Formation of the USSR (1917-1924)

Formation of the USSR (1917-1924)

Plan of V. I. Lenin

On September 25, 1922, the materials of the Commission, and among them were the draft of Stalin, the resolution and minutes of the meetings of the Commission, the resolutions of the Central Committees of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, and, probably, the materials on Belarus and Ukraine, are sent to Gorki, where Lenin was then . Having studied these materials, Lenin invited Stalin to a conversation that lasted 2 hours and 40 minutes. [one] On the same day, Lenin sent a letter to Kamenev for members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), specifically devoted to the work of the Commission and Stalin's position. From this letter of Lenin it followed that on September 25, that is, on the eve of the meeting with Stalin, he already had a meeting with one of the members of the Commission, Sokolnikov, and the next day, that is, on the 27th, he intended to meet with Mdivani. Further, Lenin wrote: “In my opinion, the question is paramount. Stalin has a little tendency to hurry. You (you once had the intention to do this and even did a little) think carefully; Zinoviev too. And then Lenin reports one concession that Stalin agreed to make. Instead of "joining" the RSFSR, it was proposed to write: "Formal unification, together with the RSFSR, into a union of the Soviet republics of Europe and Asia." The spirit of this concession is, I hope, clear:

The amendment was indeed fundamental. In the literature, it was directly written that in his letter of September 26, Lenin "put forward and substantiated the brilliant idea of forming the USSR on the basis of complete equality of all independent Soviet republics, the most careful observance of their sovereign rights." [2] The future structure of the new country changed radically and, thus, a federation of a new type was created. Actually, for Lenin it was not something absolutely new. Lenin spoke about the union of Soviet republics back at the April Conference, but actually dealt with it during the Civil War, for example, in 1919. He did not consider abandoning this idea in the autumn of 1922. Trying to find the best option for the relationship between the center and the outskirts, Moscow and the republics he proposes a new level of guidance and demonstrates it in subsequent comments on the Commission's draft. According to paragraph 2 of the resolution, he puts forward the idea of creating a "All-Federal All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia." And after that follows his another important consideration: “It is important that we do not give food to the ‘independents’, do not destroy their independence, but they were creating a new level, a federation of equal republics.”

Lenin also proposed some other amendments to the September 24 Resolution in the same spirit as the previous ones and emphasized that this draft of his was preliminary and, after conversations with Mdivani and other comrades, he would add and change it. [3] For the time being, as follows from the same letter, Stalin agreed to postpone the submission of the resolution to the Politburo of the Central Committee until the arrival of Lenin, who was going to return to Moscow on October 2. In the meantime, naturally, not earlier than September 26, 1922, a draft on the relations of the RSFSR with the independent Soviet Socialist Republics, signed by members of the commission of the Central Committee-Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, Myasnikov and Molotov, was sent to all members and candidates of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). It directly wrote about the submission to the Central Committee of "a slightly modified, more precise formulation of the decision of the Commission of the Central Committee." It also spoke of the need to conclude an agreement between Ukraine, Belarus, the Federation of the Transcaucasian Republics and the RSFSR on their unification into the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, with each of them retaining the right to freely secede from the Union, and further reported on the bodies of the Union and the republics.[4] What resulted, however, was not a “slightly altered” resolution, but a fundamentally revised resolution under the direct influence of Lenin. At the same time, Lenin, of course, took good account of the decisions of the Eighth Party Congress, which specifically emphasized: “All decisions of the RCP and its leading institutions are, of course, binding on all parts of the Party, regardless of their national composition,” and the resolution of its Tenth Congress “On Unity parties", which were a serious support and, at the same time, a safety net for the unity of all Soviet republics.

Stalin, therefore, agreed with Lenin's most important remark, although in a reply letter of September 27, also addressed to members of the Politburo, rejecting the principle of autonomization and recognizing the need to unite the republics in the Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia, he objected to the proposal to create a federal Central Executive Committee, since this will lead to the creation in Moscow of two chambers - Russian and federal, as well as against the creation of allied people's commissariats. After making a few more remarks on Lenin's proposals, Stalin emphasized: "There can hardly be any doubt that this 'hurriedness' feeds the 'independents' to the detriment of Comrade Lenin's national liberalism." [five] However, on the main issue of non-incorporation of independent republics into the RSFSR, Stalin nevertheless recognized Lenin's proposal as fair, and this was the fundamental issue of the heated discussion.

