of the labor market and unemployment among health workers, education and the arts.

No. 55 Information of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions on the number of members of trade unions as of July 1, 1926 - July 1, 1928.

Not earlier than July 1, 1928 [1]

Groups	Alliances	Total number of union members (thousand)			Changes in %	
		[on] July 1			From 1 / VI-1 / VII-28	From 1 / VII-1 / VII-28
		1926 g.	1927 g.	1928 g.		
Agriculture Industry	Agricultural forestry workers	1003.7	1192.6	1367.5	+36.3	+ 14.7
	Walleys	41.1	44.8	45.0	+ 9.4	+ 0.5
	Miners	457.0	513.3	557.3	+22.0	+ 8.6
	Woodworkers	166.8	175.9	187.6	+12.5	+ 6.6
	Leatherworkers	121.4	121.1	123.5	+1.7	+ 2.0
	Metalworkers	802.6	870.8	947.0	+18.0	+ 8.8
	Printers	112.0	134.6	133.0	+18.8	- 1.2
	Food workers	432.1	446.3	454.9	+ 5.3	+ 2.0
	Sugar bowls	98.3	103,7	111.8	+13.7	+ 7.8
	Textile workers	785.1	830.1	859.7	+ 9.5	+ 3.6
	Chemists	229.6	248.6	267.9	+ 16.6	+ 7.8
	Sewing machines	69.8	78.1	95.9	+37.4	+22.8
	Total	3315.8	3567.3	3783.6	+14.1	+6.1
Transport and communication	Builders	674.4	820.0	985.1	+46.1	+20.1
	Vodniki	155.4	171.6	176.8	+ 13.8	+ 3.0
	Railroad workers	1025.0	1099.5	1139.4	+11.2	+ 3.6
	Local transport	178.8	182.5	179.2	+ 0.2	- 1.8
	Narsvyaz	113.1	115.1	117.1	+ 3.5	+ 1.8

	Total	1472.3	1568.7	1612.5	+ 9.5	+ 2.8
Employees of state, public institutions and enterprises	Rabis	80.8	89.7	93.3	+ 15.4	+ 3.9
	Medsantrud	460.2	509.1	553.0	+20.2	+ 8.6
	Rabpros	710.1	754.3	797.9	+12.4	+ 5.7
	Soviet trade employees	1113.4	1219.8	1284.1	+15.3	+ 5.3
	Total	2364.5	2572.9	2728.3	+ 15.4	+ 6.0
Others	Komkhoz	234.3	247.6	259.3	+10.6	+ 4.7
	Narpit	213.4	279.0	324.1	+51.8	+16.2
	Total	92,784	10248.1	11060.4	+ 19.2	+ 7.9
Total excluding unions: agricultural forestry workers, sugar workers, builders and water workers		7346.6	7960.2	8419.2	+14.6	+ 5.8

((Trade unions of the USSR. 1926-1928 (Report of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions to the Congress of Trade Unions) ". M., 1928, p. 27.

[1] Dated by content.

№ 56 From materials to the report of the government of the USSR for 1927/28

Not earlier than October 1, 1928 [1]

Professional education

Mass vocational education

In organizing the training of skilled labor, the decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, adopted on August 1, 1928, on the minimum armor standards for adolescents in industry and in other sectors of the national economy, is of great importance. This decree approved the minimum armor for adolescents, uniform for the entire territory of the USSR and mandatory for all state, cooperative and private enterprises (with the number of workers employed in them at least 10), as a percentage of the total number of workers in enterprises. For certain types of industry, the percentage of adolescents was set in the range from 2 to 11. The armor of adolescents should be completed, depending on the conditions of production, by persons aged 14 to 18 years, and all persons included in the armor of enterprises should be covered by organized forms of education in accordance with the procedure factory,

During the reporting year, the number of institutions of mass vocational education increased by 20.8% (from 4101 to 4954 institutions), and the number of students in them - by 8.6% (from 412,735 to 448,215).

Higher education institutions and technical schools

In the field of vocational education, special attention in the reporting year was paid to the issues of industrial and technical education. On August 29, 1928, the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a resolution on the training of new specialists, their distribution and use [2], which outlined a number of specific measures to radically improve the training, distribution and use of new specialists [3].

