Formation of the USSR (1917-1924)

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Formation of the USSR (1917-1924)  

The national question at the party forums of 1923

Further work on the creation of the USSR continued in several directions. The First Congress of Soviets of the USSR proclaimed the creation of a new state, but many serious tasks still lay ahead. Of course, there was a single party that actually led the country. There was a single external border, there was a single defense system and, in fact, a single Red Army. A unified foreign policy was also pursued, economic ties were strengthened both by recreating the old ones and by developing new ones, for example, through the State Planning Commission. Many other common points can be found, but with all this, a number of other provisions of the Declaration and the Treaty on the Creation of the USSR still had to be implemented.

At the very first session of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of the 1st convocation, which took place on the evening of December 30, 1922, that is, immediately after the closing of the 1st Congress of Soviets of the USSR, the development of the Constitution of the USSR was entrusted to the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee. For the next session of the Central Executive Committee, he was instructed to develop the Regulations on the People's Commissariats of the USSR, the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labor and Defense of the USSR, the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and members of the Central Executive Committee and other issues. He was also instructed to outline the personal composition of the people's commissariats. The same session instructed the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and its Presidium, until the second session of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR was convened, the right to issue decrees and resolutions for the entire USSR. The Presidium of the CEC, as noted, was elected at the same session, consisting of 19 members and 13 candidates. The session also elected four chairmen of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, one from each union republic.

On January 10, 1923, at its very first meeting, the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, in pursuance of the decision of the session of the Central Executive Committee, formed six commissions to develop the main provisions of the draft constitution. The first commission was to develop regulations on the Council of People's Commissars, the STO and the people's commissariats of the Union. The convocation of this commission was entrusted to M. I. Kalinin. A budget commission was also created, which was to develop and submit to the Presidium of the CEC of the Union a regulation on the Budget Commission and the procedure for considering the budget; the commission for the development of regulations on the Supreme Court under the Central Executive Committee of the Union and on the joint body of the GPU under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR; the commission for the development of the Regulations on the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and on the members of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR; a commission for drawing up a draft for the construction of the governing bodies of the people's commissariats and determining the personal composition of the people's commissariats; and a commission for the development of the State Flag and the State Emblem of the USSR.[one]

On January 13, 1923, at the first meeting of the commission for the development of regulations on the Council of People's Commissars, the STO and People's Commissariats of the USSR, a subcommittee was created with the aim of preliminary preparation of all materials on the Constitution and draft regulations on the People's Commissariats of the USSR. In January-February, this subcommittee was engaged in drafting the text of the Constitution. At the same time, the Central Executive Committees of the union republics created their own commissions to review and clarify the texts of the Declaration and the Treaty. Other commissions, which began to operate in accordance with the decision of the Presidium of the CEC, coordinated their actions with this commission and worked on the development of individual chapters of the Constitution. By mid-February, a subcommittee of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR prepared the first draft of the Union Constitution. It took into account the proposals of the union republics, including the draft submitted by the RSFSR.

This preparatory work on the development of the Constitution also proceeded in the atmosphere of discussions, which showed the presence of different opinions, including on the ground. There was a noticeable desire to achieve greater independence of the union republics. Thus, in the Ukraine, N. Skrypnik proposed inserting the words “sovereign republics” into the Declaration already adopted by the congress after the words about the unification of the republics. However, the republics, having received the relevant documents, had the right to various kinds of proposals, which was provided for by the decisions of the congress. There were certain features in Belarus as well. There, the Presidium of the local CEC approved the decision of the meeting of legal consultants of the republican central institutions and people's commissariats on the mandatory reconfirmation of legislative acts coming from Moscow that affect the activities of officially unified departments. Representatives of the autonomies of the Russian Federation also made their demands, seeking greater independence, primarily in the economic field. Their leadership even raised the question of granting both autonomous republics and large regions and regions of Russia "the rights of allied units in the common federation of the USSR."[2] The areas of education and culture of small peoples also had their own problems. The First All-Russian Congress of Provincial Councils of National Minorities, held on January 17, 1923, stated new difficulties for itself in connection with the introduction of the New Economic Policy. Thus, the staff of the People's Commissariat of Education, which by the beginning of 1922 amounted to 8000 people, was reduced by the end of the same year to 1200 people, including the head office of the Council of National Minorities, the reduction was smaller, but also quite sensitive - from 130 employees to 42 It is noteworthy that this council categorically refused to be transferred to the People's Commissariat of Nationalities, and to such an extent that it came to collective resignation. At this congress, the serious need to combat clericalism, especially among Muslims, was noted. [3]

However, the most difficult issue after the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR remained the Georgian one. The "Georgian case" dragged on and demanded the constant attention of the party leaders. On January 25, 1923, the Politburo makes a decision, which says: “Approve the change in the composition of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and Soviet institutions in Georgia as caused by the situation in the Caucasus and the course of the struggle in the Georgian party. Likewise, the decisions of the Organizing Bureau of December 21 on the transfer to work outside Georgia vols. Tsintsadze, Mdivani, Makharadze and Kavtaradze. This decision, which was sent to the provincial and regional committees of the party, was accompanied by an explanatory letter entitled "On the Conflict in the Communist Party of Georgia." It is noteworthy that the majority of Politburo members abstained from voting, although they did not oppose it. [4]