Of course, Stalin had a different opinion, and he tried to defend it in the future. Already on September 28, 1922, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), there was an exchange of notes between Stalin and Kamenev. Kamenev, apparently commenting on a letter received from Lenin, wrote that Ilyich was going to war in defense of independence and asked him, that is, Kamenev, to meet with the Georgians. Stalin, in a reply note, called for firmness against Ilyich, emphasizing at the same time, “if a couple of Georgian Mensheviks influence the Georgian communists, and the latter on Ilyich, then the question is - what does “independence” have to do with it? In response, Kamenev wrote the following words: "I think, since Vladimir Ilyich insists, it would be worse to resist." Kamenev considered it necessary to emphasize the word resist. To which the following words of Stalin followed: “I don’t know. Let him do as he pleases." [6]

Meanwhile, work on the union project continued. On September 27, Lenin met with Ordzhonikidze, who was a supporter of autonomization, as well as with Mdivani, who was categorically against it. The next day, September 28, Lenin met with opponents of autonomization, members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia M. S. Okudzhava, L. E. Dumbadze, K. M. Tsintsadze. On the same day, he also met with the chairman of the Armenian Council of People's Commissars, A.F. Myasnikov, who shared the idea of autonomization. [7] Lenin, therefore, tried to listen to the arguments of both representatives of the republics and try to work out an optimal design. Apparently, Lenin's arguments, at least during these conversations, suited both sides. The details of these negotiations are not reflected in the sources and one has to be guided by assumptions.

Lenin, on the one hand, retained his intention to create a union of Soviet republics, on the other hand, he proposed the creation of a new leadership floor. This made it possible to preserve the principle of equality with centralization, which is so necessary for such a large country as the Land of Soviets. And for old Russia, the need for greater centralization than for many other countries was obvious. Prominent historian and leader of the Cadets P. N. Milyukov, not without reason, wrote about the weak cohesive forces in Russia, referring them to the main Russian features. [8] Russia, indeed, was too diverse geographically, multi-confessional and multi-ethnic, not to mention a number of its other features, including social character, and there were no opportunities to manage it skillfully without taking into account these features. [nine] Lenin, indeed, for that time proposed the best option for taking into account centralism and federalism, especially since the party was united and ruling, and Lenin constantly took into account its use as an instrument of control. Under those conditions, it was necessary to reassure the national intelligentsia, most of which were anti-Soviet, and to prevent a split in the party itself, since the example of Ukraine, where the chairman of the Ukrainian government Rakovsky was in some positions, and the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, in others, was very alarming.

Literally two days after Lenin's letter to Kamenev on September 28, 1922, Rakovsky, who was then on vacation in the Crimea, writes a long letter to Stalin, where he sets out his comments on the draft resolution on the relationship of the RSFSR with the independent republics, noting in it ambiguities and contradictions. First of all, he touched upon the subordination of government bodies of other republics to Russian government bodies. He wrote bluntly about the need to put the RSFSR's relations with the independent republics on a firm footing. He saw this necessity in the manifestations of the new economic policy, which liberated the petty-bourgeois capitalist element, striving for conquests that are generally characteristic of capitalism. This led to a struggle to take over enterprises between central and local authorities.

Rakovsky's second argument in favor of a necessary settlement is the international position. At the moment of entering into political and economic relations with the capitalist world, a greater unity of leadership is needed than ever before. And the third, in his opinion, was the need to complete the construction of the Soviet state form and stop drawing up short schematic contracts, often revised and even canceled. Further, Rakovsky proceeds to criticize the Resolution adopted by the commission, which, in his opinion, will also need, and in the near future, a new revision.

According to Rakovsky, the project did not work out the correct principles for building a real federation.

“Its implementation,” Rakovsky wrote further, “that is, the formal abolition of the independent republics, will be a source of difficulties both abroad and within the federation. He belittles the revolutionary liberation role of proletarian Russia. According to Rakovsky, this new policy in relation to the republics will be regarded as a NEP transferred to the sphere of national relations, and this in the presence of a noticeable aggravation of national feelings, in conditions where the proletariat itself has succumbed to the general petty-bourgeois element. This new policy, Rakovsky believed, would also harm the plans for economic revival, since the economic initiative of the independent republics was already extremely narrow.

