Formation of the USSR (1917-1924)

Formation of the USSR (1917-1924)

First Congress of Soviets

The First Congress of Soviets of the USSR began work on December 30, 1922 at the Bolshoi Theater in Moscow and was opened by an old Bolshevik, party member since 1898, former agent of the Iskra newspaper, participant in the December armed uprising in Moscow in 1905, in general, a well-known revolutionary , who went through arrests and exiles, active participation in the October Revolution in Moscow, the Civil War and Soviet construction - Pyotr Smidovich. He was, however, only 48 years old - evidence of the age composition of the congress. But people like Smidovich then enjoyed great respect in the Land of the Soviets, and the choice of the first leader was made, of course, successfully. Further, on behalf of the delegations of the Union Soviet republics, A. S. Yenukidze made a proposal to elect V. I. Lenin as honorary chairman, who was unanimously supported. At the suggestion of Yenukidze, the following were elected to the presidium of the congress: Kalinin, Petrovsky, Tskhakaya, Chervyakov, Stalin, Musabekov, Ambartsumyan, Rykov, Trotsky, Ordzhonikidze, Kamenev, Frunze, Sapronov, Tomsky, Bukharin, Zinoviev, Chubar, Molotov, Rudzutak, Yenukidze, Starostin, Kadyr-Aliev, Oak, Claudia Nikolaeva, Skrypnik and Smidovich. MV Frunze made a proposal to elect MI Kalinin chairman of the congress, which was also supported unanimously.

Preserved very detailed materials on the composition of the congress in many respects. A total of 2214 delegates arrived at the congress, 1673 of them with a decisive vote and 541 with an advisory one. There were only 77 women, which accounted for 3.5% of the delegates. In terms of age composition, the congress was, of course, young. Only 2% of delegates were over 50 years old, 20-1.2% were younger, and the main group - 45% were delegates from 21 to 30 years old. Next came the age group from 31 to 40 years old, and from 41 to 50 years old there were 7.9%. That is, less than 10% of the delegates were over 40 years old at the congress. The young delegate corps created a young country. [one]

The national composition of the congress was as follows. Russians made up 62.5%, Ukrainians - 8%, Belarusians - 1.1%, Jews - 10.8%, Caucasian peoples - 4.5%, Turkic peoples - 5.7%, Latvians and Estonians - 3.4% and other nationalities - 4%. It turned out that the Soviet Union was created, first of all, by the Russians, and this, of course, corresponded to reality.

The social composition of the congress delegates, which is also of considerable interest, was also taken into account. The share of workers accounted for 44.4%, peasants - 26.8%, intellectuals - 28.8%. In terms of the number of delegates, the workers were in first place, significantly outnumbering both the peasants and the intellectuals individually. It is also interesting that there were more intellectuals than peasants, the largest category of the country's population, accounting for approximately 85% of the total population of the country.

Naturally, the party affiliation of the delegates was also taken into account. 94.1% of all delegates belonged to the Communist Party, there were 5.7% non-partisans and 0.2% of delegates belonged to the other party, which was only 5 people. Two delegates represented the Jewish Social Democratic Party Poalei Zion, 1 was an anarchist individualist and 2 were left-wing socialist federalists of the Caucasus.

Among the members of the Communist Party, party experience was also revealed, one of the most important characteristics of that time. Up to 1 year had a party experience of 1% of the delegates, from 1 to 3-19.9% and from 3 to 6 years - 50%. In this last group, it was considered necessary to identify the communists who became such before and after October. It turned out that 19.7% of them joined the party before the October Revolution and 30.3% after. Party experience from 6 to 10 years had 8.2% and more than 10 years - 20.9%. Consequently, about half (48.8%) of the members of the congress, for all their youth, had party experience since pre-October times. However, only five years have passed since the revolution.

The professional composition of the congress was also taken into account, in total thirteen counts. In the first place - 22.2% were metalworkers, then workers in education - 12.9%, agriculture - 10.4%, without a profession - 7.5%, etc. 17.8% of delegates belonged to the category of others. Metalworkers constituted the most significant professional group of congress delegates, which corresponded to the then social policy, when the workers of this specialty were considered the main support of the Communist Party. By the way, 5.1% of all congress delegates were exclusively engaged in party work.