On February 4, Stalin, in a written appeal to all members of the Central Committee, again returned to the problems of building a union state. Among other things, he here proposed the creation of another chamber, which would represent the nationalities, in fact, according to the national-state principle. On February 8, this letter was discussed at the Politburo and, in general, approved, although the idea of ​​​​creating allied people's commissariats with control functions was rejected. [five]

The next Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), held on February 21-24, also directly dealt with interethnic problems. A report entitled "National Moments in Party and State Construction" was made on February 21 by Stalin. The report was large and structured in the form of theses. It emphasized the objective progressiveness of economic capitalist integration and, at the same time, the subjugation of some peoples by others. In this connection, a second trend was also noted, reflecting the struggle of the peoples for their liberation. The irreconcilable contradiction between the two tendencies leads to the fact that the bourgeoisie is unable to find the correct approach to solving the national question. Further, they spoke about the policy of the Communist Party on the national question before and after the October Revolution, and emphasized its features, which consisted in a resolute rejection of all forms of coercion against nationalities, recognition of the equality and sovereignty of peoples and their unification only on the basis of cooperation and voluntariness as a result of the overthrow of the power of capital. The need to eliminate not only formal but also actual inequality was noted, which can only be achieved by helping the Russian proletariat to the backward peoples of the Union by fighting against Great Russian chauvinism, as well as the need to fight against local nationalism. At the same time, Georgian, Azerbaijani, and Uzbek chauvinism was noted, which are stimulated by the conditions of the NEP.

In connection with the creation of the Union of Republics, as Stalin noted, a significant part of the bureaucracy regarded it as a step towards the liquidation of the republics and therefore, it is emphasized further in the report, such sentiments should be condemned and everything should be done in order to support the interests of nationalities. In this regard, it is necessary to create a special a representative body of nationalities on the basis of equality. And then they talked about practical measures to implement the ideas of the Union. These included the creation of a special body for the representation of all national republics without exception on the basis of equality. According to the same principle, the design of the Union's commissariats was recommended, and in the bodies of the national republics and regions it was envisaged to nominate mainly local people who knew the language, way of life, and customs of the respective peoples. Finally, Returning once again to the two deviations, Stalin emphasized the particular danger of a deviation towards Great Russian chauvinism and called for the implementation of a number of practical measures in the field of party building. Provision was made for the formation of Marxist circles from local party workers, the publication of Marxist literature in the native language, the strengthening of the University of the Peoples of the East and its local branches, the creation of instructor groups from local workers under the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties, the development of mass party literature in the native language, and, in general, the strengthening of the party education system. work in the republics, including among young people.[6]

This report, which was delivered on the very first day of the Plenum, is taken as a basis. On the last day of the Plenum, that is, on February 24, in the evening, M. V. Frunze made his report entitled “On Practical Issues Arising from the Decision [of the Congress of Soviets] of the Union of Soviet Republics”. This, too, was not Frunze's first report on the national question, and it turned out that Stalin, as it were, represented the center, while Frunze acted as the representative of the outlying districts. Experts who have studied both reports believe that their positions diverged. But, without focusing on this point, we note Frunze's proposal of the need to categorically separate the governing bodies of the Union from the existing bodies of the RSFSR. Further, Frunze proposed to the Politburo to take measures for the immediate construction of these organs and, which, of course, was very important,

Further, Frunze called for the creation of a special commission of the Central Committee for control and general leadership in solving all the tasks set and developing the draft Constitution of the USSR. [7] According to Frunze's report, a heated debate unfolded at the Plenum, revealing the existence of different approaches and reflecting the positions of both supporters of unitarism and those who defended the rights of the union republics. The plenum created a special commission consisting of L. Kamenev, I. Stalin, M. Frunze, H. Rakovsky, A. Rykov, Y. Rudzutak, E. Rakhimbaev and G. Sokolnikov, which was invited to consider Frunze's proposals in detail, as well as to hear reports on the work of all commissions created by the CEC to develop projects for the implementation of decisions on the formation of the USSR. Moreover, if necessary, this commission of the Central Committee was given the right to review the personal composition of the previously created commissions of the Central Executive Committee and, in fact, to manage all the preparatory work provided for by the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR and subsequent decisions of party bodies. [8]

V. I. Lenin, whose state of health noticeably deteriorated, apparently, for two months was, in many respects, divorced from current information. The relevant materials were handed over to him only after the end of this Plenum, on March 3, 1923. He learned about the approval of the conclusions of the Dzerzhinsky commission by the Politburo on January 25 and demanded that the materials of this commission be provided to him. Lenin said at the same time that he needed them for the upcoming party congress, to which he intended to address with a special letter. Further, on March 5 and 6, Lenin dictates two short letters, which have already been repeatedly commented on by researchers. V. A. Sakharov, again, is the only one who calls them into question, challenging the authorship of Lenin. [nine] The first letter was addressed to L. D. Trotsky, and in it Lenin asked him, as a member of the Politburo, “to take upon himself the defense of the Georgian cause on the Central Committee of the party. This case - as it was written there - is under the "persecution" of Stalin and Dzerzhinsky, and I cannot rely on their impartiality. Quite the opposite, even." [10]