To train specialists who are at the level of the latest achievements of science and technology and who can take an active part in the socialist rationalization of production, the governments of the Union republics were invited to take measures for a gradual revision, with the

participation of the relevant economic bodies and trade unions, of the curricula and programs of higher technical educational institutions and technical schools, in the direction of their approximation to the needs of production, taking into account the latest achievements of science and technology; to a significant expansion of the staff of teachers and professors, entirely, without part-time jobs, engaged in scientific and teaching work and systematically improving their scientific qualifications; ensuring the printing of their scientific works, foreign business trips, etc. ; to expand the cadre of young researchers (graduate students), a radical improvement in their selection and management of their scientific work, as well as their material conditions; to expand the opportunities for the personnel of engineers and technicians working in enterprises to improve their special qualifications and familiarize themselves with the latest achievements of Soviet and foreign production; to attract prominent foreign specialists to lecture and to systematically publish translations of the main foreign technology manuals; to renew and replenish equipment, reduce the cost of textbooks and systematically supply libraries with the latest technical literature; to ensure the development of scientific and technical journals and the publication of works of scientific research institutes; to the establishment for students of higher education institutions of compulsory knowledge of at least one of the foreign languages and, finally,

Along with these general directives, the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a number of specific decisions aimed at improving the organization of the training of specialists for industrial production. For example, it was considered expedient to send students to practice throughout the year so that the total duration of practical training for each student during the training was at least 10 months. The traineeship system was replaced by the placement of those who graduated to a permanent job, which is mandatory for economic bodies, directives were given on measures to ensure a further increase in the working core among students of technical universities and colleges, etc.

By the end of the coming five-year period, the government has recognized the need to double the percentage of engineers in large-scale industry and to bring the ratio of technicians to engineers to at least 3: 2, making a corresponding expansion of the network of technical higher

educational institutions and technical schools and the number of students in them. At the same time, it was recognized as expedient to develop such higher technical educational institutions and technical schools of a new type, which can train engineers and technicians with a more pronounced specialization and with significant production practice in a short time.

In recent years, changes in the network of higher educational institutions and technical schools are presented in the following form [tab. 1]

[TABLE 1]

[Year]	Higher education institutions		Technical schools	
	number of institutions	of students in them	number of institutions	of students in them
1923/24	176	204 795	914	153880
1924/25	160	165 351	921	164,495
1925/26	134	162013	979	180 328
1926/27	131	160 422	1,023	180,994
1927/28	129	157,695	1,038	190 582

The above table reveals a significant curtailment of the network of universities “expansion of the network of technical schools. Over the past year, the number of universities has decreased by 1.5%, the number of students - by 1.8%. The number of technical schools in the same year increased by 1.5%, the number of students in them - by 5.3%.

In order to better harmonize the setting of technical education with the needs of industry and transport, the government recognized it necessary to remove 8 higher educational institutions and 4 technical schools from the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Education of the RSFSR and transfer to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR, and to the jurisdiction of HKJIC -2 higher educational institutions.

Of great interest is the shift in student composition. Data on universities of the RSFSR give the following picture of the composition of students (%) [tab. 2].

[TABLE 2]

[Year]	Social composition				Party membership		
	workers	peasants	employees	other	members and candidates		% of women
					VKP (b)	Komsomol	
1923/24	15.3	23.5	24.4	36.8	6.9	6.0	37.8
1924/25	20.7	24.5	35.8	19.0	10.1	9.5	35.5
1925/26	24.2	25.7	35.3	14.8	13.4	13.6	33.2
1926/27	25.3	25.3	37.5	11.9	14.8	16.3	31.3
1927/28	26.9	24.2	39.4	9.5	17.1	20.1	29.3

Thus, if in relation to the social and party composition of university students there is a steady growth of the worker-peasant and party-Komsomol core, then in relation to the sex composition there is a decrease in the percentage of women in the total student body.

Working faculties

In the 122 working faculties of the USSR in 1927-28, 48799 people studied.

According to their social composition, the workers' faculty (data on the RSFSR) were distributed as follows (in%) [tab. 3].

[TABLE 3]

[Social composition]	At daytime workers' schools	At the evening workers' schools	At all workers' schools
Workers	46.1	77.7	54.6
Peasants	49.1	8.9	38.2
Others	4.8	13.4	7.2

Members and candidates of the CPSU (b) were 32.6% of the workers' faculty, members and candidates of the Komsomol - 45.5%. The percentage of women among workers' faculty should be recognized as completely insufficient, amounting to only 16.1%.

The decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars on the training of new specialists provided for the need to ensure, within the next two years, the involvement of at least 3 thousand workers in the network of working faculties (daytime) in excess of the existing contingent and to expand the network of evening working faculties with the provision also: percent of workers from production [4] .

"Year of government work. Materials for the report for 1927/28 ". M., 1929, pp. 476-479.

[1] Dated by content.

[2] SZ, 1928, M58, art. 513.

[3] A survey of the engineering and technical staff employed in the state industry showed that as of October 1, 1927, practices accounted for 39.2% of the total number of specialists, while workers with higher and secondary technical education, respectively, 30.4%. The greatest number of engineers and technicians was in the chemical industry (5.69 per 100 workers). In second place was oil (4.64 per 100 workers), followed by woodworking (4.48), metal (3.08), coal (1.45) and textile (1.03 specialists) ("Rationalization of the USSR industry." M., 11928, pp. 245-247).

