Formation of the USSR (1917-1924)

Formation of the USSR (1917-1924)

Searching for ways to unite

In general, the national question continued to be at the center of attention of the party leadership and Soviet government bodies. One of the evidence of this was the special “Resolution of the Tenth Congress of the RCP (b) on the Immediate Tasks of the Party in the National Question” dated March 15, 1921. It was the result of a special discussion at the Congress of National Relations on Stalin’s report “The Immediate Tasks of the Party in the National Question.”

The resolution, among other things, emphasized: “If private property and capital inevitably separate people, incite national strife and increase national oppression, then collective property and labor just as inevitably bring people together, undermine national strife and destroy national oppression.” The main condition for the destruction of national oppression was the victory of the Soviets and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It was also written there that the Soviet republics had turned from colonies and semi-colonies into truly independent states, and this fact alone was the greatest agitation against capitalism and imperialism. The capitalist encirclement of the Soviet republics was also emphasized, and the fact that “not a single Soviet republic, taken separately, cannot consider itself secure from economic exhaustion and military defeat by world imperialism.” And the state union of individual Soviet republics was seen as the only way of salvation from imperialist bondage and national oppression.

Further, in the same resolution, a federation based on mutual trust and the voluntary consent of its constituent countries was proclaimed a form of state union. It was emphasized that about 140 million people live in the RSFSR and the independent Soviet republics associated with it, and about 65 million of them are non-Great Russians, and a clear task was set to eliminate the actual national inequality, especially on the Russian outskirts - in colonies and semi-colonies, primarily through the development there industry. The resolution set specific tasks for winning the trust of the working masses of the eastern outskirts, organizing the local poor, and taking into account the uniqueness of this or that region. Proclaiming fidelity to the principles of communist internationalism, the congress put forward the task of fighting against two deviations - chauvinist and nationalist,[one]

This resolution clearly traces the line towards the rapprochement of the Soviet republics, giving preference to the federation, although the republics are called independent, and declares the struggle against two deviations - chauvinist and nationalist, without specifying which of them is the main one. The resolution of the 10th Congress of the RCP (b) on the national question played a very significant role in the way of further state building, the creation of a country of a new type. This imposed, in particular, great responsibility on the work of the People's Commissariat of Nationalities. In 1921, out of 462 issues considered at the collegium of the People's Commissariat of Nationalities, 24 were devoted to the formation of new autonomies, 7 to the delimitation of territories between them, 33 to the discussion of draft decrees and resolutions affecting the interests of republics, regions or individual nationalities, 11 to the relationship of autonomies with the RSFSR ,[2] However, there were still very significant difficulties ahead, which were explained by the struggle of interests of the center and the outskirts, different understanding of the foundations for building the future state, either in the form of a federal state, or in the form of a union of states, up to a confederation. These different views were especially evident in 1922 [3]

Serious questions arose already during the preparation of the united Soviet delegation at the international conference, which took place in April-May 1922. decided to invite Russia as well. [4] As you know, a single Soviet delegation represented there the interests of all Soviet republics - Azerbaijan, Armenian, Belorussian, Bukhara, Georgian, Ukrainian, Khorezm and Far Eastern republics.

Questions of staffing the Soviet delegation arose a few months before the start of the conference. On January 5, 1922, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) decides to form a commission under the NKID under the chairmanship of G. Chicherin, consisting of M. Litvinov, G. Sokolnikov, A. Ioffe, A. Lezhava and N. Krestinsky. The commission was later expanded. [5] Already on January 10, Chicherin, in a letter to Molotov, reported on the meeting of the commission on January 9, where "the question of including the fraternal republics in the RSFSR by the time of the conference was put forward was of extreme importance." [6] The question posed, of course, was far from ordinary. Indeed, there were many problems, because it was about independent republics. Another problem is the activity of émigré governments abroad. Even when the conference in Genoa begins, representatives of these governments tried in every possible way to allow Western states to participate in it as legitimate governments, for example, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and, conversely, to exclude B. Mdivani and A. Bekzadyan, who represented these republics, from the work of the conference. , N. Narimanov. [7]

Not later than January 13, 1922, I. Stalin draws up a note to the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on the composition and powers of the Soviet delegation to the European conference and emphasizes that “the question arises of our independent republics (both Soviet and Far Eastern Republics). At the conference, for the first time, one will have to face the question of the borders of the RSFSR and the legal relationship between the independent republics and the RSFSR. Further, referring to the possible difficulties that may arise in relations with foreign representatives, and these difficulties, in his opinion, may arise with the question of the borders of the RSFSR and legal relations between the independent republics and the RSFSR, Stalin sets the task of uniting the republics. In doing so, he emphasizes:[8]

Stalin fully shared the point of view of "certain comrades" and the need for serious preparatory work to realize it. In the meantime, in connection with the preparations for the conference, he proposed to convene the chairmen of the central executive committees of the independent republics in order to establish a united diplomatic front with the RSFSR to finally determine the composition of the delegation. The mandates of all members of the delegation, in his opinion, should be signed by all the chairmen of the Soviet republics and the chairman of the government of the Far East. In this way, according to Stalin, it will be possible to get rid of the raising of sensitive questions about the borders of the RSFSR, about relations with the republics, about the withdrawal of troops from Georgia, etc. In concluding this note, Stalin reports Lenin's full agreement with the proposed plan. [9]

There are several points of interest in this short note. First of all, not only the difficulties that arose in recruiting a delegation to an international conference, but the promotion of a plan to unite the republics with the RSFSR on the basis of autonomy. At the same time, in a short note, the term independent republics appears five times. That is, Stalin, by no means, denied the existence of Soviet independent republics. Difficulties of a diplomatic nature were noted not only in this note. Attention is drawn to the letter of Kh. Rakovsky - V. Molotov dated January 28, 1922, regarding the project of unification of the foreign policy of the Soviet republics drawn up by G. Chicherin.