The second letter was very short and was intended for P. G. Mdivani, F. E. Makharadze and others. It was written there: “I follow your case with all my heart. Outraged by the rudeness of Ordzhonikidze and the indulgence of Stalin and Dzerzhinsky. I'm preparing notes and a speech for you." [eleven] That, in fact, is all. We have no grounds to question the Leninist authorship of the letters. They correspond to the spirit of Lenin's letters of September 26 and October 6, 1922 and, in general, Lenin's line on taking into account the wishes from the localities and his attitudes that great-power chauvinism was the greatest evil at that time, as we noted, was also carried out by Stalin. These letters are confirmed in their content by the "Diary of V. I. Lenin's secretaries on duty", in particular, the evening entry made by L. A. Fotieva on February 14th. As noted there, Lenin was most worried about the Georgian question. Fotieva stressed there that Lenin was on the side of the offended and asked "to make it clear to any of the offended that he is on their side." [12] And further, Lenin, according to Fotieva, singled out three points: “1. You can't fight. 2. Concessions are needed. 3. You cannot compare a big state with a small one. Did Stalin know? Why didn't you react?" [13] Again, these thoughts echo the main content of the letters of September 26 and October 6, where Lenin wrote about his desire to give battle to great-power chauvinism. The main thing is the principles of building national relations according to Lenin, and they, in Lenin's subsequent dictations, are a clear development of his views in general and the autumn letters of 1922, in particular. It is no coincidence that they will receive reflection and support at the 12th Party Congress. Another thing is that the deterioration of Lenin's health led to an intensification of the struggle at the top of the party, which also influenced questions of union building.

In any case, the party leaders were familiar with the latest Lenin's notes and took them into account. This can be seen in their speeches at the party forums of March-April 1923 and, in general, in their subsequent policy on the national question. L. B. Kamenev, speaking at the Second Congress of the Communist Party of Georgia, spoke about the need to find the right proportion between the unification of the Soviet republics and their independence, “which for us is not an empty declaration, not something made under the pressure of the circumstances of the moment, but which represents for us, the embodiment of the decisions that we prepared even before the transfer of power to us. [fourteen] Kamenev, for sure, here was hinting at Lenin's speech at the April Conference of 1917, where the task of a union of Soviet republics was posed. It is known that the state of affairs in the Georgian Communist Party became the subject of a hearing both at the meeting of the Politburo on March 26 and at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on March 31. [15]

As for Ukraine, the issues of union building were reflected there, among other things, at the VII All-Ukrainian Conference of the Communist Party (b) of April 4-10, 1923. Attention was drawn to the speech of H. G. Rakovsky, who stated that the question of union building " now allowed for a more or less long period. I don't think it's been considered forever. No, we will have to return to this issue a hundred more times. [16] But, of course, a special role in the development of the theory and practice of national relations was played by the XII Congress of the RCP (b), which took place from April 17 to April 25, 1923 in Moscow. [17]

Perhaps not a single party congress has given the national question such great attention as this one, although under the title "National Moments in Party and State Construction" it was placed only as the 6th point. The presidium of the congress was elected by a special resolution, and 25 people were elected to it (Akhundov, Bukharin, Voroshilov, Zalutsky, Zelensky, Zinoviev, Kalinin, Kamenev, Kosior, Korotkov, Lashevich, Lenin, Molotov, Ordzhonikidze, Petrovsky, Rakovsky, Rudzutak, Rykov, Stalin, Sultan-Khodzhaev, Tomsky, Trotsky, Uglanov, Frunze, Kharitonov) decided to announce Lenin's work on the national question, in particular on the Georgian question, to the leaders of the delegations, and then to the delegations. Moreover, it was decided not to announce it at the section on the national question. It was about Lenin's note "On the Question of Nationalities or 'Autonomization'.[18] then, apparently, it was also about the last dictations of Lenin. No one questioned their authenticity.

A report on this 6th point (this was the twelfth session of the congress) was made by J.S. Stalin, who noted the posing of the national question already at the third congress after the October Revolution, that is, before that at the Eighth and Tenth Party Congresses. He emphasized the preservation of a principled view of the national question, both before the revolution and after, and, above all, dwelled on the international significance of the national question. According to him, the entire East looks at the Union of Republics as an experimental field, this increases the responsibility of solving the national question within the country, and a mistake in this area will undermine the confidence of the previously oppressed peoples in Russia and deprive it of attractive power in the eyes of the East. As for its internal meaning, Stalin drew attention to the influence of the NEP on the strengthening of both Russian and local nationalisms. Stalin also dwelled on the class essence of the national question and some of its other aspects, in particular, on chauvinism in individual republics of the ruling nations in relation to national minorities. Naturally, the report also dealt with the creation of the USSR.

