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  Selected Secret Documents from Soviet Foreign Policy Documents Archives - 1919 to 1941

Concentrated on 1st and  2nd WW Correspondence and Meetings related to Turkey, Balkans and Iran, with some additions from Afghanistan and India.

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Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic Vinogradov in the NKID of the USSR

October 12, 1940

Today I visited Menemencioglu. Having started a conversation about the situation in Romania, the secretary general said that yesterday, when presenting his credentials, the Spanish envoy told ismet Inonu that, according to his information, there are several hundred German instructors in Romania and there can be no question of any introduction of German troops there. Further, Menemencioglu read a telegram from the Turkish ambassador in Bucharest, which says that the Romanian foreign minister allegedly announced the presence of 23 thousand German soldiers in the oil regions of Romania and that this number could be doubled at the request of the Romanian government. Another telegram from Bucharest indicates that, according to a report from the German military attaché to the Turkish military attaché, 300 instructors are expected to arrive on October 13 to prepare the arrival of the German division. Corps commander Hansen is to arrive these days. The division will have to be stationed in the vicinity of Bucharest. After informing this, Menemencioglu concluded: “the actions of the Germans in Romania may have local significance, but they can be considered as strengthening strategic positions from the point of view of further prospects of German‐Italian advancement. 

* minister, director of the Yugoslav radio.

I would like to note, Menemencioglu continued, that the decline in Hitlerʹs confidence in you is characteristic of the last period. ʺ after my explanation of Soviet‐German relations, Menemencioglu said that he sees this mistrust in Germanyʹs desire to create a certain framework for the advancement of the USSR, to hinder its freedom of action. “I believe that in general, in the struggle for world domination, which Germany intends to wage, it will be difficult to avoid friction between the USSR and Germany. This goes beyond the framework of a non‐aggression pact. ʺ after my explanation of the foundations of the foreign policy of the USSR, Menemencioglu stressed that for him there was no doubt that the USSR had no aggressive plans and that the independent nature of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was indisputable. ʺthe position of neutrality that the Soviet Union has taken since the beginning of the current war has once again emphasized the independence of its policy.ʺ in this regard, Menemencioglu stressed that Turkeyʹs position is similar to that of the USSR. “although our country is bound by a pact with Englandʹ29, this pact, in essence, did not lead Turkey to the need to enter the war. One can even say that it is thanks to the pact that Turkey has so far managed to keep the peace. ʺ then Menemencioglu began to explain at length Turkeyʹs foreign policy in recent years. He began by saying that even before the war, Turkey, together with the USSR, Britain and France, discussed the issue of creating a common front against the aggressor. After the conclusion of the Soviet‐German pact, according to Menemencioglu, Turkey had three options: to be neutral, to conclude a bloc with Germany, and, finally, to conclude an alliance with Britain and France. “if Turkey chose the position of strict neutrality, it would certainly be the object of the struggle between the two camps. It should be borne in mind that the Anglo‐French bloc at the beginning of the war was very strong and we experienced great pressure on ourselves. We were also afraid that if we spoke out for maintaining neutrality, Britain and France would try to use this neutrality for purposes hostile to the USSR. Based on this, we decided to sign an agreement with England and France. It should be noted that at the conclusion of this pact, we succeeded in the most difficult diplomatic negotiations, since we managed to achieve, upon receipt of obligations of mutual assistance, the inclusion of a unilateral clause regarding the Soviet Union. The Ankara pact contains convincing proof of our friendly feelings not towards England and France, but towards the Soviet Union. Therefore, it is not clear to me why, precisely after the conclusion of the Ankara pact, a cooling began to be noticed in our relations with the USSR. I can only declare with certainty that we have never stopped and cannot stop treating the USSR with the friendliest feeling, our friendship originated in difficult moments for both our countries and has always remained at the basis of our relations. ʺ at these words of Menemencioglu, I noticed that it was not the fault of the USSR that relations between the USSR and Turkey had become cool. At the same time, I pointed out the Anti‐Soviet position of the Turkish press during the Soviet‐Finnish conflict. Menemencioglu replied that all the ambassadors were dissatisfied with the Turkish press, and first of all he himself. He also added: “I can repeat again that the alliance of Turkey with England did not in the least affect our relations with the USSR. History will show that the Turkish government has always taken great care to ensure that the USSR did not experience any trouble, especially with regard to some delicate points that the ambassador may be aware of. We have always viewed our relations with the USSR as an independent phenomenon, without linking them with our relations with other countries. The Soviet government obviously views relations with our country from the point of view of relations with other countries. I believe that in the recent period in our relations there have been a number of misunderstandings that must and can be eliminated. I can assure you that the Turkish government has the most ardent desire to make our relationship as friendly as possible. Friendship with the USSR is at the core of our foreign policy. I am deeply convinced of that. That our relationship will be the most cordial. ʺ I replied that I can only welcome this desire of the Turkish government.

The following conclusions can be drawn from recent meetings with Turkish leaders:

1.                   The Turks are now experiencing great anxiety in connection with the latest international events, and especially with the events in Romania. Foreign diplomats are also talking about this.

2.                   Obviously, this also largely explains the desire of the Turks to create the impression that there are exceptionally friendly relations between the USSR and Turkey. The amiable reception of me, the intensified assurances of friendly feelings, the incessant stream of the same outpourings in Turkish newspapers are all convincing evidence of this.

3.                   Along with this, I believe that the position of the Turkish government remains essentially wait‐and‐see. It is not yet felt that it intends to really achieve a decisive turning point in relations with our country.

Vinogradov

Avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 314, d. 2163, l. 55‐60.