Chicherin's project, if accepted, Rakovsky assesses as "the greatest political mistake." [10] Rakovsky opposed the direct subordination of the foreign policy of the Soviet republics to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, since this is the abolition of existing agreements between the RSFSR and the union republics and runs counter to Soviet policy on the national question. Moreover, Rakovsky even wrote that "in fact, the Chicherin project formally abolishes the independent Soviet republics." At the same time, Rakovsky, by no means, did not reject the need to appear at the Genoa Conference of a unified delegation and, in general, stood up for a unified foreign policy of the Soviet republics. [11]

On the same day, January 28, 1922, Chicherin reported this letter to Stalin, emphasizing the complexity of the issue and the need to resolve it as soon as possible, “since it would be imperialism to subordinate the fraternal Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to the Russian Commissariat of Foreign Affairs instead of putting a real federal Commissariat of Foreign Affairs at the head of all.” [12] This story in connection with the preparations for the international conference was not the only discrepancy in the field of foreign affairs. On March 16, Chicherin was forced to apply to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) with a letter in which he wrote about the disagreements between the Collegium of the NKID and Rakovsky in connection with the appointment by the Ukrainian government of a separate mission to the Baltic states. The members of this mission, according to Chicherin, arrived in Kovno, Riga and Revel "even without prior notice to the NKID of the RSFSR and conduct a separate policy there in addition to the representative offices of the RSFSR." [13]

Chicherin opposed the parallel existence of Russian and Ukrainian missions, moreover, he called it harmful and emphasized the attempts of Western missions to follow the path of playing off the RSFSR and border states and destroying the united Soviet front. At the same time, Chicherin conveyed the opinion of Rakovsky, who allegedly considered it necessary to go towards the national-democratic element, which is extremely strong in the border states. According to Chicherin, Rakovsky opposed the curtailment of the state existence of Ukraine, since in this case the opponents of Soviet power would receive material for agitation against it and "would incite the national-democratic element against Soviet Russia." Chicherin himself advocated strengthening the united Soviet front. [14]

In response to Chicherin's appeal, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) adopts a special resolution of April 27, 1922, where it once again confirms its decision on the procedure for concluding agreements by the Soviet republics of December 8, 1921 and again decides that no independent negotiations between the Soviet republics and foreign states should not be carried out without prior agreement with the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR or with the Central Committee of the RCP. Moreover, this resolution even proposed that the perpetrators be brought to justice by the Party. Thus, in practice, the leading role of the Communist Party in inter-republican relations was realized. Interestingly, on May 4, 1922, at the request of M.V. Frunze, the Politburo again returned to this issue, but upheld its previous decision. [15]

At that time, the settlement of relations with Ukraine, the largest Soviet republic after the RSFSR, was of the greatest importance, and it concerned not only foreign affairs. At the XI Congress of the RCP (b), which took place from March 27 to April 2, 1922, the attention of the congress participants was attracted by the speech of one of the representatives of Ukraine - N. A. Skrypnik, who emphasized that in Lenin's report at the congress Ukraine was noted as an independent republic, and who drew attention to, in his words, the dangerous phenomena of the administrative and formal-bureaucratic approach to resolving issues of nation-state building. He even considered it necessary to speak about the solution of national problems by individuals, and the Soviet apparatus led by them in the spirit of the slogan of a united and indivisible Russia. Skrypnyk bluntly stated the planned trend both in relation to Ukraine, and other national republics, the trend towards the elimination of the statehood of workers and peasants, that is, the elimination of the statehood of Ukraine. In fact, only D.Z. Manuilsky, who had been the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine since December 1921 and called Skrypnik a well-deserved revolutionary, spoke directly against Skrypnik’s statement on behalf of the Ukrainian delegation, but also emphasized that Skrypnik had his own peculiar opinion on a number of issues .[16]

N. Skrypnik, indeed, was a longtime member of the party, one of the oldest congress delegates in terms of party experience. In Ukraine, he was far from the last person. From March 1918, Skrypnik was chairman of the Soviet government of Ukraine and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, then, after the restoration of Soviet power, he was successively People's Commissar of State Control, People's Commissar of the RCT, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, and in 1922-27, that is, at the time of his speech at party congress, was the People's Commissar of Justice and the Prosecutor General of the Ukrainian SSR. He was still a delegate to the III Congress of the RSDLP in 1905, and in 1905-07. - Secretary of the St. Petersburg Committee of the RSDLP, that is, he was well known in the party, and his speech could not but be noticed. [17] But it's not just about him. Not only Skrypnik had a “peculiar opinion”. Even at the X Congress of the RCP (b), both he and V.P. Zatonsky expressed a somewhat different point of view than Stalin on the construction of the Soviet federation. They pointed directly to Stalin's underestimation of the complexity of national movements and opposed rigid centralization.

Both Rakovsky and Frunze had a "peculiar opinion," as has been pointed out. If Skrypnik, Zatonsky and another Ukrainian people's commissar close to them, G.F. Grinko, were natives of Ukraine, then Rakovsky was a Bulgarian born in Dobruja and actively participated in the Bulgarian and Romanian socialist movements. M.V. Frunze was not a native of Ukraine either - a Moldavian by father and a Russian by mother, who at that time commanded the armed forces of Ukraine and the Crimea and was the deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars. They clearly did not belong to Ukrainian nationalists and their position should be explained by completely different reasons, than nationalism.