Stalin emphasized that the basis of this union lies in the voluntariness and legal equality of the members of the union and, at the same time, the union naturally leads to some limitation of the independence of the republics. There are factors not only facilitating the unification of peoples into one state, but also hindering it. Among the factors contributing to the unification, Stalin attributed the economic, the very nature of Soviet power, that is, the power of the working people and the presence of an imperialist environment, as an external threat. Stalin called Great Russian chauvinism, which was growing under the NEP, the main force preventing unification. At the same time, Stalin added: “... great-power chauvinism, the most hardened nationalism, is growing in our country by leaps and bounds, trying to erase everything non-Russian, to gather all the threads of control around the Russian principle and crush the non-Russian.” This creates a danger of losing the trust of the former oppressed peoples, and thanks to this trust, it was possible, according to Stalin, to overthrow the Provisional Government and defeat the white generals. Without this trust, Stalin went on, "we shall have no Union of Republics." Stalin also dwelled on the actual inequality between peoples as the second factor preventing unification, which can only be overcome with effective help to backward peoples. And Stalin saw the third factor hindering the unification in local nationalism, nationalism in individual republics. Stalin also dwelled on the actual inequality between peoples as the second factor preventing unification, which can only be overcome with effective help to backward peoples. And Stalin saw the third factor hindering the unification in local nationalism, nationalism in individual republics. Stalin also dwelled on the actual inequality between peoples as the second factor preventing unification, which can only be overcome with effective help to backward peoples. And Stalin saw the third factor hindering the unification in local nationalism, nationalism in individual republics.

Stalin gave a special place in his report to the Transcaucasian Federation as a means of eliminating interethnic hatred in the Transcaucasus and focused directly on Georgia, speaking out against the privileged position of the Georgians in the Transcaucasus and, in general, against the violation of the principle of equality of nationalities. At the same time, Stalin emphasized: "... without the Transcaucasian Federation, peace in the Caucasus cannot be maintained, equality cannot be established." Stalin went on to dwell on the means which, in his opinion, could overcome the obstacles to unification. He called for the expansion of the use of local languages ​​not only in schools, but also in all institutions, both party and Soviet, so that Soviet power was "not only Russian, but also international." He also suggested that the main nationalities should have their representatives in the commissariats of the Union of Republics,[nineteen]

B. G. Mdivani was the first to take the floor in the debate on this issue, having previously spoken at the congress, at its fourth meeting. Then he saw fluctuations in the party's policy on the national question in Transcaucasia and, among other things, emphasized the existing intention to arrange not a federation, but the autonomy of all the republics. He also drew attention to the reshuffling of personnel in Georgia and even used the term "party repression." He also mentioned the so-called deviators with disapproval and, turning to Stalin, exclaimed: ? [20] At that meeting, another representative of Georgia, D. Orakhelashvili, spoke out against Mdivani.

This time Mdivani, once again expressing dissatisfaction with Stalin's attitude towards the so-called deviators, stressed "that we have the school of Ilyich on the national question, a school that has once and for all resolved the national question," but, continued Mdivani further, the theory must be translated into life, but the reality is much different. Mdivani referred to Lenin's last letters and called for the elimination of not only formal, but also actual inequality, and further stressed that "the economic moment in the area of ​​resolving the national question is the first question." Mdivani specifically focused on Abkhazia, Adzharia and South Ossetia, as well as on the Transcaucasian Federation, denying his negative attitude towards it as such, but opposed what happened in reality. Among other things, he said: “Soviet power itself, as such,[21]

The next to speak was the representative of Ukraine G. F. Grinko. He specifically dwelled on, in his words, the deepest centralization inertia, seeing in it one of the biggest obstacles to establishing state relations within the Union. He saw them in the mistakes of the People's Commissariat of Food in determining the single agricultural tax, in drawing up a new budget, and, as he added, in dozens of other examples. He spoke in favor of expanding the rights of the republics in the field of budgetary and economic matters in general and suggested that the congress should adopt a decision "which would break the centralizing tendencies and make all our practical work a hundredfold easier."

I.F. Sturua, a worker and metal turner, who spoke after him, first of all expressed his disagreement with Mdivani. The representative of Kyrgyzstan, A. D. Urazbaeva, who replaced him, drew attention to the need for serious work among workers of different nationalities, primarily among the poor and women. And the representative of Turkestan, T. R. Ryskunov, saw the practical solution of the national question, first of all, in the solution of economic problems. Another representative of Georgia, F. I. Makharadze, who spoke after him, stated bluntly that it was impossible to talk about independence, the independence of the republics, when there is one party that determines absolutely everything. At the same time, he fully supported Lenin's call for a fight against great-power chauvinism. [22]