The collection of information about the delegates was so thorough that they considered it necessary to find out which of them, according to their occupations, was engaged in this or that activity both before the war of 1914 and before the February Revolution, before the October Revolution, after it and separately during the congress. That is, on this basis, five categories were identified and the picture turned out to be very interesting. It turns out that 41.2% of the delegates before the First Imperialist War were workers. Before the February Revolution, only 26.9%, before the October Revolution - 16.5%, after the October Revolution - 5.3%, and at the time of the congress only 1.2%. Thus, if 44.4% classified themselves as workers according to their social status, and only 22% were professions of metalworkers, and, in addition, other workers were taken into account (woodworkers, printers, builders, workers without specialties), then at the time of the congress only 1.2% of the delegates were directly workers. The picture is also remarkable for agricultural workers. If before the First World War 10.5% of the congress delegates worked in this area, then at the time of the congress - 3.3%, students were respectively 19.4% and 1%. Then came some very remarkable information about party and trade union workers. Before the First World War, they were 3% of the congress participants, before the February Revolution - 3.3%, before the October Revolution already 17.3%, after this revolution - 5.1%, and at the time of the congress 31.1% Then came some very remarkable information about party and trade union workers.

As for the employees, before the First World War they were 14% of the delegates, and at the time of the congress - 21.7%, teachers before the war were 8.2%, and not a single one at the time of the congress. A few more interesting strata among the congress delegates. For example, before the war there were 2.6% of the military, and at the congress they accounted for 9.3%, 0.7% were in public work on elections before the war, and 32.4% were present at the congress. In addition, those who were in prisons and exiles and in exile before the war were noted. The first, that is, in prisons and exile, was before the war 2.2%, and the second 0.2%. Naturally, at the time of the congress there were none, but this account had its significance. [2]

In general, if we turn to the composition of the delegates, then in the first place were those who were in public work for the elections, in the second - party and trade union workers, in the third place were employees and in the fourth place were the military. This composition reflected the serious changes that had taken place in the status of congress delegates after the October Revolution. It can be said without exaggeration that the vast majority of participants in the congress were nominees of October, of this particular revolution. By the way, such a composition of delegates attracted attention at the congress and the figures were not only given, but also commented on, but the role of the October Revolution in changing their fate, however, was not mentioned there. There, they drew attention to another important point. Studying the data on the ownership of land by delegates, they found that 7.5% of all delegates had land at the time of the congress, but only 5,

We took into account when drawing up the general lists of delegates and their respective representation. 78.5% of the delegates were delegated to the congress by local congresses of Soviets, 4% - by the Soviets, 2.9% - by executive committees and other institutions - 2.6%. In addition, 3.5% represented the army and 8.5% were members and candidate members of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. It turned out that the overwhelming majority of delegates were delegated to the union congress by the local congresses of Soviets that preceded it, and for delegates with a decisive vote this percentage increased to 90.9%. The participation of many congress delegates in previous Russian congresses of Soviets was especially noted, and only 21.3% of them participated in one congress, while the total number of participants in various congresses was 45.1%.

Naturally, such a detailed record of information about the congress delegates could not be complete without the education column. 49.3% of delegates had lower education, 18.6% had secondary education, 7.1% had higher education, in addition, 1.6% were students, and 9.2% had incomplete higher education. Out-of-school education was also taken into account - 11.7%, semi-literate - 2% and illiterate, there were such - 0.5% of delegates. The proportion of delegates who arrived from different regions of the country was also taken into account. Thus, the contractual (report term) republics were represented as follows: Ukraine - 16.9% (364 delegates, of which 354 with a decisive vote), the Transcaucasian Federation - 4.1% (respectively 91 and 73) and Belarus - 1, 3% (33 and 23) of all delegates. The rest, of course, fell on the Russian Federation (1727 delegates, of which 1217 had a decisive vote),[3]

This is the general picture, which gives an idea of the people who were supposed to legislate the issue of creating the Soviet Union. Of course, a lot of work has been done to identify various data, but thanks to it, this detailed information about the delegates of the unification congress is known today. The presence of more than two thousand representatives, of course, did not imply any significant operational work at the congress. The congress was supposed to take stock of what had already been done before and not be drawn into discussions. Its main task is the constitution of a new state, and this task was fully completed.

