Selected Secret Documents from Soviet Foreign Policy Documents Archives

Selected Secret Documents from Soviet Foreign Policy Documents Archives - 1919 to 1941

Concentrated on 1st and 2nd WW Correspondence and Meetings related to Turkey, Balkans and Iran, with some additions from Afghanistan and India.

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Note of the peopleʹs commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR to the ambassador of Turkey to the RSFSR Ali Fuad.

October 10, 1921 no. 11/5255

Mr. Ambassador,

The memorandum dated 4 august in angora and signed by commissioner Yusuf Kemal‐bey, as well as your personal letter dated 17 September no. 870, which complements it, embraces the entire political situation in general and raises a number of different issues of a very diverse nature. The need to wait for the political situation to be clarified, which became unclear due to many unexpected facts, made us delay a little in response to your message.

The essential factors of this situation are known to you: the terrible scourge of hunger, attempts by various governments to take advantage of it to the detriment of Russiaʹs interests, a new wave of intervention, expressed in the fruitless efforts of France to push Poland into Russia, and, finally, an English note on Soviet policy in the east, which is British political offensive on this basis. Soviet Russia, severely tested by the disaster that struck more than 10 provinces, is forced once again to fight against the complex and varied attacks launched in all areas by its united adversaries. The Russian workers and peasants, in strong unity under the Soviet banner, must exert all their efforts and all their energy in order to protect themselves from the new dangers that suddenly threaten Soviet Russia.

We can say with conviction that the struggle we are waging for our protection is at the same time a struggle for the cause of all oppressed peoples fighting for their existence. We can assert that the very existence of revolutionary Russia, the workers ʹand peasantsʹ republic, the natural enemy of all oppression, is the greatest trump card that peoples in distress can have. The great historical role that fell to the lot of Russia in the east is based on its policy of renouncing any attempt to fight or rule. Those who were exploited in Russia, who put an end to all domination of the exploiters, are natural friends of all peoples, exploited or oppressed by foreign rulers. The very existence of this new Russia, an indomitable enemy of all exploitation, this workers ʹand peasantsʹ Russia, whose basic principle is the absence of any oppression of man by man, is thus an indestructible rock that allows the peoples of the east to fight incessantly for their economic freedom unconditionally. The working people of Russia extend a fraternal hand to all who are fighting against the yoke imposed from outside. This policy of disinterest cannot in any way contradict the Anglo‐Russian London treaty, and England cannot reproach us for it. To the extent possible, the workers ʹand peasantsʹ government of Russia is helping the peoples of the east in strengthening their national existence, in the matter of their political and economic development, and England cannot reproach him for this either. As soon as Soviet Russia emerges from the endless difficulties with which it is still struggling, help, which it renders to the fraternal peoples who strive to have an independent existence, will become more and more significant and extensive. Our policy is built for a whole long period of history, and not for a passing moment. If our difficult situation today prohibits us from doing more, we will seize the first opportunity and the first more favorable moment to provide all the assistance that is in our power to the peoples whom, according to our principles, we must help.

The Turkish people, which are exerting all their strength to push back the advancing invader, are guided in their struggle by a different order of ideas, but they are fighting in the same way with innumerable difficulties. The deep ties that currently bind our two peoples on the basis of great historical principles that find expression in their struggles make us emphasize the constant contact between our governments. The proposal expressed in the memorandum of august 4, supplemented by your letter of September 17, and which consists in a joint study of all aspects of the present political situation, is, of course, accepted with pleasure. What the Turkish government offers us amounts to, so to speak, supplementing the Moscow treaty with permanent negotiations on all issues.

We also regard as highly desirable periodic discussions by our two governments of everything that may interest them in relation to the political life of the moment. This real cooperation between us, using your own expression, can only contribute to a greater extent to the development of friendly relations that bind us, and to the satisfaction of the interests of our peoples. To make a common decision on all current issues ‐ this is what the principle of a friendly policy that unites us should be. This incessant exchange of views will also enable the Turkish government to take into account the dangers and difficulties that we must overcome. All the obligations imposed on Russia by the Moscow treaty will, of course, be fully fulfilled by it, but the Russian government is ready and decided to go even further, than the obligation of the treaty as soon as the position in which it is located will allow it. In the very near future, we are confident of this, we will improve this situation enough to go beyond the precise expression of our obligations.