Subsequently, the discussion of the national question was continued at the fourteenth session of the congress on the morning of April 24. In the speech of the Crimean representative, S. Said-Galiev, there was a call for a class approach to the national question and the need for the Communist Party to meet the oppressed masses of all nationalities. N. A. Skrypnik, who replaced him, focused the attention of the delegates on the need to pursue a special line in the field of culture, addressed the situation of Ukrainians in Russia and sharply opposed great-power prejudices. Sh. Z. Eliava returned to the Georgian question and argued with Mdivani and Makharadze. Rakovsky supported Lenin's appeal to the national question and thus helped the party avoid fatal mistakes. According to Rakovsky, there are reasons to worry about the fate of the party,[23] In his opinion, Stalin stopped on the verge of clarifying the background of the national question and it is necessary, first of all, to see the presence of the Soviet bureaucracy, endowed with a completely non-Soviet psychology and wishing to rule the country from the point of view of its bureaucratic conveniences, for which it is more profitable to have not twenty republics , but one. He mentioned the struggle on the ground with the central bureaucratic apparatus, which did not want to see the presence of different republics, the apparatus after the first Union Congress of Soviets, which, according to Rakovsky, became the master of our whole life. He declared that union building had gone along the wrong path and nine-tenths of their rights had to be taken away from the union commissariats and handed over to the national republics.

Another representative of Georgia who spoke after Rakovsky, K. M. Tsintsadze, told how the anti-Soviet elements of the Mensheviks and national democrats took advantage of mistakes in national construction in Georgia, and urged not to rush into unification, since it is seen as hidden colonialism. A. S. Yenukidze directed his speech against Rakovsky, and against Mdivani and Makharadze, taking under the protection of the actions of Ordzhonikidze and Dzerzhinsky, and even declared that Lenin, in particulars of his letter, became a victim of incorrect information. G. K. Ordzhonikidze, who replaced him, also devoted his speech to Georgian affairs, denying any infringement of the Georgian population under Soviet rule.

In the speech of Ya. A. Yakovlev, who represented the apparatus of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), he emphasized the importance of Lenin's last letters, without which the national question at the congress would not have acquired such a sound. Yakovlev called for the need to have serious guarantees for the practical implementation of the ideas developed in these letters. Another representative of Transcaucasia, S. L. Lukashin, connected the Georgian issue with the issue of the Transcaucasian Federation, recognizing the correctness of its creation and showing the seriousness of local nationalism, which, according to him, is more significant in this region than Great Russian chauvinism. GE Zinoviev began his speech with the Georgian question, emphasizing that this question did the congress a disservice. Further, he declared the existence of a socialist fatherland, which must be defended, fought against Great Russian chauvinism, which is raising its head, and stressed the timeliness of Lenin's raising the national question. By the way, he mentioned the role of the party, which, in his words, leads the state and called for it to burn great-power chauvinism everywhere with a red-hot iron, but also not forget about the need to fight local nationalism. The national question within the country is closely connected with the activities of the Comintern, and the more successfully it is resolved, the better will be the development of the international communist movement. Zinoviev supported the theses of Stalin and the Central Committee, calling them excellent and exhaustive.

R. A. Akhundov, another representative of the Transcaucasus, primarily Azerbaijan, called for a struggle against the Georgian deviators. N. I. Bukharin then spoke, emphasizing the very strong nationalist movement in Ukraine and the subversive work of the Petliurists in this respect. He also mentioned the major discontent of the Yakuts, the continuation of the Basmachi uprising in Turkestan and the acute conflict in Georgia. According to him, the national question is very acute and will be in ten, if not more, republics. He supported the idea of ​​struggle, primarily against great-power chauvinism, and saw in it Lenin's strategic guidelines. K. B. Radek was the last to speak at this meeting, immediately noting the importance of the discussion and the fact that the majority of the party did not understand the significance of the national question.

The discussion of the national question at the congress is not limited to these meetings. During the congress, a special section on the national question also met, in which 100 people took part, including 24 invited from the national republics. Ya. E. Rudzutak presided over the section. It is interesting that 44 people submitted notes about the speech, but only 14 received the floor. [24] The first to speak was Rakovsky, who criticized Stalin's theses and his abstract and saw administrative passion and haste in union building, as well as pressure and pressure from the central party and Soviet bodies .

Mdivani also spoke again, directing the fire of criticism against the second chamber and the Transcaucasian Federation. However, he did not receive the support of the majority of the section. The absolute majority of speakers supported the creation of a second chamber. A. I. Mikoyan actively opposed Mdivani. But, nevertheless, the provisions on the new state already approved by the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR, in fact, were opposed not only by representatives of Ukraine and Georgia, but also of Central Asia and even the RSFSR. Khodzhaev, representing the Turkestan party organization, dwelled on the need to strengthen Soviet power in Central Asia, so that these authorities were not fictitious, but actual. M. Kh. Sultan-Galiyev, delegated to the congress of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), proposed extending the federal principle to other regions, for example, in relation to the North Caucasus, Central Asia, and also called for the creation of the Tatar-Bashkir Republic. He, in essence, polemicized with Stalin.