[4] At the end of 1927/28, 1733 schools of FZU and FZU type (175 407 students), 201 technical schools (46 227 students) and 25 technical colleges (48 863 students) trained personnel for industry. Of this number, 432 FZU schools, 45 technical schools and 6 technical colleges worked in Ukraine; in Belarus - 43 FZU schools and 5 technical schools; in the TSFSR - 130 FZU schools, 16 technical schools and 2 technical colleges; in Uzbekistan - 11 schools of FZU, 4 technical schools, 1 technical college; in the Turkmen SSR - 5 schools of FZU, 2 technical schools and in the Tajik SSR-1 technical school ("Training of cadres in the USSR. 1927-1931". M, 1933, pp. 64-65).

№ 57 Information of the Central Statistical Administration of the USSR on the number of workers in the industry of the union republics for 1925 / 26-1927 / 28.

Not earlier than October 1, 1928 [1]

Union republics and industries	Average number of workers		
	1925/26 g.	1926/27 g.	1927/28 g.
Total for the USSR	2 232 852	2 352 668	2,553,287
RSFSR	1 646 512	1 702 199	1,846,739
Including			
Cotton	457,886	474 103	504 889
Flour and cereal	20874	23625	20619
Woolen	61895	62,718	63388
Various food production	23525	26384	34480
Industrial and other mechanical engineering	82866	83,199	97319
Sawmill and plywood	53,273	62688	66,724
Tannery	28636	28,069	31654
Metallurgy of ferrous metals	83 453	83034	86 381
Sewing	22492	25596	43 853
Distillery-yeast, vodka-brandy and grape-wine	13 963	16255	17123
Linen	83,072	9 [2] 204	84805
Rubber	18383	18 843	20 855
Soap, fat and perfume	7 220	7346	8 575
Manufacture of various products from ferrous metals	47 422	47847	51 839
.....			

Oil refining	2712	2830	3,162
Typography	47 129	43370	41,234
Non-ferrous metal processing	16255	15,670	15383
Power plants	13 570	13 788	14623
Sugar beet	9 437	8 836	9 598
Oil mill	7875	5916	6,230
Production of paper and cardboard	24 112	19,214	21,036
Glass	43184	45,064	46978
Coal	50,226	60 105	63 540
Ukrainian SSR	490,773	547 797	592,134
Including			
Beet sugar and refined	32,014	32,045	34120
Metallurgy of ferrous metals	76,277	92,064	98,065
Coal	160,050	186 476	189,571
Flour and cereal	And 864	10,045	9 633
Agricultural engineering	17690	18 577	20253
Various food production	4061	4750	5889
Tannery	5118	4604	5,046
Machine production of mass products	7 760	8118	8 093
Distillery-yeast, vodka-brandy and grape-wine	3530	4240	4 480
Railway and transport engineering	14152	14486	15,731
Manufacture of various products from ferrous metals	12 842	13 399	16150
Industrial and other mechanical engineering	8 680	10455	12,929
Basic chemical	6,072	6415	6 353

Sawmill and plywood	4 120	4741	4912
Power plants	2,998	3567	4640
Ceramic	10139	12504	13 637
Typography	9 319	8678	9 091
Iron ore	10 428	13,021	15359
Manufacture of leather shoes	3837	4858	7,073
Hemp processing	7 180	6710	8 440
Glass	10676	12 435	12 853
Makhorochnaya	3833	3,607	3468
BSSR	27219	31485	36906
Including			
Sawmill and plywood	3245	4591	4981
Distillery-yeast, vodka-brandy and grape-wine	1 146	1 433	1221
Sewing	636	787	2,260
Production of paper and cardboard	1,268	2735	2 955
Tannery	740	766	960
Flour and cereal	360	281	289
Manufacture of leather shoes	1,080	1 166	1779
Glass	2852	2976	3,134
Matchbox	3 056	2968	3 306
Agricultural engineering	1 002	1413	1662
Manufacture of other wood products	432	855	1 136
Typography	1 302	1472	1,303
Linen	1949	2 329	2336