The agenda consisted of only three issues - a separate consideration of the Declaration and the Treaty on the Formation of the USSR and the election of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR Union. On the first two points, and indeed, in general, the main report of the congress was made by I. V. Stalin. But this report was much shorter than what he delivered at the Tenth Congress of Soviets of the RSFSR. The first congress was presented by him as a turning point in the history of Soviet construction. According to him, the old period was ending, when the Soviet republics, with all their joint actions, nevertheless went apart, dealing with the issues of their existence, and now, according to him, a new period begins - the period of the unification of the republics into a single union state. At the same time, he emphasized that this new period testifies to the desire of the Soviet government to develop into a serious international force, able to change the international situation in the interests of the working people of the whole world. Stalin described the opening day of the congress as "the day of the triumph of the new Russia over the old, over Russia - the gendarme of Europe, over Russia - the executioner of Asia."[4]

The international aspect of the creation of the USSR, in general, was given great importance at the congress. In particular, V. Kolarov, secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, a prominent figure in the international communist movement, welcomed the congress in French on behalf of the Comintern (Smidovich acted as an interpreter). Kolarov, on behalf of the Comintern, which then included organizations from 62 countries, emphasized the outstanding international significance of creating a single union state, since the working people of the whole world in the face of the USSR see an example of liberation from the oppression of capital and an example of friendship and cooperation between peoples. In his words, for the first time in history, “the masses of numerous peoples living on such a large territory exercise the right to freely dispose of themselves, possessing supreme power and proclaiming the unconditional right to withdraw from the union at any time, if their supreme interest points to this, the working masses of the socialist Soviet republics will conclude this alliance today, an alliance of individual states, with the common goal of facilitating their common development and strengthening their self-defence. According to Kolarov, the Comintern sees in this congress the practical realization of the future form of the state, embracing the peoples of the whole world.[5]

At the congress, the attention was attracted by the introductions of M. V. Frunze, Odinets, S. M. Kirov, representing Ukraine and Transcaucasia, respectively, as well as envoys of the Central Asian republics - Bukhara and Khorezm - Kara Ioldash Bulatov and Sultan-Galiyev. These republics were then called not socialist, but people's Soviet republics. At the congress, their representatives, in fact, were present as guests, but in their speeches they expressed the desire of the peoples of Central Asia to become part of the USSR as soon as possible. [6] This emphasized the possibility of joining the USSR and other republics, including those where Soviet power had not yet been established.

M. V. Frunze, who spoke immediately after Stalin's report, on behalf of the conference of plenipotentiary delegations, emphasized the conformity of the actions of the congress with the principles of equality of nations and showed the cardinal difference between the various ways of state building in the Soviet country and in the capitalist world. He dwelled on the stages of preparing the Declaration and the Treaty on the Formation of the USSR, noting in particular the discussion of these documents at the congresses of the Soviets of the republics, where they were approved. Frunze, however, in order to obtain additional guarantees, proposed to continue work on these documents and send both the Declaration and the Treaty for approval by the Central Executive Committee of the Union Republics, whose opinion should be further taken into account by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and approved by the next Congress of Soviets of the USSR. He proposed once again to involve the governments of national states in resolving this issue (the term of his report is V. G.). At the same time, Frunze emphasized: “This path seems to be long, but we have to reckon with the fact that the work that we have just begun with you is a matter of extreme importance, is a matter that is worth working on for more than one or two months. so that the results come out the most perfect.[7] At Frunze's suggestion, the congress voted both for the Declaration and for the Treaty in the main.

S. M. Kirov, introduced to the congress as a worker from Baku, mentioned the hard lot of small peoples in old, autocratic Russia and noted the great importance attached by the workers and peasants of the national outskirts of Russia to the organization of the USSR. Kirov, emphasizing the historical significance of the decisions adopted by the congress, revealed the prospects for the unity of the fraternal family of peoples in the emerging Soviet Union. By the way, it was Kirov, on behalf of the proletariat of the Transcaucasian republics, who proposed, in honor of the formation of a new state, to found in Moscow the House of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

If Kirov spoke on behalf of the Baku workers, then on behalf of the Ukrainian peasantry, the floor was given to Odinets, a peasant in the Chernigov province, who delivered the longest speech besides the speaker. In it, a significant place was given to the heavy share of the Ukrainian people, their history and current situation. Quite negatively, he assessed the activities of Bogdan Khmelnitsky, who, according to him, planted new ones instead of the old lords, that is, hetmans. He called Catherine II the most sworn enemy of Ukraine and spoke most harshly about the tsarist regime, which enslaved the Ukrainian people and persecuted Ukrainian culture. He emphasized that Ukrainian culture was kept only in Galicia, but even there it was pogrom by tsarist officers. Among other things, they, according to Odinets, destroyed the Academy of Ukrainian Sciences.