The question of the straits is, without any doubt, one of those questions that interests the Soviet government most of all in the general plan of world politics. Our two governments have come to an agreement on this issue on a single program, which was expressed in our Moscow treaty, and if today this program is still ideal for us, then the day is near when we will overcome our difficulties enough to be able to undertake it. Practical implementation. Our relations with Romania are only indirectly related to the question of the straits. At one time there were fears that Romania would take an active part in the struggle waged in Asia minor against the freedom of the Turkish people. The Russian government proved then, by terminating the negotiations on the Dniester, that it fully took into account this new element in its relations with Romania. These fears, however, turned out to be only transitory, and at present the Soviet government was able to resume the general course of negotiations with Romania, which it has been conducting in one form or another for a long time, without causing the slightest damage to the interests of the fraternal Turkish people.

Mesopotamia, where British forces are directly involved, is one of the areas in which the Anglo‐Russian treaty comes into effect immediately, but the Russian people and the government are considering with the greatest care and with the greatest sympathy the general position of the Muslim peoples, whose independence is under threat. ... The Russian people are deeply concerned about the possibility of abuse of the Muslim religious idea to harm the vital interests of the Muslim peoples themselves. We think that the most effective way to protect oneself from this danger would be to oppose the religious idea with the idea of a national movement, which sets a definite goal of satisfying the basic vital needs of these nationalities.

The Turkish government has linked some exaggerated concerns to the presence of Turkish political figures in Russia who do not belong to the ruling party of the grand national assembly. I can categorically declare to you and decisively refute any contrary statement that no assistance or assistance was provided by the Russian government to political persons or political movements hostile to the present government of Turkey. Strictly adhering to the principle of non‐interference in the internal affairs of Turkey, we believe that the struggle of the parties in the grand national assembly does not interest us.

As for the fears of the Turkish government regarding fictitious troop movements in the Caucasian republics or fictitious aspirations hostile to Turkey on the part of these republics or even the Russian government, I declare to you on behalf of the Russian government that they are completely devoid of any foundation. Leaving aside Russiaʹs predicament, the basic principles of our policy are incompatible with any movement, hostile or offensive towards the Turkish people, which is fighting against foreign invasion and oppression, a movement that would, moreover, be in contradiction with the Moscow a treaty which the Russian government has signed and will unswervingly observe with perfect fidelity. If some agents of the government violate the principles arising from the treaty,

All rumors about negotiations between Russia and Greece are also groundless. The Greek government, through some of its ministers, proposed to Russia to start negotiations on the resumption of relations and on repatriation, but the Russian government did nothing on this matter without consulting the Turkish government, and it was in accordance with your opinion, Mr. Ambassador, that we refused to give a go. Suggestions.

In this permanent cooperation, which we have established, the agreement between Turkey and the Caucasian republics, which is to be signed in Kars * in the near future, will be an extra element for the consolidation and strengthening of our friendly relations. All issues of this policy must be clarified between us, and at the moment when the Kars treaty forms new ties between Turkey and Soviet Russia, we think all the more that we are allowed, based on the mutual obligations assumed, to ask the Turkish government to inform us about what is the agreement that has just been concluded in angora with the representative of France ¹... The merciless hostility of the French government towards the Soviet republics compels us, of necessity, to view with apprehension the secret relations (negotiations) of the Turkish government with France, since the nature of these agreements has not been revealed to us. Thus, we will accept, with the deepest gratitude, Mr. Ambassador, the explanations that you will no doubt give us on this matter.

Please accept, Mr. Ambassador, the sincere assurance of my deepest respect.

[Chicherin]

Printed by architect.