To regulate relations between the RSFSR and Ukraine, on May 11, 1922, a special Commission of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) was created. This Commission was approved at a meeting of the Politburo and was supposed to decide the issue of "Ukrainian affairs." The Commission was given a period of one month to carry out its work. Moreover, the convocation of the Commission was entrusted to M. V. Frunze. This meeting of the Politburo was attended by its members - Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Kamenev, Rykov. Tomsky, candidates - Molotov, Kalinin and with an advisory vote - Tsyurupa. Frunze, Manuilsky, Ganetsky and Karakhan then reported on “Ukrainian Affairs”. This resolution of the Politburo emphasized "that no change has occurred in relations between the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR in the sense of abolishing or belittling the independence of the Ukrainian Republic and, in general, in the sense of revising the main constitutional provisions of the Ukrainian Republic."[18]

The commission included I. V. Stalin, L. B. Kamenev, M. V. Frunze, N. A. Skrypnik, D. Z. Manuilsky. Already on May 12, the first “Minutes of the meeting of the commission of the Central Committee of the RCP on the issue of regulating relations between the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR” were signed. This protocol testified to the disagreements that existed between some departments of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR and the focus of the commission on their removal. At the same time, all central bodies were told “that they should proceed from the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP of May 11, 1922 on the inadmissibility of any measures that would practically lead to the liquidation of the Ukrainian SSR and the derogation of the rights of its Central Committee, the Council of People’s Commissars and its central bodies.” [19] The protocol was signed by chairman Frunze, members of the commission Stalin, Kamenev, Manuilsky and secretary Skrypnik.

The second meeting of this Commission took place on 17 May. Frunze again presided and Skrypnik was the secretary. The minutes of this meeting noted several issues, first of all, the settlement of relations between the people's commissariats of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR, about the Small Council of People's Commissars, etc. all central bodies of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR are obliged to mutually coordinate their relations, as well as to submit drafts fixing disagreements for consideration at the next meeting. [20]

The creation of a special commission to regulate relations between the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR, of course, was not accidental and testified to the presence of certain disagreements and inconsistencies. It was necessary to find the best option to create a working mechanism that would equally take into account the aspirations of the two sides. There was still very little time for such a mechanism to work in full force after the restoration of Soviet power in the Ukraine, and the commission played its role in this regard. It is noteworthy that the then leaders of Ukraine occupied a significant place in it, and this is an indicator of a rather loyal attitude towards it of the Politburo and V. I. Lenin, who then headed it.

However, it was not possible to remove all disagreements at that time, and they appeared already in the solution of the most global issue of the then national relations - the immediate plan for the creation of the USSR and its concrete implementation. First of all, one should keep in mind the still rather difficult position of the Soviet republics at that time. The civil war basically ended at the very end of 1920, but in general it can be said that it ended only by the end of 1922, when Soviet power was established in the Far East and, in particular, in Vladivostok. 1921 was extremely difficult with its terrible famine, Antonovism, the Kronstadt uprising, Siberian unrest, and the Basmachi movement. Of course, in 1922 things got a little easier. A good harvest is being grown and harvested, which has made it possible to largely solve the food problem, the New Economic Policy began to show its effectiveness. However, it was still far from complete calm. All national regions had their own problems, and they had to be sensitively caught and solved, with a good understanding of the real situation and taking into account the need for a correct understanding of the interests of both the center and the outskirts.

On May 15, 1922, I. N. Barkhatov, secretary of the Yakut Provincial Committee of the RCP (b), sent a detailed note to the Central Committee of the RCP (b) entitled "Soviet power and Yakutia." It refers to the fact that the white bandit movement in the region sets the task of revising the form of work of Soviet bodies with the local population. The note refers to the impossibility of building a pure dictatorship of the proletariat in this region, since it was not there, just as there was no peasantry in its usual sense. , socialism and, being nationally downtrodden, in their overwhelming majority brought up on feelings of narrow national egoism, national isolation and hostility to any oppressive foreign land. [21]

The difficult situation was reflected in 1922 by the reports of the OGPU. In a report for March 1922, it was written: “The situation in the Volga region, and especially in the south of Ukraine, can be considered almost threatening. In Odessa, Nikolaev and Zaporizhzhya, unrest does not stop all month long. The constant anger caused by the unrelenting pro-crisis leads to completely undesirable consequences in these areas ... Especially it should be noted the sharp deterioration in the mood of the workers of Donbass. [22] The same report noted the intensification of banditry in the Kiev district, the emergence of new gangs in the Volyn, Podolsk, Kyiv provinces, and the disclosure of the Petliura organization, numbering 4,000 members, in the Poltava province. The report also stated the revival of the transcendental Ukrainian movement. In particular, the opening of the All-Ukrainian Congress on November 21, 1921 was noted, at which “it was decided to demand the liberation of Ukraine from the Bolshevik occupation at the Genoa Conference.” [23]

This is only a part of the problems that Ukraine experienced in 1922. It is clear that the people who were on the ground were better aware of the real situation, and besides, it was they who had to solve all these difficult tasks. Therefore, the resolute defense of the interests of the republic by a number of Ukrainian Soviet leaders, especially in those conditions, was understandable. They did not want to get additional problems with the leaders of the Ukrainian national movement and before with the Ukrainian intelligentsia, most of whose representatives did not want to infringe upon the interests of Ukraine and, moreover, liquidate its independence.