Various industries for processing materials of animal origin	573	583	1,031
Power plants	408	498	513
Brewery	339	344	316
Makhorochnaya	254	232	259
ZS FS R	57308	57 589	62 210
Including			
Oil refining	2454	2970	3442
Oil production	25241	24,097	23497
Flour and cereal	410	332	400
Ginneries	326	381	269
Distillery-yeast, vodka-brandy and grape-wine	326	278	515
Power plants	1,588	1 486	1,462
Various food production	1,575	1 234	1329
Cotton	2395	3046	3779
Tobacco	1778	1702	1777
Plumbing	219	269	219
Sawmill and plywood	758	925	1019
Mining of manganese ore	3 136	2630	1498
Uzbek SSR	8 786	11444	12 870
Including			
Ginneries	1 464	2577	2482
Oil mill	1,573	1,697	2271
Flour and cereal	358	371	361
Distillery-yeast, vodka-brandy and grape-wine	313	426	499
Tannery	205	240	506

Silk processing	34	665	1 463
Typography	1,372	1,065	906
Brewery	314	360	321
Various food production	233	259	288
Power plants	339	359	319
Cotton	sixteen	fifteen	79
Coal	554	775	67
Turkmen SSR	2254	2,154	2428
Including			
Ginneries	161	236	278
Oil mill	216	208	278
Wool washing plants	168	149	211
Flour and cereal	41	"61	69
Distillery-yeast, vodka-brandy and grape-wine	40	41	98
Typography	292	277	257
Salt	176	255	301
Soap, fat and perfume	22	27	thirty
Power plants	80	87	90
Matchbox	392	216	-

"Union industry in figures. Growth rates and development factors. (Materials for the party conference in 1929)". M., 1929, pp. 22, 24, 26.

№ 58 Information TSUNKHU USSR about the number of women among the workers of the factory industry for 1926-1928.

Not earlier than January 1, 1929 [3]

Industries	Abs. (thousand)			% of the total number of workers [including students]		
	1926 g.	1927 g.	1928 g.	1926 g.	1927 g.	1928 g.
Extraction and processing of minerals	37.0	38.8	40.7	23.4	23.1	22.4
Mining and mining	37.3	39.3	40.7	7.3	6.9	6.8
including						
Coal	18.0	19.4	19.3	8.3	7.9	7.6
Peat	6.4	9.4	9.9	21.8	22.9	22.7
Metal processing and mechanical engineering	37.1	38.8	42.2	9.2	9.1	8.9
Wood processing	12.5	15.1	17.6	15.1	16.3	17.2
Chemical industry	27.7	28.3	32.6	33.5	34.2	34.3
Food production,	51.2	54.0	55.5	26.0	26.6	26.4
including the sugar industry	10.3	10.1	9.0	22.4	21.3	19.7
Processing of materials of animal origin (including leather, fur and leather footwear)	11.1	12.5	16.8	18.3	19.7	21.1
Cotton processing	278.4	292.8	316.5	60.1	60.7	61.3
"Wool	32.3	32.8	34,7	48.5	49.1	49.7
Silk	5.4	8.1	10.4	61.0	64.5	64.4
»Flax, hemp, jute	67.3	72.2	74.0	62.6	63.8	64.9
Mixed fiber processing, clothing and toilet production	32.0	39.9	60.8	60.3	61.1	62.1
Paper processing and printing industry	26.8	24.6	23.9	24.9	24.7	24.6

Other production	2.4	2.5	2.9	7.6	7.3	7,7
Total	658.5	699.7	769.3	29.6	28.2	28.6

“The USSR in 15 years. Statistical materials on the national economy”. M., 1932, p. 227.

CHRONICLE OF DECISIONS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ON INDUSTRIALIZATION (December 1925-September 1928)

1925 year

December 23rd

The XIV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in the resolution "According to the report of the Central Committee" outlined the party's course towards the industrialization of the country.

December 28th

The XIV Congress of the CPSU (b) adopted an "Appeal to all members of the Leningrad organization."

December 29th

The XIV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution "On the Work of Trade Unions".

1926 year

12th of February

The Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On the extension for the 1925/26 budget year of the resolution of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated March 31, 1925 on the collection from industrial enterprises for the needs of higher vocational education in the 1924/25 budget year."

February 18

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks drew the attention of the Supreme Council of the National Economy to the need to draw up a three- and five-year fuel supply plan.

25 February

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) recognized it expedient to limit the amount of capital construction of industry for 1925/26, prohibit new construction without the permission of the relevant authorities, increase labor productivity by 10%, increase the

production of consumer goods from non-scarce raw materials and achieve lower prices for them.

4 march

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) recognized the need to develop the domestic aviation industry.

11th of March

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) made a decision on the preparation and training of the labor force.

March 25

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) proposed to the People's Commissariat of Finance to create a commission with the participation of representatives of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the cooperation to prepare a draft resolution on the issue of a mass loan.

April 1st

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution on the development of measures to raise labor productivity.

9 April

The plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution "On the economic situation and economic policy."