On the international plane, if the resolution is put into practice, in Rakovsky's opinion, it can only strengthen the opponents of Soviet power from the bourgeois and compromising camps. The presence of Eastern independent Soviet republics provides an opportunity for revolutionary penetration into the East. “Through the independent Soviet Ukraine, the Soviet Federation had the opportunity to make the same revolutionary penetration into Galicia, Bukovina, Bessarabia. Without any serious need, we are depriving ourselves of these weapons , and vice versa, we are giving the Polish and Rumanian bourgeoisie new weapons to fight against us and strengthen their national policy. Moreover, Rakovsky continued, “in relation to Ukraine, Poland will act as a defender of its independence, recognized by the Riga Treaty.”

According to Rakovsky, all these emerging difficulties in relations between the Soviet republics could be eliminated by appropriate changes in their constitutions. And concluding his extensive letter, Rakovsky emphasized: “The most important question remains - the question of developing a strictly centralized, but federal system of government in which the interests of the republic would be correctly protected and the latter would enjoy a certain autonomy.” Rakovsky considered the conclusion of the commission to be inconclusive and suggested that the question be raised again and resolved in its entirety in accordance with the resolutions of the party congresses. [10] The next day, September 29, Rakovsky sent a letter from Gurzuf to Manuilsky, emphasizing his disagreement with the decision of the commission on relations between the RSFSR and the independent republics. He sees in her decision a detriment to the strengthening of the party and Soviet power in all the outlying regions, and if the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks shares his point of view, he considered it expedient that Petrovsky and Frunze, having left for Moscow, defended this point of view. [11]

Rakovsky, therefore, was not an opponent of centralism, he was clearly aware of it, but he could not in any way support the liquidation of the formal independence of the Soviet republics, putting forward the foundations of both internal and external order. He, apparently, did not yet know Lenin's proposals, but their opinions agreed, first of all, on the issue of non-recognition of the autonomization plan.

A number of other leading party and Soviet officials also took part in the development of the project for the future structure of the country. Of interest in this respect is the note of the chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, M.I. Kalinin, sent to I.V. Stalin at the very beginning of October 1922. This note also contained a number of amendments, but to another, later draft. It is noteworthy that in this note, Kalinin, addressing Stalin, directly wrote: “The democratic principle is completely violated in your project, with my amendments I seek to restore it. I hope that you, as the people's commissar, will support me." And then the “all-Russian headman” makes several amendments, which, in his opinion, will help reduce the cost of new apparatuses of power and, in general, as he wrote there, they are closer to the spirit of Soviet power. But Kalinin gave amendments to another draft,

This new draft resolution also dates from the beginning of October, more precisely until October 6, and already in its first paragraph it was written: “To recognize as necessary the conclusion of an agreement between Ukraine, Belarus, the Federation of the Transcaucasian Republics and the RSFSR on their unification into the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, leaving each of them has the right to freely withdraw from the Union. This was the first and most important point in the draft resolution of the commission, which thus proposed a new name for the future state - the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. This was followed by proposals for the organization of state bodies, according to which some of the commissariats were subject to union subordination, and some to republican. It was proposed to consider the Union Central Executive Committee as the supreme body of the Union, where it was proposed to include representatives of the Central Executive Committees of the RSFSR, Transcaucasian Federation, Ukraine and Belarus in proportion to the population they represent. It was proposed to consider the Union Council of People's Commissars, appointed by the Union Central Executive Committee, as the executive body of the Union Central Executive Committee. The draft of this resolution was signed by members of the commission of the Central Committee Stalin, Ordzhonikizde, Myasnikov, Molotov.[12]

[1] Vladimir Ilyich Lenin: Biographical Chronicle. M., 1982. T.12, p. 388.

[2] History of nation-state construction in the CCCP... T. I, p. 276.

[3] Lenin V. I. Poly. coll. op. T. 45, p. 211–213.

[4] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989, no. 9, p. 205–206.

[5] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989, no. 9, p. 208.

[6] A failed anniversary, p. 114.

[7] Lenin V. I. Poly. coll. op. T.45, p. 686–687.

[8] P. Milyukov, Why was the Russian Revolution inevitable? // Russian idea. In the circle of writers and thinkers of the Russian diaspora. M., 1994. T. P, p. 120.

[9] Grosul V. Ya. Russian society of the XVIII-XIX centuries. Traditions and innovations. M., 2003, Sat.

[10] A failed anniversary, p. 115–120. The letter was first published in Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989, no. 9, p. 209–213.

[11] Melnichenko V. Decree. op., p. 58.

[12] Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, p. 299–300.