There were also problems in other national regions. In the same report for March 1922, the OGPU dwells on banditry in the North Caucasus and notes the strong development of banditry in the Transcaucasian district, in particular in Georgia. It also speaks in detail about the Basmachi movement in Turkestan, which is taking "every measure to create a united front to fight the Soviet regime." The survey of the OGPU for May-June of the same year also gives a complex picture of the mood in the national regions among various sections of the population. For example, when characterizing the mood among the workers, the North-West of Russia and Ukraine were among the “completely not included in the category of those recovering”. There were strikes in Ukraine and the presence of banditry, although less significant than before. The presence of banditry is also noted in the Caucasus. However, and here some improvement in the situation is noted, but it is emphasized that "White Guard organizations still cover the Caucasus and Kuban with a dense network." With all the evidence of some calm in Turkestan, it was directly written: “There are still not enough symptoms to make it possible to say that the Basmachi movement, which has developed so strongly in Turkestan, is declining. On the contrary, all the information for the month of June indicates the strengthening of the Basmachi in the Ferghana and Samarkand regions.[24]

The July review noted the favorable effect on the mood of the population of a good harvest, but pointed to the presence of 70 gangs in Ukraine and banditry in a number of other areas, although subsiding in places, as well as "national antagonism between natives and Russian settlers" in Turkestan. [25] The greatest development of banditry during the summer period was noted in August 1922. Banditry is also mentioned in later reports [26] and, although there has been a gradual weakening of it, primarily a weakening of political banditry, it has not been possible to put an end to it this year. The reports and summaries also noted other difficulties among the workers, and among the peasants and intelligentsia, in November they even noted “the failure of the summer improvement in the mood of both the working and peasant masses, and the very rapid and widespread economic discontent of all groups of the population: in city on the basis of the rapid rise in prices, which had as its consequence the insufficiency of tariff rates, and in the countryside, due to the forced collection of food tax, at the end of the term, a 10% discount. [27]

The government of the RSFSR, as the most powerful Soviet republic, sought to provide assistance to other Soviet republics. In 1921, from its meager reserves, it allocated to Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia over 3.5 million poods of grain, as well as 8 million rubles. gold. The Transcaucasian republics also received significant economic assistance from the RSFSR in 1922 [28]. In turn, they increase their exports to Russia and the Transcaucasian republics. The supply of Baku oil was of particular importance. Only on April 5, 1921, in connection with the opening of navigation, an oil caravan of 33 ships set off from Baku to Astrakhan, about which the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs R. M. Huseynov informed V. I. Lenin by a special telegram. [29]

Ties in the military field are also becoming stronger. On December 8, 1921, a military convention on naval affairs between the RSFSR and the Soviet republics of Transcaucasia was concluded in Tbilisi. Its 14 articles determined the issues of unified command of all the armed forces in Transcaucasia, which included the Separate Caucasian Army (OKA), three national armies, each with one brigade of 10,000 fighters and commanders. The ground forces and fleets of the Transcaucasian Soviet republics, in accordance with this convention, were an integral part of the unified Red Army, that is, they were part of the OKA by national formations. [thirty]

On the whole, 1922 brought an undeniable improvement in comparison with 1921, but one cannot yet speak of complete calm, especially if one takes into account the presence of a powerful external factor. Foreign states, which until recently carried out intervention against the Land of the Soviets, switched from open use of force to other forms of struggle, supporting anti-Soviet elements in every possible way. Therefore, the situation in general was not simple even at the time when the formation of the USSR entered a decisive stage, that is, in the second half of 1922. By this time, three types of federal ties had manifested themselves - a federation based on autonomous principles within the RSFSR, the Transcaucasian Federation , created on the principles of a union treaty and a federation of Soviet independent republics, built on bilateral agreements. However, the struggle of opinions in the Soviet elite, in essence,

Another impetus for the direct implementation of the plan to create the Soviet Union was the question raised by the Communist Parties of Ukraine and Belarus in the spring of 1922, and then by the July plenum of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee, about improving relations with the RSFSR. To this end, it was decided to create a special party commission on August 10, 1922. At the same time, on August 10, the Politburo also discussed the proposal of the commission of M. V. Frunze, created on May 11. The wording of this new decision of the Politburo was as follows: "From the minutes of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on the preparation for the plenum of the Central Committee of the issue of relations between the RSFSR and the independent republics."[31] It is noteworthy that it was still about independent republics.

The Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) approves the composition of such a commission, which was instructed to prepare a project for the corresponding national-state construction. V. V. Kuibyshev is appointed chairman of the commission, and I. V. Stalin, G. K. Ordzhonikidze, G. Ya. G. (Budu) Mdivani, G. I. Petrovsky, A. G. Chervyakov, Ya. D. Yanson, A. Khodzhaev, F. Khodzhaev. The commission included representatives of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, the Far East, Khorezm and Bukhara.

Various approaches have already been identified. The position of Rakovsky was well known, for example, there was also the position of one of the leaders of Georgia, a member of the Commission of the Regional Committee of the RCP (b) - Mdivani. In July 1922, he drew up brief theses in which he outlined the general premises that determined the nature, scope and content of the federation. Each of the republics, according to his note, is the bearer of sovereignty "within its territory, and only its highest bodies are the spokesmen for its rights of supremacy."