14th of April

STO adopted a decree "On the regulation of the market of building materials and construction tools in the construction season of 1926"

April 22

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved VV Kuibyshev's circular on austerity and suggested that the Pravda newspaper open a special page dedicated to the economy; recognized it necessary to seek to increase labor

productivity in the remainder of the year by 10%, instructed the Supreme Council of the National Economy to submit a proposal to reorganize the management of industry; pointed out the party organizations to the inadmissibility of interference in the operational work of economic agencies and drew the attention of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions to the need to revive the work of production meetings.

25th of April

The CEC adopted a resolution "On the unified state budget of the USSR for the 1925/26 budget year".

April 30

The Central Election Commission and the Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On measures to increase the production of lead, zinc, tin, nickel and aluminum."

May 19

STO adopted a resolution "On raising labor productivity by 10% in industry and transport."

May 25

The Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On preferential terms for admitting foreign capital to the production of construction work on the territory of the USSR";

May 31

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) reviewed the results and the plan of workers' housing construction.

June 11

The CEC and the Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On the economy regime".

June 14

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) approved the resolution of the STO of June 11, 1926 on the activities of Glavmetal, proposing, when refurbishing and

building factories, to ensure the fastest possible use of them for the needs of the country's defense.

June 17

Politburo. The Central Committee of the CPSU (b) drew the attention of the SRT, the Supreme Council of the National Economy and the People's Commissariat of Labor to the need to check the implementation of measures to raise labor productivity.

June 18

The Central Election Commission and the Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On the Temporary State Excess Profit Tax".

7 July

The STO adopted a resolution "On measures to increase exports, adopted by the economic conferences of the Union republics, the People's Commissariat of Foreign and Internal Trade of the USSR and the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR."

July 24

The Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars adopted the "Regulations on the procedure for approving projects for industrial construction carried out by the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR, the Supreme Council of National Economy of the Union Republics, local authorities and their subordinate enterprises."

STO adopted a resolution "On the report of the NK RFKI USSR on the survey of the Southern Engineering Trust".

5th of August

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) approved the directive of the Council of People's Commissars on the construction of the budget for 1926-27, including Dneprostroy in the number of projects under construction.

16 august

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved the draft circular on the economy regime and proposed to publish it on August 17, 1926.

September 3

The CEC and the Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On the issue of the state internal winning loan in 1926"

September 7th

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) considered the proposals of the State Planning Commission on the control figures for 1926/27.

9th of September

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) approved the personal composition of the Council of the Supreme Council of the National Economy in the amount of 75 people and expressed a desire to additionally introduce 10 directors of large enterprises - promoted from workers.

16 of September

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) instructed the STO commission to reduce prices to quickly reduce prices for industrial goods in connection with a decrease in prices for bread, and the Supreme Council of the National Economy - to develop measures by October 15 to reduce the selling prices of industry.

24 September

The CEC and the Council of People's Commissars approved the "Regulations on the state trade tax".

October 8

The Central Election Commission and the Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On the recognition of regional power plants and regional associations of power plants as enterprises of all-Union significance."

15 October

The CEC and the Council of People's Commissars approved the "Regulations on the income tax from state enterprises, cooperative organizations and joint-stock companies (mutual partnerships) with the participation of state and cooperative capital" and adopted a resolution "On the basic provisions on apprenticeship with handicraftsmen, artisans, in industrial cooperatives and labor artels" ...

The 20th of October

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), having considered the control figures for 1926-27, approved the decision of the STO of October 16, 1926 on the allocation of 900 million rubles for the capital construction of industry. (including 400 million rubles from the state budget).

the 3rd of November

The XV conference of the CPSU (b) adopted resolutions: "On the economic situation in the country and the tasks of the party", "Results of work and immediate tasks of the trade unions", "On the opposition bloc in the CPSU (b)".

11th of November

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) approved the decree of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of November 8, 1926 on the subordination of the Autonomous Industrial Colony of Foreign Workers "Kuzbass" to the Supreme Council of the National Economy.

November 25

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) recognized the construction of the Semirechenskaya railway and Dneprostroy as the top-priority works from the plan for large-scale construction of all-Union significance presented by the State Planning Committee for 1926-27.

With regard to the Volga-Don Canal, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party) recognized it expedient to confine itself to the end of the survey and the continuation of work in the Azov port.

December 22

STO adopted resolutions: "On the organization of management of Dneprostroy", "On the procedure for financing the power construction and electrical industry at the expense of allocations from the all-Union budget."

December 23rd

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), recognizing the first successes in reducing retail prices as insufficient, drew the attention of the STO to the advisability of establishing, within two weeks, lists of goods for which a price reduction can be carried out.

1927 year

January 15

SNK adopted a resolution "On measures to combat truancy."

January 24

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) instructed the commission to check, through a survey, the attitude of specialists to the method of building Dneprostroy, especially the possibility of building it on its own with the involvement of foreign specialists only as consultants.