Frunze focused on the development of industry in the national republics and even suggested moving a number of industrial enterprises to backward areas. He pointed out the need for a greater strengthening of the bond between town and countryside and for the correct formulation of relations between the individual republics. [25] Trotsky also spoke out for moving enterprises closer to sources of raw materials, repeating in many respects the provisions that he put forward in his article in Pravda of March 20, 1923, entitled “Thoughts about the Party. The National Question and the Education of Youth. Stalin basically argued with his opponents and even allowed himself to criticize Lenin, which was not safe in the conditions of the flaring struggle for power. Among other things, he also said: “The Union of Republics has not yet been forced to work. Create a Union of Republics, work for two years, see where it leads.” [26] In the section, there was also a discussion on the separation of autonomous republics from the RSFSR, which did not receive the support of the majority. Skrypnik proposed to rename the party. But this question was postponed until the next party congress. [27]

Stalin reported on the work of this section at the sixteenth session of the congress. He openly declared the exaggeration of the national question by a group of comrades headed by Bukharin and Rakovsky to the detriment of the social question. According to him, the Great Russian proletarian should not be placed in an unequal position in relation to the former oppressed nations, since this could weaken the dictatorship of the proletariat. At the same time, he referred to Lenin, who spoke of the subordinate importance of the national question in comparison with the workers' question. Stalin called for Russian communists to fight against great-power chauvinism, and non-Russian communists against local chauvinism, that is, it is necessary to fight on two fronts. Stalin then dwelled on the section's amendments to the resolution. After him, Rakovsky and Skrypnik came forward with their own amendments, but they were not supported by the congress.

On April 25, 1923, the congress adopted an extensive resolution on the national question. It began with a statement of two tendencies in the development of capitalism - the processes of economic unification and the imperialist methods of this unification, which entail the inability of the bourgeoisie to find a correct approach to solving the national question. Particularly emphasized were the decisions of the party even before the October Revolution, which consisted of: “a) a resolute rejection of all and every form of coercion in relation to nationalities; b) in recognizing the equality and sovereignty of peoples in the matter of arranging their own destiny; c) in recognizing the position that a lasting unification of peoples can be carried out only on the basis of cooperation and voluntariness; d) in proclaiming the truth that the realization of such a union is possible only as a result of the overthrow of the power of capital.

But the elimination of national oppression also requires new forms of unification into a single multinational Soviet state. However, remnants of the past have survived that must be fought, and the first of such remnants is called Great Russian chauvinism, and the fight against it is the first immediate task of the party. The second such task was proclaimed the elimination of the actual inequality of nationalities, and the third regular task of the party was the fight against local nationalist survivals.

In the resolution, a number of its points were directly aimed at the implementation of the unification of the republics, so that it really was a union of equal state units, and not their liquidation on the principle of "one and indivisible." It was called upon in every possible way to ensure the economic and cultural needs of the national republics. They also specifically enumerated measures for the real upholding of the rights of the national republics in the highest and executive bodies of the Union and in the field. The conclusion of the resolution provided for the strengthening of the Party in the national regions and the carrying out of purposeful Party educational work and the deployment of cadres there. [28]

The XII Congress of the Communist Party played a special role in implementing the decisions of the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR. The congress showed that even after the formal proclamation of the USSR, there are different approaches to its practical construction, it demonstrated a real opposition of opinions and a struggle between the centralization approach and the desire to preserve greater independence of the republics.

The Soviet Union was just being created and far from everything was clear. This is evidenced by the then Soviet press, which reflected the nuances of different approaches to building the Union. As early as March 28, 1923, in the Ukrainian newspaper Kommunist, an article entitled “The National Moment in Soviet Construction” was published by H. Rakovsky and M. Frunze, and Trotsky, in development of the mentioned March article, also in Pravda on May 5, 1923, publishes his own new article - "Once again about the education of party youth and the national moment", where you can see his polemic with Stalin. In the same 1923, Rakovsky published a special pamphlet on the creation of the USSR, which consisted of six sections. There he wrote: "Indeed, the October Revolution did not solve the national question, but only began to solve it." [29] Rakovsky saw the task of the Communist Party in the national question not in its denial, "but in finding the most correct relationships between nations in which Soviet power has triumphed" and a little further he argued that "the communist program never set itself the goal of centralization in general." [30] He dwelled on various forms of centralization and sharply opposed the dominance of the bureaucracy and the transformation of the entire mass into an obedient instrument for the execution of orders from the central government, against the fact that political life was the privilege of a handful of people, as a result of which the Soviet power would lose its most important support. [31]

At that time, rumors spread in Ukraine about the liquidation of the Ukrainian Republic in connection with the creation of the USSR, about which the Ukrainian leadership informed the Central Committee of the RCP (b). In March 1923, M. V. Frunze, in his speech at the XI Yekaterinoslav Conference, said that the idea of ​​uniting the Soviet republics into a single federal state was not met with “complete sympathy” by everyone, and in this respect the party was no exception. Indeed, relevant examples are given in the literature on this subject, however, the policy of Ukrainization, the struggle against Great Russian chauvinism, outlined by the XII Party Congress, have borne fruit and, in general, nationalist sentiments in Ukraine are noticeably weakening. [32]

After the 12th Party Congress, party authorities continued to actively deal with national problems and state building. [33] On May 25, 1923, a special commission of the Council of People's Commissars headed by Kh. G. Rakovsky was created in Ukraine to carry out the directives of the XII Congress on the national question in the Soviet order. The commission took up the implementation of measures related to the establishment of actual equality between the Ukrainian and Russian languages ​​in state and educational institutions and the preparation of the necessary decrees and resolutions. [34] Similar events were held in other Union republics.