Unlike bourgeois federations, to which Mdivani attributed Switzerland and the United States, in his opinion, a union of Soviet republics can be formed "only on the basis of an agreement or agreement between the supreme bodies of individual republics and, moreover, within the limits precisely outlined in the agreement." The federal bodies for Mdivani must carry out the will of the republics. [32] A draft drawn up by another member of the Zakkraykom of the RCP (b) A. Svanidze has also been preserved. Speaking about the union of the republics, he noted the preservation of their sovereignty and real sources of power. At the same time, he especially emphasized: "Allied power is not supranational power." [33] Mdivani and Svanidze were not alone in their views on the union of republics in other republics of Transcaucasia. They met quite strong support in the leadership of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan.[34]

D. Manuilsky, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, who was known for his closeness to Stalin, held a different position. On September 4, he sent a letter to Stalin, where he wrote: “The experience of the past year has shown that the situation that has arisen in the outskirts and, in particular, in Ukraine, leading to a number of conflicts between the departments of the center and the localities, cannot last any longer. This provision, which leads to the fact that responsible comrades must spend three-quarters of their time on conflict resolution, should be radically revised, because it no longer corresponds to the objective situation. And then Manuilsky proposes to move towards the liquidation of independent republics, replacing them with broad real autonomy. In his opinion, the situation has changed and there is no serious national movement, for example, in Ukraine. He claimed that the Ukrainian peasant is not interested in the national question and no longer regrets taking part in gangs of a political nature. According to his letter, there was no ground for the Ukrainian intelligentsia, so no serious national movement is foreseen in Ukraine.[35]

As modern researchers of the Ukrainian national movement of that time show, not everyone shared this opinion of Manuilsky, more often it was recognized that there was a national question and the Communist Party should seriously reckon with it. [36] Moreover, in modern literature it is noted that the then Ukrainian intelligentsia, due to many ideological, political and material reasons, had a negative attitude towards the Bolsheviks. In its environment, the attitude towards the Soviet power was seen as the attitude towards the power of "Moscow", "occupation", which continued the policy of "colonial" oppression of Ukraine. Comparisons were made with the Pereyaslav Rada and the Soviet government was called the new "Pereyaslav" or "sale" to Moscow. [37] Manuilsky could not have been unaware of this, but, advocating increased centralization, he deliberately downplayed the scale of the Ukrainian national movement in the early 1920s.

The initial draft resolution entitled "On the Relations of the RSFSR with the Independent Republics" was drawn up by I. V. Stalin. It was preceded by several materials prepared by Stalin at the same time, in August - September 1922. One of them is called "Outline of theses of I. V. Stalin on the issue of unification of the Soviet republics" and is dated August of the same year. It is curious that Stalin here mentions the “October Revolution in Russia” and writes that the real liberation of the peoples in the context of a mass uprising is possible only in the form of the formation of independent national republics , taking into account the peculiarities of life, language and culture.

Next, Stalin considers several periods of Soviet power, each of which, in his opinion, set new tasks. During the Civil War, a military union of all Soviet republics was necessary, the beginning of a peaceful period required their economic union, and the Genoese-Hague negotiations demanded a single diplomatic and foreign trade front. After the collapse of the Genoa-Hague Conference, as Stalin believed, there was a possibility of intervention and therefore a closer military-economic union of all Soviet republics was needed. And then the conclusion followed: “It is necessary to complete the process of ever-increasing rapprochement of the republics by uniting them into one federation, merging military and economic affairs and external relations (foreign affairs, foreign trade) into one whole, while maintaining autonomy for the republics in internal affairs.” [38]

Noteworthy is another material of that time, compiled by Stalin and known as "The Initial Draft Proposal of I. V. Stalin on the Formation of the USSR." This is a small but very capacious document, in which the unification of the RSFSR, Ukraine, Belarus and the Transcaucasian Federation into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is recognized as timely. It was proposed to base this association on the principle of voluntariness and equality of the republics, with the right of free exit from the union for each of them. Further, it was proposed to create an appropriate commission to develop the necessary draft treaty, which was followed by the formation of the relevant federal legislative and executive bodies. Under this project, the commissariats of the naval, communications, foreign affairs, foreign trade, and post and telegraphs were subject to merging. A number of other commissariats within the republics were subject to the directives of the corresponding commissariats of the Union. Full provision was also made for the interests of the national development of the peoples of these contracting republics. The further way to implement these proposals was to be through the approval of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the First Congress of Soviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.[39] Stalin's aims for ever greater centralization of government were clearly visible in these projects, as well as the liquidation of even the formal independence of the republics.

At the heart of the official draft resolution drawn up by Stalin a little later, the idea of “autonomization” lay even more clearly, which meant the unification of the national Soviet republics by joining the RSFSR on the rights of autonomy. Stalin proposed to create not one union, but a single state. As a result, the highest organs of state power of the RSFSR were transformed into federal ones, and the formal independence of the republics was abolished in this way. The independence of some people's commissariats - justice, education, internal affairs, agriculture, workers' and peasants' inspection, public health and social security, however, was preserved. Stalin suggested fixing this decision at the Central Executive Committees or congresses of the Soviets of the republics, and proclaiming the creation of the USSR at the All-Russian Congress as the wish of the republics themselves. [40]

It is known that within the framework of the commission, Rakovsky resolutely opposed this project, and at the same time, fundamentally different approaches of two Ukrainian leaders, Rakovsky and Manuilsky, were revealed. The first of them was then a member of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), the second was only a candidate, so Rakovsky was higher in position in the party than Manuilsky. In addition, he was a member of the Central Committee from 1919, and Manuilsky became a candidate only in 1922. However, it is difficult to say which of them was supported by the majority of Ukrainian party and Soviet workers. In any case, when at the beginning of 1922 the question arose about the possible transfer of Rakovsky to another job, the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) U on March 23 of the same year decided "to categorically demand that Comrade Rakovsky not be removed from Ukraine." Among those who made such a demand was D. Manuilsky. [41] This is an indicator that at that time Rakovsky enjoyed great prestige not only in the government, but also among the leadership of the Ukrainian Communist Party. In any case, the literature emphasizes that Rakovsky relied on the support of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine and the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine. [42] But in the commission itself, apparently, the majority supported the autonomization project.