It was about the activities of the tsarist government during the First World War in Galicia, where the Rusyns sympathetically met the Russian troops, but at the direction of the tsarist government, Ukrainian cultural institutions, Ukrainian schools, as well as the “Scientific Association of them. Shevchenko”, the publication of Ukrainian newspapers and magazines was banned and many figures of the Ukrainian national movement were arrested, some of whom were exiled to Siberia. [eight] In 1922, when Odinets spoke, these events were still vivid in his memory and the speaker even considered it necessary to declare: “There used to be an alliance of robbers, now there is an alliance of workers. We, the villagers, understand our union as the only hope that now we are together and no one will separate us. Interestingly, speaking of the union of four republics, Odinets also considered it necessary to emphasize that the first place would be open to the Polish proletariat and peasantry, and then to other peoples from London and Berlin to Beijing and Tokyo. [9]

S. S. Kamenev, then Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic, Ya. E. Rudzutak, G. I. Petrovsky, M. G. Tskhakaya, and V. N. Maksimov. In addition to Kalinin, Frunze also presided over the congress.

The most important documents of the congress, which can be called historical, were the Declaration and the Treaty. The Declaration spoke of the split of the world into two camps - the camp of capitalism and the camp of socialism. In the camp of capitalism, national enmity, colonialism, national oppression, the tangle of national contradictions become more and more entangled there, and the bourgeoisie proves to be powerless to establish cooperation among the peoples. Only the camp of the Soviets under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat can destroy national oppression radically. Only in this way was it possible to repulse the attacks of the imperialists of the whole world, both internal and external. But the instability of the international situation gives rise to the danger of new attacks, and therefore a united front of the Soviet republics is necessary in the face of capitalist encirclement. But unification into one socialist family is also stimulated by the very structure of Soviet power, which is international in its class nature. Further, both the voluntariness of the unification, the equality of peoples, and the possibility of access to the Union and other socialist republics, including those that may arise in the future, were emphasized. Each republic was also provided with the right to freely secede from the Union. The creation of the Union was seen as an important step towards uniting the working people of all countries into the World Socialist Soviet Republic. Each republic was also provided with the right to freely secede from the Union. The creation of the Union was seen as an important step towards uniting the working people of all countries into the World Socialist Soviet Republic. Each republic was also provided with the right to freely secede from the Union. The creation of the Union was seen as an important step towards uniting the working people of all countries into the World Socialist Soviet Republic.[10]

The text of the Declaration differed little from its draft drafted by the Commission on October 6 and approved by the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on December 18, 1922. But there were still some differences. In addition to minor stylistic amendments, the phrase was included - "the new union state will be a worthy crowning laid back in October 1917, the foundations of peaceful coexistence and fraternal cooperation of peoples" In the draft, this phrase sounded somewhat different. The draft also said nothing about the World Socialist Soviet Republic. [eleven] Another difference, and no doubt important, was that instead of indicating the need to sign the Treaty on the Formation of the Union of Socialist Republics of Europe and Asia, as was the case in the draft, it provided for the signing of an agreement on the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Thus, the Declaration emphasized both the international factors of the unification of the republics and the internal ones, and, first of all, the emphasis was placed on the structure of Soviet power, which was international in its class nature. The Declaration adhered to all three main principles of the national policy of the Communist Party, which were clearly visible even on the eve of the October Revolution - the principle of internationalism, the principle of the right of nations to self-determination up to secession and the principle of federalism, Soviet federalism, which provided for the destruction of national oppression at the root, the creation of an atmosphere of mutual trust and the laying of the foundations of fraternal cooperation between peoples. These principles were actually stated in the Declaration and, among other things, it demonstrated the continuity of the foundations of the new policy, laid back in October 1917. Mention in October 1917[12] that is, when there was no direct mention of October 1917.