A significant role in the regulation of national relations was played by the Fourth Conference of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) with senior officials of the national republics and regions, held in Moscow on June 9-12, 1923. It was a very representative party forum, in which, in addition to members and candidates of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), 58 representatives of national republics and regions. From Ukraine, for example, such prominent leaders of the republic as G. F. Grinko, V. P. Zatonsky, D. Z. Manuilsky, H. G. Rakovsky, N. A. Skrypnik, M. V. Frunze, V. Ya Chubar.

At the end of May, I. V. Stalin prepared for this meeting the “Draft Platform on the National Question”, approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on June 4. Previously, this draft was considered by a number of party leaders who gave their comments. Thus, N. I. Bukharin's ideas have been preserved, who noted insufficient attention to the national question and made a number of specific proposals. He, among other things, recognized the correct objections made to the Ukrainians. [35] At its meeting, the Politburo rejected not only the Ukrainian, but also the Belarusian draft constitution. [36]

In the Platform Project, first of all, attention was paid to the strengthening of party organizations in the republics, since only in this way could Soviet power be strengthened there. At the same time, the difference between the situation in the localities and the situation in the industrial centers of the Union of Republics was emphasized, and in connection with this it was recommended to apply other methods of work in the outlying areas. In connection with the small number of intelligentsia, advice was given to attract them to the side of the Soviet government. Further, they spoke in detail about the composition, rights and competence of the second chamber, about the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Republics, which was supposed to be elected by both chambers. Moreover, the proposal of the Ukrainians to create two presidiums with legislative functions was rejected. In addition, this document also established five merged commissariats (Indel, Vneshtorg, Narkomvoen, NKPS and NKPochtel) and five more directive people's commissariats (Narkomfin, Supreme Council of National Economy, Narkomprod, People's Commissariat of Labor, RKI), the rest of the commissariats were recognized as completely autonomous. Once again, the proposal of the Ukrainians to transfer Indel and Vneshtorg from the category of united to the category of directives was rejected, that is, to keep these commissariats in the republics. It also noted the principles of construction of the people's commissariats of the Union of Republics, by expanding the composition of the boards of these people's commissariats at the expense of representatives of the largest and, as it was written there, important nationalities, and spoke about the budgetary rights of the republics, and provided for the expansion of budgetary independence.[37]

This section of the "Draft Platform" was most directly related to the work on the creation of the bodies of the Union, which were still being formed at that time. In addition, this project specifically provided for measures to involve the labor elements of the local population in party and Soviet building. It was ordered to purge the state and party apparatuses of nationalist elements, both Russian and non-Russian, to spread local languages ​​in office work with the obligatory study of them by senior officials, to attract local intelligentsia to Soviet institutions, with parallel training of personnel from among party members and familiarization with special non-party conferences of workers and peasants with reports by responsible workers on the most important measures of Soviet power.

The "platform project" also provided for measures to raise the cultural level of the local population, concrete steps for economic construction in the national republics and regions, practical measures for organizing national military units in such a way as to train military personnel from the local population. Also, the provisions on the organization of party educational work and the appropriate selection of party and Soviet workers for the implementation of the resolution of the XII Congress on the national question were specially signed in the draft. [38] The conference adopted this draft as a resolution on Stalin's report entitled "Practical Measures for the Implementation of the Resolution of the Twelfth Party Congress on the National Question."

The report was delivered by Stalin on June 10 and echoed the Platform Project, but was more detailed. As for issues directly related to the formation of the Union of Republics, Stalin mainly touched on them in the conclusion of his report, dwelling on the preparation of the Constitution of the Union, the second chamber and its prerogatives, as well as the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee and the commissariats. In addition to this report, 20 reports were also made by representatives from the field. These reports, as well as speeches, showed the presence of different points of view at this stage of union building. Perhaps the most critical were the speeches of representatives of Ukraine. Skrypnik, who condemned both great-power chauvinism and confederalism, resolutely came out in favor of preserving the sovereignty of the republics, seeing the danger of its liquidation in the union of republics that was achieved in practice.[39]

Rakovsky again outlined his position, emphasizing his understanding of the federation. In this regard, he considered it necessary to utter the following words: “I believe that we Ukrainians are no less communists than Stalin. When he wants to introduce a more centralistic understanding into this concept, we will argue about this ... Perhaps experience will show that it needs to be changed. [40] Another representative of Ukraine, Grinko, also spoke at this meeting, proposing to create more favorable conditions for joining the party and the subsequent promotion of local cadres to leadership positions, even if they are less trained and not of proletarian origin.