On August 25, 1922, at a meeting with Lenin in Gorki, Rakovsky was probably the first to report to the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR about Stalin's plan. [43] Lenin's meetings with Stalin on August 19 and 30 are also known. Moreover, some authors suggest that Stalin on one of these days acquainted Lenin with his proposals and that Lenin approved them. [44] Whether this is true or not, we do not know for sure. Maybe he did, but, knowing the different approaches to resolving the issue on the part of Rakovsky and Stalin, Lenin, perhaps, decided not to interfere at this stage and wait for the decision of the commission. The commission also prepared only a draft, and its work was of a laboratory nature. The Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party was supposed to decide the issue, and it was it that was supposed to work out the necessary resolution.

Later, on September 22, Stalin sent Lenin an extensive letter specifically devoted to defining the relations of the center with the republics. The letter spoke of complete chaos in the relationship between the center and the outskirts and posed the fundamental question, either complete independence, or the actual unification of the Soviet Republics into one economic entity and their subordination to the government bodies of the RSFSR, that is, as Stalin wrote further, "the replacement of fictitious independence with real internal autonomy of the republics in the sense of language, culture, justice, internal affairs, agriculture, and so on. Stalin openly wrote about the need for four years of the Civil War to demonstrate the liberalism of Moscow in the national question and that this led to the fact that some part of the communists appeared, demanding real independence. Stalin also wrote there: “Now we are talking about how not to ‘offend’ the nationals; in a year, it will probably be a question of how not to cause a split in the party on this basis, because the "national" element works in the border regions not in favor of the unity of the Soviet

Republics, and formal independence favors this work.

Expanding further on his plan, Stalin wrote that the question of Bukhara, Khiva and the Far East was supposed to be left open for the time being, while with regard to the five other republics, that is, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, he considered it expedient to autonomize, moreover, in such a way that they voluntarily expressed their desire to enter into closer economic relations with Moscow on the basis of autonomy. At the same time, Stalin referred to the statements of the Azerbaijani and Armenian Central Committees of the party about the desirability of autonomization and the statement of the Georgian Central Committee of the Communist Party about the desirability of maintaining formal independence. According to Stalin, most members of the commission were in favor of autonomization, including Sokolnikov. As for the representatives of Ukraine, Stalin emphasized Manuilsky's position and wrote about sending his mentioned letter to Lenin. Rakovsky,[45]

On September 23, the first meeting of the commission was held, but V. M. Molotov, who had not previously been a member of the commission, was its chairman. Molotov was approved as a member and chairman of the commission in connection with the departure of V. V. Kuibyshev on vacation by the decision of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) of September 20, 1922 [46] Four members of the commission - H. G. Rakovsky, P. G. Mdivani, F. Khodzhaev, Ya. D. Janson were absent from the meeting, and in this composition the decision is formulated “to adopt the draft resolution of comrade as a basis. Stalin." Only K. Tsintsadze, who was present at this meeting instead of the ill Mdivani, abstained.

But the next day, on September 24, Mdivani was present at another meeting, and different approaches were revealed there when discussing certain points of the approved resolution. Petrovsky, who then represented Ukraine, suggested "allowing discussion of the decisions taken by the commission in the bureau of the provincial committees of the republics." In addition to Petrovsky himself, representatives of Belarus, Georgia, and Azerbaijan - Chervyakov, Mdivani and Agamali oglu - voted for such a proposal, while the representative of Bukhara - F. Khodzhaev abstained. This time the commission's decision was taken by a one-vote majority (five to four). However, if Rakovsky had been present, it is not difficult to imagine how this meeting would have ended. In this situation, at the request of Petrovsky, a record is made that the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) U did not discuss the issue of relations with the RSFSR. [47] The situation began to escalate, because the representatives of the four republics did not want to take responsibility and offered to consult with their comrades in the field.

In the meantime, the resolution of the Commission of September 24, 1924 "on the question of relations between the RSFSR and the independent republics" already proclaimed in its first paragraph: "To recognize as expedient the conclusion of an agreement between the Soviet republics of Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia and the RSFSR on the formal entry RSFSR, leaving the question of Bukhara, Khorezm and the Far East open and limiting itself to accepting agreements with them on customs, foreign trade, foreign and military affairs, and so on. [48] And further, the procedure for the entry of these republics into the RSFSR was envisaged. So, foreign affairs and foreign trade, military affairs, means of communication, with the exception of local transport, mail and telegraph were supposed to be merged with the corresponding institutions of the RSFSR, and it was decided to formally subordinate the people's commissariats of finance, food, labor and the national economy of the republics to the directives of the relevant people's commissariats of the RSFSR. As for such people's commissariats as the people's commissariats of justice, education, internal affairs, agriculture, workers' and peasants' inspection, public health and social security, they were decided to be left independent. It was decided to subordinate the organs of struggle against counter-revolution in the republics to the directives of the GPU of the RSFSR. In the conclusion of this document, it was decided, if it was approved by the Central Committee of the RCP, not to publish it,[49]

Even before the meeting of the commission, the project of “autonomization” received support from the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the Regional Committee of the RCP (b), but was rejected by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, which insisted that each republic independently be part of the union of Soviet republics on an equal footing. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus spoke out for the preservation of contractual relations between the republics, while the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine did not make a definite decision on the ways of uniting the republics. [fifty]

A careful acquaintance with the then decisions of the Central Committee of the Soviet republics makes it possible to clarify a number of nuances in the corresponding wording and execution of documents. [51] The protocol of the meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party dated September 11, 1922, which approved the directive of Agamali oglu to participate in the commission on the issue of relations between the independent republics and the RSFSR, was signed by the secretary of the Central Committee S. M. Kirov, as you know, not an Azerbaijani by nationality .