In the mentioned memorandum of august 4, 1921, in particular, it was said:

“at this moment, which it considers decisive both for itself and for the entire eastern world, the government of the Turkish grand national assembly, convinced of the need to give a definitive direction to its political orientation, appeals to the government of the Russian socialist federative Soviet republic with an offer of its cooperation in all issues where the goals and interests of both governments are close enough to be considered identical. The present moment is chosen for the renewal of our proposal because we think that we are on the eve of very big events of the international order. [...]

In making this offer to you, we, of course, are by no means going to demand from one of the parties to sacrifice any principles for which it is fighting; we only want to jointly consider all world issues in which the parties may have common interests, and that they agree on a sheaf of actions in order to present a united front against imperialism and capitalism of the western powers in accordance with the spirit of the preamble and article 4 of the Moscow treaty. Our conviction, which we have already expressed several times, is that the capitalist regime will be overthrown in the west and, consequently, the Soviet regime will remain in Russia, and also that the eastern peoples will be liberated from the yoke of imperialism only if the current governments Russia and Turkey will form a bloc against western governments who, despite the divergence of their world interests, as well as the difference in the positions they hold in relation to each of us, they are essentially our irreconcilable enemies. G‐‐]

Believing that in Moscow the international situation is assessed in approximately the same way, I consider it useful to indicate in general terms the main issues on which an agreement between us would be necessary. These questions are as follows:

First, help with weapons and money that we expect from Russia. I take this opportunity to express my gratitude for the weapons that have already been sent and are being supplied. But our unyielding will to conquer and throw our enemies into the sea, which your plenipotentiary representative in our city has probably already informed you of, compels us to undertake a new very large effort in armament. In addition, recruiting recruits requires a lot of weapons and large sums of money. Therefore, I would be grateful to you if you would deign to take into account the requests that we have presented to you and are presenting at the present time both through Mr. Natsarenus and Ali Fuad pasha. I consider it necessary to draw your attention in particular to the question of financial assistance, which we urgently need. On this occasion, let me say that the promised amount of 10,000,000 rubles in gold, which, as you told me, could be provided immediately, has not yet been received in full, despite repeated requests. [...]

Second, the question of the straits to be posed. The Russian government, naturally, is aware of the advances made by Britain to Romania in order to enlist her assistance in protecting the straits. On the other hand, similar attempts took place in Belgrade in order to attract the Yugoslav kingdom to put pressure on Bulgaria in order to prevent it from attacking Greece if necessary. Under these circumstances, we would be happy to know to what extent Russia could facilitate diplomatic or other means of enforcing art. 5 of the Moscow treaty. You can easily admit that Russia itself is highly interested in resolving the issue of the straits so as to ensure the independence and security of Turkey.

Third, the question of Mesopotamia. The London government pursues a variety of goals in this country, the most important of which are: a) the creation of a barrier to protect India, b) the exploitation of Mosul oil, c) in order to ensure the safety of this exploitation ‐ the creation of one or several small states between Mesopotamia and the black sea, placed under British tutelage; as Armenia, which was intended for this role, is out of the question at present. England is trying to use for the same purpose, among other things, unsuccessfully, Kurdish gangs led by crooks; d) strengthening the power of the family of Hussein, king of Hejaz, patronized by the British, both of whose sons are called to reign over Mesopotamia and Transjordan.

In this regard, we consider it our duty to insist on the fact that if in the east religious thought were opposed, as a result of the seizure of the caliphate by the British, national thought, then the national and liberation movements of the eastern peoples would be opposed, and these peoples could even be used for in order to renew the attempts made by the forces of national emancipation and the world proletariat in order to create a new social system, we ask on this occasion the Moscow government to inform us about how it views all these various possibilities and to what extent it could with us to cooperate in order to prevent the aims pursued by England in Mesopotamia.

Fourth, the question of central and east Asia. The secret negotiations, begun between England, America and japan and which should serve as a prologue to the Washington conference, are aimed at concluding an agreement, the main provisions of which appear to be as follows: Mongolia, Manchuria, Shandong and eastern Siberia are left to Japanese influence; America receives its zone in the southeastern provinces of china and unconditionally recognizes the British mandate in Mesopotamia. For its part, England gains freedom of action and expands its influence on Chinese Turkestan, which in past centuries has always served as a gateway to the invasion of India. We believe we will be wise to prepare in advance for all of these opportunities.