The next fundamental document, discussed by the First Congress of Soviets, was called the Treaty on the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. He, in fact, bore the character of the Constitution. Like the draft approved by party authorities, it consisted of 26 articles. Differences from the project on individual items were not very significant. For example, some details appeared, for example, the number of members of the Central Executive Committee was previously planned to be 300 members, and now it is 371. A notable innovation was Article 14, where the following resolution was written: “Decrees and resolutions of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the Union are printed in languages commonly used in the union republics (Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, Georgian, Armenian, Turkic)”. [13] This was the result of local discussions on the project. The VII All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, as noted, even used the term "state languages". In the Constitution of Georgia of March 2, 1922, in general, the Georgian language was declared the state language, but there was also a note about ensuring the right of national minorities to freely develop and use their native language, not only in their national cultural, but also in state institutions. [14] The term “state language” does not appear in the Treaty, and instead they preferred to write about common languages, listing only six languages. It is curious that the term "Turkic language" appears, which can be understood as the languages of all Turkic peoples, not only Azerbaijani.

The Treaty clearly delineated the functions of the supreme bodies of the USSR, the Council of People's Commissars, and the union republics. In particular, the republics were supposed to have their own budgets, which would be components of the all-union budget, while the list of incomes and amounts of income deductions going to the formation of the budgets of the union republics was to be determined by the Central Executive Committee of the Union. [fifteen]

Under the Treaty, a single union citizenship was established for citizens of all union republics, a flag, coat of arms and state seal of the USSR were established, and Moscow was declared the capital. The right of free secession of the union republics and the need to amend the constitutions of the republics in accordance with the Treaty were recognized.

The Congress adopted a resolution approving the Declaration and the Treaty, by virtue of which they were basically approved. But, recognizing the extreme importance of these documents, the Congress decided on the need to listen to the final opinions of all the constituent republics of the Union, for which they were sent to the Central Executive Committees of the Union republics and their reviews were to be submitted to the Central Executive Committee of the USSR for its next session. It was decided to approve the final text of the Declaration and the Treaty at the II Congress of Soviets of the USSR.

The congress also adopted special resolutions on the founding of the House of the USSR, on the creation of the Central Scientific Institute of Agriculture with branches in all union republics (this proposal was made at the congress by the representative of the Ukrainian peasantry Odinets) and on the celebration of the day of the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In this last resolution, the following was written verbatim: "Instruct the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to establish a holiday on the territory of the USSR to commemorate the formation of the USSR." [16] The congress unanimously elected 371 members and 138 candidates to the CEC of the USSR. Yenukidze, read out the candidates for the CEC by delegation. From the RSFSR there were 270 members, and the first five looked like this: Kalinin, Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Zinoviev. From Ukraine, 88 members of the CEC were elected, and the first Ukrainian five included Petrovsky, Rakovsky, Frunze, Manuilsky, and Lebed. From the ZSFSR, 26 members entered the CEC. They were named first from Georgia, and then mixed up, so there is no need to talk about the first five. But the CEC included Makharadze, Mdivani, Kirov, Narimanov, Nazaretyan. Belarus was represented in the CEC by only 7 members, and the Belarusian list was opened by A. G. Chervyakov, V. A. Bogutsky and M. M. Khodosh.

Closing the congress, Kalinin summed up its work, calling it "an event of world importance." He singled out three major achievements in the creation of the USSR, which included the unification of material resources, the political factor and the new principle of relations between peoples - the principle of friendship and fraternal coexistence, while emphasizing that so far only the first stone is being laid in this principle of interethnic relations. At the same time, Kalinin emphasized: “Entire millennia have passed since the best minds of mankind have been struggling with a theoretical problem in search of forms that would give peoples the opportunity, without the greatest torment, without mutual struggle, to live in friendship and brotherhood. Only now, today, the first stone in this direction is practically being laid.” [17]

On the same day, December 30, 1922, the First session of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR took place, chaired by G. I. Petrovsky. At the suggestion of Yenukidze, the Presidium of the CEC of the Union is formed, consisting of 19 members and 13 candidates. 11 members of the Presidium represented the RSFSR - M. I. Kalinin, I. V. Stalin, L. B. Kamenev, A. I. Rykov, A. D. Tsyurupa, M. P. Tomsky, T. V. Sapronov, A. S. Enukidze, D. I. Kursky, Ya. E. Rudzutak, P. G. Smidovich. From Ukraine there were four members of the Presidium - G. I. Petrovsky, H. G. Rakovsky, D. Z. Manuilsky, F. Ya. Kon, from the ZSFSR - three - N. Narimanov, A. F. Myasnikov, G. P. Mdivani and from Belarus there was one member of the Presidium - AG Chervyakov. M. I. Kalinin, G. I. Petrovsky, N. Narimanov and A. G. Chervyakov were elected chairmen of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. A. S. Yenukidze became the Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the Union.