January 27.

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved the draft resolution of the CEC and the Council of People's Commissars on measures to regulate the labor market; recognized the reduction of the administrative and economic apparatus of the Supreme Council of the National Economy as insufficient and instructed the Supreme Council of the National Economy and the NK RKI to submit considerations on simplifying the industrial management system within a month.

January 31st.

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) recognized it expedient to organize the construction of Dneprostroy on its own with the involvement of foreign consultants,

having begun preparatory work this year; instructed the Supreme Council of the National Economy to nominate candidates for managers for organizing construction management, as well as to create a Technical Council with the involvement of the best specialists; approved the state budget for 1926-27 in all items, except for appropriations for capital construction of industry, instructing the commission to find ways to satisfy the claims of the Supreme Council of the National Economy; approved the Directorate for the construction of Dneprostroy consisting of A.V. Winter, B.E. Vedeneev and P.N. and the Technical Council - G.

February 5th

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) proposed to increase the allocations for capital construction of industry according to the budget for 1926-27 by 16 million rubles.

10 february

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) recognized it expedient to accept the proposal of the American engineer Cooper for technical advice on Dneprostroy.

12th of February

The plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) adopted resolutions: "On capital construction of industry in 1926-27", "On the reduction of selling and retail prices."

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) recognized it expedient to conclude an agreement with Siemens-Bau-Union on partial technical advice on Dneprostroy.

February, 15

The Council of People's Commissars adopted a decree "On the size of expenditures for capital work in industry in 1926-27 and on planning discipline in the field of capital construction."

16 february

STO adopted a resolution "On measures to reduce retail prices."

19 february

The Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On the report of the State Planning Committee of the USSR and the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR on the state of electrification and its long-term plan for the next five years."

March 1

SNK adopted a resolution "On the regulation of the labor market of construction workers in the construction season of 1927".

March 3rd

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) approved the draft resolution of the Supreme Council of the National Economy and the People's Commissariat of Education on the organization of the Academy for the training of the highest command personnel of industry at the Supreme Council of the National Economy.

4 march

The CEC and the Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On measures to regulate the labor market".

10th of March

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) approved the plan for workers' housing construction for 1926-27; took into account the decision of the meeting of the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and the STO with his deputies on February 22, 1927 on the preparation of a five-year plan for the development of the USSR economy by June 1, 1927.

11th of March

STO adopted a resolution "On the rationalization of the energy economy of industry."

March 22

The Council of People's Commissars approved the "Regulations on the Construction Commission at the Service Station".

March 24

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) approved the draft resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) "Questions of rationalizing production."

5th of April

The Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On additional capital work in the local industry for 1926/27".

20 April

The IV All-Union Congress of Soviets adopted a resolution "On the report of the government of the USSR", in which it approved the government's policy aimed at industrializing the country.

26 April

The IV All-Union Congress of Soviets adopted a resolution "On the state and prospects of industrial development in the USSR."

April 30

Council of People's Commissars approved the "Regulations on the State Dnieper Construction - Dneprostroy".

May 3

The Council of People's Commissars adopted resolutions: "On the local state industry"; "On the handicraft industry and industrial cooperation."

5 May

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), having heard the report of the commission on the first results of the development of local and handicraft industry, approved the SNK resolutions of May 3, 1927 "On the local state industry" and "On the handicraft industry and industrial cooperation."

12 May

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) adopted a resolution "On the construction of new metal factories", which provided for the construction of the Kerch metallurgical plant, the Rostov plant of agricultural machines and preparatory work for the construction of the Sverdlovsk machine-building, Stalingrad tractor,

Telbess, Nizhne-Tagil, Magnitogorsk and Krivor metallurgical plants, and also to speed up the completion of a number of non-ferrous metallurgy plants.

May 18

The Central Election Commission and the Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On State Excess Profit Tax".

STO adopted a resolution "On improving methods of building new metal factories."

May 19

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) approved the decision of the STO of May 6, 1927 on the plan for the construction of power plants for 1926/27, indicating the need to build, first of all, the Leningrad regional power plant on the river. Swir.

26 of May

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) instructed the Supreme Council of the National Economy to develop a draft law on trusts and syndicates.

June 8

The Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On the results of a survey of the work of the USSR State Planning Committee."

the 9th of June

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) considered it expedient to create a Society of Scientists to promote socialist construction in the USSR.

June 15th

The CEC and the Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On the introduction of the Regulation on measures to promote the construction of workers' dwellings" and approved the regulation.

June 16

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) approved the draft Statute of the Central Executive

Committee and the Council of People's Commissars "On State Industrial Trusts"; instructed the Supreme Council of the National Economy, the People's Commissariat of Labor, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League to develop standards for the armor of adolescents so that by 1928/29 the reservation would correspond to the need for manpower; made a decision to admit a significant number of workers' children to FZU schools in 1927-28.