In the first paragraph of this resolution, it was written about the need to recognize a closer than it was before, "the unification of Soviet Azerbaijan with Russia and the creation of a single Soviet Federation with the provision of the national republics with the greatest independence in matters of education, local administration, court and land."

In the second paragraph, it was recognized that Azerbaijan, both industrially and geographically, had until then been actually united with Soviet Russia and "that now the moment requires the formal consolidation of the unity of Azerbaijan with Russia on the basis of broad autonomy."

In the next 3rd and last paragraph of this resolution, it was recognized not to carry out a wide agitation campaign to popularize this decision, but it was recognized as necessary to carry out preparatory work in order to clarify the attitude of wide sections of workers and peasants to this reform. [52]

The decision of the Plenum of the Azerbaijani Communist Party recognized the need to create a unified Soviet Federation, that is, it carried out the idea of a federal structure of the country, used the term "broad autonomy", and the creation of the future USSR was called a reform, and it was recommended not to campaign on this decision, but only to clarify the public opinion. The authors of this decision, by no means, advocated a unitary state, although there is no complete unity between the federation and even broad autonomy, and here one could see some contradiction in understanding the future foundations of the Soviet state.

JV Stalin's theses on autonomization were discussed at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia on September 15, 1922, and in the very first paragraph of his resolution one can read the following words: “Proposed on the basis of the theses of comrade. Stalin, the unification in the form of autonomization of the independent Republics is considered premature. That is, it did not write about the fundamental non-recognition of the principle of autonomization, but it was assessed only as premature. But at the moment it was not accepted, but it was recognized as necessary to unite economic efforts and a common policy, "but with the preservation of all the attributes of independence." Actually, this is what was in the operative part, but even this was enough to understand the positions of the Georgian side. The leaders of the Georgian Communist Party called for the preservation of all attributes of independence, but recognized the need for unification in the economic field and common policy. In all likelihood, the common policy meant not only foreign but also domestic policy.

But in the extract from the protocol of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party, not only the operative part is of interest, but also specific information about the results of the vote. Of the members of the Central Committee present, five were in favor of the resolution, one - Eliava was against it. As for the candidates for membership of the Central Committee, of those present, six were in favor and not one was against it. The resolution further stated that of those present, 19 were in favor and 6 were against. These latter included G. K. Ordzhonikidze, A. S. Enukidze, SM. Kirov, G. Ya. Sokolnikov, L. D. Gogoberidze, and M. I. Kakhiani. Abstained Micah

Tskhakaya. In addition, the secretariat of the Central Committee was instructed to interrogate the opinion of the absent members of the Central Committee - I. D. Orakhelashvili, E. A. Eshba, M. T. Toroshelidze, M. I. Kalandadze, B. D. Gogia and A. A. Gegechkori. Mdivani was instructed to interview M. S. Okudzhava, L. E. Dumbadze and K. M. Tsintsadze, who were then in Moscow. At the end of the resolution, it was recommended to temporarily refrain from familiarizing the broad masses of the party with this issue. [53]

As for the situation in Armenia, first of all, a telegram sent by G.K. Ordzhonikidze to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia S.L. Lukashin, apparently sent on September 15, 1922, was preserved. phrase: “Here the Central Committee, apparently, will kick. The support of the Central Committee of Armenia is necessary.” Ordzhonikidze further recommended that in the event that the plenum could not be convened, then at least the decision of the presidium and responsible comrades was necessary.

It turns out that Ordzhonikidze was not very sure of the full support of the Armenian Central Committee and recommended that appropriate work be carried out. However, already on September 16, signed by Lukashin (Srapionyan), a telegram from Armenia arrived at the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the RCP (b). It reported on the unanimous support of the theses on the issue of political and economic relations between the Soviet republics, not only by the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia, but also by its Yerevan Committee. That is, Ordzhonikidze's fears were not confirmed in this case.

A different picture has developed in Belarus. There, at a meeting of the Plenum of the Central Bureau of the Communist Party of Belarus, a draft regulation on the commissariats was heard, on which Chervyakov reported. In the operative part, first of all, attention was paid, in connection with the discussion of the question of relations between the Soviet republics, to the question of the territory of Belarus. It was about unification with Belarus of Vitebsk and Gomel provinces, which were then part of the RSFSR. That is, for the Belarusian comrades, the most important was the territorial issue - the issue of annexing those lands where the Belarusians were in the majority. Only then came the following wording: "Consider it expedient to establish relations between the commissariats of the RSFSR and similar to the relations established between the RSFSR and Ukraine." [54]

