Selected Secret Documents from Soviet Foreign Policy Documents Archives - 1919 to 1941

Marx-Engels |  Lenin  | Stalin |  Home Page

  Selected Secret Documents from Soviet Foreign Policy Documents Archives - 1919 to 1941
Concentrated on 1st and  2nd WW Correspondence and Meetings related to Turkey, Balkans and Iran, with some additions from Afghanistan and India.

Download PDF
 

Recording of the conversation of the chairman of the council of peopleʹs commissars of the USSR J. V. Stalin with the heads of delegations of the Great Britain Lord W. Beaverbrook 

September 30, 1941 highly secret

Harriman delivers a note in English concluding the responses of the British and American delegations to the individual items on our list of applications, after reading this note.

Stalin: we could take 8‐10 thousand 3‐ton trucks a month. If it is impossible, then they would agree to take part 17, and 2‐t.

Harriman: I canʹt talk about the numbers right now. But we will do our best to satisfy you as much as possible.

Stalin: 4 thousand m(eter) of barbed wire a month is not enough for us. We would like to receive 10‐15 thousand tons at once. Canʹt you get now a 2‐month supply of 8 thousand m in one month?

Harriman: I canʹt promise now.

Beaverbrook: in addition to toluene, we will send you 10,000 m, but I donʹt know what month. It is an explosive substance containing toluene.

Harriman hands over a list of goods that it is desirable to receive from the USSR.

Beaverbrook: I would suggest ending the conference so that we can return to the UK and the us and there to discuss your maritime application with our governments. I want the UK to go far, very far, to have a sense of real cooperation.

Stalin: how many tankettes can you give?

Beaverbrook: 200 a month now and more then. Everything that we produce and that is not included in your applications, we will give you. You only need to tell us what you want. I am making this proposal on behalf of my government. Do you need quarter‐ton bombs?

Stalin: we would prefer half‐ton bombs.

Beaverbrook: we can offer you oxygen cylinders for 75 and 750 liters, as well as various rockets, for example, for lighting water, smoke, etc.

Stalin: we need to study all this.

Beaverbrook: you can wire me this.

Harriman: if you don’t mind, I would like to leave here a permanent representative at the embassy who would deal specifically with the supply issues and would help our ambassador in this.

Stalin: it would be very good (...]

If we have finished with this question, then I would like to say a few words about after Steinhardt. It seems to us that he is very influenced by the local foreign diplomatic missions. At the very beginning of the war, he frightened us with the fact that the Germans were supposedly plotting to send parachute troops to kidnap me and comrade Molotov. At that time, he already suggested that we evacuate the government from Moscow, as well as the embassy. He has been keeping part of his embassy in Kazan for a long time.

Harriman: I didnʹt know that. It seemed to me that Steinhardt was eager to help.

Stalin: are you satisfied with our ambassador Umansky?

Harriman: he talks too much. He addresses many people on the same matter, and as a result no one knows who is responsible for the execution. It would be better if he spoke with one person, who is responsible in each case.

There is a brief exchange of views on Maisky and Cripps, with lord Beaverbrook speaking highly of Maisky.

Harriman: I want to return to the issue I raised yesterday regarding the

Siberian airfields. Who could our general Chaney turn to?

Stalin: to general Golikov.

How is Hess doing?

Beaverbrook: I visited him on September 8th.

Stalin: is he so hospitable?

Beaverbrook: itʹs in a wired house with bars on the windows. He handed over to Mia a memorandum of 40‐50 pages, written with his own hand, where the thesis against Russia is being developed. He complained that he, who had come to save England, was being held behind bars and not even allowed to correspond with his family. He especially insists that he be allowed to communicate with Hitler. In my personal opinion, which Churchill does not share, Hess came with someoneʹs knowledge; in England he hoped to decline, to cause through his supporters a movement against the British government and then fly back. But, obviously, he was not met at the agreed place or did not give the necessary signals, the fuel ran out, and Hess had to go down by parachute. Churchill thinks Hess is insane.

We would like to do something for the Turks, they treat us with sympathy.

Stalin: it would be good so that Turkey does not go to Germany. But she doesnʹt behave like an ally of England.

Beaverbrook: they didnʹt do anything to hurt us, no trouble. They were hurt by our actions in Iraq and Iran. Helping them boils down to delivering tools you donʹt need. Yesterday I spoke about a thousand 87 lei of field guns, which would mean a lot for the Turks.