This session also adopted seven decisions. They contained instructions to the Presidium of the CEC to develop by the next session of the CEC of the Union a regulation on the people's commissariats of the USSR, outline the personal composition of the people's commissars and submit them for approval to the next session of the CEC, which was scheduled for April. The Presidium was also given some other instructions. Until the second session of the Central Executive Committee of the Union was convened, all powers to issue decrees and resolutions binding on the entire USSR were transferred to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and its Presidium. [eighteen]

The work of the congress was widely covered in all the then mass media, and after its completion, special meetings and rallies were held in many regions of the country with resolutions supporting its decisions. On January 9, at the Plenum of the Kharkov City Council, a special resolution was adopted on this occasion, where it was decided: "... warmly welcome the creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which is the key to uniting and strengthening the existing Soviet republics and expanding the boundaries of the proletarian revolution to the whole world." In a similar spirit, the following day, January 10, 1923, the resolution of the Plenum of the Kiev City Council was adopted [19] and many other decisions based on the results of the congress. The international significance of the formation of the USSR, as a rule, was put in the first place. They often wrote about the future world union of the Soviet republics, as can be read in the telegram of the III Azerbaijan Congress of Trade Unions [20] or about the world proletarian revolution. The importance of the creation of the USSR as a powerful political and economic organization capable of quickly restoring industry and agriculture was also emphasized, which can be read in the resolution of the non-party peasant conference of the Polonsky volost of the Volyn province of Ukraine dated January 10, 1923 [ 21] can be seen in the telegram of the second session of the III All-Khorezm kurultai dated January 13, 1923 [22]

However, numerous letters and telegrams approving the work of the congress did not mean the end of discussions on the concrete implementation of its decisions, nor did they put an end to the struggle between the interests of the center and the outskirts. V. I. Lenin also knew about this, whose health was deteriorating and whose isolation from the outside world was increasing. With all this, one can clearly see how he was concerned about the future of the country and, in particular, how the national question would be resolved. On December 30, 1922, that is, on the day of the congress, Lenin began and on December 31 finished dictating a note to M.A. Volodicheva, which went down in history as the article “On the Question of Nationalities or “Autonomization”. It was published in the Soviet press for the first time in 1956, but initially it was not a secret, since it was brought to the attention of the delegates of the XII Congress of the RCP (b) in 1923. They knew about it abroad, too,[23]

This note is interesting both in itself and in the influence that it had on the course of the future party congress and we have to refer to it again because V. A. Sakharov, who devoted a large place to it in his monograph, questioned Lenin's authorship. [24] In his opinion, the very text of the note testifies against Lenin's authorship. [25] Moreover, the very first lines of the note, where Lenin noted: “I seem to be greatly to blame for the workers of Russia for not intervening energetically and sharply enough in the notorious question of autonomization, officially called, it seems, the question of the union of Soviet socialist republics. (In Trotsky's copy, the word "Autonomization" is in quotation marks and begins with a capital letter, just as the abbreviation USSR is used).

Further, as we know, Lenin said, "thus, the question passed me almost completely." V. Sakharov, in response to these remarks, does not agree with the author of the letter and emphasizes the decisive influence of Lenin on the decisions made. In general, which of the then Bolsheviks could throw reproaches to the sick Lenin except himself? Lenin, whom the Bolsheviks already during his lifetime considered a genius and, of course, a great Marxist. H. Rakovsky, an old associate of G. V. Plekhanov, wrote in 1924: “Ilyich has enormous services to Marxism: he saved Marxism from degeneration, to which it would inevitably come after he, thanks to Kautsky and others, became official doctrine to justify social patriotism and social renegacy. [26] So only Lenin himself could then make such remarks to himself.