These are the main points on which, in our opinion, a quick agreement between us would be very useful. On the other hand, it would be quite clear that we are ready to consider in the most careful way all the questions that the Russian government could offer us, as well as all the wishes that it could express as to what it would expect from us in exchange for any kind of assistance rendered to us in resolving issues that might be offered to us. We hope that the frankness and frankness with which we address the Soviet republic will be appreciated and that on the eve of the resumption of negotiations on the settlement of the eastern question, we will be able to lay solid foundations for a RussianTurkish agreement, without which there would have been a chance of success in the attempts of the western powers to defeat us one by one.

...

We also hope that quick aid in arms and money will not be a bargaining chip at a time when our enemies are about to attempt, through important concessions, to force us to abandon some of our goals.

In conclusion, I would be sinning against the frankness that I have shown if I did not point out circumstances that, if left unchecked, could seriously damage our good relations. These circumstances are as follows:

First, support, apparently, provided in Moscow to some deposed careerists who, hiding abroad at the most critical moment in the countryʹs history, intrigue against us and want to return to the country as winners.

Secondly, the anxiety that some Soviet agents in the Caucasus are causing us, and, mainly, the preparations that we think are taking place in Georgia, preparations even more intensified since the beginning of the Greek offensive.

Thirdly, rumors about the upcoming Russian‐Greek trade negotiations. We consider it our duty to declare on this occasion that such negotiations would have made a painful impression on Turkish public opinion, especially since such negotiations would not make sense, since the benefits that they would give Russia would be insignificant, whereas king Constantine saw it would be an encouragement to act as a mercenary, placing the Greek people at the service of British imperialism.

Waiting for an early reply, I ask you, Mr. Commissioner, to accept the assurances of my deepest respect. ʺ

*cm. Doc. No. 264

¹ from September 20, 1921, Franco‐Turkish negotiations on militarypolitical and economic issues took place in Ankara. During these negotiations, French representative franklin‐bouillon tried to persuade Turkey to break off friendly relations with Soviet Russia and to draw closer to the imperialist powers.

Franco‐Turkish negotiations ended on October 20, 1921 with the signing of an agreement that ended hostilities between the two countries, determined the border between Turkey and Syria, which was under the protectorate of France, provided for the evacuation of French troops from Cilicia within two months, and also contained resolutions on the issue of Alexandretta Sandjak, on the railway and other concessions granted by Turkey to France.

Having made some concessions to Turkey at the conclusion of the Ankara agreement, France intended to involve it in the mainstream of an active Anti‐Soviet policy.

There were serious disagreements in the Turkish ruling circles over the direction of Turkeyʹs foreign policy.

However, during this period, the Turkish government refused to support the aggressive plans of the imperialist powers.

On November 15, 1921, the Turkish ambassador to Moscow, Ali Fuad, sent a note to Chicherin stating that the Franco‐Turkish agreement of October 20, 1921 “does not contain a single thesis, not a single clause that could to shake the spirit and letter of the Russian‐Turkish treaty of friendship concluded in Moscow or to contradict them in any way. My government adds that neither the Franco‐Turkish agreement, nor any other agreement that it may conclude, will never be of such a nature as to damage the policy of friendship and cordiality, the beginning of which the Russian and Turkish peoples and their governments laid the

Moscow and Kars treaties ʺ.

On December 26, 1921, during the stay in Turkey of the extraordinary embassy of the Ukrainian SSR, headed by m. V. Frunze (see note 48), Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) assured m. V. Frunze that there is no whatever secret clauses of the agreement with France, unknown to you, ʺhe also noted thatʺ the entire national assembly, with the exception of individual individuals, firmly intends to firmly adhere to the alliance with Russia ʺand thatʺ without reliance on Russia we cannot imagine a healthy Turkish policy ʺ ...