June 29

The CEC and the Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On Approving the Regulation on State Industrial Trusts".

30 June

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) considered the decisions of the STO of June 3 and June 17 on the construction of new metal factories.

21 July

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) recognized the need to create a cadre of permanent construction workers at large construction organizations, instructing the People's Commissariat of Labor to develop practical proposals for the implementation of this measure; drew the attention of the service station to the need to take measures to further reduce the cost of construction work.

July 27

The Central Election Commission and the Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On Heroes of Labor".

August 9th

The joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the CPSU (b) adopted the resolution "On economic directives for 1927/28"

11th August

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) approved the decision of the STO of August 10, 1927

to issue a 6-percent internal loan for the industrialization of the national economy.

12th of August

The STO adopted a resolution "On the report of the USSR People's Commissariat for Foreign and Internal Trade on the results of the campaign to reduce retail prices."

August 18

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided to organize a labor section under the State Planning Committee.

24 August

The Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On the issue of a state internal loan for the industrialization of the USSR national economy."

25-th of August

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, having considered the directives of the State Planning Committee on the control figures for 1927-28, proposed increasing the sums planned by the State Planning Commission for the development of industry by 450-500 million rubles. from the state budget; instructed the commission to consider, before the 15th Congress of the CPSU (b), the state of rationalization work in individual industries; drew the attention of the Moscow City Council to the need to start from 1927/28 at the expense of the local budget to the construction of a car plant with a capacity of 10 thousand cars per year and a bicycle plant.

September 1

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), having considered the resolution of the STO of August 26, 1927 on the plan for the construction of power plants in 1927-28, recognized it necessary to begin the construction of a new power plant in the Moscow region; drew the attention of the service station to the need to take measures to reduce the cost of construction work on Dneprostroy.

6 September

STO adopted a decree "On the cost of industrial products in 1926/27"

September 22nd

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) heard the report of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions on the work of production meetings.

September 29

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided to create a commission to draft the theses of the first five-year plan.

The 20th of October

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) approved the draft theses on the first five-year plan and created a commission for their final editing.

October 21

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) considered the issue and made a decision on the financing of industry in the first quarter of 1927/28.

STO adopted a resolution "On the approval of a model regulation on state administration for the construction of a factory (plant, power plant, etc.), which is funded by the state budget and under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Council of the National Economy" and approved the regulation.

October 23

The joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the WKB (b) adopted "Directives for drawing up a five-year plan of the national economy."

27th October

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks reviewed the report and decided on the concession policy.

November 16

STO adopted resolutions: "On improving capital construction methods at metal factories", "On measures to improve construction in the textile industry."

23 november

The Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On approval of the Regulation on the procedure for approving projects for industrial construction carried out by the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR, the Supreme Council of National Economy of the Union Republics, their local authorities and their subordinate enterprises and institutions" and approved the regulations.

November 25

STO adopted a resolution "On the establishment of the marginal cost (limit) of industrial construction."

December 14

The CEC and the Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On the introduction of the "Provisions on the state income tax".

December 19th

The 15th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) adopted resolutions: "On the report of the Central Committee", "On directives for drawing up a five-year plan of the national economy", "On the opposition."

December 29th

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) approved the report of the commission on the development of preliminary measures to rationalize the textile industry.

1928 year

January 12

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks proposed to liquidate the board of Dneprostroy, entrusting the supervision of the construction to the deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, Kosior; considered

the issue and made a decision on measures to reduce the cost of production.

January 18.

STO adopted a resolution "On the report of the NC RCI on the survey of new capital construction in the paper industry."

January 23

The Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On the procedure for approving projects for the construction of power plants, power transmission lines and auxiliary structures necessary for them."

January 27

The Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On measures for the timely start of construction work and the provision of their labor force in the construction season of 1928"

1st of February

The Central Election Commission and the Council of People's Commissars approved a resolution "On liability for violation of laws on capital construction."

February 9th

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) considered the draft budget for 1927/28 proposed by the Council of People's Commissars.

February 23

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) recognized the need to strengthen the State Planning Committee and other planning bodies with responsible communist workers and instructed the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) to implement this decision; After discussing the report of the NC RFC on the use of imported equipment, the Supreme Council of the National Economy instructed the Supreme Economic Council to take Measures to improve the use of equipment and streamline orders.

7 march

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) adopted the draft appeal of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) "On the economic counter-revolution in the southern regions of Donbass."

March 8

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) basically approved the draft resolution of the Council of People's Commissars on the consolidated industrial financial plan for 1927-28, instructing the commission to find additional funds to strengthen the capital construction of the metal industry.