What does Lenin take the blame for? First, he took up this issue in earnest only at the end of September, when the leadership of the three republics spoke not in favor of the "autonomization" plan, in fact, against it. Secondly. Lenin, being present at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on October 5, 6, when this particular issue was being decided, was absent and, thirdly, due to illness, he really could not attend either the December Plenum or two congresses of Soviets - Russian and all-Union. The note was dictated on the day of the first union congress. Serious issues are being resolved, but the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR is not present either at the X Congress of Soviets of the RSFSR or at the founding congress of the USSR. After the telegram dated October 21, 1922 on the “Georgian case” and the interview with M. Farbman dated October 27, until December 30, there are no direct Leninist documents on the problems of the formation of the USSR.[27] The synopsis, apparently, was drawn up before December 15, 1922, since it was on that day that Lenin wrote a letter to Stalin, where he emphasized the impossibility of his participation in this congress. True, he still hoped for a meeting with doctors, with whom he intended to discuss the possibility of his speech at the congress. And then he continued: "I would consider it a great inconvenience for myself to refuse it, to say the least." [28]

Lenin considers the impossibility of participating in the Tenth Congress as a great inconvenience and even more than that. That is, Lenin clearly felt guilty even before the notes of December 30–31. Lenin's plan, which he outlined in a letter to Kamenev on September 26, indeed had a decisive influence on the structure of the USSR, Lenin, of course, knew how things were being decided in this direction, but he had good reason to say that he could not deal with this a difficult issue on a daily basis and was absent during the most important meetings, where specific issues of the creation of the USSR were directly resolved.

Approximately at the same level, other arguments of V. Sakharov in favor of his assertion are built. The author does not investigate the issue, but proves his version. Since our work has other goals and we cannot strongly deviate from them, we will not refute the author's verbal construction point by point. We have indeed considered them and cannot accept them categorically. We will return later on Lenin's attitude to the "Georgian cause". Let us turn to the very text of the dictated note and try to understand its main meaning, for even under the sick Lenin it had an impact on the implementation of the national policy of the Communist Party.

Lenin, first of all, expresses his disagreement with the actions of Ordzhonikidze and Dzerzhinsky and gives an unambiguously negative characterization of the apparatus, which he calls thoroughly alien and is a bourgeois and royal mishmash. In this regard, according to Lenin, “freedom to withdraw from the union” turns out to be an empty piece of paper that cannot protect foreigners from “a great Russian chauvinist, in essence, a scoundrel and rapist, which is a typical Russian bureaucrat.” Lenin also reproaches Stalin for his, as it is written there, haste and administrative passion, and also bitterness against "social nationalism." At the same time, Lenin considered it necessary to utter the following words: "Bitterness generally plays the worst role in politics." Returning again to Dzerzhinsky and Ordzhonikidze, Lenin emphasizes that that they were the authorities in relation to other citizens of the Caucasus, and even more so they had to show special restraint. And further, at the end of the notes on December 30, Lenin poses, in his words, an important fundamental question: “how to understand internationalism?”.

With this question, he begins his note the next day, December 31. He opposes the abstract formulation of the question of nationalism and distinguishes between the nationalism of the oppressor nation and the oppressed nation, the nationalism of a large nation and the nationalism of a small nation. In this regard, since the nationals of a large nation are to blame for endless violence, it is necessary to eliminate not only formal, but also actual inequality. Hence, Lenin sees the need for concessions to small nations and especially emphasizes: “That is why in this case it is better to oversalt in the direction of compliance and gentleness towards national minorities than undersalt.”

Lenin sets the task of further strengthening the union of socialist republics, proposes that the political responsibility for the "Georgian affair" be laid on Stalin, Dzerzhinsky and Ordzhonikidze, and pays special attention to the policy in the field of national languages. He proposes to return to these questions at the next Congress of Soviets and even admits that "leaving the union of Soviet socialist republics only in military and diplomatic respects, and in all other respects restoring the complete independence of individual people's commissariats." At the same time, he recalls the party's authority, that is, the role of the party and the inconsistency in the work of the apparatus to see as a lesser evil than the possible aggravation of interethnic relations. He pays special attention to the international factor, above all, on the awakening of the peoples of the East and on the example of the Soviet country, and does not allow the undermining of principled sincerity in national relations and the need to fight imperialism. Lenin concluded this note with faith in the future "when the awakened peoples oppressed by imperialism finally wake up and when a decisive, long and hard battle for their liberation begins."[29]