The Belarusian side did not just move away from answering the direct question about autonomization, it did not agree with it, preferring bilateral relations with the Russian Federation on the principles that Russia had with Ukraine. As for Ukraine, as noted, the Ukrainian leadership did not consider it necessary to discuss the issue at this stage and proposed to postpone the meeting in the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on the issue of relations with the RSFSR, scheduled for September 22, until October 15. On October 3, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPB (b) of Ukraine spoke out against the autonomization plan. However, there was an important reservation that if the Central Committee of the RCP (b) still recognizes the need for the Ukrainian SSR to become part of the RSFSR, then not “insist on maintaining the formal signs of political independence of the Ukrainian SSR, but determine relations on the basis of practical expediency.” [55] It turned out that the representatives of three republics - Georgia, Belarus and Ukraine did not support the proposal for "autonomization". As noted in the literature, "a review of the project on the ground revealed large (our italics - V. G.) differences on the question of the form of unification of the republics." [56] The literature also emphasizes that “most of the republics did not support the 'autonomization' plan. [57] However, the commission of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), nevertheless, decided the issue in its own way, and with such an alignment of forces, the conflict could escalate, and this could not be ignored.

[1] The CPSU in resolutions ... V.2, M., 1970, p. 246–256.

[2] Makarova G.P. People's Commissariat, p. 105.

[3] See: O. I. Chistyakov, Mutual relations of the Soviet republics before the formation of the USSR. M., 1955.

[4] Documents of foreign policy of the USSR. TV M., 1961, p. 58.

[5] Nezhinsky L. N. At the origins of the Bolshevik-unitary foreign policy (1921–1923) // Patriotic history. 1994, No. 1, p.96.

[6] A failed anniversary. Why didn't the USSR celebrate its 70th anniversary? M., 1992, p. 87.

[7] Harmandaryan S.V. Rallying peoples, p. fifty.

[8] A failed anniversary, p.88.

[9] Ibid., p. 88–89.

[10] Ibid., p. 89.

[11] Ibid., p. 90–91.

[12] Ibid., p. 91–92.

[13] Central Committee of the RCP (b) - VKP (b) and the national question, p.65.

[14] Ibid., p. 65–66.

[15] Ibid., p. 66.

[16] Eleventh Congress of the RCP (b) March-April 1922. Verbatim report. M., 1961, p.37, 72–75, 115.

[17] Figures of the USSR and the revolutionary movement in Russia. Encyclopedic Dictionary Pomegranate. M., 1989, p. 668–674.

[18] A failed anniversary, p. 94; The text of the protocol in this collection of documents is borrowed from RTSKhIDNI (RGASPI), f. 558, op.1, d.2479, l. 13. A somewhat more complete text of this protocol from another fund of the RGASPI (f. 17, op. 84, file 326, l. 1) see: Central Committee of the RCP (b) - VKP (b) and the national question, p. 67–68.

[19] A failed anniversary, p. 95.

[20] Ibid., l. 96.

[21] Central Committee of the RCP (b) - VKP (b) and the national question, p. 69–71.

[22] "Top Secret": Lubyanka-Stalin on the situation in the country (1922-1934). T. 1.4.1. M., 2001, p.121.

[23] Ibid., p. 123, 128.

[24] Ibid., p. 164–203.

[25] Ibid., p. 243.

[26] Ibid., p. 265., 190-293, 466-467, 480, 488-489.

[27] Ibid., p. 474.

[28] Harmandaryan SV. Unity of peoples, pp. 29, 46–47.

[29] Soviet Commonwealth of Nations, p. 206–207.

[30] Harmandaryan SV. Unity of peoples, p. 33–34.

[31] Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, p. 295, 493–494.

[32] A failed anniversary, p. 97–98; On the Way to “Socialist Unitarism (From the New Documents of 1922 on the History of the Formation of the USSR) // Domestic History. 1992, No. 4, S. 90.

[33] Towards “socialist unitarism”, p. 90.

[34] Chivadze Sh. I. On the path indicated by V. I. Lenin (On the 60th anniversary of the XII Party Congress) // Questions of the history of the CPSU. 1983, no. 4, p. 69.

[35] Central Committee of the RCP (b) - VKP (b) and the national question, p. 77.

[36] Marchukov A.V. Decree. cit., p.385.

[37] Ibid., pp. 249, 258.

[38] V. A. Sakharov, “Political testament” of Lenin. The reality of history and the myths of politics. Applications. M., 2003, p. 646–647.

[39] Ibid., p. 647–648.

[40] From the history of the formation of the USSR // News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989, no. 9, p. 192–193.

[41] Melnichenko V. Decree. cit., p.56.

[42] Ibid., p. 55.

[43] For Kh. G. Rakovsky's meetings with V. I. Lenin, see: H. Rakovsky. Ilyich and Ukraine // Chronicle of the Revolution. Kharkov, 1925, No. 2, p. 5–10.

[44] Sakharov V.A. Decree. op., p. 227.

[45] Central Committee of the RCP (b) - VKP (b) and the national question, p. 78–79;. The letter was first published in Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU. M., 1989, No. 9, p. 198–200.

[46] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989, no. 9, p. 191.

[47] Melnichenko V Decree. op., p. 55.

[48] Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, p. 296.

[49] Ibid., p. 297.

[50] The multinational Soviet state. M., 1972, p.51.

[51] Pentkovskaya V. V. The role of V. I. Lenin in the formation of the USSR // Questions of history. 1956, no. 3, p. 17–18.

[52] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989, no. 9, p. 195.

[53] Ibid., p. 196.

[54] Ibid., p. 197.

[55] Sakharov V.A. Decree. op., p. 230; History of nation-state construction in the CCCP... T. I, p. 275.

[56] Congresses of Soviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Sat. doc. 1922–1936, T. III M., 1960, p. 10.

[57] History of nation-state building in the USSR... T. I, p.275.