Stalin: to help, you need to have guarantees that help will not be lost. Is lord Beaverbrook sure of that? There is no union between Turkey and

England, but there is neutrality.

Beaverbrook: we would like to resurrect the union.

Stalin: this should have been a condition for help.

Beaverbrook: we canʹt complain about them. We ourselves did not fulfill some obligations.

Stalin: Turkey is afraid of Bulgaria and its alliance with Germany. Does the blockade extend to Finland?

Beaverbrook: I think weʹre ready to distribute, but I’m asking you not to rely on that answer. I could give a more accurate answer to this from England.

Stalin: Finland is behaving very impudently towards Britain’s ally ‐ the USSR. At the beginning of the war, she said that she was striving to establish the old borders, and now she behaves like a vassal of Germany.

Beaverbrook: so, you want a blockade of Finland?

Stalin: this would be a continuation of the blockade of Germany. Finland has long crossed its borders.

I once asked the president of the united states of America if he could threaten Finland to break off relations. Do you know, Herr Harriman, what followed?

Harriman: I canʹt say, but personally I think it would be politically difficult for the president.

Stalin: I think that our agreement with Britain on cooperation against Germany and on not concluding a separate peace should be turned into an alliance treaty that would cover not only the military, and about post‐war period, our government is wholly behind this.

Beaverbrook: I personally would support such a proposal and would like the issue to be raised. We have a military cabinet and a defense committee, which is responsible for the issue raised. Members of the defense committee are Churchill, Attlee, Eden, and Beaverbrook. They make certain decisions without asking the rest of the government.

Stalin: is it possible to end the conference by signing the agreement on cooperation of the three powers?

Beaverbrook: I think it would be difficult for America.

Harriman: lord Beaverbrook speaks from personal experience. You should not push the president with agreements.

Stalin: I do not press, but only ask.

Harriman: you have to understand where the president is leading his country.

Stalin: but all the same, there is a lot of ambiguity in Americaʹs position: on the one hand, it supports the belligerent England, and on the other hand, it maintains diplomatic relations with Germany.

Beaverbrook: America is doing everything it can to harm Germany. The country is very friendly towards Great Britain, but the army and navy are not so willing to part with their own supplies. Roosevelt, Hopkins and Harriman, however, are pushing through. I would like you to be as much a friend of these people as we are.

Harriman: for clarity, I will add that our fleet wants war with Germany and by all definitions of the concept of war, it is already at war, having received the order to fire on German ships. Our army is too small, but difficulties are being overcome.

Beaverbrook: from July 1, 1942, we will be delivering 375 tanks a month and 500 tanks a month from January 1, 1943. I see no reason why the us could not deliver the same quantities to you. I can promise on behalf of my government to raise the delivery of airplanes to 500 per month from July 1, and to 400 from January 1, 1943. If America gives the same quantities, then you will receive 800 per month, I repeat once again, if we produce anything in the UK that is not on your list, we are always ready to provide you with a certain percentage of products.

Stalin: we would very much like to receive trucks from America.

Do you think a press communique is necessary?

Beaverbrook and Harriman: yes.

Harriman: we are sending a military mission to China; do you have anything to say about this?

Stalin: it would be nice, but China has stopped fighting.

Harriman: are you continuing to supply china?

Stalin: no, due to our own needs we stopped supplying, but 4 months ago we sent artillery and aircraft there.

Beaverbrook: the Americans recently sent 67 bombers to china that were destined for England.

Harriman: can you say something about japan?

Stalin: when the neutrality treaty was signed, the question of aid to china was not raised at all. There is no way to tear japan away from Germany. Does America seem to be working on it? It would be nice.

Harriman: all I can say is that the UK and America have dealt with this issue a lot. We now represent a united front to make japan understand the fallacy of its relationship with the axis powers. This policy, which we have been developing since the presidentʹs meeting with Churchill, is already yielding good results.

Stalin: I have the impression that Japan is not Italy and does not want to go into slavery to Germany. Therefore, there are grounds for separating it from Germany.

A decision is made to end the conference from tomorrow and to prepare a press communique in the meantime.

Wua rf. F. 048. On. 48. P. 431. D. 10. L. 26‐31.

Publ .: Soviet‐English relations ... ‐ t. 1. ‐ p. 136‐140.