The note is in many ways a continuation of Lenin's previous views on the national question, but there are also some new passages in it. It is clear that he did not consider the decisions of the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR to be final and saw the need for further work on the construction of a new state. It, by no means, should have turned into a confederation, for a single party apparatus was preserved, and Lenin speaks of this in his note. He, by no means, does not speak about the destruction of the upper floor, which, as you know, was proposed by him. As regards the policy towards small nations, it will be adopted by the Party and will yield significant results in the very near future. This document will influence both concrete work on the further creation of the USSR, and the development of a theory of national relations intended not only for domestic consumption. It is no coincidence that in 1923-1924. a number of works devoted to the role of Lenin in the development of the national question. One of the leaders of the People's Commissariat for National Affairs, S. Dimanshtein, publishes a special article on Lenin's legacy on the national question even before the First World War.[30] Tovstukha publishes a collection of Lenin's writings on the national question. Stalin gives a special lecture at the Sverdlovsk University on the national question and repeatedly mentions Lenin, [31] and Rakovsky publishes a pamphlet on the creation of the USSR, also repels Lenin and proves the need for further development of Soviet statehood. [32] At the same time, a number of other works of a similar nature were published. [33]

The First Congress of Soviets of the USSR, of course, was a major event in the building of the Union of Soviet Republics, which Lenin outlined as early as 1917. In general, 1922 became decisive in the preparation and formalization of this union. Discussions were inevitable, and approaches were tried out on the fly. Not everything could be assumed in advance, and some initial settings had to be changed. The international situation, and internal affairs of a socio-economic and political nature, and the illness of V. I. Lenin, and relations at the top of the Soviet leadership, especially in connection with the possible change of the main ideologist and head of the party and government, had their impact. All this, of course, must be taken into account in further work to complete the construction of the USSR.

[1] I Congress of Soviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Verbatim report with appendices). M, 1923, p. 3.

[2] Ibid., p. 4–6.

[3] Ibid., p. 7–8.

[4] Stalin I.V. Works, V.5, p. 158.

[5] I Congress of Soviets, p. fourteen.

[6] I Congress of Soviets, p. 13.

[7] Ibid., p. 12.

[8] Rubach M.A. Ukrainian national movement, its character and driving forces (1910-February 1917) // National question on the eve and during the Great October Socialist Revolution. Issue. 1. M., 1964, p. 36–37.

[9] I Congress of Soviets, p. 16–18.

[10] Congresses of Soviets... vol. III. M., 1960, p. 16–17.

[11] On the way “to socialist unitarism”, p. 115.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Congresses of Soviets... T. III, p.20.

[14] Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, p. 238.

[15] Congresses of Soviets... Vol. III, p.21.

[16] Ibid., p. 23.

[17] I Congress of Soviets, p. 24.

[18] 1st session of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. M., 1923. In the book. I Congress of Soviets... Applications, p. 3–4.

[19] The Communist Party is the inspirer and organizer, p. 349–351.

[20] Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, p. 391.

[21] The Communist Party is the inspirer and organizer, p. 351.

[22] Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, p. 390.

[23] Trotsky archive. Communist opposition in the USSR. 1923–1927 T. 1. M., 1990, p. 74–78.

[24] Actually, for the first time, a question in this regard arose during the International Conference "Russia in the XX century" in 1993. See: Kumanev V.A., Kulikova I.S. Confrontation: Krupskaya-Stalin. M., 1994, p.58.

[25] Sakharov VA. Lenin's "Political Testament", p. 317–362.

[26] Rakovsky X. Lenin and Marx // Young Guard. M., 1924, No. 2–3, p. 442.

[27] Lenin V.I. Poln. coll. op., p. 440–441.

[28] Lenin V. I. Works. Ed. 4th. T. 33, p. 421.

[29] Lenin V.I. Poln. coll. op. T. 45, p. 356–362.

[30] Dimanstein S. Lenin and the National Question (Before the Imperialist War) // Young Guard. M., 1924, No. 2–3, p. 285–295.

[31] Stalin I. Issues of Leninism. Eleventh edition. M., 1952, p. 46–54.

[32] Rakovsky X. Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. A new stage in the Soviet union building. Kharkov, 1923.

[33] Gurevich G. S. Principles of autonomism and federalism in the Soviet system. M., 1924; Kotlyarevsky S. A. The USSR and the Union Republics. M., 1924; Palienko N. I. Confederation, federation and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. M., 1923; Ravich-Cherkassky M. Lenin and the national question. Kharkov, 1924.