At the meeting, the special case of M.Kh. Sultan-Galiev, [41] who was accused not only of anti-Party activities, but also of links with the Basmachi movement, became the subject of consideration, the term “sultan-Galievshchina” was even used and Stalin in one of his speeches at the meeting emphasized "that she created a certain circle of her supporters in the eastern republics, especially in Bashkiria and Tataria." [42] In the same speech, Stalin focused on the right and left deviations in the national republics and regions and recognized the left danger as more dangerous. In his concluding remarks, as well as in his "Response to Speeches," Stalin most of all polemicized with representatives of Ukraine and saw in their proposals a desire to achieve something in between a confederation and a federation, and further he continued: "Meanwhile, it is clear that we are not creating a confederation, but a federation of republics, one union state uniting military, foreign, foreign trade and other affairs, a state whose presence does not detract from the sovereignty of individual republics. [43]

This conference showed the strengthening of the forces of centralism and the weakening of the forces of the republics that stood up for greater independence. This strengthening manifested itself in the further arrangement of personnel. H. Rakovsky was transferred to diplomatic work, and B. Mdivani was transferred. The meeting also once again demonstrated the leading role of the party in building a new union state.

Among the events of the same 1923, one should also note the meeting of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on September 17, which discussed the plan of measures for the implementation of resolutions on the national question and adopted it as a basis. The Organizing Bureau instructed the Secretariat of the Central Committee to finalize the corresponding resolution. This document was prepared and, signed by Rudzutak on January 7, 1924, was sent to local party organizations. The circular letter of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on measures to implement the resolutions on the national question adopted by the XII Congresses of the RCP (b) and the IV meeting of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) consisted of 73 points and contained recommendations on various aspects of work in the field of interethnic relations. [44]

Party bodies also played a decisive role in the preparation of the Constitution of the USSR. It was the Commission of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), created on February 24, 1923 to develop practical proposals for the creation of the USSR headed by Stalin and which included representatives of party organizations of all Union republics, led the development of the draft of this Constitution. In parallel, and under the leadership of the party, the active work of the Soviet organs was going on.

[1] Pentkovskaya V. Decree. cit., p.93; Congresses of Soviets... Vol. III, p. 27.

[2] Nenarokov A.P. Seventy years ago, p. 114.

[3] Central Committee of the RCP (b) - VKP (b) and the national question, p. 96–100.

[4] Nenarokov A.P. Seventy years ago, p. 114.

[5] Ibid., p. 115.

[6] I.V. Stalin. Works. T.5, p. 181–194.

[7] Nenarokov A.P. Seventy years ago, p.116.

[8] Ibid., p. 116.

[9] Sakharov V.A. Decree. op., p. 337–345.

[10] Lenin V.I. Poln. coll. op. T. 54, p. 329.

[11] Ibid., p.330.

[12] Lenin V.I. Poln. coll. op. T. 45, p. 485, 607.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Kamenev L. B. The next tasks of the Communist Party of Georgia. Report at the first meeting of the Second Congress of the Communist Party of Georgia on March 14, 1923. Tiflis, 1923, p. 27.

[15] Nenarokov A.P. Seventy years ago, p. 120–121.

[16] Cited. Quoted from: Melnichenko V. Christian Rakovsky, p. 63.

[17] See: Kantor E. D. The national question at the XII Congress of the RCP (b). M., 1923.

[18] Twelfth Congress of the RCP (b) April 17–25, 1923. Verbatim report. M., 1968, p. 821.

[19] Ibid., p. 479–495; Stalin IV Works. T.5, p. 236–263.

[20] Twelfth Congress of the RCP (b), p. 164–166.

[21] Ibid., p. 495–502.

[22] Ibid., p.516; 51.

[23] Ibid., p. 576.

[24] Nenarokov A.P. Seventy years ago...// Patriotic history. 1994, no. 1, p. 110.

[25] Twelfth Congress of the RCP (b), p. 879.

[26] Nenarokov A.P. Seventy years ago...// Patriotic history. 1994, no. 1, p. 115–116.

[27] Twelfth Congress of the RCP (b), p. 652-653, 879.

[28] Ibid., p. 691–697.

[29] H. Rakovsky. Union of Socialist Republics. A new stage in the Soviet union building. Kharkov, 1923, p. 12.

[30] Ibid., p. 13, 20.

[31] Ibid., p. 20–21.

[32] Marchukov A.V. Decree. op., p. 382–383.

[33] See: B. V. Chirko. The struggle of the Communist Party of Ukraine for the implementation of the decisions of the XII Congress of the RCP (b) on the national question (1923–1927). Dis. cand. ist. Sciences. Kyiv, 1983.

[34] Nenarokov A.P. Toward the unity of equals, p. 188.

[35] Central Committee of the RCP (b) - VKP (b) and the national question, p. 115–116.

[36] Pentkovskaya V. Decree. op., p. 107.

[37] Stalin I. V. Works. T.5, p. 294–297.

[38] Ibid., p. 297–300.

[39] The fourth meeting of the Central Committee of the RCP with senior officials of the national republics and regions in Moscow on June 9-12, 1923: Verbatim report. M., 1923, p. 206.

[40] Ibid., p. 233.

[41] On the case of M. Kh. 135–136.

[42] I.V. Stalin. Works. V.5, p.308.

[43] Ibid., p. 336.

[44] Central Committee of the RCP (b) - VKP (b) and the national question, p. 169–175.