Marx-Engels |  Lenin  | Stalin |  Home Page

  Selected Secret Documents from Soviet Foreign Policy Documents Archives - 1919 to 1941

Concentrated on 1st and  2nd WW Correspondence and Meetings related to Turkey, Balkans and Iran, with some additions from Afghanistan and India.

Download PDF
 

Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey A.V. Terentyev

September 5, 1939 out of line. Top secret

Saracoglu received me as soon as I informed him of my intention to talk to him.

Having listened with great attention to my statement, made strictly in accordance with your directive *, he asked me if he understood correctly the passage where it is said that Turkey had not informed the Soviet Union about the negotiations with Britain. If he understood so, then it is a mistake. I said yes, he understood correctly, since Turkey really did not timely inform the USSR about its negotiations with the British. Then Saracoglu called his secretary, who wrote down my statement in detail. After that, the minister, extremely concerned and outwardly agitated, again said that the Turkish government had informed its embassy in Moscow about everything, and that copies of the British letters had been handed over to Potemkin in Ankara. “we constantly informed Moscow about all the offers made to us by the British. In connection with the German ultimatum to Romania and the appeal of the British to the Romanians and Greeks, we informed Moscow about our proposal, just in case, that with the same appeal the

British, apparently, intend to turn to the USSR and Turkey. When Potemkin, while in Ankara, told us that the Turkish embassy in Moscow had not informed the Soviet government of the British proposals, I immediately requested an explanation from Apaydin. The latter replied that he did not get the opportunity to meet with Litvinov, instructed Karabud to inform the peopleʹs commissariat of foreign affairs about the British appeal to Turkey: ʺ

Then Saracoglu asked me if the content of the last part of my statement meant mutual assistance between the USSR and Turkey in the event that the latter fulfills its obligations. I replied that it is premature to talk about this, if only because it is necessary to know what specific obligations of Turkey are in question. Should the Anglo‐Turkish and Franco‐Turkish declarations also be regarded as obligations, although it is as if Turkey has not signed any pact with Britain and France yet. Declarations are not yet a pact or a breakdown of a treaty with definitely fixed obligations. Saracoglu replied that yes, the declaration is not a pact and the pacts with Britain and France have not really been signed yet. However, he continued, the existing declaration nevertheless imposes certain obligations on Turkey, which is also bound by the pact of the Balkan entente40. ʺonly these obligations are limited to the obligations of Turkey.ʺ

I asked Saracoglu if he had anything to tell me now about the intention of the Turkish government in connection with the current situation so that I could report this to my government. The minister replied that since the plans of the belligerents are not yet known, the Turkish government has not yet taken any decision. In speaking of this, he obviously had in mind the plans and intentions of Italy. “until now, we do not know whether Italy will really remain neutral or whether it will enter the war on the side of Germany or against it. Until Italy enters the war on the side of Germany or the members of the Balkan entente are attacked, we will not enter the war. I am sure that the war will continue for a long time, several years, the war will be big and stubborn. I am also confident that Germany will be defeated. She could have conquered Poland alone or won successes in the Balkans, but she could not cope with England and France. ʺ he draws these conclusions on the basis that England is located on the islands, has naval bases, and France is inaccessible to Germany with its Maginot line222.

I asked Saracoglu in what form the Turkish governmentʹs response to the statement I made on behalf of comrade Molotov would follow. Saracoglu replied that he, together with his colleagues in the council of ministers, would carefully study this statement and give me a written answer, preparing at the same time a certificate of the dates when they were instructed to the Turkish embassy in Moscow to inform the peopleʹs commissariat of foreign affairs about the negotiations with the British. Finally, I told Saracoglu that I would like to meet with ismet Inonu on occasion. The minister replied that he would be happy to arrange this meeting.

Saracoglu greeted me happily, because apparently he expected that I wanted to make him some message on behalf of Moscow, and to the first paragraph of the statement, which says about rumors that the Soviet government was in negotiations with Germany on a nonaggression pact even during the period of Potemkin’s stay in Turkey, Saracoglu did not react in any way. By this, in my opinion, he tacitly agreed that secret rumors in the Turkish ruling circles were indeed exaggerated. Saracoglu was especially agitated and outwardly looking depressed after my words that the Turkish government did not consider it necessary to inform the USSR in time about its negotiations with Britain and France. Saracoglu returned to my question three times, believing that there was some kind of misunderstanding. Judging by the remarks of surprise thrown to Saracoglu, it seemed to him that my words about the conspiracy being prepared with the British were new to him. Saracoglu especially carefully and asking me to repeat it twice, listened to the last part of my statement, which says that we were and will remain friends of Turkey and that with good will on both sides, we can say with confidence that we will find a common language.

It should be emphasized, however, that when it came to the straits and the Balkans, Saracoglu did not treat this as something that the Turkish government would have to grab onto immediately. I have every reason to think that Saracoglu, clearly an Anglo Francophile, has personally played and is playing a big role in bringing Turkey closer to England and France. Therefore, I assume that he is guilty of untimely information about the Anglo‐Turkish negotiations. This, perhaps, explains the proximity of Saracoglu, who in Turkey may be considered the culprit of the policy of withdrawing from the USSR and focusing exclusively on England and France.

We know for certain that among a group of old deputies there is talk condemning the policy of the Turkish government, ʺwhich too hastily exchanged declarations with the British and French, while the Turkish government had to talk with the British and French, only being at the same table with the USSR.ʺ

Terentyev

Avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 293, d. 2028, l. 137‐142