March 15th

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) made a proposal for the allocation of additional appropriations in the amount of 20 million rubles and 7 million rubles, a reserve to accelerate the construction of the Telbess and Kerch metallurgical plants, the Mariupol pipe-rolling plant, Uralmash, the Stalingrad tractor and Rost-selmash, as well as for capital work on the existing plants of Yugostal, Lenmashtrest and the Gomza trust; instructed the Supreme Council of the National Economy to submit within two weeks a project for reorganizing the management of the metal industry.

20th of March

The Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On the consolidated production and financial plan for capital construction of the industry, planned by the Supreme Council of the National Economy, for 1927/28"

March 22

The Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On the formation of a commission to consider a note submitted by scientists and chemists to the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars."

March 29

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) decided to hold discussions on the VSNKh project on reorganizing the management of the metal industry in the SNK, STO

and Gosplan, and also instructed the VSNKh to organize a discussion on this issue in the press.

April 11

The joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution "The Shakhty affair and practical tasks in combating the shortcomings of economic development."

26 April

The Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On measures to promote invention".

April 27.

STO adopted a resolution "On the survey of the rubber industry."

28 april

The Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On measures for the chemicalization of the USSR national economy."

May 8

STO adopted a resolution "On the results of the inspection of the glass industry."

May 10

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) approved the decision of the STO of April 30, 1928 on the glass industry.

May 14

The Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On approval of the Regulations on State Dnieper Construction - Dneprostroy in a new edition."

May 17

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks took note of the report of the People's Commissariat of Trade on the procurement of raw materials for industry.

May 21st

The Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On the handicraft industry and trade cooperation."

May 23rd

The Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars approved the decree "On personal registration of engineers, technicians, agronomists and other specialists of the national economy."

May 30

The CEC approved the resolution "On directives for the unified state budget of the USSR for 1927-28"

May 31

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) took note of the report of the NK RKI on the progress in the construction of power plants; found it expedient to expand the network of temporary control commissions at enterprises.

June 6

The CEC approved the decree "On the establishment of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the procedure for approving capital construction projects."

June 8

STO adopted a resolution "On streamlining the financial situation of state construction organizations."

12 June

STO adopted a resolution "On the results of a survey of the NK RFI of the USSR of agricultural engineering."

June 15th

STO adopted a resolution "On streamlining the building materials market."

June 20

The Central Election Commission and the Council of People's Commissars approved the resolution "On the reorganization of the textile industry management system."

June 23rd

The Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars approved a circular to the Central Executive Committees and the Council of People's Commissars of the Union Republics "On expanding the production of building materials."

27th of June

The CEC and the Council of People's Commissars approved the "Basic Provisions on the Bank for Long-Term Lending to Industry and Electricity of the USSR".

June 28

Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), having considered the resolution of the STO of June 22

1928 on the plan for the placement of loans in 1928/29, raised the question of an additional issue of a loan for 500 million rubles. for accommodation in the city and village.

July 2

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks made a decision on measures to improve technical education in the country and the material situation of teachers and students.

6 july

STO adopted a resolution "On the progress of power construction".

July, 12

The plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) adopted a resolution "On improving the training of new specialists."

the 14 th of July

SNK adopted a resolution "On the use of inventions."

July 18

The Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars approved a resolution "On the issue of the 2nd state internal loan for the industrialization of the USSR national economy."

July 27

STO adopted a decree "On preparation for the construction season of 1929".

The Central Election Commission and the Council of People's Commissars adopted resolutions "On transferring a number of higher technical educational institutions and technical schools to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Council of the National Economy and the People's Commissariat for Railways", "On strengthening funding for technical education and improving the material support of students."

August 1

The Central Election Commission and the Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On the minimum armor rates for adolescents in industry and in other sectors of the national economy."

August 2

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks instructed the Supreme Council of the National Economy and the People's Commissariat of Railways to develop measures within two weeks to strengthen the work on the promotion of specialists to responsible posts in industry.

August 7

SNK adopted a resolution "On the organization of research work for the needs of industry."

10th of August

The CEC and the Council of People's Commissars approved the "Regulations on the state trade tax".

STO adopted a decree "On the accounting of labor productivity in the enterprises of the factory industry."

16 august

The Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On changing Art.10 of the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of May 3, 1927 on the local state industry".

August 22

The CEC and the Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On the cash execution of the state budget of the USSR and local budgets."

August 29

The CEC and the Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On the training of new specialists, their distribution and use."

September 5th

The Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On the Procedure for Annual Planning of the USSR Industry."

The CEC and the Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On the procedure for approving production and financial plans of state industrial enterprises."

September 19

The CEC and the Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution "On Amendments to the Regulation on State Industrial Trusts."



1926–1928

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